exam 2. n. 73. p. 19. A person saith he is ashamed of some crime committed he may make a general confession and accuse himself of this sin amongst others without saying whether he have confessed it otherwise at onother time Because this disguise doth not much change the judgement of the Confessor This is nothing but a sleight to deceive a Confessor and to preserve ones reputation with him by betraying ones conscience But this same Jesuit passes yet farther and saith formally that one may lye in confession See here his words h Dicit quis Confessario se velle cum eo confessionem generalem gercre non ideo tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere quia quamvis mentiatur id tament parum refert ad Confessarii judicium Escebar tr 7. ex 4. n. 118. p. 818. A person addresseth himself to a Confessor and saith that he would make a general confession to him he is not for all that obliged to declare unto him all the mortal sins that he hath committed for although he lye it is of small concern to the judgement the Confessor is to make of him But if they who have any sense of God and Religion cannot resolve to use these kind of surprizes and disguisements and these lyes in a Sacrament in which they speak to God in the person of his Priest who holds his place the same Jesuit will give them also another expedient to deceive the Confessor familiarly that they may continue in his good opinion which is not to discover to him other then their sleighter faults and to have another Confessor whom they may chose at their pleasure to confesse to him their great crimes i Duos quis adis Confessarios quorum alteri venialia confitetur ut bonam famam apud Confessarium ordinarium tueatur Rogo num delinquat A person saith this Jesuit hath two Confessors to whom he applyes himself to the one he confesseth his mortal sins and to the other his venial that he may continue in good opinion with his ordinary Confessor The question is whether he doth ill The case is important he must take a sociate to resolve it that he may be more confidently believed k Cum Suario assero non delin qacre Quiâ—…est consessio integra nec est ver a hypocrisis nec mendatium Ibid. n. 135. p. 821. I maintain saith he with Suarez that this person doth noevil at all His reason is not lesse strange then his answer since he pretends that it is neither lye nor hypocrisie to conceal his sins from his Confessor and to make h im believe he hath no great ones though he hath committed such to maintain himself in good reputation with him Emanuel Sa approves this practice provided it be not common l Habere ordinarie duos Confessarios alteruns cui gravia dicas alterum cui levia ut probus babearis Quidam dicunt esse peccatum mortale ob illusum Consâ—ssorem secus vero esset si semel aut iterum fiat ob pudorem verecundiam Emanuel Sa verbo Confessor â—um 16 pag. 76. There are that hold saith he that it is a mortal sin to have two Confessors in ordinary to confesse to one his great sins and to the other his small sins that he may passe with him for an honest man because this is to deceive the Confessor and to mock him But there is no sin in doing this onely once or twice through bashfulness That is to say that it is lawfull to deceive a Confessor to mock him and make sport with him provided that it be not common and that it be done onely some times and upon some motive so good as is that of Pride and Vanity ut probus habearis That thou mayst bo esteemed an honest man Filliutius who examines and handles this case most exactly acknowledges that many condemn it for mortal sin Some for hypocrifie which is a kind of lye which cannot be a small fault in a matter so holy and so important as confession is others because at least the custom and will to continue in this practice is a note of great corruption and a very wicked disposition in him who is in this estate and which cannot be excused from mortal sin To which may be added the motive which leads to this disguisement which is a Vanity and Pride so much more criminal and unsufferable in that it is practised upon design and in an action which ought to be the most sincere and humble of all that are Religious but notwithstanding all these considerations he forbears not to maintain with his fraternity that there is no evil to use this practice so much and so often as one will or that it is no great evil m Quaeres an sit contra integritatem Confessori ordinario tantum venialia peccata confiteri alteri vero extraordinario gravia quae occurrunt l' Respondco etsi Sylvester conf 1. q. 6. dicat esse peccatum mortale ob hypocrisin virtuale mendacium Victoria in Summa n. 169. asserat esse mortale quando id sit animo perseverandi in tali consuetudine tamen dicendum est non esse absolute contra integritatem neque peccatum mortale Filliutius tom 1. tract 7. c. 4. n. 75. p. 175. You will inquire of me saith he if it be against the integrity of confession to confesse onely your sleight faults to your ordinary Confessors and to have another extraordinary one to whom to confesse your great sins when you happen to fall into them I answer that Sylvester saith that though there be nothing herein that is contrary to the integrity of confession yet there is mortal sin therein because of the hypocrisie and virtual lying that is in it And Victoria assures us also that this is mortal sin when it is done with design to continue in this custom But we must say absolutely that there is no mortal sin in it nor any thing contrary to the integrity of confession He proves by a pleasant reason that he that treats his confessor in this sort is not properly a hypocrite and that he deceiveth him not at all properly a lyer n Non est proprie mendax quia dicit falsum sed tantum permittit alium decipi Ibid. because he relates no falsity neither to one nor other of his Confessors but onely permits one of his Confessors to be deceived though there be no deceiver For he that confesses himself is none according to him and the Confessor cannot be any because he could not deceive himself and he must have at least a gift of Prophesie to be able to divine that one surprises him by hiding his principal sins and confessing onely his small ones It would be easie to report yet many more examples of like shifts of like foolish childish and ridiculous sleights by which the Jesuits do teach people to mock God and the Ministers of his Church in abusing the Sacraments and making void
according to the Jesuits and that custom of sinning may make a man uncapable of sinning AS in doing evil we accustom our selves thereunto and in following lusts we cause them to pass into habits which strengthen and increase more the inclination we had unto evil the order of reason requires in the design we have to consider the springs and the principles of sin to make appear how the Jesuits nourish them that after we have treated of Lust we speak also of evil habits I propose for example of habitual sins swearing and blasphemy because these sins of themselves produce neither pleasure nor profit its onely passion which carries men to them and evil custom which nourisheth them So that to speak properly and according to their peculiar nature they are sins of passion and habit Bauny in his summe chap. 4. pag. 60. speaking of a person accustomed to swear who for this reason is always in danger to be forsworn gives this counsel to their Confessours The Confessor to hinder this evil ought to draw from his penitent an act of dislike or to speak better of disavowing this cursed custom For by this means the oaths which follow proceeding from such an habit shall be esteemed involuntary in their cause Suarez l. 3. of Oaths chap. 6 Sanchez in his Summe l. 3. c. 5. n. 11. and by consequence without sin This practice is very easie and very convenient if it be so that one word of disowning sins which a Confessor can draw out of the mouth of a sinner may serve all at once to be a remedy for all the sins which he hath committed and for the justification of all the sins he shall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit so the simple declaration which a man shall make of his being sorry to see himself subject to such a vice sufficeth to excuse him from all the sins which he shall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice as the debauches and excesses of the mouth immodest speeches lyes deceits thefts and other such like And so almost all vices of this sort shall be innocent there being few persons that are not sorry for being engaged in them and being unable to avoid them because of their long accustoming themselves unto them or who at least do not or will not sometimes disallow them and testifie some displeasure against them in some good interval And yet if this good Father had been well read in Sanchez whom he cites I am confident he would have been render'd yet more easie and complacent in this point For Sanchez acknowledges no particular sin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no disavowing them be made to excuse them as Bauny requires See how he speaks herein p Posterior sententia cui tanquam probabiliori accedo ait juramenta prolata sine advertentia formali per se sufficienti ad peccatum mortal non esse in se novum ac proprium ac speciale peccat um propter solam jurandi consuetudinem qualiscumque fit nedum sit retracta Sanchez op mor. part 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21. The last opinion which I follow as the most probable holds that those Oaths which are made without actual application which of it self were sufficient to a mortal sin are not of themselves new sins properly and particularly onely because of the custom of swearing how great soever it be and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it Escobar is not far off from this opinion where speaking of blasphemy he demands q Num aliquando venialis blasphemia Consuetudo quidem absque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit Escobar tract 1. exam 3. cap. 6. num 28. pag 73. If blasphemy be sometimes a venial sins And he answers absolutely according to his use That such a custom whereof one thinks not at all makes sin not to be mortal But for the most part hinders it from being mortal as it would he if he did swear without being accustomed Filliutius speaks the same more at large and more clearly a Octavo quaero de consuetudine blasphemandi ordine ad malitiam Respendeo dico 1. si desit advertentia plena ca toriatur blasphemia etiamsi adsit consuetudo blasphemandi non commitâ—itur peccatum mortale Filliutius 〈◊〉 qq tom 2 tract 25. cap. 1. num 27. pag 173. It is demanded what sin it is to blaspheme customarily I answer in the first place that when a man blaspames without having full knowledge thereof how much soever he be accustomed thereto he sins not mortally He taken the reason of this conclusion out of a general principle which he presupposeth as assured b Ratio est quia ut diximus de voluntario libero ad â—…ccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plenâ— undecunque oriatur defectus illius excusat a peceato Ibid. The reason is saith he because as we have said handling free and voluntary actions to six mortally it behoves to have a full knowledge for want of which on what account soever it comes sin is thereby bindered He demands in the same place c An jurandi consuâ—tudo constituat hominem in statu peccati If the custom of swearing put a man in the estate of sin First of all he reports the opinion of those who hold the affirmative afterwards he speaks his own in these terms d Dico 2. consuâ—tudinem jurandi sine necessitate vel utilitate sed cum veritate sufficiente advertentia non esse peccatum grave ex se nec constituere hominem in statu peccati mortalis Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313. I say in the second place that the custom of swearing without necessity and without utility but with verity and without sufficient knowledge and reflection is not of it self a great sin and puts not a man into a state of mortal sin He demands again on the same subject e Sitne perjurium cum in advertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob consuetudinem perjurandi Ibid. n. 316. If perjury which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal sin because of the custom he hath to forswear And rejecting the opinion of those who believed it to be a mortal sin he answers f Dico 2. Probabilius est non esse peccatum mortale speciale quando est sine advertentia naturali Ibid. I say in the second place that it is more probable that there is no mortal sin particularly when one forsweareth himself without perceiving it at all and by a natural inadvertence And a little after he adds g Etiamsi operans sit cum habituali affectu ad peccatum Ibid. Though he who doth it hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit So that according to the judgement of this Divine although he swear with full knowledge provided that it be not against truth although he swear against the truth and
perjure himself if he have not a full knowledge being transported with passion and by the violence of some habit it is no mortal sin although he doth swear without necessity without utility and by an evil custom contracted by many crimes and which is yet more considerable though he also have a will and affection addicted to sin because of this evil custom That is to say that a man may have a will carryed on to sin and sin actually without sinning and without being capable of the sin which he commits Bauny in the 6. chap. of his Summe p. 73. speaks of persons accustomed to curse creatures that are without reason as Gentlemen that curse their Dogs and Hawks when they have no good Game Carters their Horses when they put them to trouble Mariners the season and the wind when it is contrary to them And after he had reported the opinion of Navarre and some others who condemn these maledictions of venial sin he adds As for me I believe that I may say with truth that setting aside choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported in such innocent exercises it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curse Dogs Horses Hawks or other irrational things So that there is nothing but choler according to him that causes sin in these curses he that shall utter them in cold blood and without transport or who shall make use of them onely as ornaments of language as he saith speaking of Oaths chap. 5. p. 66. or who suffers himself to go on therein by an evil custom which is become natural and makes him do it without violence without transportation and even so that he perceives it not he committeth no sin in the most strange curses and execrations But to hold to these principles of the Jesuits and others and to follow their arguments if it fall out that these same persons who are accustomed to utter these curses be also transported with choler their choler will be no sin no more then their curses especially if it come from a strong habit and that the emotion be so strong that it trouble and blind the minde Layman comprizes in a few words all that Bauny Filliutius Escobar and Sanchez have said concerning the custom of swearing and blaspheming He speaks also more precisely and more clearly then they discharging absolutely of all sin the blasphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long use which he assures us of as a certain truth and which follows necessarily from the principles of his Divinity See here his terms h Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata consuetudine velut quadam necessario impetu rem malam agit vâ—…câ— materiales blasphemias pâ—ofert vel perjuria effundit tunc non peccare nec pâ—oprie blasphemare quia nullum peccatum sine rationis deliberatione committitur Layman l. 1. tr 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20. It follows from that which I have said that he who from the impression of an inveterate custom as it were by a sort of impetuous necessity is transported to do evil as to speak words of blasphemy or perjury sins not at all and to speak properly blasphemes not at all because a man cannot sin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation Following his principles there are no habitual sins at all since evil custom not onely doth neither cause nor augment sin but also diminisheth it and sometimes takes it wholly away and a person who blasphemes forswears and doth every other criminal thing that can be sins not according to this maxime when it comes from an evil inveterate custom which is become natural which carryes him on to the commission of all these crimes by a kind of necessary impression almost without any sensible apprehension So the condition of this man altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice shall be better then of another lesse vicious and exempt from wicked habits This man by often sinning shall be put into an estate of not sinning any more and into a kind of for him happy necessity which will give him a power to commit all sorts of crimes securely freely and without being more criminal or even at all guilty But if it be true that by multitude of sins a man becomes uncapable of sinning and that multitude of sins make a man innocent this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all sorts of vices and excesse and to set men farther from virtues whose exercise is more painful and never brings that advantage of being uncapable of sinning or to have power to commit the greatest sins without sinning CHAP. III. Of Sins of Ignorance That Ignorance excuses sins committed without knowing them and even those which are committed afterwards And that there is properly no sins of Ignorance according to the Jesuits THere is a particular connexion and as it were a natural consequence betwixt sins of evil habits and sins of Ignorance For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to stifle the remorses of sin and by consequence to remove all thoughts of it and to take away the knowledge of it For this cause having before viewed what the Jesuits say of habitual sin order requires that we represent their opinion of those which are committed by ignorance Ignorance may be considered either in regard of those sins which are committed without knowledge of them or in regard of those which have been heretofore committed without thinking to do evil And it may be inquired if the first be true sins and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the second are so As to the latter point Bauny in his Summe chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651 holds that if any one of ignorance and simplicity hath confessed his faults in grosse without determining of any one in particular it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot be commodiously done because the Confessor is pressed so with penitents which give him not leasure He would say that on the Feast-days when the Confessors are pressed it will suffice to make a general confession without specifying any one sin in particular as the Hugenots would have it After this question he proposes another And what may we say of those who in their youth have committed muny actions of a vicious nature which notwithstanding they did not believe to be such He answers definitively that they are not obliged to confesse one word of them when they know them and understand their nature and conditions much lesse to reiterate their confessions made already Whence it follows that Saint Paul might have dispensed with himself to do penance for the sins he had committed in his youth before his conversion being he committed them through ignorance as he tells us himself Ignorans feci incredulitate I did them ignorantly in unbelief and David ought not to say a Delicta
if when we were obliged to observe the commandment we had any thought thereof For if we had none at all and that without considering either the right or fact we violate the commandment by neglect this forgetfulness is innocent and free from all sin Corduba approves this opinion no more then Cajetan and would that at least he who acts in so evil a disposition come not voluntarily thereinto and that the forgetfulness or inadvertency which hinders him from thinking of the evil which he doth comes not by his own fault But Sanchez finds this also to be too much and he can no more approve of this than that of Cajetan f Nec admittenda est sententia Cordubae in q. l. 2. q. 17. dub 1. dicentis oblivionem reduci ad ignorantiam invincibilâ—m quando oblivio non contingit ex culpa Hoc enim ita universaliter dictum non est sed quando quis initio causam oblivioni dedit cum periculi adveâ—tentia Si enim periculum non ad errit oblivio est inculpabilis Ibid. num 30. There is no more need saith he to receive the opinion of Corduba who faith that when forgetfulness comes not by our fault it ought to be esteemed as one sort of innocent Ignorance but not when it proceeds of our fault For this is not universally true but onely when we have done some thing which hath caused this forgetfulness forseeing well the danger whereunto we cast our selves For if we thought not of this danger the ignorance can not be faulty He repeats a little after the same thing and he makes a decree as it were without appeal and a principle unremovable g Quare stat ut causa ignorantiae fuerit aliquod peccatum tamen in se ignorantia sit invincibilis Ibid. n. 31. It remains certain saith he that although ignorance comes of some fin as of its cause it ceases not therefore to be excusable To which he adds also for better explication h Tunc quamvis causa culpabilis sit ignorantia tamen erit inculpabilis Ibid. And in this case though the cause of ignorance be culpable yet the ignorance is not And for maintenance of this principle he undertakes to refute Saint Thomas under pretence of explicating that which he saith i Euentum posse esse â—oluatarium in sua causa Ibid. An event may be voluntary in its cause He expounds and at once overturns this rule of right k Ubi hab tur igno antiam facti non juris excusare Ibid. That ignorance of fact excuses but not of right As also the Doctors who teach as he confesseth l Ignorantiam legum ad statum officium alicujus pertinentem esse vincibilem nec excusare Ibid. That ignorance of that which every one is obliged to do according to the rules and Laws of his condition and calling is bleamable and excuseth not at all And generally he rejects it in the point of Law and Right and he takes to him as on his side the Doctors which expound them in their true sence but not in his m Ex his deducitur 1. esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores dum aequiparant scire debere scire passim dicunt esse indirecte voluntariam ignorantiam cum qua vel scivit advertitve aut debebat scire advertere Ibid. n. 24 It follows saith he that we must understand with discretion what the Doctors and Laws say that to know and to be obliged to know are one and the same thing and when they commonly affirm that when we know or consider or ought to know or consider ignorance and inadvertency are indirectly voluntary He witnesseth sufficiently that Saint Thomas with the more part of the School Divines are not for him in saying that Saint Thomas is received by all Thomas ad omnibus receptus n. 25. and that the Laws themselves and those that expound them are contrary unto him And he thinks himself discharged herein by saying that they are to be wisely understood Esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores But if we demand of him also why he takes the liberty to reject so great and so strong authorities He can onely repeat that which he hath said already so many times n Haec intelligenda sunt quando adfuit al qua actualis plena sufficiens ad mortale advertentia ad malitiam objecti ejusve periculum seu dubium aut scrupulus saltem Ibid. num 24. That all this must be understood where we have an actual knowledge full and sufficient to sin mortally of the evil we are about to do or of the danger to which it exposeth us or that at least we have had thereof some scruple or some doubt Tambourin hath also expounded all this Doctrine sufficiently at large according to the principle of Sanchez establishing two general rules in favour of ignorance The first is o Si quis ex ignorantia inculpabili putet aliquid esse veniale quod aliunde mortale est venialiter tantùm peccabit Ita S. Thomas p. 2. q. 76. 3. Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis tantùn venialiâ—er Tambur l. 1. Decal c. 1. sect 3. n. 35. if any one think by ignorance which is not criminal that a mortal sin is but venial he sins onely venially this is Saint Thomas's opinion We must say the same if ignorance be but a venial sin I say nothing of the rule which he proposes in favour of ignorance to observe the abuse he doth to the authority of Saint Thomas I see no way to excuse his visible visible falfity unless by his ignorance being he cites this Angel of the School in making him say that which he saith not and whereunto he speaketh the contrary in his quodlibetary questions where he saith clearly p In his vero quae pertinent ad fidâ—m bones mores nullum excusabiâ—e si sequatur erroneam opinionem alitujus Magistri In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat S. Thomas quod lib. 3. art 10. that in what concerns faith and good manners no man is excused if he follow an erronous opinion of some Doctor Because in these things ignorance excuseth not The other rule which he proposeth is no less favourable to ignorance and sin then the former For he saith that if a Silegem scias sed non poenam adhuc probabile est à te non incurri poenam Ita Suarez Sanchez Coninck apud Castrop Tambor Decal Tambur Decal l. 1. c. 2. sect 10 n. 12 you have knowledge of the Law and that you are ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it it is probable you do not incurr the penalty He underprops his principle by the authority of three the most famous Divines of their Society Suarez Sanchez and Coninck b Ratio est quia ad has incurrendas requiâ—…tur delinquentem consenlisse saltem tacite in
Sa to affirm c Fabellam recitare ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum non est peccatum Sa verh Praedicare num 5. p. 378. that it was no sin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to stir up the auditors attention and devotion He speaks also more clearly in another place where he saith d Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam quidam aiunt esse mortale alii non semper quod intellige si sit materia levis Sa verb. Mendacium num 2. pag. 494. that there are some who hold that it is always mortal sin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point but others deny it And he relates the opinion of these latter adding onely that it must be understood onely when the matter is sleight If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine according to this Jesuit be but a venial sin he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher should speak in other matters and it may be he might give them in this the same liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally and without exception He condemns them not more rigorously who tell lyes in confession e Mentiri in consessions de peccatis venialibus out de aliis confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum est etiamsi illa antea apud se proposuisset vere confiteri Sa verb. Confessio n. 12. p. 88. It is but a venial sin saith he to lye unto a Confessor in confessing venial or mortal sins formerly confessed though after resolution to confesse them truly Escobar saith the same and adds some thing f Mendacium de peccaâ—o veniali veniale est nisi illud veniale esset totalis confessionis materia quia tunc daretur absolutio fine materia Sacramentum nullum esset Suarez tom 4. n. 3. par disp 22. sect 10. n. 6. Alii negant quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis Escob tr 7. ex 4. n. 107. p. 816. Suarez holds saith he that to lye in confessing a venial sin is but a venial sin provided that this venial sin be not all the matter of the confession for in this case the absolution will have no subject and the Sacrament will be nul Others hold the contrary for that a lye which consists in a sleight and venial matter is always sleight A lyetold in confession and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of this Jesuit and of those whose judgement he reports seems to him a very sleight thing to furnish matter for a mortal sin though it destroy a Sacrament and turn it into an action profane and sacrilegious It is easie to see if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance which by a particular reason may be called the Sacrament of Truth because there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly confessing himself a sinner before God and confessing his sins before a Priest who holds the place of God nevertheless this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament and that fault committed herein ought to be considered according to the matter of the sin rather then by the holinesse of the Sacrament in such manner that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it self the sin is but sleight though thereby the Sacrament be profaned made nul and sacrilegious This Jesuit commits yet a greater extravagance against the truth when he saith that it may be opposed with a resolution altogether formal that is to say by pure malice though it be acknowledged in the heart without becoming guilty of any great fault g Impugnaeâ—e perspicuam veritatem animo impugnandt contradicendi est peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiae gravitatem aut levitatem Escobar tract 2. exam 2. cap. 1. num 14. pag. 292 To conflict with the truth saith he which is evident with a formal design to oppose and contradict it is great or little according as the truth in hand is of great or little consequence He considers not the greatness of the Majesty of God who is encountred in the Truth and who is Truth it self neither doth he any more consider the wicked disposition of him who impugnes the truth by an aversion or contempt which he hath towards it opposing it by a formal design to resist and destroy it though he know it evidently animo impugnandi contradicendi perspicuam veritatem If when the King speaks any of his Officers should rise up and contradict him publickly in a thing which he knew himself to be just and true being induced to this excesse onely by insolence and to oppose himself against the King and to contradict him without cause it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treason and his action would passe in the judgement of all the world for an unsufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majesty though the subject upon which he thus opposed the King were not of great importance And yet Escobar would that it should be accompted but a sleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth One passage alone of Sanchez which I will rehearse here may suffice to prove that which I have said that in things purely spiritual the Jesuits find scarcely any sufficent matter for mortal sin h Res quantumvis sacras principal ter ob vanam gloriam officere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere sacram celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. Et si debitus ordo pervertatur ea tamen perversio non tanti est ut adea gravis injuria rebus spiritualibus inseratur ut poena aeterna digna sit Ibid. To perform of vanity saith he the most sacred actions as to administer the Sacraments or to receive them or to celebrate the most Holy Masse for vain glory can be but a venial sin though vain glory be proposed as the principal end He acknowledges that there is disorder in this action but he pretends that it is of small consequence and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them subservient to vain glory is not a thing so considerable as to merit the disfavour of God and that it conserve for a matter to mortal sin and a cause of eternal damnation It is not an easie thing to judge what reason he may have thus to diminish this sin if he acknowledge that there may possibly be great ones in Spiritual matters For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this considered by the light of Faith then to say Masse for vanity as the principal end thereof this is properly to sacrifice to vanity or to the Devil who is the god of vanity the body of Jesus Christ which is horrible onely to think And if the sacrifice of the Masse may be
need no other preparation to approach the Altar and holy Table than for to eat at our common tables and that a man may go with the same pace and temper to receive the Communion as he would to a Feast to be debauched As for Priests who are the Ministers of the Eucharist and who consecrate the Body of Jesus Christ upon the Altar and who give it to the Faithful after they have taken it first themselves Emanuel Sa saith that for to say Mass they 1 Potest quis secundum quosdam in necessitate profanis linâ—eis uti eaque postea Domino reddere utenda Sa verbo Missa num 7. p. 501. may make use of the same Napery whereof they make use to spread common tables when they have no other and make use of them after Mass as they did before at table But if this Casuist be so liberal in this he will appear very severe in another of less moment when he supposes that it is a great sin to say Mass 2 Celebrare sine calceamentis si absit contemptus non est mortale est autem si celebretur corporalibus valde immundis Ibid. num 15. pag. 503. Azor existimavit mortifere eos peccare qui sine justa causa tertia horae parte ante auroram vel post meridiem faciunt Sacrum Ibid. n. 27. pag. 509. without shooes though he dare not say that it is a mortal sin when it is not done by comtempt as he assures us it is when the Consecration is celebrated on very foul Corporals But he is yet more rigorous afterwards when he saith it is not lawful to say Mass before day nor after noon without a dispensation adding that they who transgress Rule and say the Mass a quarter of an hour or at most half an hour sooner or later sin mortally grounding this opinion upon Azor. Amicus saith the same thing and acknowledging after Baronius that the Mass hath been heretofore celebrated in the Church at divers hours and many times in the evening it self he saith that this ancient custom hath been interrupted for some time and another new one introduced into use to say it only from the time it is day until noon And after he adds 3 Quod autem haec consuetudo vim habeat legis obligantis sub mortali colligitur tum ex privilegiis quae Pontifices concedunt Religiosis c. That this Custom is instead of a Law and hath a vertue to oblige upon pain of mortal sin as may be collected from the Priviledges that the Popes give unto Monks to say Mass before day and after noon He would say that if it were only a venial sin to say Mass before day or after noon there would be no need to demand a Dispensation for neither he nor his Companions make any great account of venial sins mortal ones only in their opinion requiring a Dispensation that they may be committed without fear or danger So that all Laws and Commandments that oblige not under mortal sin have not any need of a Dispensation according to these Doctors and we may boldly violate and contemn them We have seen hitherto in divers places of this Book and particularly in this Treatise of the Commandments of the Church that according to the Jesuits when the Church commands the Faithful to pray to assist at divine Service to say to hear Mass on the Feast and Lords-days to communicate at Easter to confess at least once a year we may satisfie and accomplish all its Commands by doing only the outward actions which it commandeth though we do them by compulsion in hypocrisie with a formal design not to obey it through any wicked motive and by committing in the very outward action of the obedience we render it crimes and Sacriledges It is now pertinent for us and as it were necessary in the prosecution of this Work to discover the cause of this mischief and to ascend unto the Spring and Principle from whence the Jesuits draw these Maxims so pernicious and contrary to all good Manners Christian Purity Sanctity of the Sacraments Authority and Conduct of the Church and of the Holy Ghost who animates and governs it in all things This we are about to do in the next Chapter where we shall shew that the Jesuits hold that the Church is no other than an humane Assembly and a Body Politick and by consequence that it hath no Power nor Authority over internal and spiritual actions which are out of its Jurisdiction because they are hid and without its cognizance Whence they infer that when it commands any practice of Vertue exercise of Religion or use of the Sacraments its Commandment reaches only to and stays at what is external in these actions without proceeding farther unto inward actions and obliges not to any other thing than to do simply what it ordaineth in some sort whatever it be and upon what design or motive soever it be done that we may represent the Opinions the Jesuits have of the Church its Authority and Commandments we will add this Article to the three former ARTICLE IV. That the Jesuits teach that the Church cannot command spiritual and internal Actions that its Laws and Guidance are humane that it is it self only a Politick Body IF you inquire of the Jesuits wherefore according to their Divinity we may be discharged of the Prayers ordained by the Church by praying with voluntary distraction and reciting the divine Service without intention Wherefore we may accomplish the Command of saying Mass on Feast and Lords-days by attending without devotion that of Fasting by fasting for vain-glory that of Confession by confessing without sufficient sorrow for sin that of Communicating at Easter by receiving with hypocrisie and knowing we are in mortal sin Wherefore we may acquit our selves of Penance injoyned us by a Confessor accomplish a Vow made unto God satisfie a Promise an Oath made unto men and God by doing only in outward appearance what we are obliged to do And why we may generally accomplish all sorts of Precepts by actions which in truth are sins by doing them without any design to discharge our duty and on the contrary with a formal design not to discharge it and by a formal contempt of the Commandment and those who made it having an express intention not to obey even then when we seem to obey it doing outwardly what is commanded If you demand I say of the Jesuits the reason of all these so strange things which we have already made appear that they teach for the most part some will answer you with Sanchez that this is because the Church hath not the power to make Laws which command other than the substance of a thing that is to say in his language what is external in the actions it wills you to do Quia leges praecipiunt solum substantiam actus non modum Sanchez opermor lib. 1. cap.
