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A31706 The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.; De bello civili. English Caesar, Julius.; Edmondes, Clement, Sir, 1566 or 7-1622. Observations upon Caesars commentaries of the civil warres.; Hirtius, Aulus. De bello Gallico. Liber 8. English.; Edmondes, Clement, Sir, 1566 or 7-1622. Manner of our modern training or tactick practise.; Caesar, Julius. De bello Gallico. English. 1655 (1655) Wing C199; ESTC R17666 660,153 403

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in the rere who as in his proper place seeth all things executed accordingly as the Captain shall command It shall be unpossible to performe any thing herein unlesse first every one do exactly observe his leader and his sideman and to this purpose it is often commanded Keep your files Keep your ranks Of Marches IN champains there needs no great labour to marshall particular troups for their after-marches because they may march either by whole divisions observing onely their course of indifferency that every division may every third day have the vantgard or else in such form and fashion as the Generall hath proposed for a day of battell according as the danger of an expected enemy shall give occasion But because all countries will not afford a champain for the marching of an army and therefore not possible to march far with many troups in front nor many files of any one troup or division by reason of often straights and passages betwixt hills woods or waters It is provided though by long induction the whole army shall be extended into a thin length and few files yet the souldiers well disposed shall be as readily able to defend themselves and offend the enemy on their flanks from whence only in such streights the danger is imminent as if they were to affront an enemy with an entire battallion in a champain country First therefore a division or Battallion being ordered and drawn before the Quarter into one even front of just files ten in depth the musketiers equally divided on the right and left slanks of the pikes all standing in their order that is to ●ay six feet distant in files and ranks the Captain carefully provideth that the first fifth sixth and tenth ranks be alwayes well filled and furnished with his most able and best-armed souldiers Which done he commandeth first the middlemen or half files to come a front with their leaders so that the division becometh but five in depth Next he commandeth to turn faces to the right or left hand as direction shall be to march from that quarter and so the whole division resteth ready in his fashion to march five in front the one half of the musketiers in the vantguard and the other in the rere the pikes in the battell and both flanks well furnished with the ablest best men to offend or defend as there shall be occasion that is to say the right flanks with the first and fifth ranks and the left with the sixth and tenth ranks If occasion afterwards shall be given of a halt in a champain or before the quartering the Captain commandeth first unto all they being first closed into their order Faces as you were next unto the half files Faces about and march out and fall again upon your files By which means the division becometh again reduced into the same front and fashion from whence it was first transformed ready to encounter an enemy or to be drawn into the Quarter When pikes are to charge pikes in a champain it useth to be performed two severall wayes First the whole division being commanded into their close order the five first ranks charging their pikes every follower over his leaders shoulder directeth his pike as equally as he can the first rank shall have three feet of his pike over the formost shoulder The other five ranks with their pikes advanced follow close up in the rere either ready to second the formost or to be employed in the rere as occasion shall be offered Otherwise and most usuall when the whole depth of the files throughout the division shall charge together all fast locked and united together and therefore most able to make the strongest shock offensive or defensive provided alwaies that none mingle their pikes in others files but the whole file one in anothers shoulder In charging with musketiers it is observed no way convenient that there should be too many in a rank or that the ranks should be too long For the first rank is commanded to advance ten paces before the second and then to discharge and wheeling either to the right or left hand falleth into the rere and so the second advancing to the same distance dischargeth and wheeleth as before and likewise the third and so forward as long as the Officer shall be commanded Which shall not so well be performed the ranks being extraordinary long because it will require so long a time to wheel from the front that the second may succeed unlesse by direction the rank may divide it self the one half to the right hand and the other to the left in wheeling to the rere In the retreat the whole ranks having turned their faces about are to march three or four paces forward their chief officer coming in the rere first commandeth the last rank to make ready and then to turn faces about discharge and wheel about to the head or front of the division and being clearly passed the next rank to perform as much and so the rest in order Where the passages are narrow and the division cannot come to charge in front as between two waters or woods the manner of charging is different for there being five or ten files led in the induction that file which flanketh the enemy dischargeth first onely and the rest marching continually forwards it standeth firm untill the last rank be passed and then sleeveth it self on the left flank and makes ready and so the second file and the third so long as the enemy shall continue there being a continuall discharging by files as before by ranks Unlesse it be in the pases of Ireland meeting with an irregular enemy where they use to intermingle their files of shot with pikes that the one may be a defence for the other when the enemy shall come up to the sword as they use there very often How directions are delivered in the warres ALl directions in the wars have ever been delivered either by signes subject to the eye by word of mouth or the sound of a drumme or some such warlike instrument Concerning those visible signes displayed unto the souldiers the falling of mists the raising of dust showers of rain snow the beams of the Sun hilly uneven and crooked passages by long experience have found them to be most doubtfull and uncertain as also because as it was a matter of great difficulty to invent different signes upon all sodain occasions so it is almost an impossibility that the common souldier who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the understanding of plain words distinctly pronounced should both apprehend and understand sodainly and execute directly the true sense and meaning of his Commanders signes The Drum and Trumpet are yet used But because many different sounds are not easily distinguished in souldiers understanding without some danger of confusion we onely command by the inarticulate sounds to arm to march to troup to
