farre short of it in degree and measure and therefore is unable for the perfect causation of that for which in the full and persect grace of Adam there was an ample sufficiency The seaventh and last thing I proposed concerning Originall Righteousnesse was a question concerning the manner of its 〈◊〉 unto the first man whether it were naturall or supernaturall to him in his state of innocency some may looke upon it as an unnecessary nicety but the Papists make it the foundation of many dangerous opinions for grant that originall righteousnesse was supernaturall before the fall they will hence inserre that its contrary concupiscence was naturall and from this againe they will conclude that in the regenerate 't is not properly a sinne and consequently that 't is no barre unto the absolute persection of their good works and their justification by them and divers other the like unsound and 〈◊〉 tenents By a right stating then of this question these errours will be forestalled and yet 't is strange what confusion and mistakes there are in the stating of it amongst both Protestants and Papists Amesius I confesse hath in a very short passage given me herein greater satisfaction then I could find in the larger discourses of others His words are these Neque dicimus nos justitiam fuisse vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturae physicè aut physico modo ex 〈◊〉 principiis 〈◊〉 sed conditionem esse moralem naturae illi debitam quae ad justè operandum fuit creata But this may be looked upon rather as a generall and an obscure hint than a just determination of the question and theresore I shall addresse my selfe unto a more full handling of it and in order hereunto shall premise an Explication of these two terms in it naturall and supernaturall The first terme to be explained is naturall and this hath many acceptions a thing may be said to be naturall to man five waies in regard first of its 〈◊〉 of his nature 〈◊〉 consecution or emanation from it or thirdly 〈◊〉 unto it or fourthly connexion with it or fiftly duenesse unto it First a thing may be said to be naturall unto man in regard of the constitution of his nature to wit that which is a principle or essentiall part of his nature his soule and body and all integrall parts of one of his essentiall parts his body Secondly a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of consecution or emanation from his nature that physically results and flowes from the principles of his nature and thus the properties of his nature are said to be naturall unto him v. g. the faculties of the understanding and will Thirdly a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard 〈◊〉 suitablenesse unto his nature and thus every ornament or 〈◊〉 suitable and agreeable to his nature every thing that heales perfects adornes or advanceth his nature all gracious and glorious endowments may be said to be naturall for naturall in this sense is opposed unto not supernaturall but that which is against nature which is hurtfull unto or destructive of nature Fourthly a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of 〈◊〉 with his nature to wit that which he hath derived unto him together with his nature in the same instance of time though not of nature and thus originall sin is said to be naturall unto lapsed man that is connaturall connexed with his nature from the very first receipt thereof we were saith Paul by nature the children of wrath Eph. 2. 7. that is we were obnoxious unto wrath as soone as we received our nature Fiftly a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of duenesse to his nature without which his nature could not be created and thus things due unto man are said to be naturall unto man because they doe in some way resemble naturall properties in point of necessity and are in some sort necessary unto man This acception of the word is found in some of the most learned amongst the Papists when they speake of other subjects It is usually said that habituall grace was connaturall unto Christs soule as a property consequent unto the personall union though it did not result theresrom by any physicall dimanation or reall efficiency but was immediately given thereunto by Gods power and will and this 〈◊〉 justisieth srom the present acception of the word naturall accidents saith he may be said to be connaturall not only when they flow and result actively from an intrinsick principle but also when by an extrinsick agent they are conferred juxta naturae debitum so we say that grace was cald a connaturall property of Christ God-man because from the worthinesse of his person it was due debito quodam proportionis connaturalis by a debt or duenesse of connaturall proportion so that it would have been a strange preternaturall and prodigious thing to have created the humane nature of Christ and to have joined it unto the person of the word and not to have replenished it with all the ornaments of divine grace This duenesse of a thing unto the nature of man is againe twofold either of condecency or of obligation First A duenesse of condecency and according unto that a thing is only fit congruent convenient Secondly A duenesse of obligation and that againe may be conceived to arise either from the merit of man or else from some acts of God preceding or concomitant for though Gods will be most free yet by one act he may necessitate and oblige himselfe unto another either following it or connexed with it Deus promittendo se feclt debitorem is a proverb in Divinity God by his promises freely obligeth himselfe and we may say the same of other acts this is fully declared upon another occasion by Mr Hord whom I take yet to be our antagonist in this question I grant saith he in his treatise entituled Gods love unto mankind that God is simply and absolutely bound unto no man he is agens liberrimum a most free dispenser of his own favours both what he will and to whom he will but yet he is conditionally determinavit seipsum he hath bound himselfe to give supernaturall abilities to men by three things First Decernendo the Almighty is eternally subject to his own decree or else he would be mutable and therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men he is bound to give them by virtue of his decree Secondly Promittendo we use to say promise is debt it is iustice to performe what it was free to promise if therefore God hath made a premise of any gift or grace to men this promise binds him to performance Thirdly Legem ferendo by giving men a law to keep which without supernaturall power they cannot keepe any more then they can eat a rock by such a law the Allmighty Law-giver binds himselfe to his creatures to give them such power as may enable them to keepe that
