not do it should be chastised more severely The third reason is contained in these two words nec ratio id dictat which signifie that reason doth no more oblige us to conform our will in all things to the will of God then the Divine command As if the light of reason did not testifie sufficiently that we ought asways to follow the Soveraign Reason and wisdom which is in God and which is not distinguished from his will And as the light of nature shews sufficiently that we are to follow at all times this Soveraign Reason as the rule of all our actions and all our thoughts it shews also clearly that we are not to follow our own wills unless we will pretend to be more reasonable and more wise then wisdom it self who hath established it for a fundamental rule of all our lives p Post concupiscâ—ntias tuas ne cas à voluntate tua avertere Ecclesiasticl 18. ver 30. that we should not follow our desire and that we ought to turn away from our own wills The fourth reason is q Quia Deus omnia quae vult ex charitate vult nos antem non tenemur omnia ex charitate velle Filliutius Ibid. because all that God wills he wills of charity but we are not obliged to will all of charity It seems that he would say that God wills and doth all things in the World for charity that is for love of us and our good but that we are not obliged reciprocally to do all for charity that is for the love of God and his honor whence it will follow that we may at least do one part of our actions for the world and for our selves for other mens and for our own satisfaction But after he had maintained that there is no obligation upon us to conform our wills to God in all things he adds that he would counsel us notwithstanding to do it as far as we can alledging for reason r Quia bona pars felicitatis nostrae consistit in concordia nostrae voluntatis cum Divina Ibid. because a good part of our happiness consists in the conformity of our will to that of God's Presupposing that another part of our happiness consiâ—…s in doing what we will our selves or in doing what God hath commanded us in such manner as we please Celot expounding this same thing in other terms and speaking of them that live in the world and of the priviledge which he pretends God hath given them above the Monastiques he makes it to be said by a great Saint expressely against his intention f Antistes une verbo eoque hierarchico dividuas distinctasque vitas imaginationes illi permissas admonet Celot pag. 573. that God hath permitted them to live a life divided and parted in giving one part of their life to God and the other to the world or affairs and pleasure of it If it be permitted to lead in this world two sorts of lives different and divided dividuas distinctasque vitas it must needs be that one of these lives be for God and the other not for him else they could not be two lives nor would they be parted and divided if both these ways belonged unto God and had relation to him as to their end It must needs be therefore that one of these two ways which are not for God should be for the world For there is but God and the World the love of God and of the World that can divide our heart and our life So that according to this Doctrine we may divide our hearts and lives betwixt God and the World and do one part of our actions for the love of God and another part for the love of the World and of our selves These two disorders are in effect but one and are both contained in this principle of Filliutius of which we have spoken That we are excused from conforming our whole will to that of God in willing all that he wills and commands and in willing it in such manner as he wills it There is none who may not see how this principle overthrows the dependance which man ought to have upon God at least in that which concerns the inward part For provided that he do that outwardly which God hath commanded he is little or nothing concerned in what manner and upon what motive he do it they leave this to his liberty and pretend that God hath given no commandment therein and even reason it self demands it not of him If they would absolutely part betwixt God and Man they should at least make a more just and more reasonable partition attributing to God that which is the better and the more noble to wit the heart and the intention instead of giving it to man and leaving unto God nothing properly but the outside as if he were not the God of the spirit but onely of the body ARTICLE II. That according to the Divinity of the Jesuits we sin not if we have not an intention to sin IT is one general maxime in the Divinity of the Jesuits that to sin it is not sufficient to do the evil that is forbidden or not to do that which is commanded by the Law of God Nature or the Church But it behoves also to have a knowledge of the evil that we do and an intention to do it By this rule they excuse the greatest sins under a pretence that they have a good intention in committing them which commonly is but imaginary or that we have no evil intention though commonly we have so without knowing it Bauny makes use of this pretence of an imaginary good intention to justifie the hatred of our Neighbour and the good aversion we have from him so far as to wish him evil and even death it self Bauny in his Summe chap. 6. conc 4. pag. 73. We may saith he wish evil to our Neighbour without sin when we are induced thereto by some good motive Which he endeavours to confirm by reason and by the authority of the â—asuists So Bonacina upon the first commandment d. 3 q. 4. n. 7. exempts from all fault the Mother that desires the death of her Daughters because for want of beauty or portion she cannot match them according to her desire or perhaps because by occasion of them she is ill treated by her Husband or injured For she doth not properly detest her Daughters through dislike of them but from an abhorrence to her own evils The good intention which induces this Mother to desire the death of her Daughters is no other thing then ambition and a desire to marry them more advantagiously then she is able or her impatience which permits her not to bear the evil usage and injuries of her Husband which seem unto her more unsupportable then the death of her own children Neverthelesse a good intention of this sort is sufficient with Bauny to excuse from all fault this Mother who desires the death of her
should attend him this night or that you come meet him at his lodging or at least to shew him the house of this woman It seems to me after this there is nothing more to say nor to desire for the clearing up of all points and all the difficulties of a profession so honest and for the entire satisfaction of them who engage therein but only to advertise them that they ought to set a good rate on their mysterie and trade and to testifie how dear and acceptable the counsels and instructions which the Jesuits give them in the whole practice of their profession are unto them that they cause them whom they serve to pay well for it For if they think to do it freely Hurtado and others will not excuse them from sin p Porro hasce omnes actiones Hurtadus 2.2 d. 10. dist 9. solius utilitatis ratione excusat Ibid. Hurtado saith he will not excuse these but by reason of their gain alone This is the conclusion of Escobar after the words which I have now related that is to say that to avoid or rather to cover a crime another must be committed and that a man may nor be accounted impudent according to the rules of the Jesuites Divinity whereby they shamefully serve lecherie a man may help himself by avarice and looking to the lucre he gets in the service he performs to Lust III. POINT Of dishonest thoughts and desires Of Fornication Adultery and other such like sins and of the pleasure that may be taken therein THe Jesuites are not yet come so far as to deny that Fornication and Adultery are sins The Commandment of God and the Law of Nature are very expresse in this point All that they could do herein is to separate by their rules and by their metaphysical abstractions the pleasure which is found in these crimes from the Criminal actions that by this means they may give the spirit that satisfaction which they beleeve they cannot allow unto the Body But yet being they could not authorize the action considered absolutely in it self they have permitted it under a condition and hold that one may desire it and please themselves therein in this manner Amongst the Aphorisms of Emanuel Sa we find these very terms a Non est mortale cogitare sic apud se si peccatum non esset furtum aut adulterium illud facerem Sa ver peccatum n. 2. p. 560. It is no mortal sin to think and say in ones self If Theft or Adultery were no sin I would commit it He that is thus disposed hath his will not farre removed from Adultery though the Law alone and the fear of punishment seems to keep him back from committing it For if it had been the deformity of the action and the hate of sin had held him back and kept him off from Adultery wrong had been done in saying that he had only not sinned mortally for he had not sinned at all and it had been on the contrary a good disposition and an act of vertue to have eschewed an action because it is evil This is without doubt an excellent means and a very easie expedient to do without fear or at least to desire and will to do all things whatsoever they be if they may be made lawfull by representing them as lawfull and if for to remove truly the evil from the most criminal actions it be sufficient to separate it by thought only and by an abstraction meerly imaginary or to adde to them in the same manner that which is necessary to make them lawfull Sanchez serves himself of this expedient more freely than Emanuel Sa for the defence of dishonesty giving by this rule to all persons a liberty to fill their spirits with the thoughts and their wills with the pleasures which they may have in the enjoyment of any women whom they please to represent to themselves as if they were their own wives This is in the First Book of his Morals where after he had established this general maxim b Delectatio voluntatis de objecto conditionâ—li quod seclusa conditione esset peccatum mortale non autem ea posita non est illicita Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 2. n. 34. p. 9. That the pleasure which the will doth take in an object considered under a certain condition which without this condition had been mortal sin and was not such therewith is not unlawfull being taken with that condition put upon it He brings for proof and clearing of that his proposition this example c Ut gaudium voluntatis de concubita si esset uxor Ibid As the pleasure which a man hath to desire to lye with a woman if he had married her He had already said the same thing before and he repeats it again whether for the pleasure he takes therein or because he thinks it to be important as if any one desire to lye with a woman whatsoever she be a married woman kinswoman or a Nun. For he removes the evil which might be therein in regard of the one as well as of the other by this condition which he puts in their imagination d Si esset sua uxor if she were my wife si uxor mea esset Ibid. And the reason he alledges thereupon proves it very well according to his principles for adding only this condition in his thoughts e Est praecisio malitiae à copula quae consistit in ea habita cum non sua apponendo conditionem si esset sua ibid. n. 33. if she were my wife or if I had married her it takes away the sin that had been in lying with her because sin consists only in lying with a person whom we have not married Filliutius saith the same thing and he expounds and extends it yet farther He proposes first this general maxim which may serve for a principle to resolve many difficulties in this and other matters f Dico primo quando conditio tollit matitiam ab actu ut comederem carnem in Quadragesima nisi esset vetitum cognoscerem Titam si esset uxor tunc puest absque peccato desiderari res ex objecto mortaliâ— sub tali conditione si liceret Filliutius mor. tom 2. tract 21. c. 8 n. 269. p. 27. That when the condition whereupon an action is desired doth remove the evil that is in it of it self as when a man saith I would eat flesh in Lent were it not forbidden me I would lye with such a woman if she were my wife in this case one may desire without sin a thing which in it self is a mortal sin under this condition if it were lawfull And although this condition being altogether voluntary and subsisting only in the imagination be also impossible in it self in an ordinary way according to those laws which God hath established in all things it will not fail for all that according to these Doctors to make innocent the most
him believe their innocence And in case they meet not with a prudent Confessor who understands well these shifts and deceits and fall into the hands of one who seems to them too exact and would oblige them to restore what they have privily taken away he holds that they are excused from giving credit unto him and though the Church it self should interpose and employ its Authority and press them by vertue of a Monitory to come unto Confession and Restitution they would not be obliged to obey it Because in this occurrent saith he neither the wife nor the children aforesaid ought or can be forced by the Confessor to reveal the things they so purloyn'd though the Creditors should obtain Mandates and Letters monitory from the Bishop From the same Principle he affirms in the same Chapter pag. 200. That a person who is indebted for very great and notable sums may to the prejudice of his Creditors give away part of his goods so that he to whom the gift is made shall not be obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors if he be not constrained by Law See how he concludes after he had proposed contrary opinions upon this point I say then that he who hath received by Deed of Gift any moveable or immoveable of a man in great debt is not obliged to quit it in favour of the Creditors of such a Debtor before the Law constrain him In the following Page he propounds another Case upon the same Subject and he resolves it after such a manner as authorizes and maintains not only injury but revenge also and murder Some one saith he entreats a Souldier to smite and beat his neighbour or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended him It is demanded whether the Souldier failing the other who prayed him to do all these outrages ought to repair out of his own Estate the damage which proceeded thence Upon which he makes a Relation of some Authors who hold the affirmative and without quoting any one for the contrary opinion he broaches it as from himself and saith for refuting the first My opinion is not as theirs For no man is obliged to restore if he have not violated Justice Doth he so who submits himself to anothers pleasure when he only entreats of him a favour This goodly reasoning may serve to justifie from doing wrong not only all men who employ their friends or other persons to do mischief making use of them as their hands and instruments and so doing the very same action and injury with them whether they commit theft or murder or other violences but it may also justifie all persons who induce and sollicite others unto wickedness and the Devil himself when he tempts men and causes them to sin because temptation and sollicitations unto evil force not the will and are only inducements and prayers as it were which depend absolutely on them who are tempted and sollicited to do evil which many do also refuse and reject Behold whereunto the Maxims of this Casuist are reduced They teach to steal with subtilty and confidence without being obliged unto restitution to speak against ones conscience without lying to forswear without treachery to make a mock of Justice without being deficient in the respect due thereto to contemn the Authority of the Church without disobedience and finally to defraud Creditors ruine Commerce destroy publick Faith and make havock of our neighbours goods without injustice ARTICLE VII THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESSE BEaring false witness is a sin so odious and contrary to the Law of Nature that the most corrupted persons and who boast of all other sins cannot endure to be accused of this nor even of a simple lye God hath always forbidden it whether before a Judge or in private but the Jesuits favour it at any time and the sins which depend on it to wit slander and detraction Dicastillus demands 1 An teneatur quis retractare suum falsum dictum quando ex co inferenda est alteri mors seu mutilatio etiamsi testi se retractantâ— fidem resultet simile damnum Exi stimo si non peccaverit mortaliter dicendo illam falsitatem non teneri cum tanto suo incommedo cognita veritate dictum retractare Legatur Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 59. Less dub 7. Reginald sect 2. num 45. Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 8. dub 7. num 92. Whether he be obliged to retract who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life or member to another when the witness by his retractation will himself incur the same penalty He answers That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony he is not obliged after that he understands the truth to retract what he hath said so exposing himself to so great evils That is to say it is lawful to kill an innocent after we have slandered him rather than put our selves into any danger by retracting since it is not so much the offences or the Hangmen as the witnesses that put him to death who is condemned upon their depositions That we may have a clearer Exposition of this Question this Jesuit sends us his to Treatise of Restitution where he saith 1 Ad nibil tenetur is qui falâ—um testimonium dixit ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia etlaâ—si ex â—llo tesâ—imonio contingaâ— aliquem damnari Less cap. 3. dub 7. Haec sententia in praxi tuta est sed prior magis videtur consona rationi Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 3. dub 2. num 57. That the opinion which holds that a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertence without sinning mortally is obliged to nothing though this false testimony do occasion the condemnation of a man is safe in practice though the opinion seem to him more agreeable unto reason For he regards no more to follow the light of natural reason and equity than the Rules of Faith but only his own sense and the Authority of such as he is in resolving difficulties which refer to Manners and Religion And this is one of the most goodly and commodious Principles of the Jesuits Divinity that we are not obliged to restitution when we have not sinned mortally in wronging our neighbour For if this Principle be sure they who find a great sum of money or take it by ignorance and heedlesness are not obliged to restore it because they have not sinned mortally in taking of it We may see the consequence of this in the Chapter of Restitution But if you joyn hereto the conditions the Jesuits require to make an action a mortal sin false witnesses will thereby receive great comfort and encouragement boldly to act and acquit themselves in this duty The same Author is not less favourable to him who suffers himself to be corrupted by money not to bear false witness but not to testifie the truth He approves Azors observation who saith
