That cannot be his meaning nor be consequent from it if he only mean that the Deity comprehends in it three such essences If indeed he think those three beings are as distinct as Peter James and John what is said by W. J. against him I think irrefragable that then they are no otherwise one than Peter James and John and by him against himself for Peter James and John are not mutually self-conscious as they are asserted to be which mutual self-consciousness since it is supposed to make the three divine Persons one cannot be supposed to leave them so distinct as they are with whom it is not found As to what is observed of the defective expression of this unitive Principle by the word consciousness that bare Consciousness without consent is no more than bare Omnisciency Sure it is not so much For Consciousness doth not signifie Omnisciency We are conscious to our selves yet are not omniscient But I reckon as I find he also doth that even consent added to consciousness would yet leave the expression defective and still want the unifying power which is sought after For it would infer no more than a sort of moral union which in the kind of it may be found among men between whom there is so little of natural union speaking of the numerical nature that they are actually separate But now may we not suppose as that which is possible and actually is for ought we know what may be fundamental to both Consciousness and Consent a natural union even of the numerical natures Such an union would not infer an Unity or Identity of these Natures Essences Substances or Beings themselves For as W. J. hath well argued Letter p. 5 6. Substances upon Union are not confounded or identify'd or brought to unity of Substance but continuing numerically distinct Substances acquire some mutual community or communication of operations c. And deferring the consideration a while what this would signifie towards the unity notwithstanding of the Godhead shall take notice how accommodately to our present purpose W. J. speaks in what follows where instancing in the chief unions that are known to us he says Our Soul and Body are two substances really distinct and in close union with one another But notwithstanding this they continue distinct substances under that union In like manner the humane soul of Christ is in union with the Logos or second Person of the Trinity which we call an hypostatical Union But neither doth this union make an unity of substance For the two substances of the divine and humane natures continue distinct under that union 'T is true he addes which must not be allowed in the Unity of the Godhead where there can be no plurality or multiplicity of substhaces Nor do I say that it must I only say Do we know or are we sure there is no sort of Plurality But if we are sure that there are temporal unions i. e. begun in time as in our selves for instance of two substances that make but one man and in our Saviour an humane nature and divine that make but one Emmanuel How do we know but that there may be three in the Godhead that make but one God And the rather because this being supposed it must also be supposed that they are necessarily and eternally united and with a conjunct natural impossibility of ever being or having been otherwise whereof the absolute immutability of God must upon that supposition most certainly assure us And such a supposed union will be most remote from making the Deity an aggregate And for any thing of composition I reckon we are most strictly bound to believe every thing of the most perfect simplicity of the Divine Being which his Word informs us of and to assent to every thing that is with plain evidence demonstrable of it But not every thing which the Schools would impose upon us without such testimony or evidence For as none can know the things of a Man but the Spirit of Man which is in him so nor can any know the things of God but the Spirit of God Nor can I think the Argument concluding from the imperfection of a Being in which distinct things concur that were seperate or are de novo united to the impersection of a being in which things some way distinct are necessarily and eternally self-united Nor can therefore agree with W. J. that we are to look universally upon real distinction as a mark of separability or that clear and distinct conception is to us the rule of partibility For tho' I will not affirm that to be the state of all created Spirits yet I cannot deny it to be possible that God might have created such a being as should have in it distinct assignable parts all of them essential to it and not separable from it without the cessation of the whole But now as the accession of the humane Nature to the divine in the hypostatical union infers no imperfection to the divine so much less would what things we may suppose naturally necessarily and eternally united in the Godhead infer any imperfection therein I easily admit what is said by W. J. Letter pag. 8. That we have no better definition of God than that he is a Spirit infinitely perfect But then being so far taught by himself my conception of him I must include in it this trinal distinction or a triple somewhat which he affirms of himself and without which or any one whereof he were not infinitely perfect and consequently not God and that all together do make one God As you most aptly say of your resemblance of him a Cube there are in it three dimensions truly distinct from each other yet all these are but one Cube and if any one of the three were wanting it were not a Cube Set this down then for the Notion of God that he is a Spirit infinitely perfect comprehending in that omnimodous Perfection a trinal distinction or three persons truly distinct each whereof is God What will be the consequence that therefore there are three Gods Not at all but that each of these partaking Divine Nature give us an inadequate and all together a most perfectly adequate and entire Notion of God Nor would the Language of this Hypothesis being prest to speak out as he says in his Letter be this these are not fit to be called three Gods but not possible with any truth to be so called And whereas he after tells us these three being united by similitude of Nature mutual consciousness consent cooperation under the greatest union possible and in that state of union do constitute the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the entire all-comprehensive Godhead and adds this looks somewhat like a conceivable thing To this I Note two things 1. That he makes it not look like so conceivable a thing as it really may do For he leaves out the most important thing that was as supposable as any of the rest and prior to a meer
similitude viz. a natural union of these supposed distinct essences without which they are not under the greatest union possible and which being supposed necessary and eternal cannot admit these should be more than one God 2. I note that what he opposes to it so defectively represented is as defective that the Christian Trinity doth not use to be represented thus c. What hurt is there in it if it can be more intelligibly represented than hath been used But his gentle treatment of this hypothesis which he thought as he represents it not altogether unintelligible and which with some help may be more intelligible became one enquiring what might most safely and with least torture to our own minds be said or thought in so awful a Mystery It however seems not proper to call this an hypostatical union much less to say it amounts to no more It amounts not to so much For an hypostatical or personal union would make the terms united the unita the things or somewhats under this union become by it one hypostasis or person whereas this union must leave them distinct persons or hypostases but makes them one God In the use of the Phrase hypostatical or personal union the denomination is not taken from the subject of the union as if the design were to signifie that to be divers hypostases or persons but from the effect or result of the mentioned union to signifie that which results to be one person or hypostasis As the matter is plain in the instance wherein it is of most noted use the case of the two Natures united in the one Person of the Son of God where the things united are not supposed to be two Persons but two Natures so conjoyn'd as yet to make but one person which therefore is the Negative result or effect of the union viz. that the person is not multiply'd by the accession of another Nature but remains still only one But this were an