assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
written in the Hearts of men in the very same manner as the Lawes of Cities or oâ— the Prince are accustomed to be inscribed in Tables of Brasse For they have the same authority and estimation of a Law or of a Rule imposed by God upon us as the Will of the Law-giver signified in a publick instrument and exposed to the peoples view is adjudged to be a Law XXV This natural Law doth consist of diveâ— practical principles which notwithstanding are redâ—ced to one first and universal Law which doth contain the other This universal Law though but short is bipartite of two parts viz. Good is to be done Evil is to be avoyded In the same manner all the Commandements in the Decalogue are reduced to one Universal Law to wit the love of God and the love of our neighbour To this Universal Law conserved in the Synteresis there are other particular Laws subordinated which are derived from it as Conclusions are from Premises some whereof are of the first Dictate of Nature and next of all adjoyning to that principal Law others stand farther off and have only a Secondary relation and by the virtue of those which are more neere Those which are of the first dictate of Nature as soon as they are presented to our minds and cogitations they presently command our belief and by reason of the undeniable evidence of them they do inforce us to assent unto them for it is not lawful to doubt of the truth of them nor is it possible for any one who understands the sence of the words to erre concerning them for no sooner it is propounded that God is to be worshiped and no man to be injured but the mind presently is at rest and without delay assenteth to it but in the latter by reason of the difference which may arise from Circumstances it most often comes to passe that we both doubt and erre and the more remote we are from those first Principles the more prone we are to run into error For the first and universal Principles are so much the more certain than the posterior and the particular as they are the lesse circumstanced For by Circumstances and by descending as commonly it is spoken we oftentimes do fall into errors The precepts of the first kind are that Parents are to be honoured Children nursed the life of our neighbours to be preserved the pledge to be restored which as they are commonly and for the most part to be observed yet they are not absolutely and simply if the thing and place which might so come to passe should otherwise require it For the Commands of the Parents are to be despised in comparison of the Love of God and there may be a just cause of disclayming unreclaymed Children and taking away the life of our neighbour neither is the sword to be restored to the mad man Near unto this distinction is that distribution of Offices Cicer. lib. 1. Offic. in Cicero which he hath taken from the Stoicks for with them a right and perfect Duty which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one thing and a mean or a common duty which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is another Wherefore that the Conscience may judge more rightly and more certainly what is the will of God so far as is pertaining to this part of the Rule of it it will be requisite to direct it to the most universal precepts that possibly may be had and to those first Axioms which are of themselves to be believed But because I must make haste to other observations I shall here put a period to my discourse concerning this Law of Nature and present you with that of Cicero in his lost books de Republica which by Lactantius 6. Instit 8. is expressely thus recorded Est quidem verò lex recta ratio naturae congruens diffusa in omnes constans sempiterna quae vocet ad officium jubendo vetando à fraude detereat Huic legi nec obrogari fas est nec derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest Nec verò aut per Senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus Nec est quaerendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius Nec erit alia Lex Romae alia Athenis alia nunc alia posthac sed omnes gentes omni tempore una lex sempiterna immortalis continebit Unúsque erit communis quasi Magister imperator omnium Deus ille Legis hujus inventor disceptator lator cui qui non parebit ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernabitur atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenas etiamsi caetera supplicia quâ—e putantur effugerit The Law is right Reason agreeable to nature diffused into all constant everlasting which calleth unto duty by commanding and by forbidding deterreth from deceit This Law is not to be contradicted neither is it lawfull for any man to derogate from it neither is it possible that it should be altogether abrogated We cannot be discharged from it either by the Senate or the People It needs not an Expounder or Interpreter It will not bear one construction at Rome and another at Athens it will not be one now and another hereafter but being the same Law perpetual and immortal it includeth all Nations and at all times And there is as it were one common master and Soveraign Commander over all the one God the Inventor Discussor and Communicator of this Law whom whosoever shall not obey he shall fly from himself and be unworthy of the nature of man and for this alone shall grievously be tormented although he escapeth other punishments that are conceived A remarkable place and which so cleerly unfoldeth the force and nature of this inbred light that we need not to make any addition to it XXVI The second light which is conveyed into the mind as I have said doth come unto it from without and proceedeth from Divine Revelation to wit from that light which God hath held forth unto us in the holy Scriptures in which more fully he hath made known his will unto man that there nothing might be wanting which is necessary for the institution of his manners and the attainment of everlasting happinesse And the rather because the inward natural light as already I have shewed doth not suffice thereto Now this light differs from the natural light not only in its original but in its perfection First because it manifesteth the will of God in those things to which the light of Nature cannot attain Secondly because it ordinateth the moral actions dictated by the light of Nature to a higher end Thirdly because that whereas the Law ingraven in the mind is instituted by God as he is the Author of Nature This Law revealed in the word is instituted by him as he is the Author of Grace and Salvation Therefore where the light of nature is either weak or defective as it is
defective in those things which are beyond its Sphear of which nature are the mysteries of Faith and weak in those things which are a little more remote from those precepts which are most universal in those cases I say we must have recourse to the light of the word as to a light shining in a dark place 2 Pet. 1. 19. To the Law and the Testimony if they speak not according to this word it is because there is no light in them Ifa 8. 20. Thy word is a Lantern unto my feet and a light unto my path Ps 119. 105. If I should enlarge my self upon the perfection and the profit of this Law there would be no end of my discourse See on this Subject the nineteenth Psalm where there you shall find much in few words and concisely And the hundred and nineteenth Psalm where you shall find the same things in more words and more largely represented XXVII Moreover there are two parts of this Law the Law properly so called and the Gospel I do not here understand the Law and the Gospel in that sence as for the most part it is taken by Divines for the two Covenants made by God with man The covenant of Works and the covenant of Grace but in the more common acceptation for the Books of the old and new Testament which the Fathers not unaptly for this purpose have called the old Law and the new Law but both these Laws all the whole Law of Moses and the new Law of Christ for that part of it which containeth moral institutions is cryed down by the Antinomians the Anabaptists and Enthusiasts and other prodigious names of a generation of people of our age as altogether unprofitable and unworthy of the care and study of a Christian after he is come to be of age in Christ and annoynted with the unction of the Spirit They will admit of no Law but only the Law of Faith and the Dictates of the Spirit I am not at leasure now to confute them neither indeed is it very needfull seeing that the Apostle James hath long since so opposed the Monsters of such errours as if by some Prophetick Spirit he had on purpose undertaken the Confutation of them XXVIII The old Law which is called the Mosaical Law is distinguished into three parts the Moral the Ceremonial and the Judicial Of every one whereof many things are diversely disputed by many men I shall at this time passe them by and briefly propound unto you what I conceive of the obligation of them reserving in the mean time to every man his own Judgment I say therefore in the first place That no Law at all delivered by Moses doth formally directly and by its self oblige the Conscience of Christians as it is the Law delivered by Moses my reason is that every Mosaical Law as Mosaical was positive and a Law positive doth oblige none but those only on whom it is imposed Seeing therefore that the Law delivered by Moses was only imposed on the peculiar Nation of the Hebrews as may easily appear to any man that will observe but the beginning of it Hear Israel and the whole Addresse of the folowing discourse it cannot so appertain unto those who are out of the number of that Nation as by that account to oblige them because delivered by Moses But if any part of that Law doth now oblige Christians as certainly the Commandements of the Decalogue are obliging it commeth to passe by Accident and ratione materiae by reason of the matter not because Moses so commanded but because that which hath been commanded by him is either agreeable to the Law of Nature or confirmed in the new Law by Christ himself XXIX I say in the second place That the Ceremonial Law of Moses doth oblige the Jewes in their Consciences before the Gospel of Jesus Christ was preached to them but not other men unlesse those only who were Proselytes of the Jewish Religion and worship who consisting of two kinds Proselytae Portae and Proselytae Justitiae so called by the Jews that is to say Proselytes of the Gate and Proselytes of Righteousnesse were obliged to the observation of the Ritual precepts Those of the former kind were obliged to the fewer but those of the latter as the Jews themselves were obliged to the observation of them all Now from the time of the Death and Resurrection of Christ since the Gospel began first to be preached to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles until the eversion of the Temple of Jerusalem and the Jewish Common-wealth this Law indeed was dead if we love to speak after St. Augustine but not deadly which is to say that it had lost the force of obliging but the Rites and Ceremonies delivered by Moses were not altogether unlawful but left as indifferent to the observation of every man so that it was lawful for any one according to the emergency of the occasion to use the freedom of his own will and to use them or not to use them a due respect being always had to Prudence and Charity And that this was the sence of St. Paul is so manifest both by his constant Doctrine and his Practice that there needeth no proof of it And after the eversion of the Temple it was spoken by diverse men that this part of the Law of Moses was not only dead but mortiferous which unlesse it be rightly applyed and with a prepared Distinction I am affraid will be found to be more wittily than solidly expressed For all Ceremonies are not alike to be esteemed But those which concern Order and Decency are wisely to be severed from those which were the Figures of Christ to come for those figurative Ceremonies which were instituted by God to be Types of Christ our Redeemer to come in the Flesh such as were Circumcision sacrifices and many such like became certainly of no use after Christ did really fulfill all things which were typically figured in those Ceremonies and sufficiently declared to the whole world by the Preachers of his Gospel that all those things were rightly fulfilled they are therefore to be taken away not only as dead and rotten but are most carefully to be shunned by every true Christian as deadly and pestiferous and above all things it must most precisely be taken heed unto that they be not observed with any opinion of necessity according to that Gal. 5. 2. I Paul say unto you if you be circumcised Christ will profit you nothing But those Ceremonies which pertain only to the outward Decency in the solemnity of the Divine-worship although peradventure it were better not to use them where a just cause of offence may be given yet they are not simply to be condemned as unlawfull upon this bare account that they are a part of the Mosaical paedagogy XXX I say in the third place That although many do distinguish betwixt those Political Laws of Moses which were of a common right of which they
