Memory Understanding and will â—his is as near as in this impeâ—scrutable Mystery we can come speaking in a Parable with that ancient Father And we must say so rather than acknowledge any similitude with that of the common humane nature in Pythagoras Plato and Socrates least we run into that dreadfull absurdity of making more Gods than One. But now speaking according to the sense of St. Austin it is plain that that One Divine Nature being not in the three Persons as one general humane nature in three Men but the Union and mutual inexistence being as that of the Soul and her Powers it is plain I say that thaâ— One Divine Nature will be no more divided from it self by being thus inexistent in the three Persons than the Soul will be divided from her self by reason of her three Powers Memory Understanding and will or Mâ—ns Notitia Amor or Sapientia Amor which Peter Lumbard contends to be the proper titles of the Son and Holy Ghost which also is very consonant to the doctrine of the ancient PhÃlosophy of the Jews and Greeks touching their Trinitâ— And lastly as the Soul is sufficiently divisa ab aliis in a Metaphysical sense though she be really identiâ—ed with her three Powers so is the Divine Nature sufficiently divisa ab aliis though it be identified reallâ— with the three Persons So that my Adversarâ— does here nodum in scirpo quâ—rere out of an ill will to the clearness of my Arguments which he would thus obliquely obscure and teach the Infidel to cavil against the solid Mystery of the Trinity because neither himself nor any else can make good that false Opinion of Transubstantiation Which how pious and warrantable an act of him it is let any man judge This is onely to cast dust into the eyes of the Vulgar to dishearten them from endeavouring to see the Truth His Answer to the Argument from Mathematicks in the sixth Paragraph This Argument is meer Cob-web stuff half an eye may look through it For these words of the Doctor That a part of the Division is equal to the whole either refer to the species and then it is false that a part of the Division is equal to the whole or they point at the Body of Christ and then the words are de subjecto non supponente for there is no division of any part of Christs Body from the whole The Reply I will not say That my Adversary looks through too thick a Cob-web to discern the force and scope of my Argument But this I will say that he has plainly missed it For the very absurdity that I drive at is that in dividing suppose an entire consecrated Host into two parts in which one entire consecrated Host there is but one continued Body of Christ veiled as he says but co-extended with the species that in the dividing this Host or species of the Host if you will that one continued Body of Christ there before is discontinued and separated into two as sure as it is in two places at once And what I pray you is this but to be divided into two And being Division here is into two intirely the same with the divided what is it but to be divided into parts of a Division which singly are equal to the whole contrary to that common Notion in Euclid Or if you think this less absurd to be divided into two wholes For they may be called either in such an Hypothesis as brings in the conâ—usion of all things His Answer to the Argument from Logick in this sixth Paragraph This says he is the same in effect with the former and requires no new Answer Because these his trisling expressions if applied to the separated species are false if to Christs Body then they proceed upon a false supposition as hath been declared in my Answer to the third Objection The Reply That this Argument stands upon the same supposition that the former I grant But that the supposition is false I may well deny having proved it true in my Reply to his former Answer Nor is this Argument altogether the same in effect because it illustrates the grand absurdity of the opinion it oppugns from new Maximes So little triâ—ling is the argumentation which I have here produced But it is the Policy of my Antagonist to slight and make himself merry with such things as are too solid to be really Answered For this is succedaneous to a real Confuâ—ation in the eyes of the Vulgar and it may be of more consequence with them that are taught not to examine but believe In which Method he shows himself an egregious Artist in his attaque upon my next Objection where he begins with some few scoptical and undervaluing Reflections as he calls them But a Man of his parts and wit cannot but know that they are insignificant to any but the Vulgar before whom he thinks it very conducing to seem to trample on his Antagonist right loftily acting his part as it were on a Stage His Reflections on some Passages in my Argument from that fundamental Principle in Logick and Metaphysicks in this sixth Paragraph together with my Replies thereunto First saith he a knowing Reader cannot chuse but smile to see Can be or a capacity of Being brought in for a piece of an Argument to prove that a thing is not That individual thing that can be saith the Doctor and is to be made of any thing is not So my Adversary in his first Reflection To which I Reply That some knowing Reader it may be may not onely smile but laugh quite out while he observes to what pretty