union quite of another kind viz. of the three hypostases still remaining distinct and concurring in one Godhead And may not this be supposed without prejudice to its Perfection For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead when they admit three modes of subsistence which are distinct from one another and from the Godhead which they must admit For if each of them were the very Godhead each of them as is urged against us by you know who must have three Persons belonging to it as the Godhead hath And your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct or else they could not be three I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats they must be three things not three nothings for however uneasie it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing I shall wave that Metaphysical contest But yet collect that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd is not in your account to be ascribed to God either according to his own word or the reason of things It may here be urged how can we conceive this Natural Union as I have adventur'd to Phrase it of the three Persons supposing them distinct things substances or Spirits Is such an Union conceivable as shall make them be but one God and not be such as shall make them cease to be three distinct things substances or Spirits We find indeed the mentioned unions of Soul and Body in our selves and of the two Natures in Christ consistent enough with manifest distinction but then the things united are in themselves of most different Natures But if things of so congenerous a Nature be united will not their distinction be lost in their union I answer 1. That a Spirit and a Spirit are numerically as distinct as a Body and a Spirit And 2. That we may certainly conceive it as possible to God to have united two or three created Spirits and by as strict union as is between our Souls and Bodies without confounding them and I reckon the union between our Souls and Bodies much more wonderful than that would have been Why then is an unmade uncreated union of three Spirits less conceivable as that which is to be presupposed to their mutual consciousness I shall not move or meddle with any Controversie about the Infinity of these three supposed Substances or Spirits it being acknowledged on all hands that Contemplations of that kind cannot but be above our measure And well knowing how much easier it is to puzzle oneself upon that Question An possit dari infinitum infinito infinitius than to speak satisfyingly and unexceptionably about it to another And tho' I will not use the expressions as signifying my formed judgment that there are three things substances or Spirits in the Godhead as you that there are three somewhats yet as I have many Years thought I do still think that what the learned W. J. doth but more lightly touch of the Son and the Holy Ghost being produced which term I use but reciting it as he doth not by a voluntary external but by an internal necessary and emanative Act hath great weight in it In short my sense hath long lain thus and I submit it to your searching and candid Judgment viz. That tho' we need not have determinate thoughts how far the Father Son and Holy Ghost are distinguished yet we must conceive them in the general to be so far distinguished as is really necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which the Scriptures do distinctly give them And that whatever distinction is truly necessary to that purpose will yet not hinder the two latters participation with the first in the Godhead which can be but one because that tho' we are led by plain Scripture and the very import of that word to conceive of the Father as the Fountain yet the Son being from him and the Holy Ghost from them both not contingently or dependently on will and pleasure but by eternal natural necessary promanation these two latter are infinitely distinguisht from the whole Creation Inasmuch as all Creatures are contingent beings or dependent upon will and pleasure as the Character is given us of created things Rev. 4. 11. Thou hast made all things and for thy pleasure they are and were created But that whatever is what it is necessarily is God For I have no doubt but the Dreams of some more anciently and of late concerning necessary matter and the Sophisms of Spinosa and some others tending to prove the necessity and identity of all substance are with what they aim to evince demonstrably false The Summe of all will be this 1. That we can be more certain of nothing than that there is but one God 2. We are most sure the Father Son and Holy Ghost are sufficiently distinguished to give a just ground to the distinct attributions which are in Scripture severally given to them 3. We are not sure what that sufficient distinction is
seen thorough an over-magnifying Opinion of our selves as if our Eye could penetrate that vast and sacred darkness or the glorious light equally impervious to us wherein God dwells too great rudeness to the rest of Men more than implicitly representing all Mankind besides as stark blind who can discern nothing of what we pretend clearly to see And it is manifest this cannot be said to be impossible upon any other Pretence but that it consists not with the Unity of the Godhead in opposition to the multiplication thereof or with that simplicity which stands in opposition to the concurrence of all Perfections therein with distinction greater than hath been commonly thought to belong to the Divine Nature For the former we are at a certainty But for the latter how do we know what the Original Natural State of the Divine Being is in this respect or what simplicity belongs to it or what it may contain or comprehend in it consistently with the Unity thereof or so but that it may still be but one Divine Being What distinction and unity conserved together we can have otherwise an Idéa of without any apprehended inconsistency absurdity or contradiction we shall rashly pronounce to be impossible or somewhat imperfectly resembled thereby in the Divine Being unless we understood it better than we do Some prints and characters of that most perfect Being may be apprehended in the creatures especially that are intelligent such being expresly said to have been made in the Image of God And if here we find Oneness with distinction meeting together in the same created intelligent being this may assist our Understandings in conceiving what is possible to be in much higher Perfection tho not to the concluding what certainly is in the uncreated V. Waving the many artificial Unions of distinct things that united and continuing distinct make one thing under one Name I shall only consider what is natural and give instance in what is nearest us our very selves tho the truth is we know so little of our own Nature that it is a strange assuming when we confidently determine what is impossible to be in the divine Nature besides what he hath told us or made our own Faculties plainly tell us is so and what he hath made any mans Faculties to tell him he hath made all mens that can use them But so much we manifestly find in our selves that we have three Natures in us very sufficiently distinguishable and that are intimately united the vegetative sensitive and the intellective So that notwithstanding their manifest distinction no one scruples when they are united to call the whole the humane nature Or if any make a difficulty or would raise a Dispute about the distinction of these three Natures I for the present content my self with what is more obvious not doubting to reach my mark by degrees viz. that we are made up of a mind and a body somewhat that can think and somewhat that cannot sufficiently distinct yet so united that not only every one without hesitation calls that thing made up of them one man but also every one that considers deeply will be transported with wonder by what more-than-magical knot or tye two things so little a-kin should be so held together that the one that hath the power of will and choice cannot sever it self and return into the same union with the other at pleasure But VI. Since we find this is a thing actually done the making up of two things of so different Natures into one thing that puts the matter out of doubt that this was a thing possible to be done 't was what God could do for he hath done it And if that were possible to him to unite two things of so very different natures into one thing let any colourable reason be assigned me why it should not be as possible to him to unite two things of a