clear indeed from the fault by reason of his invincible Ignorance which was impossible to be helped and consequently he ought to be free from the punishment which justly is due to no man but for the fault neverthelesse he shall not only sustain the Dammage by reason of the nullity of the Contract which he entred into but he is bound also to sustain it according to Conscience both by the force of obedience which is due unto the Law and by his reflection on the publick profit The like is to be determined in many other Laws of the like nature For examples sake In those Laws by which persons are disabled by which privileges are revoked In those Laws by which Usury is moderated and in those by which certain prices of things to be sold are constituted and in the like of which the Canonists and the Divines do treat at large Neither ought this seem to be unjust to any man for although a Dammage be sometimes called a Punishment it is only analogically and very improperly for otherwise there is a great difference betwixt a Dammage and a Penalty or punishment properly so called If an innocent person be punished a great injury is done unto him but often it comes to passe that an innocent person may be dammaged and yet no great injury done unto him And thus much as conduceth to our present purpose may suffize to be spoken of the promulgation of the Law X. In the next place we are to speak of the penal Law in which many things being omitted which unprofitably are accustomed to be disputed by many of the Casuists and which pertain rather to the external and pleading Courts as that of the Canonists and Papists than to the internal Court of Conscience we shall be contented to give a view unto you of some few and the most remarkable of them and which most neerly we conceive do conduce to the Government of Conscience In this kind we meet first of all with this doubt Whether the Constitution of the punishment doth any wayes pertain to the Essence of the Law I answer It seemeth that it doth not as something that is extrinsecally requisite to compleat the Essence of it so that the Law were not a Law if the penalty were not annexed to it but only consequently as something necessary to this that the Law may effectually obtain the end which it intended For the Form and Essence of the Law consisteth in the Precept of it I here understand Precept as it is largely taken to comprehend a prohibition with it as in the Scriptures are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and amongst the Divines as well Negative Commandments as Affirmative are commonly called Precepts And from this Precept alone both the powers do depend which we have said to be in the Law viz. the power of directing the Action and of obliging the Consciences of the Subjects For the Subject hath a sufficient Rule according to which he ought to direct his Actions and to the observation whereof unlesse he will be wanting in his duty he is bound in Conscience as soon as he understands that his lawful Superior hath commanded this or that by Law whether there be any punishment annexed to that Law or not Therefore this necessity of annexing the punishment doth not arise from the Nature of the Law it self which consisteth in the meer Precept but that the Precept which of it self would not barely suffice Tatitè permittitur quod sâ—ne ultiâ—ne prohibetur Tert. 1. contra Marcion 26. may with the greater vigour obtain its effect from another double Hypothesis the one of the Subject the other of the End For it is expedient that the Laws should be most religiously observed which is the Hypothesis in respect of the End neverthelesse the inbred Depravity of mans heart being supposed w ch is another Hypothesis in respect of the Subject it can very hardly or almost never come to passe but that the most profitable Laws will be despised either by the negligence or the perversenesse of most men unlesse by fear they are contained within their bounds Qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt solo metu continentur Quintil. 12. Instit who make but a mock of the Dictates of Conscience From this double Hypothesis it comes to passe that the wisest Law-makers have alwayes judged it necessary and saving to the Common-wealth to add more force to the observation of the Laws by the fear of punishments and that after the example of God himself who pronounced not the first Law which he gave to man without the threatning of a punishment Gen. 3. Some good Citizens peradventure whose number are but few induced only by the Conscience of their Duty and their Love unto Virtue and their Country would render Obedience unto the Laws although there were no punishment propounded but the Turba or the greatest number are inforced only by the fear of punishment to the performance of their Duties It is manifest hereby that the Constitution of punishments in the making of Laws is necessary XI The second Doubt is concerning the obligation of the penal Law as to the extension of it whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the penalty or whether it obligeth unto the fault also Which is to demand if a Subject may so satisfie the Law and his Duty if being prepared to undergoe and by undergoing the penalty constituted by the Law he may be no longer guilty of the Delinquency although he observeth not the command of the Law Or whether for all that he is not bound in Conscience to the performance of that which is by the is Law commanded That more clearly and distinctly we may answer to this doubt it being a Question of great Moment and of which in the Common Lives of Men there is a most frequent use It will not be amisse the better to unfold it to premise some things which are very profitable before hand to be known We are to understand therfore in the first place that that positive Humane Law ought only to be called Penal which by the will of the Legislator doth expresly determine some temporal punishment for the Transgressors of it And in all this discourse as often as mention is made of punishment you are to understand no other but only a Temporal punishment This word Temporal punishment is taken in a twofold Consideration either as 't is opposed to the Spiritual or as it is opposed to Eternal punishment And for the most part in common discourse they are taken as Members contradistinct to one another sometimes Spiritual opposed to Temporal and sometimes Eternal unto Temporal there are therefore three kinds of punishments or if you will you may call them Species or manners of punishments or degrees of punishments For whatsoever comes under the name of punishment is first Either a spiritual punishment as the losse or the deprivation of Grace
8. c. No nor all those deeds neither which are praised 78 12. It is an easy thing to erre in the application of examples 82 14. c. Some examples of perverse Imitation 85 16. c. An argument from the example examined against the custom of kneeling in the holy Supper 87 23. c. What is the use of examples 95 25. c. It is unsafe to subject the Conscience to the opinions of every man 99 28. The tyranny of the Pope of Rome over the Consciences of men 102 29. c. Not to impute too much to the judgements of other men ibid. 31. Nor yet too little 104 The Summary of the Fourth Lecture 1. c. What is that Rule of Conscience to be enquired after 106 4. c. To which we ought to conform our selves 109 6. c. Diverse Degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience 111 9. c. The first Conclusion God alone hath a peculiar and a direct command over the Conscience 113 12. c. The second Conclusion The next Rule of Conscience is right reason 116 14. c. The third Conclusion The Scripture is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience 119 18. c. And nothing hereby derogated from the perfection of it 124 20. c. The fourth The Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be manifested 126 23. Which is also the Fundamental of the Obligation 13 24. c. The three parts of this rule first the light by nature infused into the mind which is the Law of Nature 131 26. Secondly the light conveyed into the mind by the written Word of God 27. c. 32. c. In the old Law or the Law of Moses 137 In the new Law the Law of the Gospel 142 35. Thirdly the â—ight acquired 143 Which consisteth by 36. The discourse of Reason 145 37. And the Authority of the Church ibid. The Summary of the Fifth Lecture 1. c. A rehearsal of what before hath been spoken 147 2. c. What is to be understood by the word LAW 149 5. And what by the word OBLIGATION ibid. 6. Question Whether Humane Laws do oblige the Conscience 154 7. c. The first Conclusion Unjust Laws do not oblige the Conscience 155 Which is unfolded 157 9. And confirmed 158 10. The Second Conclusion The Law of man can superinduce a new Obligation to the former 159 11. The Third Conclusion A Law made by one not invested with lawful doth not oblige 162 14. c. A Discourse concerning the Office of a Subject when de Facto it is manifest that he commandeth who hath no right to command 166 22. The Fourth Conclusion Humane Laws do oblige of themselves in general 175 23. And in particular also by consequence 177 24. c. Which is variously confirmed 178 31. c. An Objection is answered drawn from the liberty of a Christian Man 184 36 As also from the allegation that there is but one Law-giver God and Christ 190 37. And from what else is disputed against this opinion 191 The Summary of the Sixth Lecture 1. A proposal of the most remarkable things here treated of 2. The duty of Obedience and the difference of the either sort of Subjection 197 4. The Conscience is free under that obligation which the Laws induce 20â— 6. c. The first Doubt Of a Law commanding a thing impossible 202 8. Second Doubt Or a thing possible but very burthensome 204 9. Third Or what before was necessary 205 10. c. Fourthly Or a thing filthy and unlawful wherein are Questions and Answers 207 10. 13. 14. 1 Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit ibid. 2 Whether the Subject be bound to observe it so made 210 3 Whether it be lawful for him to observe it so made 4 what unjust Law he may obey and what not 213 15. 16. c. What is required to make a Law obligatory 214 What a Subject is to do being not satisfied whether the Law be just or unjust 215 18. c. The Fifth of the Obligation of a Law permiting evil 217 22. c. Sixth Of a Law determining a thing indifferent 222 26. The Seventh Of Ecclesiastical Laws in specie 226 27. Those things are refelled which are alleaged against them by the adverse party 228 The Summary of the Seventh Lecture 1. A Rehearsal of what hath been already spoken 238 2. c. The first Doubt who it is to whom it belongeth to make Laws 237 Where it is stated that That the Power of making Laws is the Power of a Superior 238 4. Having an external Jurisdiction 239 5. And that in the highest Command 241 6. c. Which conclusion is largely unfolded 243 9. c. And diversly confirmed 246 11. c. The late fiction of a Co-ordinate Power confuted 248 13. The second Doubt Whether the Consent of the people be required to the obligation of a Law 250 14. c. The chief Command or Soveraignty is from God 253 19. And is an off-spring of Fatherly Power 255 17. c. What are the Peoples parts in constituting a Prince 259 21. The People having given the supreme Power to the Prince have not any right to re-assume that Power again 261 22. c. How it comes to passe that some consent of the people is thought to be necessary to the obligation of a Law 264 25. c. The third Doubt what And how far the consent of the people is required 266 28. The fourth Doubt Of the Laws of lesse Commonaltyes 268 The Summary of the Eighth Lecture 1. A Proposal of things to be spoken 273 2. Of the PROMULGATION of a LAW 274 The first Doubt Whether it be necessary 275 3. c. The second Doubt When a Law is conceived to be sufficiently published 276 6. The third Doubt When a Law that is promulgated or published beginneth to oblige 279 7. c. The Fourth Doubt Whether and how far that man is obliged to the observance of a Law who is ignorant of the Promulgatian of it 281 10. Of a LAW PENAL 28â— The first Doubt How far the Constitution of the penalty pertaineth to the Essence of a Law ibid. 1. c. The second Doubt Of the Obligation of it And what a penalty is 287 3. c. What manner of Law a Penal Law is and how manifold it is 290 5. c. The first Conclusion A Penal Law doth so far oblige as the Legislator doth intend it 293 7. c. The second Conclusion A Law purely Penal doth of it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty 295 9. c. Diverse Objections are answered 299 4. The third Conclusion A mixt Penal Law doth oblige unto the Fault also 304 5. The third Doubt How far the transgressor of the Law is bound to undergoe the penalty ipso facto The Summary of the Ninth Lecture â— The end of the Law is the good of the