to man in regard of originall or 〈◊〉 for God immediately produced it and it did not could not flow from any principle of nature this concession is made by Dr. Twisse in his animadversions upon the conference of Arminius with 〈◊〉 pag. 36. 37 c and there justified by him at large against Junius but though this be a very plaine and evident truth yet Arminius doth very weakly confirme it as appeares by Dr. Twisse his examination of all his arguments But there is one argument of his which he urgeth not only in the place cited but also in his Examen of Perkins pag. 587 that merits in a speciall manner to be remarked not so much for the strength and solidity of it as for the facetiousnesse of Dr. Twisse his answer to it Arminius his argument stands thus that which is restored unto man by the supernaturall action of regeneration was at first supernaturall and bestowed upon man by a supernaturall action but holinesse and righteousnesse is restored unto man by a supernaturall act to wit regeneration therefore it was at first supernaturall in it selfe and bestowed upon man by a supernaturall action We shall passe over the greatest part of Dr. Twisse his answer and only pitch upon what he saith unto the major which he invalidates by two instances Christ restored unto many health of body by a supernaturall action it doth not therefore follow that health of body was not naturall unto Adam before his fall it was by a supernaturall action that he restored unto Malchus that eare which Peter with his sword had cut off but it doth not therefore follow that this eare was at first supernaturall unto Malchus But leaving Arminius his argument we confesse that originall righteousnesse was supernaturall unto Adam if you respect the principle of it and thus it was supernaturall unto Adam not only per accidens but also per se it neither did nor could flow from the principles of nature That then which alone is controverted is whither or no originall righteousnesse was supernaturall unto Adam in his state of innocency in respect of the manner of it's inhaesion in and agreement unto the nature of man whether the nature of man could have been created without it Here the Papists generally averre that man might have been created in his pure naturals without originall righteousnesse nay that the contrary of originall righteousnesse concupiscense would naturally have flowne and resulted from the codition and very constitution or composition of his nature and such resultancy was prevented and stayed by the supernaturall gift or grace of originall righteousnesse to illustrate this their opinion they use diverse 〈◊〉 they compare originall righteousnesse unto a rich robe or garment which God threw upon man to cover his naturall nakednesse so that the state of man after the fall of Adam differeth no more from the state of Adam in his pure naturals than a man that is spoiled differeth from a naked man they farther resemble it unto a garland set on the head of a Virgin as also unto Sampsons locks for looke as a garland is not necessary required unto virginity nor the strength that lay in Sampsons locks unto humanity so originall righteousnesse say they was no necessary requisite unto the integrity of man's nature a Virgin may be a Virgin though no garland be put upon her head and when the garand is taken away her virginity remaines untouched and unblemished 〈◊〉 had been a man though no supernaturall strength had layne in his locks and he remained a man still when that strength was departed from him thus say they man might have been created in his pure naturals without the addition of originall righteousnesse because it was not required nececessarily sor the perfecting of his natures integrity and therefore when this originall righteousnesse was taken from him he was only reduced unto the condition of pure and sole nature and his naturals were no wayes vitiated originall righteousnesse was say they as a soveraigne antedote against concupiscence which would have been a naturall disease unto man as a golden bridle to restraine and keep in that feircenesse rebellion and unrulinesse of the inferiour faculties which otherwise would naturally have been unavoidable it was say they as a precious 〈◊〉 that made bright the nature of man and kept it from that rust which necessarily would have growne upon a nature so framed and compounded as ours was 〈◊〉 in lib. 2. sent 32. 〈◊〉 1. out of Anselme likneth originall righteousnesse unto the 〈◊〉 of a ship when the rudder of a ship is wanting or broken how can the Pilot guide it will be in perpetuall perill of being dashed or split upon rockes and quicksands thus if man had been created in his pure naturals without originall righteousnesse he had been as a ship without a rudder so that he could never have steered the vessell of his soule unto it's wished end the haven of heaven for it would have been in continuall danger of shipwracke by the wind of every sensuall passion and desire thus you see how dishonourably they speake of the nature of man which yet was the master-peice of the creation and made as it were by the consultation of the whole Trinity God said let us make man in our image after our likenesse Gen. 1. 26. In opposition unto this doctrine of the Papists I shall lay down 〈◊〉 conclusions wherein I shall wholy lay aside the terme supernaturall and speake only to the thing and matter and indeed it were heartily to be wished that the termes naturall and supernaturall had never been used in this controversy for they have brought no light unto it but occasioned only a strife of words The first 〈◊〉 shall be It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contradictory of Originall righteousnesse to wit the negation and absence of it The second conclusion It was 〈◊〉 impossible for man to be created with the contrary of originall righteousnesse concupiscence and inclination 〈◊〉 sin To begin with the first conclusion It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contradictory of originall righteousnesse to wit the negation and absence of it of more briefly It was hypothetically impossible for man to be created without originall righteousnesse I say hypothetically in respect of Gods ordinate power presupposing those decrees of God mentioned in the first part of the question First his decree to make man very good Secondly his decree to prescribe him so high and glorious an end as the glorifying and enjoyment of himselfe an infinite good Thirdly his decree to impose upon him severall lawes obedience to which might bring him unto the said end for without originall righteousnesse it was impossible for any of these decrees to be put in execution without it impossible that he should be made 〈◊〉 good for what goodnesse is correspondent unto a rationall creature but