may be furnished with the next most sufficient men both because of their nearnesse unto danger as also that if their leaders or bringers up shall either be slain or disabled by wounds they may presently succeed in their places and make them good There is also a good decorum to be observed in the middlemen or fifth and sixth ranks both for the men themselves and their armes that in our marches when the middlemen or sixth ranks shall be called up to front with their leaders they may in some sort and proportion answer their places as also when we double our front by calling up middlemen to fight in a greater breadth they may not be unsutable but especially in marches that they may be able to make the best resistance when they shall become the flanks of the Battallions As these respects ought to be observed in ranks so the files also are not without their different degrees of dignity As the leader of the right-hand file is accounted to have the first place of honour in the Battallion for he doth not onely lead the rest in his own file but he is the author and beginner of the motions of the whole Battallion The leader of the left-hand file hath the next place because that he with the leader of the right-hand file do alwaies in their marching and imbattelling rectifie or rank the whole front of the battallion and so consequently all the next of their files as they stand in order even untill the middle who are accounted the last in dignity The Battallion being thus disposed into files and ranks and each file and rank according to his worth and experience rightly advanced it followeth that there should be a just distance proportioned between either that at all times upon all occasions they might be found ready and in comeliest fashion either to offend their enemy or defend themselves These distances which every follower must observe in respect of his leader and every leader and follower in respect of the sidemen may be reduced unto three severall Orders as followeth The first is called open Order the distance whereof is twelve foot between every follower and his leader or between every rank and six foot between them and the sidemen or between every file This order is commonly used upon marches when the enemy is known to be farre off as also in private exercising of souldiers for their severall managing of their armes It differeth somewhat from the Ordinatus Miles amongst the Romans who alwayes observed but four cubits in files and ranks The second distance is called Order when we contract the battallion both in length and breadth and gather the souldiers within a nearer scantling both in files and ranks that is by observing six feet in their files between the follower and leader and three feet between the ranks or sidemen This distance is used when we march toward an enemy near at hand or in marches by reason of the opportunity of the place suspiciously dangerous This is also near unto Densatus ordo but onely that that was but two cubits in both files and ranks The third and last order is when either we attend the enemy his present assault or that we intend to charge him upon our securest and best distance when every follower standeth three feet or his rapier length behind his leader and a foot and a half from the sidemen or files or when every souldier occupieth but one foot and a half for his own station joyning pouldron to pouldron or target to target This differeth from Constipatus ordo because that alloweth but one cubit for files and ranks and this close order alloweth one cubit in the file but two in the ranks This distance doth agree also best with the length of our piles of 15 or 16 feet long For it is thought fit oftentimes that the battallion consisting of ten ranks there should not charge more at one time then the 5 formost so that the pikes of the fifth rank might be three foot over the formost shoulder and the other five ranks should in this close order or nearer if it be possible follow the other charging with their pikes advanced untill some occasion should require their charge In the mean time they should perform their dutie in keeping the five formost ranks from retiring and besides adde strength unto the charge or shock The manner of exercising of composed Battallions with their different motions THe files and ranks being thus understood disposed and ordered and all parts and members of the battallion being joyned in their just proportion and distance able and fit to be altered upon any sodain occasion as if it were but one entire body into severall and divers postures and to make resistance unto what forces soever shall oppugne the same it might be thought needlesse to have made the disposition of the members so exact unlesse by continuall practise and exercise they might be made nimble and ready not onely to defend themselves and their whole body on all sides but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of advantage The terms of direction or command which are commonly used in this modern discipline of martiall exercise as they are not many onely answering to the different postures which are required in the Battallion so they are and must be short and perspicuously plain that by this means being sodainly uttered easily apprehended and understood they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commanded First therefore that the Battallion may be commanded into some one fashion or posture from whence it shall be fit to convert it self into all other the Captain or Officer shall bid them stand in front When every particular souldier composing himself after his foremost leader standeth comely in file and rank fronting unto some certain place or to the Captain as shall be thought best for the present In this and all other directions whatsoever it shall be especially observed that every follower attending what is commanded mark his next leader and accordingly move himself as he shall see him move first The Battallion therefore thus fronting if the enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left flank it shall be commanded to turn faces to the right or left hand when every souldier observing his leader shall turn his face and make his flank his front according to the direction There is also a doubled motion or declination to the right or left hand when every souldier observing his leader shall turn their bodies twice to the right or left hand and by that means become turned with their faces where their backs were as if they expected an enemy in the rere or being to perform some other motion that may be offered beginning this alteration from the right or left hand as shall be commanded As every particular souldier in the troup is
least of his vertues yet argu'd some conscience of his own weaknesse at this time For he was extreamly perplex'd that the other part of his Army was not come in so much that he embarqued in a Brigandine disguized to fetch them Having pass'd down the River the sea was so tempestuous that the master of the vessell would not adventure out whereupon as it is said Caesar discovered himself and said to him Friend thou carriest Caesar and his fortune Whereat the master being encourag'd ventur'd out into the sea but the Tempest was so violent that it brought Caesar back again This action of his was like to have rais'd a mutiny in his Army as a thing which though it spoke courage yet was a stranger to discretion which it may be is the reason that Caesar hath made no mention of it in his Commentaries But some few dayes after Antonius arrives with four Legions of the remaining part of the Army and sends back the ships for the rest These joyning with Caesar there past divers skirmishes and pickeerings being so nearly lodg'd between both Armies but that which was most remarkable was near the City of Dyrrachium wherein Caesar's Troups were so routed that no threats or entreaties could stay them from running to their Camp which though fortifi'd yet was abandon'd by some Pompey in the mean time either out of fear that the slight might be feigned and in