farther and said not that this Mother might procure the death of her Daughters as well as desire it provided she might do it without scandal For this seems to be the necessary consequence of his opinion for she may do that which she may desire the things which are lawfull to be desired cannot be other than good and lawfull And indeed this is the Doctrine of the Society and almost of all the Jesuits asserting and maintaining it in other matters changing only the examples and not the maxime as I shall shew when I come to speak of Murder I will here only report as it were by way of advance one passage of Lessius who assures us b Dico secundo fas etiam est viro honorato occidere invasorem qui fustem vel alapom nititur impingere ut ignominiam inserat si aliter haec ignominia vitari nequit Lessius de just jure l. 2. c. 9. dub 12. n. 77. p. 81. That it is permitted to a man of Honour to kill an enemy who with intent to affront him attempts to give him a blow with a cudgel or a box on the ear if he cannot otherwise avoid this dishonour And a little after repeating the reason for which one may attempt the life of another and deprive him thereof he speaks in this manner c Quartus modus est si nomini meo falsis criminationibus apud Principem Judicem vel viros honoratos detrahere nitaris nec ulla ratione possim illud damnum famae avertere nisi te occulte interficiam Petrus Navartus n. 375. inclinat licitum esse talem è medio tollere eandem tanquam probabiliorem defendit Bannes q. 64. art 7. d. 4. addens idem dicendum etiamsi crimen sit verum si tamen est occultum Lessius ibid. n. 81. The fourth case in which you may kill without sin is when by false reports attempt is made to decry you in the spirit of a Prince a Judge or other persons of Honour and that you cannot otherwise hinder this wrong they would do you in your reputation than by killing him secretly who is the author thereof P. Navarre n. 375. inclines very much to agree that it is lawfull to kill this Enemy Bannes holds the same opinion the more probable q. 64. art 7. d. 4. And he addes That we may affirm the same thing though the crime whereof he accuseth us were true so it be secret In this case and these examples of Bauny Escobar Sa and Lessius the three principal degrees of Hatred against our Neighbour may be remarked the first is to have and entertain an ill will and an irreconcilable aversion against him so as not to be willing either to see or speak with him any more the second is to desire his death the third is actually to kill him And all this is lawfull or it is no great sinne according to the Divinity of these Authors the Jesuits After this that might be justly said of those who teach these pernicious maxims as well as of those that practise them upon their word which our Saviour Christ said of Tyrants d Occidunt corpus post haec non habent amplius quid faciant Luc. c. 12. v. 4. They kill the body and after there is nothing that they can do if they did not proceed yet farther and gave power to make souls perish also as well as bodies in permitting to kill him from whom we fear to receive any displeasure or any damage in reputation or temporal good though we be assured that he shall be damned This is the opinion a Quod autem circumstantia illa aeteâ—nt interitus injusti aggressor is non impediat affiâ—miat Caiet 2.2 q. 64. art 7. Molina de just commut tr 3. d. 13. n. 1. p. 1762. Tunc lege charitatis non est necesse praeponere vitam illius spiritalem nostrae propriae corporalâ— imò vero neque nostrohonori aut bonis nostris externis quae ille injustè velit à nobis auserre of Molina who saith that this circumstance ought not to hinder from killing him and that there is no Law of Justice noreven of charity it self which obligeth us to spare the eternal life of his soul no more then that of his body This is also the opinion b Quid si invasor sit ebrius vel amens ad tempus quem ante amentiam mihi certo constet fuisse in peccato mortali cum co in amentiam incidisse Respondeo ex Silvio eodem art 7. q. 3. adhuc in ejusdem amentia licitè posse invasum contra invasorem suae vitae cum moderaoune inculpatae tutelae usque ad necem invadent is se difendere Amicus tom 5. de just jure d. 36. sect 5. n. 85. p. 408. of Amicus who that he might better expresse his mind upon this case proposes an example of a man who had committed a mortal Sin and afterwards was drunk or fallen into madness he assures us that if he assaile us in this estate we ought not to make any difficulty to kill him though we know assuredly that he is in mortal sin and by consequence that he shall be damned This is also the Doctrine of the four and twenty Elders of the Society or rather it is the opinion of all the Society reported by Escobar who hath placed this decision amongst the Oracles which the Lamb hath pronounced by the mouth and written by the pen of the Jesuits whom he hath chosen to be his interpreters c Malefactores possunt occidi nocturni diurni fures alii quicumque malefactores etiam certo damnandi De Escobar tr 1. exam 7. c. 2. pag. 1154. sect 1. num 21. We may kill saith Escobar all those that do us wrong as those that rob by night or by day and all other sorts of persons who offend us though we be assured that they shall be damned dying in this estate Observe these words quicumque malefactores whatsoever offenders or malefactors Whence it follows that though this assailant were our friend or our kinsman it were permitted to kill him though he should be damned Yea even a Monk might kill his Superiour and a Son his Father in a like case For that is the sense of these words quicumque malefactores possunt occidi any malefactors whatsoever may be killed And although this explication of it self be clear and natural enough yet for fear it should trouble any one and appear suspected because of the strange excesse which it contains Amicus hath made a particular conclusion of it and declares in formal terms that this liberty of killing any one whosoever it be that is ill-affected towards us or any thing that belongs to us is a right which suffers no limitation or exception whatsoever d Hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non solum habet privata persona contra privatas sed etiam privata contra publicam
Sa. For proposing this question c An foemina conspectui viri se offerens à quo se turpiter amari novit peccet mortaliter peccato scandali Sanchez op mor. lib. 1. c. 6. n. 16. p. 19. Whether a Woman who presents her self to the view of a Man whom she knows to love her dishonestly do commit a sin of scandal which is mortal After he hath reported the common opinion of the Casuists in these terms d Communiter Doctores eam peccare mortaliter censent quando nulla necessitate ducitur sed ut suae voluptati satisfaciat indifferenter hac illac discurrit Ibid. The Doctors commonly answer yea when she doth it without any necessity and when she courses about without discretion onely for her pleasure Afterwards he relates the opinion of some persons who exempt this woman from mortal sin e A'iis tamen placet hanc non peccare mortaliter Ibid. Yet there are others who hold that this woman doth not sin mortally And after he hath deduced their reasons or rather those which he invented himself for to justifie this vitious liberty he concludes in this manner f Et ideo quamvis primâ—n opinionem probabilem credam existimo c. And therefore although I believe that the first opinion is probable yet neverthelesse I believe the second is the truer and therefore that this reason is not sufficient to conclude that a woman is obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a door or a window or to walk forth into the Town His principal reason is because this woman doth nothing in this but make use of her right and of her liberty and that if one would constrain this woman as some do whom he terms scrupulous to deprive her self of the pleasure which she takes in walking abroad and going out to be seen when she pleases although she have no occasion quando nulla necessitate ducitur sed ut voluptati satisfaciat this would give her too much trouble and she should be too much disquieted if she were obliged to consider when she had reason to go out and when she had not And therefore she ought not to torment her own spirit nor trouble her self about that which may befall her being it is lawful for her g Jure suo libertate sibi concessa utitur nec ea commode privari potest quin mille scrupulu aditus pateat circa egressum è domo necessarius sit nec ne Ibid. to make use of her right and of her liberty which she cannot be deprived of without making way for a thousand scruples which would come into her minde whensoever she had a desire to go abroad for to understand whether she had any necessity for it or not So that to take away these scruples he would have the rains let loose to passions and other disorders But this Divinity doth not accord with that of our Lord who saith in the Gospel that it were better one were cast into the Sea with a Mill-stone fastened about ones neck than to offend the meanest of men and who commands expressely to pull out the eye and to cut off the foot and the hand rather than to suffer them to be causes of offence After they have thus authorized a-part amongst men and women these two vices of ambition and vanity they authorize them jointly amongst Ecclesiastiques and persons consecrated unto God I have already touched something of Ambition in the precedent Treatise and I have showed how the Jesuits give unto the Ecclesiatiques and the Religious Monks and Nuns the same licence which they give to the Seculars to preserve their worldly honour by all sorts of effectual ways and even to prevent and kill if need be those who would deprive them thereof Therefore I will not touch this point here of which I must also speak elsewhere I will onely relate some passages of their Casuists to make it appear that they justifie vanity amongst the Ecclesiastiques and that they do introduce it into the most high and holy functions of their ministry See how Emanuel Sa speaks in this businesse a Vanae gloriae causa praecipue praedicare Missam celebrare peccatum esse mortale quidam atunt quidam negant Sa verb. vana gloria num 2. pag. 485. There are that say that it is mortall sin to say a Masse or to Preach principally for vain glory and others say the contrary Mindes being divided in this point the one and the other opinion are at least probable and by consequence one may follow which likes his conscience best according to the constant maxime of the Jesuites School He saith elsewhere simply that there are some who at least do excuse this action from mortal sin without saying that there are any that condemn it b Mortale quidam câ—nsent praedicare sine lâ—gitima licentia c. non esse autem si quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter praedicet aiunt nonnulli Sa verb. praedicare n. 4. p. 405. Some Casuists saith he hold that it is a mortal sin to Preach without allowance others say that it is not to Preach Principally for the glory of this world or for money Escobar speaks more confidently and saith that by his advice which is that of the Society there is not in this any appearance of mortal sin c Scio non esse grave crimen fabellam â—ecitare imo si â—d fit anìmo exci andi auditores ad pie audiendum nullum peccatum est Porro praedicare quem principaliter ob gloriam aut pecùniam mortale non esse affirmo Escebar tract 6. Exam. 7. n. 132. pag. 769. I am assured saith he that it is no great crime to relate a fable in a Sermon or relation which one hath invented and if it be done to excite the spirits of the Auditors to hear with more devotion it is no sin at all but I maintain it that one may without mortal sin Preach out of vanity or for money although one should regard vanity or money as the principal ends Sanchez saith the same thing and taking it yet higher he expounds it also with advantage in this manner d Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere Sacrum celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanch. l. 1. oper Mor. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. To do the most sacred actions out of vanity as to administer all the Sacraments or to receive them or to celebrate the Holy Masse for vain glory can be but a venial sin though vain glory be proposed as the principal end They are not content to excuse as much as may be the vanity of the Clergy and the Friers but they pretend also that they may make it their principal end in the most Holy and Divine Functions of Religion without committing any great fault To Preach say they or say Masse principally for
vain glory is no more then a venial sin But to Preach and to say Masse principally for the glory of this World is to sacrifice the Body of Jesus Christ to vanity to the World and to the Devil who is the Prince of the World and the Father of pride and vanity and this is no great matter according to the Divinity of the Jesuites this is at most but a venial sin non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez discovers in a few words the foundation of this Doctrine establishing for his first conclusion that e Si jactantia vana gloria de aliquo bone fit est sola oulpa venialis Sanch. loco citato if boasting and vain glory have for its object any good it is onely a venial sin That is to say that one may vaunt and glory as much as one will of things which are good in themselves and advantagious without committing a great sin Escobar flies higher than Sanchez For he doth not onely free them from mortall sin who glory in the good qualities which they have or which they think they have but those also who would make men believe that they have such as they have not and who go about to establish their honour and reputation amongst men by a false appearance of Sanctity which they affect and counterfeit on this design For after he hath given this definition of hypocrisie f Hypocrisis est manifestatio propriae excellentiae per facta ficta falsa Poâ—ro hypocrisis semper est peccatum quia mendacium semper perniciosum est mortale quidem erit si intus vult esse malus foris tantùm bonus apparere veniale autem si aliqua praestet exterius ut sanctus appareat Escobat tr 2 Exam. â— n. 11. p. 291. It is a manifestation of ones proper excellence by fained and deceitful actions he adds This is always a sin because a lye is alway prejudicial and this sin is mortal when one would be wicked within and appear good without but it is onely a venial sin if one do onely something before men to appear Holy He proceeds yet farther and saith in the same place n. 9. that one may without fear of mortal sin boast of evil and glory in the greatest crimes of the World whether one have or indeed have not committed them a Perrocum quis se jactat flagitium grave gessisse si non adsit scandali occasio aut facti veâ— conficti operis non admiscetur complacentia vel faciendi voluntas veniale est Ibid. n. 9. p. 291. When saith he a man boasteth himself to have committed some enormous crime provided that he doth this without scandal and without compleasance in this action true or fained and without desire to commit it it is but a venial sin That is to say that if a man onely vaunt himself of a crime it is but a light fault and that he ought onely to take heed to avoid scandal modó non adsit scandali occasio So that if a man who doth glory in the most enormous crimes have but onely the discretion not to speak thereof before persons who may thereby be scandalized he may vaunt thereof freely before debauched people who will onely laugh and take pleasure thereat He speaks in the same same manner of novelties and of those who invent new fashions and new opinions that they may as well content their own curiosity and vanity as that of others whom he also exempts from mortal sin For having proposed this question b Quidnam inventio novitatum Est manifestatio prepriae excellentiae per facta quaedam puta novas opiniones novas vestes exponere Quae quidem inventio nisi aliunde gravius vittetur ex se venialis tantùm culpa est quia communiter ejusmodi inventione quis solummodo geslit aliorum laudem comparare Escobar ibid. n. 10. What is it that is called invention of novelties He answers It is a demonstration of ones own excellence by certain actions as in inventing new opinions or new sorts of Garments This invention of novelties is of it self but a venial sin if there occur no other circumstance which may render it more criminal His reason is Because commonly the Authors of these novelties do look after nothing but the estimation and praises of the World Provided then that a man set his soul and heart onely on the desire of worldly honour and glory this desire is either not evil at all or it is but a small fault according to these Divines and what ever one doth or saith for this end well or ill with truth or falsehood he shall not lose the grace of God nor fall short of Salvation If this be no heynous fault to boast himself even of crimes to invent novel opinions to counterfeit actions of piety and vertue to gain honour in the world it must needs be that neither is it a great fault to desire honour even with a desire irregular and vitious For this cause Escobar concludes well according to his own principles in that place where after he hath given us this definition of that haughtinesse of mind which they commonly call Pride c Superbia est appetitus propriae celfitudinis perverse voluntarius Escobar Tr. 2 Exam. 2. n. 4. p. 290. Pride is no other thing then an irregular desire of ones own greatness he makes this question d Quandonam appetitus ille graviter vulnerat conscientiam Quando cum Dâ—i contemptu copulatur Ibid. n. 5. When is it that this desire doth notably hurt conscience And he answers When it is joyned with contempt of God And that he may leave no doubt nor difficulty in this so nice a point he adds also by way of demand e Exprime quandonam superbia cum Dei contemptu admissceatur Ibid. n. 6. Expresse your self that we may know when this contempt is contained in Pride And as if he had a design to satisfie the desire or rather the passion of the ambitious and settle their consciences in quiet he declares that there is no contempt of God and by consequence no mortal sin in the most vehement passion that a man can have for his own excellence and for worldly glory except onely in these cases First f Quando quod à Deo habet à seipso habere existimat Aut vult ab aliis tanquam à seipso bona habens existimari Aut vellet à seipso non à Deo bona sua possidere Aut dolet quod bujusmodi bona à Deo non à seipso receperit Aut cum quis existimat quidem se bona habere à Deo sed non gratis ei obvenisse verum ex justitia sibi debita propter jejunia eleëmosynas c. Escobar ibid. n. 6. p. 290. When he thinks to have of himself that which he receives from God Secondly When he would have others think that he hath those good things from himself Thirdly
possunt Ibid. n. 217. That one may without any Sin behold all the parts of his own or anothers body which are commonly uncovered without indecency in the converse of the world as the Arms Bosom and the Leggs He declares that it is ordinarily lawful to go with the Breast open and to walk in company with the arms and legs uncovered And he adds thereupon that e Totum etiam corpus coopertis pudendis in balneo vel flumine si necessitas vel utilit as aliqua vel etiam commoditas vel delectatiâ— ob sanitatem intercedà t absque ullo peccato aspici potest Ibid. When one bathes whether privately or in the River for any necessity or benefit or even for any convenience or pleasure which serve for health one may behold all his own or anothers body naked without any Sin as he said before provided that they hide their shame After so many motives and pretences of necessity profit convenience pleasure or health for which he gives full liberty to behold ones own or anothers body naked he condemns in this respect curiosity alone f Ex sola curiositate non excedâ—t culpam venialem but yet with so great indulgence that he holds it onely for a venial sin And because vice unto what excesse soever it may arrive cannot take away that natural confusion which â—…lls on a man and woman in beholding one another all naked to the intent he â—ight remove from them this shame if he could which else might hinder them from contenting their curiofity and to take this shameful pleasure which he permits them when occasion presents it self he lays down for his second conclusion g Personae diversi sexus nudae è remoto loco brevissimo tempore it a ut non detur occasio notabilis emotionis ob solam curiositatem aspici possunt Ibid. n 218. that one may behold the naked bodies of persons of different sexes of more curiosity without mortal Sin provided that one behold them at a distance and for a short time in such manner that place be not given to some notable emotion But a little after he overturns these clauses and these restrictions speaking in this manner of persons of different sexe h E loco proximo longiori tempore communiter regulariter loquendo ob probabile periculum in praxi censeo absque mortali sectari eas non posse quidquid speculativè alii excusent à meâ—tali qua in re quisque satisfaciaâ— suae conscientiae Ipse enim aspectus damnatur tantùm quia periculosus moraliter Ibid. n. 218. I believe that they cannot be beheld nearhand and for a long time without mortal Sin considering these things practically and as they ordinarily happen by reason of the danger to which such would probably be exposed notwithstanding there are others who considering this case onely in general and in the theorie exempt them from mortal Sin In this every one ought to follow the judgement of his own conscience For this beholding cannot be condemned but because it is commonly dangerous That is to say that although his own opinion be favourable enough to corrupt passions yet notwithstanding the contrary opinion which is yet more favorable is also probable at the least considered in it self and in general without particular circumstances which may make it evil and that it may be defended in dispute and in discourse and which indeed some do defend and consequently may be followed without sin according to that maxime and reasoning which is common with this sort of people This is the reason why this Jesuit complying therewith as he that knows not what it is to torment any person after he had simply spoken his own thought leaves every one to his own conscience quà in re quisque satisfaciat suae conscientiae Thereby testifying that he treats of a thing which cannot be absolutely condemned And that he might yet give more assurance to carnal curiosity and concupiscence he attempts to cover it with this reason a Ipse enim aspectus damnatur tanâ—ùm quia periculosus moraliter Looking is not blamed but that it is ordinarily dangerous Escobar hath recollected and couched in a few words all that which Filliutius hath written upon this point For he saith generally that b Locutio rerum tâ—rpium ex se res indifferens est ..... ob curiositatèm tantum vellevitatem sublato periculo aut alie malo fine veniale peccatum est ob delectationem verâ— ex narratione non excedit venialem culpam Escobar tract 1. Exam. 8. c. 1. n. 2. p. 1348. to speak of dishonest things is a thing indifferent in it self And a little after speaking out of more curiosity and lightnesse taking away the danger or other evil end is but a venial Sin And in the end he concludes that to talk thereof for the pleasure we take or receive by the discourse of such things can be but a venial Sin And in the following page n. 4. demanding what evil may he in dishonest looks he answers c Aspectus rerum turpium ob delectationem tantùm naturalem omni pericule sublato transeundi ad veneream venialis culpa tantùm est Ibid. n. 4. p. 139. To behold dishonest things for natural pleasure onely is but a venial Sin provided that one bring not himself in danger to go on forward unto carnal pleasure And some lines after to behold these of curiosity is but a venial Sin provided one be out of danger of proceeding unto carnal pleasure He is also more hardy then Filliutius who permits or at least passes by as small faults all sorts of beholding all parts of the body except those which nature obliges us to cover For he declares that this exception is not absolutely necessary d Enimvero si essit aspectus partium quas pudor velat vel ipsius concubitus speculativè quidem non damnarem practicè tamen sub mortali damâ—andxm existimo ob periculum faciliter transeundi ad illicita pag. 139. As for me saith he if one look on those parts of the body which natural modesty obliges us to hide or even a man in the act with a woman I will not condemn him considering the thing in it self and in general all be it that in the practique I believe that it ought to be condemned of mortal Sin because there is therein danger to passe to that which is unlawful If he condemn this look it is not because he doth acknowledge it to be absolutely evil but onely because of the danger therein of committing and passing on from an action lawful to that which is not lawful And to shew yet better the conformity of the opinions of these Jesuits who agree also with the most part of the rest who have written on this subject it is worthy to be observed that as Filliutius after had said what he could to take away or diminish the sin of impurity which is found
their vows but an occasion to speak hereof yet more to purpose will be presented when we treat of confession and of the vows of Religion III. POINT Of Unfaithfulness in conversation and common discourse SECT I. An expedient which the Jesuits give for to deceive the World and to take a false Oath even before a Judge without perjury THe Jesuits have the reputation commonly to be Masters of equivocations and one may see it indeed that it is not without cause For to establish this kind of knowledge in the world and to facilitate the practice amongst all sorts of persons they do all that an affectionate Master can do for his profession and for his disciples to make them perfect in his Trade 1. First of all they give rules of equivocations then they note divers forms of making them and finally to facilitate the knowledge and practice of them they make themselves some equivocations which they propose as models and examples whereby to teach others to make the like 2. They determine the occasions wherein they may be made use of or rather without bounds or restraint they give liberty in almost all sorts of occasions to make use of them and some times even without any occasion or reason 3. They shew how they are to be made use of and give the method as well for persons of discretion as for more simple and more grosse 4. They give an invention to maintain the possession and use of equivocation so that there is no sort of person that can by any means whatsoever hinder from making use of them without any scruple These four points shall be so many fections of this title which is of Unfaithfulness in words and common discourse SETC. II. Rules and Examples of equivocation taken out of the Books of the Jesnits FIrst of all they declare that if one inquire whether the Prince be at Court a Jurare verbis aequivocis sine justa causa v. c. quod Princeps sit in aula intelligendo pictum lethale peccatum affirmat Lessius probabilius Sanchez negat Escobar tract 1. exam 1. num 35. pag. 76. it is permitted to assure him without any necessity and even to swear without any great sin that he is there though he be not there intending that he is there in picture This is the opinion of Sanchez and Escobar who declare plain enough that one may affirm it simply without any sin because they acknowledge it not to be other than a venial sin to affirm it with an oath without any just cause sine justa causa so that a small occasion would suffice them to discharge this oath of all sin Filliutius speaking of mental restriction which is permitted according to the rules of Divinity brings many examples which he took out of Suarez which he gives for a model b Talem ait Suarez esse illam Non comedi intelligendo hodie cum interrogans putet alioqui non comedisse rem illam Behold here an example saith he which Suarez reports You may say I have not eaten of such a dish intending to day though the intention of him that asked were to know if you had ever eaten of it Another example is this c Item illam Petrus non est domi cum tamen revera sit Verbum enim est sumitur à dicente pro comedit Denique dici potest de aliis similibus Filliutius qq mor. tom 2. tract 25. c. 11. n. 327. d. 204. You may say Peter is not at home Petrus non est domi which signifies ordinarily that he is not in the house though he be there taking this word est for to signifie he eats so that you have a design to say that he does not eat in the house And we may judge of other like sorts of speaking equivocally in the same manner And a little before proposing some examples of equivocation in the same place whence they were taken which I reported before he hath put this foremost d Afferri solent exempla aliquot Et primo ejns qui promisit exterius aliquid sine intentione promittendi Si enim interrogetur an promiserit negare potest intelligendo se non promisisse promissione obligante sic etiam jurare Ibid. They are accustomed saith he to relate some examples of equivocations for to make their Doctrine and rules to be better understood as in the first place of him who outwardly promises a thing without an intent to promise For if one asked whether he had promised or no he may deny it meaning that he had not promised with a promise obliging and with this restriction he may also swear He presupposes without doubt that perjury cannot be committed more to purpose then to support an equivocation which is made purposely to hide some deceit and unfaithfulness Sanchez saith the same thing and yet more and for to be better understood he reduces the general thesis to a particular case e Quoties quit sive vere sive ficte promittens matrimonium immunis est ab aliquam cansam ab implendi obligatione potest à Judice vocatus jurare se non promisisse intelligendo it a ut teneatur implere Sanchez op mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 32. p. 29. So often as saith he a person who hath promised marriage to another whether it were made sincerely or onely in appearance is discharged by any reason from holding his promise being called before a Judge he may swear he hath not made this promise meaning he hath not so made it as to be obliged to observe it And that it may be known what reason he requires for this he holds f Non tantùm quando causa est certa non im plendi etiam quoties sapient is judicio est proba bile non teneri servare quia potest amplectendo opinionem probabilem existimare se tuta conscientia non obligatum Ibid. that it is not necessary that the pretence upon which he grounds his belief that he is not obliged to marry her to whom he hath passed his word be true or certain but it sufficeth that it have some appearance of truth and that it be probable Because saith he following a probable opinion he may perswade himself in conscience that he is not obliged He had reported before an example taken out of other Authors who teach g Qui docent cum qui nummos mutuo acceptos solvit posse à Judica rogatum de mutuo jurare se illud non accepisse intelligendo it a ut teneatur illud solvere Atque idem dicendum est si quacunque alia ex causa ab eo mutuo solvendo liber esset Atque idem credo si tunc non teneretur solvere eo quod terminuâ— ad quem mutuum datum suit non est impletus vel prae paupertate excusatur debitor à â—unc solvendo Ibid. That a person who hath payed the money which he borrowed being examined by a