like nature i. e. If it were possible to him to unite a spirit and a body why is it less possible to him to have united two spirits And then I further enquire If it were possible to him to unite two would it not be as possible to unite three Let Reason here be put upon its utmost stretch and tell me what in all this is less possible than what we see is actually done Will any man say two or three spirits united being of the same nature will mingle be confounded run into one another and lose their distinction I ask supposing them to pre-exist apart antecedently to their Union are they not now distinguished by their own individual essences let them be as much united as our Souls and Bodies are why should they not as much remain distinct by their singular essences There is no more hazard of their losing their distinction by the similitude of their natures than of our Soul and Body's transmuting one another by their dissimilitude I know not but the dictates of so vogued an Author with many in this Age as Spinosa may signifie somewhat with some into whose hands this may fall who with design bad enough says that from whence one might collect the remaining distinction of two things of the same nature in such a supposed union were the more easily conceivable of the two i. e. than of two things of different natures For in his Posthumous Ethicks de Deo He lays this down in Explication of his second Definition Cogitatio aliâ cogitatione terminatur At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore Some may regard him in this and it would do our business For my patt I care not to be so much beholden to him for it would at the long run overdo it and I know his meaning But I see not but two congenerous natures are equally capable of being united retaining their distinction as two of a different kind and that sufficiently serves the present purpose However let any man tell me why it should be impossible to God so to unite three spirits as by his own power to fix their limits also and by a perpetual Law inwrought into their distinct beings to keep them distinct so that they shall remain everlastingly united but not identifyed and by vertue of that union be some one thing which must yet want a name as much and as truly as our Soul and Body united do constitute one man Nor is it now the question whether such an union would be convenient or inconvenient apt or inept but all the question is whether it be possible or impossible which is as much as we are concerned in at this time But you will say suppose it be possible to what purpose is all this How remote is it from the supposed Trinity in the Godhead You will see to what purpose it is by and by I therefore adde VII That if such an Union of three things whether of like or of different Natures so as that they shall be truly one thing and yet remain distinct tho united can be effected
as one may with certainty pronounce there is nothing more impossible or unconceivable in it than we find is actually done then it is not intrinsecally impossible or objectively it is not impossible in it self No power can effect what is simply and in it self impossible There is therefore no contradiction no repugnancie or inconsistencie as to the thing nor consequently any shadow of absurdity in the conception hereof Whereupon VIII If such an union with such distinction be not impossible in it self so that by a competent power it is sufficiently possible to be effected or made we are to consider whether it will appear more impossible or whether I shall have a conception in my own mind any thing more incongruous if I conceive such an union with such distinction unmade or that is original and eternal in an unmade or uncreated being For we are first to consider the thing in it self abstractly from made or unmade created or uncreated being And if it pass clear of contradiction or absudity in its abstract notion we are so far safe and are not liable to be charged as having the conception in our minds of an impossible absur'd or self-repugnant thing So that clamour and cry of the Adversary must cease or be it self absurd and without pretence This now supposed Union with such distinction must if it be judg'd impossible as it is in our thoughts introduc'd into unmade being can no longer be judg'd impossible as it is an Union of distinct things but only as it is unmade or is supposed to have place in the unmade eternal Being IX This is that then we have further to consider whether supposing it possible that three spiritual beings might as well be made or created in a State of so near Union with continuing distinction as to admit of becoming one spiritual being to be called by some fit name which might easily be found out if the thing were produc'd as that a spiritual being and a corporeal being may be made or created in a state of so near union with continuing distinction as to become one spiritual-corporeal being called by the Name of Man I say whether supposing the former of these to be as possible to be done or created as the latter which we see done already we may not as well suppose somewhat like it but infinitely more perfect to be original and eternal in the uncreated Being If the first be possible the next actual what pretence is there to think the last impossible X. I might add as that which may be expected to be significant with such as do seriously believe the Doctrines both of the Incarnation and the Trinity tho' I know it will signifie nothing with them who with equal contempt reject both that the union of the two Natures the humane made up of an humane Body and an humane Soul which are two exceedingly different Natures with the divine which is a third and infinitely more different from both the other in one Person viz. of the Son of God cannot certainly appear to any considering Person more conceivable or possible than that which we now suppose but assert not of three distinct Essences united in the One Godhead upon any account but this only that this is supposed to be an unmade eternal union the other made and temporal which renders not the one less conceivable than the other as it is union but only as in the several terms of this union it is supposed eternally to have place in the Being of God whereas that other union in respect of one of its terms is acknowledg'd de novo to have place there In short here is a spiritual created being an humane Soul setting aside for the present the consideration of the humane body which united therewith made up the Man Christ confessed to be in hypostatical union with the uncreated spiritual being of God not as that being is in the Person of the Father nor as in the Person of the Holy Ghost for then they should have become Man too but as it was in the Person of the Son only why shall it be thought less possible that three uncreated spiritual beings may be in so near an union with each other as to be one God as that a created Spirit and Body too should be in so near union with one of the Persons in the Godhead only as therewith to be one Person will it not hereby be much more easily apprehensible how one of the Persons as the common way of speaking is should be incarnate and not the other two Will not the Notion of Person it self be much more unexceptionable when it shall be supposed to have its own individual Nature And why is a natural eternal union of uncreated Natures with continuing distinction or without confusion sufficient unto the Unity of the Godhead less supposable than a temporal contracted union with created Natures without confusion too that shall be sufficient to the Unity of a Person will it be any thing more contrary to such simplicity of the Divine Nature as is necessarily to be ascribed thereto or will it be Tritheism and inconsistent with the acknowledged inviolable Unity of the Godhead XI That we may proceed to speak to both let these things be consider'd with seriousness and sobriety of mind as to our selves with all possible reverence towards the blessed God and with just candour and equanimity towards other Men. And first we must leave it to any ones future representation not being hitherto able to discern any thing what there is in all this that is here supposed any way repugnant to such simplicity as God any where claims to his own being or that plain reason will constrain us to ascribe to him or that is really in it self any Perfection We are sure God hath not by his Word taught us to ascribe to him universal absolute simplicity or suggested to us any such Notices as directly and evidently infer it to belong to him Nor hath seem'd at all intent upon cautioning of us lest we should not ascribe it The word we find not among his Attributes mentioned in the Holy Scriptures The thing so far as it signifiies any general perfection we are sure belongs to him but the Scriptures are not Written with visible design to obviate any danger of our misconceiving his Nature by not apprehending it to be in every respect most absolutely simple It doth teach us to conceive of him as most powerful most wise most gracious and doth not teach us to conceive all these in the abstract viz. Power Wisdom and Goodness to be the same thing Yet we easily apprehend by reflecting upon our selves that without multiplying the subject these may all reside together in the same man But our difficulty is greater to conceive what is commonly taught that these without real distinction or with formal only as contradistinguished to the difference of thing from thing are in the abstract affirmable of God that he is Power Wisdom Goodness That