but vanity and vexation of spirit no rest for the sole of the soules foot Gen. 8. 9 and therefore no wonder that men in a naturall condition make their end to be one while to satisfy this lust and another while to satisfy that one while to enjoy this creature another while to enjoy that when men for sake the fountaine of living waters they then hew and dig out unto themselves many cisternes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that will hold no water Jer. 2. 13 when they neglect the unum necessarium the one thing that 's needfull they are soon with Martha carefull and troubled about many things Luk. 10. 41. Carnal mens desires of happinesse are consused and unsettled for they are the many of whom the Psalmist speakes Psal. 4. 6. that say who will shew us any good they doe not pitch upon the true and only good yet they desire in a generall way to be happy but they know not where this happinesse lyeth and therefore is it that in the prosecution of it they post and run from creature to creature from lust to lust from sinne to sinne they seek out many inventions and doe not fix as David upon the lifting up of the light of God's countenance upon them and thus have I given you the sense of the words according unto our translation I shall briefly acquaint you with other rendrings of them and so conclude my meditations upon them First the Septuagint render the word we translate inventions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Junius renders it ratiocinia reasonings or disputings Luther artes Some translate it deliberations others of which Diodati is one expound it so largely as to take in all thoughts imaginations and counsels that are vaine false sinfull and exalt themselves against the knowledge of God Symmachus turnes the whole clause thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 operati sunt curiositatem 〈◊〉 variam negotiationem they were become polypragmatists they toyled and busied themselves with many curious and 〈◊〉 affaires that were utterly unrelated unto their cheife end the glory of God and salvation of their soules Bernard renders it thus ipse autem se implicuit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he inwrapped himselfe in many griefes troubles difficulties perplexities and miseries Adam's fall was as it were a Pandora's box out of which flew all the evils and calamities with which the world is replenished in the vulgar latine 't is ipse 〈◊〉 infinitis miscuit quaestion bus he hath mingled himselfe or as the Divines of Doway expresse it he hath intangled himselfe with infinite or numberlesse questions 〈◊〉 Alapide thinks that questions here signify lusts and sinnes in generall by a metalepsis because all lusts and sinnes have in some sort their originall from questions the first sinne of our first parents had it's rise from the question of the serpent Gen. 3. 1 He said unto the woman yea hath God said yee shall not eat of every tree of the Garden and 〈◊〉 by list'ning unto this question ruined herselfe her husband and all her posterity and in ensuing sins the sinner hath ever some questions First interpretatively he questions and disputes the authority of God's commands and next commonly he hath some question concerning some creature or other to sind out what is good and evill in it and thirdly some question concerning the sinne committed a curious itch to experience what sweetnesse and delight there is therein But the generality of Popish interpreters understand the clause more particularly of the ignorance 〈◊〉 and contentiousnesse of lapsed man First of his ignorance for questions presuppose ignorance and doubts to say that man hath mingled himselfe with infinite questions is as much as to say man is ignorant sull of queries in search of which he languisheth away his dayes this the endlesse disputes of Philosophers de summo 〈◊〉 concerning man's chiefe good and end doe plainly witnesse for these imply that man is naturally 〈◊〉 of it and at some losse about it Secondly of his 〈◊〉 he hath mingled himselfe with insinite questions to wit curious nice and unpresitable questions that have no tendency to edification such as the Apostle speakes of 1 Tim. 1. 4 6. 4 of this curiosity the school-men are a sad example many of whose questions are like spiders webs curiously spun but 〈◊〉 to catch flies than soules Thirdly of his contentiousnesse he hath mingled himselfe with infinite questions that is brawles disputes and quarrels and that both with himselfe and others First with himselfe how frequent and warme are the contests in his own bosome betwixt his rationall and sensuall powers ever and anon his sensitive appetite disputes the most rationall dictates of his understanding and the most regular commands of his will Secondly with others with strangers and neerest neighbours with foes and most intimate and dearest friends with his most faithfull servants with the wife of his bosome the children of his bowels Pineda observeth that there is an Auxesis in the word mingled so that it signifies man is ingulfed in and as it were swallowed up of questions they are as it were incorporated into him and he as it were compounded and made up of them he is wholly and altogether a questionist But the Reader may perhaps thinke that I stay too long upon these severall versions seeing the word Chishbonoth hath but one signification in the whole scripture it signifies inventions as 't is rendered by our Translatours and nothing else FINIS Certaine Letters OF HENRY IEANES Minister of Gods word AT CHEDZOY AND D r IEREMY TAYLOR Concerning A passage of his in his further Explication of Originall sin OXFORD Printed by HEN HALL for THO ROBINSON 1660. Dr Taylor in his further explication of the doctrine of originall sin pag. 496. THat every man is inclined to evill some more some lesse but all in some instances is very true and it is an effect or condition of nature but no sinne properly 1 because that which is unavoidable is not a sinne 2 because it is accidentall to nature not intrinsecall and essentiall 3 It is superinduc'd to nature and is after it c. To the unprejudiced Reader I shall only give thee a briefe narrative of the occasion of the ensuing letters one M r T. C. of Bridgwater being at my house brake out into extraordinary that I say not excessive and Hyperbolicall prayses of D r Ieremy Taylor I expressed my concurrence with him in great part nay I came nothing behind him in the just cōmendations of his admirable wit great parts quick and elegant pen his abilites in Criticall learning and his profound skil in antiquity but notwithstanding all this I professed my dissent from some of his opinions which I judged to be erroneous and I instanced in his doctrine of originall sin now his further explication of this lay then causually in the window as I take it which hereupon I took up and turned unto the passage now under debate and shewed unto M r T. C. that therein was grosse