we promise obedience to the Superiors of the Church in becoming Christians and we promise to render them this obedience as to them who hold the place of God according to the Word of Jesus Christ 1 Qui vos audit me audit Luc. 10. v. 16. He that obeys you obeys me And according to that of S. Paul 2 Pro Christo ergo legatione fungimur tanquam Deo exhortante per nos 2 Cor. 5. v. 20. Gods speaks unto you by us we are but the Ministers and Embassadors of Jesus Christ If then the Superiors of a Religious Order can command the internal actions because the submission rendred unto them depends on the will and promise of their Inferiors which regards God in them it must also be confessed by the same reason that the Ecclesiastick Superiors Prelates have the same power and may as well command the internal actions of them that are subject unto them for their Salvation Also it is incredible and contrary to the most common apprehensions of Christianity that the Superiors of Religious Orders should have more Power and Authority in their Congregations than the Bishops and Pope himself have in the Church and that the Power of the Pope and the Bishops should not be more internal and spiritual than that of Magistrates and Secular Princes unto whom these Jesuits compare them setting them all equally in the same inability to command internal things without acknowledging any difference betwixt them in this point and giving this advantage above them only unto Superiors of Religious Orders when they say 3 Discrimen est inter obligationem regularium ex voto obedientiae obâ—igationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Ecclesiastica That this is the difference which is betwixt the obligation of Regulars who come under a vow of obedience And if the Laws of the Church differ not in this point from the Civil Laws and the Prelates of the Church no more than Civil Magistrates have any power to command internal actions we must say that the Superiors of Religious Orders unto whom they ascribe this power hold it not from the Church and cannot receive from it that power which they say it hath not it self Also they pretend to hold it from the will of those who make vows of Religion since they say 4 Praeceptum Praelati regularis fundatur in voluntate voventis pacto seu promissione ejuâ— c. That the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow and on the covenant and promise by which he is obliged to obey him c. They would then that the Superiors of a Religious Order receive not from the Church the Authority and Power which they have to command but from the will of those who become Religious and they are herein soveraign and independent on the Church Which is both against the modesty of Religious persons the Order of the Church truth it self and evident reason the Superiors of the Religious Orders being not capable of so much only as to receive any Religious into their Order but by the power which they have received from the Superiors of the Church who consequently have all the power of the Superiors of the Religious Orders and much more but they have it in a manner more eminent as the Spring and Principle of this Power And if the Inferiors can by their will and by their vows give to the Superiors of Religious Orders Authority and Power to command them even internal things Jesus Christ might with stronger reason give it unto the Prelates of the Church over them and over all other the Faithful since Jesus Christ hath more power over us than we have over our selves and we are without comparison more his than our own So that he might give the Church all power over us which private persons can give over themselves to Superiors of Religious Orders by their vows and much more Which shews that the Ecclesiastick is far different from the Civil Jurisdiction with which the Jesuits nevertheless do confound it and the Ecclesiastick are other than the Civil Laws which they notwithstanding would make equal For the Jurisdiction which Jesus Christ hath given the Church over all Christians is more extended holy and divine than that of Secular Magistrates and it respects Souls more than bodies the inward than the outward since it respects eternal Salvation which depends altogether on the actions of the Soul and not of the body which do nothing without those of the Soul Also Jesus Christ hath not given unto Secular Powers the Holy Ghost to govern their people as he hath given it to his Church He hath not given them the power to open and shut Heaven unto them to cut them off and re-unite them to his body to nourish them with his flesh and blood and to fill them with his Spirit and he hath not said unto them that when they speak it is the Holy Ghost who speaks in them that it is the Holy Ghost who commands what they command that whoso despise and dishonour them despise and dishonour the Holy Ghost For thus the Apostles have spoken in the Scripture since S. Peter saith to Ananias and his Wife that they lyed unto the Holy Ghost because they had lyed unto one of the Ministers of the Church And this is the reason that the Councils and the Fathers so often call the Laws of the Church Sacred and Divine knowing that they proceed from the Holy Ghost who is always in the Church as Jesus Christ was with the Apostles and conducted them till his Passion and death Which is so true that Layman himself could not refrain from acknowledging it more than once in very clear terms 1 Quis enim neget quin lege vel praecepto Ecclesiae utpote animarum salutem sptctante praecipi possit ut ministri Ecclesiae vere non simulatorie orent Sacramenta ministrent Fidelibus omnibus ut Sacramenta vere non per fictionem suscipiant Qui autem sine interna intentione orant sine ullo animi dolore peccata confitentur c. si non vere sed ficte orant non verae sed fictae poenitentiae Sacramentum postulant Ergo non satissaciunt Ecclesiae praecepto Ibid. Who doubts saith he that the Church which in all its conduct regards the Salvation of Souls may command its Ministers to pray and administer the Sacraments with sincerity and not only in appearance and to all the Faithful to receive in like manner the Sacraments with a true internal disposition Now they who pray without inward attention and they who confess without a true sorrow for their sins neither pray nor confess truly but in appearance And by consequence they satisfie not the Commandment of the Church Which may be extended to all the Commandments and all the Laws of the Church since they are all of the same nature and all have reference to
and Conclusions which their Authors have taught it will be very hard for them not to be surprized therein and not to be powerfully struck by so many detestable Opinions Who knows but God hearing the prayers which have now for a long time been ordained by the whole Clergy of France and which have been made publickly in some particular Diocesses to beg for them that he would open their eyes may touch them and bring them on highly to disowne the Authors of so many abominations and to make it appear by their condemning them themselves as publick Plagues and declared Enemies of all Truth and Justice that the Crimes with which they have been reproached belong only to some private men and not to the whole Society The approbation of the Doctors hath not been sought after for the Publication of this Book For besides that there was no apparent need to expose the Approbators to the indignation of a Society who hold it for a Maxime that they may with a safe conscience kill them who pretend to hurt them in their reputations it was believed that this precaution would not be necessary on this occasion Indeed the Author producing nothing of his own in this Book and having prescribed unto himself only therein to represent faithfully those Maxims alone of the Jesuits Morals which are notoriously wicked and which are the very same against which all the Parochial Rectors of the most considerable Towns of the Realm have been stirred up so that the Pope the Bishops the Sorbonne and the other Catholick Faculties have condemned by their Censures the Apology of the Casuists and that the Faculty of Divinity in Paris have now very lately censured in the Books of Vernant and Amadeus we believe all these Censures to be as so many Approbations of this Book and that for that cause the Pope the Bishops the Sorbonne and the other Faculties and the Parochial Rectors of the principal Towns of France may pass for its Approbators or at least of the Doctrine contained therein For as to the knowing whether the Author hath been a faithful Relator of the Propositions of the Authors whom he cites every one in particular may well be allowed to judge thereof because indeed better Judges of this sort of differences than the eyes of those who shall have any scruple in this point cannot be had But if the Jesuits and some of the Partisans of their Society complain of this Author because he hath so exactly represented their Extravagances there is cause to hope that all other faithful people will be satisfied therewith because that one may say in truth that he gives by his Book unto every one that which belongs unto him and which the Casuists of the Society have used their utmost force to ravish from them He gives unto God the love the acknowledgment and the worship which belongs unto him to the Church the belief and submission of the Faithful to worldly Powers their honour and the fidelity of their Subjects safety to their Estates to Fathers and Mothers the obedience and respect of their Children to Children the love and tenderness of their Fathers and Mothers Conjugal fidelity to Husbands and Wives to Masters the fidelity of their Servants to Servants kindness of their Masters to the Ecclesiasticks Piety and Religion equity and integrity to Judges true honour unto the Nobility fair dealing unto Merchants Finally he establishes in the World all those Vertues which the Jesuits seem resolved to banish from thence that they might entertain and cause to reign there all the disorders which the malice of men or the Devil himself was capable to invent The Translators Conjecture concerning the Author of this Advertisement and of the Book it self THis Advertisement seems to be Father Arnolds the Preface and Work his Nephew Monsieur Pascals who is also supposed to have written the Porvincial Letters not without his Uncles privity and assistance whose head and hand could not be wanting to this Work also if his The style much differing and Lewis Montalt affirming himself to be no Doctor makes me suspect a third hand to have been made use of in drawing up those Letters however these Doctors as I am credibly informed were the Head-contrivers of them There are also many passages in the Provincials which seeming to promise this Work confirm my Conjecture The Preface of the Author The Design and Order of this Work THE end of Morality not only among Christians but also among the Pagans hath always been to make known that which is good and to separate it from the bad to carry men on to vertue and to good actions and to turn them away from vice and from sin and in pursuit thereof to teach them the means to proceed from the one to the other It cannot be shewed more easily and more evidently how dangerous and prejudicial the Moral Divinity of the Jesuits is than by making it appear that it tends and leads to a quite contrary end and that it walks in ways opposite to Reason and to the Law of Nature as well as those of Christian Piety that it confounds good and evil or to use the words of Scripture it calls evil good and good evil that the more part of the resolutions which it gives upon the points and particular cases which respect conscience tend to the stopping up in men the lights and motions of conscience it self and favours lust which corrupts it that the Principles from which they draw their Resolutions and the Reasons of which they make use for to support them are so many means and expedients proper for to authorize vice to sustain sin to excuse the most criminal actions and to entertain loosness and disorder in all sorts of Professions This is that which I have a design to make appear in this Book And to the end that I may before-hand give a general Idea of all that which I handle therein and represent most clearly the Method and consequence of the means whereof I make use to justifie that which I pretend I will expose here in a few words the whole order and disposition of my Discourse I reduce all these matters to certain principal Points which I handle after such manner and in such order as seems to me most clear and most proper to make appear the consequence of the Moral Doctrine of the Jesuits the connexion of their Principles with their Conclusions and the conformity of their practice with their Opinions For the consort and the resemblance which is between their Doctrine and their Conduct is so perfect that it is visible it proceeds from the same Spirit tends to the same end which is to please men to satisfie them by flattering their passions and their interests and to train them up in vice and disorder To see clearly the truth of this point which is the whole subject of this Book it must first be considered that there seems not possible to be found a way more proper to
lives of men and Justice it self for money and yet notwithstanding Filliutius with many others justifies this gain which is gathered by this infamous and criminal traffique saying expressely that y Turpiter acceptaab aliquo pro faciendo actu turpi qui vel sit contra justitiam ut pro faciendo homicidio vel non sit ut pro consentiendo in fornicationem si actus factus sit retineri possint Filliutius moral 22. tom 2. tract 32. c. 4. n. 103. p. 364. the recompence which one receives for doing any dishonest action whether it be against justice as to cause a man to be killed or against honesty onely as for committing fornication may conscionably be retained if the action be already done Whence he draws this conclusion which he proposeth as a certain and undubitable truth that z Ex his sequitur non esse restituenda accepta ab assassinis à Lenone ab infamante à milite pugnante in bello injusto à teste dame falsum testimonium Ibid. num 104. that which is received for an assassination committed for being a pander to the debauched persons for defaming ones neighbour for bearing arms in an unjust war for being a false witness is not to subject any restitution Lessius saith the same thing and he saith it also generally a Si solum jus naurae spectetur acceptum ob turpem causam seu propter opus quod est peccatum opere impleto non necessario est restituendum sive opus sit contra justitiam sive non Lessius de just jure l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 52. p. 145. If one regard saith he the Law of Nature that which one has received in a dishonest affair or for an action which is a sin is not subject to restitution after that the thing is done whether it offends against Justice or not And a little after he addeth b Verâ—us etiam videtur nec jure positivo necessario id restuuendum And it is more conformable to the truth that positive right also doth not oblige thereunto So far is it off that injustice hinders Covetousness in these affairs according to these Doctors that on the contrary they hold that it favoureth it For if these persons have not executed these crimes unto which they were obliged in taking the money they will be engag'd according to them to render it back because they gave it them only on condition that they should accomplish that which they had promised so that the true means to be able to retein conscionably that which they have taken without being bound to make restitution is to execute readily this crime and this unjustice which serves to cover injustice and its traffique Layman follows this opinion c Promisisti ficario daturum decem aureos si hominem occiderit nulla nascetur obligatio nisi postquam facinus non sine labore ac periculo suo in tui gratiam patrarit Tunc enim spectato jure naturali tener is solvere vel si solvisti repetere non potes Layman l. 3. tract 4. c. 6. n. 8. p. 377. If you have promised saith he ten crowns to a murderer to kill a man you are not bound to pay it untill such time as to oblige you to it he hath done this crime not without pain and danger but after he has done the fact common right obliges you to pay him and if you have already made payment you cannot constrain him to restore that which he hath received So that if after you had done a murder by a man unto whom you had promised ten crowns for his pains you had Confessed your self unto Layman before you had performed your promise he would have sent you away without Absolution if you did not give him assurance that you would speedily discharge your promise made unto him who killed this man to do him a pleasure and he tells you for his reason that d Spectato jure naturali teneris the law of nature which is undispensable obliges you to do it And to content your mind to engage you yet further to consider his pains and to pay for this villany of the murtherer he adds this second reason e Propterea quod molestia periculum ab illo in tui gratiam susceptum pretio aestimabile sit Ibid. That the pains which he had taken and the danger that he had exposed himself to for your sake deserves very well to be recompensed with money And a little after pursuing the same matter he proposes this Question f Si cum Judice pactus fueru ut non sine periculo suo in tui gratiam suscepto iniquam senâ—… tiam ferat ea elata probabilis est opinio Navarrae obligationem saltem naturalem exinde oriri ut quod ob eam causam à Judice acceptum fuit restitutioni obnoxium non sit in conseuntiae soro Ibid. n. 8. If you have drawn a promise from a Judge that he will pass sentence for you unjustly with any kind of danger te himself The opinion of Navarre is probable that this judge having performed his promise you are obliged at least by common right to satisfie him and he is not at all bound in conscience to restore that which he had received from you Lessius is also of the same opinion and assures us that a Judge who hath taken money for an unjust judgement is not obliged to make restitution no more than a murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder q Notandum est Covarruviam Casetanum excipere id quod acceptum est à Judice ut injustam sententiam serat Hoc enim putant jure naturae esse restituendum Quia injusta sententia perversio judicii non est res vendibil is Sed baec ratio non est firma Nulla enim est causa cur mag is debeat jure naturae restitui quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua sententia quà m pro iniqua occisione Lessius de just jur l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 54. p. 145. It must be observed saith he that Covarruvias and Cajetan make here an exception and believe that a Judge is obliged by the Law of nature to restore that which he hath taken for an unjust sentence because that the overthrow of Justice and an unjust Judgement is a thing that cannot be sold But this reason is very feeble For there is no more cause to say that one is obliged by the Law of nature to restore that which he hath received for an unjust sentence than for an unjust murder Therefore we must conclude by the advise of these Divines who are the most famous amongst the Jesuits that by the Laws of Justice this Judge deserves a reward for an action of unjustice for which he deserves not onely to lose his soul but to lose his Office if Justice be done on him and by consequence that he deserves punishment and reward both