to his Being belongs so absolute simplicity that we must not look upon these as things really distinguishable there from one another but as different conceptions of the same thing We must conceive of things as we can not as we cannot and are only concern'd to take heed of unreveal'd and undemonstrable and peremptory conceptions concerning that glorious most incomprehensible and ever-blessed Being to beware of too curious prying into the Nature of God when it vvas so Penal to look unduly into or even to touch that only-hallovved Symbol of his Presence his Ark beyond what he hath reveal'd expresly or we can most clearly by generally received light apprehend When we knovv there is a Knovvledge of him so reserved from us vvhereof our Minds are so little receptive that it seemed all one vvhether he told us he did dvvell in thick darkness or in inaccessible light 'T will be a reproach to us if we shall need to be taught reverence of him by Pagans or that such a document should need to be given us for our Admonition as that very ancient Inscription in one of their Temples imported I am whatsoever was is or shall be and who is he that shall draw aside my Vail XII If we should suppose three spiritual necessary beings the one whereof were meer Power or furious might destitute of either wisdom or goodness another meer wisdom or craft rather destitute of either goodness or power a third meer goodness or fond and fruitless kindness destitute of either power or wisdom existing separately and apart from each other This triple conception would overthrow it self and must certainly allow little ease to any considering mind Nor could any of these be God But if we conceive essential power wisdom and goodness concurring in one spiritual necessarily existent Being in which are each of these not only by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 usually acknowledged in the three Persons totally permeating one another which signifying but meer presence as we may express it is in comparison a small thing but really and vitally united by so much a nearer and more perfect union than hath ever come under our notice among created beings of partly corporeal partly incorporeal natures by how much beings of purest Sprituality may be apter to the most intimate union than when one is quite of a different nature from the other and as whatsoever union is suposeable to be originally eternally and by natural necessity in the most perfect being may be thought inexpressibly more perfect than any other And if hereupon we further conceive the most entire perpetual everlasting intercourse and communion of these three so originally united that what is conceivable of perfection or excellency in any one of these is as much the others for whatsoever exercises or operations as his own I cannot apprehend what there is of repugnancy contradiction or absurdity in this supposition nor any thing that by any measures he hath given us to govern our conceptions of him appears unbecoming or unworthy of God There is 't is true less Simplicity but more perfection ascribed hereby to the divine Being intirely considered and more intelligibly than if you go about to impose upon your self the notion of most absolute omnimodous simplicity therein There would be yet more absolute simplicity ascribed unto an eternal Being if you should conceive in it meer power exclusive of wisdom and goodness and so of the rest but infinitely less perfection And if that would avail any thing I could easily produce more School-men than one of no small note concurring in this sentiment that simplicitas si sumatur in totâ suâ amplitudine non dicit perfectionem simplicitèr But I count it not worth the while XIII And let it be here again observed I speak not of this as any certain determination that thus things are in the Deity but as a possible supposition of what for ought we know may be If any say this gives us the Notion of a compounded Deity or of a composition in it I only say the term composition seems to imply a pre-existing component that brings such things together and supposes such and such more simple things to have pre-existed apart or separate and to be brought afterwards together into an united state Whereupon I peremptorily deny any Composition in the Being of God And let any man from what hath been hitherto said or supposed inferr it if he can Imagine this of the Godhead and you shall we acknowledge conceive most untruly most unworthily most injuriously of God and what is most absolutely impossible to agree to the Divine Being And for this Reason only that I know of that carries any shadow of Importance in it many have been so apt without the least warrant from any revelation God hath given of himself to ascribe to him an unintelligible simplicity apprehending they must otherwise admit a composition in his most sacred Essence i. e. the putting of things together that were separate to make it up which must suppose it a new production that once was not and from an imperfect state by the Coalition of things once severed to have arrived to the perfection we ascribe to the Divine Being which sort of being cannot without the most absurd and blasphemous contradiction ever admit to be called God But if we suppose most perfect essential Power Wisdom Love by original eternal and most natural necessity to have co-existed in that being most intimately united tho' distinct that seemingly important reason will appear but a shadow and accordingly vanish as such And indeed this is no more than what in effect such as discourse upon this Subject do commonly say tho' perhaps some may less consider the ducture and sequel of their own professed Sentiments when they speak of the incomprehensibleness of God's Essence and how impossible it is a finite mind should form or receive a full and compleat Idéa of it or when they therefore say that any conceptions we can have of the Wisdom Goodness or any other Attribute of the Divine Being are still but inadequate conceptions whereby they must mean when we consider for instance the Wisdom of God that we not only fall infinitely short of conceiving all that belongs to the Divine Being in that kind but that there is also infinitely more belonging thereto in other kinds than it is possible that conception can contain or express And when we have the conception in our minds of the Divine Wisdom do we not apprehend there is really somewhat else in the Divine Being whereof that term hath no signification or will we say his Wisdom and his Power are really the same thing as they must either be the same or divers things If we say they are the same we must I doubt confess our selves to say what we do not understand especially when in the abstract we affirm them of one another and of God and accordingly say that Wisdom is Power and Power is Wisdom and the one of