which we see clearly and totally the object with consideration and reflection as when one is perfectly awaked For it may come to pass that even when one is awake he may think so little of that which he doth as may not be sufficient to sin mortally His opinion therefore is that the knowledge which is necessary to most obdurate sinners to make them consider and see the evil which they do must be as great and as perfect as it can be in the most virtuous persons who have not their passions nor their evil habits and that without this knowledge they cannot sin mortally that is to say he will have a man that is in darkness and at midnight to see as clear as he who is at high noon and a blind man to perceive and judge colours as well as he who hath his eyes sound and intire For passions and vices and evil habits are properly the darkness and blindness of the soul and to pretend farther as he doth that for want of a full and perfect knowledge a man given up to vice and accustomed to sin sins not mortally is as if he should say that he could not sin mortally in that estate and the more this man advances in darkness and blindness continuing this wicked life by so much he shall be farther off from sin and from power to sin untill that by the consummation of his evil custom being also the consummation of his blindness he be made intirely and absolutely without power to sin Layman quotes Sanchez and Vasquez for this opinion and he embraces it with them in his first Book tr 1. chap. 4. pag. 22. I rehearse not his words for brevity sake Amicus is of the same opinion and saith that u Advertentia ad peccatum mortale requisita debet esse plena perfecta per firmum judicium de malitia actus vel periculo illius Amicus tom 3. disp 17. sect 8. n. 172. p. 205. the knowledge and reflection which is necessary to mortal sin ought to be full and perfect with the judgement assured of the evil or of the danger of doing it Sanchez demands onely time and means for deliberation with the knowledge of the evil but Amicus will have one go on to do evil with a firm and assured judgement Escobar follows his brethren where he demands x Quidnam ad mortale peccatum requiritur Plena expressa adverventia malitiae aut saltem dubium Escobar tr 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275. what is necessary to make a sin mortal he answers that there is requisite a full and actual knowledge or at least an express and formal suspition of the evil which is done It is not sufficient according to these new Doctors to sin mortally that the knowledge which they pretend to he necessary thereunto be full and perfect but they will also have it to be particular and determinate So that if in one action there occurre many wickednesses many sins or many circumstances which augment or multiply sin they must be known all distinctly a Ad unius generis malitiam advertere non est satis ad malitiam quoqualterius generis contrahâ—ndam sed oportet ad hanc quoque advertere aut debuisse advertere Sanchez supra num 8. pag. â— When there occurre saith Sanchez in one and the same action two sorts of different wickednesses it is not sufficient to perceive one to make himself guilty of both But we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledge of the other Without this he holds that we are not guilty but according to the proportion of the knowledge we have as he saith expressly afterwards b Si pars malitzae cognita sit aut vincibili et ignorata ca culpae imputatur Ibid. cap. 16. num 10. pag. 70. If we know one part of the malice or if we be ignorant of it by our own fault it shall be imputed for a sin Whence he draws this conclusion which we have already reported When a man sins with a woman whom he knows to be not his wife but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman he is guilty of fornication but not of incest He stays not there For it is not sufficient for them that a man hath heretofore known an action to be wicked they hold that if he hath forgotten it or if he yet know it but doth not actually think of it and does not make reflection upon it so as to perceive at the very time when it is committed that it is evil he offends not God at all at least not grieviously Cajetan retrenches a little the licentiousness of this opinion declaring that he who by inadvertence or forgetfulness commits a sin which he knows to be a mortal sin ceases not to be guilty thereof if he be not so disposed that if he had thought of it he would not have committed it But Sanchez on the contrary assures us that this condition is not at all necessary And after he hath faithfully reported the Doctrine of Cajetan in these terms c Quinto deducitur quid sentiendum sit de doctrina Cajetanâ— jui 1. 2. q. 6. art 8. ad fiaem in Summa verb. Inconsideratio vers Adverte tamen quem â—oi sequitur Anvilla n. 1. ubi ait ineuntem contractum quem usurarium esse novit v. l opus aliquod prohibitum prohibitienis conscium sacientem ac tuac cum reco it actu excusari à mortali quod ita affectus erat ut si recoluisset vitaret utpote qui firmum cavendi mortalis propositum haberet He that hath made a contract which he knows to be usurarious or who doth some other unlawful act knowing well that it is forbidden but not remembring it to be such when he doth it is exempt from mortal sin provided he were then so disposed that if he had remembred he would have abstained from doing it because he hath a firm resolution to eschew mortal sin In the sequel of his discourse he enters into a farther explication of the opinion of this Doctor d ubi id propositum exigere videtur quò obliver illa conseatur invincibi'is excuset Sanchez oper mor. l. 1. c. 16. n 28. p. 73. It seems to him saith he that this resolution is required as absolutely necessary to render the forgetfulness innocent and to excuse the person But he meddles not with it but onely to refute it adding e At jure â—ppâ—mo id propositum nihil referre bene docer Zumel 1. 2. q. 76 art 3 d. 2. diff 6. quippe solum attendendum est an aliqua cogitatio operanti in mâ—ntem vâ—neâ—it co tempore qâ—o praeceptum implere debeat Si eâ—…m ea non veniente in mentem immemor juris vel facti praeceptum transgâ—ediatur est obliâ—io invincâ—bilu excusat Ibid. that others hold with great reason that this resolution is to no purpose and we are onely to consider
formal intention to blaspheme God And a little after to assist them herein we think that it is in every respect to good purpose that the Confessor know from his mouth his intention and what moved him to blaspheme and if he answers that he was not touched with any despite against God but against Man or against Beast to whom they had a pique the Confessor shall not repute them to be Blasphemers nor destitute of Grace This man that blasphemeth against God and against Jesus Christ though he doth it through transport of choler against Men or against Beasts though he doth it without passion and in cold blood making use of these blasphemies in common discourse as ornaments of his language yet ought not according to Bauny to be treated in his confession as a blasphemer though the words and blasphemies he uttereth be contumelious opprobrious and dishonourable to the most venerable members of the Son of God if he have not truly had some indignation against God if he was not touched with some despite against God if he have not done it with a formal intent to dishonour God and the Confessor ought to referre himself in all this to what the blasphemer shall say after that he hath been informed of the matter from himself and hath knowledge of it from his own mouth If this be true as this Casuist assures us we must of necessity avouch that there are hardly any blaspemies or that to blaspheme we must have the heart of a Devil or a damned Spirit and hate God with a formal will to displease and dishonour him And when a person is so forlorn as to fall into this miserable estate if he neither resent nor acknowledge it as it easely befals him because of that blindness and hardness which is the ordinary consequence and punishment of these great crimes and pretends not to have this evil intention of dishonouring God by despite and hatred towards him which induceth him to blaspheme his ignorance and freedom from evil intention will be sufficient to every such person to exempt him from crime according to the Divinity of these Jesuits and Bauny will absolve him easily and not repute him for all this for a blasphemer nor as one destitute of grace He speaks after the same manner of cursings in the chap. 6. pag. 47. saying that to make cursing a mortal sin it ought to proceed of a will deliberately bent upon the ill which is desired to fall on others From the same principle treating of scandal in the chap. 46. pag. 719. and speaking of a woman who adorns her self proudly and who pranks and trims up her self to please her Husband or to observe the custom of the country he declares that allbeit the said woman knows well the evil effect which her diligence in adorning her self will work upon the bodyes and souls of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious garments yet she sins not in using them And to give a reason thereof he maintains it as a maxime and general rule that we are not responsible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action nisi fuerint intenti formaliter that is to say as he expounds himself unless we effectually seek will or procure them Filliutius speaking also of scandal proposes the same example and case and explicates it in the same manner e Sexto sâ— famina sciat se turpiter ab aliquo amart non peccat quoties se offert ejus conspectui modo non intendat hunc provocare ad turpem sui amorem Filliutius tom 2. tr 28 c. 10. num 232. pag 331. Though a woman saith he knows that a man loves her dishonestly she sins not how often soever she presents her self before him and in his view so that she have not an intention to stir up the dishonest love which he hath towards her Sanchez having also proposed before this same question namely f An saemina conspectui viri se offerens à quo se turpiter amari no vit peccat mortaliter peccato scandalt quando nullatenus cum ad sui amorem provocare intendit Sanchez op mor. lib. 1. cap 6. num 16. pag 19 whether a woman who presents her self to the view of a man whom she well knows doth love her dishonestly do commit a mortal sin of scandal when she hath no intention to stir him up to love her He reports the common opinion which condemns this action of mortal sin g Communiter cam Doctores peccart mortaliter censent quando nulla necessitate ducitur sed ut sâ—ae voluptati satisfaciat indifferenter hac illac discurrit Ibid. The common opinion saith he of the Doctors is that she sinneth mortally when without any necessity but onely for her own pleasure and satisfaction she gads indifferently into every place In the sequel he propounds the opinion of those who excuse this woman from mortal sin though she go abroad without necessity and know the evil which she must cause by her coming abroad h Aliis tamen placet hanc non peccare mortaliter quod ea occasio potius ex propria adamantis turpiter malitia sit accepta quam à muliere data quae jure suo ac libertate sibi concessa utitur Ibid. n. 17. There are others saith he who hold that she sins not mortally because he that loveth her dishonestly doth rather take this oocasion of offence and from his own malice then she gives it him by the use of her own right and liberty Finally after he hath considered these two opinions and the reasons on which they found them he concludes for this latter in favour of this woman whom he declares innocent i Et ideo quamvis priorem opinionem probabilem credam existimo veriorem esse hanc posteriorem ut non ob id teneatur faemina sua se egrediendi domo standi ad ostium domus vel fonestram discurrondi per civitatem libertate privare Ibid. And for that saith he though I also believe the first opinion to be probable but I esteem notwithstanding the latter to be more true which is that this woman is not obliged to deprive her self of this liberty which she hath of going abroad from her house to stand at her door or window or to walk in the Town He demands no other thing of her k ut nullatenus cum ad sui amorem provocare intendat but that she have no intention to cause him to sin who loves her And after this he justifies the offence which she gives him out of a frolick and without necessity and which she might easily avoid if she pleased So that although this woman knows that she is about to destroy a man by an action which is altogether free and which she may easily eschew she shall not be at all guilty for his death according to the Jesuits if she had not a formal design to kill him If any should
grace and receiving absolution He saw well enough that this passe was dangerous and that the answer he was about to make to this question was of it self odious and scandalous For this reason he causes to march in his front a good number of Authors as it were to sound the ford and to be his guarde The first he produces is de Baia whom he makes mouth to them all and to answer absolutely yea He alledges Navarre after making him to confirm this opinion and to assure us that we may not constrain this penitent to abandon that traffick which is so perillous unto him He puts Emanuel Sa last saying that he declareth that upon the penitents refusal to quit his traffique we may not refuse him absolution provided that he and those others with whom he is accustomed to sin found their refusal upon some good and lawful cause as not to be able to dispense therewith without giving the world subject to talk of or that they themselve should thence receive some inconvenience For otherwise say they he speaks of others whom he cited we cannot refuse them absolution dummodo firmiter proponant so that they strongly insist on it After these Authors he is more confident and speaks with more assurance p. 712. saying that though the occasion of sin be as it were certain neverthelesse because it is not affected nor sought out in a frolick and without necessity because we cannot avoid the dangers that are joyned thereunto without scandal without concerning therein our honours and our goods it follows that to persevere therein is no fault by the fourth rule of right quod non est licitum in lege necessitas facit licitum what is not lawful by law is made lawful by necessity The same man in the 5. q. pag. 715. demands what is to be done with men-servants and maid-servants Cousins of both sexes Masters and Maids who mutually engage and aid one another in sin or such as take occasion from the house where they are or occasions they have therein To answer this question he makes use of the same artifice he made use of in answering the former which is to make others to speak and to cover himself under their shadow When the relapses saith he are frequent and as it were dayly Navarre in 3. chap. num 31. Graff l. 1. c. 30. num 23. Suarez part 3. t. 4. d. 32. s 2. holds that they must be sent back And a little after If notwithstanding add they they offend onely rarely together as once or twice a month they may be absolved concurrentibus quatuor praedictis quorum quatuor scilicei causa notabilis est quod non possint sine magno incommodo detrimento separari Those four things concurring of which four the remarkable cause is that they cannot be separated without great inconvenience and dammage See here the Law of God put in ballance with temporal goods on one side the Law of God forbids sin and to avoid it commands to flie from the occasions of it on the other side commodity interest and pretence of honour ingage in perpetual danger and in as it were certain occasion of sin In these occasions the good which is found in these temporal things is no longer slender and of no consequence as Bauny spoke before to remove envie out of the number of mortal sin he declares here on the behalf of Emanuel Sa that it is a good and lawful cause and on the part of Navarre that it is a very considerable occasion and finally he doth not onely make use of it as of a good excuse but he forms thereout a kind of necessity which dispenseth with the Law of God abusing this text of right a Qâ—od non est licitum in lege necessitas faciâ— licitum That necessity makes that lawful which is not lawful by the Law which is to be understood onely of things which are indifferent in themselves and not of things which are in themselves and essentially naught and dishonest as these of which I speak are In consequence of this principle and this rule the Jesuits judging also of sin by the object and matter when this object is spiritual and the matter invisible or little exteriourly the sins can be onely sleight ones according to their judgement Whence it comes to pass that they acknowledge hardly any mortal sins of curiosity idleness pride vanity and other spiritual vices of like kinde and these vices must passe unto some sensible matter and different from their own and in some notable outward excesse to make them mortal according to them as we have already remarked speaking of coveteousness concerning which Escobar relating the opinions of the principal Divines of the Society acknowledges no crime if it be not accompanied with some circumstance contrary to Justice and when he treats of pride and ambition and of boasting he finds also nothing which approacheth so much as near to mortal sin if this vice do not proceed unto some great excesse against the honor of God or our Neighbour if by a perversion altogether extraordinary it do not blinde a man so far as to make him say with the King of Tyre I am God See here the passage entire which deserves to be represented also here though we have already rehearsed it elsewhere because it is very remarkable b Tunc ad mortale accederet quando aut graviter Dâ—i revereatia laederetur aut proximi fama Fit equidem cum gravi Dei irreverentia cum in morem Regis Tyri dixerit satuus Ego sum Deus proximue outem gravi injuria afficitur quando quis cum Pharisaeo jactat Non sum sicut iste Publicanus Escobar tr 2. exam 2. num 9. pag. 291. If boasting do not ably offend against the honour of God or the reputation of our Neighbour it proceeds unto mortal sin now the honour of God is remarkably burt by pride and boasting when a man is such a fool as to say with the King of Tyre I am God and when he boasteth himself like the Pharisee in saying I am not like this Publican he offends grievously his Neighbour namely him whom he so speaks of These two cases excepted and some other such like which he observes he holds that ambition vanity and boasting cannot proceed unto mortal sin and that so long as these vices continue that they are of their own peculiar nature so long as vanity continues simple vanity pride is simple pride and they exceed not their own proper matter they are ordinarily but venial sins By consequence of this same principle sins which are committed against vertues purely spiritual and against the most Divine and elevated things which we enjoy such as are the Word of God and his Truth Religion and the most Holy Functions of Religion provided they be not extraordinary are onely venial and it is the excesse onely that renders them mortal and this excesse also must not be common This made Emanuel
design to commit if he could all venial sins sinneth onely venially Escobar makes thereof a probleme proposing it in this manner l Habens voluntatem peccata omnia venialia perpetrandi peccat non peccat mortaliter Escobar Theol. Mor. l. 3. pag. 83. It may be held that he who hath a will to commit all venial sins sinneth mortally and it may also be said that he doth not sin mortally The reason for this second part of this probleme is the very principle that we now speak of m Non peccat quia malitia interni actus voluntat is desumitur ab objecto prout propenitur à ratione Sed objectum hujus internae voluntat is sunt omnia venialia nulla major malitia proponitur à ratione praeter venialem Ergo interna volunt as perpetrandi omnia peccata venialia non potest esse culpa lethalis Because that saith he the malice of an inward action of the will is taken from the object towards which it warps according as it is represented to it by the understanding But the object of this will are all venial sin and the malice which the understanding represents unto it is but venial and for that cause a will to commit all venial sins can be but a venial sin So that a man may have a will to commit all the venial sins which he can commit in the matter of theft and all those which can be committed by intemperance and by all other vices without sinning otherwise then venially that is to say that without mortal sin we may have a will to steal all the goods of the world if we could taking it at many times and every time in small quantity which according to this rule of these Casuists could not be matter sufficient for a mortal sin and so in the other vices and sins The same Escobar in the abridgement which he made of moral Divinity in one sole Book proposeth the same question but not any longer as a probleme but as a resolution and an opinion constantly assented to by the Society For he professes to relate no others and to advance nothing of himself no more then from strange Authors n Rogo auex numero venialium exurgat moâ—ta'e Unde v. g. per impossibile quie omnia peccata venialia committeret culpam levem non excederet Escobar tract 2. exam 1. c. 12. n. 57. p. 385. It is demanded saith he whether of many venial sins one mortal may be made and by consequent if one committed all venial sins which is impossible if the fault were more then a sleight one He confesses himself that this case is so extravagant that it is impossible Yet he forbears not to propose and resolve it in this sort o Negative respondeo cum Granado 1.2 cont 6. tract 2. d. 2. sect 7. docente volentem uno actu omnia peccata venialia perpetrare solum venialiter delinquere Then with Granades who holds that he who hath a will to commit all at once and by one sole act all venial sins sins onely venially There is some cause to doubt whether the question be more strange or the answer For if it be a thing altogether unsufferable and which would have been grievously punished in the Church heretofore to propose a case and an excesse so extraordinary which no man could not onely not commit but which even could not come possibly into the heart of the most forlorn in vice it is not less strange to endeavour to make it be believed that he who would commit this excesse which passeth the corruption of all men that is to say who would commit more wickedness then either he or any other could possibly act and would do this deliberately and out of more malice should commit onely a small sin Who can perswade himself that a person can be in favour with God who is resolved to offend him as much as he can so that he may not be damned and doing all the evil that he is able against him with resolution to do yet also more if he could do it without destroying himself If a child should deal thus with his Father or a friend with his friend or a servant with his Master he would make himself an object of publick hate and an abomination to the whole world and there would be no person who would not judge them entirely unworthy of the quality and name of a Son friend or servant And neverthelesse these Jesuits pretend that he who demeans himself thus towards God ceases not to be in truth his servant his friend and his son and that he doth nothing which deserves displeasure and that he may not be taxed of mortal sin Sanchez proposes a case which is not far from that of Escobar He speaks of a man who entring into a Religious Order had made a resolution not to observe any rule or constitution of that Order nor of all the counsels or commands of his Superiours but those things onely which he could not neglect without mortal sin and for all the rest whereto he thought not himself obliged under the pain of mortal sin as vigils silence abstinence Justes of the Order and other such like Religious observations and mortifications of the spirit of the body he would not trouble himself at all and would dispense with himself as much as he could He asks what judgement ought to be made of a Frier who should be in such an estate whether his resolution and will which he hath absolutely to violate all the points of his rule and all the duties of his profession wherein he believed he should not sin at all or but venially should be a mortal sin whether this would hinder him from being a good Monk and whether this would be a great fault against the obligation which he had to move towards perfection The answer of this Doctor is that such a man ceased not for all that to be in a good estate before God and that he should be a good Frier though not perfect and that he sinned not at least not mortally against the obligation he had in the quality of a Religious person to pursue after perfection One of his reasons is that because he sins but venially as he supposes in violating severally every one of the points of his rule and the regular observations which he is resolved not to observe the will which he hath to transgresse them all is but a will to sin venially and which hath for its object venial sins onely and which by consequence it self could be no other then a venial sin We shall consider more particularly this case of Sauchez and his answer in handling the duties of Friers and perhaps elsewhere speaking of mortal and venial sin I was willing onely to mark this here by the by as a dependence and conclusion of the principle which is the subject of this Chapter that the greatness of the sin ought to estimated from and according to
Deiparae in which there will be found very little if all that be thrown out which he hath invented himself It had need to be copied out in a manner whole and entire to make appear all the ridiculous and extravagant things that it contains and all the excesses and errours into which he is fallen pursuing his own thoughts and imaginations having not taken so much care to given the Verigin true praises as to produce new and extraordinary which even in this do dishonour her and cannot be pleasing to her Because the praises which are to be given to Saints as well as the honour which we are to render unto God himself ought not to be founded on any thing but truth I will onely rehearse some of the most considerable places of this Author He maintains confidently that Saint Anne and Saint Joachim were sanctified from the wombs of their Mothers and that there is more reason to attribute to them this priviledge then to Jeremy and Saint John Baptist He confesses d Nullus est proâ—me in asseâ—tione hac sed neque contra me cum non sit hacterus disputata Peza in Eâ—ucidarioâ— 2. tr 8. c. 3. p. 547. that there are no persons that are for him or against him in this proposition because none have spoken of it before himself If there be no Author for him they are all against him and the silence of the Saints and all the Doctors that were before him is a manifest condemnation of his presumption and of his rashness in so declaring himself an innovator in an unheard of novelty in the Church in a matter of Religion Molina hath done the same thing where he hath gloried to have invented the middle knowledge in the matter of Grace and of Predestination with such insolence that he is not affraid to say that if it had been known in the first ages of the Church the heresie of the Pelagians possibly had never risen Maldonat who is one of the Commentators on Scripture whom they esteem doth often declare himself the Author of new sences which he gives the Word of God against the consent even of the Fathers many times in his books we meet such expressions as these e 〈◊〉 habere Antorem qui na sâ—ntret ..... â—ames qur quot ligisse me memini â—…oâ—…s sic explicâ—nt ego autem alâ—…er sentio Malden I would find some Author who was of this opinion or all Authors whom I remember to have read expound this text in this manner but I expound it otherwise Which is a manifest contempt of the Council of Trent which forbids to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers and an imitation of the language of Calvin and other Hereticks renouncing the tradition of the Holy Fathers and all the antiquity of the Church If Escobar could have condemned this confidence of his Fraternity he would have condemned them onely of venial sin f Novas opinio nes novas vestes exponere vâ—nialis tantùm culpâ— est Escob â—r 2. exam 2. n. 10. p. 291. Qaia ejusmodi inventione quis gestit aliorum laudem captare Ibid. To introduce saith he rovel opinions and new sorts of habits into the Church is onely a venial sin He hath cause to talk of new opinions as of new fashions of Garments for in the new Divinity of the Jesuits who hold all things probable there needs no more reason to quit an ancient opinion then to change the fashion of apparel and if there be any ill in it it is very small and that too must come from some peculiar circumstance as from vanity or ambition Though this censure of Escobar be very gentle Molina and Maldonat as more ancient and more considerable in the Society then he will not submit thereunto and Poza is so far from acknowledging that there is any ill in inventing new opinions that he had a design in his Book not to produce therein any other then the inventions and imaginations of his own mind and for this reason in the entrance and preface he makes an Apology for novelty in which he hath forgotten nothing that he believed might be of use to make it recommendable and to give it admission as well into the Church as into the World imploying for this purpose authority examples and reasons He rehearses many passages out of Seneca saying g Patet omaibus veritas noadum est occupata qui â—nâ—e nos fueruut non domini sed duces fuerunt multum ex illa futuris relictum est Seneca Ep. 33. Dum unusquisque mavult credere quam judicare numquam de vita judicatur semper creditur that truth is open exposed to all the World that none have yet taken possession thereof that they who were before us were our guides but we are not therefore their slaves that there remains yet enough for those who come after us that every one liking better to believe then judge they are always content to believe and never judge at all how they ought to live And a little after h Non alligo me ad aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus est mihi censendi jus Itaque aliquem jubebo sententiam dividere de beata vita I addict not my self to any one in particular of these great Stoical Philosophers I have a right to judge them and to give my advice upon them This is the cause why some times I follow the opinion of one and sometimes I change something in the judgement of another It is clear that these passages go to establish a right for reason above authority which had been tolerable in an Heathen who had no other guide but Reason and who speaks of questions and things which cannot be regulated but by Reason But a Christian a Monk a man who interposes himself to write in the Church in matters of Faith for the instruction and edification of the faithful to make use of the maximes and terms of a Pagan to ruine the obedience of Faith and the tradition which is one of its principal foundations staving off the Faithful from the submission which they owe to the Word of God and the authority of the Holy Fathers is a thing unsufferable in the Church of God this is almost to turn it Pagan and to give every one a liberty to opine in matters of Religion as the Heathen Philosophers did in matters of science and morality wherein they followed their senses onely and proper thoughts He alledges also some passages of Catholick Authors as that same of Tertullian i Dominus noster Christus veritatem se non consuetudinem nominavit Tertull. Our Lord Jesus Christ said that he was the truth and not the custom And this other of Lactantius k Sapicntiam sibi adimuut qui sine ullo judicio invent a majorum probant ab aliis pecudum more ducuntur Sed hoc cos fallit quod majorum nomine posite non putant fieri posse ut ipsi plus