order to some ambush or that he thought Caesar sufficiently conquer'd doth not prosecute the victory Which weaknesse in him Caesar dissembled not when afterwards he said to his men that that day had ended the war if the enemy had had a Captain that knew how to overcome But Caesar as no Prosperity disorder'd him so in Adversity he had a courage and such a confidence of Fortune that he was nothing cast down He lost in that engagement besides the Common-Souldiery 400 Roman Knights 10 Tribunes and 32 Centurions with as many Colours This successe obtained Pompey sends the news of it into all parts of the world so advantageously to himself as if Caesar were utterly routed who though he did not decline fighting yet thought it not policy to engage his men lately worsted though indeed exasperated with shame and indignation at their losse with those that were animated and flesh'd with a victory He therefore disposes his maimed men into Apollonia and in the night takes his way towards Thessaly both to hearten and refresh his Army as also to draw the enemy further from the Sea-coast where his main force and all his provisions lay or at least to meet with Scipio who he had intelligence was to join with Pompey This unexpected departure of Caesar's brought Pompey almost to a Resolution to return into Italy to recover that with France and Spain and afterwards to meet with Caesar But the Roman Lords that were about him a sort of proud insolent indisciplinable people who indeed prov'd his ruine disswaded him and caused him to alter his design and so he fell upon the hot pursuit of Caesar who making a stay in the fields of Pharsalia till that his men had reassumed their courage and resolution was now willing and eager to fight But Pompey perceiving this readiness of Caesar to proceed from want of Provision and a fear his Army should diminish purposely avoided fighting and would have prolong'd the warre and so have defeated his enemy without hazzarding his own Army But the murmurings mutinyes and importunity of those that were about him had such a prevailing influence over him as Plutarch Lucan and Caesar himself acknowledgeth that they forced him contrary to his intentions and policy to give Battell which was such that all the flower and force of Rome was engaged in it Caesar's Army according to the computation of most writers amounted to half Pompey's but in compensation his men were more active and versed in warre and knew their advantages whereas the other 's was a tumultuary sort of people raked together besides what Romans he had The exact number of both these Armies is not agreed on by Authors some raise them to 300000. of which opinion was Florus others bring them down to 70000. But if we agree with Appianus we must conceive that so many countries and nations having sent in their assistances on either side there must needs be vast Armies on both sides and therefore those who pitched upon the lesser number meant onely the number of Romans who were the maine force and hope of both Generalls But here we may make a strange remark upon the uncertain events of warre We have two of the greatest Captains that ever were the stoutest Armies that ever met such as experience force and valour was equally divided between and to be short the most exasperated parties that could be and yet it proved but a very short sight so weak is the confidence and assurance that is onely placed in number We may further note the strange influence of Religion upon Mankind in general in that it enforces man in the greatest exigencies to consultation for Pompey met with divers things that might somewhat have informed him of the successe of that famous Battel The running away of the beasts destined for Sacrifice the swarming of bees the sky darkned and his own fatall dream of being in mourning in the Theatre seconded by his appearance in the head of his main Battel the next day in a black robe which might signifie he mourned for the liberty of Rome beforehand Being both resolved to give Battel they put their Armies in such order as they thought fit and harangued their Souldiers according to their severall pretences In the beginning Pompey's horse consisting most of the Roman Gentry and Nobility prevailed over Caesar's and made them give ground which he perceiving causes a Battalion set apart for that purpose to charge them with order to aime altogether at the face which Pompey's horse not able or not willing to endure began to retreat and so made way for the totall overthrow by which means the foot being discourag'd and seeing Caesar's horse falling on the Victory was soon decided on Caesar's side Pompey flying to his camp and leaving the field to his adversary Here was the greatest misfortune of Pompey to out-live the Liberty of his Country which he pretended so much to fight for and his own glory in this Battell being forc'd to a dishonourable flight and to deliberate whither he should retire whether into Parthia Africk or Aegypt Caesar being thus Master of the field and meeting with no opposition falls upon Pompey's camp which without any great difficulty he entered Whereupon Pompey disguizing himself takes up the first horse he met and with four more his own Son Sextus Pompeius the two Lentuli and Favonius makes his escape and stayes not till he came to Larissa where meeting with some of his own horse who were in the same condition of running away he continued his flight till he came to the
to sustain the charge of the Enemy and in the mean time in the midst of the hill made a triple battell of four legions of old souldiers and upon the highest ridge thereof he placed the two legions which he had lately inrolled in the hither Gallia together with the associate forces filling the whole front of the hill with men and stowing the carriages in one place which he commanded to be fenced and guarded by those that were in the uppermost battalions The Helvetians on the other side conveyed their carriages and impediments into one place and having beaten back Caesars horsemen with a thick thronged Squadron they put themselves into a Phalanx and so pressed under the first battell of the Roman legions THE FIRST OBSERVATION COncerning the true sense of this triple battel which Caesar made upon the side of the hill I understand it according to the ancient custome of the Romans who in the infancy of their Military discipline divided their Army into three sorts of souldiers Hastati Principles and Triarii for I omit the Velites as no part of their standing battels and of these they made three severall battels from front to back In the first battel were the Hastati and they possessed the whole front of the Army and were called Acies prima Behind these in a convenient distance stood the Principes in like sort and order disposed and were called Acies secunda And lastly in a like correspondent distance were the Triarii imbattelled and made Aciem tertiam Their legion consisted of ten Companies which they called Cohorts and every Cohort consisted of three small Companies which they named Manipuli a maniple of the Hastati a maniple of the Principes and another of the Triarii as I will more particularly set down in the second book And as these three kinds of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to back so was every battel divided into his maniples and these were divided by little allies and wayes one from another which were used to this purpose The Hastati being in front did ever begin the battel and if they found themselves too weak to repell the enemy or were happily forced to a retreat they drew themselves through these allies or distances which were in