THE REFLECTIONS ON THE XXVIII PROPOSITIONS TOUCHING THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY In a LETTER to the Clergy c. maintain'd against the Third Defence of the said Propositions By the same Hand 1 Tim. 2. 5. For there is one God and one Mediator between God and Men the Man Christ Jesus Printed in the Year MDCXCV The REFLECTIONS upon the XXVIII PROPOSITIONS c. maintain'd THough there is nothing in the third Defence of the 28 Propositions c. that can as far as I can perceive enervate the least Objection that is urged in my Letter yet because the Doctrine therein maintained tends to subvert the Foundation of the Christian Religion by introducing a Plurality of Gods I cannot but think my self in Conscience oblig'd to shew the Vanity of those Pretences that are urg'd in its behalf especially since the Defender's writing with so great an Assurance of his own Performance and so much contempt of the Reflections may have some influence upon some weak and prejudiced Readers Had the Author design'd a just Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity he should have taken notice of what is said against it in general but more especially of what is urged against the real Trinitarians wherein he is equally concerned with them and not only of those additional Absurdities of his own Hypothesis Therefore I shall now set down his Opinion both as I find it in his Propositions and in the Defences of them and then shew the weakness of his Notions either with new Arguments or at least with enforcing those that were mentioned in my Reflections The Defender in his Propositions asserts That there are three Eternal and necessary Divine Beings or Substances each of which has unlimited Power Wisdom and Goodness and that so many Men or Angels are not more expresly distinguished in Scripture as different Persons or Substances Prop. 16 17. And pag. 8. of the second Defence I do affirm the Son and Spirit to be absolutely perfect Beings in reference to the Perfections of their Nature they are all boundless and Infinite So pag. 10. The Father's Existence being without a Cause does not make him to have another sort of Nature from that of the Son and Spirit which may be a necessary Nature and uncreated and constituted of all the boundless Perfections of which the Nature of the Father consists abstracted from the consideration of the manner of his Existence and in the same Page The Divine Nature speaking of the Nature of each doth comprehend all Perfections So pag. 11. An Essence of the same Kind though not the same numerical One So that here are three divine eternal necessary Natures or Essences as different as three Human or Angelical Natures which at first sight appear as much to be three Gods as three human Natures to be three Men which is a revolting to Polytheism or Plurality of Gods except he can shew that either two of these Divine Natures are not Gods or that these three Divine Natures are but one God We will therefore see what he saith to these two Points 1. He says that the Name of God is used in more senses than one in Scripture In the highest Sense the Father alone is God he is the only Independent the only True the only Good and Great and Self-existent God The Son and Spirit have a right to the Name of God next to that which is appropriated to the Father they depend on him with an entire dependance both for their Being and continuance in Being But is not this inconsistent with what is said before because it is first to assert that the different Ways or Manners of having their Natures does not make any difference in their Natures the second and third are as truly Divine as the First and then in effect to suppose it does because the Father has several Perfections the others are uncapable of To this he replies the Perfections the Father has above them belong immediately to his Existence not to his Nature but what is Existence abstracted from the Nature that exists but a Chimera If the Nature did not exist it would not be a Nature To say such a Nature exists is to say it is not only in our imagination but really or in act To make the Existence of a Nature a distinct thing from the Nature that exists and to suppose it to be the Subject in which the Attributes or Perfections of Independance and being the first Original of all things do exist is to suppose it a Substance because we have no other Idea of a Substance but that it is a Subject in which Properties exist which would be to make two distinct Substances in God his Nature that exists and the Existence of his Nature abstracted from the Nature What is the Existence of God the Father but the Existence of the Nature of God the Father except he exists distinct from his Nature And consequently if Self-existence be so great a Perfection it sheweth that the self-existent Nature of the Father is more perfect than the not self-existent Nature of the Son But suppose Self-existence which is Existence of the Father belongs to the Existence of the Father which by the way is only supposing Existence to belong to Existence yet Self-existence as I observed in my Letter is only a Perfection as it supposeth necessary or independant Existence and all those Perfections that belong to a necessary or self-existent Nature so that Self-existence barely considered in it self abstractedly from those Perfections notwithstanding his denial is no more a Perfection than any other way of having Existence if that way supposeth the same Perfections As suppose there was some Matter self-existent and some other Matter not self-existent and the Nature of the one were not any way different from the Nature of the other would they not be both equally Perfect and a parcel of Guinea's made of the One be as good as a parcel of Guinea's made