let any man judge If he say that he takes concupiscence in such a sense as Papists and Protestants understand it in the controversy then I shall assume the boldnesse to tell him that to say that it was in Christ is an assertion guilty of 〈◊〉 falshood and palpable blasphemy for both sides take this concupiscence to be a pronenesse or inclination unto sinne as will be confessed by every one that knowes any thing in the controversy and that a pronenesse or inclination unto sinne was in Christ's humanity is a proposition apparently not only false but also blasphemous against the purity and persection of that holy one of God this I shall evince by two arguments First an inclination unto sinne could not be where there was not so much as a possibility of sinning But in Christ's humanity there was not so much as a possibility of sinning Therefore much lesse an inclination unto sinne This is one of the arguments reckoned up by Estius which those dissenters from the usuall and generall opinion of Papists and School-men which he speakes of doe alleadge A second argument an inclination unto sinne in any degree could not be in that wherein there was a totall and utter aversen sse from sinne in the highest degree for of contraries if one be in the highest and most intense degree it is not consistent in the same subject with it's fellow contrary so much as in a remisse degree But in Christ's humanity there was an utter and totall aversenesse from sinne in the highest degree for there dwelled in him an all-fullnesse of grace Col. 1. 19. Joh. 1. 14. And therefore there could not be in Christ's humanity an inclnatination unto sinne in any the least degree much lesse such an impetuous inclination unto sinne as Papists affirme concupiscence to be A third principall argument is taken from the adjuncts of concupiscence ab adjunctis occupatis it is to be crucified destroyed and mortified Gal. 5. 24. Rom. 6. 6. to be hated as being hatefull not only unto good men butunto God himselfe But nothing is to be thus dealt with but sinne Concupiscence therefore is sinne The fourth principall argument is drawne from the opposites of concupiscence First the Law of God Secondly the grace of God in generall Thirdly the love of God in particular First the Law of God it warreth against the law of the mind Rom. 7. 23 that is as Estius upon the place adversus legem Dei against the Law of God in which Paul 〈◊〉 after the inward man vers 22. Est enim inquit eadem lex Dei lex mentis sicut è diverso eadem est lex peccati membrorum Ex his verbis rectè colligitur concupiscentiam etiam quae in 〈◊〉 est repugnare contrariam esse legi Dei quia ad instar legis ad ea quae legi divinae contraria sunt impellit the law of God and the law of the mind are one and the same thing as one the other side the law of sinne and the law of the members from these words then it may rightly be gathered that even that concupiscence which is in the regenerate is repugnant and contrary to the law of God because as a law it impelleth unto those things which are contrary unto the divine law Unto this place let me adde also Ro 8. 7 the carnal mind or the minding of the flesh or the wisdome of the flesh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is enmity against God for it is not subject to the law of God neither indeed can be the putting of the abstract for the concrete enmity for enemy signifieth that 't is a very grand enemy unto God and 't is an enemy unto God only because it is opposed unto his law and revealed will suppose it be not a branch of concupiscence or the flesh but only an affect or fruit thereof an actuall sinne as Bellarmine determineth yet first no probable reason can be given why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the minding of the flesh should be so restrained as to exclude the first motions of the flesh or concupiscence and if they be enmity against God then so also is 〈◊〉 originall the flesh or 〈◊〉 too Secondly whatsoever is meant by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it proceedeth from the flesh it deriveth from the flesh as it 's being so it 's enmity against God ti fighteth against God under the colours of the flesh which in this war against God heads all actuall sins whatsoever as their General now from the enmity of the flesh or concupiscence unto God we may inferre it's opposition unto the law of God and the law of God is holy just and good Rom. 7. 12 and therefore that which is opposed unto it must needs be naught bad and sinfull Unto this Gregory de Valentia comment theol disp 6. quaest 12. punct 1. answereth by distinguishing concerning a twofold repugnancy unto the law of God one effective and another formal concupiscence saith he is repugnant unto the divine law effectively as it inclineth unto sinne not 〈◊〉 as if that perfection of which it is a privation were commanded in the law of God But this is refuted by the tenth commandement wherein the first motions unto sinne are prohibited and consequently concupiscence the roote of them unto this I might adde in the next place that this answer may be retorted in an argument thus that which is repugnant unto God's law effectively is also repugnant thereunto formally that which inclineth to disobey the law of God is formally opposite thereunto as I shall hereafter at large manifest But thus doth concupiscence by even the confession of our adversaries and therefore 't is opposed thereunto formally as a deviation therefrom and a transgression thereof A second opposite of it is the grace of God in generall the flesh and the spirit saith the Apostle are contrary the one unto the 〈◊〉 Gal 5. 17 where by spirit is understood the inherent and habituall grace and by flesh the concupiscence of a regenerate man the corruption of his nature the contrariety of these two principles is especially manifested by their actings one against another in the regenerate for in them and in them only the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh Gal. 5. 17 now nothing can be contrary to the spirit and grace but that which is properly really and formally a sinne Lastly 't is contrary unto the grace or virtue of the love of God in particular That which inclineth the soule unto inordinate and immoderate love of the creature is contrary unto the love of God for where the creature is loved inordinately God is not loved with all the soule heart mind and strength But now concupiscence inclineth and disposeth the soule unto an inordinate and immoderate love of the creature to wit as it 's soveraigne end for what is it but an habituall conversion of the soule from the injoyment of an immutable God unto the