sufficient to excuse sin but probability of a probability There is no appearance that the Jesuits would make use of this doctrine in their temporal affairs And in effect it is not good save onely to give them power to dispose of mens consciences according to their fancies and so sport themselves with the Salvation of Souls by submitting them to the inventions of their spirits and their judgements as a safe rule for the guidance of conscience which is a thing never heard of in the Church before them Azor handling che fame point saith l Quando opiniones sunt aeque probabiles jure possumus minus tutam in agondo praeferro immo etiamsi quae minus tuta est minus probabil is habeatur Azor. l. 2. c. 16. p. 126. that when two opinions are probable the one as well as the other we may justly preferre in the practice that which is lesse sure though we believe it also to be less probable He is not content onely to say that we may follow the less probable but to heighten the esteem of it above others he adds that we may follow also the less safe And though he confesses that none ever advanced it so far saying Haec authores non tradiderunt he forbears not to propose this opinion whereof he is the Inventor by his own confession as a probable opinion and sure in conscience because allbeit he want authority he believes he hath a good and sufficient reason for it Ratione tamen efficaci concluditur saith he following the maxime of his Fraternity that to make an opinion probable it is sufficient to have one authority or reason which we believe to be good This good reason is that m Quia id bene agitur quod prudenter agitur sed qui aliorum consilio ducitur prudenter agit ergo qui in agendo opinionem Doctorum probabilem sequitur prudenter rem gerit what is prudently done is well done and We do that prudently which we do by the counsel of others by consequence he that doth follow the opinion of learned men acts prudently I leave it to those who make profession of logick to examine this Syllogisme according to their rules whether it be in good form or not I will content my self to say without digging deeper into this matter for the clearing up and making it to be better understood that if to act in the manner this Jesuit speaks of be to act prudently it must needs be that this prudence comes not from the Father of lights since it carries us to preferre something before God and our own Salvation and not to have so much love for him nor for the truth which we see more clear and certain as for our own sence and some secret passion which causeth us to embrace and follow that which is less true and sure Dicaftillus extends this prudence so far as to preferre a probable opinion before that which is certain and safe even in the matter of the Sacraments For that it is saith he to act prudently For example n Assero si quis probabiliter credat se jam confessum de illo mortali vel ic non commisisse tale peccatum vel consessionem prius foctam de â—llo probabiliter putet esse validam vel probabiliter putet tales aut tales cir cumstantias non esse necessario confitendas non teneri ad confessionem etiamsi forte probabilius sit consenfisse vel peccasse mortaliter Ratio est quia licitum est cuique seqai opinionem probabilem etiamsi contratia sit probabilior quod principium satis receptum est in re morali Suarez de p. d. 22. lib. 9. n. 6. Henriq l. 5. c. 4. Sanchez f. l. 1. c. 10. n. 76. Dicastillus de Confessione tract 4. d. 9. d. 8. n. 134. If any one believeth probably that he hath already confessed such or such a mortal sin or that he hath not committed it or that the confession he hath made thereof is valid or that he is not necessarily obliged to confess such and such circumstances he will not be obliged to confesse it though possible it may be more probable that he hath consented unto mortal sin or that he hath committed it The reason is that it is lawful for every one to follow a probable opinion though the contrary be more probable this principle being sufficiently received in morality as Suarez saith If this principle be sufficiently received in the Morals of Suarez and his companions it is not received by the Saints which governed the Church or rather by whom the Holy Spirit did govern it wherefore not to speak of others Saint Augustin saith expressely that o Graviter peccat in rebus ad salutem animae pertinentibus vel eo solo quod cert is incerta praeponeret S. Aug. l. 1. de Baptilm contra Donat. c. 3. in things which have reference to the Salvation of the soul a man shall sin grievousty in this onely that be preferres that which is uncertain before that which is certain And by the same rule that which is less certain and assured before that which is more For that which is less certain is uncertain in comparison of that which is more and the intention of this great Saint as well as of all the rest is to teach us that when eternal Salvation is concerned we ought always to take the most certain ways and that we cannot take too much security in a matter of so great importance Nulla satis magna securitas ubi periclitatur aeternit as No security can be enough where eternity is in question Finally this prudence is not so much as humane and reasonable and we should not approve of it in the conduct of temporal affairs For if a Physitian give unto his patient of two remedies which he hath the more uncertain and ineffectual or if a Consellor in his instructions about a suite or in a Plea of great concernment should make use of evidences and arguments which were more doubtful and suppresse the more certain for any private interest if an Overseer or a Tutor who hath money to put out should not lend it him whom he knew to be the most sure and solvent If all these persons I say acted on this manner would they be esteemed wise or could we say they acted prudently or should we have cause to approve or be content with their conduct It is probable the Jesuits would not make use of such people nor imploy them in their affairs of importance they are onely the things of God and of Salvation wherein they find it good for us to act on this manner and wherein they believe that it is not to act against true prudence In pursuance of all these maximes which are as it were the foundations of all that they say upon this matter Layman and Azor draw diverse consequences to decide many particular questions and difficulties Layman assures us p Doctor alters
of Superiours will depend on the will and the fancy of their inferiours He holds not onely that the priviledge of probability may dispense with an inferiour for the obedience which he owes to his Superiour but also to elevate him above his Superiour and to oblige the Superiour to obey his subject He demands n Tenetur poenitentis opiuionem probabilem confessarius sequi relicta sua probabiliori Tenetur quia poenitens habet jus ad absolutionem opinioni probabili nitens In prooem exam 3. cap. 6. num 27. dag 25. whether a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent and to quit his own which is more probable His answer is that he is obliged thereto because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion hath a right unto absolution So absolution and pardon of sins is no longer a grace and favour unto the sinner according to Escobar but a right and this right is not founded on the Word of God but upon the word of man and upon a probable opinion and even upon the word of a single man who may be the Author thereof and stand single in this opinion according to the Jesuits But as a probable opinion gives right unto a penitent to demand absolution so it might seem that a probable opinion should give a right to a Consessor to refuse it if he judged it neither to be his duty nor to be in his power to give it him But Escobar maintains that he is obliged to give it him renouncing his own right as well as his opinion to submit it to that of his penitent o Quod si Confessario falsa videatur opinio pâ—nitent is debet se accommodare si à probat is autoribus probabilis reputetur Ibid. n. 27. p. 29. and if it happen that the opinion of the penitent appear not onely not probable to the Confessor but that he also believes it assuredly false Escobar wills not to refuse to comply with the will of his penitent and that if the penitent will not submit nor abate any thing of his pretended right the Confessor must accord to what he demands For if he pretend to use rigour and to passe sentence upon this difference these new Doctors who have established themselves judges in the Church and of the Church it self and of the Holy Fathers will almost all with one voice condemn him to give him absolution and in case he fail therein p Vasquez 1.2 tom 1. disp 92. a. 7. n. 4. addit Confessarium non proprium negantem absolutionem secundum opinionem probabilem solum venialiter delinquere At credidero mortaliter pecoare si de mortalibus facta confessio Ibid. n. 27. Vasquez will declare he sinneth mortally if he be an ordinary Confessor as are the Parish Priests or venially if he be a delegate as are the Monks And Escobar with others having no regard at all to this distinction will condemn absolutely them both of mortal sins SECT III. The opinion of Sanchez concerning the probability of opinions WE might produce upon this subject almost as many Authors as there are of the Society because they have in a manner all written of it and they are all agreed in the principal questions so important is this point in their Diviuity of which we may say that it is as it were the foundation and that there upon their Doctrine and their conduct is built But there is none that hath more enlarged and cleared this matter nor by consequence who hath more discovered the spirit of the Society then Sanchez For this purpose I thought meet to give him a title apart Amongst many maximes which he establisheth as fundamentals in this matter this is a principal one a Opinio probabilis est quae rationi alicujus momenti inniâ—tur ita tamen ut pro opposita parte nihil convincens sit Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 6. p. 28. An opinion is probable when it is founded on some considerable reason provided there be nothing to convince the contrary opinion From whence he draws this consequence with Val. b Tunc manere apud aliquem intra opinionis certitudinem quidpiam quando sibi persuadet rationem illius solvi posse aut ab ipsomet aut ab aliis A man may hold an opinion probable when he is perswaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons used for ground thereof And when he is perswaded that neither he nor any other can answer the reasons he hath against an opinion c Licet quis rationem peculiarem habeat contra oppositam sententiam quam ipse solvere nequit sibi solvi non posse videctur non ideo censere debet opposiram aliorum opinionem improbabilem esse ut eam sequi nequeat He ought not to believe for all that if it be held by others that it is not probable so that he may not follow it himself Of which he renders this reason which breathes nothing but modesty and humility d Quiae solo suo jubicio non debet aliorum sententiam improbabilem judicare Ibid. Because he ought not judge of himself alone that the opinion of others is not probable And to make all men resolve to pass by all sorts of difficulties and reasons how strong and insoluble soever they appear he saith that it e Vel eo maxime quod sibi persuadere debeat quotidie contingere subito inveniri solutionem rationum quas quis insolubiles putabat aut ab aliu facile solvi Ibid. happens dayly that new answers are found to reasons which were believed to be invincible And so although one single person or many cannot answer the convincing reasons which are given for an opinion yet they ought perswade themselves that others may do it and that so the contrary opinion ceases not to be probable and by consequence may be followed in conscience So that according to this Author it is lawful to put in practice an opinion which we believe false and pernicious thinking that this own judgement made thereon may possibly be false so there will be nothing which can be capable to retain these libertine spirits nor to hinder them from despising all sorts of reasons and lights how clear and strong indeed soever they be and that by their own judgement and after that from doing what they please They may extend this liberty much more easily to the most certain truths of Religion which have not always convincing reasons for them because they subsist only by authority and faith and if they had a libertine f Sibi persuadeat rationem illius solvi posse ab ipsomet aut ab aliis Supra might easily perswade himswade himself that either he or some other might answer them And if he should not happen on any person who were able to do it he might always imagine that it was not impossible to meet some one hereafter since that as
that as the penitent is obliged to obey the Confessor when he commands just and reasonable things so the Confessor is obliged to absolve the penitent when he is well disposed as he is when he follows a probable opinion And he believes that the Confessor is in such manner obliged to absolve this penitent that if he fail therein he sins sometimes mortally and when that happens not his fault is always great and dangerous the thing being of great consequence according to the opinion of Vasquez and Suarez i Et ita credo esse quia ratio proposita ita suadet ac graviter conqueri jure optimo poenitens potest quod sibi bene disposito anditaque ejus confessione absolutio denegetur Nec levis videtur culpainstitutionis Sacramenti ac confessaris muneri contraria Ibid. n. 24. which he approves being perswaded by their reason and because the penitent will have just cause to complain greatly of him for that being well disposed and confessed absolution was refused him Neitheir can this his fault being contrary to the institution of the Sacraments and Office of a Confessor be little Upon this account the holy Fathers and the first Pastors of the Church had committed many mortal sins in refusing absolution to many penitents who could not want probable reasons to maintain against them that they were well disposed unless perhaps the Doctrine of probability being not yet started in those times the penitents were not so well instructed then as they may be now to maintain and defend their rights and Priviledges which this Doctrine giveth them against their Confessors and to oblige them to renounce their own judgement supported by the authority of all the Doctors ancient and modern to submit to the private opinion of the penitent provided that it be probable and to do for them and let them do themselves what they please Escobar is yet more resolute upon this point then Sanchez For saying that Vasquez holds that if the Confessor be a Monk or some other delegate and not ordinary he sins in this case but venially he is not of his opinion and he maintains with others that absolutely and without any exception at all k At crediderim mortaliter peccare si de mortalibus facta confessio Escob in prooem exam 3. c. 6. n. 27. p. 29. he sins mortally if the penitent in his confession have mentioned any mortal sins If any dared to say that a Physitian is obliged to follow the opinion of his patient though he believe his own to be better and more proper to cure his disease he would be condemned of folly by all the world How then dares any say that a Confessor is obliged to be less sincere and less faithful in the conduct of souls whom he ought to heal of their sins It must needs be of necessity that as these Doctors assure us that secular Justice ought to be more exact and more fixed to truth in the Judgement it makes in temporal things then the sacred Justice of the mysteries of Jesus Christ in the dispensation of Spiritual Wealth and eternal Truths on which depends the Salvation of souls So likewise they must assert that the Physick of souls ought not to be so rational so just and fixed upon their true good as those of the body Sanchez proceeds yet farther and saith that the Confessor sins mortally or dangerously if he absolve not his penitent in submitting to his opinion l Imo dicendum est contra Manuelem n. 28. allegatum quamvis Confessarius falsam esse opinionem poenitentis existimet Though he is perswaded that it is false m Tandem huc usque dicta locum habent quando poenitens est doctus vel ab altis instructus de probabilitate opinionis quam sequitur Sanch. l. 1. c. 9. n. 30. p. 31. when the penitent is learned or instructed in the probability of the opinion which be maintains against him But if the penitent be ignorant and know not that his opinion is probable some believe that the Confessor ought not give him absolution in that estate unless he be upon the point of death in which case they think that he ought to instruct him n Tunc enim ait Salas esse informandum de opinionis probabilitate ne in malo statu decedat Ibid. n. 31. declaring to him that his opinion is probable for fear that he not knowing it should dye impenitent But Sanchez believes that this is also too severe and unjust and he repeats it saying p Verùm ego existimo etiam extra hunc statum eum informandum Ibid. n. 31. As for me I am perswaded that even when he is not in this extremity he ought to instruct him and make him know that his opinion is probable He builds upon this that he ought to consider the Salvation and good of his penitent who otherwise may despise his Confessor and do contrary to that which he hath ordained loving rather to follow his own proper sence and passion then to subject himself unto the advice of his Confessor or at least take counsel of some other for the savegard of his conscience which he pretends the q Quod Confessor vitabit si poenitentem admoneat Confessor may redresse by teaching him that the opinion which he maintains so obstinately and without any reason since he knows it not to be probable is yet held by some Divines He believes also that the a Tunc quia Confessor tenetar ex officio bonum poeaitentis procurare ill que consulere illum admonendo tum quia lex charitatis obligat ad peccatum proximi vitandum Ibid. n. 31. Confessor is obliged by his office and by the Law of Charity which he owes his neighbour and penitent to give him this charitable advice this making one part of the obligation which he hath to procure his weal and Salvation and that he is not to stay until his penitent himself demand it but that he is obliged to prevent him when he sees him in danger to fall into sin as it would happen in this case where he sees his penitent wholly resolved to despise his advice by mere obstinacy and being bent to follow his own judgement and to do what he list in despight of him b Cum in ejusmodi peccati perpetrandi periculo videt Confessor eum constitutum cum pertinacem eum videat Ibid. As if seeing the sinner addicted to his own sence disobedient and too obstinate in his disobedience the Confessor ought or could judge that he is in a good estate and well disposed to be reconciled unto God or as if he could hope to put him out of this wicked disposition and obstinacy by acknowledging and declaring unto him that what he maintains against him is reasonable and may be probably maintained and that he is ready to give way to him On the contrary it will come to pass that if he comport himself in this
manner in stead of removing from him this indisposition he will augment it in him there being nothing more proper to make a man yet more obstinate and more insolent and to confirm him in his wicked opinions then therein to approve and follow him and by consequence this man shall continue to remain in an incapacity of receiving absolution since he persists in one of the greatest sins and one of the worst dispositions of sinners which is a resolution to oppose himself to his Confessor without reason and of mere obstinacy and blinde passion if the Confessor do not come over to his opinion Sanchez proposeth also another question in the matter of the Sacraments which he resolveth according to the same principles The question is c Octavo deducitur quid in ea quaestione dicendum sit An licitum sit in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili minus tuta quando de Sacramenti valore agitur Ibid. n. 32 p. 32. if in the matter of the Sacraments it be lawful to rule ones self by the opinion which is less probable and less safe when the validity of the Sacrament is in question He answers in reporting the opinion and reasons of them who maintain that this is not lawful but he pretends d Quamvis tamen hoc probabile sit existimo tamen probabilius esse licere in Sacramentorum adm mstratioae uti opinioue minus probabili relicta probabilio iâ—ac tuta non obstante irritandi Sacramenti peâ—iculo Ibid. n. 33 that though what they say is probable yet it is more probable that in the administration of the Sacraments it is lawful to rely upon an opinion which is less probable leaving that which is safe and more probable notwithstanding the danger of rendring the Sacrament null He requires onely two conditions The first is that here in nothing be done outwardly against the custom and ordinary manner of administring the Sacraments The second is that it be not prejudicial to the salvation of our Neighbour For in these cases that more safe opinion ought to be followed out of these two cases he declares that it is lawful to put the Sacrament in hazzard and administer it in an uncertain manner onely to have the satisfaction of putting in practice a probable opinion making less accompt of the validity of a Sacrament and of the respect which is due unto the Sacred Mysteries and the blood of Jesus Christ then of the goods and advantages of private men and of the customs and outward forms which they observe in the administration of the Sacraments as if it were more evil to offend the eyes of men then those of Angels and God himself who sees the Sacrament made void by the sleightness and rashness of the Minister But he makes one exception worth the noting e Excipitur tamen ab hac regula quando opiniones circa jurisdictionem Sacerdotis ad audiendas confessiones versantur atque opinio probabilis docet illum habere probabilior autem negat Talis enim Sacerdos nullo modo peccabit audiendo confessiones Ibid. n. 35. We must except saith he from this rule the case in which the opinions differ about the jurisdiction of a Priest for hearing of confessions when one probable opinion holds he hath this jurisdiction and the other which is more probable denyeth it For in this case the Priest sins not at all in hearing confessions It may here be questioned whether the same charity towards his neighbour which made him before establish the rule which he proposed have made him also to adjoin this exception to the same rule But if this be not clear enough by his answer it will appear with advantage by his reason which is f Quia communis error ex prebabili opinione ortus satis est ad gestorum per eum Sacerdotem valo em Ibid. that an errour which hath taken its original from a probable opinion and which in consequence thereof is become common is sufficient to authorize and make valid all that which the Priest doth That is to say that a false opinion and an errour in the fact and practice may serve for a rule and foundation to the conduct of Christians when it is by use or rather by abuse past into a custom The Son of God saith that it is truth that delivers men and this Jesuit will have that errour and falsehood may deliver them from their sins and save them He ad joins also this other reason g Tum etiam quoniam in confessionibus semper quispiam fatetur aliqua venialia cum mortalibus At quilibet Sacerdos certam in venialia jurisdictionem habet ideo cum poenitens non ponat obicem sit certa jurisdictio in aliquam materiae partem erit certus confessionis valor Et quamvis careat ille jurisdictione in mortalia ca indirecte per accidens vn tute illius absolutionis remittuntur atque excutabitur poenitens ab eis iterum confitendis ratione justae ignorantiae eo quod juxta probabilem opinionem credatur vera Sacerdotis illius jurisdictio Ibid. that in confessions he that accuses himself of mortal sins accuseth himself also of venial Now it is certain that every â—riest hath jurisdiction of venial sins and by consequent the penitent for his part putting no bar and the Priest on his part having an assured jurisdiction of one part of the matter he is assured that the confession will bevalid albeit the Priest have no jurisdiction over mortal sins they shall be nevertheless remitted indirectly and by accident in vertue of the absolution which he shall give for venials and the penitent shall be dispensed from a new confession his ignorance sufficing for his excuse because it is just and reasonable being built upon a probable opinion which is the cause he believes that the Priest who absolveth him hath a right and true jurisdiction The Priest is in an errour as he now said and the penitent ignorant and yet he believes that the Priest gives absolution and the penitent receives truly the remission of his sins marvellous force of errour and ignorance or rather of probability and of an opinion probable in appearance onely which gives such vertue to errour and ignorance Nothing can be spoken more to purpose to conclude that there needs no approbation nor jurisdiction of Bishops and ordinaries to confesse and this is that which Sanchez regards and pretends in his exception rather then the good and salvation of souls For if this be truth which he saith the Monks without having recourse to Bishop or Pope may of themselves take liberty to confesse in all things and all sorts of persons They need onely command their regents to teach that without this their absolution may be valid For so this opinion becoming probable it will become lawful So that putting themselves afterwards into possession they will acquire some right and the opinion whereupon this right shall be founded
casu proposito potest Confessarius judicare quod peniteus commissum peccatum tacuerit justa aliquitâ—ex causa oc proinde tuta conscientia poterit illum absolvere Ibid. In this occurrent the Confessor may judge that the penitent hath concealed his sin for some good or just reason and for that he may absolve him with a safe conscience The reason he makes use of for a foundation to build this answer on is c Probabiliter prudens Consessarius judicare poterit tale peccatum esse quod vel reipsa vel juxta probabilem opinionem poenitentis ipse putat non esse in confessione explicandum Ibid. that a prndent Confessor may judge probably that the sin in question is of it self and indeed or according to some probable opinion of the penitent of such a nature that he is not obliged to tell it in Confession This is not only simply to oblige a Confessor to yield an entire submission to a sinner contrary to the nature of his charge which requires that he should receive it from him but also to yield unto him a blind submission and obedience without knowing even what he thinks which is not only shamefull and extravagant for a Director and a Guide who ought to conduct and not suffer himself to be conducted and follow those who are under his charge without knowing whither they go nor what way they take but it is also unjust in a Confessor who being a Judge and a Divine Judge holding the place of Jesus Christ cannot judge in that manner without cognisance of the Cause but by Sacrilegious rashness and unjustice concluding that an opinion which he knows not is probable and that an action which he hath all the reason in the world to mistrust is innocent Filliutius declares openly that he desires to oblige men and comply with their humours when he saith that the I oclesiasticks are not obliged under mortal sin to have any manner of attention in rehearsing their Office For reporting the opinion of those who hold f Neminem teneri sub mortali ed attentiâ—nem internam Respondes â—ico prime hane primam opinionem probabilem esse Fillutius tom 1. qq mor. tr 23. c. 8. n. 253. p. 126. that no man is obliged under mortal sin to have any inward attention I answer saith he this opinion is probable He confesseth indeed that the contrary is more probable but according to his principles it is sufficient that this same is probable to follow it with a safe conscience in quitting the more probable And the reason which induceth him to approve this opinion is g Quia satis accommodata est hominum fragisitati difficultati quam humanus intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni ret Ibid. because it is very accommodant and conformable to mans frailty and to the difficulty which men have commonly to settle their spirits a long time upon one thing He is not content at all that this opinion is indulgent to the softness and fickleness of men but he cannot forbear to declare that it is even for this cause that he approves it and to testifie that the Jesuits Divinity hath for its scope to flatter and nourish vices instead of fighting with and destroying them Celot having undertaken to defend the Casuists of his Society saith that one of the conveniences which may be received thereby is that it delivers men from scruples which trouble them that it dischargeth them of restitutions which they believe themselves obliged to make and gives them expedients to break marriages after they have been lawfully contracted h Accedit ad te perplexo vir animo lancinantibus conscientiae vulneribus cruentatus videt faciendum quod morte gravius timet vult quae ut faciat nunquam inducetur se suae omnia salva cupit sed-fieri non potest Hinc urget animae salus hinc honoris bonorum fa miliae Quid tot liberi Quid plena ut inter cives dignitatdomus Celot l. 8. c. 16. p. 717. A man saith he agitated by the remorses of his conscience and all torn with the wounds it hath given him addresses himself to you He acknowledges that he must do that which he fears more than death he desires it also but can never obtain force to resolve upon it He would save himself and his wealth both at once but this is impossible The desire to save his Soul presseth him on one side and that of preserving his Estate his Honour his Family presses him on the other side What shall become of his Wife of his Children of his whole Family great and honourable for a private one See here without doubt a man in a strange estate and a sick person reduced to extremity betwixt life and death he had need of some extraordinary medicine to succour him and above all with that sweetness which is necessary for a spirit that is almost in despair A learned Doctor may see some little ray of light after he hath a long time pondered upon an affair so difficult and encumbered Omnia ut doctus es versanti tibi radius consilii non incommedi affulget But you shall never meet with day nor entire clearness untill you seek it amongst the Jesuits the principal of whom are as the shining Stars and Sun of Divinity who by their influences will in a moment recover this desperate spirit Hunc tibi scrupulum eximant Suarez aut Lessius aut Molina aut omnes tres consulti casum tuum explicent rationibus stabiliant securam faciant conscientiam tuam After this there is no means according to Celot to hinder them from kissing their Books and lifting up their cryes of Joy unto Heaven Non erumpes in coelum non triumphabis gaudio Abstinebit cliens ille tunâ— ab osculo libris salutaribus imprimendo But he confirms this goodly discourse by an History worthy to be rehearsed i Scimus repertum aliquando qui summam ingentem pecuniae Confessarii judicio restituendam deferret atque ex itinere in amici Bibliopolae officina confliterit In qua roganti num aliquid novi oblatus est recens Theologiae Moralis scriptor quem ille neglectim omnia alia cogitans cum evolvit in casum forte suum incidit restituendi obligationem solutam didicit Tum enim vero dòjecta scrupuli sarcina retento auri pondere leviorem domum repetiisse Ibid. I knew saith he a certain man who carried a great sum of money by the order of his Confessor but passing by the Shop of a Book-seller his Friend he staid there and asked if he had any new Book He was presented with a Book of Moral Divinity printed a while before which turning over negligently and without any design he by accident met with his own proper case and learned that he was not at all obliged to restitution Whereupon discharging himself of his scruple and keeping his Coyn he returned lighter hearted than