of the other Or how could it be possible they being alike for Weight Colour Duration c. to distinguish them And if it be so in lower Natures the reason is the same in the highest Natures But however to carry the Simily as high as we can suppose a Human self-existent Father had two Sons who had all the Perfections of Human Nature and did as necessarily and independently exist as He there can be no reason assigned but that they would be Men in the highest Sense and as absolutely perfect as the Father He saith in pag. 44. of the first Defence That if a Human Father could be suppos'd to be Self-existent and that his Sons had the now mentioned kind of Dependance upon him viz. as the Light on the Sun the consequence must be that their Nature is short of the Perfection of their Father's Nature notwithstanding the many Properties they agree in which is owning that Self-existence and Independence belong to the Nature and that therefore the Nature of the Father is different from
but one God I shall only instance one Authority which may be instar omnium and that is Grotius de verit relig Christ. The first Attribute of God saith he in the beginning of that excellent Book is that he is one God and no more This is thence collected that he is that Being which is necessarily and by himself for whatsoever is necessarily or by it self is not considered in Kind but as it is in Act but if you suppose more Gods then you will find nothing in each of them why any of them should necessarily be and no reason why there should be rather two than three or ten than five Add hereunto that the multiplicity of singular things of the same kind proceeds from the fecundity of Causes by reason of which fewer or more things are brought forth but God has no Origin nor Cause So that this great Man is contrary to our Author in every thing 1. In supposing it impossible there should be more than one necessary Being 2. That more than one such necessary Being would infer more than one God and that God could not out of the Fecundity of Causes multiply his Kind 3. Whatever had a Cause or Origin could not be God 4. That there is no difference between necessary Being or Being by it self or without a Cause they are really one and the same with Him and so they are with all that have writ on this Subject They suppose God self-existent or without a Cause because he is necessary and eternal They never make use of our Author 's admirable distinction pag. 50. of having necessary Existence from another and necessary Existence from one's self He asks me pag. 48. whether I think that God can be the necessary Cause of nothing or whether the Perfection of his Nature does not determin Him to do what is best or to do what he in his infinite Wisdom knows fit to be done To which I answer That the Question between us is not what the Perfection of his Nature doth determin him to but what the Perfection of his Nature is whether three perfect necessary Natures or one only which is questioning whether the Unity of God be a Perfection or not Whatsoever is necessarily in God must contain the highest Perfection otherwise it would not be essential to his Nature but God being in his own numerically one Nature absolutely and infinitely Happy and Perfect two other Divine Natures cannot be in Him or which is all one with our Author emane from him necessarily because they can add no Perfection great or little to Him who in his one Nature contains all Perfections whatever He and they together can be no more Good Powerful Wise than he is alone He alone is All-sufficient and two other such Natures can make him no more Therefore it must be directly contrary to the Nature of God and highly injurious to his Honour to suppose his Nature necessarily to emane two Persons who must be needless ad intra to God himself and as useless ad extra as God himself is All-sufficient But if God gave a Being freely to the Son and Holy Spirit because he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done they are no more necessary Beings than all other Beings which God also produced because he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done or that the Perfection of his Nature did determin him to what was best and consequently they as all others continue in Being because God's Wisdom thinks it best But to say that God acted otherways than so that is necessarily in producing or causing the Son and Holy Spirit to exist who are as distinct and different from Him as two Men are from all other Men is either to make him act without understanding or else to act contrary to his Mind for Necessity only takes Place where Thoughts are wholly wanting or else the Power to act or forbear acting according to the Direction of Thought But if God did not give them then Beings neither as necessitated nor because he in his Wisdom thought fit which our Author calls necessarily he could not there being no middle way give them their Beings at all or be the Original or Cause of them and consequently they having no Origin or Cause must be as much without a Cause or self-existent as the Father and the same necessity if I may so say that made the Father to exist must make them exist And the Father upon supposition that they necessarily eman'd can be no more the Original of them than of his own Nature because the same Necessity that made his Nature exist made it emane It was as essential to it to emane as to exist and consequently the emaning Natures must be as self-existent and independent as his own Nature since they no more depend on him for Existence or continuance in Existence than his own Nature does Which very thing would the Defender seriously consider it would make him abate of his confidence in his Hypothesis But more of this hereafter 2. Now I shall remind him