effusior fuerit beneficentia Christi in Joannem quà m in utrumque avum Joannes erat quidem consobrinus Deiparae at multo minor est necessitudo haec à transversa linea derivata quà m quae recto tramite descendit patrum avorum Joannes fuit praecursor Domini haec tamen dignitas urget minus clementiam Christi quà m illa quae sumitur ex patrio munere per Mariam Poza Elucidarâ—i l. 2. tr 8. c. 3. sect 2. p. 547. For to make himself more complaisant towards Mary who was to be conceived without original sin he delivered her Father and Mother from the original corruption more readily then Saint John And I see not saith he why the liberality of Jesus Christ should be greater towards Saint John then towards his Grand-father and Grand-mother Saint John being Consin unto the Virgin but this proximity being onely in the collateral line it is lesse then that of Fathers and Mothers and other Ancestors who are in the right line Saint John was the fore-runner of our Lord but this dignity is not so proper to presse the bounty of Jesus Christ as that which arises from the quality of Father and Mother in respect of Mary This is a great rashness and a reasoning altogether carnal and grosse to preferre the natural quality of Father and Mother of the Virgin to the Holy and eminent quality of the fore-runner of Jesus Christ by which Saint John surpassed all the greatest Saints and all the Prophets But this is yet a greater temerity and a thought yet more carnal to attribute the grace of God to natural conditions of flesh and blood against the most clear and certain principles of Faith Finally this is a third excesse to maintain Saint Joachim and Saint Anne had so much or more grace and Holyness then Saint John Baptist since it is formally to contradict Jesus Christ who hath declared that amongst all the Saints who were born before John there was none greater then he And the foundation of this imagination is no better then it is it self For he pretends that Jesus Christ entring into the same obligations with his Mother and making them as his own ought to give more grace to those to whom the Virgin was more obliged and more straitly bound according to the order of nature and of birth See here his words e Ut quibus magis secundùm naturam debitum causae tenebatur beata Virgo illis abundantiorem gratiam Christus impertiret L. 3. tr 10 c. 5. p. 617. It was reasonable that Jesus Christ should give grace in more abundance to those to whom his Mother was more obliged by the Laws of nature and by the particular engagements of her condition And speaking of the vocation of the Apostles he saith that Jesus Christ f Hoc carni sangumi dedit ut media fere parte Apostolorum ex cognatis secundum carnem pararetur to satisfie the Laws of Flesh and Blood did choose almost half his Apostles of the number of his kindred according to the flesh He cannot say more openly that Jesus Christ was acted by carnal affection and by humane considerations in the distribution of his Graces and in the vocation of his Apostles to their office which are two actions of his power the most principal and Divine The Pelagians proceeded in their heresie no further than this point to say that God distributed his Grace according to the rules of flesh and blood The Pharisees who looked narrowly into all the actions of Jesus Christ to reprove them never found in all his life the least occasion to reproach him that he acted humanely and with acceptation of persons preferring his kindred before others On the contrary they found always so much indifferency in all his conduct that they publiquely gave this testimony of him Å¿ Non est tibi cura de aliquo non respicis personam hominis Mat. 22. v. 16. You respect no mans person and you have no regard unto men The same Author in the same place pursuing his discourse discovers more openly yet the thought which he hath of our Saviour in this matter and makes it more unexcusable see how he speaks g Ne autem in consanguincos nimius videretur amor ambitioni fraena laxarentur nullum ex illis Apostolorum Principem elegit sed â—x aliena familia vicinae autem patriae Simonem Petrum Lib. 2. tr 10. c. 4. p. 614. But for fear that Jesus Christ should let loose the reins unto ambition and that the love which he had to his kindred might not appear too excessive he chose none of them to make him Prince and Chief of the Apostles but he chose Saint Peter who was of another Family and of another Neighbouring Town So that according to the thoughts of this Author vanity and the consideration of men did a little hold back the ambition of Jesus Christ so that if he had not been afraid to discover and make too much to appear that passion which he had to make great his kindred as he had already advanced many to the Apostleship he had also it may be chosen some one of them to make him head of the Apostles But if Jesus Christ could prefer his kindred before other men to make them Apostles because of their kindred as this Jesuit pretends why could not he by the same reason give them the primacy over the Apostles If it had been too great ambition to do the second as he supposes it had been also ambition according to him though lesse to do the former The extremest point of impiety of the Jews in the time of the Law and of Tyrants since the coming of Christ hath been to set Idols in the Temples and on the Altars consecrated unto God But this is a far greater excess to set lust that is to say the spring of all sins of all disorders of all the evils in the world in God himself and Jesus Christ The Holy Fathers have observed that the Devil never found any artifice or means more efficacious to authorize vice and give it a free course among Pagans then to let them see the examples of it in the actions of the false gods it being easie to carry them on to imitate those whom they adored The Jesuits do the same thing In a manner more criminal attributing to the Saints and even unto Jesus Christ himself humane motions and earthly desires and passions of flesh and blood and perswading men also that they are not evil and that they may follow them in their conduct or rather that they are obliged to do them since the Gospel teaches us to follow Jesus Christ in all things in the conduct of our lives and the regulation of our manners We must avow that it is not possible more to promote lust nor more to debase the Son of God CHAP. II. Of Sins in habit or habitual Sins That there is scarcely any habitual Sins
in a Collection which he hath made of the principal decisions which are drawn from the principles of the Doctrine of Probability where after he had reported a great quantity according to the order of the Alphabet he declares that there are an infinite of others which he hath not nor can report because that would be very difficult and tedious and the maxims and use of the Rules of Probability extending themselves in a manner unto all sorts of matters there would need an entire Volume wherein to collect and report them simply Operosum id ita est prolixum quippe per omnes fere materias est percurrendum ut integrum merito volnmen exposcat yet I cannot abstain from reporting here also three taken out of this Author which shew an extraordinary and palpable corruption and a very peculiar deprivation of reason in those who are capable to approve or follow them 1. n Probabile est v. c. hoc vectigal injuste esse impositum probabile item esse impositum juste possumne ego bodie quia sum exocto Regius vectigalium exigere ejusmodi vectigal sequendo opinionem asserentem illud juste esse impositum atque adeo licere mihi sine injustiâ—ia illud exigere cras imo etiam hâ—die quia sum Mercator illud occulte defraudare sequendo opinionem asserentem illud à justitia deficere It is probable saith he for example that an Excise is justly established it is probable on the other side that it is unjust may I being at present established by the King to raise this Impost exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is just and therefore lawfull for me to levy without doing any injustice and to morrow or the same day being I am a Merchant may I secretly defraud this very Impost following the opinion which condemns it of injustice 2. o Secundo probabile rursus est ablationem famae pecunia compensari probabile non compensari Possumne ego bodie infamatus velle ab infamante compensationem in pecunia cras imo bodie ego ipse alium insamans nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compensare pecunia It is probable that the loss of reputation may and may not be compensated with money May I to day being defamed desire satisfaction in money and to morrow or this very day having defamed another not be willing to allow him the same compensation 3. In the third place p Tertio probabile item reo licere aequivocare in judicio probabile non licere Possumne ego reus bodie aequivocare cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non aequivocet Haec innumerabilia ejusdem generis hic in controversiam narrantur In casibus relatis num 1. 2. 3. atque in similibus licitam esse ejusmodi mutationem concedimus Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect 5. num 1. 2. 3. 21. It is probable that a Defendant may use equivocations in Justice May I being this day Defendant use equivocations and to morrow being chosen Judge constrain the Defendants not to make use of them In the process he answers In this case and other such like I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion He believes therefore that these persons may do that justly unto others which they would not have done unto themselves and which they would free themselves from as much as possible and he sees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature and the Gospel which ordains That we should do unto others that which we would they should do unto us and not to do unto others that which we would not they should do unto us and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God which are founded on this principle of Nature and all the Law and Prophets which according to Jesus Christ's saying depend upon this rule and all the Holy Scripture which are nothing else but an extension and explication of this same principle SECT IV. That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability ruines entirely the Authority of the Church of Pastors and Superiors of all sorts TO make this truth appear we must observe that there are four sorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors 1. By corrupting or destroying the principle of it 2. By bounding it and encroaching upon it 3. By rejecting or weakning its commands 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying The Jesuits by the Doctrine of Probability corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power They retrench and destroy it in not consenting that it may prescribe the inward actions of vertue they bound it and encroach upon it by the irregularity of their Priviledges which they abuse to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Bishops and invading their Jurisdiction they utterly abolish some of their Laws and they weaken others of them and there are hardly any unto which they have not given some assault by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them These points are entirely verified in the whole process of this Book and some of them in entire Chapters But that which is remarkable and very proper to justifie what I pretend here is this that the means and the armes which they and those who follow their opinion make use of to fight against the Authority of the Church in all these manners are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability The Authority of the Church is of it self assured and uncontroulable being supported by the firm rock of Gods Word For this cause there cannot be found a means more ready or more infallible to ruine or weaken it than to undermine its foundation and to make it depend on humane reason and authority submitting its Jurisdiction and its power to the disputes and contests of the Schools and rendring in that manner every thing probable that respects its power that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Masters thereof It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book to prove this truth it is sufficient only to report some passages of their Authors and their Disciples in which they avow themselves that the Doctrine of Probability doth absolutely ruine the Authority of the Church and of all sorts of Superiors and they make it so clear in the examples that they produce that after they are read it seems not that any person can doubt thereof Hereof see one manifest proof in the case which Caramouel propounds in these terms q Petrus secutus opinionem benignam probabilem non satissacit mandato sui Abbatis in casu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire probabilius tenebatur Praelatus supscribens sententiae severiori judicat illum debuisse obedire proinde peccasse Petitur an possit contra illum procedere punire tanquam inobedientem Caram in com in reg S. Bened. l. 1. n.
it is not only lawfull to accept but also to offer them And one of the Casuists of the Society who taught publickly at Caen of late years after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons which we shall represent in their place concludes in this manner e Qui haec responsa non probaâ—t ignari sunt communis consuctudinis vitae Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari These who approve not these answers know not the manner of living and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way There is no custom more wicked nor more general amongst people of base condition than to swear blaspheme and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel men and every thing that gives them trouble Bauny considering this cursed custom saith according to his ordinary lenity Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73. For my part I believe that it may be said with truth that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported it is no fault neither mortal nor venial to curse Dogs Hawks and other such things as are without reason The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick and which yet is very common at this day is falshood and deceit whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes or in selling them dearer than they are worth or selling them by false weights and false measures But Layman following this custom saith f Mercatores statim injustitiae damnari non possunt si merci substantiam alienam puta tricico secale vino aquam picem cerae admisceant modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum Layman l. 3. tr 4. c. 17. n. 15. That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds as Rye amongst Wheat Water with Wine and Pitch amongst Wax provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs and proper enough for common usage And he confirms his opinion by that of Lessius and Lopez saying g Addit Lessius n. 83. cum Lopez loco citato si additio materiae secundum se deterioris eò artificio industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona idonea ad usum quam sine tali admixtione posse tunc consueto pretio divendi luerum majus repoâ—tari quippe quod industriae esse censetur sine damno emptorum percipitur Ibid. that Lessius and Lopez assure us that if the mixture of the matter which of it self is of less value be done with such artifice and industry that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use than it would be without this mixture it may be sold at the ordinary price and take more than it is worth because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant and is no wrong to those that buy it The ordinary vice of women and principally of those of Quality is luxury and vanity They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein and the scandals which fall out thereupon than to say that it is the custom and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition Bauny approves this reason and makes use of it in his Summe ch 46. p. 717 718. where he proposes this question If maids and women who exceed modesty and duty and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates may be thought capable of absolution when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed and will so continue are uncapable of absolution but he declares against their judgement and concludes in these terms Nevertheless we must say 1. that the woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband ought not to be blamed though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity and against modesty knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin He saith moreover that neither is she more to be blamed if she trim her self in this sort with scandal when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Countrey and not to be singular unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband and a disorderly and shamefull custom should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity without being blameable and that custom hath power to change the nature of things to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty that vanity shall be no longer vanity that luxury shall not be longer luxury and that scandal shall be no longer scandal He continues speaking in this manner 2. I say though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof The reason is Because to prevent the offence of another this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey and nature it self permits That is to say that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her so it makes scandal also lawfull for her and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point by the corruption of the World are just and true Laws and proper to regulate all things in a Country I might speak here of Usury and Symony which are two vices so common at this day that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others because that custom hath made them publick But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters that I may avoid repetitions CHAP. III. Of the Occasions of Sin That the Jesuits retain men in them and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin ONE of the most important and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin is that he fly the occasions and if we observe it we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation attain not to a true and solid conversion or fall back after a while is because they have not received this advice or have not been faithfull in the observation of it This is such that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity
assumpta admittere sicut non solum potest assumere naturam omni sensu externo privatam sed etiam talem sensuum privationem in assumpta jam natura admittere Ibid. n. 130. That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool or after he hath taken our nature to suffer it to fall into folly as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward senses but also suffer it to fall into this privation after he hath assumed it He is not content only to say that the eternal Word might suffer under folly but he saith also that he might have assumed it voluntarily as he assumed humane nature That is that this proposition the impiety and blasphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought might have been true God is a fool and that with a voluntary folly which is accounted the worst of all He ought to have considered that folly is a disorder of the body and the Soul and of the highest part of the Soul which is Reason and that all disorder is inconsistent with the Wisdom of God as well as sin is inconsistent with it because it is a voluntary disorder and a true folly according to Scripture and if the reason of Jesus Christ had been disorderly it is manifest that his Will might have been so too and that as his Will could not be so by sin which is the folly of the Will neither could his reason be so by folly which is as we may say the sin of the Understanding as some Philosophers esteem Errour is yet a greater evil than folly because folly takes away reason but errour is the cause it is ill used Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing then to abuse it as it were better not to have wit then to abuse it in deceiving not to have strength then to abuse it in committing violences and murthers and yet Amicus forbears not to maintain with others that Jesus Christ was capable of erring and that he might erre in deed For the explication of this opinion he distinguisheth two sorts of errours whereof one respects the things we are obliged to know and which he calls Error pravae dispositionis because it includes a wicked disposition from whence it proceeds as from its cause the other respects such things as we are not obliged to know which consists in a simple privation of knowledge error simplicis negationis He saith 2 De secunda non est dubium quin potuerit esse in Christo Nam sicut potuit Verbum assumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis scientiae ita rationalem omni scientia spoliatam tam actuali quam habituali Amicus tom 6. disp 24. sect 4 n. 114. p. 359. of this second sort of error that there is no doubt but it might be in Jesus Christ For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beast incapable of all sort of rational wisdom and knowledge so it might in like manner have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all wisdom and knowledge as well actual as habitual He is not content only to maintain a proposition so strange and impious but he would also have it pass as undubitable as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it non est dubium But behold his blindness we need only consider what he saith of the other species of errour which consists in being ignorant of that which is our duty or to have an apprehension of it contrary unto truth He dares not absolutely affirm that this sort of errour might have been in Jesus Christ he contents himself to relate the opinion of Vasquez and some others 3 Tantum de prima est controversia Prima sententia affirmans potuisse de potentia absoluta talem errorem esse in Christo est Vasquez disput 60. c. Ibid. Who hold saith he that this sort of errour might have been absolutely in Jesus Christ and this opinion is that of Vasquez Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this sort of errour after he had said that we may not doubt of the other For if it be certain as he pretends that the eternal Word might have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all kind of knowledge and wisdom actual and habitual it follows manifestly that he might have taken it destitute of all that knowledge of things which every reasonable nature is obliged to know as of the knowledge of God and of the first principles of Reason since this sort of errour is necessarily contained in the other Which follows also clearly from the other opinion of the same Jesuit that Jesus Christ might have taken on him the nature of a fool For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties but of all truths also according to the very definition of the Philosophers who say that it is a general blindness of mind in all things mentis ad omnia caecitas So that if Jesus Christ might have been a fool in humane nature he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reasonable Nature and of all the principles of Reason And Amicus shews himself as weak a Logician as Christian in doubting of this last Article after he had said that we might not doubt of that general Maxime whereunto it is inseparably and visibly annexed One of the Reasons of the Jesuits who teach that Jesus Christ was capable of that errour which hath respect unto his duty which they call an Errour of a depraved disposition error pravae dispositionis and which is not only a simple ignorance and simple privation of light but an opposition to the truth and an apprehension contrary to its Rules and Laws is That Jesus Christ might according to them have taken the nature of an Ass as they express it in these very words 1 Foruit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae ergo errorem naturae humanae Amicus ib. n. 116. The Word might have taken upon him the sottish and blackish disposition of the nature of an Ass and by consequent he might have taken the errour of humane nature Which can serve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible whether we regard the impiety of these strange words Potuit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae or we regard the consequence which is ridiculous Ergo errorem naturae humanae For the blockish disposition of an Ass is not an ignorance of his duty because it hinders not an Ass to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature and much less is it an apprehension opposed unto truth which the nature of an Ass is uncapable to know And so though it were true that Jesus Christ might have been united to the nature of an Ass it would not have followed that he might have been united to a reasonable nature ingaged in errour and in errour contrary
Christ There is no need that I insist on these so abominable imaginations and expressions since that which they affirm of him absolutely is no less To prove that Jesus Christ might have sinned effectually they say that he might have had of himself and in himself an obligation to undergo the punishment of sin 5 Respondent docti aliqui recentiores non repugnare in natura assumpta remanere reatum poenae non solum temporalis sed etiam aeternae Ibid. disp 24. sect 2. n. 56. Some new Doctors saith Amicus answer that the obligation to punishment not only temporal but eternal is not inconsistent with the nature assumed by the Word Obligation unto punishment is a propriety and necessary consequent of sin and the obligation to eternal pain the propriety and necessary consequent of mortal sin For it is impossible that he who sins mortally should not be obliged to eternal punishment and it is also impossible that he should be obliged to eternal punishment who hath not sinned mortally both the one and the other being equally contrary to Justice and by stronger reason to the Justice of God Whence it comes that they who say that an obligation to eternal punishment might befal the humanity of Jesus Christ suppose of necessity that this humanity hath sinned mortally and that it may even be actually engaged in mortal sin whilst united to the Word in Jesus Christ it being impossible that he to whom sin is remitted should be lyable to eternal punishment and that God can punish him eternally to whom he is reconciled and to whom he owes eternal life as he owes it to all the just and much more to the Man-God who is his eternal Son This opinion is maintained by some Casuists as saith Amicus but it seems to him very rude and especially to Suarez taking it generally and in its whole extent For this cause that he might sweeten and moderate it he makes a distinction betwixt pain temporal and eternal saying that Jesus Christ might well be lyable to temporal punishment but not unto eternal 1 Respondet Suarez dis 33. sect ult versus finem concedendo de reatu poenae temporalis negando de reatu poenae aeternae quoniam poena aeterna necessariò tollitur cum ipsa culpa Ibid. n. 57. Because saith he eternal punishment is necessarily remitted with the sin and the guilt Whence it follows that if Jesus Christ were obliged to eternal punishment he should be actually in mortal sin by the assertion of Suarez himself who for this reason durst not say that the Humanity of Jesus Christ could be obliged unto eternal punishment But he is at least constrained even by this same reason to affirm that Jesus Christ might sin venially since they hold that he might be lyable on his own account unto temporal punishment and that the obligation to temporal punishment cannot come but from venial sin as the obligation unto eternal punishment cannot come but from mortal sin Which agrees well with that which Amicus saith that Jesus Christ might absolutely sin 2 Dico 4. potentia physica proxima peccandi si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti non repugnaret ratione unionis sanctitatis Verbo participatae in humanitate Christi Amicus ibid. n. 43. by a physical and next power of sinning which would not be incompatible with the union which the humanity of Jesus Christ had with the Word whereof he was partaker if the repugnance came not from the decree of God And if you would know what he means by a physical power of sinning potentia physica peccandi he expoundeth it himself saying that it is 3 Quae constituitur ex principiis intrinsecis ad operandum simpliciter necessariis Ibid. that which proceeds from the internal principles which are simply necessary unto action that is to say unto sinning So that according to his opinion Jesus Christ had in himself a power of sinning and the internal principles necessary to sin and if these principles had not their effect in him that is to say if Jesus Christ did not actually sin it was not because there was any thing in him that was repugnant thereunto non repugnaret ratione unionis sanctitatis à Verbo participatae in humanitate But this came to pass purely and simply from the will and protection of God and from his Decree which he had made not to permit Jesus Christ to fall into sin si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti In this manner Molina Suarez and some others expound the Impeccability of Jesus Christ as Amicus saith 4 Qui docent impeccabilitatem humanitatis Christi fuisse eandem cum impeccabilitate quam habent confirmati in gratia quae non est physica sed moralis Ibid. n. 70. p. 352. maintaining that the Impeccability of the humanity of Jesus Christ is the same with that of those who are confirmed in grace which is not physical but moral That is to say that Jesus Christ was not properly impeccable but by the grace and mercy of God as the Saints might have been in this world as well as he and are also now in Heaven by the same mercy And by consequence that Jesus Christ was of himself capable to sin even as they and that he had sinned effectually without the extraordinary succours and graces he received from God It is from this same Principle that Amicus saith with Vasquez and many others whom he nameth not that it were no inconvenience to affirm that this proposition is true The Word was capable of sin For making himself this objection 5 Objicies 4. implicat Verbum etiam per communicationem idiomatum denominari physicè peccabile Denominaretur autem per communicationem idiomatum physicè peccabile ab ipsa potentia physica peccandi si ea posset cum humanitate unita Verbo manere Ergo c. Ibid. n. 102. It cannot be said without contradiction that the Word by the very communication of the properties of the two natures which are in Jesus Christ should be naturally capable to sin Now this may be said if a physical and natural power to sin may subsist in the humanity which the Word hath assumed He answers to this objection 6 Respondeo 1. negando majorem Multi enim inter quos Vasquez disp 61. cap. ult non reputant absurdum Verbum per communicationem idiomatum denominari peccabile Ibid. n. 103. by denying the major because there are many and amongst them Vasquez who hold that it is no absurdity to say that the Word by the mutual communication of the two natures is capable of sinning And by consequence we might say according to this Divinity what is horrible and dreadful only to think that the Word had or might have been mischievous and wicked and that the Devil might have had him under his power as his Captive and Slave because the Devil is the Prince and Master of sinners
according to Scripture There have been Hereticks that have maintained that Jesus Christ was not God and others that he was a man of the same nature as we but there was never any that acknowledging that he was God and Man both at once imagined that he was capable of sinning and falling under the power of the Devil as the Jesuits affirm and testifie by attributing to him a next and natural power of sinning of being in errour and even of that which proceeds from a wicked disposition and deordination error pravae dispositionis to retain and keep wicked habits of being subject unto vices of being obliged to temporal punishments and even of eternal for his own sins as we have now seen in their own proper words 1. If Jesus Christ might have sinned he could not have been the Saviour of men nor delivered them from sin because hereunto it was necessary that he should be himself uncapable of sin according to the Doctrine of the Church and of the holy Fathers 2. If sin might have been in Jesus Christ then sin is no more sin because sin being no otherwise sin then as it is against the will of God if Jesus Christ who is the Son of God and God as well as his Father could sin sin would be voluntary unto him not only according to his humanity which did or should commit it but also in regard of his Divinity and divine person who should permit it or take it unto him voluntarily in the Humanity which should be personally united unto him as well as the other qualities and actions of this humanity which are proper to him and appertain unto him in some sort more than unto the humanity it self 3. But if God could will sin or be partaker thereof by assuming it or permitting it voluntarily in a nature which should be united unto him God should be no more God because he should be no longer the supream Truth which is more inconsistent with sin which is nothing else but errour injustice and malice then light is with darkness 4. This is not the way to withdraw men from sin to attribute it unto Jesus Christ But to move them unto horror and detestation of so strange an opinion it is sufficient to consider that it tends to destroy both the Incarnation of Jesus Christ and even his Divinity it self For as in dying voluntarily in his humanity he did put sin to death and destroyed the Empire of the Devil who was the Author of his death because he suffered this death unjustly being innocent and having no sin at all this opinion on the contrary attributing sin unto him makes him dye at once both in his Humanity and Divinity and subjects him to the power of the Devil to favour and revive sin CHAPTER II. Of Repentance REpentance is a remorse and sorrow for offending God and herein is it the proper and natural Remedy of Sin since as it is committed by pleasure so it must be blotted out by sorrow This sorrow is a vertue which appertains to Religion and it is also one part of the Sacrament of Penance so necessary and so considerable that it hath given even its name thereunto We separate not here these two considerations and that we may treat more largely of Penance we will consider it as a Sacrament and because that in this quality besides grief for sin it contains also Confession Absolution and Satisfaction we will treat here of every one of these by way of preocupation of what should have been said in the Chapter of the Sacraments distributing them into so many Articles ARTICLE I. Of Sorrow for Sin That according to the Jesuits we may be justified by the Sacrament of Penance by a natural sorrow and even without any true sorrow for sin THe first step of a Soul that returns unto God is the knowledge and remorse it hath for offending God 1 Surgam ibo ad patrem meum dicam ei Pater peccavi in coelum coram te Luc. 5.18 I will arise and go unto my father and say unto him Father I have sinned against Heaven and before thy face saith this child after he had departed from the obedience and guidance of his father when he began to resolve himself to return unto him The Jesuits consent well unto this Catholick Truth they do truly affirm that we cannot absolutely obtain pardon of sins without acknowledging with sorrow that we have committed them but when they would expound what sorrow this ought to be they speak of it in such manner as destroys it in effect For they are not content to say that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient to blot out all the sins in the world but they do also maintain that this sorrow ought not of necessity to be supernatural and some proceed so far as to say that without any true sorrow for offending God we may be reconciled unto him by being only grieved that we have not the sorrow which we ought to have Filliutius demands 2 Quaeroâ—n requiratur certa intentio ad contritionem Tom. 1. tract 6. cap. 9. n. 231. If there be any particular degree of sorrow necessary unto contrition And he answereth 3 Dico 3. non requiri certum gradum intentionis Ibid. 234. That there is no certain particular degree which is necessary His reason is 4 Tum quia Scripturae Sancti Patres conversioni in Deum promittunt remissionem peccati absque limitatione intentionis ergo neque nos limitare debemus Filliut mor. qq to 1. tr 6. c. 9. n 234. Because that the Scriptures and holy Fathers allow remission of sins to him that is truly converted unto God without limiting the degree Whence it follows that we ought not to limit it God wills and demands oft in Scripture that for obtaining pardon of sins we should be converted unto him with all our hearts Whence the holy Fathers have taken occasion to say that we ought not to limit or bound the grief of a sinner who is converted since it ought to be with all the affection of his heart and that it cannot be too great nor equal the demerit and indignity of sin And this Jesuit on the contrary saith it must not be limited because it cannot be too little and that it is always great enough to blot out sin See the conformity of his spirit with that of the holy Fathers and Scripture It seems that he would correct his errour in the answer which he makes a little after to this question 5 An contritio debeat esse intentior Whether the sorrow of contrition ought in degree to surpass all other sorrow For he answers 6 Respondeo dico 1. debere esse intentiorem saltem quoad appretiationem Ibid. n. 237. Yes as to appretiation at least But he doth only hide his errour under the obscurity of his words as will appear by the explication he gives himself to this word Appretiation For