than what became me being at that instant forgetfull of his place and person and of my duty I ought not to revile the High Priest although he hath done something unworthy of the honour of it but the exilience of my passion did prepossesse me from giving that respect unto him which by a more attentive deliberation I should have done This is the sence of the Apostle in that place and it is as easie as it is proper and pertinent X. But I proceed as Science so Conscience also is taken in three several wayes or acceptations First Subjectively for the intellective practical power as when we say that the Law of Nature is written in the heart or the Conscience Secondly Formally for the Habit pertaining to that Potentiaâ— and informing it In the same sence making mention of a person notoriously wicked we say he is a man of no conscience that he hath either thrown off or lost all conscience Thirdly Effectively for any actual motion exercise or operation of that Habit as when a man saith that he is conscious of this or that fact In which sense is that of St. Peter the first Book second Chapter and 19 verse If any man for his conscience to God doth suffer troubles XI Again seeing that Conscience is properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or a knowledge Syllogisticall insomuch that all who do treat of the nature and the method of it do conceive that it cannot more openly or more aptly be illustrated than by a practical Syllogism It is to be observed that the word Science in the very same respect doth fall under a fourfold consideration First and most properly for the precise knowledge of the conclusion and thus it is taken by Aristotle in his Analyticks and many other places Secondly for the knowledge of Principles from which conclusions are demonstrated as if a man should say he knoweth that Omne totum est majus qualibet sui parte Every thing that is whole is more and greater than any part thereof Thirdly for the knowledge of the whole syllogism for he who knoweth the premises and the Conclusion doth know the whole argumentation Fourthly for the aggregated knowledge of many conclusions or demonstrations pertaining to one Subject in the same sence we are said to know natural Philosophy Geometry Physick c. The very same is to be affirmed of conscience whose full discourse many Authors do comprehend in one practical Syllogism But Conscience as is already mentioned being a conjoyned Science that all which comes under this name may more fully and as it were at one sight be discerned the whole businesse as I conceive will more commodiously be dispatched if we shall frame the whole discourse of Conscience so to consist of two Syllogisms that the conclusion of the first Syllogisme be the Major proposition of the following Every thing that is unjust is to be eschewed Every Theft is unjust therefore Every Theft is to be eschewed Let this be the first Syllogism the first proposition whereof is known of it self by the light of Nature Reason doth prove the Minor and the Conscience doth bring in the conclusion which conclusion it presently takes up to be the beginning of the following Syllogism and applying it to some particular Fact accordingly as the Will shall propound unto it it argues in this manner All Theft is to be eschewed This which is now propounded to me to be done is a Theft therefore it is to be eschewed And the Name of the Vice being changed it proceedeth in this manner as often as it judgeth of any past particular Fact XII These things being thus stated I say that Conscience as well as Science is taken four wayes First and most properly for the last conclusion in the course of both Syllogisms as that in which the last Judgemâ—nt of the practical understanding is contained As if a Man should say my Conscience doth suggest unto me that this Theft is not to be committed or my Conscience cryeth out unto me that it ought not to be committed And the knowledge of this conclusion is properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Conscience as it is distinct from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or a guiltlesse conservation of ones self Secondly it is taken for the knowledge of that first universal principle known by the light of Nature or Revelation on which the whole thred of this discourse depends As if a Man should say my Conscience dictates to me that no unjust thing is to be done The word Synteresis which is a guiltlesse conversation of ones self is often used for Syneidesis or Conscience but improperly as in this and such like expressions The Conscience is nothing else but a Synteresis or a guiltlesse conservation of the mind from falling into any Vice when indeed between Synteresis and Conscience properly so called there is no little difference for there is as great a diversity betwixt this Synteresis and Conscience properly so called as betwixt Science and the Habit of the Intellect which are two habits of the mind specifically distinct as heretofore we have read in the fifth of Aristotles Ethicks As therefore in Speculatives Intelligence is a habit of the first principles about Truth and Falshood from whence conclusions are deduced out of which proceedeth Science So in practicks Synteresis is the habit of the first principles about Good and Evill from whence conclusions are deduced out of which proceedeth Conscience Thirdly Conscience is taken more largely for that whole practical discourse of the mind from the first beginning to the last conclusion which is contained in two such syllogisms as a little above I have propounded to you and in its circuit comprehendeth Synteresis and Syneidesis also properly so called For a mans Conscience doth easily suggest unto him all these things viz. that no unjust thing ought to be done and that Theft is deservedly ranked amongst those Crimes which do carry on them the face of injustice and that this particular act which is by me now committed or which opportunity doth tempt me to commit is the guilt of Theft Fourthly Conscience is taken for the aggregated knowledge of many particular acts of which the whole account of our life and conversation doth consist In which sense those words of the Apostle do seem to be understood Men and Brethren in all good Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have conversed with God unto this day Acts 23. 1. To the same sence is that of the Author of the Hebrews Cap. 13. ver 18. we do assure our selves we have a good Conscience desiring to converse honestly with all men and that of St. Peter in the first Book third Chapter and fifteenth verse where as a godly and learned man hath observed that which in the beginning of the verse is called a good Conscience the very same thing in the end of the same verse is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good conversation for as often as we do praise and
morally good or bad as to serve God to honour our Parents to restore the pledge to oppresse the poor to plunder to keep or to break our trusts and all other things which the Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is worthy praise or reproof and the Schoolmen meritorious or demeritorious And these things are properly the objects of Conscience XXIII The object therefore of the Conscience of man is a moral operable that is either done or to be done either omitted or that may be omitted Neverthelesse it is to be advertised that in men as they are Christians the object of the Conscience is further to be extended and not only oblige them to the performance of their duties as they are men but to believe the mysteries of Faith revealed in the word of God as they are Christians for infidelity doth cause the Conscience to be impure T it 1 15. And the Conscience doth sting that man as much who dispiseth what he vowed in Baptism to believe as him who violates the commandment which he promised to keep And it may not unfitly peradventure be said that even the Evangelical Faith it self is to be accounted amongst the moral operables They are the express words of our Saviour This is the work of God that you believe in his Son Joh. 6. 29. And the like in the first Book of the Apostle St. John the third Chapter and twenty third verse This is his Commandment that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ as he hath commanded us XXIIII The last member of the Definition remaineth which is The proper act of Conscience to wit the application of the light which is in the mind by the discourse of reason to particular Acts I say in the first place that application is the proper and primary Act of the Conscience That Axiome in the Schooles is in every mans mouth That of one Habit there is but one Act to wit the primary and the chief and unto which all the other Acts pertaining to it may be reduced It may sufficiently appear by what is already spoken that there are many Acts of the Conscience in the Species of it but what is that most common Act which brings all the other within its compasse is most of all to be inquired after for no other Act but that primaâ—ry one which is adaequate unto Habit and to which all other Acts are reduced ought to come into the Definition of Habit And hereupon it is that many when they observed that most of those Acts exercised by the Conscience may in some measure be referred to the Act of judging for the Conscience doth judge of Acts past present and to come they concluded that this primary Act was the Act of judging But there are some Acts of Conscience which cannot but hardly and with restraint be referred to it As that Act for example by which the Conscience gives testimony of some thing committed or omitted For it is not for a Judge to be a witnesse nor for a witnesse to pass judgement on a Trespasse Moreover that Act of judging doth necessarily presuppose the Act of applying as going before it for it cannot be but that the Conscience must first apply the Fact which it is about to judge to the light of the mind before it can give true judgment on it And this Act of application is very neer of kine to the derivation of the word of which I have before spoken that Conscience is so called because it is an application of knowledge unto knowledge XXV In the second place I say that this application is an application of the light which is in the mind that is of the light present to the mind at that time when the Application is made whether it be that light of Nature viz. common notions written in the Hearts of men by the dictates of nature and kept in the Synteresis or guiltlesse conservation of the mind as a treasure snatcht from the Common fire and the reliques of the Image of God after the Fall or whether it be a light of Divine revelation either extraordinary by Visions Dreams and Prophesies or ordinary being laid open to mankind in the bookes of the old and new Testament Or lastly whether it be the light of reason to wit whatsoever from the principles of both kinds from the law of nature and the Divine revelation is so immediately and evidently deduced that no man who doth grant the one can doubt of the other XXVI In the third place I do say that this light is applyed by the discourse of reason for this light that is to be applyed being quid universale something universal and that which it is applyed to being particular or singular Acts such an application cannot be made but by the mediation of this discourse of reason which is able to unite Universals unto Singulars And this is the work of Reason by such a Syllogism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 1. Poster 17. or such practical Syllogisms as already I have exhibited unto you Moreover it often comes to pass as it is commonly spoken and experience doth prove it to be true that we erre by going downwards and so it is that although we do not easily fall into an errour concerning the Prima Universalia principia the universal principles which do carry with them a greater evidence yet in the application of those principles and in deducing conclusions from them errours most often are committed wherefore we must use the greater care 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 2. Metaph. 1. and diligence that we do not deceive our selves but that in this discourse of reason all things be exactly considered that so we may justly proceed and as legitimately and duely conclude XXVII Fourthly I say that this application ought to be made to particular Acts which four ways may be done for the Conscience doth apply the light of the mind with which it is endued either to things already done or to things to be done To things already done in a twofold consideration first by bearing testimony that this is done or that it is not done by us in this manner are those formes of the Rhetoricians in the question of the Fact Crestes hast thou killed thy mother the Conscience maketh answer I have killed her Secondly by 〈◊〉 judgment whether the fact committed or omitted be well or ill done or whether well or ill omitted as in the question of right or Law among the Rhetoriciâ—ns where the Fact is evident as Didst thou kill Clodius Milo the reply is I kill'd him Dost thou therefore confesse thy self guilty I have killed him lawfully Here in the first application the Conscience proceeds by the way of a witnesse in the second by the way of a Judge for the offices and Acts of Conscience in the first proceeding are to bear witnesse in the second to reprove to accuse to excuse to condemn to absolve