the second battel between the maniples of the Principes into the space which was between the Principes and the Triarii and there they rested themselves whilst the Princepes took their place and charged the Enemy Or otherwise if the Commanders found it needfull they filled up those distances of the Principes and so united with them into one body they charged the enemy all in grosse and then if they prevailed not they retired into the spaces between the Triarii and so they gave the last assault all the three bodies being joyned into one Now if we examine by the current of the history whether Caesar observed the same order and division in his wars we shall find little or no alteration at all for first this triplex Acies here mentioned was no other thing but the division of the Hastati Principes and Triarii according to the manner of the first institution And least any man should dream of that ordinary division which is likewise threefold the two cornets and the battel and in that sense he might say to have made triplicem Aciem let him understand that the circumstances of the division have no coherence with that division for in that he saith of the Helve●●ans successerunt sub Aciem primam they pressed near the first battel or Vangard he maketh it clear that the Army was divided into a triple battel from front to back for otherwise he would have said successerunt sub dextrum aut sinistrum cornu aut mediam Aciem for so were the parts of that division termed Again in the retreat which the Helvetians made to the hill when he saith that the first and second battel followed close upon the enemy and the third opposed it self against the Boii and Tulingi and stood ready at the foot of the hill to charge the legions in the stank and on the back it is manifest that no other division can so fitly be applied to this circumstance as that from front to back But that place in the first of the Civill wars taketh away all scruple of controversy where he useth the very same terms of prima secunda and tertia Acies forbeing to encamp himself near unto Afranius and fearing least his souldiers should be interrupted in their work he caused the first and second battel to stand in Arms and keep their distance to the end they might shroud and cover the third battel which was imploied in making a ditch behind them from the view of the enemy and this kind of imbattelling Caesar observed in most of his fights by which it appeareth that he used the very same order and discipline for imbattelling as was instituted by the old Romans Concerning the ancient names of Hastati Principes and Triarii which Ramus in his Militia Julii Caesaris urgeth to be omitted throughout the whole history I grant they are seldome used in these Commentaries in the sense of their first institution for the Haestati when the discipline was first erected were the youngest poorest of the legionary souldiers and the Principes were the lusty and able-bodied men and the Triarii the eldest and best experienced But in Caesars Camp there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares between the Hastati Principes and Triarii which he nameth Prima Secunda and Tertia Acies and therefore they were never termed by those names in respect of that difference Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline that vertue might be rewarded with honour and that time might challenge the priviledge of a more worthy place the said distinctions and terms were religiously observed For in the battel with Petreius at Ilerda in Spain he mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius ex primo Hastato legionis quart aedecimae and in the overthrow at Dyrrachium he saith that the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded commended the safety of his Ensigne to the horsemen all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain praeter Principem priorem And for the Triarii there is no term more frequent in Caesar then Primipilus which name by the rules of the ancient discipline was given to none but to the chiefest Centurion of the first maniple of the Triarii whereby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction although peradventure the Hastati were as good souldiers as either the Principes or the Triarii As touching the spaces between the maniples whereinto the first battel did retire it self if occasion urged them I never found any mention of them in Caesar excepting once here in England where in a skirmish the Britans so urged the court of guard which kept watch before the Roman Camp that Caesar
sent out two other Cohorts to succour them who making distance between them as they stood the court of guard retired it self in safety through that space into the Camp Otherwise we never find that the first battel made any retreat into the allies between the maniples of the second battel but when it failed in any part the second and third went presently to second them as appeareth in the battel following with Ariovistus and in divers others Concerning the use of this triple battel what can be said more then Lipsius hath done where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof as far forth as a speculative judgement can discern of things so far remote from the use of this age which never imitateth this triple battel but only in a march for then commonly they make three companies a Vangard a Battel and a Rereward but in imbattelling they draw these three Companies all in front making two cornets and the battel without any other troups to second them But let this suffice concerning Caesar his manner of imbattelling and his triplex Acies untill I come to the second book where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion and the commondity of their small battalions THE SECOND OBSERVATION THe Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square battel of Pikemen consisting of sixteen in flank and five hundred in front the souldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the front of the battel the rest whose pikes were not serviceable by reason of their distance from the front couched them upon the shoulders of those that stood before them and so locking them in together in file pressed forward to hold up the sway or giving back 〈◊〉 the former ranks and so to make the assault more violent and unresistable The Graecians were very skilful in this part of the Art Militarie which containeth order and disposition in imbattelling for they maintained publick professours whom they called Tactici to teach and instruct their youth the practise and Art of all formes convenient for that purpose And these Tactici found by experience that sixteen in flank so ordered as they were in a Phalanx were able to bear any shock how violent so ever it charged upon them Which number of sixteen they made to consist of four doubles as first unitie maketh no order for order consisteth in number and pluralitie but unitie doubled maketh two the least of all orders and this is the double which doubled again maketh the second order of four souldiers in a file which doubled the third time maketh eight and this doubled maketh 16 which is the fourth doubling from a unite and in it they staied as in an absolute number and square whose root is four the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes For every one of these places the Tactici had severall names by which they were distinctly known But the particular description requireth a larger discourse then can be comprehended in these short observations He that desireth further knowledge of them may read Aelianus that lived in the time of Adrian the Emperour and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great