to refute any one in particular fundamentally but only to represent some few of the more visible and more extraordinary in every matter that by these Judgment may be made of others which are more in number and many times greater than those which I report I will bestow the greater part of this Chapter on Confirmation because I shall not meet with other occasions to speak thereof as of other Sacraments of which for the same reason I shall here speak only some few things ARTICLE I. Of Baptism and Confirmation I. POINT That the Jesuits take away the necessity of Baptism and destroy the dispositions required thereto EScobar in his first Book of Theological Problems proposes these questions as Problematical that is to say in which the two contrary opinions are probable and safe in conscience 1 Praecepâ—um Baptismi obligat non obligat adultos ad eum recipiendum quamprimum commodè possunt Escobar lib. 11. probl 109. Qui hoc tempore Baptismi legem ignorant sed tamen legis naturalis praescripâ—a observant possunt non possunt sine Baptismo salvari Whether the Precept of Baptism obligeth those who are of age to demand it to receive it as soon as they can conveniently If now they who know not the Law of Baptism but live according to the Rules of the Law of Nature may be saved without Baptism He proposes this also 2 Gravis metus excusat non excusat à praecepto divino recipiendi Baptismum aut Ioenitentiam Whether great terrour may excuse from observing the Divine precept which obliges to receive Baptism or Penance After he hath concluded after his ordinary manner that it doth and doth not excuse him that is that herein you may follow what opinion you please he adds 3 Ego quidem aliquando putsbam instante divino praecepto reciplendi Baptismum aut poenitentiam tyranno prohibente receptionem fub mortis comminatione adhuc esse recipienda ut certa quoad possit salus redderetur As for me I sometimes thought that the divine Precept which commands us to receive Baptism or Penance urging us and a Tyrant forbidding us to receive it upon pain of our lives we cease not to be obliged to receive it that we may make our Salvation certain so far as in us lyes So that if God on one hand command Baptism on the pain of losing eternal life and a Tyrant on the other hand forbid it on the pain of losing temporal life the Jesuit permits us to obey the Tyrant rather than Jesus Christ against the very word of Jesus Christ who saith in the Gospel that he who would save his Soul that is his life shall lose it and contrary to that of S. Peter which being an explication of that of Jesus Christ is also more express and more clear in our case that we ought to obey God rather than men even in peril of our lives according as this Apostle did indeed expose his by preaching Jesus Christ against the prohibition of the chief Jews The reason for which this Jesuit saith that he adheres to this opinion which denâ—es the precept or obligation of Baptism when one cannot receive it without being exposed to the danger of death is very considerable It is 4 Ac jam primae haereo sententiae dum video susâ—epto Sacramento omne damnationis periculum non cessare cum omnino certum non sit fuisse citè sâ—sceptum seu ministratum Escob lib. 1. Theol. mor. sect 2. cap. 7. probl 29. Because I see saith he that after this Sacrament is received all peril of damnation ceaseth not since it is not altogether certain that the Sacrament hath been well received or well administred He grounds then the necessity and obligation to receive Baptism on the effect it worketh rather than on the Command which ordaineth it to be received and because that this effect which is to be delivered from sin and damnation is not always entirely certain so that we may in some sort doubt thereof even after we have received the Sacrament the obligation to receive it according to him is also not entirely evident and assured but uncertain which suffices him to make the obligation of the divine Precept to receive Baptism questionable when a Tyrant forbids to receive it on pain of life and to form two probable opinions both safe in conscience whence he follows and maintains that which dispenses in these incident cases with the precept and obligation of Baptism He saith the same thing of Penance and by the same Principle and self same Reason which he makes use of to abolish the obligation to these two Sacraments it will be easie for him to ruine also when he pleases not only the precept and obligation to other Sacraments as that of Confirmation and the Communion but also generally of all the Commands of God and the Church or the obligation to obey them when a Tyrant shall forbid them on pain of life there being no Command so important nor whereof the effect is more assured than that of Baptism So that if because the effect of Baptism is not always so certain that we cannot absolutely doubt thereof at all this Jesuit pretends that the Precept of Baptism though divine obliges us not at all when we are menaced with death if we receive it it is clear that any other precept whatsoever it be shall never oblige us so that we shall not have liberty to dispense with it in this same circumstance and so the Doctrine of Probability as we have already observed on divers occasions overturns and ruines in divers manners all the Commands of God and the Church The dispositions necessary for worthy receiving Baptism cannot be more destroyed than by putting them amongst Problematick questions as doth this Author with others whom he cites of his Company 1 In adulâ—o ad baptismum reciplendum requiritur non requirituâ— contritio de peccatis praeteritis sufficit non suffiâ—it attritio Escobar l. 2. l. 11. problem 78. Attritio quam habet adultus peccator ad fructum baptismi recipiendum debet esse non debet esse existimata contritic Probl 79. Attritio sufficiens ad recipiendem gratiam bapâ—ismi debet non dâ—bâ—t supernaturalis esse Probl. 80 Ad effectum baptismi sufficit non sufficit attritio existimate Probl. 81. Attritio naturalis quoad substantian supernaturalis extrinfâ—cè sufficiâ— non sufficit ad baptismum cum fructu ab adulto peccatore recipiendum Problem 82 Whether contrition be necessary to Baptism or attrition suffice Whether we ought to believe that this attrition is true contrition Whether this attrition ought to be supernatural or natural be sufficient If it be enough that we believe that we have attrition and that it be only supernatural outwardly That is to say that it be supernatural only in that it comes from God who excites it though it be natural in
is valid Some believe that it ought to pass as null others on the contrary that it ought to be held for good The one and the other of these opinions are probable because of the authority of those who hold them That is to say that there are none but those who would put themselves to fruitless trouble who will take any care to see whether they obey the Church and to demand of it permission to do that which it forbids since in the most important commands and most assured obligations the least suspicion and the least doubt we can have of being acquitted thereof whether it be of having had a dispensation or of having had a just and reasonable one suffices to put the conscience in repose without taking care of any other thing According to these Maxims and this reasoning of our Jesuit a man who doubts whether he owe a sum of money or a rent or who being assured that he owes it doubts whether he have paid it or who knows certainly that he doth owe it and hath not paid it and doubts only whether he to whom he owes it hath gotten it well or whether there were not some defect in the contract in all these cases and in all these doubts shall not be obliged to pay I know not whether the Jesuits observe these Rules or this Conduct towards their Creditors but I cannot believe that they would have their Debtors observe them towards themselves and yet they teach men to demean themselves in this manner towards God assuring them that upon a simple probability and doubtful conjecture they may transgress the Commandment of God and the Church without troubling themselves about the faults which they may fear they have committed in failing therein of their duty no more than about the dispensations for their exemption for the future A Rape is one impediment of Marriage according to the Council of Trent which excommunicates and condemns unto a perpetual infamy those who have committed this crime or who have been accessories thereto 1 Sanchez referens Basil Rebell putat illud decretum Trid. non se extendere ad soeminam raplentem virum quia Tridentinum tantum loquitur de raptore non de raptrice odiosum poenale non est ad raptricem extendendum Dicastil dc matrimonio tract 10. disp 7. d. 58. num 660. Dicastillus following the opinion of Sanchez believes that the Canon and all the Penalties it ordains respect the men only and not the women who are guilty of this crime of Rape because in the Council it is Raptor and not Raptrix and this odious Decree ought not to be enlarged For it is an odious thing in the Divinity of the Jesuits to condemn crimes Tambourin hath taken the same care to restrain this Decree 2 Quare si quis rapiat mulierem causa libidinis non ad contrahendum cum illa matrimonium non incurrit praedictas Goncilii poenas Ratio est quia Goncilium nil intendit praeterea nisi libertati matrimonii providere Tambur lib. 7. decal 6. sect 2. num 11. If any one saith he steal a woman to abuse her and not to marry her he incurs not the penalty of the Council The reason saith this Father is because the Council pretends only hereby to provide for the freedom of Marriages He must be therefore less punishable who is more criminal since to commit a Rape to abuse a woman is an action more lewd and more criminal than to steal her to marry her it being impossible to expose her to greater extremity than to abandon her after she hath been abused As if he who steals a woman and abuses her did not hinder a woman from being married as she might have been before and did not reduce her to a necessity of being married to him that will accept of her This Author sinds also another means to exempt from the condemnation of the Council of Trent those who steal women 3 Ignorante Caesare adolescente abducta est ab ejus amico quaedam invita puella ut eidem Caesari illa puella in mattimonium traderetur Si neque perse neque per alium Caesar puellam rapuit ipse taptor non est atque adco poenas non incurrit ex Sanchez amicus etiam nec incurrit quia non est raptor pro suo matrimonio de quo loquitur Tridentiai decretum quod cum sit odiosum non est extendendum ultra verba Unde vides in hoc casu tum amicum hunc tum adolescentem illum pro quo rapta est mulier valide posse matrimonium inire cum eadem mullere etiam non separata Tambur lib. 7. cap. 6. sect 2. num 16. He saith that if any carry away a woman whether she will or no to cause her to be married unto his friend his friend knowing nothing thereof neither the Ravisher nor he for whom the woman was stoln incurs the pains ordained by the Decree of the Council which being edious ought not be extended beyond its words And thereby you see saith he in this case as well the friend who hath committed the Rape as the young man for whom the woman was stoln may lawfully contract Marriage with her without having need to be separated from her afterwards So that he who hath a friend of some competent understanding may marry by force what woman he pleaseth and if he for whom she was stoln make some scruple because of the Rape he who hath stoln her may upon his refusal take her himself and marry her without fear of the Excommunication of the Council Children have an obligation upon them by the Law of Nature not to marry at least without demanding the consent of their Fathers and Mothers Dicastillus saith 1 Quod sit obligatio monendi parentes petendi confilium sub mortall non facile admiserim nec satis assequor fundsmentum hujus tam gravis obligationis peccatl in non petendo consilio ab eis quorum petitum datum omnino liberum est rejicere Dicast de matr tr 1. disp 4. d. 17. n. 176. That he finds it hard to admit that children are obliged under the pain of mortal sin to advertise their fathers and mothers of their Marriages and to demand their advice he sees not the foundation of so strict an obligation For what respects Marriage considered in it self though the Council of Trent ordain that for the future clandestine Marriages should be null and assures us that the Church hath always detested them Dicastillus ceases not to be favourable unto them 2 Oppositum satis constat nullum scilicat esse peccatum Prohibitionem vero matrimonil clandestini non extendendam esse ad spousalis Ibid. tr 10. dist 1. dub 24. num 351. He saith That it is no sin to make clandestine Contracts of Marriage and that they are not comprised in the prohibition made by the Council against clandestine Marriages The Church declares
first of the Commandments which God gave in the old Law and which he hath repeated in the new is 1 Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex to to corde tuo Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart And Father Sirmond is not afraid to maintain that we are not obliged by this Commandment to love God For God saith he tr 2. p. 16. commanding us to love him is satisfied in the main that we obey him in his other Commandments And as he saith also pag. 28. A God so loving and lovely commanding us to love him is satisfied that we obey him without loving him It is easie to destroy all the Commandments by this Method there being none more important nor more clearly explained nor oftner repeated in the Old or New Testament than this When God saith Thou shalt love me with all thy heart if it be lawful to say that he intends something else than what he saith and that he would not oblige us to love him though he saith it with an expression so clear and strong there can be nothing certain in the whole Word of God and we may in this manner clude all the Commandments pretending that he desires not that of us which he demands or that he would not oblige us in good earnest to that which he testifies to be his desire But the reason of this Father why God would not have us to love him is excellent because he is loving and lovely as if love desired any thing so much as reciprocal love or could be otherwise acknowledged and satisfied than by this love He ought also at least to consider that God is not only amiable and loving but also a great lover of truth and sincerity and that so there can be no apparent ground to make him a lyar or dissembler in commanding men to love him without desiring to oblige them thereunto This Jesuit corrupts also this same passage and Commandment in another manner saying Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart c. signifies no other thing than thou shalt love him if thou wilt without being obliged thereto because the Commandment to love God is a Command of pleasure in respect of affective love but a Command of rigour in respect of effective love and the execution p. 21. He would say that God by this Commandment demands the outward actions and not the affection that he commands us to produce the effects of love without obliging us to have this love and that he is content provided we do the things which he commands though they be done without loving him or thinking of him No wise man would be served in this manner of his children or of his friends nor of his slaves themselves and who would not scorn such services He hath also invented a third gloss which is no other than a consequence of the former saying Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart signifies thou shalt love him freely and without any obligation For God saith he the God of love will be loved freely and without any obligation and if he threaten it is that he may be obeyed But if we love not them freely whom we love of duty and upon obligation we must say that a Son loves not his Father freely because he is obliged to love him by the Law of God and Nature and if that which is done of duty be not freely done it follows that the Religious Orders keep not their vows freely nor the Faithful any of the Commandments of God because they are thereunto obliged But if he threatens saith he it is that he may be obeyed and not that he may be beloved We must believe then that there are no penalties nor threats against them that never love God Which neither agrees with what S. Paui saith He that loves not the Lord Jesus Christ let him be accursed 1 Cor. 16. nor with that which S. John saith Qui non diligit manet in morte 1 John 3. He that loveth not abideth in death The one threatning them with death and the other with a curse who love not Jesus Christ There remains yet his last corruption of this very word of God of Jesus Christ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart That is to say thou shalt not hate him at all For albeit his sacred love be not kindled in our hearts saith he Pag. 19. though we love him not at all and the motive of Charity do not incline us to do that which he commands us yet we cease not for all that to obey the Commandment of Love in as much as we do the works of Love So that herein we may see the goodness of God he hath not so much commanded us to love him as not to hate him either formally by an actual hate which were indeed devillish or materially by the transgression of his Law This excess is visible enough of it self and needs not be represented more particularly and it might easily be apprehended to be the extreamest that can be committed on this subject if there were not found another yet greater in this little Book which is as it were the foundation of all the rest For he talks of the love of God as a thing odious and servile and he represents the Commandment of loving God as a yoke and servitude unsupportable attributing it to the particular favour and grace of Jesus Christ that he hath delivered us as he pretends from the obligation of serving God in love that our services might be pleasing to him and meritorious unto eternal life And to justifie this his imagination which scents strong of impiety he abuses these words of Jesus Christ 1 Si vos Filius liberaverit vere liberi critis Joh. 8. v 36. If the Son make you free you shall be free indeed which speak manifestly of freedom from sin as appears by what goes before See here how he expounds this passage If the Son make you free saith he himself in S. John you shall be free indeed Yea I hope we shall by his own proper testimony yea even from that very strait obligation wherewith some would charge us which is to love God in every point which hath any reference unto merit Tr. 3. p. 60. He pretends then that Jesus Christ hath not only delivered us from sin as is formerly affirmed in this place but also from the obligation even of loving God himself and of serving him in love which appears unto him too rigorous Which hath reference to what he saith tr 2. p. 24. that God neither could nor ought command us to love him but only to serve him See here saith he how God hath right and might command us his sacred love he hath right to command us so far as concerns the effect but not in what concerns the inward affection It must needs be therefore that according to the opinion of this man the love of God