shifts my Adversary is puâ— to make the Doctor as he calls him seem an old doting fool to the heedless and ignorant For the knowing Reader will easily discern that That that can be is not to be disjoyned from the rest of the sentence but that made is to be referred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be in both places and that the sense is though the sentence is then less succinct and elegant That that individual thing that can be made or is to be made of any thing is not But here he makes another oblique Reflection and observes how fondly the Doctor playes the confident Dogmatizer asserting as evident That that individual thing that can be and is to be made of any thing is not As if forsooth it were evidently demonstrable that that individual thing which is to day in actual being could not possibly be destroyed and made anew again to morrow by a second generation Reply This is a very oblique and distorted Reflection indeed and cast off quite from the mark it should aim at nor does it at all respicere Titulum the Argument in hand which is our ever blessed Saviours Body never to be destroyed So that this Answer is onely an argute Cavil For my Antanist is not so short sighted but he could easily discern that I understand the individual thing I
or miles distant from A quoad integram suam substantiam as to its intire substance as B is from C. But B is really distant or separate from C suppose twenty yards or miles as to their intire substances Ergo A is distant or separate from A twenty yards or miles as to its intire substance nothing of its substance being between So that it is both present with it self and absent from it self at the same time twenty miles and may be many thousands according to this impossible Hypothesis In so much that it is plain this part of his Answer is weak and insufficient To the other part I say That it manifestly follows from my former Reply that shows plainly that A is distant and separate from A which is a plain and palpable Division of A wholly and intirely from it self That A is not Ens unum but Entia multa or plura because the very definition of Ens unum is that it be indivisum à se. This is perfect demonstration to any one 's whose eyes are not obstructed with prejudâ—ce And now to his Second Answer I deny that I go upon any such supposition That Essential Unity is derived from the unity of local Presence But what I contend for is this Tâ—at unity of local Presence is a necessary consequence of Essential Unity Nor can any finite Essential Unity be in any mâ—re than one place at once as Athanasius and Anastatius also have concluded And there may be as ne essary and indubitable reasonings â—rom the property of a thing as from its intrinsick Principles As a man may as certainly conclude such a Triangle to be a Rectangle Triangle from the equality of the Power of the Hypotenusa to the Powers of the sides including the Angle subtended by the Hypotenusa as from the very definition of a Rectangle Triangle it self And though the ubi of a Being be not essential to it yet we are sure what ever is is some where quod nusquam est nibil est From whence it is apparent how weak my Adversaries Inference is That unless essential Unity be derived from the Unity of local Presence it will not follow that the same Body being in divers places at once is divided from it self any more than it is divided from its intrinsick Principles which it can never be by Plurality of local Presence they being wholly extrinsick to the subject Which is the same as if he should contend that a Man may be and yet be no where because Vbi or Place is extrinsecal to him Or that his Soul may be neither wiser nor less wise nor equally wise with others or his Body neither taller nor less tall nor equally tall with others and yet be these being onely external respects and comparisons and not in the definition or â—ssential constitution of a Man To all which I add That the very intrinsick Principles of any one â—eing supposed to be in two Places are divided from themselves that is are distant or sâ—parate so many Yards or Miles as is plain from my former Arguing As suppose Plato were at the same time at Athens and Thebes the intrinsick â—rinciples of Plato to wit his Soul and Body would be both divided from themselves at this distance and constitute two Plato's These things are so plain that it is a wonder to me that they can be hid from any Mans eyes that does not wilfully wink against them or rather that any Man can wink against them though in humour or for ends best known to himself he may talk against them Now to his third and last I Answer Who does the greater disservice to the Catholick Church he or I I dealing bonâ fide and plainly demonstrating that to be an errour that cannot be hid from the unprejudiced it being in a subject so easily comprehensible to all mens perceptions I mean the nature of a Body and the impossibility of what they pronounce thereof And it being an Opinion unknown or disown'd by the Fathers of the Church I mean this Opinion of Transubstantiation not avowed by any Council till about four or five hundred Years ago when as the Doctrine of the Trinity was repeatedly ratified in the Primitive times by general Councils above 1200 Years ago with what reason is it that my Adversary will allow no greater certainty of the Mystery of the Trinity then of Transubstantiation which has such palpable and easily deprehensible and plainly demonstrable contradictions in it Is not this to put weapons into the hands of Inâ—idels with a witness But I hope I shall easily wrest them out again by a sufficient Reply to this third Answer of my Adversary In the First part therefore I say his supposition is very gross and incompetible to the Divine Nature As if it were in the three Persons as one hand phancyed in three distinct distanced gloves at once or one finger in three distinct fingerâ—stalls filling them out in several with its presence whenas the Divine Nature and the Persons are promiscuously said to be in one another Iohn 17. 