which is not to be found in the most holy exercises and best works He who grieves for his sins for fear of damnation if he love not God at the least he fears him but he that hath not this grief neither testifies that he hath neither love nor fear for him and yet he will have it that in this estate he may be reconciled unto God that is that he may return unto God without any good motion and come to him without making only the first step since the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom and of a good life Bauny in the same place relates another opinion of some Casuists in these terms 4 Quod si quis in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in se est nihil aliud occurrat quam actus attritionis quo dicit Domine miserere mei cum animo placandi Deum hic justificabitur supplente Deo absolutionis necessitatem If a man being at the point of death endeavours to do what he can and having in his mind only an act of attrition present he saith unto God these words Lord have mercy on me with design to pacifie him he shall be justified God himself supplying the want of absolution This is the true thought of Libertines and debauched persons who are accustomed to say when they are pressed to be converted and to think on death that they need only one good Peccavi to obtain pardon for all their sins It is true that Bauny saith that he approves not this opinion Because it is founded only on the mercy of God and not on any good or solid reason But it is enough to vent it into the world that he proposeth it as being maintained by some Casuists since that he thereby testifies that it is probable and may therefore be followed with a safe conscience according to the Principles of the Divinity of his Society Father Anthony Sirmond hath been yet more bold For he makes no bones to say that attrition alone when more cannot be done sufficeth to deface all sins be it at the point of death or when the Sacrament is to be received or administred There are saith he who refer this to the extremity of life He speaks of the obligation to exercise the love of God Whereunto is opposed the small appearance that so great a Commandment should be given us not to obey but so late Neither am I of opinion to be perswaded that upon every reception or administration of the Sacrament that we ought of necessity excite in our selves that holy flame of love to consume therein the sins of which we are guilty attrition is thereto sufficient with some strong endeavour after contrition or with confession when there is câ—nvenience for it We must not dispute after this whether attrition be sufficient to receive the Grace of the Sacrament of Penance This Jesuit gives no place for this difficulty pretending that attrition alone is sufficient to restore a man unto grace provided only That he endeavour after contrition or that he confess himself when he hath convenience So that for him who hath not this convenience being in mortal sin he maintains that attrition is sufficient and that he may himself all alone blot out his sins be it at the point of death or when he comes to receive some Sacrament And that he may leave no cause to doubt of his opinion nor of the vertue he ascribes to attrition he saith That it alone is sufficient to take away sin For he establisheth as it were two ways to return from sin to grace attrition alone with endeavour for contrition and attrition with confession giving as it were the choice unto the sinner of which he please He will have it then that attrition alone without the help of contrition will suffice to take away sin He believes indeed that confession is good with attrition but it is to him that hath convenience for it He affirms also that a strong endeavour after contrition is commendable but he is not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty He confesses that this is the best expedient the most safe and perfect but he pretends that we may dispense with it and that attrition is sufficient thereto It is remarkable that he speaks of attrition in the self same sense as Father Bauny though it be not entirely in the self same terms For he speaks of attrition which ariseth from self-love and which is without any love of God as his words evidently testifie I am not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty He excludes then the obligation and necessity of exciting in us the love of God to destroy mortal sin So that when he saith that attrition is sufficient he intends that attrition which is without the love of God the attrition and regret for offending God which takes it rise from love of ones self and not of God as Bauny saith Dicastillus extends also the effect of this attrition yet farther For he saith that this alone is sufficient to cause that one may suffer Martyrdom that death and torments undergone not through a Principle of Charity and Love of God but only through fear are capable to justifie and make everlastingly happy the greatest sinners There is not then any remedy more universal than attrition by the opinion of these Fathers since as we have now made appear it hath so many different effects Martyrdom it self not being excepted which we hitherto believed to have been an effect of love and that not of any sort neither but strong and powerful majorem charitatem We must not only say of this fear altogether earthly and servile what the Scripture faith indeed of the most noble Initium sapientiae timor Fear is the beginning of wisdom but we ought also to add Consummatio sapientiae timor Fear is the compleating of wisdom since it causeth us to produce the most Heroick act of Christian Religion and conducts us even into Glory ad conferendam gratiam gloriam and contrary to what the Apostle saith When my body is in the midst of flames if at the same time my heart be not inflamed with this heavenly fire of divine love all these torments are unto me unprofitable Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam charitatem autem non habeam mihi nihil prodest If I give my body to be burnt and have not charity it profits me nothing This Jesuit would have it that death which the Philosophers call terribilium terribilissmum sufficeth with attrition only that is to say by the motive of fear alone and without any mixture of love it is capable to purge away all blemishes and to bestow glory on the most criminal person of the whole world ad conferendam gratiam
not obliged to declare his quality of a Priest Dianae adhaereo saith the same Jesuit But see here an Example which surpasseth all the rest and which tends to hide from a Confessor the most enormous Sacriledges without sparing the respect which all the faithful and especially Priests ought to have to the body and blood of Jesus Christ 3 Si Sacerdos portans sanctam Eucharistiam infamaret furaretur tam gravem irreverentiam non video Tambur n. 42 sect 5. c. 7. l. 2. meth confess If a Priest whilst he carries the holy Sacrament calumniate and defame his neighbour or rob him and take from him his goods it is not necessary that he declare this circumstance in Confession And see here his reason I fee not herein saith he any great irreverence and in the mean time it had been great and criminal if he had done the same thing in the Chamber of a King or in his Presence the King looking on and certainly knowing his crimes Dicastillus is not more respective to this divine Sacrament 4 Observant Vasquez communiter Doctores cò gravius esse peccatum suscipiendi indignè quò quis pluribus majoribus peccatis est irretitus Non tamen putat Vasquez esse necessarie explicandum in confessione an cum multis vel cum paucioribus quis accesserit Quae doctrina mihi placet Sufficit enim si explicet se in statu peccati mortalis accessisse Dicast n 37. d. 2. d. 9. tract 4. de Euch. The irreverence and the sin of him who approacheth unworthily to the Eucharist are so much greater saith Vasquez as his soul is charged with more enormous and greater number of mortal sins and nevertheless the same Vasquez teaches that he is not obliged to declare in Confession the number of these crimes And this Doctrine pleaseth me adds Dicastillus For it is enough to accuse himself that he did participate of the Eucharist being in the estate of mortal sin For what concerns evil habits and relapses into the same fins Bauny inquireth Whether frequent and ordinary relapses be circumstances whereof the Confessor ought to be instructed by the Penitent in his Confession And after he had related the opinion of those who hold that the Penitent is obliged to tell these circumstances and that in such case it is expedient to defer the absolution he answers that nevertheless according to his apprehension the contrary opinion as being more conformable to reason and favourable to the Penitent ought to be held and followed in the practice Chap. 59 pag. 621 622 The reasons upon which he foundeth his resolution are considerable The first is that this is more agreeable to reason as if humane reason especially in an estate wherein it is corrupted by fin were the Rule of a Christian who ought to live by faith The second that it is more favourable to the Penitent also That is that it is more favourable for entertaining his pride and his vanity as he expounds it himself sufficiently Afterwards he brings for his third reason That a Penitent cannot inform his Confessor concerning his lapses proceeding from an inveterate habit without manifesting unto him his past offences with shame for his weakness and pronounces definitively concluding in these terms Therefore he is not bound But one part of Repentance consisting in the confusion which a Penitent resenteth for having offended God this is not to be too favourable to him who hath a true design to do Penance and to be converted but to dispense as much as is possible with repentance by delivering him from the pain and confusion which he might have had in discovering his weaknesses to his Confessor He saith the same thing in his Moral Divinity save that writing in Latine he talks also more freely and boldly For he is not content to say that although frequent relapse into the same sins is a very notable circumstance the Penitent is nevertheless not obliged to declare it whether it come from an evil habit or from the next occasions in which he is engaged but he maintains also 1 Dubitatur 12. an circumstantia recidiva sit confitenda Teneri poenitentem consu etudinem peccati confiteri si à confessario interrogatur Tamen Vasquez Henriquez c. maximè si haec oritur ex proxima peccandi occasione quam poenitens tenetur reserare Contrarium docet Saucius in select is disputat 9. num 6. Et haec opinio priore videtur esse probabilior sequenda in praxi quia Confessarius jus non habet interrogandi poenitentem de consuetudine peccandi nisi ejus rei gravem causam habeat rarò accidit Deinde non est in ejus jure afficere poenitentem dedecore cognita ejus peccandi consuetudine sed debet eum statim absolvere si dolorem de peccatis concipit cum proposito futurae emendationis Bauny Theol. mor. p. 1. tract 4. de poenit q. 15. pag. 137. That a Confessor bath not so much as a right to interrogate the Penitent touching the custom of sinning if he be not obliged thereto by some important reason which happens seldom that he hath not a right neither to put the Penitent to confusion when he knows he is accustomed to commit some sin but that he ought forthwith to absolve him if he put forth some act of sorrow for his sins past with a resolution to amend So that if a Confessor demand of some person who accuseth himself of some great sin if he have formerly committed it whether he have fallen therinto often and whether his relapses come from the next occasions or from the habit he hath of this sin the Penitent according to Bauny may elude all these interrogations if he had not rather lye according to some others or say openly that he is not obliged to answer to these Articles and if his Confessor press him very sore thereto he may say that he is grounded on a probable opinion and his Confessor shall be obliged to rest satisfied therewith and to give him absolution readily according to the words of this Casuist debet eum statim absolvere How horrible is this Divinity And which is altogether admirable in the Doctrine of these Fathers in the very same time that they say that the Penitent is not obliged to answer unto these Articles 2 Dicastillus n. 194. d. 3. d. 9. tr 8. de poenit Non tenetur ei dicere illam circumstantiam and that the Confessor cannot constrain him thereto tunc non potest cogere illum Confessarius he assures us that the Confessor who is of contrary judgment to that of his Penitent may examine him on these very Articles Respondetur posse Confessarium interrogare de iis circumstantiis The one then may interrogate and the other may refuse to answer the one hath a right to take cognizance of these Articles and the other hath a right to refuse it him the one in asking performes his
must be done May absolution be refused them or for some time deferred Dicastillus saith No 2 Potest absolvi etiamsi peccaverit spe obtinendae absolutionis Dicast n. 254. d. 16. d. 11. tr 8. de poenit and that it may be given them though they fall into sin through hopes of obtaining absolution Another Maxime altogether common in the Jesuits Schools is that a Confessor is obliged to give absolution to a Penitent who demands it of him upon some probability that he is sufficiently prepared to receive it though the Confessor be perswaded of the contrary 3 Absolvi potest qui contrariam opinioni Confessoris opinionem sequitur sed probabilem Sa verb. absolutio n. 15. pag. 6. He may be absolved saith Sa who follows a probable opinion though contrary to that of his Confessor La mâ—n speaks also more clearly more absolutely and more universally in these terms 4 Si poenitens in praxi bona fide sequatur sententiam quae à quibusdam Doctoribus tanquam probabilis tuta defenditur Confessarius vero seu ordinarius seu delegatus eandem speculativè improbabilem censcat non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre Lay-man l. 1. tr 1. cap. 5. sect 2. n. 10. pag. 7. If a Penitent follow in his practice with simplicity an opinion which some Doctors hold to be probable and safe and his Confessor whether ordinary or delegate believe that this opinion considered in it self and in the Theory hath no probability notwithstanding this perswasion he is obliged to give him absolution And because he sees the confusion that it would make to put the Malefactor into the place of the Judge he represents himself this inconvenience which follows upon his Principles and makes this objection himself 5 Confessarius est poenitentis superior ergo poenitens deposita propria opinione Confessarii praecipientis opinionem amplecti tenetur Ibid. The Confessor is the Penitents Superior and by confequence the Penitent is obliged to quit his opinion to follow what his Confessor ordains He answers in this sort 6 Respondeo non esse superiorem simpliciter neque jus praecipiendi habere in omnibus sed solum in ordine ad peccara quae ad tribunal poenitentiae def eruntur Ibid. I answer that he is not absorutely his Superior and that he hath not a right to command him in all things but only in what hath reference to the sins wherewith he charges himself at the Tribunal of Penance To speak this in more clear terms the Confessor ought indeed to pronounce the Sentence of Absolution on the Penitent but he is to take it from the mouth of the same Penitent like a Cryer that publisheth the Decree of some Court. Because the Penitent who appears before the Tribunal of Penance as the Malefactor is also the witness in his own affair and his own chief Judge that it belongs to him to inquire after his sins to examine them and to judge of their greatness and of the punishment which they deserve that having done this there remains nothing for him to do but to present himself before the Priest and to cast himself down at his feet to confess himself and that accusing himself for his sins he hath nothing else to do but to present unto him his process already made up with his Judgment to the end that he may follow it as it is already concluded and decreed I see very well that the Confessor is not absolutely nor in all things superior to the Penitent as this Jesuit saith but only in what respects the sins which he hath confessed But in what consists this superiority if the Penitent having discovered his faults he ought not to refer it to the light of the Confessor to judge of the quality of his sins the convenient remedies and the time necessary to heal them and of his disposition to receive absolution For if in every of these points and particularly in that which presupposeth and contains them all which is absolution the Confessor ought to submit to the opinion and will of the Penitent he is no more his Superior in what respects even those sins of which the Penitent hath accused himself It is the Penitent who is true Superior and the Confessor holds the place of an Inferior on his part since he is bound to obey him and follow his opinion against his own Which comes all to one with what I have already observed that upon this supposition that the Confessor pronounceth Sentence of Absolution taking it from the mouth of the Penitent as a publick Cryer doth from the mouth of a Chief Justice of some Court and by consequence the Confessor is not the Judge but the Cryer and absolution is only a simple declaration The opinion of Layman were probable if it might be said that a Judge were obliged to refer himself to the judgment of the Malefactor sending him back absolved when he pleases though according to the Laws he deserved death or a Physitian that of his Patient treating him as a sound man because he desires it and because he is not sensible of his disease though the Physitian believe he is in danger of death For this is in effect that which Layman pretends when he saith that a Confessor who is truly a Judge and a Physitian is obliged to give absolution to a Penitent because he demands it though the Confessor be perswaded that he is not in an estate to receive it 1 Sanchez l. 1. in Decal c. 9. n. 28. apud Escobar l. 2. Theol. mor. sect 2. prob 28. non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre Sanchez obliges him even unto this under the pain of mortal sin Amicus saith the same thing in other terms 2 Ex dictis deducitur Confessarium semper posse debere contra propriam opinionem poenitentem absolvere quando ille probabili opinione ductus putat aliquid sibi licitum esse quod Confessarius juxta suam opinionem putat esse illicitum Amicus tom 3. disp 15. sect 2. n. 90. p. 212. It follows saith he from what I have said that a Confessor may always and that he is even obliged to absolve the Penitent against his own proper opinion when the Penitent following the Maximes of a probable opinion believes that he may do that which the Confessor believes he may not do according to his He relates for it this reason a little after 3 Alioquin gravissimo onere poenitentem obstringeret ad iterum sua peccata alteri confiteri Ibid. For otherwise he would oblige the Penitent by too great rigour to confess his sins also to some other And to confirm his Answer he gives this example 4 Deducitur 2 posse medicum aliorum opinionem secutum dare aegroto medicinam quam ipse privata sua opinione probabiliter putat illi nocituram Ibid. of a Physitian who according to him may follow the opinion of others
and give to a Patient a medicine which he believes may hurt in his particular case He could not have chosen a more proper example to make the excess of this Doctrine appear For who will believe that it is lawful for a Physitian to cause his Patient to dye by giving him for a remedy that which he believes to be poyson that he may render this observance to other Physitians that are not of his opinion or even to content the sick who desires and demands this remedy which the Physitian believes is not proper for him and may cause his death like as this Jesuit pretends that a Confessor may and ought to give absolution to his Penitent because he demands it and believes he hath reason to demand it though the Confessor be perswaded that he is not in an estate to receive it and that he cannot give it him but to his condemnation But if this opinion which this Penitent hath contrary to that of his Confessor be prejudicial to a third party wherein for example the making restitution is in debate may the Confessor absolve him permitting him to act according to this opinion Escobar after he had made a Problem of this Question ranks himself on their side who say that the Confessor is obliged to absolve his Penitent and judges even that the contrary opinion is hardly at all probable Tambourin a faithful Scholar of the great Masters of the School of the Society makes use also of the Example of a Physitian and a Judge but in a different manner and quite opposite to Amicus and more proper to evidence the excess of their Doctrine 5 Potest imo debet Confessarius sequi opinionem probabilem poenitentis contra propriam sententiam sive probabilem five probabiliorem ..... Et quamvis in rebus humanis five judex five medicus deberet opinionem probabiliorem sequi tamen Confessario ..... satis erit si poenitens rectè ad praedictam justificationem dispositus appareat id quod satis habetur sequendo opinionem probabilem Tambour n. 1. sect 1. c. 9. l. 3. meth confess Debet id sub mortali n. 2. Obligatur sub mortali conformare se opinioni probabili Ibid. The Confessor saith he may and ought to follow the probable opinion of his Penitent against his own judgment although it be more probable .... And though in the world a Judge and a Physitian be obliged to follow the more probable opinion it is not so with a Confessor because it is sufficient for him that his Penitent have the dispositions which are for receiving grace which he may have following a probable opinion and by consequent a Confessor is obliged to give him absolution by conforming himself to his opinion on pain of mortal sin After this the Confessor will take heed not to be wanting therein and the Penitent needs fear nothing But to oblige him under so great a pain of what sort ought the Penitents probable opinion to be See the Rule this Jesuit prescribes him 1 Opinio debet esse probabilis in se five tamen per rationes in trinsecas five per autoritatem extrinsecam autorum-si ergo opinio poenitentis nullam ex his probabilitatem habeat sed solum ipsi poenitenti appareat probabilis diligens sit Confessarius in examine talis sententiae an fortè sit probabilis faltem extrinsecè propter autoritatem alicujus autoris si invenerit esse talem illi se conformet num 4. That the Confessor may be obliged to follow it it must be probable either because of the reasons on which it is built or because of the authority of those who follow it If the opinion of the Penitent have none of these probabilities but only seem probable to the Penitent the Confessor shall take heed that he neither do nor resolve any thing rashly that be examine it diligently to see if he can find any Author who hath approved it and if he find any that he conform thereto and give him speedy absolution He cannot herein use more precaution so fearful the Jesuit is lest his Penitent should be sent back without absolution Amicus proposes also a difficulty about Absolution 2 Si dubitas an Confessarius qui evidentiam habet quod poenitens peccatum commiserit illudque non sit confessus debeat illum de tali peccato monere Amicus tom 8. disp 13. sect 13. n. 331. p. 235. Caterum in casu proposito posset Confessarius judicare quod poenitenscommissum peccatum tacuerit justa aliqua ex causa ac proinde tutâ conscientiâ poterit illum absolvere Ibid. It is doubted whether a Confessor who knows evidently that his own Penitent hath committed a sin which he hath not confessed ought to advertise him of this sin He answers and concludes That in this adventure the Confessor may judge that the Penitent hâ—th some just reason to conceal his sin and for this he may absolve him with a safe consciencs Filliutius proposes the same case 3 Si constet Confessori poenitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati per se loquendo tenetur interrogare ob integritatem ipsius judicii Filliut tom 1. qq mor. tract 7. cap. 12. num 360. pag. 210. If the Confessor saith he be entirely assured that his Penitent hath forgotten some sin he is obliged speaking generally to examine him thereof to make his judgment entire and perfect He saith not that this is for the benefit and Salvation of the Penitent that he might make him confess his crime and make him capable to receive pardon but because of the integrity of the judgment that it may have all its parts that is to say that he may have an examination and answer of the sinner upon which judgment may be made because all judgment ought to be composed of the hearing of the guilty and sentence of the Judge who cannot pronounce sentence before examination He requires not then that he should examine but to observe the forms of judgment what answer soever the sinner make 4 Quod si interrogatus neget regulariter tenetur illi credere Ibid. so that if he deny his fault and will damn himself he declares that the Confessor is bound to absolve him and make shew to believe him That if he cannot absolutely believe him 5 Quod si evidens illi sit poenitentem mentiri si tantum id sciat via secreta post prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare secundum acta probata in illo soro Ibid. because he is assured that he lyes he maintains that notwithstanding this assurance if he knows the sin of the Penitent only by some secret way he is obliged having examined him prudently to judge according to what is said and proved in this inward Justice of Confession That is to say that he is obliged to absolve him though he see that in absolving him he accumulates to the highest his fault and his lye by a Sacriledge Strange