nonsense and blasphemy he for his own part with a great deale of modesty forthwith declined all further dispute of the businesse but withal he told me that he would If I so pleased give D r Taylor notice of what I said whereunto I agreed and in a short time he brought me from the D r a faire and civill invitation to send him my exceptions and with it a promise of a candid reception of them whereupon I drew them up in a letter unto Mr T. C. the Copy whereof followeth Letters of the Authour And D r IEREMY TAYLOR To M r T. C. Sir I have here according unto your desire sent you my 〈◊〉 against that rassage in Dr Taylor concerning which you 〈◊〉 at my house It is in his further explication of the Doctrine of originall sinne pag 496 and it is the second argument which he brings to prove that inclination to evill is no sinne properly because it is accidentall to nature not intrinsecall and essentiall The argument put into sorme may be reduced into two syllogismes The first Sinne properly is not accidentall to the nature of man An inclination to evill is accidentall to the nature of man therefore An inclination to evill is no sinne 〈◊〉 A second Syllogisme is Sinne properly so called is intrinsecall and essentiall to the nature of man An inclination to evill is not intrinsecall and essentiall to the nature of man therefore An inclination to evill is not sinne properly so called Unto the first of those syllogismes I answer that the major is false and that according to Porphyry his so celebrated desinition of an accident Accidens est quod adest abest sine 〈◊〉 interitu that is as the best Commentators upon Porphyry expound the words An accident is that which may be affirmed or denied of it's subject without any repugnancy or contradiction to the essence and desinition thereof now to deny sinne of man gives no overthrow to his essence and definition for a man that is no sinner may bee animal 〈◊〉 sinne therefore is accidentall to the nature of man The major of the second syllogisme is 〈◊〉 lesse salse than that of the first as for the terme intrinsecall I shall not stay upon it because the 〈◊〉 useth it as equivalent to essentiall as is apparent by the 〈◊〉 he puts between 〈◊〉 and accidentall but shall wholy insist upon the word 〈◊〉 To say as the Dr doth hy consequence that sinne is essentiall to the nature of man is an assertion guilty of nonsense Blusphemy and libertinisme 1. Nonsence A thing may be said to be essentiall unto an other either a priori and then it is 〈◊〉 of it in primo modo dicendi perse or else 〈◊〉 posteriori and then it is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. And to say that finne is either of these wayes essentiall to the nature of man is such pittifull and prodigious nonsence as that I cannot thinke it 〈◊〉 of any serious refutation In a second place I charge it with Blasphemy it blasphemes three actions three acts of God 1. The creation of man 2. The incarnation of Christ. 3. The full 〈◊〉 of the Saints at the resurrection 1. The creation of man God was the Authour of whatsoever was essentiall unto man And if sinne be essentiall unto the nature of man then God was the Author of sinne 2. The 〈◊〉 of Christ in which God made Christ like unto man in essentialls If sinne then be 〈◊〉 unto the nature of man God made Christ sinsull a blasphemy that I tremble to mention 3. This opinion blasphemes God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection for it affirmes by just consequence that they shall be raised with sinne because doublesse they shall be raised with whatsoever is essentiall to the nature of man In the third and last place this Tenet is chargeable with 〈◊〉 'T is a licentious doctrine and opens a gap to the greatest 〈◊〉 for it takes away all conscience of sinne all repentance of it for the time past all caution against it for the suture If sinne be essentiall to the nature of man what reason hath he to be humbled for it to aske God pardon for it to make any scruple of the committing of it And thus having briesly performed my promise and satisfied your request I shall rest Your affectionate freind and humble servant HENRY JEANES Before the receipt of this Mr T. C. gave an account unto Dr Taylor of what he remembred in our discourse and received from him an answer which he concealed from me untill the delivery of my paper and then he produced it This answer together with my reply thereunto I shall next offer unto thy Consideration To his respected Freind Mr. T. C. these c. Mr. C. I thanke you for your letter and friendly information os Mr Jeanes his exception but is he had been as carefull to understand as he was forward to object and mistake he had cased you and me of this little trouble He objects that I say that inclination to sinne is no sinne because it is accidentall not intrinsecall and essentiall and he gives reasons why such a reason is absurd To all which I returne this sost answer that he sayes true but nothing to the purpose For the thing that I was to prove then was the precedent word that every man is inclined to evill some more some lesse that is that this inclination to evill is not regular and 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 not naturall sor as sor the other clause it is an effect or condition of nature but no sinne properly that was the lesse principall part of the proposition and to it only the first reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 viz that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not a sin But if he had considered the 〈◊〉 I was then 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 needs have seene that I was explicating that clause of the Church Article and is inclined to evill which I was to say was an inclination not naturall not 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 but accidentall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this thing I pursue and to this all the other 〈◊〉 relate to the end of that section and none of 〈◊〉 the first only excepted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 part of the proposition which is I had lest out and the reasons 〈◊〉 to it the sense had been as compleat and my argument not the worse and my 〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 the 4 last reasons that is all 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 to that 〈◊〉 of the variety of our inclination to 〈◊〉 he will not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reason but all the 〈◊〉 Besides this if Mr Jeanes had so much 〈◊〉 as he pretends to have Logicke he would have perceived that sor me to 〈◊〉 what he sayes I 〈◊〉 had been the perfect destruction of all my 〈◊〉 and all my 〈◊〉 sor if I had sayd that nothing could be a sinne but what is 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 I had 〈◊〉 that not only some sinne but all sinne had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now my Thesis