21. I in thee and thou in me And Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity Peter Lumbard not unskilfully resembles the Trinity and Divine Nature to the Mind and the three Powers in the Mind Memory and Understanding and Love or Will These three saith he out of St. Austin are not three Lives but one Life not three Minds but one Mind one Essence He descants further on this Similitude but it is enough to hint thus much that from hence also it is manifest That the Divine Nature is not in the three Persons as one finger that fits three distinct distanced finger-stalls but as the Memory Understanding and Will are adequately every-where where the Mind is by a Metaphysical Coincidency and â—ongruity so also is the Presence of the three Persons and Divine Nature every where coincident and adequate Nor is the Divine Nature any more repeated according to the number of Persons then the Essence of the Soul is according to the number of those three Powers Memory Vnderstanding and Will So that nothing more can be concluded then thus That the number of the Persons are triple to the Divine Nature which is but One as the Powers of the Soul or Mind are triple to the Soul or Mind that is but One. And what inconvenience is there in this Do not all Men say that there are three Persons though but One Divine Nature But he would bring a thick Night upon Truth that gross Errour also might find harbâ—ur under that Covert In the second part of his Answer there seems also to be a supposition as Uncatholick and false as the former As if the Divine Nature in the three Divine Persons were as One common general Humane Nature in three Men suppose Pythagoras Plato and Socrates when as according to St. Austin and others The Divine Nature is to the three Divine Persons raâ—her as the Rational Soul or Mind to the three Powers
conceive to be the true God made visible by Hypostatical union therewith is maniâ—est Idolatry But let us put the case saith he that some Christian contemporary to Christ our Lord whilest he sojourned upon Earth had through mere mistake adored some other person for Christ. Here the Query arises whether this mans errour would have pleaded his excuse or no The reformed Churches of France in their Apology by Dally declare for the affirmative And if this Errour be not Idolatry he says I shall never be able to prove what I aim at in my twenty-second Conclusion That any Idolatry is committed though it should so fall out that the Host untransubstantiated were exposed to the veneration of the people For as no Adoration is here due so none is intended but onely to Iesus Christ adorable where ever he is This is the main strength of his Answer to my twenty first and twenty second Conclusions The Reply The long stride that is made is made by this Doctor of the Church of Rome not by my self I had rather he would have taken my Conclusions as they lye in order which he does hugely neglect to do in this Chapter But however I am his servant to attend his motions whither he pleases within the compass of this little Treatise And to his Query upon the propounded case I Answer with the reformed Churches of France if they speak no further then to the case of this man for I never saw that Apology by Daille that this mans Errour would have pleaded his excuse But not so as to argue him guiltless of Idolatry but that his sin of Idolatry is more pardonable in these Circumstances pardonable I say which implies a fault or sin And so my fifth Conclusion holds good That to be mistaken in the Object of Worship or in the kind of Worship or in the Application cannot excuse any thing from being down right Idolatry because mistake is necessarily supposed in any Idolatry that is committed in good earnest But the invincibleness of the mistake the sudden surprisedness or inevitable changeableness of the mistake may be a ground though not of making that to be no Idolatry which is yet of excusing the person as to the severity of punishment Whence you may see that it was not for nothing that my Adversary moulded my fifth Conclusion into words of his own that he might the easilyer have something to Cavil at But to let this pass I say the Mistake does not excuse but the invincibleness or inevitableness of the mistake which it does in all other sins whatsoever And in all Idolatries whatsoever besides these committed in the Christian world where ever they are committed upon invincible mistake But as amongst the Heathen those that worshipped the Sun suppose taking it to be the supreme