felicity If not that is to say though we never have the felicity to love him actually provided we do not otherwise offend him he will not damn us Whence we must conclude according to these Principles and Reasonings that there is not absolutely any true Command which obliges us to love God since that which he hath given us himself contains neither threat nor penalty at the least no grievous one against them who fail therein if you will believe in him rather than S. John S. Paul and the Son of God himself who say the contrary in so many places of Scripture SECTION II. That according to Father Sirmond the Gospel speaks hardly any thing at all of Divine Love and Charity and that Jesus Christ hath not much recommended it AFter Father Sirmond had reduced this great and first Command of God to a simple advice and no more this advice is also of so little consequence in his Judgment and according to the mind of Jesus Christ himself if you will believe this Jesuit that he hath scarcely mentioned it in the whole Gospel You will be troubled to find saith he pag. 162. tr 2. that he hath spoken manifestly of this divine practice if it be not at the conversion of Magdalen and in his Sermon at his last Supper where he exhorts us to love him In these two places which he observes as those alone wherein our Lord hath spoken of the practice of the love of God he will not have him therein to recommend it as necessary but only that he commends it and exhorts us to it as a good thing that is to say that he advises but commands it not And in this he testifies that he hath read the whole Gospel very exactly and that he hath very well dived into the sense of the words of Jesus Christ saying to his Apostles at the last Supper 1 Hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem Joan. 15. v. 12. The commandment which I give you is that you love one another He discovers also by his discourse that he understands perfectly well what the Gospel and new Law is which according to the Divines after S. Thomas is no other thing than the Law of love and love it self So that when he saith that love is scarcely spoken of through the whole Gospel it is as if he should say that the new Law is not spoken of in the new Law nor the Gospel in the Gospel But to shew that he speaks not hereof without having considered it well he observes that of 32 Parables which is the most frequent manner of Christs discourse he applies but one for the recommendation of the love of our neighbour in the person of that distressed poor man abused by thieves betwixt Jericho and Jerusalem pag. 121. After he hath read the Gospel so exactly as to number the Parables contained therein as he hath observed only two places wherein our Lord speaks of divine love so he hath found but one wherein he speaks of the love of our neighbour So that S. Paul had no reason to say writing to the Romans 2 Plenitudo legis est dilectio qui diligit proximum legem implevit Rom. 13. v. 10. That love is the fulfilling of the law and that he who loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law For if love be the accomplishment and fulfilling of the Law it will follow that love is extended through the whole Law otherwise it could not fulfil nor comprehend it all And so it would neither be the fulfilling nor accomplishment of it and if the love of our neighbour fulfil and accomplish the Law the love of our neighbour must contain and be contained in all the Law as the Soul fills and contains and is filled and contained by the body which caused S. Austin to say 3 Non praecipit Scriptura nisi charitatem nec culpat nist cupiditatem to modo informat mores dominus That the whole Scripture old and new is and commends nothing but charity If we will not submit to the Authority of S. Austin and S. Paul we should at least give way to that of Jesus Christ and acknowledge his errour or raze out of the Gospel so many passages wherein he recommends so expresly and clearly the love of God above all things and that of our neighbour by making thereof an express Commandment which he calls his and the Commandment proper to the new Law as when he saith in the 13. of S. John 4 Mandatum novum do vobis ut diligatis invicem sicut dilexi vos Joan. 13. v 34. A new commandment give I unto you that you love one another as I have loved you And in Chap. 15. 5 Hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem Joan. 15. v. 12. This is my commandment that you love one another And a little after 6 Hoc mando vobis ut diligatis invicem Ibid. v. 17. I command you to love one another and many other places there are wherein he speaks of charity and of the command to love God and our neighbour as a Commandment which is not only proper to the new Law but which contains also the whole Law new and old as he expresly declares in S. Matthew where speaking of the double Commandment to love God above all things and our neighbour as our selves he saith 7 In his duobus mandatis úniversa lex pendet Prophetae Matt. 22. v. 40. That all the Law and Prophets depend on these two Commandments SECTION III. The mixture and agreement of Self-love with the Charity invented by Father Sirmond the Jesuit IT soffices not Father Sirmond to have taken away and dasht Charity as much as he could out of the Law of God the sacred Scriptures and the heart of man he sets upon it in its own nature and he seems to desire to drive it from it self first in mingling it with and secondly in changing it into self-love He mixes it with self-love when he saith tr 2. pag. 47. The more that charity possesseth it the less doth the Soul think of any other thing than to love and the more it takes to heart the interests of God the less it cares for its own peculiar but all this is accidental unto charity whereof the highest perfection may subsist in a heart altogether inclined to and concerned to the utmost for it self without falling short of what it owes unto the principal object of its affection as it comes to pass among the Blessed who eschewing all sorts of evil provide for all that which concerns them and yet are not the less belonging to God If it be true that to lay to heart the interests of God and to care for them more than our own be accidental unto charity as this Jesuit pretends S. Paul understood not what charity was and he hath spoken very improperly of it in 1 Cor. 13. where making the most express and exact description of
Sacramentum novae legis Ibid. That Christians who live under the Law of Grace are not obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God so often with a love of supernatural charity to obtain life and avoid death eternal because it is sufficient for them to have attrition receiving at the same time some Sacrament of the new Law Amicus saith the same thing of the Commandment of Contrition for our conversion unto God after sin But I will not stand here to alledge or make reflection on what Molina saith because it is spoken of elsewhere I will only add to clear up the conformity of the Jesuits upon this Point that which Filliutius saith He demands 1 Pro quo tempore urgeat ejus obligatio An statim post pâ—ccatum commissum Secunda sententia negat etiamsi occurrat opportunitas facile fieri possit Respondeo dico 1. tenendum cum secunda sententia Filliut tom 1. qq mor. tr 6. cap. 8. num 198. 199. pag. 157. In what time we are obliged unto contrition and whether it be so soon as we have sinned And after he hath reported two opinions of which the second saith he denies that we are so soon obliged though we have conven ience and that we may easily do it he concludes in these terms I answer and say in the first place that we must follow the second opinion which holds that we are not obliged He descends also yet farther in particular and demands 2 Quibus temporibus per se obliget contritio ex jure naturali Ibid. num 205. Respondeo dico 1 si respiciatur lex justitiae qua homo tenetur satisfacere Deo pro injuria peccati sic non videtur obligari nisi quando adest periculum mortis Ibid. on what occasion the Precept of Contrition obliges by the Law of Nature Whereto he gives three Answers The first is that if we regard the Law of Justice by which a man is obliged to satisfie God for the injury which he hath done unto him by sin in this manner he seems not to be obliged to contrision and sorrow for his sin but only when he finds himself in danger of death His other Answer is 3 Si respiclatur lex charitatis erga Deum jute naturali obligat ante mortem Ibid. num 206. That if we respect the love which is due unto God we are obliged unto it by that Law of Nature before death That is to say that though in rigour and without any injustice a sinner may remain in his sin and aversion from God until his death notwithstanding he ought of charity to prevent that time and to love God sometimes without attending for this extremity if he will not ask him forgiveness as soon as he hath offended him nor even for many years after it is reasonable that at least he pass not above five or seven years before he do it This is the charitable advice which Filliutius gives him in these terms 4 In universum intra annum non videtur obligare quolibet septennio vel quinquennio est probâ—bile 〈◊〉 alibi dicam de charitate Ibid. n. 208. Speaking generally it seems that a man is not obliged thereto within one years time that he should be obliged thereto within five or from seven years to seven is very probable as we shall see elsewhere where I shall speak the same thing of Charity He holds that a sinner after he hath passed five or seven years in his sin and in a voluntary aversion from God and all others in like manner who have passed over so long a time without once thinking of loving God will be obliged the one to ask God pardon and the other to love him at least after so long a time If this be probable as he saith the contrary is also and by consequence of two probable opinions we may follow which we will with a safe conscience according to the Jesuits Divinity a sinner may persist in his sin and in his aversion from God and every other man in his insensibleness without having any motion of love unto God after he hath already past seven years without thinking of him The third Answer of Filliutius is 5 Si respâ—ciatur lex charitatis propriae probabile est obligare etiam extra articulum Ibid. num 206. That if we regard the Law of Charity which every one owes unto himself it is very probable that he is obliged to have contrition and sorrow for sin before the article of death And as if he feared lest this should also torment some consciences and give them too much trouble and scruple he adds 6 Ob authoritatem autem Doctorum quos citavimus in praecedenti quaesito non est improbabile quod non obliget Ibid. For all that because of the Authority of the Doctors whom we have quoted in the former question it is probable that he is not obliged thereto That is to say that a man who is in mortal sin may with a safe conscience according to this probable opinion persist voluntarily all his life in a state of enmity against God and delay his conversion until the point of death demanding only forgiveness of God when he is ready to dye and can offend him no longer without doing herein any thing against the charity he owes to himself any more than against that which he owes unto God I can hardly believe that a Jesuit would approve a Child who should deal with his Father in this manner as he saith we may carry our selves towards God and I know not whether he would counsel any of his Brethren who had a mortal disease to suffer it five or seven years or even until he should see himself nigh unto death without calling for the Physitian and without applying any remedy thereto and whether be believes he may do this without danger of killing the body of his Brother by this delay and his own Soul by so remarkable a negligence especially if he had an assured remedy whereof it was only his own fault if he did not make use I know well at the least that if herein he pretend not to offend against the Laws of Justice and Christian Charity he shall transgress those of the Society who have so well provided for the health of all their Brethren that inftead of delaying to the extremity they have ordained to cause the Physitian to visit them from time to time though there be none of them sick What kind of prudence must this be which hath so great care of the health and life of the body and so little of the Souls Father Celot is not content to say as Filliutius and others that a sinner is not obliged to seek God after he hath offended him but even that God himself preventing and seeking as we may say his friendship by the inspirations and good motions he bestows on him he may refuse and reject them effectually
because he favours him not Here is the case to which he answers precisely and without hesitation in these words If you desire only or receive with joy the effect of this death to wit the Inheritance of a Father the Charge of a Prelate the deliverance from some trouble he procured you the answer is easie that you may desire all these things lawfully and that because you rejoyce not in the evil of another but in your own proper good Dicastillus durst not at first determine upon this question because it seemed to him uncertain the Authority and Example of Castropalao having made him more bold he approves and propounds it as probable and Tambourin makes thereof a Maxime in which there is no difficulty at all facilis responsio Thus it comes to pass that these Doctors who make profession of a complacent Theology go on still advancing not to the better but to the worse as S. Paul speaks and labour to stretch or rather to corrupt mens consciences by stretching and corrupting the most holy and inviolable Rules of Faith and Morality and making those things probable which in themselves are incredible If to desire the death of ones father be of itself a crime as none can question it the crime is yet greater when he is carried thereto by some wicked motive as that of having his estate which comes from covetousness and injustice and contains in it also a notorious ingratitude and it is in the sight of God a kind of theft and usurpation to desire to have the estate of another and which is more of ones father against his will the appointment of God and all the Laws of Reason and Nature So that to justifie the desire a child hath of the death of his father by that which he hath of his goods is to justifie one crime by another wherein many more are also contained This injustice and disorder may appear yet more visible in the other Example brought by Tambourin of an Inferior who desires the death of his Superior A Monk for Example or a Clerk of his Abbot or Bishop that he might enter upon his Office For the desire alone of a Charge of this nature even under pretence of a good motive as to be serviceable unto Souls is a kind of ambition and presumption which renders a man unworthy of that Office which he desires in that manner as S. Thomas after the Scripture and Fathers doth expresly teach us he who hath not this good motive and desires to enter by a way so odious and criminal as is the death of his Superior is not only unworthy of the Office which he so desires but also deferves to be excluded from the Clergy and even to be chased out of the Church as a rebellious and unnatural child from the house of his father who desires to see his death though he dares not kill him himself How then can one of these desires justifie the other How can we say that an Inferior may lawfully desire the death of his Superior if we pretend not that one may be a murderer because he is an Usurper and desire the death of a man because we would have his goods without having either right or capacity but only an unjust and unreasonable pretence unto the one or the other This yet sufficeth not this barbarous and murthering Theology to permit children to desire the death of their father and mother they permit them also to be willing to kill them themselves to attempt their lives and effectually to kill them in some cases It is from this Principle that Dicastillus saith 2 Colligitur ulterius â—…citum esse fillis contra parentes servis contra dominos vassallis contra principes vi vim repellere quando actu invaduntur injuste cum praedictis conditionibus idemque de Monachis aut subditis contra Abbates Superiores Dicastill lib. 2. de just tr 1. d. 10. dub 3. num 30. An in casibus praecedentis dubitationis liceat directe velle intendere mortem injusti aggressoris ad defendendam propriam vitam Negat S. Thomaâ— His tamen non obstantibus asserendum est tanquam verissimum sicut honestum est in executione repeilere aggressorem illum occidendo pari raâ—lone honestum est directe illum velle intendere occidere Dub. 4. num 4. That a child who defends himself against his father who assaults him unjustly may kill him as also Servants their Masters Vassals their Princes Monks their Abbots and their Superiors Which he understands not only in such manner that a Son may kill his Father by accident and besides his intention in his own defence but so as he may have a design to kill him voluntarily For after he had proposed this case which I have now related and many others he concludes that in this case it is lawful to desire to kill him who assails us As for what concerns the respect due unto Fathers and Mothers Tambourin declares confidently 1 That a Son is to be excused from mortal sin who will not acknowledge his Father if he do it not of contempt but to avoid some inconvenience or that he might not be put to the blush in acknowledging him It is manifest that according to Scripture this is to renounce ones father as it is to renounce Jesus Christ to be ashamed to acknowledge and confess him and yet this is a small fault in the Jesuits Divinity Neither is he more religious about their obedience concerning which he demands 2 Filius si recognoscere nolit patrem non ex contemptu sed ad vitandum aliquod incommodum aut crubescentiam à mortali culpa sic puto esset excusand us Tambur lib. 5. decal cap. 2. sect 2. num 17. Whether children may lawfully contract Marriage with persons unworthy of their alliance against the will of their fathers and mothers He answers Though some believe they cannot without mortal sin which is very probable yet he avouches that it is probable and safe in conscience that they may ..... and that Sanchez hath reason to say that a daughter is so free as to Marriage that though she have not yet attained so much as twenty five years of age she may marry her self unto a person unworthy of her without her fathers consent Whence it follows according to this Author that Isaac exceeded his power when he so expresly forbad his Son Jacob to marry in the family of Chanaan which was unworthy of his alliance If the disobedience of a Daughter towards her Father in these circumstances be not criminal it seems it never can be so since it cannot be in a more important matter than this same wherein Marriage is concerned which imports an engagement for the whole time of life and a Marriage with an unworthy person and which proves a disadvantage and dishonour not only to the Daughter who enters it but also to her kindred and whole family But if we object to this Father that