to be severed and distinguished from it for their Lye was a Vice and not to be followed but their humanity and their piety is praysed by God and they both deserve our Imitation X. In the third place I say that the extraordinary atchievements of the Worthyes are praysed in the Scriptures which being stirred up by a peculiar motion and inspiration of the holy Spirit they performed as it were by a peculiar mandate and beyond the ordinary Law and yet notwithstanding those atchievements are not to be followed Of this Nature is that remarkable Act of Phineas for which he received both commendations and recompence from God himself for being but a private Man and invested with no Lawful Authority he did notwithstanding with his Spear run through the bodies of those two shamelesse persons whom he had taken in the Act of Incontinency Numb 25. 8. And of the same nature was that of Elias the Prophet who having called Fire down from Heaven destroyed the Souldiers that were sent to secure him 2 Kings 4. 10. c. Which Act of his when two of the Disciples of Christ James and John desiring to imitate having asked counsel of their Master concerning it he was so far from approving their rash desires Luke 9 54 that he did reject them and gave a great check to their Choleâ—ick Importunity You know not saith he of what Spirit you are As if he should have said forbear the extravagant heats of your unquiet minds and contain your selves within the bounds of your Vocation If Elias heretofore did any thing severely do not you suppose that the same thing is fitting to be performed by you That which he did was effected by the extraordinary Spirit of God which inwardly did suggest and dictate to him and was like unto that particular Mandate which was given to Abraham to kill his Son Isaac But this belongs not to you whom the Spirit of God hath not yet called to the Execution of so extraordinary and so high a charge you ought not to entertain any thought of attempting it XI Seeing therefore it is not alwayes certain that what hath been performed by a Godly Man ought to be commended and though it hath been commended it ought not unpremeditately to be imitated it is far more conducible to the security of our Consciences to bring home and conform our Deeds to the Rule of the Law which is certain than to follow the uncertain Examples of Men. Most true is that of St. Augustine Haec quae in Scripturis Sanctis legimus non ideò quià facta credimus etiam facienda credamus ne violemus praecepta dum passim sectamur exempla We ought not to believe that these things which we read in the Holy Scriptures are therefore to be done again because that already they have been performed least we violate the precepts whiles every where we do follow the Examples And after other words to the same purpose he doth thus conclude Unde constat quod non omnia quae à Sanctis et justis viris legimus facta transfere debemus ad mores From hence it is manifest that we ought not to translate all things into practice and manners which we do read to have been performed by holy and just men And thus far of our second Argument concerning the difficulty of judging the examples of Godly men by reason of the great uncertainty which is in them XII The third Argument followeth taken from the difficulty of rightly applying the Examples of other men to our own Affairs and Actions by reason of the uncertainty of the Circumstances which being of an infinite variety do also infinitely vary the qualities of humane Actions That which is free and lawful in the Thesis that is the Positions is so also in the Hypothesis or Supposition the same Circumstances remaining I call that lawful which may be done without Sin and that free which without Sin may be omitted now the same thing any one circumstance being added or taken away or any wayes changed may be made unlawful of that which was Lawful and necessary of that which before was free and this we see every day by Experience in our Courts of Law when pleadings are made at the Bar where by the advocate of one side the preceding Examples of Cases before judged are cited for the advantage of their Cause and it is answered by the Advocate of the other side that there is not in both Cases the same Reason of Law that the Circumstances are varyed from whence it comes to passe that the Case is altered and those things which were cited to be reported and to be judged of before do not appertain to the Suit now in Controversie But if that rightly the Case be demonstrated the whole frame of the Defence which did support it self on this Foundation doth presently fall to the ground And the precedent taken heretofore of the things that have been so judged will be of no moment at all with the Judges From hence it comes to passe that amongst the several kinds of Argumentation with Logicians the Exemplum or Example is ranked amongst the last as more fit to illustrate than to demonstrate a thing And certainly if that of Fabius be true Tot seculis nullam repertam esse causam quae sit tota alteri similis In so many ages there hath never yet any cause been found which hath been altogether like to one another It s likely enough that very easily he may Erre who by the condition of one cause doth hastily passe his Judgement on another like unto it having not first with all diligence weighed with himself the circumstances of them both XIII In which consideration we are so much the more ready to fall into an error because we are most of us of such a temper that in the application of the examples of others unto our selves we only look upon the bare fact and greedily make use of it by enforcing it to our purpose especially if it seems to comply with our affections and the desires of our hearts in the mean time taking not into our least consideration either the causes of the fact or of the end or the manner of the circumstances of it especially if they are not suitable or complacent unto us The Prophet Amos in the sixth Chapter and fifth verse doth reprove some of his time who in the midst of publick calamities being too slothfull and secure did delight themselves in Riot and all manner of pleasures and amongst other things did whisper unto themselves that like unto David they did invent unto themselves instruments of Musick as if they should have said why should that be condemned in us to be a Vice which was a praise and honour unto David That Holy Man did exercise himself in Psalms and Instruments of Musick And we do the like but in the mean time we do dissemble with our selves and fail in that which principally was to be imitated in David for
performance of them because they did not pertain unto him but were only peculiar to the Israelites and it is known that the Law doth not oblige all men unto whom it is known but all those only to whom it is given XXII In the third place I say the will of God in what way soever it be revealed for the will of God receiveth its authority from it self and not from the manner of revealing it So that the Church of Rome in their controversie concerning Traditions need not to take so much pains to prove That the word of God unwritten is of equal authority with the word of God that is written for this we willingly do grant unto them We only â—ain would understand how we may satisfie our selves that the Tradition unwritten may appear to be the word of God as undoubtedly as the word which is written The will of God therefore in what manner soever it be revealed is the Rule of the Conscience provided it be so revealed that it either actually be made known or may be so made known unto the mind if culpable negligence doth not hinder And it doth oblige the Conscience to acknowledge it and to propound it unto our own will as the will of God to which it is bound to conform it self and not only so but to command the executive potentiaes to bestirre themselves for the fulfilling of this will of God Remarkable is that of Damascene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what God willeth mâ—st of necessity be good for his will is the measure of goodnesse but the Law of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—hat commandment by which 〈…〉 that good will of his he proceeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of God comming to our â—ind doth attract it to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it doth incite instimâ—late and as it were spurs it doth urge our Consciences to the performance of their duties by representing and inculcating into our wills the will of God And this is that most proper and exact obligation of Conscience which we before have spoken of XXIII The force and effect of this obligation is variously expressed by St. Paul Sometimes he confesseth himself a Debator to the Grecians and Barbarians Rom. 1. 14. As if he should say seeing I know by the will of God that I am set apart to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles without difference whether they are Graecians or Barbarians I acknowledge that in this respect I am a Debtor to them And in the 2 Cor. 2. 14. he saith that he is tyed and bound as men are bound with bonds to the performance of this duty And in the first of the Corinthians the ninth Chapter and the sixteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The preaching of the Gospel is intrusted to me so that I have not the leasure to be idle for a great necessity doth presse me and wo unto me if I should neglect it The like necessity to be imposed upon them and not to be shaken off was openly and before St. Pauls time acknowledged by two of the greatest of the Apostles and for a long time individual Companions S. Peter and St. John Acts 4. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we cannot but speak God hath commanded us to speak with authority and you command us to hold our peace Whether it be better to obey him or to obey you Do you judge We are free and can be so from your command for you have no power upon our Consciences but the command of God doth hold us fast and haâ—h such a coercive power over us that unlesse we wil perish we cannot be free nor do any thing but that only which he commandeth XXIV Moreover when it is asserted that the next and immediate Rule of the Conscience is the light of the mind and the primary and the supreme Rule is the written word of God and the proper and the Adaequate Rule of it the will of God by manner whatsoever revealed or which is to the same sence The Law imposed by God on the reasonable Creature That these things may more fully be understood we are to know that the light of the mind is threefold as God in three ways hath manifested his will to the reasonable Creature There is the light innate the light inferred and the light acquired or the light of nature the light of Scripture and the light of Doctrine The first light which I do call the light Innate doth proceed from the Law of nature For in the first creation of the World as God endued brute and inanimate Creatures with a natural instinct by which they are inclined unto those things which are congruous to their natures and the conservatives of it which is as a Law unto them as it is so expressed by David Psal 148. 6. Thou hast given them a Law which they may not transgresse So a certain natural Law is given unto man and proportionated to his nature as he is a reasonable Creature that is more sublime and noble and if I may so speak it more Divine than what is given to other Creatures of this inferiour Oâ—h And this Law doth incite him to the performance of those things which are agreeable to his nature as he is a man that is to say a living Creature indued with reason or to live according to reason Now this Law is natural impression and as it were a figure of that eternal Law which is in the mind of God and it is a part of that Divine Image after which man at the first was said to be made Gen. 1. by which knowing of a certainty that there are some things in our reasonable nature that are congruous to the will of God the Creator and other things which are not so we do conclude that the one is good and ought to be performed by us and the other evil altogether to be abhomined The light proceeding from this law is extremely obscured by that grievous ruine which folowed the fall of Adam and from hence arise those thick clouds of Ignorance and Error in which all his posterity whilst we live in this World are invelopped But the providence of God hath so most wisely ordered it that in the common wrack it hath come off more unhurt than many other of the Faculties for it hath pleased God that certain propositions and practical principles Quae animis imprimuntur inâ—â—â—atae intelligentiae Cic. 1 de leg which the Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Basilius most acutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spark of the Divine Fire which in the great conflagration was preserved in the ashes of it should still remain that so in our breasts and most inward parts Haec tamen exigua lucis scintillula râ—mansit Calvin Instit 10. Sect. 5. he might have the Preachers of his will These 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These common Notions are that Law of God which the Apostle Rom. 1. doth say is