God endued with understanding and Power of making and Governing the Universe and Millions worshipped him under the Notion and as it seems to me were in a manner inevitably by reason of their education and want of opportunity of knowing better detained in this Errour as these by all men are rightly judged to have been Idolaters though more excuâ—able then they that have opportunity of knowing better so it is in the case of this man my Adversary instances in who surprised by an inevitable errour has his excuse to crave pardon but it is manifest that he has committed the fault or rather crime of Idolatry in giving Divine Adoration to him that is not God And if this were repeated and habituated act in him he were as errand an Idolater as the Persians other Nations that worshipped the Sun For mistake even where it is not essential to a fault does not destroy the nature of the fault as suppose one having his hat flung off his head to day by some body he meet with in the streets and next day meeting one like the party that did him the injury should presently fling his hat off the mistake does not take away the nature of this fault so as to make it no injury to this Party but onely makes it more pardonable it being not intended to an innocent person How then can mistake even in faults to which mistake is essential change their nature from being what they are So that though the Idolaters of the Church of Rome were under invincible Ignorance they would not for all that cease to be Idolaters or though they were made such onely by sudden and inevitable surprise But this is not their Case and therefore with the good leave of my Adversary I must tell him the Case he has put is not at all to the present purpose nor that of a Loyal Subject taking Hephestion for Alexander All these Learned fetches will not serve his turn The worshipping of the consecrated Host with them is neither upon inevitable surprise nor invincible Ignorance nor want of opportunity of knowing better For that which is accustomary and continual is not surprise nor is that Invincible Ignorance which common sense Scripture and Reason will so easily dissipate in a very ordinary Capacity For who unless he were under the Power of Diabolical delusion but can easily undeceive himself by common sense Reason and Scripture that a Wafer which Mice and Rats will eat cannot be that adorable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God-man the Creator and Redeemer of us all And then for opportunities of knowing better from others what irrefragable evidences have the reformed Churches offered to the contrary and how many Thousands have sealed their Testimony with their very blood Which is a sufficient occasion I think in so easie a Case to undeceive them that are not given up as the Apostle speaks 2 Thes. 2 to believe a lye for their want of the love of the Truth So that the Adoration given to the Host upon the presumption of its being Transubstantiated is most palpable and unexcusable Idolatry according as my twenty second Conclusion infers from my twenty first and that from the fourth and fifth But to say as no adoration is here due so none is intended but onely to Jesus Christ adorable where ever he is is such a laxe Answer and unsound that it will excuse the Persians worshipping the Sun and indeed all the Idolatries in the world as well as the Romanists Artolatria or Bread-worship which is a manifest Demonstration of the falsness thereof For no serious Idolaters give nor intend any Worship but such and to such Objects as they think it due to Answer to the sixth seventh eighth tenth eleventh twelâ—th thirteenth fourteenth fiâ—teenth eighteenth and twenty fourth Conclusions but more particularly to the eigâ—th tenth and twelâ—th and first in a more general way These eleven Conclusions says he talk big against the Invocation of Saints But the best speakers amongst them are the eighth tenth and twelfth He should add the fifeenth also that the foundation may be more square and stable which I desire my Reader to read over and then consider my Antagonists Answer
a place internal upon which our Argument goes but is equally true of locus externus Nor then will this high flight beyond 〈◊〉 supreme or extimate Heaven serve for any evâ—◠〈◊〉 For as much as we speak of Bodies placed â—n this side of 〈◊〉 extimate Heaven and no Boâ—y can bâ— found amongst Bodies but it will be 〈◊〉 cumscrâ—bed bâ— the ambient superficies of the next Bodies about it that superficies of the ambient Bodies that do immediately compass 〈…〉 Body being its place And every Body â—ill hâ—ve such a place that is found on this 〈…〉 extimate Heaven This is a Truth that 〈◊〉 be denied And our Question is 〈◊〉 onely of sucâ— Bodies as are on this side 〈◊〉 extimate Heaven From which the unseasonablenâ—ss of my Adversaries subterâ—uge is plainlâ— dâ—cerned which in no sense will serve his turn unleâ—s for the amuzing the minds of the People To 〈◊〉 Second Answer I return this To the first 〈◊〉 thereof That it is not onely enough to him but it is also enâ—ugh to me that in each of the two â—paces the Body be equal to that deâ—erminate place it tâ—ere occupies understanding either an internal or external place For suppose one and the â—ame Body at each place at â—nce 〈◊〉 either an internal or