these is God and the other God I know a formal distinction is commonly admitted i. e. that the conception of the one is not included in the conception of the other But are these different conceptions true or false If false why are they admitted if true there must be somewhat in the Nature of the thing corresponding to them But if we say they are distinct but most intimately and eternally united in the Divine Being by a necessary natural Union or that it is not impossible so to be what we say will I think agree with it self and not disagree with any other conception we are obliged to have concerning the blessed God In the mean time I profess not to judge we are under the precise Notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost nor that the Notions we have of those or any other divine Perfections do exactly correspond to vvhat in God is signify'd by these Names but I reckon that vvhat relief and ease is given our minds by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these to be the very same things may facilitate to us our apprehending the Father Son and Spirit to be sufficiently distinct for our affirming or under standing the affirmation of some things concerning some one without including the other of them XIV But some perhaps will say while we thus amplify the distinction of these glorious three we shall seem to have too friendly a look towards or shall say in effect what Dr. Sherlock is so highly blam'd for saying and make three Gods I answer that if with sincere minds we enquire after truth for its own sake we shall little regard the friendship or enmity honour or dishonour of this or that man If this were indeed so doth what was true become false because such a man hath said it But it is remote from being so There is no more here positively asserted than generally so much distinction betweeen the Father Son and Spirit as is in it self necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which in the Scriptures are severally given them that when the word or wisdom was said to be with God understanding it as the case requires with God the Father in the creation of all things we may not think nothing more is said than that he was with himself that when the Word is said to be made flesh 't is equally said the Father was made flesh or the Holy Ghost that when the Holy Ghost is said to have proceeded from or have been sent by the Father or the Son he is said to have proceeded from himself or have sent himself But in the mean time this is offered without determining precisely how great distinction is necessary to this purpose It is not here positively said these three are three distinct substances three infinite minds or spirits We again and again insist and inculcate how becoming and necessary it is to abstain from over-bold enquiries or positive determinations concerning the limits or the extent of this distinction beyond what the Scriptures have in general made necessary to the mentioned purpose that we may not throw our selves into guilt nor cast our minds into unnecessary straits by affirming this or that to be necessary or impossible in these matters XV. The case is only thus that since we are plainly led by the express revelation God hath made of himself to us in his Word to admit a trinal conception of him or to conceive this threefold distinction in his Being of Father Son and Spirit since we have so much to greaten that distinction divers things being said of each of these that must not be understood of either of the other since we have nothing to limit it on the other hand but the Unity of the Godhead which we are sure can be but One both from the plain Word of God and the nature of the thing it self since we are assured both these may consist viz. this Trinity and this Unity by being told there are three and these three i. e. plainly continuing three are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one thing which one thing can mean nothing else but Godhead as is also said concerning two of them elsewhere there being no occasion then to mention the third I and my Father are one thing We are hereupon unavoidably put upon it to cast in our own minds and are concerned to do it with the most religious reverence and profoundest humility what sort of thing this most sacred Godhead may be unto which this Oneness is ascribed with threefold distinction And manifestly finding there are in the Creation made Unions with sufficient remaining distinction particularly in our selves that vve are a soul and a body things of so very different natures that often the Soul is called the Man not excluding the Body and the body or our flesh called the Man not excluding the Soul we are plainly led to apprehend that it is rather more easily possible there might be two Spirits so much more agreeing in nature so united as to be one thing and yet continuing distinct and if two there might as well be three if the Creator pleased And hence are led further to apprehend that if such a made Union with continuing distinction be possible in created being it is for ought we know not impossible in the uncreated that there may be such an eternal unmade union with continuing distinction And all this being only represented as possible to be thus without concluding that thus it certainly is sufficiently serves our purpose that no pretence might remain of excluding the eternal Word and the eternal Spirit the Godhead as if a Trinity therein were contradictious and impossible repugnant to reason and common sense Where novv is the coincidency XVI Nor is there hereupon so great a remaining difficulty to salve the Unity of the Godhead when the supposition is taken in of the natural eternal necessary Union of these three that hath been mentioned And it shall be considered that the Godhead is not supposed more necessarily to exist than these three are to coexist in the nearest and most intimate union with each other therein That Spiritual Being which exists necessarily and is every way absolutely perfect whether it consist of three in one or of only one is God We could never have known 't is true that there are such three coexisting in this one God if he himself had not told us What Man knoweth the things of a Man but the Spirit of a Man that is in him even so the things of God none knoweth but the Spirit of God In telling us this he hath told us no impossible no unconceivable thing It is absurd and very irreligious presumption to say this cannot be If a Worm were so far capable of thought as to determine this or that concerning our Nature and that such a thing were impossible to belong to it which we find to be in it we should trample
of the same name and nature As the body and soul of a man are one individual body and one individual soul but both together are but one individual man And the case would be the same if a man did consist of two or three spirits so or more nearly united together as his soul and body are Especially if you should suppose which is the supposition of no impossible or unconceivable thing that these three spirits which together as we now do suppose do constitute a man were created with an aptitude to this united coexistence but with an impossibility of existing separately except to the Divine Power which created them conjunct and might separate them so as to make them exist apart which yet cannot be the Case in respect of three such uncreated spiritual Beings whose Union is supposed to be by natural eternal necessity as their Essences are and are therefore most absolutely inseparable XX. Or if it should be said I make the Notion of God to comprehend Father Son and Holy Ghost and a Godhead besides common to these three I answer nothing I have said or supposed implies any such thing or that the Notion of God imports any thing more of real being than is contained in Father Son and Holy Ghost taken together and most intimately naturally and vitally by eternal necessity united with one another As in a created being consisting of more things than one taken together and united a Man for instance there is nothing more of real entity besides what is contained in his Body and his Soul united and taken together 'T is true that this term a Man speaks somewhat very divers from an humane body taken alone or an humane soul taken alone or from both separately taken but nothing divers from both united and taken together And for what this may be unjustly collected to imply of composition repugnant to Divine Perfection it is before obviated Sect. 13. If therefore it be askt What do we conceive under the Notion of God but a necessary spiritual Being I answer that this is a true Notion of God and may be passable enough among Pagans for a full one But we Christians are taught to conceive under the Notion of God a necessary spiritual Being in which Father Son and Spirit do so necessarily coexist as to constitute that Being and that when we conceive any one of them to be God that is but an inadequate not an entire and full conception of the Godhead Nor will any place remain for that trivial Cavil that if each of these have Godhead in him he therefore hath a Trinity in him but that he is one of the three who together are the One God by necessary natural eternal Union Which Union