facientem confessionem generalem nolentem manifestare se aliquod peccatum ab ultima confâ—ssione commisisse posse illud per alia peccata prius confessa aperire Ibid. num 136. pag. 821. When the Penitent signifies that he will make a general Confession if he apprehends that the Confessor would have an evil opinion of him if he should represent his whole life unto him they pretend that he may tell him only one part of his sins and hide from him the other and even lye if he examine him of those which he is not willing to discover unto him 4. 4 Rubâ—re quis afficitur de aliquo crimine potest generalem confessionem sacere illud peccatum simul confiteri non exprimendo an alià s confessum sit quia id parum variat Confessarii judicium Escobar in proaem exam 2. n. 75. pag. 19. That if he fall into any great fault which he is ashamed to accuse himself for fear of diminishing the good opinion which the Confessor hath of him he may by the advice of these Doctors signifie to him that he will make a general Confession and so mingle this last sin whereof he is in trouble with those of his life past as if he had committed it a long time before 5 5 Confitens generaliter de peccatis alià s confessis absâ—lutis potest per partes absolvi scilicet nunc de parte peccatorum quae dixit postea de alia parte cum dixerit partem uni partem alteri explicare partem omittere Sa verbo absolut n. 2. p. 10. They say also that we may make a general Confession easily enough by saying one part of our sins to one Priest and another to another and suppressing a third part provided they have been already confessed 6. 6 Duos quis adit Consessaries quorum alteri mortalia alteri venialiâ— confit turs ut bonam samam apud ordinaâ—ium tueâ—tur rogo num delinquat Cum Suario assero non delinquere quia est confessio integra nec est vera hypocrisis neque mendacium Escobarâ—r 7. exam 4. n. 135. pag. 821. Filliut saith the same thing tom 1. mor. qq tr 7. c. 4. n. 75. p. 175. Habere ordinariè duos Confessarios alterum cui gravia dicâ—s alterum cui levia ut probus habearis quidam dicunt esse pecca um mortale ob illusum Confessorem secus verò esse si semel iterum fiat ob pudorem verecundiam Sa verbo confessor n. 16. pag. 105. Beyond all this they have found out an expedient for spiritual persons and Votaries who would preserve their reputation with their ordinary Confessor which is to have a second Confessof or whom the first knows nothing on whomto discharge themselves of their gross sins which they would be ashamed to discover to their Ordinary Escobar saith not only that we may take this expedient but he even praises also those who make use of it and reproves those Confessors who think it not good that their Penitents should sometimes go to confess themselves to others then they He places this amongst the opinions which are out of controversie and in his Problems he holds that it is no sin to do this many times 7. And imâ—…ediâ—tely after he cites some Casuists who say Id peccatum mortale esse cum hoc â—it in fiâ—em mortiferum bonum esâ—e si bonus sit finis uni leviora al eri graviora explicare ad retinendam existimationem Qui Câ—nlessâ—rio ordiâ—ario levia solum peccata manifestat prius alii Confessario gravia exponenâ— conâ—essionis non laedit integritatem Ex. grâ— foemina carnis piaculo maculata pudore detineâ—ur nâ— Confessarium ordinarium adeat laudabiliter incognito Confessario grave peccatum rederat ne subâ—icendi criminis periculum subeat graviter subtraxerim confeslarios qui suos ordinarios alumnos alienam aliquando diâ—ionem ineuntes imprudenter quidem objurgant Escobar tom 2. lib. 15. cap. 4. Nulum esse peccatum existimo vel saepè confessarium extraneum adire Ibid. problem 21. 7 Viâ—eo cum qui juravit aut vovit castitatem aut paupertatem praecepto posse sati facere confessionis si separatim aperiat fornicationem surtum addaâ—que se bis juramentum in te gravi violasse Escobar lib. 4. Theol. mor. sect 2. problem 1. tom 1. There is yet herein another very subtle expedient to hide sins in confession which hath some reference to the former which is that as you may hâ—de them by parting your confessions to many Confessors so you may also hide a sin by parting it into two See here the case He that hath sworn chastity or poverty saith Escobar may satisfie the precept of Confession by saying apart that he hath committed fornication or theft and then adding that he hath twice violated his oath in things of importance For unless the Confessor suspects that he intends to deceive him he will not understand by this that he hath violated the vow of Chastity 8. 8 Commisit quis mortale piaculum non longè à confessionis hodiernae tempore à quo absolutus non est ac uâ— minuat pudoris instantiam dicit dum confitetur pâ—ceatum illud quondam fuisse commissum etiam confessum haec simulatio confessionis integritati obest non obest Integritati confessioâ— is non obest c. Primam sententiam sine sorupulo admitterem ac probâ—biliorem planè esse judicarem si poe ni tens solam temporis simulationem gereret satus multis abhinc annis haec aut haec peceata commisi quae quidem ex oblivione inculpabili fassus non sum If this be not enough you are permitted to tell as many lyes as you need to deliver you from the shame which confession of sins might procure unto you Escobar avouches that it is a probable opinion that it doth not offend against the integrity of Confession if one having committed a mortal sin immediately after he hath made his Confession whereupon he hath not yet received absolution he say that he hath some other time committed this sin and hath been absolved thereof He adds at length that this opinion about which he is in suspense will become more probable if we content our selves to say the Penitent may speak in this manner It is many years ago that I committed this sin but I have not confessed it because I forgot it innocently 9. 9 Mentiri in câ—nfessiâ—ne de peccatis venialibus aut de alià s confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum esse tametâ—i aotea illa prop suit apud se confiteri Sa verbo confessio n 12. pag 88. In confessiont mentiri de peccato venialâ— ven ale est Escobar tr 7. ex 4 n. 107. pag. 816. For vâ—nial sins they hold that we are not only not obliged to confess them but that being examined by a Confessor we may lye and say that we have not committed those
some good or to remove some evil which we observe that we cannot acquire or avoid without the help of God that thence it follows that he who prays not to God in a temptation against chastity sins only against chastity because he sins not in omitting prayer but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity He thinks not that we are at any time directly obliged to pray unto God any more then to love him to believe on him to hope in him but indirectly by adventure and as it were by accident That is to say that according to him God hath not commanded us Prayer Faith Hope and Charity for their own sakes but only to help us in the exercise of some other vertue or to surmount some temptation when they are absolutely necessary thereunto as a good Physitian appoints not purging bleeding and other remedies for themselves but only when they are necessary against the diseases and incommodities which we cannot be freed from but by their assistance So that Faith Hope Charity and Prayer according to this Divinity have no more part in the conduct of a Christian life than purgation and blood-letting in the conservation of the natural life and health and that as a Physitian who hath prescribed a Purge obligeth not the Patient to love it nor to take it for its own sake but simply to take it for the need he hath of it in the same manner God commanding Prayer Faith Hope and Charity obligeth not Christians to love these vertues and to exercise them for their own sakes but only for necessity sake and as it were by force upon such occasions in which they cannot dispense with them without putting themselves in danger of losing life and Salvation by sinning against oâ—her vertues And as a man of a strong complexion who is not subject to be sick though he be subject to some slight infirmities may pass over his whole life without purgation or phlebotomy so a Christian who is of a good and moderate natural disposition and hath no violent passions and is not subject to strong temptations may pass his whole life without ever being obliged to pray unto God to love him to believe on him nor hope in him and yet he shall not for all that cease to be a good Christian according to this new Divinity nor to live well nor to go to Heaven and to deserve it by a good life The Proâ—het saith that the just man lives by Faith S. Paul that we are saved through Hope and S. John that he who loves not abides in death and that to obtain and preserve life and Salvation we ought to pray without ceasing And the Jesuits maintain on the contrary that we may live justly avoid death and obtain Salvation without loving God believing or hoping in him and without ever or rarely praying to him in all our life timâ— It suffices to relate these excesses barely which are unheard of in the Church and as it were Monsters of errour and impiety and neither Comparisons nor Expressions can be found capable to represent them neither can we call them otherwise than the universal overthrow of the whole Christian Religion fince they destroy Prayer Faith Hope and Charity which are its foundations support and perfection There is nothing which the simple light of Nature doth better make known unto all men than the attention they ought to have to whatsoever they say especially when they treat of important affairs and with persons eminent in dignity and merit but they redouble their respect and their attention when they beg any singular grace or favour from them and there is no prudent man who would not condemn him of extravagance and folly who should therein speak in any other manner and who would not judge that he merited not only to be refused but also to be punished for his rashness and insolence In the mean time the Jesuits hold that this carriage which appears so unsupportable towards men is good enough and sufficient towards God and that the prayers which he ordains to be made unto him may be without affection reverence attention and even with voluntary thoughts the most criminal that can be Which is yet so much the more strange because men may be deceived and not know the secret wandrings and irreverences of those who speak unto them but all is visible to God and he sees better the most secret dispositions of hearts than we see the outward motions of bodies and faces So that the insolencies which are committed inwardly before him are no less known unto him and are no less criminal than those which are externally committed before men Which yet hinders not the Jesuits to hold that prayers made without sense of piety without inward reverence and attention and even with a wandring spirit voluntarily distracted and wholly replenished with impure and prophane thoughts sufficeth to fulfil the obligation unto prayer Filliutius demands if 1 Quaero an quae attentioâ— sit necessaria ad praeceptum to accomplish the Law which commands us to pray unto God it be necessary to have attention and what kind of attention this ought to be Before he answers he advertises the Reader 2 Pro responsione notandum agere nos de hor is canonicis quando recitantur ex obligatione non autem de privata devotione Tunc enim non est major obligatio attendendi quà m in quacunque oratione vocali ad summum obligat sub veniali Filliut mor. qq tom 2. tr 23. cap. 8. n. 252. pag. 126. That he intends to speak only of Canonical hours which are recited upon obligation and not of prayers which are made by private devotion For in that case we are no more obliged to attend to what we say than to any other sort of vocal prayers and this obligation goes not farther than to venial sin That is to say that whatsoever distraction we may have in the prayers which we make upon devotion and not by particular Commandment it can be no more than a venial sin and for those which are rehearsed upon obligation as are those which Beneficiaries and Religious persons say in reciting their office this Author saith that there are two opinions the first which holds 3 Prima neminem teneri sub mortali ad attentionem internam modo integrè recitet externè Ibid. That none is obliged upon pain of mortal sin to an inward attention in saying his office provided he rehearse it outwardly and entirely And though he follows not this opinion absolutely yet he passes it for probable adding thereto in the process for his first Answer 4 Respondeo dico 1. primam sententiam probabilem esse Ibid. That according to his judgment this first opinion is probable But if it be probable then we must conclude according to the Jesuits that it may be followed with a good conscience and it will become also more probable by the approbation which
dare not express openly and which yet is comprehended in what he saith that they pass their time in an employment altogether vicious Though he concludes not for the affirmative yet for all that he testifies sufficiently that it rather shame and fear of men that hinders him from declaring himself and he makes it well appear that he is not far off from this opinion in that he contents not himself only to report and propose it as probable and to say that we may follow and advise it with a safe conscience which is truly to approve it but he approves it yet more formally by supporting it with all the reasons he can See here how he talks Because we are not assured of the intention of the Church and that the Texts of c. 1. de Cler. non res ...... of c. Licet 32. of the title de Prebend make no mention save of their assistance in the Quire and because the custom every where received exacts of the Chanons no other thing that they may receive their dividends but that they be present I esteem them without blame and reproach who in favour of their Penitents hold this second opinion Here are four reasons to be observed upon which he concludes that they are not reproachable who maintain that the Chanons satisfie their duty as far as the Church obligeth them therein and earn their dividends by assisting in the Quire with irreverence and that even outward also by laughing scoffing and spending their time in employments altogether vicious 1. Because it is enough that they are present 2. Because the custom every where received requires no other thing of them 3. Because this opinion is favourable to Penitents The Jews and Pagans themselves who have any knowledge of God will perhaps be ashamed to speak in this sort and to say that we may pray to him and serve him in so prophane and unworthy a manner His fourth reason is because we are not assured saith he of the intention of the Church It is apparent that he hath taken this reason from Filliutius who to confirm the opinion which he holds that whatsoever voluntary distractions we can have in prayer and in the divine Office there is therein no more than venial sin makes use of this very same reason For after he had brought for proof of this opinion 1 Quia satis accommodata est hominum sragilitati difficultati quam humanus intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni rei that it is sufficiently accommodate to mens frailty and to the difficulty of holding the spirit of man a long time attentive to one object he adds 2 Verisimile est autem Ecclesiam noluisse suo praecepto obligate ad rem ardusm ita ut major hominum pars eam servare non possit Filliut tom 2. mor. qq tract 23. c. 8. num 253. pag. 126. That for this cause it is likely that the Church had no intention by its precept to oblige men to a thing so difficult that the greatest part of men cannot observe He would say that when the Church commands the faithful to pray unto God and to the Ecclesiasticks to recite the divine Office and to both of them to be assistant at Massâ—on Festival days we are not assured that it sorbids voluntary distractions and wicked thoughts wherewith they voluntarily please themselves we are not assured that it would that we should at least demean our selves with some outward reverence or whether indeed 〈◊〉 have not left to all a liberty to laugh sâ—…ff and pass their time in scandalous discourse and in an employment altogether vicious Now if these Jesuits had said as some of their Fraternity that the Church had not power to forbid the greatest part of these things which respect the thoughts though their opinion had been false it had for all that been less criminal and less injurious to the Church For to say that it cannot command us to pray to God with reverence and attention is to hurt its Authority but to say that it is not its intention or that it would not or only to doubt whether having power it would and whether it desires we should bear that reverence and attention which God demands in prayer is to violate its Holiness to give it an intention far distant from that of God to deny that it is guided by the Spirit and to make it accomptable for all the crimes which are committed in this kind because having power it forbids them not as Filliutius and Bauny suppose For otherwise it were in vain that they should trouble themselv es to know its intention and will in a point which depends not at all on its will But though there were some one to be found who might doubt of this or who of gross ignorance knew not the intention of the Church in this matter it is not lawful for Father Bauny to make use of this pretence to favour an opinion which leads unto Libertinism and Irreligion and we need not seek more clear testimony to destroy this errour than his own since he declares in Chap. 20. of his Sum pag. 332. That being true devotion is in the heart and not in the carriage or without in the fashion and other outward gesture and that this pretended devotion without is but a vizor and an Idol of devotion it is a resolved case that in the voluntary distraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation as do Priests Deacons and Subdeacons and Beneficiaries there is sin and so they are obliged to repeat the Office which they have said with so great indevotion For the will of the Church is that by this action which it commands them they should praise and pray unto God their Creator And do they this whilst they have nothing less during their singing than God before their eye They ought then to fulfil their duty begin the Office again and in default thereof if they be Beneficiaries they are bound to restore either to the Church where their Benefice is or to the poor the fruits they have received according to the rate of their omissions as may be collected from the Bull of Pius V. He pursues the same matter and declares once more in the same place what is the intention of the Church in the Command which it give Ecclesiasticks and Beneficiaries to recite the Office The Church intends not saith he to make the Ecclesiasticks Possessors of the fruits of their said Benefice if they earn it not by their labour The disposure thereof is conditional if they perform the prayers with which they are charged doing them to the praise and honour of God And can we say with truth that they deserve to be his servants or put into the rank of those who render him the worship which his Majesty requires of them when they have their lips only occupied in his service and not their heart because it is filled with unprofitable thoughts and very remote from
is obliged thereto but it is more probable that he is not obliged That is to say that a person that hath abundance and who after he hath satisfied all his own necessaries and those of his family hath yet a superfluity is not obliged in a publick Famine to give unto the poor nor to any one whomsoever if he see him not in evident danger to dye with famine 3 Aâ—à s enim pauci divites salutem consequerentur Ibid. For otherwise saith this Jesuit there would be very few rich men saved As if he had a design by this reason to oppose the judgment and express the word of Jesus Christ who says by way of admiration 1 Quam difficile qui pecuniam habent in Râ—gnum Dei intrabunt Luc. 18. v. 24. How hard is it for them who have wealth to enter into the Kingdom ef God! Observing how few rich men were saved by reason of the great difficulty of their Salvation things so difficult are always rare and on the contrary this Jesuit pretends that there are many saved and that it is not hard for them to be saved which they may do according to him without making use of the principal means which God hath given them which is the exercise of Charity since he dispenseth with them in the obligation of doing except in extream necessity which is very rare Nor will he have them always bound thereunto even in extream necessity as when it is needful that they retrench something of what is of use unto them for to live commodiously and in honour and reputation in the world For he demands 2 An dives â—eneatur preximo subvenire etiam in extrema necessitate constituto cum gravi propriiâ— status detrimento Tract 5. ex 6. n. 155. pag. 652. If a rich man be obliged to assist his neighbour who is in extream necessity with a notable diminution of what belong unto his condition And to answer with more assurance in so important a Point wherein the life of a man in extremity is concerned and who is in danger to give up the Ghost for want of assistance he makes use of the Authority of two of his Fraternity 3 Ex Coninck affirmavi Addo ex Toleto cum Doctores non conveniant quando peccet mortaliter qui non sacit eleemosynam non facile condemnandes divites qui non largiuntur Ib. I have already answered saith he that he is not obliged according to Coninck to whom he adds Tolet who gives this important advice upon this subject we must not easily condemn rich men who do no alms since the Doctors accord not when it is mortal sin not to do them 4 Quamvis Confessarius absolutionem à peccatis diviti non facile negare debeat quod communes pauperum miserias per eleemosynam sâ—blevare monitus recuset tum quia de obligatione hac an qualis sit Doctores non conveniunt tum quia semper dives aliquam causam in specie profert cur recuset Tambur lib. 5. decal c. 1. sect 1. n. 18. Tambourin adds thereto a reason which secures Confessors if it be good and which makes that absolution can never be refused to a rich man because of his hard-heartedness towards the poor So it is saith he that rich men bring always some apparent reason for which they refuse to do alms An apparent reason is sufficient to this Father to elude the Law and the Word of God as if God were to be contented or deceived as well as men by vain appearances Escobar a little above n. 154. doubts not at all but constantly assures us that rich men commit no mortal sin at all in not giving even of the superfluity of their wealth unto the poor who are in a great and pressing necessity 5 Scio in gravi patâ—perum necessitate divitem non dando superflua non peccare mortaliter Ibid. n. 154. I am assured saith he that a rich man sins not mortally in not giving alms to the poor of what he hath superfluous in their great necessity Tolet whom he alledgeth saith 6 Extra extremam necessitatem si quis sine detrimento vitae honoris aut reâ—… aut cum parvo detrimento potest alium juvare tenetur sub mortali si vero absque notabili praedictorum detrimento non potest non tenetur Tolet. lib. 4. Inst Sacerd. cap 10. num 5. pag. 635. That when there is no great necessity when we can assist our neighbour without notable diminution of our wealth honour or life we are thereunto obliged under mortal sin but if we cannot do it without notable diminution in these things we are not obliged He would have the rich do their alms at a small charge and without incommodity or at least without feeling the inconvenience which they may receive in doing them He speaks yet more clearly in lib. 8. where he inquires 7 Anex superfluis teneamur facere eleemosynam in communibus necessitatibus ex praecepto Tolet. lib. 8. cap. 85. num 2. pag. 1242. Whether in common necessities we are obliged by the Commandment to do alms of our superfluities And after he had said that this is the judgment of S. Thomas and of Cajetan he adds 8 Tamen communis opinio tenet contrarium Imo aliqui aiunt nec etiam in gravi obligari sub mortali For all this the common opinion holds the contrary and there are that say even that we are not obliged thereto under mortal sin even in a great necessity Whence he takes his foundation to establish this general Conclusion 9 Sit ergo alterâ— conclusio Nullus sub mortall tenetur distribuere superfâ—ua extra extremas graves necessitates Ibid. n. 3. That none is obliged under mortal sin to give of his superfluities unless it be in extream and very great necessities All his reason is the Authority of the Casuists of that time as he saith himself I am of this opinion because this is the common opinion of the Doctors and I dare not declare them guilty of mortal sin whom so many great Doctors do excuse Dicastillus saith 1 Illam teneo propter communem Doctorum sententiam nec audeo obligare sub mortali eos quos tanti Doctorâ—s excusant That this Author holds that we may fulfil this Precept of Alms by lending only without giving any thing another may add that it may be satisfied by lending upon usury and there are some who say it already in effect though they express it not in the same terms For to authorize Usury they teach them that make profession thereof to say to those who borrow money of them that in lending unto them their intent is not usurarious but altogether designed to do them good that they pretend that it is only to do them a pleasure and to exercise Charity that obligeth them to lend to them Emanuel Sa saith the same thing and almost in the same words 2
Cum inter Dectores non conveniat quando peccet mortaliter qui non facit elecmosynam non facile condemnandi sunt divites qui non faclunt Sa verb. Elcemos n. 2. pag. 201. The Doctors being not agreed when we sin mortally in not doing alms we must not easily condemn the rich who do them not at all And a little after citing Tolet in the place before alledged with some other Casuists and reporting that Judgment he concludes thus 3 Extra extremam necessitatem eleemosynam sub mortali peccato non esse praeceptam dicunt Ibid. They say that unless in case of extream necessity alms is not commanded under mortal sin That is to say that unless we see some person that hath his Soul in a manner hanging on his lips or who is in evident danger of death it is no great sin for him that is able to assist him to abandon him This is to speak properly to discharge men from the obligation of giving alms these extream necessities never falling out in a manner and there being few persons who see any such in many years or not at all in their whole lives and when such an one by great accident is presented we are not obliged any farther to provide for them according to these Doctors if we have not wealth to spare and riches that are superfluous and there being hardly any person who believes he hath such or who indeed hath such so much doth Covetousness Luxury House-keeping rack men at this day and makes all men in a manner necessitous so the obligation of giving alms shall be abolished and there shall hardly be any person found who shall think himself obliged to assist his neighbour to what necessity soever he be reduced But the words of Tolet are considerable and discover also with advantage the solidity of this Doctrine 4 Istam teneo propter communem Doctorum sententiam nec audeo obligare sub mortall quos tot tanti Doctores excusant I am saith he of this opinion because it is the common judgment of the Doctors and I dare not engage him in mortal sin whom so many great Doctors excuse He calls the Casuists of these last times great Doctors and he dares not depart from their opinion though he avows after that they are themselves departed from that of the holy Fathers who were the Doctors and Masters of the Church before them which hath proposed them as such to all the faithful of latter Ages and by much stronger reason to Priests and Divines who ought to be the most perfect amongst the faithful For he acknowledges that although the Scholasticks discharge the rich from the obligation they have to give alms of that which they have superfluous the holy Fathers for all that and the common judgment of Antiquity obligeth them thereunto 5 Etsi Scholasticorum communis sententia eos excuser tamen Doctores Sancti eos damnant ita ut profecto sit sententia probabilis illos obligari sub praecepto Tolet. l. 8. c. 35. n. 3. pag. 1242. Though the common opinion of the School-men excuse them saith he yet the holy Doctors condemn them So that it is very probable that they are obliged thereunto by Precept He is not content to say in general that this is the Judgment of the holy Fathers but he cites many passages of S. Ambrose S. Jerom S. Austin S. Basil and of S. Chrysostom who place in the rank of those who rob or detain unjustly the goods of others all them who give not to the poor what remains of their wealth after they have provided for their just and true necessities You see saith he after he had named all these Fathers 6 Vides tot Sanctos damnare superflui retentionem multùm ergo timendum est Ibid. so many of the Saints who condemn them that do not their alms of what they have of superfluity There is therefore herein much cause to fear He might have added to the Authority of these Fathers that are the most illustrious and the most famous of the Church that of all the rest for they all agree in this Point so that there is not one found to say the contrary So that if there be one Point of Doctrine established on the ancient and universal Tradition of the Church this is as clearly as any other and if that which is established upon this Tradition ought to pass for indubitable amongst Catholick Divines and amongst all the Faithful as it hath always certainly been until this present we cannot call this Doctrine into doubt without wounding the Authority of the Church and the foundations of the Faith and to say it is probable as Tolet saith Profecto sententia probablis est is not of much â—atter effect than to say that it is false because this is to hold always for doubtful the ancient and universal Tradition of the Church and to give men liberty to decide Points of Divinity and to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers which is expresly forbidden by the Council of Trent Another that hath not read the Fathers might be excused by his ignorance But this excuse hath no place in Tolet who forsakes them after he had cited them and which is yet more unsupportable and more injurious to these great Saints he renounces their Judgment after he had acknowledged it to follow that of the new Divines of our times 1 Et nisi esset tam unanimis Scholasticorum sentâ—ntia qua possunt exculari modo aliquo tales homines absque dubio damnanda esset talis retentio Ibid. If the School-men saith he did not agree so unanimouslâ— as they do in this very Judgment by which we may in some sort excuse these persens who give not in alms what they have of superfluity we must without doubt have condemned this sparingness so as the holy Fathers condemn it as he saith himself Vides tot Sanctos damnare superflui retentionem He pretends then that the holy Fathers on one side condemn those who give not in alms what they have of superfluous and on the other hand the new Scholasticks excuse them we must hold to the Judgment of these later if we will believe this Jesuit and follow his Example But if it be lawful in this manner to oppose the new Divines to the ancient Tradition in this Article and in this opposition to prefer the Judgment of the Casuists before that of the holy Fathers instead of judging and correcting the Moderns by the Tradition of Antiquity it will be lawful to do the same thing in all other Points which concern Manners or Religion and so there shall be nothing fixed in the Doctrine of the Church and Antiquity shall be no more a mark of Truth and Faith but Novelty shall be more considerable though until this present it hath passed for a Vice and a mark of Errour But for all that he hath over-reached in saying that this new Opinion