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
are grounded which although they do all agree in this that whatsoever power of obligation they have they altogether acknowledge it as proceeding from the Law of God For the first in every kind whatsoever it be is the cause of the rest neither would the Law of God as already it is stated be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience if it should oblige any beyond it self which it did not oblige by vertue of it self yet these things as I have said that do so agree in one do notwithstanding every one of them differ amongst themselves not only in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter but also in the Degree according to the efficacy of the obliging and they chiefly consist in a threefold difference for some of them do oblige constantly of which there are two kinds The one in reference to those things whose obligation doth arise from the power of another as humane Laws the Commandements of Parents Masters and the like The other in reference to those whose obligation doth arise from the free election of the will it self As Vows Oaths Contracts Promises and the like Somthings again do only oblige by accident and as it were cursorily according to Time and Place and the exigence of other circumstances as the Law or Reason of Scandal The privilege and priority of order and method do require that we begin with humane Laws concerning the obligation whereof those things which at this time shall be spoken of may all of them be reduced to these two questions 1. Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences and secondly how far they do oblige them The determining of most of the particular cases do pertain chiefly to the latter Question which God willing shall be the Subject of our following Lecture we shall only at this time touch upon the first Delectus vim in lege ponimus Cicero 1. de legibus which is Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences The Subject of the question needeth not any large exposition Lex or the Law is first so called in an active construction a legendo id est eligendo from choosing as Cicero will have it because the Lawgivers do make choyce of those things which they conceive to be most profitable to the Common-wealth Or secondly as others will have it Lex or the Law is so called a legendo from reading and that in a passive construction because the Laws after they were Enacted were engraven in Tables of Brasse or otherwise legibly written and fastned unto Pillars to be read in publick by the people Aquin 1. 2. quaest 90. Arti 16. Biel. 3. dist Arti 1. Or lastly according to other mens derivation Lex is so called a ligando that is from binding because it doth bind the Subjects to the observation of it but in the Genus of it it is nothing else than a Rule of acting imposed on the Subject by the Superiour being impowered thereunto They are called humane Laws in opposition to Divine for as those Laws are called Divine which immediately are constituted by the authority of God himself whether they be Laws Natural or Laws Positive so those Laws are said to be Humane which although they have an authority derived to them from God yet they are immediately commanded by men and imposed on their Subjects III. The Law of man is thus defined by Aquinas 3. 1 a. 2. ae quaest 90 arti 4. It is the ordination of Reason to a common good promulgated by him who hath the care of the Commonalty His words are Lex humana est Rationis ordinatio ad Bonum Commune ab eo qui curam Communitatis habet promulgata By others it is defined otherwise they differ in the words but almost all of them doe agree in the sense and well so they may for this Definition is very suitable to the publick Law which is the most known and the most usual acceptation of that word And so we use to speak Analogum per se positum pro famosiore significato praesumitur an Analogick being placed by it self is presumed to stand for that which is the most remarkable in the signification But in this present question and to our present purpose Under the Notion and Name of Humane Laws the publick Lawes of Cummonalties are not only to be understood although most chiefly they are and primarily but even the particular Commands of Parents Masters Magistrates and all other Superiors imposed on their Children Servants or their People for when both of them are a kind of Precept in this one thing especially there is a Difference betwixt a Law properly so called and a Mandate for a Mandate or Command is but the Precept of a private person invested with a private Authority but the Law is a publick precept of a person indued with a publick Authority In all other considerations there is but little diversity Certainly as to the effect and force of obliging since it is apparent by the tenth verse of this Chap. that all Legitimate Power whatsoever it be not only publick which notwithstanding I must confess to be the only meaning of the Apostle in that place but also all private power is constituted of God and the Command of a Father to his Son is no lesse a Rule for acting than the Law of the Prince to his Subject all those things which I shall now discourse of concerning the obligation of humane Lawes are so to be understood and let this one premonition suffice that the mandates of private persons be comprehended in the publick Lawes and oeconomical Commands with Politick Constitutions and others of the like nature as far as the Course and Consideration of the Analogy will permit And thus much be spoken of the Subject of the Question The Praedicate followeth V. The Praedicate of the Question is the obligation of the Conscience Now what Conscience is and what is an Obligation in the generality of it hath largely enough been already unfolded by me neither is there any need of repetition When we say the Law doth oblige we mean nothing else than that the Law doth impose on the Subject a Necessity of observing and obeying it You are to know that the Law of its own Nature and as it is a Law doth cary in it self a double force or necessary effect that is the force of directing from whence it is called a Canon or a Rule as it layes open to the Subject the will of the Superiour and sheweth what it is that he would have to be performed by him and a power of obliging by which it differs from Counsel and Admonishment because it commandeth the Subject to obey his will and doth so oblige him to the performance of it that if he doth not obey him he doth sin or erre for Sin is nothing else but an aberration or a receding from that Rule or Law which we ought to follow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so Monsters by receding from the ordinary Law
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
go with him twayn A man therefore may and if occasion so requires he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace but much more for the publick tranquillity and obey him who hath no lawful power to command But above all he must have this Reserve so to depart from his own right that by so doing he taketh not any thing away from the right of another And Abraham in this did justly and wisely Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the spoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown yet he cautelously provided that both the Priest should have his Tenths and his three Associates in the War should not want of their full proportions In the like manner obedience is so to be payed to an Usurper that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated and that his right suffers no prejudice by it XXI But it may be objected How can this be done That which is grateful to an Usurper cannot but be most ungrateful to the lawful Prince No man can serve two Masters that look so contrary all whose Votes Mat. â— Studies and Counsels are violently carryed on to the ruine and destruction of one another I answer the account being well computed there is no reason that we should think that this obsequiousness of the Citizen so ordered and bounded as we before have delivered should be unpleasing to the lawful Prince but altogether to the Uâ—urper nay we may presume that with the consent of the true Prince himself it ought to be so For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have assisted so much the unjust Possessor as the whole Commonalty or Republick the safety whereof doth no lesse concen the true Heir than the unjust Possessor Nay peradventure much more because being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it sincerely to wish it more happinesse than the other who having excluded him hath thrust himself into his house and hath excercised a command over his Family and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure vehement than a Step-mothers as may appear by that remarkable contestation of the two Harlots before Solomon the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own desiring the safety of it and that it should be given rather to another nay unto her Adversary than that it should perish by the Sword so it is most likely and it is to be presumed that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the safety of his people whom although for the present under the yoak of a Stranger yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him than he who having newly usurped the supreme Magistracy will be more careful it is likely to establish his newly acquired Greatness than to procure the safety of the publick and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modestly as they could they should accommodate themselves to the present affairs for their own safety than to run into a certain destruction by making an unseasonable and an unsuccessful opposition against one that overpowers them And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this most difficult and high question determining possitively of nothing but being ready if any man shall render more certain reasons to correct what hath been spoken and to jump in to the same Judgment with him XXII The fourth Conclusion followeth Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful do by themselves and directly in the general oblige the Conscience Which is as much as to say This general precept that Subjects should obey humane Laws being duly made is obligatory directly and by its self And this Calvin himself who doth not use to attribute too much to humane constitutions doth acknowledge who in the 4 Institute 10. § 5. doth advise that such a distinction be made inter Genus et Speciem betwixt the General and the Special that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conscience yet it must be granted that they have an obliging power in the General The reason is perspicuous for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law every part whereof doth directly and by it self and not only by consequence oblige our Consciences It pertains to the Law of God in a double respect First Because natural Reason dictates that Peace and Order which is the Soul of Common-wealths and of all humane Societies cannot be preserved but by an Obedience to the Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them Secondly Because that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject unto those who are over us in that Order as God hath appointed and to obey 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he Higher Powers as may appear in the first and second verses of this Chapter and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks upon a bare pretext that they are meet men 2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures such as we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sons of Adam of the same â—ace of mankind and subject to the same Affections Sufferings Inâ—irmities and Casualties as our selvs but rather being mindful that Almighty God by a delegated Power did set them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth and hath been pleased to vouchsafe them so much honour as to communicate his own Name unto them as to so many visible and mortal Gods Psal 82. 