is also quite of another kind than that of three Men as for instance of Peter James and John partaking in the same kind of Nature who notwithstanding exist separately and apart from each other These three are supposed to coexist in natural necessary eternal and most intimate Union so as to be one Divine Being Nor is it any prejudice against our thus stating the Notion of the Godhead that we know of no such Union in all the Creation that may assist our Conception of this Union What incongruity is there in supposing in this respect as well as in many others somewhat most peculiarly appropriate to the Being of God If there be no such actual Union in the Creation 't is enough to our purpose if such a one were possible to have been And we do know of the actual union of two things of very different Natures so as to be one thing and have no reason to think the Union of two or more things of the same sort of Nature with sufficient remaining distinction less possible or less intelligible XXI Upon the whole let such an union be conceived in the Being of God with such distinction and one would think tho' the Complexions of Mens minds do strangely and unaccountably differ the absolute perfection of the Deity and especially the perfect felicity thereof should be much the more apprehensible with us When we consider that most delicious society which would hence ensue among the so entirely consentient Father Son and Spirit with whom there is so perfect rectitude everlasting harmony mutual complacency unto highest delectation according to our way of conceiving things who are taught by our own Nature which also hath in it the Divine Image to reckon no Enjoyment pleasant without the consociation of some other with us therein we for our parts cannot but hereby have in our minds a more gustfull Idea of a blessed state than we can conceive in meer eternal solitude God speaks to us as Men and will not blame us for conceiving things so infinitely above us according to the Capacity of our Natures provided we do not assume to our selves to be a measure for our Conceptions of him further than as he is himself pleased to warrant and direct us herein Some likeness we may taught by himself apprehend between him and us but with infinite not inequality only but unlikeness And for this Case of delectation in Society we must suppose an immense difference between him an all-sufficient self-sufficient Being comprehending in himself the infinite fulness of whatsoever is most excellent and delectable and our selves who have in us but a very minute portion of being goodness or felicity and whom he hath made to stand much in need of one another and most of all of him But when looking into our selves we find there is in us a disposition often upon no necessity but sometimes from some sort of benignity of temper unto Conversation with others we have no reason when other things concur and do fairly induce and lead our thoughts this way to apprehend any incongruity in supposing he may have some distinct object of the same sort of propension in his own most perfect Being too and therewith such a propension it self also XXII As to what concerns our selves the observation is not altogether unapposit what Cicero treating of Friendship discourses of perpetual solitude that the affectation of it must signifie the worst of ill Humour and the most savage Nature in the World And supposing one of so sour and morose an Humour as to shun and hate the Conversation of Men he would not endure it to be without some one or other to whom he might disgorge the virulency of that his malignant Humour Or that supposing such a thing could happen that God should take a Man quite out of the Society of Men and place him in absolute solitude supplyed with the abundance of whatsoever Nature could covet besides who saith he is so made of Iron as to endure that kind of Life And he introduces Architas Tarentinus reported to speak to this purpose That if one could ascend into Heaven behold the frame of the World and the beauty of every Star his admiration would be unpleasant to him alone which would be most
of the three Sacred Persons in the Godhead seem much more to challenge a greater distinction of the Persons than your Notion of a Person doth seem to admit That of sending and being sent spoken so often of the first in reference to the second and of the first and second in reference to the third as not to need the quoting of places If the same man were a King a General and a Judge methinks it would not well square with the usual forms of speaking among Men and God speaks to Men as Men to say that as the first he sends the two latter that is himself And one would think our being required to be Baptized in the distinct Names of the Father Son and Holy Ghost should signifie some greater distinction As also that three are said to bear witness in Heaven I doubt that in a Cause wherein our Law requires two or more Witnesses the same Man that should be a Father a Brother and a Son would scarce thereupon be admitted for three Witnesses And how the Incarnation of the Son can be understood according to your Notion of Person without the Fathers and Holy Ghosts Incarnation also I confess I cannot apprehend Your Notion of a Person contradistinct to the Scholastick Notion as was said before seems to leave the Godhead to be but one hypostasis or Person in the latter sense How then are we to conceive of the hypostatical union The assumed Nature will be as much hypostatically united with the Father or the Spirit as with the Son 3. And doth not this civil or meerly respective Notion of a Person the other being left fall in with the Antitrinitarian Will it not make us Unitarians only as they affect to call themselves Would any of them who as you are pleas'd to take notice Letter 6. p. 1 2. say none but a Mad-man would deny there may be three Persons in God have been so mad not yet professing themselves Converts as to say so if they had not suppos'd their Cause not hurt by this Notion of a Person For as you well say Letter 1. we need not be fond of words so the thing be agreed so have they equal reason to say we need not be afraid of words if in the sense you agree with us And with one sort of them I only desire you to consider how great an appearance the asserting only of three Persons in the one sense quitting the other will carry off an agreement And have they not all the advantage left them which they seek in arguing against the satisfaction made by our Saviour from the necessity of an alterity that in the business of making satisfaction there must be alter atque alter One who satisfies and another who is satisfy'd I do very well know what Instances are brought of humane Rulers making satisfaction for Delinquents but there is no parity in the Cases They being themselves Debtors to the governed Community as God is not who hath with most undoubted righteousness made all things for himself 4. And consider whether by your Notion of a Person you forsake not the generality of them who have gone as to this point under the repute of Orthodox Who no doubt have understood by three Persons three intelligent Hypostases tho' they have differ'd in thinking some of them that only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was the genitum or spiratum as to the two latter a notion that is either too fine or too little solid for some Minds to grasp or take any hold of Others that the divine Nature might it self be some way said to be communicated to them But I pass to the II d Enquiry Whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible The only thing that straitens us here is the most unquestionable unity or unicity as we may call it of the Godhead Which if it cannot be otherwise defended I must yet for my part notwithstanding these hardships and I know no man with whom I could do it with more inclination fall in with you But I must crave it of you so far to fall in with you know not who as to apply your clearer mind as I do my more cloudy one to consider whether it can or no You will here say further than what and what would I have further To the former of these I only say further than the asserting in very deed but one Hypostasis in the Godhead distinguished no otherwise into three than by certain relative capacities like those which may among men be sustain'd by one and the same man and which distinction as you after add is analogous to what in created beings is called distinctio modalis To the latter I desire you to observe what I generally propose not that we may positively