apply to the Faithful the fruit of the Mass which is reserved for himself Filliutius in the process of his discourse examining with another Casuist what is the value of that part of Sacrifice which belongs to him who saith the Mass that the Priest may not take for it more than it is worth saith 6 Quia nescitur quanta sir addit arbitrari partem trium Missarum posse supplere uni Ibid. That he ought to give his part in three for one entire Mass Whence he draws this practick Rule which he bestows on those he calls hireling Priests 7 Quod servare poterunt qui cum receperint multa stipendia non possunt pro omnibus satisfacere Ibid. That those who are hired to say more Masses than they can discharge may make use of this expedient See here a pretty way for mercâ—…ry Priests to get money by selling their part in the Sacrifice and participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ which they receive in saying Mass for lucre of getting more chusing rather not to participate of the vertue of the Sacrament and to have a little more silver As the Jesuits do thus teach Priests to say Mass out of covetousness so they do not much condemn those who say it of vain glory Emanuel Sa tells us 8 Vanae gloriae causa praecipue praedicare aut Missam celebrare peccatum esse mortale quidam aiunt alii negant Sa verbo vana gloria num 2. pag. 693. That there are some who hold that it is mortal sin to preach or say Mass principally for vain glory and that there are others who deny it He repeats almost the same thing in another place where he saith only 9 Non esse autem peccatum mortale si quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter praedicet aiunt nonnulli Sa verbo praedicare num 4. pag. 578. That there are some who hold that it is no mortal sin to preach principally for vain glory or for money never mentioning them who hold the contrary opinion that he might render that which he propoundeth more probable and give more liberty to follow it Sanchez and Tambourin speak more generally yet and withal more precisely where they say 1 0 Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere Sacrum celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanch. op mor. lib. 1. cap. 3. num 1. pag. 9. Vel lucrum Tambur lib. 2. meth Missae cap. 1. sect 1. num 6. That it can be no more than venial sin to perform the sacred actions as to administer or receive all the Sacraments and to celebrate the Mass for vain glory as the principal end or for some sordid and dishonest gain It seems that as there are in the world some sorts of commerce which persons of honour may exercise without derogation to their quality so they would introduce some into the Church which should not be incompatible with piety nor the quality of the most considerable and dignified persons For those who account that it will not become them to sell the Sacraments or the Mass for money may yet according to the advice of these Jesuits give them away for worldly honour and reputation amongst men But whether we refer the Sacraments to money or honour it is always a true traffick and if those who set a price of money on them seem to vilifie and debase them much those who make them serve their vain glory do use them more unworthily and profane them much more because it is certain that vain glory is a vice and a sin greater and more odious in the sight of God than Avarice and this crime is yet more inexcusable when it is pursued voluntarily and when the glory of the world and esteem of men is propounded as our principal end and yet Sanchez pretends and Tambourin also that herein no other than venial sin can be committed Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere Sacrum celebrare non excedit culpam venialem saith Sanchez si propter finent venialiter peccaminosum quis principaliter celebraret v. g. ob vanam gloriam vel lucrum venialiter malum solum venialiter peccaret These are Tambourins own words who rehearses this passage out of Sanchez Tambur meth Miss lib. 2. cap. 1. sect 1. num 6. Escobar who cites the same Sanchez and follows him puts his opinion not amongst the problematick but amongst those which are received without dispute V. g. si quis propter vanam gloriam jejunet oret Sacraments recipiat vel ministret Sacrum faciat quia quamvis aut similia principaliter gerat propter vanam gloriam dummodo tamen in hac vana gloria non instituat finem ejusmodi sacris rebus levem irrogat injuriam Escob l. 4. Theol. mor. cap. 3. If any one for example saith he fast pray administer or receive the Sacrament by a motive of vain glory though he do these things or other their like principally for vain glory he doth only slightly injure holy things It is but a slight wrong unto Jesus Christ to make him serve vain glory thence it follows that Sacriledges are no more crimes but small offences it being clear that to refer the most sacred actions of Religion even the Sacrifice of the Mass it self unto vain glory as its principal end is it may be the greatest profanation that can be committed and the greatest Sacriledge and not only a Sacriledge but an horrible Idolatry since this is not only to establish a creature but a vice for ones supream end It is properly to sacrifice unto vanity and to refer the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Devil as to his chief end For we sacrifice not unto God but by offering and relating the same Sacrifice unto him in the same manner A strange kind of Sacrifice and unheard of amongst the Heathens For this is not to sacrifice one creature unto another as they did but it is to sacrifice unto a creature and even to a vice God himself and the Son of God by offering and referring thereto Jesus Christ as to the principal end Where we must observe what Escobar addeth Provided saith he that he place not his end in this vain glory this is an exception wholly absurd and which destroys it self For it is a contradiction to say that an action is done principally for vain glory and that nevertheless vain glory should not be its end the end of an action and that for which it is principally done being one and the same thing If it be not enough to permit them who administer the Sacrament to celebrate it with an evil intention Escobar will also give them leave to cooperate with the sins of those who receive it unworthily 1 Potest Sicramentum peccatori publico exhiberi dummodo non ex con
Sacramentum novae legis Ibid. That Christians who live under the Law of Grace are not obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God so often with a love of supernatural charity to obtain life and avoid death eternal because it is sufficient for them to have attrition receiving at the same time some Sacrament of the new Law Amicus saith the same thing of the Commandment of Contrition for our conversion unto God after sin But I will not stand here to alledge or make reflection on what Molina saith because it is spoken of elsewhere I will only add to clear up the conformity of the Jesuits upon this Point that which Filliutius saith He demands 1 Pro quo tempore urgeat ejus obligatio An statim post pâ—ccatum commissum Secunda sententia negat etiamsi occurrat opportunitas facile fieri possit Respondeo dico 1. tenendum cum secunda sententia Filliut tom 1. qq mor. tr 6. cap. 8. num 198. 199. pag. 157. In what time we are obliged unto contrition and whether it be so soon as we have sinned And after he hath reported two opinions of which the second saith he denies that we are so soon obliged though we have conven ience and that we may easily do it he concludes in these terms I answer and say in the first place that we must follow the second opinion which holds that we are not obliged He descends also yet farther in particular and demands 2 Quibus temporibus per se obliget contritio ex jure naturali Ibid. num 205. Respondeo dico 1 si respiciatur lex justitiae qua homo tenetur satisfacere Deo pro injuria peccati sic non videtur obligari nisi quando adest periculum mortis Ibid. on what occasion the Precept of Contrition obliges by the Law of Nature Whereto he gives three Answers The first is that if we regard the Law of Justice by which a man is obliged to satisfie God for the injury which he hath done unto him by sin in this manner he seems not to be obliged to contrision and sorrow for his sin but only when he finds himself in danger of death His other Answer is 3 Si respiclatur lex charitatis erga Deum jute naturali obligat ante mortem Ibid. num 206. That if we respect the love which is due unto God we are obliged unto it by that Law of Nature before death That is to say that though in rigour and without any injustice a sinner may remain in his sin and aversion from God until his death notwithstanding he ought of charity to prevent that time and to love God sometimes without attending for this extremity if he will not ask him forgiveness as soon as he hath offended him nor even for many years after it is reasonable that at least he pass not above five or seven years before he do it This is the charitable advice which Filliutius gives him in these terms 4 In universum intra annum non videtur obligare quolibet septennio vel quinquennio est probâ—bile 〈◊〉 alibi dicam de charitate Ibid. n. 208. Speaking generally it seems that a man is not obliged thereto within one years time that he should be obliged thereto within five or from seven years to seven is very probable as we shall see elsewhere where I shall speak the same thing of Charity He holds that a sinner after he hath passed five or seven years in his sin and in a voluntary aversion from God and all others in like manner who have passed over so long a time without once thinking of loving God will be obliged the one to ask God pardon and the other to love him at least after so long a time If this be probable as he saith the contrary is also and by consequence of two probable opinions we may follow which we will with a safe conscience according to the Jesuits Divinity a sinner may persist in his sin and in his aversion from God and every other man in his insensibleness without having any motion of love unto God after he hath already past seven years without thinking of him The third Answer of Filliutius is 5 Si respâ—ciatur lex charitatis propriae probabile est obligare etiam extra articulum Ibid. num 206. That if we regard the Law of Charity which every one owes unto himself it is very probable that he is obliged to have contrition and sorrow for sin before the article of death And as if he feared lest this should also torment some consciences and give them too much trouble and scruple he adds 6 Ob authoritatem autem Doctorum quos citavimus in praecedenti quaesito non est improbabile quod non obliget Ibid. For all that because of the Authority of the Doctors whom we have quoted in the former question it is probable that he is not obliged thereto That is to say that a man who is in mortal sin may with a safe conscience according to this probable opinion persist voluntarily all his life in a state of enmity against God and delay his conversion until the point of death demanding only forgiveness of God when he is ready to dye and can offend him no longer without doing herein any thing against the charity he owes to himself any more than against that which he owes unto God I can hardly believe that a Jesuit would approve a Child who should deal with his Father in this manner as he saith we may carry our selves towards God and I know not whether he would counsel any of his Brethren who had a mortal disease to suffer it five or seven years or even until he should see himself nigh unto death without calling for the Physitian and without applying any remedy thereto and whether be believes he may do this without danger of killing the body of his Brother by this delay and his own Soul by so remarkable a negligence especially if he had an assured remedy whereof it was only his own fault if he did not make use I know well at the least that if herein he pretend not to offend against the Laws of Justice and Christian Charity he shall transgress those of the Society who have so well provided for the health of all their Brethren that inftead of delaying to the extremity they have ordained to cause the Physitian to visit them from time to time though there be none of them sick What kind of prudence must this be which hath so great care of the health and life of the body and so little of the Souls Father Celot is not content to say as Filliutius and others that a sinner is not obliged to seek God after he hath offended him but even that God himself preventing and seeking as we may say his friendship by the inspirations and good motions he bestows on him he may refuse and reject them effectually
transported by voluntarily despising the Doctrine of the holy Fathers after he hath acknowledged it since he hath confidence to say afterwards I believe nevertheless that to fail in these things is no mortal sin unless in case of scandal pag. 81. He means that it is no morsal sin to be deficient in that which God and Nature obligeth us unto as he said but now that it is no mortal sin as he saith also in the same place to have such an â—atred against our neighbour as not to be willing to keep company with him to have such and so violent an aversion from him as upon no terms or occasion to be willing to speak with him nor help him in his business nor at all to forgive him when he acknowledges his fault and offers satisfaction For he declares roundly that to be deficient in all these things which he hath related according to the opinion of the Fathers and new Divines themselves is no mortal sin unless in case of scandal that is to say in the language of this good man that provided men be not offended at these things the violation of Charity and the Law of God is of little consideration He speaks also of Envy with the same spirit citing also S. Austin and S. Cyprian but only to despise their Authority also by openly preferring his own opinion before that of these great Saints For after he hath related the words of S. Cyprian who wondring at the nature of Envy crys out Qualis est animi tinea zelare in altero felicitatem in malum proprium bona aliena convertere illustrium prosperitate torqueri He adds speedily after as thinking strange at S. Cyprians wondring and correcting the opinion of S. Austin whom he quotes likewise This sin though by the testimony of S. Austin it be contrary to Charity yet seems not to be mortal pag. 80. And the reason he opposes to the Authority of these great Saints is Because the good which is found in these temporal things is so slender and of so little consequence for Heaven that it is of no consideration with God and the Saints I let pass this reason of which I have spoken in another place to relate that which he adds also concerning the sin of Envy It is no more mortal saith he when a man gives way to such desires upon some good motive ex bono motivo He expresses a little before some of these desires which he doth not only discharge of mortal sin but which he justifies absolutely and would have to pass for innocent saying that we may wish evil to our neighbour without sin when we are urged to it by some good motive pag. 77. And to expound and support his opinion he makes use of the Authority of Bonacina writing in these terms So Bonacina upon the first Commandment disp 3. q. 4. n. 7. exempts from all fault the mother who desires the death of her daughters quod ob deformitatem aut inopiam nequeat juxta animi desiderium eas nuptui tradere or indeed because for their sakes she is ill used by their father quia occasione illarum male secum agitur à marito aut injuriis afficitur Non enim proprie filias detestatur ex displicentia ipsarum sed in detestationem proprii mali pag. 77. He brings also another Example on the same subject also one may without fault desire some evil to befal a wicked man as death non quidem optando quatenus malum ipsius est sed quatenus boni rationem habet This good or this appearance of good which serves for motive to desile the death of a man without offending God is expounded by Emanuel Sa in this sort 1 Potes optare hosti tibi alioqui valde nocituro mortem non odio sed ad vitandum damnum tuum Item de morte ejus gaudere ob bonum inde secutum Sa verbo charitatis num 8. pag. 65. You may desire the death of an enemy who might do you much hurt not of hatred to him but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you You may also rejoyce in his death because of the good which you receive thereby Jesus Christ was far off from this Doctrine when in the Gospel he forbids us to render evil for evil and commands us on the contrary to do good for evil But this Maxime justifies the greatest part of the enmities and mortal feuds that are in the world For commonly we desire not the hurt and especially not the death of another but to deliver our selves from some evil or to reap thereby some good and he must have lost all regard of God and Nature who should desire any evil or death it self to befal a man out of a meer frolick without occasion reason or hope of any good I might here also represent that the Jesuits dispense with the obligation of assisting our neighbour except only in extream necessity and that they cherish the licence of committing without fear of punishments thests murthers impostures cheats and breaches of trust in all sorts of condition For all these abuses and all these sins are against the Command which God hath given us to love our neighbour as our selves and never to do unto him what we would not have done unto us But because all these things have been largely proved in other places I will speak no more of them at present I will add only for conclusion unto this Chapter that which Amicus saith upon a question which he proposeth concerning the command to love our neighbour to wit 1 An vi hujus praecepti teneamur ad aliquem actum charitatis erga proximum An vero huic praecepto satisfacere possimus per solos actus externos misericordiae beneficentiae quando necessitas ratio postulat Amicus tom 4. disp 28. sect 1. n. 3. pag. 377. Whether by vertue of this Precept we be obliged to some act of Charity towards our neighbour Or whether we may satisfie it by acts of mercy and bounty exercised towards him when necessity and occasion require After he hath quoted the Divines who hold the affirmative and related their reasons to the number of five which are very considerable he cites Suarez Coninck and some others who are of the contrary opinion with whom he concludes in these terms 2 Haec sententia probabilis est quam expresse tradit Bernardus Serm. 50 in Cantica Ibid. num 14. Baque non obscure colligitur ex illis verbis Matth. 7. Lucae 6. Quaecunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines vos facite illis Ibid. This opinion is probable He attributes it also to S. Bernard saying That S. Bernard teaches it expresly in his 50. Sermon upon the Canticles Which we should have more reason to wonder at if he had not also the confidence to say that he learnt it of Jesus Christ and that it was drawn and did evidently follow from these words of Jesus
also upon some bad occasion as to affirm by oath that one hath committed murder or adultery is but a venial sin 1 Qula licet juramentum hoc adjungatur narrationi peccati mortalis ut juro me commisisse tale homicidium vel fornicationem tamen non fit cum complacentia in illo ex necessitate sed tantum fic sine causa leviter quare non excedet culpam venialem Ibid. n. 336. pag. 205. For though we make use of this oath in the relation we make of a mortal sin as when we say I swear that I have committed this murder or this fornication yet this may be done without any complacency in this crime and only out of levity and without cause Wherefore it is but a venial sin He adds that though a man who swears thus should take pleasure in the crime he relates and should scandalize and defame another person in his relation this oath according to Suarez would not be mortal which he also believes as probable with him For after he hath said that the more rational Casuists hold that 2 Si quis narret peccatum mortale infamando proximum ut adulterium cum muliere honesta vel complacendo in illo tunc juramentum additum videtur mortale Ibid. num 337. if any one reporting a mortal sin wrong the honour and reputation of his neighbour as by saying that he hath committed adultery with an honest woman or if he take pleasure therein if he swear to affirm that which he saith it is a mortal sin he opposeth unto theirs the opinion of Suarez as probable 3 Attamen Suarez loco citato n. 8. defendit à mortali si tantum habeatur ratio juramenti quia non cadit supra illam materiam quatenus mala sed tantum quatenus vera Quare nec erit peccatum saltem mortale quod est satis probabile Ibid. For all that Suarez saith he in the place now quoted n. 8. maintains that it is no mortal sin if it be considered only as an oath because this oath regards not the matter of this discourse as bad but only as true And by consequence there is none at the least no mortal sin therein which is probable enough And because this reason of Suarez is metaphysical enough Filliutius relates another or rather expounds the same in another manner and makes it more intelligible 4 Quia ejusmodi defectus nec est contra finem juramenti Potest enim confirmari per illud veritas nec facit Deum testem mendacii sed ad summum rei malae indecentis ut diximus At id per se non est injuria gravis Ibid. num 336. Because this defect saith he speaking of the injury done unto God by the man who takes him for a witness of the adultery he hath committed is not contrary to the end of an oath For it may serve to confirm the truth and he takes not God for a witness of a false but at the most of a wicked and dishonest thing as we have said and this in it self is no great injury against God By this reckoning we may say that a child should do his father no great wrong nor a servant his Master nor wife her husband to produce and take him for witness of her debauches provided they were true unless we will say that the honour of God is less considerable than that of men or that God ought to be insensible of all injuries and indignities committed against him Sanchez discharges of sin at least mortal all those who swear of custom 5 Qualiscunque illa fit nondum sit reâ—ractata Atque ita ut sint peccata lethalia requirit talem advertentiam qualis est necessaria in homine non sic ad jurandum assueto Sanch. op moral lib. 3. cap. 5. num 28. pag. 21. of what sort soever it be saith he though they have not yet recanted it If they in swearing have not so much presence of mind as to perceive what they say and do and what evil they cause as the most prudent have who have not this evil habit so their vice and wicked custom of swearing shall not hurt them but on the contrary upon this occasion it shall be favourable unto them For if they had it not they would perceive what they did in swearing and would make themselves Criminals But because the evil custom of swearing which they have contracted and wherein they persist still voluntarily blinds and hinders them from perceiving the crime they commit it secures them from it according to this Doctor By this reason if a man being in a dangerous way should pull out his own eyes and then fall into a precipice he might be excused by this that he could not see when he fell By all this which hath been said unto this present it is clear that the Jesuits excuse them who swear and forswear through an evil habit who swear rashly and without reason vainly and without necessity in wicked and scandalous matters which tend to the dishonour of our neighbour by defaming him and of God by taking him for witness of crimes and debauches of which in swearing they boast themselves So that there remains nothing in this matter but swearing and forswearing with full knowledge and black malice to be a crime and which properly retains the name of an oath and perjury in the Schools of these Fathers Escabar puts this Question 1 Lictuâ—e inducere aliquem ad jurandum falsum quod tamen ipse juraturus ex ignorantia verum putat Escobar tr 1. exam 3. cap. 7. num 31. p. 74. Is it lawful to suborn any person to swear a false thing which he notwithstanding ignorantly believes to be true And after he had said that Azor is not of this opinion because it is not lawful to cause that evil to be done by another which we cannot do our selves he adds 2 Affiâ—n ac autem Petrus Hartado But this is the opinion of P. Hurtado He might also have joyned Sanchez to him who holds the same opinion 3 Si absque inductione aliqua mea ille se effâ—…at ad jurandum quod bona fide putat esse verum etian si ego falsum norim conducat ad probandum quod scio verum esse ne jure meo defrauder licebit utique acceptare Sanch. op moral lib. 3. cap. 8. num 10. pag 35. If some one present himself to me saith he without my sollicitation to swear that which he in simplicity believes to be true though I know well that it is false if notwithstanding it serve to prove some other thing which I know to be true and conduces to hinder that I be not deprived of my right it is lawful for me to take his offer The reason of Escobar is 4 Quia proximus tunc non inducitus ad effâ—ctum formaliter malum cum jurando non delinquat Ibid. Escobar Because in
without making use of a Perjurer this is to give great liberty or rather a great and dangerous temptation to all Agents Proctors and Sollicitors of Affairs The other Example is of a man who hath need of a Knight of the Post to reform a Contract and make it valid 8 Insuper potest deservire hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui alià s infirmus erit Ibid. Moreover saith Sanchez this oath may be made use of to fortifie and make valid a Contract which without it would be null This is to make good penny-worths of conscience and our neighbours Souls to abandon it in this manner and to help him even to cast himself into perdition and the power of the Devil to secure a debt or to avoid the reproach or suspicion of being negligent in the conduct of an affair Escobar puts also this Question about an Oath 9 Num liceat per faisos Deos ad jurandum inducere Determinate inducere mortale crimen est petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falsos Deos est juraurus per se malum non est Escob tr 1. exam 3. num 57. pag. 79. Whether it be lawful to induce one to swear by false gods The Answer is 10 That to engage him expresly thereto is a mortal sin but to demand an oath of him who will swear by false gods is no evil thing in it self He holds then that it is no evil in it self to take such an oath of an Infidel but it would be to demand it that it may be demanded but not expresly that we may sollicite an Infidel and engage him to swear provided we tell him not in express terms that he shall swear by his false gods though we be assured that he will not swear otherwise not acknowledging the true God Who sees not that this is to deride God and men to treat of matters of Religion and Salvation in a manner so unhandsom and gross that common sense only is sufficient to perceive the excess and baseness of it Escobar cites Filliutius upon this Point and he saith in effect the same thing with him and in the same terms 1 Petere juramentum ab co quem constat esse juraturum per falses Deos non est per se malum Filliutius tom 2. mor. qq tr 21. cap. 11. num 339. pag. 265. To demand saith he an oath of him who wâ—…are assured will swear by his false god is not a thing evil in it self This is also the Judgment of Sanchez who with his Brethren acknowledging that it is to contribute to an action of Idolatry or at the least to give occasion of it also with them that it may not be done without some reason for it But instead of what the others say generally that we ought to be engaged thereto by some necessity or utility he saith more that it cannot be so little as not be sufficient thereunto 2 Vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis Sanch. ut supra num 23. pag. 37. The least benefit or interest sufficeth saith he to dispense with the Precept which obliges us to avoid this occasion And it is in a manner upon this reason that he gives a solution to another difficulty which he propounds a little after 3 Secunda difficultas est quale peccatum fit exigere hoc juramentum ad Infideli parato ad jurandum per falsos Deos quando defuit necessitas aut utilitas excusans Ibid. num 22. Quam difficultatem in terminis non enodant Authores Quia generale charitatis preximl ac correctionis fraternae praeceptum obligat quemlibet sub mortâ—li ad vitandum lethale alterius peccatum quando commode absque suo damno id potest What sin is it to require an oath of an Infidel who is ready to swear by false gods without necessity or utility which might serve for excuse He answers 1. That none have declared nor explicated this Question in the terms he hath proposed it And after he acknowledges that some condemn this action of mortal sin because it is entirely against the Charity which we owe to our Neighbour which obliges us to hinder and much more not to tempt him to offend God mortally at least when we can do it conveniently and without any loss This so weighty a consideration startles him a little but it is not capable to make him to quit his opinion and yield unto the truth 4 Quamvis autem hoc probabilius esse credam quia ratio adducta fortiter urget at probabile est culpam solum venialem admitti Though I believe saith he that this opinion is more probable because the reason of these Authors which I now related is very urgent it is very probable that it is but a venial sin His reason is that since there needs so small a matter to be able without sin to prevail against the Precept forbidding us to demand an oath of an Infidel this is a sign that this Command is not so rigorous as to oblige under mortal sin though we should violate it expresly and without any particular reason 5 Quia ut vidimus n. 2. seq vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis at à praeceptis sub mortali obligantibus non tam levis causa excusare solet Ibid. Because saith he the least consideration of benefit sufficeth to exempt us from the Precept which obligeth to avoid this occasion and it is not ordinary for so slight an occasion to dispense with Commands which oblige under mortal sin This manner of arguing is very ordinary with the Jesuits to establish one Errour by another and to make use of one disorder which they have already introduced to make way for a second by drawing consequences from the one to the other Because they give liberty without sin to demand an oath of an Idolater when we have any small pretext for it they infer from thence that when we demand it without any reason it cannot be any great evil Thus it is that they take from themselves authority to dispense with the Commandments of God and abolish them as they please and that they make use of their own dispensations to give them liberty to violate them freely or at least without any great sin ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment of God HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER THis Commandment obligeth Children to their Fathers and Mothers in four principal things as the Catechism of the Council of Trent observes to love reverence obedience and assistance These are also the four Duties in which the Jesuits undertake to dispense with them 1. For what concerns love Dieastilius saith 1 Defiderare filium v. g. parentis mortem aut de illa gaudere ob haereditatem eldem provenientem non ita certum est esse licitum quamvis de