6. I have said you are Gods we should reverence honour and obey them with the greatest Reverence and though not for their own sakes who are but men as we are nor composed of better Clay yet in respect to the Divine Oâ—dination who making them to bâ— Prâ—nces hath preferred them into a higher place abovâ— other men and in some measure made them Partakers of his own Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Lord as the Apostle Sâ— Peter â—n another place and by consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording unto Conscience as the Apostle Sâ— Paul hath it in this place XXIII The fifth Conclusion Humane Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them doe oblige theâ—â—â—science even in particular and although not directly and by themselves yet by Consequent and by 〈◊〉 of the general Divine Commandment I say in the first place Lawes solemnly and rightly constituted that is both by reason of the efficient Cause being made by him who is indued with lawful Power and by reason of the matter commanding nothing unlawful dishonest or filthy or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Christian For we already have asserted that the Lawes which do offend in either of those two senses are not obligatory I say in the second place In the particular that is to a particular Determination in things of a middle Nature and in others As what and how
much tribute is to be paid What merchandise is lawful and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in such and such a Country What habits are suitable to such and such degrees in an University What Statutes are dispensable and what not c. I say in the third place that such Lawes doe not oblige by themselves and directly I prove first because that God alone is that Law-maker who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Consciences of men There is but one Law-giver who is able to save and destroy James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature which are indifferent which for the most part are the subjects of humane Laws we do suppose that God made no Law in particular but left them all to the arbitration of those who are his Vice-gerents on Earth It is proved thus in the second place because that those things only do oblige directly and by themselves which oblige by reason of the matter as of an internal Cause without any respect to the external Causes the Efficient and the Final which would have obliged of themselves if they had not been commanded by Men But things indifferent and of a middle Nature determined by a particular and positive humane Law when they are so qualified in themselves that before the Determination of them they may freely be made or nor be made by any they doe not oblige in respect of the matter therefore not of themselves I say in the third place that the same Lawes notwithstanding doe oblige in particular by the Consequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement And because in this last position the hindge of the whole controversy is turned I will more plainly propound the Conclusion which by and by I will more fully confirm The Conclusion is this Positive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully constituted which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent and which before they are determined are free to be made or to be unmade do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God so oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them that they are bound under the penaâ—ty of moâ—tal Sin and the fear of Gods displeasure to give obedience to the said Laws and if they shall fail in the performance thereof they shall endure the checks and sâ—ings of their accusing CoÌ„sciences XXIV This Conclusion is confirmed by divers Reasons the first whereof is taken from this present Text we must therefore be subjected not only for wrath but for Conscience sake The words in themselves are perspicuous enough In the former verses the Apostle had largely insisted upon the necessity of Christian Subjection which he urged chiefly by two Arguments the one from the Institution and the Ordination of God in the two first verses and the other from the fear of the Punishment of man in the two verses following In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument and repeateth them in this fifth verse and as it is very usual in the Scripture in an order inverted beginning the repetition from the latter and the next member As if he should have said A great necessity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both respects whether the fear of punishment may deterr you or the Conscience of the Duty may incite you If you despise the Power and Authority of the Lawes and do evil consider with your selves that the Magistrate who is set over you is the Minister of God the Revenger of your neglected Duty and ready to draw the Sword with which God hath intrusted him to inflict a corporal punishment due to the despisers of his Lawes But if these things move you not being deluded by a vain hope to find out one subterfuge or another to escape the force of his Arm yet think on God the just Remembrancer of aâ—l Acts committed whether they be good or evil stand in awe of him as of a just Judge Fear your own Consciences those severe accusers those faithful witnesses and importunate Tormentors you cannot avoid them by any Artifices not elude them by any Inventions From the scope of this place the Argument is thus framed Those things which being violated do leave a Remorse upon the Conscience do oblige the Conscience for so it must necessarily be that all remorse or reproof of Conscience must proceed from the sense of some obligation as all other effects do follow their causes but humane Laws being violated do leave a remorse upon the Conscience for that is the expreâ—â—e sense of those words in the Text Necesse est subjici propter Conscientiam You must of necessity be subject for Conscience sake you cannot keep your Consciences upright and safe unlesse you be subjected Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conscience XXV But some there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conscience and chiefly herein they defend themselves by the Authority of Chrysostome as if no other Conscience was to be understood in this place but a Conscience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government I have made mention of this heretofore and praysed it for the sense I confesse is pious though not so genuine And I have thus much against it For in the first place amongst the Ancients Chysostome is singular in this Interpretation whom hardly one or two amongst so many Interpreters have followed Theophyâ—act only and Oecumenius excepted Who are not to be reputed in the number of witnesses for they so tread in the footsteps of Chrysostome that all three of them do make only but one witnesse Secondly No place can be aleged in the Scripture in which either St. Paul or any other of the Apostles have made use of the word Conscience in that sense as Chrysostome here doth feign unto himself Thirdly the Apostle in this place as it is very manifest would induce something which should be of more moment and more effectual to stir up the minds of men than temporal punishment for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger than to admonish them of any benefits received from men Fourthly and lastly the Apostle here in a short repetition of those reasons before alleged would conclude his discourse of Christian Subjection now in the two first Verses of this Chapter he did bring the reason not from the Conscience of the benefit but of the duty XXVI The second reason followeth from the use and the end of the Laws It being most necessary that they should be made and observed for the preservation of humane societies in peace and publick tranquillity for otherwise there would be no certain rule of Contracts no measure of Faith and Civil Justice which are the firmest bands of Cities and societies for the natural and the
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
And many are the objections w ch from hence do take their Rise They allege it is written by St. Paul 1 Cor. 7. 23. Yee are bought with a price be yee not made the Servants of men And agâ—in Gal. 5. 6. Stand firm in that liberty in which Christ hath set you free and be not intangled again with the yoak of bondage And again Col. 2. 16. Let no man judge you in meat or drink c. and other places to the same effect They dispuâ—e also that it is not likely that Christ at last should have freed us so from the positive Laws of God himself which were certainly most just to leave us captivated under the slavish Bondage of the Laws of Men. XXXII I will answer to all these places but I would have you first preadvertised seeing that there are many Texts and heads of Christian liberty that we diligently do take heed not too rashly to confound them neither rudely and unskilfully to wrest and cite those places of Scripture which pertain to one kind of Liberty to another kind to which they do not belong which transition to another kind is not only the perpetual and Solemn vice of the Antinomians and the Anabâ—ptists but of many others who would be esteemed the Reformers of this age and this as they often put in practice in other disputations so most especially in those where the debate is concerning the Rites of the Church having thus preadmonished you of their Errors I now proceed to the solution of their Arguments In that Text to the Corinthians the Apostle would exhort the faithful that in whatsoever place God had constituted them and with whatsoever gifts he had indued them that contented in that Station they would modestly contain themselves within their own limits measuring themselves by the gifts and calling of God and acordingly accommodate their lives and actions whether they be servants or free and not so inslave and emancipate their Consciences to the Judgment and command of any Man as wholly to depend upon his Will and Opinion but being mindfull that he is the servant of God and of the Lord Jesus so to study to please men and to be subservient to their affections and commands as to do nothing unworthy of a man who professeth himself to be the Servant of God and Christ And this being the certain sense of the Apostle in that whole discourse we may most truly conclude from hence that we ought not to be obedient to the pleasures of Masters Parents or Princes or any Mortals whatsoever if they command any thing to be done which is wicked or unlawful for instead of being the Servants of God this were to make themselves the Servants of Men But he who out of Conscience doth obey the just honest and profitable Constitutions of Men is so far from being thought that he is therefore the Servant of Men that by the two chiefest of the Apostles he is expressely said to serve the Lord God and not Men. Eph. 6. 7. Col. 3. 23. and 1. Pet. 2. 