that tho the Design of his Propositions is to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity is not contradictory to natural Reason yet they as I observ'd Sect. 64. directly destroy the Unity of God which is the second Point I am to examine and that we may be assured there are not three Persons or Divine Natures in the Godhead he affirms Prop. 13. That the Godhead or GOD in the highest Sense can be but ONE NUMERICALLY and therefore the Oneness so frequently affirmed of him in Scripture is a numerical Oneness and in his Answer to the Consid. to which he refers me he says pag. 23. That the Name of GOD in Scripture is ever to be understood in the absolutely highest Sense How could an Unitarian in more direct Terms deny a Trinity What he urges in behalf of the Trinity is pag. 17. where he says The Holy Scripture doth abundantly declare the Unity of God but no where distinguisheth of Unity nor says of what Nature that Unity is which it ascribes to God But is not this directly contradicting Prop. 13. where he declares of what Nature or sort the Unity of God is to wit a numerical Unity and pag. 22. That the Name of God in Scripture is ever to be understood in that highest Sense And indeed it had been very absurd to suppose the Scripture did frequently inculcate that God is one and yet not let us know in what Sense he is one except it be obvious to common Reason what that Oneness is to wit one eternal absolutely perfect necessary Being It 's most certain that when we ascribe any thing to God as a Perfection we ascribe it in the highest Sense and consequently the Oneness of God must be taken in that Sense I desire to know what will destroy the Unity of God if every thing Treble in him will not do it as three Natures with three unlimited Powers Wisdoms Goodnesses But he
over his Works and rule them by his Providence what Place shall we assign to another God Not in this World for it belongs to another nor over the World for he that made it is above it And if he be not in the World nor over the World where can he be above the World or God Is it in another World If so then he is nothing to us that governs not our World nor can his Power be great being confin'd to a certain Place If therefore he is neither in nor over this World nor any other for there is no other seeing all Parts of the Universe make but one World whereof the entire extent is fill'd by its Maker therefore he is no where for there is no Place for him But supposing him somewhere pray to what purpose plainly to none at all c. It will be said perhaps to provide for us but certainly he cannot provide for those he has not made It follows therefore that if he created nothing nor provides nor can be confin'd to a Place there is no other God at all but one from Eternity the only Creator of the Universe FINIS A REPLY TO The Second Defence OF THE XXVIII PROPOSITIONS Said to be wrote in Answer to a Socinian Manuscript BY The AUTHOR of that MS. no Socinian but a Christian and Unitarian Nullius addictus jurare in verba Magistri LONDON Printed in the Year MDC XCV A REPLY to the SECOND DEFENCE of the XXVIII Propositions said to be wrote in Answer to a Socinian Manuscript SIR I NOW find by Notice in the Gazette that your Learned and Worthy Friend whose Name you concealed from me is the Lord Bishop of Glocester He has published an Answer which he calls A Second Defence of his Propositions to a private Manuscript which he calls Socinian Which MS. to excuse his not publishing it he tells his Reader he had returned to you and had it not by him nor a Copy of it He saith he collected the Substance of it I believe what he thought the Substance but how shall the Reader judg of that since as a great Master tells us The Context the Stile and the Phraseology of an Author must be well considered by one that means to understand him perfectly But it seems he was not willing to lose an Opportunity to expose a Heretick tho' he strain'd Civility in so doing In the mean time my MS. gave occasion to encrease the Number of his explanatory Propositions But after this farther Explanation of his Explanation he is as obscure as ever tho' that to deal ingenuously is rather his Misfortune than his Fault for there are some things which will never be explain'd while the World stands such as necessary and eternal Emanation Divine Fecundity the Difference between Order of Time and Order of Nature One thing before I begin my Reply let me acquaint you with I am advised to pass by whatever does not concern the Cause to bear the Imputation of affected Poedantry Ignorance and Arrogance Contemptuous Charges enough to exercise the Patience of a well-compos'd Man and urge one of my Make to take out Letters of Reprisal at least by way of Self-defence to say something like that of Tully Non video in hâc meâ mediocritate ingenii quid despicere possit Antonius But I will submit my Resentment to my Adviser as obedient Sons are wont their Faith to their Mother and that not only for the Reason aim'd at by my Friend but also out of Respect to my Adversary and therein I shall please you whom I believe to be as you character him one of the most deserving of his Order But yet I beg leave to tell you that I do not hold my self oblig'd by this Promise to forbear exposing the Weakness of an unconcluding Argument or setting two contrary Sayings to stare one another in the face but from all Revilings from foolish Words designed to lessen his Lordship's just Esteem I shall religiously forbear If I sprinkle Salt it shall not grieve his Person P. 1. of the Defence c. whereas I had affirmed that the Trinitarians had in vain tried their Strength against the Unitarians his Lordship answers There 's no doubt of it if their Adversaries may be Judges I now affirm it if the