duty of Justice and he fears not to say and declare that he who fails herein sins mortally 1 Quando aggrestus persona esset cujus vita multum Respublicae vel in spiritual ibus vel in temporalibus referret teneretur sub reatu culpae lethalis interficere aggressorem si posset ut vitam suam conservaret Molina de just commuâ— tract 3. disp 14. pag. 1754. When he who is assaulted saith he is a person whose life is of importance and necessary to the Weal publick whether it be in temporals or spirituals he is obliged under mortal sin to kill if be can the Aggressor in defence of his life If this Jesuit had been found amongst the Apostles when our Lord said unto them that he should be delivered unto the Gentiles outragiously dealt with and put to death he would have believed without doubt that he ought to have opposed himself thereto more forcibly than S. Peter did who said unto him only by way of advice and natural affection 2 Absit à te Domine non erit tibi hoc Matt. 16. v. 22. God forbid Lord that this should befal thee this evil shall not be unto thee And he would have had no better answer than that which Jesus Christ made unto S. Peter 3 Vade post me Satana scandalum es mihi quia non sapis ea quae sunt Dei sed quae hominum Ibid. v 23. Get thee behind me Satan thou art an offence unto me for thou savourest not the things that are of God but of men It must also be observed that he would have the Commandment to kill an Aggressor unless we will sin mortally not to be only for publick persons when the publick good is in question but also for private persons when the interests of their families are concerned See here his words 4 Idem videtur eff si ex ipsius morte sequeretur maximum detrimeâ—… tum familiae ut uxori ac filiis quos alere tenetur Molina ibid. It seems that the same is to be said if his death would bring some great prejudice unto his family as to his wife his children whom he is obliged to sustain And for fear that it should be objected to him that if this man be not obliged in Justice to expose his life or his goods for his neighbour that he might recover him from death eternal and temporal at once he might at least do it of Charity he prevents this objection by saying 5 Quamvis enim posset cedere juri suo permittendo se ab aggressore interfici ne aggressor damnum mortis temporalis aeternae incurreret non tamen posset cedere juri suorum quibus vit a ipsius est necessaris quibus alimenta protectionem debet quae à vita ipsius pendent Ibid. That though it might be lawful for him to depart from his right by suffering himself to be slain by him that assaults him to prevent his falling into death temporal and eternal yet he cannot give away the right of those who belong unto him to whom his life is necessary being obliged to maintain and defend them And by consequence he sins mortally in not killing the Aggressor if he can for the preservation of his life But why may he not say also of the Head of an Ecclesiastick Body of the Superior of an Order and of all those who have any Charge or Employment in the Church what he speaks generally of those whose lives are necessary for the Common-wealth or their private Families 6 Tenetur sub reatu culpâ—… lethalis interficere aggresscrem si possit ut vitam suam conservet That they are obliged under mortal sin to kill the Aggressor if they can for the preservation of their lives The one as well as the other is a consequence of his Principle and his reason is stronger for a Head of an Ecclesiastical Body or Superior of an Order or a person who hath some Charge in the Church than for a Secular Magistrate or a Father of a Family it being more true of every one of the former than of the latter 7 Est persona cujus vita multum Reipub in temporalibus in spiritualibus refert That be is a person whose life is very important to the Weal-publick of the Church both in temporals and spirituals Whence it will follow that we may say according to the same Jesuit 8 Tenetur sub reatu culpae lethalis interficere aggressorem si pâ—ssiâ— ut vitam suam 〈◊〉 conservet That he sins mortally if he kill not him that assaults him if he can in the defence of his life So that it shall not be in one or two cases only but in an infinity of occurrents almost that this Command of Killing which Molina would introduce amongst Christians shall oblige them under pain of eternal damnation And it would not be easie according to the Doctrine of this Jesuit to exempt from mortal sin a multitude of holy Martyrs who have suffered themselves to be slain unjustly not only without defending themselves but also sometimes forbidding those who could and would to defend them because some of them being Fathers of Families and others Fathers of the Church and of the Faithful their lives were of importance both in spirituals and temporals So that though they might recede from their right in Charity and suffer themselves to be slain without defending themselves yet they could not according to this new Theology recede from the right of those who appertained to them and who were under their Charges whereunto their lives were necessary And by consequence if this Jesuit do not shew them favour and grant them a dispensation from this Rule they sin mortally in dying for Jesus Christ and not defending themselves and not doing all they could to preserve their lives so far as to kill if it were needful their Aggressors But if he pretend that this Commandment is from God as it ought to be that it may imply so great and strict an obligation we must also believe that the Law of God is less reasonable and less just than the Maxims of Philosophy and the Civil Laws of Pagans who never commanded nor taught any such thing and who rather condemn it in many cases in which the Jesuit approves it as an excess and crime he must therefore be constrained either to change the Commandments of God or to increase their number we must according to him make eleven Commandments of God instead of ten or indeed instead of what hath been said to this present Thou shalt not kill we must say for the time to come Thou mayst kill oftentimes without fear of mortal sin and thou shalt even be obliged sometimes to kill on pain of Hell IV. POINT The Opinion of Escobar concerning Murder I Will give all this Article to Escobar and indeed he deserves it well for he is Spokesman for twenty four of the most famous
place because there is oftentimes danger to consent unto these things and so to stay therein with pleasure or to fall into pollution according to the complexion or disposition of the body For this cause saith he it is expedient not to be too loose in these things Whence he infers that these kisses must be absolutely forbidden unto persons betrothed But a little after he grants them as innocent and lawful things to the betrothed themselves For having made this Objection on the behalf of those who are of the contrary opinion 2 Sponsis conceditur ea voluptas quae praecise ex osculo contactu manus vel faclei percipitur ita ut ne venialiter quidem in eo peccet Ibid. num 59. It is allowed unto persons betrothed to enjoy the pleasure they take in kissing or touching the hands or faces of one another so that herein they sin not so much as venially He answers affirming this Proposition 3 Sponsis conceditur quia est signum copulae futurae in quam ratione matrimonii consentire quodammodo possunt num 59. That it is allowed to betrothed persons because this is a sign of the carnal conjunction which is to be afterwards whereunto they have in some sort a right to consent by reason of Marriage He allows them the same kisses which he had before condemned of mortal sin according to the more common Doctrine and his own opinion And which is yet more strange and extravagant he hath allowed these unto them for the same reason for which he had said above that they could not be allowed them This is granted saith he to persons betrothed because it is a sign of the future carnal conjunction whereunto they have in some sort a right to consent by reason of Marriage And a little above he had said 4 Etiam inter sponsos suadeo plane dissuadenda Quia osculum ut est delectabile carni natura sua est signum copulae vel instantis vel futurae ut etiam ex usu animalium constar Itaque in co contineri videtur tackus quidam consensus in copulam Ibid. num 59. My advice is that we ought wholly to divert from them even persons betrothed themselves because these kisses as they produce sensual pleasure of themselves signifie naturally present or future carnal conjunction as may be seen commonly amongst Animals themselves For which cause it seems that they contain in them a silent consent unto this conjunction I leave it to his Brethren to undo these contradictions I will only observe here farther that he assures us that betrothed persons may take pleasure and consent in some sort to the action of Marriage which they shall exercise when they are married as if it were lawful to enjoy a right which we have not yet and even which we shall never have Marriage giving us only a power to do what is necessary for the begetting of children and not to hunt after shameful pleasures and the satiating of lust Layman hath taught the same thing For taking the difficulty at the highest he puts this general Question 5 An sit mot tale peccatum morosae delectationis si conjux absente conjuge delecter se cogitatione copulae maritalis Eademque quaestio proponi solet de vidus oblectante se recordatione copulae praeteritae Idem de sponso defiderante vel oblectante se in copula futura Layman lib. 1. tract 3. cap. 6. num 12. pag. 41. Whether a married person commit mortal sin by a too long continued delight taken in dishonest pleasures of mind when in the absence of his Bed-fellow he entertains himself with the thoughts of the pleasure which arises from the use of the Marriage-bed The same Question is commonly made concerning a Widow entertaining her self with the remembrance of pleasures past and a Spouse who desires and fore-tastes as it were by way of advance that which he shall have He answers 6 Dico 1. conjux mortaliter non peccat si de maritali copula absente conjuge cogitans tem cogitaram voluntarie approbet five de ea gaudeat That a Husband and Wife sin not mortally when at a distance from one another they think of the action of Marriage and admit and entertain this thought with pleasure and joy He saith the same thing after of Widows and betrothed persons who do what he spoke of in the Question he propounded He proceeds yet farther and makes use of the Authority of Sanchez to maintain that all sorts of persons indifferently may voluntarily continue and with complacence in the thoughts of pleasure which they might have with any woman whatsoever she be if they were married together Quod idem Sanchez lib. 1. moral cap. 2. num 33. Filliur cap. 1. extendunt ad omnem volupraris affectionem etiam simplicis complacentiae conceptae ex cogitatione concubitus cum mulitre si uxor esser Ibid. It is easie to see that there are no filthy and dishonest desires which may not be justified by these distinctions and subtilties which are of no use but to corrupt minds and to give them liberty to commit without ceasing an infinite of Fornications Adulteries and Incests within themselves without any scruple of conscience As for Pollution Lessius maintains that it may be desired when any good is expected from it His words are 1 Dico 3. prebabile est licitum esse illam desiderare simplici affectu causa alicujus boni effectus cum ca conjuncti v. c. causa sanitatis sedandae tentationis obtinendaetranquillitatis animi Lessius de just lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 14. n. 104. pag. 697. It is probable that it may be desired with a simple affection by reason of some good effect which may thereby be produced as health deliverance from temptation and repose of mind Tolet saith the same thing more clearly 2 Si quis desiderat pollutionem eb bonum finem scllicet saninatem vel ad levandas carnls tentationes quibus interdum affligitur non est peccatum Tolet lib. 5. cap. 13. num 4. pag. 772. Sa verbo Luxuria num 11. pag. 449. Sanchez moral lib. 1. cap. 2. num 18. pag. 7. Escobar tr 1. exam 8. num 95. pag. 154. If any one desire pollution for some good end as for his health or that he may be quit of some fleshly temptations which are a trouble to him oftentimes it is no sin Emanuel Sa Sanchez and Escobar are of the same opinion I will only relate the words of the last who saith 3 Inchoatam in somno pollutionem non tenetur quis evigilans reprimere That a person who in his sleep begins to fall into pollution is not obliged to repress it when he awakes This he takes for certain in his Divinity and then demands what is to be said to it 4 Quid si gaudeat de llia pollutione vel opter evenire Si gaudear vel opter non ob delectationem
they know probably or certainly that they will break it it is more difficult to grant them this permission yet we grant it them with probability enough because the Victualler provides not these meats nor provokes us to buy them with a direct intention that we should break our Fast or sin but that he might get their money as all Buyers know See here a motive very capable to purifie this action Interest which spoils the best things and corrupts the most holy actions purifies and justifies this which of it self is vicious By this reason it will be lawful for a Merchant to sell poyson to a man whom he knows certainly will take it or give it to another to destroy him since as poyson kills the body so meats taken against the Churches Prohibition kill the Soul and he that sells the poyson hath no more than he that sells the meat a direct intention to kill or commit a spiritual or corporal murder but only to benefit himself by this murder and to get money by the sale of this meat and poyson which are the cause of this murder And so it will be lawful to induce any person whomsoever to violate all the Commands of the Church and God himself if therein we find our interest and can draw thence some temporal benefit ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment to communicate at Easter and of the Confession to be made every year That according to the Jesuits Divinity these Commandments may be satisfied by true Sacriledges THe Jesuits expound not the Commandment to communicate at Easter more Christian-like than the other Commandments of the Church They pretend that it may be satisfied by a sacrilegious Communion and by receiving the Body of Jesus Christ with a criminal conscience nay though we know that we are in this estate and in mortal sin This opinion is common in their School and passes there for indubitable 2 Eucharistiam indigne sumens in die Paschatis satisfacit praecepto Sa verbo Eucharist in fine pag. 233. He that receives the Eucharist unworthily on Easter day satisfies the Precept quoth Emanuel Sa. 3 Quid si indigne communicem Imples tamen per voluntariam susceptionem praeceptum Escobar tract 1. exam 12. cap. 2. num 15. pag. 196. Escobar supposes a person to communicate unworthily and saith that he faileth not for all that to accomplish the Precept though he receive the Body of Jesus Christ in this estate voluntarily that is to say though he commit Sacriledge voluntarily as the rest whom we shall relate hereafter say it openly Filliutius saith the same thing almost in the same terms He demands 1 An impleatur praeceptum per voluntariam susceptionem Sacramenti etiamsi indigne suscipiatur Repondeo â—ico primo impleri Filliutâ— qq mor. tem 1. tract 4. cap. 2. num 60 pag. 74. Whether this Precept may be accomplished by receiving the Sacrament voluntarily though unworthily And his answer is that it is accomplished Amicus is of the same opinion and he expounds it yet better than others 2 Ecclesiasticum praeceptum Eucharistiae omnino censeo impleri etiam per sacrilegam manducationem Amiâ—uâ— tom 8. disp 29. sect 5. num 53. pag. 401. I hold absolutely saith he that the Precept of the Church touching the Eucharist is fulfilled even by a sacrilegious Communion This is a strange manner of obeying the Church by committing Sacriledges and it is to honour it very much to imagine that it may be satisfied with Sacriledges It must needs be that they who believe it to be capable of this have an horrible opinion of it they must believe that it commands Sacriledges if they believe that by obeying it they may be committed and it may be satisfied by these same Sacriledges For when it commands any thing it cannot be satisfied otherwise than by doing what it commandeth Jesus Christ hath said in the Gospel that they who despise the Church and its Pastors despise himself and these Jesuits make the Church to say that those who despise Jesus Christ and dishonour him outragiously by a sacrilegious Communion cease not to obey and satisfie it by fulfilling its Commandment Celot having undertaken to prove against Aurelius that the Laws of the Church and Gospel may be accomplished without love speaks thus against him 3 Non enim post disputata cum Judaeis disputare potest Aurelius qâ—i Paschalem synaxim cum conscientia lethalis peccati celebraverit quin is nihilominus Ecclesiae paruerit justitiam operum si non justitiam legis impleverit Celot lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 124. Aurelius cannot doubt but that he who communicates at Easter in mortal sin satisfies the Command of the Church and yet though he accomplisheth not the Justice of the Law he accomplisheth for all that the Justice of Works He would not that his Adversary should doubt of this Maxime though he knew well enough that he did not only doubt of it but condemn it Coninck to prove that the Commandment of the Church may be fulfilled not only in an estate of sin but also by an action which is a sin brings an Example of a man who communicates unworthily at Easter 4 Ut patet in jejunante eb vanam gloriam aut in Paschate indigne communicante Coninck de Sacr. q 83. a. 6. d. uni n. 296. p. 286. As it is clear saith he in his case who fasts for vain-glory or communicates unworthily at Easter Which he propounds as a constant Maxime and of which it was not lawful to make any doubt saying 5 Nâ—m certum est eum satisfacere praecepto Ecclesiae qui simulat se jejunare ex pietate pie in Paschate communicare etsi jejunet ob vanam gloriam sacrilege communicet Ibid. That it is certain that he satisfies the Precept of the Church who makes shew of Fasting for devotion and of communicating at Easter with requisite piety though he fasteth out of vain-glory and commits Sacriledge in communicating This is also the opinion of Azor answering those who demand 6 An qui in die Paschatis Sacramentum Eucharistiae accipit indigene videlicet aut sua peccata non legitime confessus aut alio quolibet modo lethalis peccati conlcius Ecclesiae praeceptum implear Whether he who receives the Sacrament of the Eucharist unworthily on Easter day whether it be that he hath not well confessed his sins or for some other defect which renders him guilty of mortal sin do accomplish the Precept of the Church For he saith 7 Respondeo eum implere Is enim licet jus divinum frangat aut violet male ad Sacramentum accedendo legis tamen Ecclesiasticae substantiam servar Azor Instit lib. 7. cap. 30. pag. 734. That he accomplisheth the Precept of the Church And his reason is Because though he violate the Law of God by approaching the Sacrament in a wicked estate yet he observes the Law of the Church in the
acts nor sees but by Faith and not by sense and reason all alone The second disposition which the Jesuits require unto the Communion besides Confession is Fasting Amicus treating of this condition puts it in question and demands 2 Dubium est de saccharo quod retinetur in ore ad temperandas capitis distillationes an impediat Eucharistiae sumptionem Whether putting a little sugar in the mouth to stay defluxions from the brain be a bar to the Communion And he answers that this is Suarez's opinion 3 Affirmat Suarez negare tamen videtur Tabiena alii viri docti quos ego consului qui addunt hanc opinionem tutam esse in praxi Et sane non videtur improbabilis cum talis liquor in stomachum descendat per modum salivae Amicus tom 7. dub 27. sect 1. num 5. pag. 385. Nevertheless saith he after Tabiena and other learned men whom I have consulted seem to be of a contrary judgment and say moreover that this opinion is safe in the practice And in truth it seems probable this liquor destilling down into the stomach in the form of spittle This opinion which was not received in Suarez's time is become probable in Amicus's and it may quickly become very common because it is favourable unto sensuality Escobar puts another question to wit 1 Frangitue naturale jejunium folium aut puivis herbae illius quae â—abac vocitatur Râ—…pondeo ex Praeposito in 3. p. 280. art 8. d. 1. n. 34. Per os sumptum in folio non frangere nisi deglutiatur Addit Tannerus tom 4. disp 5. num 1. neque si quid salivae incorporatum trajiciatur in stomachum Whether Tobacco in leaf or powder breaks the natural Fast He takes his answer out of Praepositus who saith That being taken in the leaf and put into the mouth it breaks not the Fast provided that it be not swallowed down Tannerus goes beyond what he saith and holds That this is true though something of it do fall into the stomach being mingled and incorporated with our spittle And as for the smoke of it Granado whom he cites saith 2 De fumo idem asserendum Granado in 3. p. contr 6. tract 10. dub 8. num 4. putat etiamsi sit tantae quantitatis ut ad aliqualem nuttitionem sufficiat That it is all one though it be taken in such quantity as may in some fashion serve for nourishment That is to say that it hinders not nor breaks at al the natural Fast which is necessary for approaching to the Communion And his reason is 3 Quia fumus non sumitur per modum cibi Ibid. That smoke is not taken in form of nourishment We may communicate according to this reason after we have taken some medicine or drunk water because neither are taken in form of nourishment There remains nothing behind to the resolving of this question in all these instances but to know what must be said of taking Tobacco in powder Escobar fortified by the advice of those whom he hath made to speak before him gives us the resolution of this point himself and saith 4 De pulvere autem idem omnino censco quia ad hoc jejunium observandum solum prehibetur cibâ—… potus Ibid. That his opinion is that we must affirm the same thing of the powder as of the leaf and smoke Because to keep us fasting it is only forbidden to eat and drink Amicus allows us to take Sugar Escobar Tobacco so every one may please his own taste And if any one have an aversion from Tobacco and Sugar he may according to the reasonings of these Casuists take in his mouth all sorts of Essences Electuaries Tablets Comfits which may be taken without chewing suffering them to melt like Sugar by little and little in the mouth so the liquor which falls into the stomach with the spittle shall not break his Fast nor hinder him from communicating If any too scrupulous person should say that to take Comfits or such like things and to make them dissolve in the mouth is a sort of eating and drinking he may perhaps find satisfaction in that which this Jesuit adds for the explication of his thoughts and supportation of his opinion 5 Jejunium non violatur nisi cibus potus perâ—os sumptus in stomachum vitali quidem actione comestiva potativa traâ—ciatur Ibid. That we break not our Fast if the meat and drink which we take by the mouth be not eaten and drunk by a vital action and pass not on presently into the stomach And if you urge him farther shewing that these things may serve for nourishment as well as what we eat and drink he hath told you already out of Tannerus and Granado that this matters not for though these things nourish it is always true to say that in rigour and in the letter we neither cat nor drink in taking them as Granado affirmed of Tobacco quia non sumitur per modum cibi though it do nourish Etiamsi sit tantae quantitatis ut ad aliqualem nutritionem sufficiat This is very new and unheard of in the Church of God until these Authors But that which he saith in the same place relating the opinion of Praepositus is more strnage 6 Praepositus asserit esse praeceptum Ecclesiasticum intelligendum to modo quo Ecclesis in quadragesima quatuor temporibus principle sesunium Ibid. num 65. pag. 870. Praepositus saith he speaking of the Commandment to communicate Fasting maintains that it is a Precept of the Church and must be understood in such manner as the Churches command to fast in Lent and Ember weeks From whence he draws this consequence that it hath some latitude 7 Colligitur hinc parvitatem admitti materiae Ibid. Addunt aliqui peccarei 〈…〉 post modicum cibum synaxi reficitur Ibid. and some small matter may be allowed Upon which we may consequently judâ—… whether there be any evil in it or not and what evil or sin it is to communicate after we have taken something That is to say that we may eat before we communicate provided we eat not much all one as in Fasting days commanded by the Church we may according to these Dictors take a morsel of bread and drink once without breaking our Fast But if there be any fault in communicating thus the most rigorous can make it but a venial one So the Jesuits acknowledging hardly any save these two dispositions and preparations necessary to communicate that is Confession and Fasting yet are found in truth to destroy them both and to give liberty to people to communicate without having any at all And indeed if it be true as these Jesuits teach that by communicating in an estate of mortal sin and knowing well that we commit Sacriledge we cease not to satisfie the Precept of the Communion any thing is credible after this in this matter and it seems that according to this opinion we
spirit and in his heart though it were easie for him to do it if he would they content themselves if he say Amavi Mariam toto mense toto anno I have loved Mary a whole month a whole year But if he also startle at Penance they will give him so slight an one that he cannot refuse it they will even leave him to his choice if it be needful and they will remit him to do his Penance in the other world After this they must wholly renounce all devotion who will not go to confess themselves to the Jesuits and it seems that he who refuses can have no other pretence then to say that he hath no devotion and he may adde that he cannot have any for Confession as the Jesuits represent it and that he cannot believe that he confesses himself as he ought if he confess as they say he may But after all this though one will not be devout if he be a Catholick he must at least confess himself at Easter that thereupon he may communicate the Command of the Church is express and to fail herein were to decry and declare himself to be a man of no Religion The Jesuits have therefore provided for this also they have made the observation of this Precept so easie that the most debauched and most impious may discharge this duty according to them without being obliged not only to change their lives but to interrupt the course of their debauches for the time only while they go to Church and return after they have presented themselves to a Priest to whom they may tell only what they please of their sins and do also what they list of all that he saith to them For it is a common opinion amongst these Doctors that we may satisfie the Command which ordains that we should at least confess our selves once a year by any manner of Confession whatsoever it be provided that we can say that it is a Confession though it be a Sacriledge They say the same thing of the Communion and hold that we may satisfie the Command of the Church in communicating unworthily and receiving the Body of Jesus Christ after we have confessed in the manner now related or without any Confession at all though we believe we are in mortal sin and over-run with crimes But because I shall handle these two Points in their proper place expounding the Commandments of the Church according to the Maxims of the Jesuits I will not speak thereof here at all and I will rest satisfied only in representing some of the dispositions with which they hold that we may communicate worthily and receive the fruit of the Communion They grant indeed that our conscience must not be charged with any crime but they hardly require any thing farther It is from this Principle that Filliutius speaking of dispositions for this Sacrament saith at first that we ought to be in a state of Grace and free from mortal sin but in the sequel he declares that there needs no other preparation 1 Non requititur autem necessaâ—iò pein ò actualis devoâ—io First saith he it is not necessary to have actual devotion Whence he draws this consequence 2 Ex quo etiam colligitur voluntariè distrctum secluso co temptu quia culpa non est mortalis non ponere oblcem Filliut tom 1. mor. qq tr 4. c. 6. n. 163.164 pag. 87. That he who is voluntarily distracted in the Sacrament provided be contemns it not puts no obstacle to the effect of the Communion because he sins not mortally Supposing there is nothing but mortal sin alone which makes a man indisposed for the Communion and to receive the effect of the Eucharist He adds a little after 3 Non requititur carentia peccati venialis Ibid. That it is not also necessary to be without venial sin whatsoever it may be even voluntary wherewith one actually and deliberately imploys himself at the holy Table and when even after he hath received the Body of Jesus Christ and holds it yet in his mouth instead of adoring it he dishonours and offends him expresly by some venial sin whereunto he casts himself at that very season this shall not be incompatible with the Communion and shall not give any stop to its effect according to this Jesuit 4 Dâ—actusli pâ—ccato ve nali quod comiâ—…tur ipsam communionem etiam probatur non ponere ob cem quia tale peccatum non facit indigâ—un Ibid. n. 165. As to actual sin saith he which is committed in the very Communion it self it hinders not at all from receiving the Grace of the Communion because this sin makes not the person unworthy of the participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ because according to him there is nothing but mortal sin that is capable of causing this unworthiness He may say by the same reason that he who should be so rude as of meer humour to jostle the King and lose all the respect he owes him whilst he fits with him at his Table should not thereby render himself by this insolence unworthy of the honour which he had done him or that a Child who was resolved to do his Father all the displeasure he could and should actually do it Parricide only excepted should not be so unworthy but that he might receive him to his Table and give him the utmost testimonies of paternal affection For this is in effect that which he maintains when he declares that there is nothing but mortal sin which renders a man indisposed for the Communion and that no venial sin though voluntary nor even that which is purposely committed whilst the Body of Jesus Christ is actually received can render him who commits it unworthy of the Communion nor of the fruit of the Grace which it confers he thinks also that be hath found a good reason to support his opinion when he saith 5 Alioquin talis peccaret mortaliteâ— quia qui indigne suscipit judicium sibi manducat b.bit. Ibid. That otherwise he who communicates in this disposition sins mortally because he who receives unworthily the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ eats and drinks his own damnation As if we could not communicate unworthily without sinning mortally This is on one side too rigorous to think that all indispositions in the Communion should be mortal and on the other side too large to believe that all sorts of venial sins even voluntary and affected should not be indispositions to this Sacrament All that which renders the stomach incapable of receiving food or of digesting it is not mortal and yet though the food received in this estate kills not the person yet it ceases not to weaken him and to cause in him those diseases which sometimes bring him to his end But foreseeing that it might be justly objected unto him that his opinion is universally condemned by the Holy Fathers and Councils there where they represent the great