with Mauritius and Leo Imperator where he shall have the divisions of Tetraphalangia Diphalangia Phalangia unto a unite with all the discipline of the Grecians The chiefest thing to be observed is that the Grecians having such skill in imbattelling preferred a Phalanx before all other formes whatsoever either because the figure in it self was very strong or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons which were long pikes and targets But whether Caesar termed the battell of the Helvetians a Phalanx in regard of their thick manner of imbattelling onely or otherwise forasmuch as besides the form they used the naturall weapon of a Phalanx which was the pike it remaineth doubtfull Brancatio in his discourses upon this place maketh it no controversie but that every souldier carried a pike and a target The target is particularly named in this historie but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same that their offensive weapons were pikes In the fight at the baggage it is said that many of the legionarie shouldiers were wounded through the cart-wheeles with tragulae and materae which are commonly interpreted Speares and Javelins and I take them to be weapons longer then common darts but whether they were so long as the Sarissas of the Macedonians I cannot tell Howsoever this is certain that the Helvetians have ever been reputed for the true Phalangitae next unto the Macedonians and that in their thick and close imbattelling they failed not at this time of the form of a Phalanx for they roofed it so thick with targets that Caesar saith they were sore troubled because many of their targets were fastened and tied together with piles darted through them Which argueth that their Phalanx was very thick thronged whatsoever their weapon was Chap. VIII Caesar sendeth away all the horses of ease exhorteth his men and beginneth the battell CAesar to take away all hope of safety by flight first caused his own and then all the private horses of ease to be carried out of sight and so using some motives of courage began the battel The souldiers casting their Piles with the advantage of the hill did easily break the Helvetians Phalanx and then with their swords betook themselves to a furious close THE FIRST OBSERVATION THe ancient Sages found it necessary to a faithfull and serious execution of such an action to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement and to take away all scruple out of their conceits either of the unlawfulnesse of the cause or disadvantage against the Enemie for if at any time that saying be true that Oratio plus potest quam pecunia it is here more powerfull and of greater effect For a donative or liberanza can but procure a mercenarie endeavour ever yielding to a better offer and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong even amongst those that are willingly inriched with them and so maketh them slack to discharge their service with loyaltie yea oftentimes of friends to become enemies But inasmuch as speech discloseth the secrets of the soul and discovereth the intent and drift of every action a few good words laying open the injurie which is offered to innocencie how equity is controlled with wrong and justice controlled by iniquitie for it is necessary that a Commander approve his Cause and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his souldiers as it is easie to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their bloud when indeed every man relieth upon anothers knowledge and respecteth nothing lesse the right a few good words I say will so stirre up their minds in the ferventnesse of the cause that every man will take himself particularly ingaged in the action by the title of Equitie and the rather
his due and proper composition What then is the cause that the Romans do overcome and that those that do use the phalanx are voyd of the hope of victory Even from hence that the Roman Armies have infinite commodities both of places and of times to fight in But the phalanx hath onely one time one place and one kind whereto it may profitably apply it self so that if it were of necessity that their enemy should encounter them at that instant especially with their whole forces it were questionlesse not only not without danger but in all probability likely that the phalanx should ever carry away the better But if that may be avoyded which is easily done shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable and free from all terrour And it is farther evident that the phalanx must necessarily have plain and champain places without any hinderances or impediments as ditches uneven places vallies little hils and rivers for all these may hinder and disjoyn it And it is almost impossible to have a Plain of the capacity of twenty stadia much lesse more where there shall be found none of these impediments But suppose there be found such places as are proper for the phalanx if the Enemy refuse to come unto them and in the mean time spoil and sack the Cities and country round about what commodity or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered for if it remain in such places as hath been before spoken of it can neither relieve their friends nor preserve themselves For the convoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the Enemy whiles they remain in those open places And if it happen at any time that they leave them upon any enterprise they are then exposed to the Enemy But suppose that the Roman Army should find the phalanx in such places yet would it not adventure it self in grosse at one instant but would by little and little retire it self as doth plainly appear by their usuall practice For there must not be a conjectur of these things by my words only but especially by that which they do For they do not so equally frame their battel that they do assault the Enemy altogether making as it werebut one front but part make a stand and part charge the Enemy that if at any time the Phalanx do presse them that come to assault them and be repelled the force of their order is dissolved For whether they pursue those that retire or fly from those that do assault them these do disjoyn themselves from part of their Army by which meanes there is a gap opened to their Enemies standing and attending their opportunity so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front where the force of the phalanx consisteth but to assault where the breach is made both behind and upon the sides But if at any time the Roman Army may keep his due propriety and disposition the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place being not able to do the like doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodnesse of their disposition and the disposition of the phalanx To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an Army which is to march through places of all natures to encamp themselves to possesse places of advantage to besiege and to be besieged and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army and oftentimes are the especiall causes of victory to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit or convenient forasmuch as neither in their generall order nor in their particular disposition without a convenient place they are able to effect any thing of moment but the Roman Army is apt for all these purposes For every souldier amongst them being once armed and ready to fight refuseth no place time nor occasion keeping alwayes the same order whether he fight together with the whole body of the Army or particularly by himself man to man And hence it happeneth