assert any further determinate distinction as certain and known but only whether we may not admit some further distinction to be possible in consistency with the Unity of the Godhead I do equally detest and dread to speak with rash and peremptory confidence about things both so Mysterious and so Sacred But may we not modestly say that if to that Oeconomy which God hath represented himself in his Word to bear and keep afoot towards his Creatures any further distinction than hath been assigned is necessary it is also possible and may be for ought we know if indeed we know nothing to the contrary What is impossible we are sure cannot be necessary But God himself best and only knows his own nature and what his own meaning is in the representation he hath made to us If we sincerely aim to understand his meaning that we may bear our selves towards him accordingly he will vvith mercifull indulgence consider our shortor mis-apprehensions But vve need not say there is not this or that distinction if really vve do not knovv there is not While vve knovv so little of natures inferiour to our ovvn and even of our ovvn nature and hovv things are distinguished that belong to our selves vve have little reason to be shy of confessing ignorance about the Nature of God Therefore I most intirely agree to the tvvo Conclusions of the Ingenious W. J. vvherevvith he concludes his Letter But in the mean time and pursuantly enough thereto cannot but doubt the concludingness of his very acute reasonings against at least some of the expressions of that learned Person Dr. Sherl vvhich he animadverts upon as I perceive you also do p. 16. of your 7 th Letter And even W. J. himself for vvith a pious modesty he tells us concerning infinite Natures he presumes not to determine Letter p. 8. What he objects against that Authors having said the divine Persons are three beings really distinct vvherein I instance not intending to run thorough that elaborate Letter that then there must be three distinct Essences seems to me a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I doubt not the Author vvill easily admit it But what will be the consequence That therefore there are three Deities
wherein I find you saying with me over and over But whereas you rightly make the word person applicable to God but in a sense analogous to that which obtains of it with men why may it not be said it may be fitly applicable for ought we know in a sense analogous to that notion of it among men which makes a person signify an intelligent hypostasis and so three distinct persons three distinct intelligent hypostases 4. But if that sufficient distinction can be no less than that there be in the Godhead three distinct intelligent hypostases each having its own distinct singular intelligent nature with its proper personality belonging to it we know nothing to the contrary but that the necessary eternal nature of the Godhead may admit thereof If any can from plain Scripture testimony or cogent reason evince the contrary let the evidence be produced In the mean time we need not impose upon our selves any formal denial of it 5. If the contrary can be evidenced and that hereupon it be designed to conclude that there can be but one intelligent hypostasis in the Godhead and therefore that the Son and the Holy Ghost are but creatures the last refuge must be to deny the former consequence and to alledge that thô the same finite singular nature cannot well be understood to remain entirely to one and be communicated entirely to another and another the case will not be the same speaking of an infinite Nature SIR If what is here said shall occasion to you any new thoughts that you shall judge may be of common use I conceive there will be no need of Publishing my Letter but only that you be pleased to comunicate your own Sentiments as from your self which will have so much the more of Authority and Usefulness with them The most considerable thing that I have hinted is the necessary Promanation of the Son and Holy Ghost that must distinguish them from contingent Beings and so from Creatures which if you think improveable to any good purpose as it hath been with me a Thought many years old so I suppose it not new to you and being now resumed by you upon this occasion you will easily cultivate it to better advantage than any words of mine can give it But if you think it adviseable that any part of my Letter be Published if you please to signifie your mind to that purpose in one Line to marked it will come Sealed to my view and will give Opportunity of offering my Thoughts to you what parts I would have supprest which will be such only as shall leave the rest the fuller Testimony of my being Poirets method of proving a Trinity in the Godhead tho' it call it self Mathematical or Geometrical is with me much less convictive than the plain Scriptural way SIR Your most sincere Honourer and most respectful Humble Servant Anonym LETTER II. SIR YOur Eighth Letter happening to come to my View before it was printed off I have the Opportunity of taking Notice to you that it quite misrepresents the intent of the Letter to you subscribed Anonymous which it makes to be the defending or excusing some Expressions of Dr. Sherlock's which indeed was the least considerable thing if it were any thing at all in the design of that Letter and not altogether accidental to it The true design of it was that there might be a clearer Foundation asserted as possible at least to the Doctrine of the Incarnation and Satisfaction of the Son of God Nor can the fortè quod sic here be solved by the fortè quod non the Exigency of the Case being such as that if more be possible it will be highly requisite and that it cannot well be avoided to assert more unless it can be clearly evinced that more is impossible Nor yet is it necessary to determine how much more is necessary But not only the commonly receiv'd frame of Christian Doctrine doth sem to require somewhat beyond what the meer civil or respective Notion of the word Person imports but also the plain Letter of Scripture which says Heb. 1. 3. that the Son is the express Image of the Fathers hypostasis which seems to signifie there are two Hyyostases and other Scriptures seem to say enough whence we may with parity of Reason collect a third Now that Letter intimates I think sufficient matter of doubt whether hypostasis doth not signifie much more than Person in your sense The principal thing that Letter humbly offer'd to consideration i. e. whether supposing a greater distinction than you have assign'd be necessary it may not be defended by the just supposal that the promanation of the second or third Persons or hypostases rather howsoever divers they are is by natural eternal necessity not contingent or depending upon will and pleasure as all created Being is and doth is altogether waved That Letter was written with design of giving you the occasion of considering what might be further requisite and possible to be asserted for the serving of the Truth and with that sincerity and plenitude of respect to you that it might be wholly in your own Power to do it in such a way as wherein not at all to disserve your self Which Temper of Mind is still the same with Reverend SIR Your most unfeigned Honourer and Humble Servant Anonym Decemb. 91. LETTER III. Worthy SIR I Am very loath troublesomely to importune you But the very little time I had for the view of your 8th Letter before I wrote mine by the last Post not allowing me fully to write my sense as to that part which concern'd my former Letter I take leave now to add that my design in it as well as the profest design of the Letter it self was to offer you the occasion of employing that clear understanding wherewith God hath blest you above most in considering whether a greater latitude cannot be allow'd us in conceiving the distinction of the three in the Godhead consistently with the Unity thereof than your notion of a person will extend to And if it can whether it ought not to be represented at least as possible to give a less exceptionable ground to the Doctrines of the incarnation and satisfaction of the second Person in order whereto it seems to me highly requisite This was that I really intended and not the vindicating the Sentiments of that Author which you might observe that letter animadverts upon The Scripture seems to allow a greater latitude by the ground it gives us to apprehend three hypostases which so much differ from the notion you give of persons that one hypostasis may sustain three such persons as you describe The only thing that seems to straiten us in this matter is the usual Doctrine of the Schools about the divine simplicity I confess I greatly coveted to have had your thoughts engag'd in sifting and examining that Doctrine so far as to consider whether there be really any thing in it cogent and demonstrable that