that either of us should Your 〈◊〉 reason also is as pretty For first I demand whether a possibility to sinne be not of the nature of man for that is all I mean by essentiall If it be not how came Adam to sinne his first sine if it be I ask whether shall the 〈◊〉 in the resurrection be raised up with it or no If yea then you 〈◊〉 God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection for 〈◊〉 is certainly a part of their full glorification If nay then it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrect on the Saints shall be raised up will out something that is essentiall to them or of their nature But Sir what 〈◊〉 you of mortality is that 〈◊〉 or os the nature of man I suppose you will not 〈◊〉 it But yet I also believe you will confesse that though we are 〈◊〉 a corruptible 〈◊〉 yet we shall be 〈◊〉 an incorruptible and the 〈◊〉 shall put on immortality Once more is it naturall to be naturall that will not be denyed but then remember that although to be naturall is essentiall that is of the essence of the body yet the natural body shall 〈◊〉 without it's 〈◊〉 it is sowne a naurall body it is raised a spirituall So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me which is so contrary to my thoughts and so against my purpose yet your arguments could not have overthrowns it It is good advice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If you had been pleased to have learn'd my meaning before you had published your dislike I should have 〈◊〉 my selfe oblig'd to you in a great acknowledgment now you have said very much evill of me though I deserv'd it not For suppose I had not prosperously enough express'd my meaning yet you who are a man of wit and parts could easily have 〈◊〉 my purpose and my designe you could not but know and consider too that my great 〈◊〉 was to say that sinne could not be natural that it is so sar from being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not so much as subjected in our common nature but in our persons only 〈◊〉 beside 〈◊〉 Sir I am a little to complaine of you that when you had two 〈◊〉 at your choice to explicate each other intrinsecall and 〈◊〉 you would take the 〈◊〉 and the worst sease not the easiest and most ready for you cannot but know that 〈◊〉 is not alwayes to be taken in the 〈◊〉 sense os Philosophy 〈◊〉 that which is 〈◊〉 os a nature but largely and for all sorts of proprieties and the universall accidents of 〈◊〉 as it is essentiall to man to laugh to be capable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be mortall to 〈◊〉 a body of contrary qualities and consequently by nature corruptible and in a morall 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 metaphysicall significations and not to be content with 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from an 〈◊〉 to quarrel but not from that ingenuity which will be your and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Although I have not much to doe with it yet because you are so 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 and so great an admirer of that which everyone of your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desinition of an accident I care not if I tell you that the 〈◊〉 on is imperfect and 〈◊〉 it is not convertible with the 〈◊〉 For even 〈◊〉 things 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sine interitu subjecti I instance to be 〈◊〉 is essentiall 〈◊〉 a ledy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 have successioâ— of duration but yet in the resurrection when bodies shall be spiritual and eternal those other which are now Essential predicates shall be taken away and yet the subject remain and be improv'd to higher and more noble predicates This I have here set down not that I at all value the probleme whether it be so or no but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shal be specifically distinct from what they are I believe them the same bodies but enobled in their very beings For to a specifical and substantial change is required that there be an introduction of new forms but yet the improving of Essential predicates is no specification of subjects but melioration of the first But the consequent is that abesse adesse c is not an excellent definition of an accident And yet further it follows That if sin were as essential to a man as mortality is or to be quantitative yet there is no more need that a man should rise with sin then with mortality But Aristotles Philosophy and Porphyriâ—s Commentary are but all measures in Theology and you should do well to scoure bright the armor in which you trust which unless it be prudently conducted it will 〈◊〉 a man a Sophister rather then a Theologue but you are wiser I have onely this one thing to adde That the common discourses of Original sin make sin to be natural necessary and unavoidable and then may not I use your own words This Tenet is chargeable with Libertinism It is a licentious Doctrine and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness For it takes away all conscience of sin all repentance of it for the time past If sin be natural necessary and unavoidable as it is to us if we derive it from Adam c. What reason hath he to be humbled for it and to ask God pardon for it So that you have done well against your own Opinion and if I had not used the argument before I should have had reason to thank you for it Now as it is you are further to consider it not I. Sir Though I have reason to give you the priority to every thing else yet in civility I have far out-done you You were offended at a passage which you might easily but wou'd not understand You have urged arguments against me which return upon your own head The Proposition you charge me withal I own not in any of your senses nor as you set it down in any at all and yet your Arguments do not substantially or rationally confute it if I had said so Besides all this you have used your pleasure upon me you have revil'd me slighted me scorn'd me untempted unprovoked you never seat to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your objections but tâ—k'd it in my absence and to my prejudice yet I have sent you an answer I hope satisfactory and together with it a long Letter which in the midst of my many affairs and straitned condition is more then I can again afford And after all this I assure you that I will pray for you and speak such good things of you as I can â—â—â—de or hear to be in you and profess myself and really be Sir Your affectionate Friend and Servant in our blessed Lord and Saviour Iesus Jer 〈…〉 Taylor August 15. 1657. Postscript Sir I received yours late last night and I have returned you this early this 〈◊〉 that I might in 〈◊〉 thing be respective of you