Trinitarians themselves be Judges for the Modalists will not allow the Hypothesis of the Realists and the Realists despise theirs and then again the Ignoramus or Mystery-trinitarians esteem the Methods taken by both these Parties not only vain and fruitless as to the refuting the Unitarians but also dangerous and likely to overthrow their own great Article while both these Parties join and with full consent condemn the Ignoramus-trinitarians who press the Belief of a Trinity in the Godhead but cannot say what is meant by it What the modern Unitarians have taught in their late Tracts concerning this controverted Article some or other of their Adversaries teach as well as they For example the Unitarians have taught that if by Persons are meant Relations Capacities or Respects of God to his Creatutes then there may be more Persons than 3 in the Godhead because God hath the Capacities Respects or Relations of a Judg of an Oeconomus or Provider c. They have taught that a Mode or a Posture cannot be a Person that a Mode cannot be in God because Modes are changeable and God is not They look upon it as an inconceivable Extravagancy to fancy that God in one Mode or Posture begat himself in another and breath'd forth his Self by the help of his begotten Self in a proceeding third-Self And as to all these things Dean Sh k Mr. H w and the Bp. of Gl. have the same Sense as the Unitarians The Unitarians have taught that there are not 3 Persons in the proper Sense of that word not 3 distinct Essences Natures Spirits Minds or intelligent Beings in the Unity of the Godhead but that it 's down-right Tritheism to say it and equally idolatrous with the Polytheism of the Heathens Dr. S th teaches so likewise Dr. Wallis is of the same Opinion and the famous Bps. of Worcester and Sarum who will not declare plainly their own Sense both declare against this The Unitarians have taught that that Article which is propos'd ro be believ'd as necessary to Salvation is capable of being explained and that it 's very unjust not to say ridiculous to require Men to believe words whereof no certain Signification can be given Now if Dean Sherlock with all the Realists and his Friend Dr. South with all the Modalists were not of the Mind of the Unitarians in this Point would they think you take such Pains to explain the Article each after his own particular Manner Whatsoever single Affirmation you arraign the Unitarians upon upon the same you arraign a Majority of Trinitarians For I think I may reckon that no one of the three chief Divisions is equal to the other two In short the Majority of
surely make a rational Being as great as the greatest I come next to consider how his Lordship has answered 4 Questions which I put 1. Does the Divine Nature comprehend all Perfections or can it want one or two of the chiefest and be still the same Divine Nature To this thus he Self-existence is a Perfection relating immediately to the Father's Existence not to his Nature or Essence I reply that this is not answering the Question but a very sorry shuffling it off for let the Perfection of Self-existence belong to what he pleases yet I hope it is a Perfection and if the Divine Nature comprehends all Perfections that Nature which does not comprehend all must not be the Divine Nature 2. If Self-existence as he teaches relates immediately to the Father's Existence and as he seems to mean be but as good as no Perfection yet to be first Original of all things and Independent must relate to his Nature or none of all the rest relate to his Nature The Nature of a Being is that by which he is that which he is and if you abstract from the Divine Nature Independence and being the first Original of all things you do not conceive God to be that which he is 3. Even the Manner of God's Existence as his Lordship once phras'd it belongs to his Essence nay it is the very fundamental Notion of a God Whatever Excellencies you ascribe to a rational Being without self-existence you raise him not above the Character of a most excellent Creature nay more you cannot ascribe infinite Perfections to any but the Self-existent God For his Lordship grants that the Perfections of all other Creatures are in them but derivatively and by being so receive Abatement But if he can make these two things consist I will give him this Gift he shall never be able to contradict himself while he breathes 4. Tho' he will not allow Self-existence to belong to the Essence of God yet he says that it speaks a more excellent Manner of Existence peculiar to the Father I argue then If the Father does exist after a more excellent Manner than the Son then he is a more excellent Person than the Son and has a more excellent Nature even as created Adam it is his Lordship's Simily is more excellent than any of the Sons of Men. And if the more excellent Nature of the Father be not another sort of Nature than the less excellent Nature of the Son who can help it But then I 'll tell him that One absolutely perfect God with all Perfections all and every Self-existence Being the first Original and Independence not excluded and his 2 Gods not absolutely perfect but as perfect as 2 Gods can be that are not absolutely perfect is a Dream which would make sport for any Man that has not more Reverence for his Vertue than his Reasoning But his Lordship is positive that the Nature of the Son may be a necessary Nature and uncreated for all that I can object or he has said Well! I will try that I object that the Nature of the Son is not said to be necessary or uncreated in Scripture He offers no Reasons why it should be thought so I will produce some why it should not 1. Because there can be but one numerically necessary Existent Dr. Cudworth tho'a Trinitarian could not but own this