will be repugnant to what is overtur'd in that Letter And I the rather desir'd more room might be gained in this matter apprehending the Unitarians as they more lately affect to call themselves might upon the whole think you more theirs than ours and while they agree with you concerning the possibility of such a Trinity as you assert may judge their advantage against the other mentioned Doctrines no less than it was My desiring that letter of mine might not be printed was most agreeable to what I intended in writing it that was only to suggest to you somewhat very loosly that I reckon'd you more capable than any man I knew to cultivate and improve to the great service of the common Christian Cause And that you might seem to say what you might upon your own search find safe and fit to be said as meerly from your self without taking notice that occasion was given you by any such Letter at all Had I design'd it for publick view it should have been writ with more Care and with more expressed Respect to you But if upon the whole you judge there is nothing in it considerable to the purposes it mentions my further request is you will please rather to suppress that part of your Letter which concerns it for which I suppose there is yet opportunity and take no notice any such letter came to your hands I am Reverend SIR Your most Respectful Humble Servant Anonym Decemb. 19. 91. Summary Propositions collected out of the foregoing Discourses more briefly offering to view the substance of what is contained in them 1. Of the Unity of the Godhead there can be no doubt it being in reason demonstrable and most expresly often asserted in Scripture 2. That there is a Trinity in the Godhead of Father Son or Word and Holy Ghost is the plain obvious sense of so many Scriptures that it apparently tends to frustrate the design of the whole Scripture-revelation and to make it useless not to admit this Trinity or otherwise to understand such Scriptures 3. That therefore the devising any other sense of such Scriptures ought by no means to be attempted unless this Trinity in the Godhead can be evidently demonstrated to be impossible 4. That the impossibility of it can never be demonstrated from the meer Unity of the Godhead which may be such as to admit these distinctions in it for ought we know 5. Nothing is more appropriate to the Godhead than to be a necessarily existent intelligent Being since all Creatures whether intelligent or unintelligent are contingent depending upon the Will of the necessary intelligent Being 6. If therefore the Father Son and Holy Ghost do coexist in the Godhead necessarily they cannot but be God 7. And if the first be conceived as the Fountain the second as by natural necessary not voluntary promanation from the first the third by natural necessary not voluntary spiration so as that neither of these latter could have been otherwise This aptly agrees with the Notions of Father Son and Spirit distinctly put upon them and infinitely distinguishes the two latter from all Creatures that depend upon will and pleasure 8. Whatever distinction there be of these three among themselves yet the first being the Original the second being by that promanation necessarily and eternally united with the first the third by such spiration united necessarily and eternally with both the other inasmuch as eternity and necessity of existence admit no change this union must be inviolable and everlasting and thereupon the Godhead which they constitute can be but One. 9. We have among the creatures and even in our selves instances of very different Natures continuing distinct but so united as to be one thing and it were more easily supposeable of congenerous Natures 10. If such Union with distinction be impossible in the Godhead it must not be from any repugnancy in the thing it self since very intimate Union with continuing distinction is in it self no impossible thing but from somewhat peculiar to the Divine Being 11. That peculiarity since it cannot be Unity which because it may admit distinctions in one and the same thing we are not sure it cannot be so in the Godhead must be that simplicity commonly wont to be ascribed to the divine Nature 12. Such simplicity as shall exclude that distinction which shall appear necessary in the present case is not by express Scripture any where ascribed to God and therefore must be rationally demonstrated of him if it shall be judg'd to belong at all to him 13. Absolute Simplicity is not a Perfection nor is by any ascribed to God Not by the Socinians themselves who ascribe to him the several intellectual and moral excellencies that are attributed to him in the Scriptures of which they give very different definitions as may be seen in their own Volkelius at large which should signifie them not to be counted in all respects the same thing 14. That is not a just consequence which is the most plausible one that seems capable of being alledg'd for such absolute simplicity that otherwise there would be a composition admitted in the Divine Nature which would import an imperfection inconsistent with Deity For the several excellencies that concur in it howsoever distinguished being never put together nor having ever existed apart but in eternal necessary union tho' they may make some sort of variety import no proper composition and carry with them more apparent Perfection than absolute omnimodous simplicity can be conceived to do 15. Such a supposed possible variety even of individual Natures in the Deity some way differing from each other infers not an unbounded Liberty of conceiving what pluralities therein we please or can imagine The divine revelation which could only justify doth also limit us herein mentioning three distinct I's or He 's and no more 16. The several Attributes which are common to these three do to our apprehension and way of conceiving things require less distinction no more for ought we know than may arise from their being variously modify'd according to the distinction of Objects or other extrinsecal things to which they may be referr'd We that so little know how our own Souls and the Powers and Principles that belong to them do differ from one another and from them must be supposed more ignorant and should be less curious in this FINIS Books printed for and sold by Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns at the lower end of Cheapside near Mercers Chappel A Body of practical divinity consisting of above 176 Sermons on the Lesser Catechisme compos'd by the Reverend Assembly of Divines at Westminster With a Supplement of some Sermons on several Texts of Scripture By Thomas Watson formerly Minister of St. Stephens Walbrook London Theological Dicourses in two Volumes The First Containing eight Letters and three Sermons concerning the Blessed Trinity The Second containing 13 Sermons on several Occasions By John Wallis D. D. Professor of Geometry in Oxon. An Account of the Blessed Trinity argued from the nature and perfection of the Supream Spirit coincident with the Scripture Doctrine in all the Articles of the Catholick Creeds together with its Mystical Federal Practical uses in the Christian Religion By William Burrough Rector of Cheynis in Bucks The confirming Work of Religion or its great things made Plain by their primary Evidences and Demonstrations whereby the meanest in the Church may soon be made able to render an account of their Faith By R. Fleming Author of the Fulfilling of the Seriptures Now Published by Daniel Burgess The Rod or the Sword the present Dilemma of the Nations of England Scotland and Ireland considered argued and improved c. A Family Altar erected to the Honour of the Eternal God or a Solemn Essay to promote the Worship of God in private Houses together with the best Entail or dying Parents living Hopes for their surviving Children grounded upon the Covenant of Gods Grace with Believers and their Seed By Oliver Heywood Minister of the Gospel 1 Joh. 5. Joh. 10. 1 Cor. 2. 11. Joh. 17. 3. P. 17. of these Considerations Prov. 8. Gen. 1. Prov. 8. Isa. 9. Mic. 5. Joh. 1. Joh. 3. Joh. 10. Joh. 21. Rom. 9. Phil. 2. Col. 1. 1 Joh. 5. Rev. 1. Chap. 2. Chap. 3. God 1 Cor. 2. Acts 5. 1 Joh. 5.