Mr Hord 〈◊〉 149. 150. who makes the like objections against him from another place 7. You are the unmeerest man in the world to 〈◊〉 me with the 〈◊〉 of my party sor the rigid Zelots of your party in your doctrine of originall sin are such whom you may be ashamed to name Indeed in 〈◊〉 point there are very few of your party save the Pelagians of old and now the worthy 〈◊〉 of the Racovian denne and their followers unto whom the best and the most learned of Protestants will hardly vouchsafe the name of Christians The Arch-Bishop of Armagh 〈◊〉 them in a sermon of 〈◊〉 that I heard a company of 〈◊〉 Turkes and indeed Turkes and 〈◊〉 can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine person and nature of Christ unto his offices and unto his great and glorious worke of redemption and satisfaction than these wretched miscreants are Dr Taylor Your second charge of blaspemy is that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sinne because whatsoever is essentiall he had but 〈◊〉 If you remember that I say not that sinne is 〈◊〉 and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses you have reason to shake the fire out of your own 〈◊〉 not to tell me that I burne for is inclination to 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 naturally and derived from our Parents I 〈◊〉 whether or no 〈◊〉 not Christ all naturall desires if he had not he was not a 〈◊〉 man If he had 〈◊〉 all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not naturall 〈◊〉 sor is you say they be you are the 〈◊〉 by the consequence of your 〈◊〉 not I but God sorbid that 〈◊〉 of us should 〈◊〉 First here is no 〈◊〉 of my argument for none of my party or opinion hold that inclination unto 〈◊〉 is essentiall unto man Flaccius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 sinne was the 〈◊〉 or substance of the soule but I never heard that 〈◊〉 sollowers were considerable he hath I am sure both Papists and Protestants 〈◊〉 and Lutherans for 〈◊〉 opponents but perhaps you confound naturall with 〈◊〉 and make them all one if you doe your reason will be 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. I believe you here play with the 〈◊〉 of the word naturall a thing though it may be tollerated in a Sophister altogether unworthy of a 〈◊〉 Inclination to 〈◊〉 may be said to be naturall either 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 That inclination to 〈◊〉 is naturall 〈◊〉 that it flowes and 〈◊〉 Physically and necessarily from our nature I slatly deny and if you can direct me unto any place in your bookes where you prove it to be naturall in this sense I shall take it into 〈◊〉 Indeed to say that it is in this sense naturall is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature But it is naturall 〈◊〉 together with our nature derived unto us from our first Parents and yet not in Christ who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation but was miraculously conceived by the holy Ghost and 〈◊〉 in the wombe of the 〈◊〉 Mary This inclination unto evill is a 〈◊〉 blemish of 〈◊〉 nature because it is a cause of sinne qualis causa 〈◊〉 est effectus A good tree saith our Saviour cannot bring forth evill fruit Matth. 7. 18. This inclination to evill bringeth forth much 〈◊〉 fruit and therefore it cannot be good and consequently it is bad and sinfull and therefore could not be in Christ who even as man was the most holy one of God Indeed if Christ had wanted any propriety of man's nature he had not then been a perfect man but that inclination to evill is a propriety of our nature sc proprium 4 to modo you are never able to make good But Sir in good earnest doe you thinke that Christ was inclined unto evill if you doe not your 〈◊〉 of Christ is impertinent if you doe I shall conclude your opinion to be blasphemous and unto it shall oppose this following argument He in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of the Godhead bodily he in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of habituall grace he who enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision was not could not be inclined unto evill But in Christ dwelled an all 〈◊〉 of the Godhead 〈◊〉 in him also dwelled an all 〈◊〉 of habituall and sanctifying grace he enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision Therefore he was not could not be inclined unto evill The Minor will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine and we may say the same of the Major for he that shall thinke that the grace of personall union the 〈◊〉 of habituall grace and the beatificall vision are not sufficient to exclude from Christ all inclination untoevil wil render both 〈◊〉 learning religion too suspected But to put the matter out of doubt take this following argument for confirmation of the Major there could not be the least inclination unto evill in that person in whom there was an utter aversenesse from evil in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for of contraries that which is in a 〈◊〉 degree is not consistent with the other in the highest and most intense degree but in that person in whom there was an 〈◊〉 of the Godhead on all-fullnesse of habituall grace and the beatificall vision there was an utter aversnesse from evill and that in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore impossible that there should be in him an inclination to evill in the least degree The Papists extenuate the malignancy of concupiscence as much as may be affirming that in the regenerate it is no sinne and that it had been 〈◊〉 Adam if he had been created in his pure naturalls yet they thinke not so well of it as to ascribe it unto Christ. Indeed 〈◊〉 is accused for speaking somewhat suspiciously this way but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolemen who hold that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concupiscence was neither 〈◊〉 primo nor 〈◊〉 in Christ. 1. Not in actu primo and for this they alledge three reasons 1. The absolute perfection of his virtues and all-fullnesse of grace 2. The perpetuall vigilancy and advertency of 〈◊〉 reason 3. The government of his humane nature and actions by his divine and infinite person 2. Not in actu secundo because in him the very first motions unto sinne would have been voluntary and consequently sinfull Unto this purpose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scholast Tom 5. cap. 12. 〈◊〉 5. pag 200. observeth that the first motions of concupiscence may be said to be voluntary two manner of wayes 1. Antecedently when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them 2. Consequently when one yeelds consent unto them after they are crept in in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Christ because Christ could have avoided them by reason of the government of the person of the word if he had not therefore avoided them but willingly admitted them they had in him been blameworthy Dr Taylor 〈◊〉 third reason also is as pretty for first I demand whether a possibility to