16. In this Text To serve the Lord and not Men the particle of Negation as usually in other places is taken comparatively that is to say rather God than Men he serveth God for himself and Men for God He serveth Men as he performeth what is commanded by them and he serveth God as he doth it out of the Conscience of his Duty XXXIII That other place to the Galathians is best of all to be understood by the whole scope of the Epistle Some false Apostles in the Churches of Galatia being either Jews or Judaizing Christians did violently contend contrary to the institution of the Apostles in the Council at Jerusalem that the Gentiles newly converted to the Faith should not only be baptized but circumcized also And those Impostors as their custom is under the pretence of piety and a wicked diligence amongst the credulous vulgar did so wonderfully prevayl that they had drawn many into so great an errour that they thought they could never attain unto everlasting happinesse unlesse they suffered themselves to be circumcized The Spirit of the blessed Apostle not induring this wretched and growing Imposture doth inveigh against the grossenesse of the error of it with more than ordinary Indignation throughout the whole course almost of the Epistle And amongst other Arguments he admonisheth the Galatians of that liberty by which Christ after his comming did free his Church from the unprofitable burden and yoak of the Mosaick Ceremonies and doth exhort them constanly to maintain the liberty obtained by the death of Christ and not to stoop their necks again unto the yoak of slavery which they should altogether do if they should believe the ritual observation of the dead letter of the Law to be necessary Now how incongruously this is by the Anabaptists applyed to the Laws of Men profitable and necessary for the Commonwealth from which the Scriptures do no where tell us that Christ hath freed us he is wilfully blind that doth not discern it XXXIV The third place taken out of the Epistle to the Colossians doth not at all appertain to Humane Laws rightly constituted concerning things of a middle nature but to the Doctrines of Impostors who dogmatically propounded to the people of God some things to be necessary which God never commanded which was the Custom of the Traditionary Pharisees whom Christ Mat. 15. reprehends upon that account for making the Commandements of God of no effect by their Tradition or clean contrary they as dogmatically did forbid other things as unlawful which God never did prohibit injoyning the people as to such and such things Touch not taste not handle not The Apostle admonisheth the Colossians to have a care of such dogmatizing Teachers and not suffer any snare to be thrown upon their Consciences by these Impostors Magistrates therefore in a political Government do not offend who in things of a middle nature do either command or prohibit any thing to the people for Profit Honesty Decency or for Orders sake but without any opinion of necessity on either side which belongeth to the thing it self that is commanded or forbidden Those pittiful Ministers I may more truly call them Magistrates so Magisterially they do pronounce all things do rather offend who so importunately vex and inveigh against the harmlesse Laws of Magistrates and exercise a Tyranny oâ—â—er the Consciences of the people and whatsoever is distastful to them is presently condemned for Impiety or at least for Superstition XXXV That which in the fourth place they do allege thaâ— because Christ hath freed us from the positive Laws of God therefore much more from the Laws of Men is in many respects erroneous and absurd For in the first place it is not truly said that Christ hath freed us from the positive Laws of God by which we never were bound For the positive Laws of God or Men do only oblige those on whom they are imposed Now those Laws of
shall be examined and discussed at this time The first doubt is De materia impossibili of a matter in it self impossible concerning which I say in the first place That no Law ought to be made concerning a matter altogether impossible If such a Law be made it is tyrannical and by right null and obligeth no man in Conscience The first reason is because that Laws are made in relation to Acts as to be acted by a man who is a free Agent now liberty speaketh a power unto both but in things impossible there is no such liberty of power as by it self is manifest Secondly No man by right can be obliged to the performance of that the omission whereof cannot be imputed as a fault unto him nor ought to be imputed to him for punishment for every obligation is either to a fault or to a punishment or to both but the omission of a thing impossible cannot be imputed to any man for a fault nor ought it to be imputed to any one for a punishment Ergo c. But that there is no obligation of a thing impossible whether it be impossible by the Nature of the thing or by circumstances Praelect 2. Sect. 12. or any other way hath already by me been proved in my treatise of the obligation of an oath and there is no need of repetition VII I say in the second place A Law which is possible to some but seemeth to any other or to but few or peradventure but to one or two to be impossible may lawfully be made if it be useful to the Common-wealth but not unless there be some extraordinary great cause and a manifest necessity doth require it but being made it doth oblige all those who are able to keep it but not those who cannot keep it as if some great Tribute were commanded for the necessary use of the Common-wealth for the payment whereof some of the Subjects are nothing so able as others Those who are so poor that they cannot pay the sum which the Law lays upon them are not bound in Conscience to do that which they are unable to perform as is already apparent by the proposition above mentioned Neverthelesse they are obliged to make their addresses to those who are over them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazianz. Orat. 9. Debeone omittere quod possum quoniam quod debeo minime possum Bernard and openly and sincerely and without the least falshood to professe the slendernesse of their Estate and unless they can prevail to be quite exempted from the Law or to procure a remission of some part of the sum with which they are taxed they are to bring into the publick as great a part of it as possibly they can for he who cannot do what he ought to do he yet ought to do what he is able to do VIII The second doubt is concerning a thing commanded by the Law not impossible but very grievous and very burthensome and which the Subject cannot perform without great inconvenience losse danger of life and the ruine of hiâ— whole Estate I say in the first place That in this case the Law-giver if he foreseeth this will come to passe ought to use some caution in the clauses of that Law and as conveniently as he can he is to provide a remedy for this Evil And if it cannot so well be done in the form of the Law it self leâ—t subtile and deceitful Knaves and too much intent to their own profit may thereby find a hole to escape 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isae â—s ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so elude the force of the Law yet what possibly in him lyeth he ought to provide that in the execution of that Law some qualification may be had leâ—t a Law otherwise profitable and necessary may become a snâ—re or a detriment to any honest man I say in the second place That the Subject though so heavily taxed is neverthelesse bound in Conscience to obey that Law although with the ruine of his whole Estate if any evident or necessary Cause for the good of the Common-wealth doth so require For example suppose a hostile Army be invading the Kingdom if a Law be made that all the corn in the Fields for some miles not far from the Shore be spoiled and all the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be carried away be burned and that all the Houses in the Suburbs be pulled down and that all the Sluces thereabouts shall be opened and the Fields be drowned every Citizen and Subject is directly bound to obey this Law and cheerfully and willingly to obey the Commands thereof and with the loss of his own goods to redeem the publick safety not only upon that account that his Country being betrayed to his Enemies by his unseasonable parsimoniousness it is sure enough that every private person will be suddenly sensible of the ensuing calamity but especially out of the Conscience of his duty because that every good man is to preferâ— the publick above all private interests I say in the third place That a Subject unlesse some remarkable necessity doth appear or fear of publick danger is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law that is so extremely burthensome as to bring with it the certain ruine of his whole Estate or the imminent danger of his life But he is bound as generally hath been already spoken and which almost in all cases I would have you to observe that we may need not any more to repeat it to you to make not the least resistance but patiently to endure whatsoever injury or contumely shall be brought upon him by the superiour powers IX The third doubt is concerning things necessary as if the Law of men should command any thing which was necessary before and commanded by the Law of God or forbid any thing which was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of God What is the obligation in this case I answer briefly That the Subject by this Law is absolutely obliged For first the obligation which was in force before the Law of God doth not hinder the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new obligation for a man by many bonds may be obliged to the performance of one and the same duty as I have already declared in the former Lecture to which reason we may also adde another which is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde something to the Law of God to wit by determining the Act as to the substance of it commanded by the Law of God and therefore necessary as to the manner quantity or some other circumstanceâ— of it which was free before or by adding some determination to the Law of God prohibiting a thing unlawfull as to the degree of the Crime or the manner of the punishment or the measure of it or other things of the like nature for examples sake it is by Divine right that there should be publick congregations to perform
Subject is not bound by that Law It was my first Conclusion in the former Lecture and confirmed by many Arguments and if any man be yet unsatisfied it may be further proved For no inferior power can oblige against the will of the superior power therefore the power of God being above all the power of Men there is no power of any man whatsoever that can oblige against the will of God who by his Law hath forbidden all wicked and filthy things from whence is that of Saint Augustin There can be seen no Law which is not just And by this reason the Argument drawn from that of obedience is answered by granring that the Subject ought to submit himself without dispute to the will of his Superior to wit the supreme superior into whose will all obedience is ultimately resolved Quod jubet homo prohibet Deus ego audiam hominem surdus Deo Beâ—nard Epist 7. and not of the subordinate Superior if it appeareth that his will is averse to the supreme superior Now God is absolutely the chief Commander the bare signification of whose will is sufficient to induce an obligation of Obedience especially since it is most certain that his will cannot be unjust Therefore Abraham obeyed God commanding those things which if God himself had not given him the charge might seem not only to be hard and unjust but impious and full of wickednesse To wit that his Father his Country and kindred being all abandoned he should become a poor banished Man and travel into a remote and an unknown Country nay that with his own hand he should cut the throat of his own Son in whom alone was not only all the Comfort and the Succour of his Age but all the Hope of the Promises of God and that he should lay him on the Altar and offer him as a Sacrifice to that God who commanded of him such cruel things He did rightly indeed and as it became a man who deserved to be called the Father of the Faithful and to be the singular Example of an unshaken Faith to all the world without the least haesitation and with a most willing obedience he made himself ready to put in Execution the Commands of God But as for the Commandments of men seeing that every man is lyable to Errour and sin and his Will may be depraved it is very lawful nay where there is a just Cause of suspition it is needful also to examine and to try them That admonition of the Apostle 1. Thess 5. 2. Try all things and keep that which is good may with great right and as fitly be applyed to the commands of the Superiors as to the Instructions of Teachers of whom notwithstanding St. Paul in that place doth especially speak Away then with the haughtiness and proud commands of over-lording Spirits sic volo sic jubeo This will I have This I do command Away with the base flattery of the Papists who think it a sin for any man in any manner whatsoever to suspect the Dictates of their Lateran Jove Away with their blind obedience by which those that enter into their Religious Houses do by a vow oblige themselves to obey their Superiors in every thing and in all things without distinction XIII In the third place it is propounded Whether it be Lawful for a Subject to depart from his own right Pura mala ut nunquam justè juberi sic nec licite possunt fieri Bernard Epist 7. and although he be not obliged yet of his own accord to obey such an evil Law I answer it is not lawful for the law of God doth simply oblige to the not doing of any thing that is evil or unlawful Therefore an unjust Law I understand unjust in that sense in which we now speak as unjust in relation to the matter cannot lawfully be kept because God cannot lawfully be offended For whatsoever is repugnant to the Law of God or to the light of Nature known and written in our hearts or revealed in the written word is not to be admitted by a Christian either to avoyd any particular detriment whatsoever or the scandal of our Neighbours or to promote the favour or to decline the hatred of our Superiors Daveniam Imperator tu Carcerem ille Gehennam were the words of the primitive Christians Excuse us Emperor you can only condemn us to prison but God unto Hell And so before them said the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ Whether it be right in the sight of God Act. 41. 