p. 200. The true and proper Idea of God is a Being absolutely perfect absolute Perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity and is that alone to which necessary Existence is essential and of which it is demonstrable The Nature of the Son cannot be uncreated because there can be but One numerical uncreated Nature Indeed the Athanasian Creed pronounceth The Father uncreate the Son uncreate the H. Ghost uncreate but the Compiler did not believe it for he determines not Three uncreate but One uncreate His Lordship hints sometimes that the Nature of the Father Son and H. Ghost is specifically the same sometimes that it is closely inseparably unconceivably the same but he constantly teaches that their Natures are numerically distinct and now if every one of them is uncreate it undeniably follows that there are 3 numerical distinct uncreated Natures But this methinks he should scarcely venture to assert if it be but out of Reverence to the Athanasian Creed how much soever he may be tempted to trespass upon evident Principles of Reason 2. Neither the Son nor the H. Ghost is a necessary Nature because a necessary Nature must be also self-existent and independent That Being which exists necessarily could exist from no other but the Son exists from the Father therefore does not exist necessarily He will say The Son exists from the Father by eternal necessary Emanation what that is I shall presently enquire I argue on If a Being could exist necessarily then it would not depend on God for its Existence but the Son according to his Lordship does depend on the Father for his Existence therefore he does not exist necessarily If the Nature of the Son were necessary as is the Nature of the Father no reason could be assigned why the Father should not as much depend on the Son as the Son on the Father In short two necessary Natures there cannot be but if there were they would both be independent To my 2d Question he bids you Sir read again what he said to the former I have done so and find I have not censur'd these words God the Father's Existence being without a Cause doth not make him to have another sort of Nature from the Son and H. Ghost Here it is implied that the Nature of the Son and of the H. Ghost had a Cause whereas the Nature of God had none Will not this pass for a sufficient Character to distinguish them as different Natures I 'm sure no two different Natures which he can name do differ half so much as a Nature that had a Cause and a Nature that had not And then again To have a Cause and to be uncreated if that be not a Contradiction I am satisfied he may talk backward and forward securely My 3d Question Can a Being that depends on God be properly said to be essentially that God on whom it depends He answers Such a Being can be properly said to be essentially that God in one Sense but cannot in another i. e. can have an Essence of the same kind tho' not the same numerical One But by his favour an Essence of the same kind can at most but make a Being to be a God not make him to be that God on whom himself depends If a Being can be that God which depends on another and that very God also on whom himself depends then such Being may at once be Two Gods and so the Second Person in the Trinity is the Father that caus'd the Son to be and the Son that was caus'd by the Father Thus by his Lordship's Answer to my 3d Question it
to play with Expressions by chance ambiguous than to answer Arguments Upon my Remark to his 15 Prop. he asks Who are they that determine any Notion to be true while they cannot conceive it to be so Why Sir in general they are the Trinitarians but in particular and more especially his Ldp. he is the Man for does he not expresly determine in this very Prop. that there is an unconceivably close Union between them the supposed 3 Persons Therefore unless he can conceive an unconceivable Notion or doubt of that which he determines to be true he is notoriously guilty of determining that Notion to be true which he cannot conceive to be so I grant him there may be a stricter Union between God and Christ than we know of but here I am bold and fixt there can be no such Union between them as contradicts the Notions he has implanted in us According to him the 3 Persons are 3 distinct Beings and there can be no distinct Being without its distinct Nature so 3 distinct Beings are 3 distinct Natures and 3 distinct Natures continuing so can never become one single Nature what Union soever there is between them I wonder the Trinitarians should so constantly amuse their Readers with that unsutable Comparison of Soul and Body in Union for 't is plain that in their Union they are that one thing which neither of them can be in a State of Separation Prop. 16. Such an Union as this between them being acknowledg'd by us together with the fore-mentioned intire Dependence of the Son and H. Spirit upon the Father the Unity of the Deity is as fully to all Intents and Purposes asserted by us as it is necessary or desirable it should be The End for which the Unity of the Deity was ever asserted What does he mean by this very odd Phrase My Sense is that it 's asserted because it is true and that the Consequence of its being true is this the Service of our whole Hearts is therefore due to him alone and our lower Respects to other Objects according as his Word and our own Reason directs us but we cannot both to God and Christ pay the Service of our whole Hearts notwithstanding their Union in Will and like Natures For if we love one Master with our whole Hearts we have no Affections left for any other but as he shall direct us and he cannot direct us to love another equally with himself Unity of Nature or 3 Beings united in 1 Nature is no better nor worse than 3 Beings in 