not grant that the essential predicates of substances might be improved by 〈◊〉 of them or by addition unto them yet what will this make to the separability of essentials from a subject The improving of essential predicates that belongs unto our present purpose is by abolition of them and by substituting new and more noble essentials in their room and that essentials may be abolished and new essentials substituted in their rooms the things remaining the same is a thing you may magisterially and imperiously dictate but can never Scholastically prove But perhaps you will say that you take essential in a Moral and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But Sir you must remember that you are not to take essential here in such a latitude as to include accidental and contingent predicates for if you should Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unshaken by what you say Would not this be a ridiculous Argument accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away sine subjecti interitu therefore adesse abesse sine subjecti 〈◊〉 is no excellent definition of an accident and yet this will be your very argument if by essential predicates you mean any thing besides the four first predicables unto which all essential predicates are reducible Dr. Taylor But the consequent is that abesse adesse sine subjecti interitu is not an excellent definition of an accident Jeanes The arguments from which you infer this consequent are overthrown and therefore this consequent falleth to the ground of it self without you support it by some fresh arguments Dr. Taylor And 〈◊〉 further it follows That if 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 essential to a man as mortality is or to be 〈◊〉 yet there is no more need that man should rise with sin then with mortality Ieanes And pray Sir why do not you adde and with quantity Do you begin to startle at this Proposition that men shall rise without quantity But as 〈◊〉 the separability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the resurrection I have spoken already so fully as that I may spare to say any thing anew of it Dr. Taylor But Aristotles Philosophy and Porphyry's Commentary are but ill measures in 〈◊〉 and you should do well to scour bright that armor in which you trust which 〈◊〉 it be prudently conducted will make a man a Sophister rather than a 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 are wiser Ieanes Aristotle and Porphiry are no contemptible Authors in Philosophy but who ever thought them 〈◊〉 in Philosophy or their Books measures in Theology Philosophy is a very usefull Hand-maid unto Divinity and none will decry it but such whose sayings and writings cannot endure the test thereof nothing that is true in Philosophy can be false in Divinity for verum vero non opponitur one truth doth not cannot clash with another As for my Philosophy I hope God will preserve me from trusting in it or in any other arm of flesh If you can detect any error therein I shall be ready to retract it and be very thankful to you for your pains as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon it will not stick but recoileth on your own face Dr Taylor I have onely this one thing to adde That the common Discourses of Original Sin makes sin to be natural necessary and unavoidable and then may I not use your own words this Tenet is chargeable with Libeatinism it is a liceatious Doctrine and opens a gap to the greatest prophaneness for it takes away all conscience of sin all 〈◊〉 of it for the time past if sin be natural necessary and unavoidable as it is to us if we derive it from Adam c. what reason hath he to be humbled for it and to ask God pardon for it so that you have done well against your own opinion and if I had not used the argument before I should have had reason to thank you for it now as it is you are further to consider of it not I. Jeanes If you understand by natural that which naturally results from nature and by necessary and unavoidable that which is denominated such from a primitive and created necessity that which you say is a foul slander against the common discourses of Protestants against Original sin But if you mean by natural that which is connexed with and cocval unto our nature and by necessary and unavoidable that which is such in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity it will be nothing to the purpose for you and you may take in to boot your good friends of Racovia are never able to prove that the assertion of such a naturality and necessity of Original sin is any bar to humiliation or repentance for it unto Prayer for the pardon of it Dr Taylor Sir Though I have reason to give you the priority in every thing else yet in civility I have far out-done you Ieanes First You have written a Letter to me without a Superscription and I have returned one unto you with a Superscription and this I take to be of the two the greater civility If I may believe the eccho of the neighborhood you have written several Letters unto Mr. T. C. concerning me that cannot pretend to any great civility for they are said to be stuffed with insulting reproaches unto which I shall return nothing but my Prayers for the increase of your charity and humility Dr. Taylor You were offended at a passage which you might easily but would not understand you have urg'd arguments against me which return upon your own head The Proposition you charge me withall I own not in any of your 〈◊〉 nor as you set it down in any at all and yet your arguments do not substantially or rationally confute it if I had said so Ieanes Here you sum up your Conquests but whether you do not reckon without your Host let the Reader judge Dr. Taylor 〈◊〉 all this you have used your pleasure upon me you have reviled me slighted me scorned me untempted unprovoked you never sent to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your Objections but talked it my absence and to my prejudice Ieanes Unto all this a general negative is a sufficient answer until I know the Particulars that your Delator hath informed you with but perhaps you may think that for such an obscure person as my self to dare to except against what you write is to revile slight and scorn you if you be so impatient of contradiction I shall leave it unto your own bosom to judge from what spirit it proceeds When you published your Book you exposed it to every mans censure that would read it and will you accuse every man of uncivility that passeth his censure upon any passage in it in a private discourse with friends But Sir upon Mr. C. his entreaty I sent him in writing the reasons that I had for my censure and these reasons were by my consent to be conveyed to you and therefore I sent unto you mediately by another to give satisfaction to my