him 4 Cum modeâ—amine tutelae Id enim semper subinteligitur Ibid. provided only we pass not the bounds of a just and necessary defence and that we do no more then is precisely necessary to kill him For it is thus that he declares he hath always understood it for fear we should question his prudence and moderation He continues his reasoning and adds 1 At non esse mortale hoc ultimum pâ—obabile est ergo nec illud prinium Ibid. Now it is probable that there is no mortal sin in the second to wit in bearing false witness against him who would take away our honour and therefore neither any in the first to wit in killing for maintenance of the same honour We may conclude by the same reason that it is lawful to rob to preserve our reputation or to commit a second adultery to cover the first for which we fear to be disgraced since these crimes are not greater than slander false witness and murder which he pretends to be lawful for the same reason Then he undertakes to verifie in order all the Propositions of this his Discourse beginning with the first 2 Majorem prâ—bo quia homicidium ex natura sua malum non est Multi enim interimunt juste mendacium ita malum est ut nec divinitus dispensari aut cohonestari possit in omnium Thomistarum sententia imoetiam in opinione Scotistarum plurium qui putant posse Deum dispensare in aliquibus praeceptis Decalogi Ibid. Quod si dicantur non sufficere vix erit ulla opinio probabilis Ibid. I prove saith he the major because manslaughter is not absolutely evil in it self since many may kill justly and on the contrary a lye is so wicked that God himself cannot make it lawful and honest according to all the Thomists nay according to many of the Scotists who hold that God may dispense with some Precepts of the Decalogue Amicus then and his Fraternity and other his Partisans who maintain at this day his opinion must have more power than God himself being they can justifie and sanctifie lyes and calumnies when they are scrviceable to them for preserving their honour in the world which God cannot so much as make lawful by dispensation But the proof of his second Proposition is remarkable 3 Prâ—bo minorem etiam esse videlicet probabile non peccare mortâ—liter qui imponit falsum testimonium alicui ut suam justitiam honorem defendat quia illud est probabile quod asseritur à viris doctis at haec doctrina habet in se viginti plures viros magnos doctos Quod si dicantur non sufficere vix erit ulla opinio probabilis Ibid. I prove also saith he the minor namely that it is probable that he who bears false witness to defend his right and his honour sins not mortally for that which is maintained by persons of piety and learning is probable and this doctrine hath for it more then twenty great and very learned Personages Whence he concludes That if we imagine these not to be sufficient to make it probable we shall hardly find any at all that is so Behold a new wonder of the Doctrine of Probability to prevail not only against the opinions of men but against the Law of God and Nature For this Casuist said a little above that by the common consent of the Doctors a lye is in its nature so bad that God himself cannot prevent it from being so at all times nor dispense with the Law which forbids it And here he would have the opinion of twenty Jesuits or Disciples of Jesuits of force to make it lawful by the Doctrine of Probability and not only to protect lying but which is worse false witness also against the Law of God It is impossible to advance the Doctrine of Probability any higher then to elevate it above the Power of God and to subject the Laws of God unto it by giving it a power to approve what they condemn and to justifie that which God himself cannot so much as tolerate I know not whether as they hold that a Confessor is obliged to quit his own opinion to follow that of his Penitent though he believe it is false if it be supported by some probability so they do not even pretend also that a man who hath killed one to preserve his honour coming to appear before God to receive his Judgment may not oblige him to renounce his own light and to pass over his own Laws to absolve him by representing unto him that he could not sin following a probable opinion supported by the Authority of twenty Doctors If the Jesuits be not confident enough to say this yet they must needs believe it or renounce their Doctrine of Probability since it is a necessary and evident consequence of the Maxims of this Science For as they hold it for certain that we cannot sin in following a probable opinion it is also very certain that an equitable Judge and by stronger reason God who is Equity and Justice it self cannot condemn nor punish him who sins not And by consequent this man who following the opinion of Amicus and these twenty Doctors who have approved it hath slain one to preserve his honour having not sinned God cannot condemn nor punish him but he shall be obliged to absolve him and give him part of his glory in yielding to the Authority of these Doctors and giving way to the Rules of Probability though he judge according to divine light that his action is wicked and condemned by the eternal Laws After this we must not think it strange that they will not submit this marvellous Doctrine to the Laws of the Church or Princes and that they pretend that they are of no force against it as Caramuel declares answering this question 1 Anne cadem doctrina poterit admitti sano jure civili canonico May we entertain this Doctrine of Amicus without offending against Civil and Ecclesiastick Laws For he answers 2 Respondeo Amici doctrinam esse novam legibus vulgatis juniorem utque adeo nihil de illa à Pontificâ—bus Caesaribus aut Regibus fulsse dispositum Ibid. pag. 549. That the Doctrine of Amicus is new and later than the common Laws and that by consequence the Popes Emperors and Kings have ordained nothing about this point Whence it will follow by the same reason that if any one should begin at this day to teach some new and heretofore unheard of errour as to say that Blasphemy or Adultery were no sin his opinion would not be condemned by the Church because it would be new and later than its Laws When the Church condemns an Errour it condemns all those who shall hold it for the future as well as those who have held it in time past And it hath truly and sufficiently condemned this of Amicus in condemning slander and murder which this
contrary to publick good since it would oblige us to suffer an unjust loss of our lives and goods for fear that in defending our selves and doing what is necessary for our security we should cause a man to lose his life who invades us unjustly and who of meer malice refuses to desist from so great injury as he would do us or lest he should incur eternal damnation by continuance in the same wicked disposition By this reckoning S. Paul was unreasonable and made an unsufferable remonstrance to the Corinthians when he reproved them that they did not suffer themselves to be wronged defrauded unjustly spoiled of their goods rather than not only to offend or kill the wrong-doers as this Jesuit allows but also rather than sue and contest publickly with them 2 Jam quidem omnino delictum est in vobis quod judicis habetis inter vos Quate non magis injurism accipitis Quare non magis fraudem patimini 1 Cor. 6. v. 7. Et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere 1 Joan. 3. vers 16. You are to blame saith this great Apostle in this very thing that you go to Law together before the Judges why do you not rather suffer wrong Why do you not rather suffer your selves to be defrauded And S. John must be yet more unreasonable and inhumane when he saith that all the faithful ought to lay down their lives for their brethren And yet the licence which Molina gives in this point is absolute and general and he will have it 3 Est autem hoc licicum non solum Laicis sed etiam Clericis cum jure naturae liceat nullibique illis prohibitum reperiatur quin potius defensio bonorum externorum illis permittatur Ibid. pag. 1770. belong not only to the Laicks but to the Ecclesiasticks as being allowed by the Law of Nature and not found to be forbidden them at any time since on the contrary it is lawful for them to defend their worldly goods Amicus applies also this Maxime to the Religious particularly saying 4 Quod hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam etiam cum periculo mortis invasoris non solum habeant seculares sed etiam Clerici Religiosi constat Amicus de just jur disp 56. num 128. pag. 546. That it is certain that the right of defending their goods at the expence of their lives who would take them away doth not only belong to Secular but also to Ecclesiastick and Religious persons Thence it follows that a Monk encountring a man who is entred into his Monastery to rob it may take a Sword or a Knife to kill him if he cannot otherwise hinder him from bearing away the goods of the Monastery Dicastillus supported by the Authority of many Authors whom he quotes speaks more resolutely and more generally 5 Asserendum est omnibus etiam Clericis licitum esse occidere invasorem suarum facultatum notabilis momenti quando alitet servari vel recuperati non pâ—ssunt Dicast lib. 2. tract 1. disp 10. dub 5. num 46. That it is lawful for all sorts of persons Clergie men themselves to kill them who take away their goods And if you will take his word and keep to his Principles this sort of man-slaughter is an action not only not wicked but honest and worthy the profession of a Clerk or Religious Monk 6 Colligitur posse occidi furem dum sugiâ— cum re quam surripuit ut si fugiat cum equo quem mibi surripuit possum illum insequi telo vol bombirda consodere quando fur praemonitus de morâ—… recusaâ—rem accepâ—…m Sdimittereâ— vel etiamsi non sit praemonitus quando non est locus praemonendi perioulum nunquam recaperandi rem 〈◊〉 Ibid. num â—… That if a Thief flye away on horse-back he may be pursued with a weapon or killed by a Pistol-shot when after he hath been threatned to be killed he cease not to bear away what he hath taken and even though he be not threatned nor admonished thereof because time permits not and there is danger never to recover what he carries away But what if satisfaction might be had for it by Law were it not then ill done to kill him It is not saith he against Charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble So it is that in the Jesuit-Divinity the Law of Charity hath no force against that of Interest and the life of a man is not worth the pain of pursuing at Law the restitution of what he hath robbed Molina gives the same liberty and yet greater for he allows killing for preservation of worldly honour For he fears not to say 1 At si homo ingenuus cui dedecori sit fugere quando alius eum aggreditur tunc esto fugiendo vitam propriam aggressoris posset conservare non tenetur fugere sed defendendo propriam personam proprium honorem interficere potest injustum aggressorem quando aliter non potest utrumque conservare Molina supra pag. 1778. That if an honourable person be assaulted and in danger to lose his reputation if he flye though by flying he might preserve his own life and his who assaults him he is not for all that obliged to flye but it is lawful for him to kill him who invades him unjustly in defence of his life and honour when he cannot do it otherwise So a worthy person is not obliged to retire nor step one pace backward no more than abate a point of honour to save the life of him who offends him in some matter or assaults him Vasquez finds so little difficulty in this point that he speaks of it as a thing of which none ought to doubt saying 1 At si homo ingenuus cui dedecori sit fugere quando alius eum aggreditur tunc esto fugiendo vitam propriam aggressoris posset conservare non tenetur fugere sed defendendo propriam personam proprium honorem interficere potest injustum aggressorem quando aliter non potest utrumque conservare Molina supra pag. 1778. That all are agreed without doubt they of the Society that when a man comes upon us to assault us and testifies that he would violate our honour by threatning to beat us with a Cudgel or give us a box on the ear it is lawful for us to kill him if we have no other way to defend our selves He is not content to say we may revenge an affront received but he pretends that it is lawful even to prevent the mischief and to kill him that only threatens to do it The reason is 2 Omnes fatentur quod licitum est invasorem qui suste aut alaps minatur nobis mâ—lum contra honorem occidere si alius non sit sufficiens modus defensionis Vasquez opusc moral cap. 2. dub 9. num 34. pag. 43. Because he who invades us in this
not publickly known and he knows that another hath a design to inform against him before a Magistrate if he fears lest this Accuser should cause him to be condemned to lose his life or part of his goods Escobar gives him by the Authority of Bannez liberty to kill him He only wills him that he may not offend against the Laws of Prudence in doing Justice in this manner to consider well before-hand whether there be not some other means to quit himself of this peril and that by all means he admonish the Informer to give over his prosecution that if he refuse he may be slain with greater satisfaction of conscience Coninck by the report of Escobar is not altogether of this opinion not that he condemns the opinion which is attributed to Bannez but on the contrary he acknowledges 8 Coninck de act Supern d. 32. dub 2. num 12. docult licet opinio Bannez spectato solo jure naturali sit probabilis jus tamen positivum potuisse id ptohibere de facto prohibuisse Ibid. That it is probable if we respect the Law of Nature but he saith that positive Laws might and have in effect forbidden it And one of the most forcible considerations which he bringeth to disswade us from following this opinion in the practice is that though we may if we will repose our conscience and Salvation upon the Faith of this Author yet for all that we shall not therein find security for our persons and lives 1 Nâ—c impunis abit qui acculatorem testem praetextu salfitatis aut injustae veri criminis revelationis necat Ibid. Because he who thus kills a man for being an Informant or witness against him under pretence that he had revealed some crime true but secret or even had accused him falsly cannot free himself from being punished by the Judge So that if one can design his plot so well and give the blow so secretly that he be not known killing a man in this manner that he may escape the chastisement justly due unto the crime he hath committed he hath nothing to fear according to this Doctrine neither from the Justice of God nor man Escobar also maintains with his Brethren that it is lawful to kill in defence of our goods and he brings their very reason for it saying 2 Quia bona externa medium sunt ad vitae honoris status sustentationem Ibid. n. 43. pag. 122. That worldly goods serve to the preservation of life and honour and for the support of our state and condition And to add something to this invention which is common to him with his Brethren he saith 3 Et ideo bona externa vita sanguis hominum appellantur That it is for this reason that worldly goods are called the life and blood of men But if they be the life of men they are only so to them that love them and who are of the world and live according to its Maxims And this speech is unworthy to proceed from the mouth of a Religious person and agrees not with the profession of despising the world and its goods to follow Jesus Christ and his Gospel But this Jesuit testifies also that he speaks as he thinks and believes not that Monks are obliged to desire and love the goods of the world less than Worldings themselves since he gives them the same liberty with the Laity to kill those who would take them from them For after he hath said that Molina extends this Doctrine which permits to kill in preservation of goods unto the Clergy he demands 4 An possit extendi ad Religiolos cum proprium nihil habeant Potest quia unusquisque habet jus defendendi non solum propris sed ea quae possidet in communi Ibid. num 43. p. 122. Whether it may be also extended unto Menks seeing they have nothing of their own And he answers Yes because all men have a right to defend not only what every one possesseth in particular but also what they possess in common That is to say that the goods of the Monks are to Monks as the goods of the world are to Lay-men and that there is none but this difference advantagious to Monks that every private person in the world enjoys only his own propriety but in a Monastery every one doth not only possess a part of the goods of the Society but the whole is common to him with the rest Whence it follows that every Monk hath a right to kill him that invades the goods of his house He demands a little after num 46. if Monks have the same right to kill for maintenance of their honour as for defence of their goods 5 Licitumne Religioso occidere calumniatorem gravia crimina de sua Religione spargentem sicut licitum est cuilibet pro tuendo honore cum moderatione interimere Ibid. num 46. Is it lawful for a Monk to kill a slanderer who publisheth great crimes against his Order as it is lawful for all men to kill for preservation of their honour with requisite moderation And he saith first 6 P. Amicus cujus octo de cursu Theologiae volumina nuper ad meas venere manus tom 5. de just d. 36. sect 2. num 118. non audet sententiae affirmativae adhaerere ne omnium adversari videatur That Amicus durst not hold to the affirmative for fear of seeming to oppose himself against the common opinion He acknowledges that until the time of Amicus Monks had not yet the liberty of killing for the preservation of their honour This Jesuit would gladly give it them but he dares not and that which restrains him is not consideration of Justice but of men and custom He is not afraid of violating the Law of God by granting them this dispensation but of offending the Casuists and opposing himself to the common opinion Ne communi sententiae adversari videatur In the mean time he forbears not to propound this opinion which he dares not yet maintain and he approves and supports it as much as he can His reason for it is 7 Si Laico ait propter honoreâ—… famam hoc licitum est multo magis videtur â—cere Clerico c Religioso siquidem professio sapientia virtus ex quibus hic Clerici Religiosi honor progignitur majoris est quam dexteritas armorum ex qua secularibus honor nasciturs Ibid. Because if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for the preservation of his honour and reputation it seems by stronger reason that it is lawful also for a Church-man or Monk For as much as their profession wisdom and vertue from which the honour of a Clergie-man or Monk proceeds is more to be esteemed than skill in Arms from whence Lay-men draw their honour Amieus quoted in this same place by Escobar adds also to confirm his reason that in this the condition of a Monk