that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous so the end doth answer the expectation These things I thought to speak of at large because many of the Graecians are of an opinion that the Macedonians are not to be overcome And again many wondered how the Macedonian phalanx should be put to the worse by the Roman Army considering the nature of their weapons Thus far goeth Polybius in comparing the weapons and embattelling of the Romans with the use of Arms amonst the Macedonians wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered according as the wise Gracians could best proportion it with that form of battel which might give most advantage to the use thereof so that if our squadrons of Pikes jump not with the perfect manner of a phalanx as we see they do not they fall so much short of that strength which the wisdome of the Grecians and the experience of other nations imputed unto it But suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our warres which the nature of the weapon doth require yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius the said manner of imbattelling is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time one place and one kind of fight I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practice of our times doth seem to make it especially in woody countries such as Ireland is where the use is cut off by such inconveniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof And doubtlesse if our Commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike and Ireland they would not proportion so great a number of them in every company as there is for commonly half the company are Pikes which is as much as to say in the practice of our wars that half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons but onely against a troup of horse For they seldome or never come to the push of pike with the foot companies where they may charge and offend the enemy and for defence if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand but maketh more advantage to play upon them afarre off with shot it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them and stand fair in the mean time to entertain a volley of shot with the body of their battalion As I make no question but the pike in some services is profitable as behind a rampier or at a breach so I assure my self there are weapons if they were put to triall that would countervail the pike even in those services wherein it is thought most profitable Concerning the Target we see it take the hand in the judgement of Polybius of all other weapons whatsoever as well in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of imbattelling as the quality of the place wheresoever for their use was as effectuall in small bodies and centuries as in grosse troups and great
down the Hill they d●d the more urge and presse upon them and would not suffer them to fall back for that they seemed to forsake the Place for fear It is reported that Pompey should then in a vain-glory say to those that were about him That he would be content to be taken for a Generall of no worth● if Caesar's men could make any retreat from thence where they were so rashly ingaged without great losse Caesar fearing the retreat of his souldiers caused Hurdles to be brought and s●t against the Enemy in the brimme of the Hill and behind them sunk a trench of an indifferent latitude and incumbered the place as much as possibly he could He lodged also Slingers in convenient places to defend his men in their retreat These things being perfected he caused the legions to be drawn back But Pompey's party began with greater boldness and insolency to presse our people and putting by the Hurdles which were set there as a Barricado they passed over the ditch Which when Caesar perceived fearing least they should rather seem to be beaten off then be brought back whereby a greater scandall might consequently ensue having almost from the mid-way incouraged his men by Antonius who commanded that legion he willed that the signe of charging the Enemy should be given by a T●umpet and gave order to assault them The souldiers of the ninth legion putting themselves suddenly into order threw their P●les and running furiously from the lower ground up the steep of the Hill drave the Enemy headlong from them who found the Hurdles the long poles and the ditches to be a great hinderance unto them in their retreat It contented our men to leave the place without losse so that having slain many of them they came away very quietly with the losse of sive of their fellows And having staied about that place a while they took other hills and perfected the fortifications upon them OBSERVATIONS THis Chapter sheweth that advantage of place and some such industrious courses as may be fitted to the occasion are of great consequence in extremities of war but above all there is nothing more availeable to clear a danger then valour Valour is the Hercules that overcometh so many Monsters and verifieth that saying which cannot be too often repeated Virtute faciendum est qu●cquid in rebus bellicis est gerendum What a man does in matter of war must be done with valour But of this I have already treated CHAP. XVIII The scarcity which either Parti● endured in this siege THe carriage of that war was in a strange and unusuall manner as well in respect of the great number of Forts and Castles containing such a circuit of ground within one continued fortification as also in regard of the whole siege and of other consequents depending thereupon For whosoever goeth about to besiege another doth either take occasion from the weakness of the Enemy daunted or stricken with fear or overcome in battail or otherwise being moved thereunto by some injurie offered whereas now it happened that they were far the stronger both in horse and foot And generally the cause of almost all sieges is to keep an enemy from provision of Corn but Caesar being then far inferiour in number of souldiers did neverthelesse besiege an Army of intire and untouched forces especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary provisions for every day came great store of shipping from all parts bringing plenty of all things needfull neither could there any wind blow which was not good from some part or other On the other side Caesar having spent all the Corn he could get far or near was in great want and scarcity and yet notwithstanding the souldiers did bear it with singular patience for they remembred how they had suffered the like the year before in Spain and yet with patience and labour had ended a great and dangerous war They remembred likewise the exceeding great want they indured at Alesia and much greater at Avaricum and yet for all that they went away Conquerers of many great Nations They refused neither Barlie nor Pease when it was given them in stead of Wheat And of Cattell whereof they were furnished with great store out of Epirus they made great account There was also a kind of root found out by them that were with Valerius called Chara which eaten with Milk did much relieve their want and made withall a kind of bread whereof they had plenty And when Pompey's Party happened in their Colloquies to cast in their teeth their scarcity and misery they would commonly throw this kind of bread at them and scatter it in divers places to discourage them in their hopes And now Corn began to be ripe and hope it self did relieve their want for that they trusted to have plenty within a short time And oftentimes the souldiers in their watches and conferences were heard to let fall speeches that they would rather eat the bark of trees then suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands Besides they understood by such as ran away from the Enemy that their horse of service could scarce be kept alive and that the rest of their Cattell were all dead and that the souldiers themselves were in no good health as well through the narrowness of the place wherein they were pent as also by means of the ill savour and multitude of dead bodies together with continuall labour being unaccustomed to travel and pains but especially through the extreme want of water for all the Rivers and Brooks of that quarter Caesar had either turned another way or dammed up with great works And as the places were mountainous with some intermission and distinction of Valleys in the form and fashion of a Cave or Den so he stopped the same with great piles beaten into the ground and interlated with fagots and hurdles and then strengthened with earth to keep back the water insomuch as they were constrained to seek low grounds and Marish places and there to sink Wells Which labour they were glad to undertake besides their daily works albeit these Wells stood far distant from their Garrisons and were quickly dried up with heat But Caesar's Army was in exceeding good health and had plenty of water together with all kind of provisions excepting Wheat which the season of the year daily brought on and gave them hope of store Harvest being so near at hand In this new course of war new policies and devices of warfare were invented and put in practice by either Partie They perceiving by the fires that our Cohorts in the night time kept watch at the works came stealing out and discharged all their Arrows upon them and then presently retreated Wherewith our men being warned found out this remedy that they made their fires in one place and kept their watch in another THE FIRST OBSERVATION FOrasmuch as all matter of attempt doth much import the fortune of a war we may not omit to take notice
lain in garrison past eighteen dayes he draweth the fourteenth and sixteenth Legions out of garrison from the river Arar where he had placed them for the speedy purveiance of corn and victuall as was shewed you in the last book and with those two Legions went to prosecute the Carnutes When our enemies heard of the coming of our army the Carnutes moved with the calamity of others left their towns and villages that they dwelt in which they had made upon the sudden with little cottages for necessities sake to keep off the winter for since they were conquered of late they had lo●● many of their walled towns and fled scattering abroad Caesar forasmuch as he would not put his souldiers to the abiding of the unseasonable sharp storms which chiefly at that time fell encamped himself within Genabum a town of the Carnutes and housed his souldiers partly in the buildings of the Galles and partly in such buildings as being unfinished they thatched in haste with the straw that was brought in to cover their tents and cabines Neverthelesse he sendeth abroad his horsemen and auxiliary footmen into all parts whither he heard his enemies resorted and that was not in vain for commonly our men returned ever with a great booty The Carnutes being put to it with the hardnesse of the winter and the terrour of the danger being driven out of house and home and not daring to stay any where any long time the woods being not able to defend them from the bitternesse of the storms were scattered abroad and with the losse of a great part of them dispersed into the next cities CHAP. II. The Bellovaci and other States under the leading of Corbeus and Comius invade the Suessiones Caesar marcheth against them CAesar at that hard time of the year thinking it enough to disperse the powers that were assembling to the intent no beginning of warre might spring up and weighing how much it concerned him to prevent any open warre from breaking out the beginning of the next summer he placed G. Trebonius in garrison at Genabum with those two Legions that he had there about him and forasmuch as he was by often messages certified from the men of Rhemes that the Bellovaci who excelled all Galles and the Belgae also in military fame and the States adjoyning unto them under the conduct of Corbeus of Beanvoys and Comius of Arras levied men of warre and assembled them into one place to the intent with their whole power to invade the borders of the Suessiones which were appertaining to the men of Rhemes thinking it stood not only upon his honour but also tended to his own security for the future to save his allies which had deserved well of the Commonweal from displeasure and damage he called the eleventh legion again out of garrison Moreover he wrote to C. Fabius to bring the two legions that he had into the confines of the Suessiones and sent for one of those two legions that were with T. Labienus So according as his garrisons lay for the purpose and as the slate of the warre required to his own continuall trouble he put sometimes one of his legions and sometimes another to march from their quarters With this power that he had assembled he went against the Bellovaci and encamping himself in their countrey sent abroad his horsemen into all quarters to glean up some of them by whose means he might learn what his enemies purposed to do His horsemen doing their duty brought word how few were found in the houses and those not such as had stayed behind to till the ground for they were purposely removed out of all places but such as had been sent back again to spie Of whom Caesar enquiring in what place the forces of the Bellovaci were and what was their intent found that all the Bellovaci were gathered together into one place and that the Ambiani Aulerci Caletes Velocasses and Attrebates had chosen a very high ground to encamp in enclosed with a troublesome marish and had conveyed all their stuff into woods that were farther off Of the which warre there were many Noblemen that were ringleaders but the multitude obeyed Corbeus chiefly because they understood that he hated most the name of the people of Rome And that Comius of Arras was a few dayes before gone to fetch aid of the Germans who were their next neighbours and swarmed in multitude of people He learned moreover at their hands that the Bellovaci by the consent of all the Noblemen at the earnest instance of the Commons were determined if Caesar came as it was said he would but with three legions to offer him battell lest afterward to more disadvantage and hinderance they should be compelled to encounter with his whole host And if he brought a greater power with him then to keep themselves still in the same ground that they had chosen and by ambushes to keep the Romans from forrage which by reason of the time of the year was scarce and also lay scattering and from corn and other victuals and things necessary for their army The which things when Caesar understood by the concurring report of many considering how still of wisdome this project was and how farre from the rashnesse that the barbarous people are wont to use he determined to make the best advantage of all things to the intent his enemies disdaining his small company should make the more haste to come into the field For he had three old practised legions the seventh eighth and ninth of singular valour and prowesse and the eleventh which was of chosen young men of great hope and towardnesse which having at that time received eight yeares wages was notwithstanding look'd upon as not comparable to the other three either for standing or for valour and courage Wherefore summoning an assembly and there declaring all things that had been reported unto him he confirmed the hearts of the common souldiers if peradventure with the number of three legions he might draw out his enemies to fight with him in the field He set his battel in this order the seventh eighth and ninth legions went before the carriages and the eleventh closed in the rere thereof the which notwithstanding was but small as it is wont to be in such expeditions and this he did lest the enemies should find a greater number then they expected By this means in a square battel almost he brought his host in sight of his enemies sooner then they looked for him When the Galles beheld these legions so suddenly set in order marching toward them apace as it had been in a pitched field whereas it was reported to Caesar that they intended to carry on their businesse with confident boldnesse whether it were for the perill of the encounter or the suddennesse of our coming or that they looked to see what we intended to do they set themselves in order of battel before their camp and would not descend from the higher ground Albeit that Caesar was