1 Being 3 Natures in 1 Nature 3 and not 3 in the same respect which is a Contradiction if any thing be so Upon his 17 Prop. I had told him he was an Ismaelite Trinitarian whose Hand is against all the Heads of Trinitarian Expositors To this he replies 'T is false But since he deals so bluntly with me I will 1. Set down some of his Contradictions not consequential but broad Contradictions 2. Not to be wanting in the least to the Vindication of my Censure I will plainly show that I said no worse of his Lordship upon the account of his Hypothesis than he himself had said before of himself The first of his 28 Prop. is this The Name of GOD is used in more Senses than one in H. Scripture but in his first Def. p. 23. speaking of Perfections necessary to essentiate a God in the absolutely highest Sense he has these words Which the Name of God is ever to be understood in in the H. Scripture In the same Def. p. 17. he affirms that H. Script saith not of what Nature that Unity is which it ascribes to God But Prop. 13. of the 28. he says The Oneness so frequently affirmed of him in Script is a numerical Oneness In his second Def. p. 13. he says The individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Persons But Prop. 15 he says Each of them has a Right to the Name of God in a Sense next to that in which it is appropriated to the Father This Contradiction he is in love with it often occurs P. 10. of 2d Def. distinguishing between Perfections which he makes to belong to the Father's Existence and Perfections which belong to his Divine Nature or Essence he contends that the Son and H. Spirit have all the Perfections of the Divine Nature as well as the Father But p. 23. of first Def. he observes that Athanasius S. Basil Greg. Nazianzen and S. Chrysostom with several of the Latin Fathers interpret those Words of Christ MY FATHER IS GREATER THAN I to have been spoken not of his Humanity but his Divinity and himself gives his Judgment to their Sentence Prop. 16. of the 28. he affirms it to be evident from H. Script that the Son and H. Spirit have unlimited Power c. which also he allows 2d Def. p. 10. to be an essential Perfection but 2d Def. p. 24. he acknowledges that the Power of Judging the World was a Power committed to Christ not as Man and not essentially in him Prop. 17. he determines that they the 3 Persons are always spoken of in Script as distinct Beings or Persons according to the proper Signification of this word both from the Father and from each other nor are so many Men or Angels more expresly distinguished as different Persons or Substances by our Saviour or his Apostles than the Father Son and H. Ghost are But 1st Def. p. 20. he says They are outwardly and in reference to the Creation perfectly One and THE SAME God as concurring in all the fame external Actions I hope the Reader will allow me at least that these Instances do sufficiently prove that his Lordship's Hand is against one of the Heads of the Trinitarians I mean himself That it is also against all the other he will excuse me the Labour of proving by a tedious Induction of Particulars for Prop. 17. of the 21. he affirms that his Explication is the best and easiest way of reconciling those Texts which according to the other Hypothesis are not reconcilable but by offering extream Violence to them Here he prefers his Hypothesis indefinitely to all other Hypotheses Here 's no Restriction no Exception Nay in the Conclusion he doubts not to pronounce that the many Explications of the adorable Mystery have had little better Success than to make Sport for the Socinians My Animadversion on his 18 Prop. I have a better Opinion of since I saw his Answer than when I first pen'd them However I shall examine a few Lines P. 37. l. 30. How can he say saith his Ldp. that Jesus Christ desir'd not Divine Honours to be paid to him except he mean it when he was on Earth I mean as a plain Reader would imagin that Christ desired not any Divine Honours to be paid him either in one State or other meaning by Divine Honours such as are due to him that is by Nature
having necessarily inherent in himself infinite Power Wisdom c. our Devotion terminates in each we give each the same Divine Honour To which he says p. 58. This is a very false Charge for we heartily acknowledg that all the Honour we pay to the Son and H. Spirit ought to be ultimately terminated in the Father and I am sure he cannot think otherwise of those he calls the real Trinitarians because their Hypothesis necessarily obliges them so to believe whatever the Hypothesis of the others does But the Holy Scripture is so express upon this Point that I should think no Christian should find it hard to believe it no tho there were no oother Text but this for it viz. That at the Name of Jesus every Knee should bow to the glory of God the Father Phil. 2. 9 10 11. We will now first set when it can be said that the Honour we give a Person is not for his own but for the sake of another on whom it ultimately terminates and then examine whether it be such an Honour which the Trinitarians give to the Son and Holy Spirit The Honour we give a Person does not ultimately terminate on him when it is not for any inherent Quality in himself but for the sake of some Power Trust or Office that is receiv'd from another and which he holds during the Will of that other Thus we pay Honour to a Vice-roy a Judg a Magistrate because they are the Image or some way represent that Person who endued them with Power Whatever Honour or Deference we pay such Persons it still terminates in the Supreme it is for his Sake and to his Honour And the Reason is because such Persons how much soever they may be advanced above their fellow-Subjects yet in respect of the Person that advanced them they