external place of such a quantity of six Cubits suppose which it cannot fill unless it be commensurate to them it is plain it fills as much space as comes to twelve Cubits if six and six make twelve which is as sure as two and two make four And therefore that it is equal to twelve Cubits because it plainly fills up the space of twice six Cubits Or how ever at the same time fills the ambient superficieses that would exactly fit twice six Cubits in several There is no greater demonstration of equality then this which the Geometricians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Coâ—gruentia So certain is it that a Body adequately filling two places of six Cubits big at once has it self the magnitude of twelve Cubits But the Body is supposed but one and the same Body in both places and therefore can be but six Cubits Wherefore it is both six Cubits and twelve Cubits at once that is to â—ay it is double to it self at the same time which is impossible Nor does the Second part of my Adversaries Answer evade this Impossibility That it will no more follow that a Body occupying at â—he same time two places and so being equal to those two places which are double to one single place that the Body is double to it self then that a Body of one Cubit â—aâ—ified into a double dimension and therefore occupying a double space is double to it self Or the rational â—oul informing a Bodâ— of a span length at first but 〈◊〉 the same Body grown another span is thereby double to it self For not at all to quarrel with the mistake of the nature of Rarefaction which I must confess I take to be the Cartesian way not the â—ristotelean and candidly interpreting his meaning in those words a body of a span length and then grown up to another span which grown up to another span naturally implies the Body not double but octuple to what it was before passing by these and medling onely with his own meaning as it may be hoped and Hypotheses the examples do not at all reach the present purpose For speaking in his sense a body of one Cubit rarified into a double dimension is double to it self unrarified that is It is as big again as it was when it was unrarified But it is not as big again or double to it self at the same time but double it is to what it was before And the same is to be said of the soul in such a sense as extension is applicable to her and increase or decrease of it namely by dilatation and contraction Spiritual that it is double when the Body is grown as big again as it was when it was but a span long to what it was when the Body was but a span long But here in the present Case a Body is demonstrated double to it self compared with it self and its present condition at the same time Which is impossible viz. That the same Body should be double now to what it is now That it now should be as big again as it self is now For neither can the Soul her self be said to be now as wise again as she is now but onely as wise again as she was some time ago And so my Adversaries Answer does not at all reach the point in hand And therefore my Demonstration stands firm and unshaken of the Impossibility of Transubstantiation from this Argument taken from Physicks as any unprejudiced eye may easily discern Nor had we any need here to consider the continuity or discontinuity of places But all is clear from what we have thus briefly represented His Answer to the Argument from Metaphysicks in this fifth Paragraph To my Metaphysical Argument that infers that the Body of Christ will be Divisum à se and both Unum and Multa First he Answers to the first part If divisum à se secundum substantiam I deny it If divisum à se quoad locum transeat To the Second That it will not be Unum Multa but onely Unum in Multis one and the same in many places His second Answer is that I go upon a false supposition That essential Vnity is derived from the Vnity of local Presence not from the Intrinsick Principles of the subject For unless this be granted Plurality of local Presence at once will not prove a thing divided from it self His last Answer is That by this and my former Argument I put armes into the hands of Infideâ—s against the Mystery of the Holy Trinity For it will follow saith he That one and the same Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons at once the same Nature will be treble to it self as much as the same Body being in two places at once will be double to it self And secondly that one Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons it will be as much Divisa à se besides that it will not be Divisa ab aliis viz. from the three distinct Persons with which it is really identified as a Body will by being in two distinct places at once Thâ—s is the bare edge and full strength of his Answers against my Metaphysical Argument As for his Rhetorical Flourishes and Boasts they are no part of any proof and I list not to meddle with such things The Reply To the First part of his first Answer I Reply That it is plain that it is divisum à se secundum substantiam both quoad totum and quoad partes because it is separate or distant so many yards or so many miles suppose from it self nothing of it self being between As distant and separate as two several Individual Bodies at the same distance that is to say A is as many yards