thus commanded at sometimes to turn his face to the right or left hand or about the Battallion standing in order that is according to the distance before named so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order is commanded to turn as one body to the right or left hand It is performed thus Imagine the Battallion stand first in order it shall be commanded that they close their files to the right hand when the right file standing still the rest turning their faces to the right hand march into their close order and return as they were next that they close their ranks from behind when every follower marcheth forward to his leader unto his rapiers point as is said before This done the leader of the right file standing immoveable all the rest as the body of a ship or a great gate turn about that leader as about the hinge or center every one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed as if they were but one entire body When the same Battallion is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first it is commanded Faces about to the left hand and march into your order from whence you were closed Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still and the rest turning faces about march ranks in order as before then turn as you were and you are restored When the whole Battallion being in their close order should turn about and make the Rere the Front it is done by a double turning or declination and commanded to wheel about which is answerable to the former faces about or mutation There is also another wheeling in this sort when the front changeth the aspect thrice for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Rere so this wheeleth from the right hand to the left or contrariwise which fashion is so seldome used that we scarce afford it a name In all such motions and alterations it is most fit that all men perform their directions with their pikes advanced being in that sort most easie to be commanded as also lesse troublesome to their followers and leaders Countermarching Files and Ranks THere is also another means to prevent the enemy his assaulting us in the rere or flank lest he should find our worst men least able to make resistance and this is performed by countermarching both files and ranks three divers wayes apiece The first was used by the Macedonians after this fashion First the leader turneth his face about towards the right or left hand and so the next follower marching behind his leader turneth also and so the third and fourth untill the bringer up have carried himself out into a new place in the rere further from the enemy as he was before next unto him But this neither was nor is accounted safe or secure because it doth somewhat resemble a flying or running away from the enemy which might give him no small incouragement and therefore it is not much in practise Only at some times the bringers up marching throughout beyond the leaders untill they possesse the same space before them which they did behind them all turning their faces about make their leaders to affront the enemy who were before farthest from them The Lacedamonians used the contrary as it were pursuing the enemy the bringer up first being turned face about and so the next marching before him and so the third untill the leader himself became also turned and in the foremost front unto the enemy Which with us is somewhat otherwise but yet both affronting and as it were pursuing the enemy because our leaders first begin this motion and so countermarching through on the right or left hand become in the front in a new space of ground who were before in the rere The third and last was invented by the Persians whom when the place or near approch of the enemy would not suffer to change their ground they were wont to countermarch the front to the right or left hand and being come unto the depth of the bringers up to stand still untill the other half file had likewise marched forth and fallen upon their leaders in every file In all these it is especially commanded to march still in the same distance and by whole ranks to prevent confusion which especially the enemy at hand must needs be most dangerous and therefore carefully to be avoided In like sort the ranks may countermarch when either the right wing would be strengthened by the left or the left by the right alwayes marching by whole files towards the right or left hand according as they shall have the direction either changing the ground or upon the same ground as in the former countermarches There is used also another kind of strengthening both the front and flank when occasion shall be offered viz by doubling either files or ranks And this either by doubling the number of souldiers in the same files or ranks keeping still the same breadth and depth of ground or else by doubling the ground keeping the same number of souldiers The files are doubled when the second file shall insert it self into the first the leader thereof putting himself a follower unto the leader of the first and the next follower follower to the next in the first file and so forwards And likewise the fourth file inserting it self into the third and the sixth into the fifth And this is to be performed when the Battallion standeth in his order To double the place or depth is when the same number of men shall put themselves out of their order into their open order either by advancing forward or by falling backwards as they shall be commanded The ranks are doubled two manner of wayes either by inserting the second into the first to the right or left hand as before in the files or else the enemy being at hand by joyning whole troups together to the right or left wing according as occasion shall be offered and this is held to be the safest when the enemy is near to avoid confusion It is performed either in the same ground or by doubling the ground when either we desire to exceed the front of our enemy his battallion or to prevent lest we our selves be included The terms to both are Double your files or ranks to the right or left hand and when you would have them return again into their proper places it is commanded As you were The ordinary directions which are especially given in these martial exercises are first that no man in the time of exercising or marshalling shall be lowder then his Officer but every one attending to his place when he is commanded shall diligently hearken to such directions as shall be given The Captain in the front shall speak and the Sergeants in each flank shall give the word unto the Lieutenant or Ensigne