have no Power at all but are meer Ministers and Servants So our Lord Christ tho he is highly advanced as a Reward of his perfect Obedience above all his fellow-Creatures yet in respect of God he is a meer Minister and Servant wholly impotent can as he saith do nothing of himself and the Reason why the Honour given him in Scripture is not for his own sake but for the Glory of God the Father is because it is a delegated Honour God has made him a Prince and Saviour giving him all Power after his Resurrection or because as this Text says God has highly exalted him and given him a Name above every Name And there is no instance in Scripture where any Honour Glory Power and Dignity is ascribed to Christ either by himself or any Man or Angel but is expresly given to him either as a Man or as the free gift of God to a Man And it 's more than probable that this is so done lest it should administer occasion to People to terminate their Worship on him as a Divine Nature with all Perfections necessarily and eternally inhering in him It would be absurd if he had such a Nature not to worship him for himself ultimately except an eternal and necessary Divine Nature is not to be worship'd for its own sake which would be to say that the Father is not to be worship'd ultimately for the sake of his Divine Nature The Honour that does not terminate on the Person is never given to the Creator but to the Creature and of this Nature is that Honour or Worship we give to those Gods or supreme Powers which are the Deputies or Representatives of the most high God which Worship does not ultimately terminate on them because what they have they have from God and hold it only during his Pleasure What then can be a stronger Argument that the Son is not God than this that the Honour we are oblig'd to pay him does not ultimately terminate in him but in another If any thing were strange from our Author this would be that he that is God is not to be worship'd for his own sake or that a supream Being must not have supream Honour But let us now see what sort of Worship it is which the Trinitarians pay to the Son They of whatsoever Denomination are so far from honouring the Son for the sake and to the Glory of God the Father that in their publick Prayers and Liturgies they give him equal Honour with God the Father and both Papist and Protestant Trinitarians in their damning Creed make them equal and declare that none is before nor after another none greater or less than another the Glory equal the Majesty coeternal Which equality is as much to the Glory of God the Father as it would be to the Glory of a King to have his Subjects set up two others with equal Power and Majesty Therefore I wonder with what assurance our Author can deny that the Trinitarians have 3 Objects of supream Worship and he himself in this Treatise is for giving Divine Worship to the Son and Holy Spirit and Divine Worship can be no other than Supream and consequently must terminate in the Person to whom it is given Nay he cannot terminate his Worship more in one than in another since all three are as he says one and the same God with respect to the Creatures All that our Author can say is that it is to the Honour of God the Father because they depend on him but the more dependent he supposes them the more absurd it is to pay the same Honour to a dependent as he does to the independent Being But their dependence since he makes them necessary Beings is Independence And because our Author is much taken with Similies I shall oblige him with one that is more parallel than that of the Sun and Rays Suppose for there has been such a thing in Nature one Man born with and growing out of the side of another who was a distinct Man though necessarily united to him which was manifest by their discoursing one with another Now in this instance we have one intelligent Substance emaning from another yet this did not make him owe his Being or continuance in Being to the other since they had the same cause of Being and continuance in Being on which cause both were equally dependent and not one upon the other nor did the Honour and Respect Men paid the side-man terminate in the other for in honouring the one they no way honour the other The Parallel is very easy and natural for as the two Men depended on the same Cause and therefore the emaned Man was no way obliged to the other so God's Nature having no Cause his supposed Emanations must be as much without a Cause for what is necessary to the Nature is as much without a Cause as the Nature it self therefore they could no more be obliged to God for their Divine Natures or their being Gods than God is beholden to himself for his own Nature since there was the same necessity of his emaning them as of existing himself and consequently they are as independent
appears he holds the Three Persons to be One God as having an Essence of the same kind but to be Three numerical Gods And to make his Polytheism look as heathenishly as possible he saith p. 19. that the individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Persons And then Self-existence Being the first Original and Independence signify much His Lordship makes the same Answer to my 4th Prop. as he did to my 2d i. e. he has answered it already What can be more extravagant than this Fancy on which the Weight of more Hypotheses than one depends viz. that Angels exist by voluntary Creation but the Son and H. Ghost by necessary Emanation It 's common with the Trinitarians to use these Terms Generation Emanation Procession it 's common also with the most eminent of them to acknowledg that it 's a difficult Thing to understand a dangerous Curiosity to enquire a bold Presumption to determine wherein these Terms differ and the Reason is tho' they are