them in whose hands the Government now is By this discourse it is easie to conclude according to this Fathers Morals that Dr. Arnauld having proposed a Doctrine contrary to that which is in credit amongst the Jesuits deserved death and that he should do no other than a very laudable act who should draw the running knot about his neck to strangle him nay that it is necessary for them who have the Government in their hands to act thus and to make themselves the instruments of the passions and interests of these Fathers It is an incredible thing that a Priest a Monk and a Christian durst speak in this sort and durst rise up in a manner so cruel and shameful against a Priest and Sorbonne Doctor But it is more incredible that he would extend this fury as he makes shew of against so many Bishops and Doctors who approved his Book of frequent Communion and generally against all those who followed and esteemed the opinions of this Book that is to say against an infinity of learned and pious persons of all conditions It must be avowed that those who have allowed Murders who have given liberty to dispatch enemies by killing them were never transported to so great excess and that there are few men who have in their whole lives committed so great and abominable homicides as this Father so good and gentle hath a will to do with his own hand I speak not here though this seems to be its place of that detestable Doctrine which teaches Subjects to kill their Kings under pretence of their being Tyrants women great with child to cause the fruit in their wombs to perish when they cannot be delivered thereof without endangering their lives young Maidens defloured to expose their children to save their credit which is the Jesuits Doctrine I shall represent all these things more conveniently when I shall come to speak in particular of the Duties of every person according to his condition I will only observe here that if the Murder which is committed in all these cases and in all others which we have formerly related and extracted out of the Jesuits Books be not against the Commandment of God which forbids to kill as the Jesuits maintain it will not be easie to imagine on what occasion one may possibly break that Commandment or make himself criminal in the violation thereof if he may kill an enemy a slanderer a thief an invader an informer in false crimes and even in true ones but secret and which is yet more an innocent person and from whom he never received any displeasure an Infant a Prince a King all sorts of Superiors without excepting Fathers and Mothers If he may challenge into the field assassinate publickly kill by surprise or upon advantage cause to dye secretly by poyson or otherwise for the preservation of his life honour or goods and even for the least thing in the world as for an Apple when he believes himself obliged in honour not to let him carry it away who hath taken it I say if one may kill or cause to be killed in all these cases without punishment or sin as the Jesuits teach publickly it will necessarily follow that according to their Maxims for a man to make himself criminal against the Commandment which forbids Murder he must kill in a frolick and without any true or apparent cause Which cannot be suitable to any but Devils and those that have a diabolick malice ARTICLE V. Of Vncleanness which the Jesuits allow against the Command of God and natural Reason THe Jesuits allow almost every thing in this matter excepting the last act of this sin and it would be even hard to justifie according to their Maxims and Reasons that they condemn it at all in good earnest since they approve as we shall see presently and discharge from all crime all the ways and means that conduce to that end as lewd company impudent discourses kisses looks dishonest thoughts pollution it self which is in some sort the accomplishment of fleshly lust I know not whether we may not fear after what Father Tambourin hath written lest the Jesuits should at length affirm that Fornication may be lawful See here his words 1 Fornicationem esse peccatum mortale contrariuni afferete esse haereticum decretum est in Clement Ad nostram De haereticis Sed an sit solum prohibita jure positivo an etiam jure natureli atque adeo ex se sit intrinsece mala quaeritur à Doctoribus Et Durandus quidem Mardnus de Magistris Caramuel aliique putant esse solum ex jure positivo Verum communis omnium fere Doctorum sententia docet esse de lege naturali Mihi vero duo sunt certs Primo hanc communem esse veram sententiam Secundo data hac veritate dicendum à nobis esse dari rationem naturalem id certo probantem sed ingenue fateri nos debere eam à priori nondum clare esse compertam Ita solemus respondere cum de coeli quibusdam occultis cum de quadratura circuli aliisque similibus etiam in Philosophia disputamus ea nimitum certa esse certisque rationibus posse probari verum eas nondum adhuc fuisse manifeste ab ullo proposi as Dixi à priori nam à posteriori satis manifeste probatur praesertim ex eo quod si non esset jure naturali prohibita in aliquo tandem urgentissimo casu postet in ea dispensari quod nullo modo dici potest Tambourin lib. 7. decal cap. 1. sect 2. num 1. It is defined by the Clementine Ad nostram De Haereticis That Fornication is a mortal sin and that to say the contrary is an Heresie But whether it be forbidden by positive or natural Law and by consequent whether it be evil in it self is a question amongst the Doctors Durand Martinus de Magistris Caramuel and some few others believe that it is forbidden by positive Law only But the common opinion and of almost all the Doctors is that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature As for me I hold two things for certain First that the common opinion is true Secondly that this truth being presupposed we must say that there is some natural reason which proves it But I must ingenuously acknowledge that the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn is not yet entirely discovered After this manner it is that we are accustomed to answer concerning some secrets of Heaven or the squaring of the Circle or other like questions when we dispute of them in Philosophy For we say that these things are certain and that they may be proved by demonstrative reasons but no man hath yet propounded them I say the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn For if the consequences of it be considered it may be proved manifestly enough principally from this that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature it might be granted by dispensation in some
very pressing occasions which cannot be said in any wise It is easie to see whither this reasoning tends 1 Dari posse ignorantiam invincibilem circa praeceptum non fornicandi saltem apud Barbaros incultos probabile est Ita Azor Fagundes quia non admodum manifeste illud deducitur ex primis principils luminis naturalis num 10. It is probable saith he that one may be invincibly ignorant of the precept which forbids fornication at least amongst barbarous and gross-witted persons This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundez The reason is because this precept is not drawn manifestly from some first principle of natural light He saith first of all that many Doctors whom he cites hold that Fornication is forbidden only by positive Law and by consequent this opinion is probable according to him being supported by the Authority of these Doctors who without doubt are not destitute of reasons to prove it In the second place he saith the Principle from whence we may infer that Fornication is evil in it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature is not evident that it cannot be found or at least wise not clearly discovered Whence it follows that this Conclusion is no more evident than its Principle but is it self only probable And though it be more probable at this day than the contrary opinion which hath not so many Partizans and Casuists on its side nevertheless as it is the more sweet that is to say hath more liberty and canformity to the corrupt inclinations of Nature it may perhaps shortly prevail above the other by suffrages and the greater number of these new Casuists who profess a complacent Divinity and follow voluntarily the most indulgent opinions In the third place though it should continue always less probable it is enough that it is simply probable since the least or last degree of probability suffices to be followed with a safe conscience according to these Doctors 4. Whence it follows evidently that he who shall be of Tambourins opinion may absolutely demand and receive a dispensation for Fornication as well as for fasting because it is at least probable according to him that neither the one nor the other is forbidden but only by positive Law and where things are not evil save only in regard they are forbidden one may with some reason and even without any reason according to some Casuists obtain and make use of a dispensation for it 5. Tambourin hath foreseen this inconvenience and disorder and confesseth openly enough that it follows from his opinion in the manner he propounds and that he maintains it when he saith 2 Si non esset jure naturali prohibits inâ—liquo tandem urgentissimo casu posset in ea dispensari Tambur lib. 7. decal cap. 1. sect 2. num 1. That if for want of an evident Principle which he confesses it hath not one would prove it by consequences it may be proved manifestly enough from this principally that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature he speaks of Fornication it might be indulged by dispensation He produces here as a principal reason which may prove it or rather as a conjecture which may make it believed that Fornication is forbidden by the Law of Nature because we cannot have a dispensation to commit it And some other time if the world be better disposed than at present he himself or his Society building upon the same Principles with him may easily prove that it may be dispensed with because it is not evident that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature and that it is even probable that it is only by positive Law as he declares it himself And so Fornication shall be in the number of things indifferent and it may be lawful when it pleases them to employ their Authority and their reasons to take away the prohibition which alone renders it evil and criminal And it seems that he would prepare before hand as it were at distance mens minds one day to receive this unhappy Doctrine when he saith in the end of the Section 1 Dari posse ignorantiam invincibilem circa praeceptum non fornicandi salcem apud Barbaros incultos probabile est Ita Azor Fagundez quia non admodum manifeste illud deducitur ex primis principils luminis naturalis num 10. That it is probable that there may be invincible ignorance of the precept which forbids Fornication at least amongst Barbarians and gross-witted people This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundez The reason whereof is because this precept is not manifestly drawn from the first Principles of the light of Nature He also said once that it is neither evident nor certain by way of Principle or by natural Reason that Fornication is evil of it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature And from thence he infers that a man may be invincibly that is innocently ignorant that Fornication is a sin Whence it follows that in such a disposition it may be committed innocently and without sin because according to the Principles of his Divinity and Society that which is done by invincible ignorance is no sin This permission which he grants to commit Fornication by ignorance is as it were a presumption and proof that Fornication may be committed according to him by dispensation since the one follows as well as the other from his reasoning and is grounded upon the same foundation which he establisheth or supposeth here in this place That there is no evident Principle drawn from the light of Nature by which it may be demonstrated that Fornication is evil in it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature And this same reason proves also that he holds Fornication not to be forbidden by the Law of God For no man can dispense any more with the Law of God than with the Law of Nature So that if Fornication were not forbidden by the Law of Nature nevertheless it could not be dispensed with if it were forbidden by the Law of God and so whilst he maintains that if the Law of Nature forbad it not it might be lawful in some case by dispensation from men he testifies clearly that he believes not that it is forbidden by the Law of God Bauny in his Sum Chap. 46. pag. 717. assures us That they who in the places of their Trade and Commerce are obliged to see speak and treat with young Maids and Women whose sight and company causeth them oftentimes to fall into sin are capable in this perpetual danger of being in a state of Grace and of receiving the Sacrament Layman affirms indeed in general that we are obliged to flye the next occasions of sin but he adds thereto these exceptions 2 Excipe nisi proquinquum periculum seu occasio mortaliter peccandi sine gravi incommodo corporis famae aut fortunarum tolli non possit tunc consilium quidem est minorem illam jacturam majori bono securitatis animae posthabere Layman lib.
its behalf commanded us on these days to quit the care of all other affairs and abstain from all employments which might hinder or divert us from it The Jesuits acknowledge these two obligations contained in this Commandment but they destroy them at the same time by false explications and accommodations altogether humane as we shall now presently see in this Article which we shall divide expresly into two Points and each of them shall have two Paragraphs that we may more distinctly and clearly represent the Opinions of the Jesuits upon each of these obligations I. POINT SECTION I. That the Jesuits despise the Authority of the Church and destroy the Commandment by which it forbids to work on Feast-days LAyman treating on the observation of Feasts saith that in that part of this Commandment which forbids labour it is commanded that we should 1 Ut integro die Festo opera servilia non exerceantur abstain the whole Feast-day from doing any servile work And in his following discourse expounding what he intends by servile works he adds 2 Opera servilia dicuntur quae corporis commoditatibus inservientia ignobiliora sunt per servos exercerl solita cujusmodi sunt arare fabricare c. Layman lib. 4. tract 7. cap. 2. num 1. pag. 181. They are called servile works which being only for the service of the body are in themselves base and are not ordinarily done but by servants as to plow to build c. He testifies that to dance play go to a Stage-play are not actions forbidden by this Commandment because these are not actions proper unto servants nor slaves And he discovers his opinion sufficiently by what he speaks in the sequel 3 Dicimus igitur sola opera servilis eaque omnia die Festo prohibita esse praeterquam si jure vel consuetudine permissa sint Ibid. n. 2. That none but servile works are forbidden on Feast-days but they are not all forbidden neither if there be any particular reason or custom that allows them This suffices him not to have reduced the Churches Prohibition of working on Feast-days to those works only which are proper for slaves and servants as if this part of the Commandment were only for servants he thought fit also to put a great exception to it by saying Praeterquam si jure vel consuetudine permissa sint From this exception as a Principle he draws many Conclusions which are so many usurpations upon this Commandment and so many dispensations to work on Feast-days He allows 1. To write all sorts of things to copy to paint And his reason is 4 Quia non minus pictores in pingendo quam literarum studiosi in legendo animi quadam voluptate capiuntur detinentur quod signum est artem pingendi non servilem â—d liberalem esse quippe ad recreandum hominem institutam liberoque homine dignâ—m Ibid. num 3. Because Painters receive no less satisfaction in painting than those who love books in studying which shews that the Painters Art is not servile but liberal and taken up for a divertisement unto our minds and worthy of a Gentleman As if Festivals were instituted for divertisement or none but persons of base and servile condition were obliged to break off their ordinary Trades and labour to serve God on these days He adds a little after that to follow these exercises that is to say to write and paint on the Feast-days not only for divertisement or some just and necessary cause but also out of a meer mercenary Spirit and for lucre only is no evil and his reason is 1 Nâ—m lucrum aut merces non facit opus esse servile Because interest and profit do not make an action servile There is nothing but toil and weariness of the body that seems to him to be servile profane and unworthy the Feast-days but divertisements pleasures interests and profits appear unto him honourable and worthy of generous persons and solemn Festivals And because according to this Principle hunting and fishing should be judged the most servile being the most toilsom of greatest labour see how he speaks thereof 2 Venari aucupari piscari ex genere suo servilia opera esse videntur ideoque jure communi prohibitâ—… ut colligitur ex cap. Licet De feriis Consuetudo tamen obtinuit ut diebus Festis licita sit recreation is causa instituta venatio itemque piscatio in fluminibus sint c. Ibid. n. 6. To hunt and hawk and fish seem to be actions of a servile nature and consequently forbidden by the civil Law as may be gathered from the Chapter Licet De Feriis yet custom hath obtained that it should be allowed to hunt for divertisement on Feast-days as also to fish in Rivers without too many people and too much toil He doth well to set the civil Law and the Commandment of the Church on the one hand which forbid hunting and fishing on Feast-days and on the other hand the custom contrary to this Commandment which hath introduced the abuse of hunting and fishing on these days and hereupon he passes sentence in favour of the custom Consuetudo obtinuit It puts also the Exercises of War into the same rank with hunting and fishing 3 Bellare videtur opus fervile cum proxime tendat ad hominum necem quare die Festo permissum non est Ibid. num 7. It seems saith he that the Exercises of War are servile works because they tend directly to kill men for this cause they are not lawful on Festival-days He declares then that the Exercise of War is a servile thing But presently after he advances and ennobles it again in the same manner as he did hunting and fishing before adding 4 Consuetudo tamen non minus artem militarem quam venationem Festo die honestavit That custom hath made it honourable and worthy of the Feast-days as well as hunting The same thing may be said of Dances Balls Stage-plays and other shews which the corruption of the world hath authorized against the intention and order of the Church consuetudo illa die festo honestavit But it is easie to see that the Feast-days do not make these exercises honourable but rather these exercises dishonour and profane the Feasts as all the Saints have at all times believed and taught in the Church and the most common light of Faith and Christianity alone is sufficient for us whereby to know this And this Jesuit himself acknowledges it sufficiently in affirming that these Exercises of Hunting and War c. are of a servile nature and forbidden by the civil Law on the Feast-days So that when he saith afterwards that notwithstanding the prohibition of the Church and order of Nature it self custom hath authorized these Exercises and made them honest and lawful on Feast-days he must needs attribute an admirable vertue unto custom and altogether extraordinary which surpasses the Power of the