asham'd to own it because they know not what they would have their Terms signify In common speaking we know what is meant by To generate or beget To emanate or flow from To proceed To go or come forth but those Terms cannot be applied to the Father Son and H. Ghost in that natural obvious Sense why then should they be applied to them at all when no Man can distinctly say what they are to signify 'T is granted we have not an adequate Conception of God there may be something in his Nature whereof we have no just Idea but that which we cannot understand how can we talk of How can we form Propositions of Things out of the reach of our Knowledg But by this one particular Term EMANATION his Lordship will venture to say This is what is meant A more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation and to his Term Emanation he adds this Epithet Necessary so then the more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation is necessary Existence and so it is but then the Son does not necessarily exist That Being which could not but be ever was and that Being which ever was could be from no other But because his Lordship is wont sarcastically to deride my Arguing who am indeed an obscure and unlearned little Fellow tho' for ought he knows I may equal the very great Abilities of that DYING MARTYR yet a Trinitarian to my Knowledg who starves to the Reproach of this Nation to whom the envious Jovian allow'd the Praise of Mediocrity I shall therefore seek a little shelter from Authority that his Lordship may not renounce his Senses if any Man of Sense be of his Mind The Author I am going to quote is Dr. Cudworth a good Man and very near of his Lordship's Make too who in his Intellectual System contradicts his own and his Lordship's Hypothesis as plainly and liberally as heart can wish p. 210. Self-existence and necessary Existence are essential to a perfect Being and to none else But his Lordship teaches that the latter and not the former is essential to a perfect Being and that the Son is absolutely perfect tho' not in his strictest Sense without Self-existence and that the Self-existence which belongs to the Father does not belong to his Essence tho' he who can separate Self-existence from the Father's Essence may with as much Reason deny the Existence of his Essence for the Father is as certainly self-existent as he is existent Cudworth again p. 726. Nothing could exist of it self from Eternity naturally and necessarily but that which contains necessary and eternal Self-existence in its Nature I am apt to believe this Author put in that Phrase of it self to save an Emanation or two but it will not do it for he constantly makes Self-existence and necessary Existence inseparable Perfections And p. 748. he speaks full and home against his own and the Bp. of Gloucester's Tritheism in these words Tho' it be certain that something did exist of it self necessarily from all Eternity yet it is certain likewise that there can be but one such thing Necessity of Existence being essential to no more Now if Necessity of Existence be essential but to One I pray Sir what will become of his Lordship's necessary Emanations Cudw p. 764. Because something did certainly exist of it self from Eternity unmade therefore also is there actually a necessary existent Being The Doctor proves the necessary Existence of a Being from its Existing of it self from Eternity i. e. from its necessary Existence as I had done before Let the Reader judg if it be not a good Argument P. 13. his Lordship says A Creature communicating its Nature does not forgo its own individual Nature but neither does he communicate his own individual Nature nor any part thereof Here I beg his Pardon for the Creature does forgo a part a seminal part thereof the bodily Substance of the Foetus is by the wonderful Providence of God made from the bodily Substance of the Parents and as far as the bodily Substance of Men may be call'd their Nature they waste their Nature to produce their like How Souls are produced he says not neither I. But hitherto he has not offer'd any thing to make me retract my Assertion That we have no other Notion of the word Communicate but to impart or give and what one Person doth impart or give of any essential and singular thing THAT himself hath not but he hath it to whom it is given Who questions the Power of God to generate his Like He made Man in his own Likeness endued him with rational Faculties with noble Excellencies of Mind but the Unitarians do not see how God can communicate all his infinite Perfections for that is to communicate himself to beget himself to multiply himself which deserves a harder Name than I can give it Prop. 10. There seems to be no Contradiction nor the least Absurdity in asserting that God is able to communicate every one of his Perfections except those of Self-existence and being the first Original of all things Against this I did affirm and see no Cause I have to retract that for the same Reason as Self-existence and being the first Original of all things are incommunicable for the very same Infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness were incommunicable also and to make good this Affirmation 't was proper for me to declare why the former were incommunicable that the Reader might judg wherein the latter were not so likewise for the Reason alledg'd All that his Lordship has to offer is that I attempt to prove a self-evident Principle but that 's not so great a Fault I hope as to attempt to prove an evident Contradiction such as That two Persons have all Perfections necessary to essentiate a perfect God tho' they have not absolutely all Perfections That God the Father has more Perfections than are necessary to essentiate a perfect God That the