9. to hearken unto you rather than unto God judge yee And before them the three young men of the Hebrews in the third of Daniel Dan. 3. 18. Be it known unto thee O King that we will not serve thy Gods nor worship the Golden Image which thou hast set up XIV In the fourth place it is demanded What Law is to be thought so unjust that it is not only not obliging but moreover it is unlawful to obey it I answer a Law may be said to be unjust for manifold considerations First if it be made by one who is not invested with a lawful power and so it is unjust Proper defectum Justitiae Commutativae for the defect of Justice commutative because the Lawgiver assumeth more than is due or by right doth belong unto him it doth not therefore oblige the Subject to obedience neverthelesse the Subject if it seems expedient to him and he be not otherwise hindred may depart from his own right and obey that Law Secondly in consideration of the Final cause if it doth not tend to the publick good nor preserve the rights due unto the Commonalty And this Law is unjust by reason of the defect of that Justice which they call Legal which alwayes intendeth the common good and that the republick may receive no detriment a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer 〈◊〉 ad â— But this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige the Subject for the Subject is no competent nor fit Judge of Legal Justice and if by his obedience any thing doth follow which is either incommodious or noxious to the Commonwealth it is not to be imputed to him who performed his part well enough but to the Supreme Magistrate whose duty it was to provide for the preservation and advancement of the publick good Thirdly in consideration of the Formal Cause if the Law by an unequal proportion and not by merit of the Citizens doth dispence and distrbute Burdens and Favors Pâ—nishments and Rewards This Law is unjust by reason of the defect of Justice distributive which commandeth to give all things by equity to every one as every one hath deserved And this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige as well as that of which but now I spoke of and for the same Cause for the dispensation of these things doth not belong to the office of a Subject but of the Supreme Magistrate Fourthly in consideration of
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
certain pay of some Tribute and thus houses of Incontinence are permitted at Rome XIX This distinction being permised In the first place I affirm That privatively many Evils are necessarily tolerated in all Common-wealths for it is impossible that the Laws should extend themselves to all the Species and kinds of vitious Acts or that all kind of Sin should be restrained by humane Laws The Law of God hath this only which is admirable and peculiar to it self that it alone commandeth all things that are to be done and forbiddeth all things that are to be avoyed Now in this permission there is no place for obligation for it is necessary that every obligation should arise from some Act and not by the privation of an Act or a Non-Act I say in the second place That the negative permission of evil may be lawful For if there be some evils that cannot be quite taken away without some great Inconvenience to the publick it pertaineth to the political prudence of Government so to moderate the use of it and circumscribe it within certain bounds as to make it subservient to the Publick profit And this by the Example of God himself who permitted the Divorce of Wives to the people of Israel to that purpose as Christ the most excellent Interpreter of the Law expounds it Mat. 19. â— Lest by the hardnesse of their hearts and the unbridled roughnesse and cruelty of Husbands to their Wives there should arise more grievous inconveniences I say in the third place That by this Law there is no man notwithstanding obliged to perform that which this Law permitteth for the end of permission is not that that be done which by this Law is permitted but that nothing be done beyond that which the said Laws permit Therefore as the permission it self is only negative so it induceth only a negative obligation That is the Subject is obliged to do if he pleaseth what the Law permitteth and not to exceed the bounds which that Law prescribeth I say in the fourth place That the positive permission of Evil is not lawful if there be more or more grievous Evils which follow that permission than those are for the remedy whereof it was pretended especially if to the permission and imposition of a filthy thing there is added a suspition of filthy lucre I say in the fifth place That by such a Law no man is bound to the performance of that which is permitted nay for all the permission of that Law every man is obliged to a non-performance My Reason is as to the former part Because it is against the Nature of a permission to oblige for a permission granteth Liberty and every obligation is a kind of a Bond. As to the latter part Because we suppose that what by the Law of man is so permitted is of it self evil and by the Law of God we are obliged not to do Evil The permission therefore of Evil as it is a bare permission doth oblige no man to the performance but as it is the permission of Evil it doth oblige every man not to do that which is permitted XX. But it hath often heretofore been spoken that every Law hath a power obligative which so individually doth accompany it as but to grant the Law the obligation must necessarily follow and take away the obligation you take away also the Law with it It may therefore be objected that we must hereupon either deny the permissive Law to be a Law or acknowlege it doth oblige To answer to this objection we need not fly so far as to deny the Law permissive to be a Law which we do acknowledge not only to be a Law but a Law properly so called Certainly that Mosaical Law of Divorce mentioned Mat. 19. Though it comes by name of permission 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the eighth verse yet in the seventh verse of the same Chapter it is called a command 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What is not the very name of a Law every where given to it is not the Definition of that name as congruous to it as to a Law either commanding or forbidding something to be done so that it cannot be denyed but that the Law is predicated of them all univocally and as a Genus in reference to its Species it is not then to be granted that the Subject by this Law is obliged I do so conceive it altogether to be granted which that it may more rightly be understood to be not incohaerent with those things which have been already spoken of a permissive Law I say in the sixth place That every Law permissive as it is a Law doth oblige the Subject in his Conscience to the observation of it The reason is manifest for an obligation as often it hath been already spoken is a necessary effect of the Law and not to be severed from it Which that it may not seem to be quite contrary to what now hath been delivered these two things are to be observed which therefore the more remarkably I shall give unto you The first that I said the permissive Law doth oblige to the observation of it Now it is one thing that the Subject is obliged to the observation of the Law which I still affirm and another thing that the Subject is oâ—liged to do that which the Law permitteth which I have before denyed and do deny it still The second that I said the permissive Law as a Law doth oblige which is true but I did not say it did oblige as it was permissive for that is false because we are to know that the force of a permissive Law as it is a Law doth not consist in the permission it self which being differentaa divisiva but a divisive difference of the Law it must needs come in order after it as every difference divisive is by nature in a posterior place to the Genus which doth divide it and presuppose it but is for the most part expressely or at least virtually contained in that praeception which is as it were the constitutive and formal difference of the Law and in the very words of the Law it self For this preception is that from whence the obligation of the Subject doth first arise and to which his obedience is ultimately terminated I will make it manifest unto you by example By reason of the necessity of borrowing of money the maker of the Law permitteth of Usury in a moderate proportion amongst the Citizens a punishment being denounced to those who shall exceed by taking more use than the Law allowes I will not here define whether Usury be simply and in every kind of it unlawful or not neither doth it belong to my present purpose nevertheless this is certain that were it never so lawful no man by that permissiou is obliged to the exercising of it But in this Law besides this permission which obliges no man there are two things which belonging to the Precept of the Law have thereupon
from the Intention of the Law-giver a force of obliging the Citizens to the observation of them One whereof is enjoyned formally and in express words to wit That no man exact monies beyond the allowance prescribed in the Law the other virtually and by Consequence That no man be punished for trading in usury as it is by that Law permitted To conclude therefore in a word the Precept or Injunction of the permissive Law doth oblige all Subjects but the Permission no man XXII The sixth doubt is of things indifferent and of a middle nature Now these things indifferent or of a middle nature are such all the Species whereof are neither commanded nor forbidden by any Divine Law natural or positive They are therefore of themselves and of their own nature lawfull to be observed as they are not forbidden and free to be observed as they are not commanded There were some of an opinion that there ought no Laws of man to be made concerning things indifferent but of those things only which are of a natural or a divine right and thereupon they said That Civil Laws were not so much the Constitutives of a new Law as the Declaratives of the old and explications and evolutions of the Divine will But what need we to confute an opinion so abhorring from all sound reason that rather to the contrary we may rightly judge that these things indifferent are the most proper and the only most fit matter of Humane Laws For we are bound to the observation of those things which God hath commanded although the commands of all men whatsoever are either silent or do contradict them And as for those things which by God are forbidden we are obliged to the not performance of them the Laws of men being silent or never so importunately commanding them Therefore these things indifferent do remain as a large Field in which the power of man might exercise it self and put forth its force by inducing an obligation where there was none before That manifestly it may appear that the civil Magistrate in things indifferent and which before any Act of his were free to both may state and decree something on either side by determining that indifferency which may oblige the Consciences of his Subjects to obedience For as in Meat and Drink and Pleasures as also in giving and receiving the moral prudence of a privare person by allowing unto himself a golden mediocrity doth so far advance his natural and indifferent Acts beyond their state and native Condition that from thence they begin to be Acts of Vertues to wit of Temperance and Liberality so a person invested with the publick Authority doth by his politick prudence in giving certain bonds of mediocrity to his Subjects concerning things free and of a middle nature so advance those Acts enjoyned in his Laws beyond the degree of their former State that they now begin to be Acts of virtues to wit of Obedience and Legal justice XXIII A thing most plain and which would have found no Adversary if so manifest a truth had not prestringed some Reformers of our age nay and of our own Nation who to make a way to that wild Reformation for which they so much contended had rather against common sence to take away from the world all indifferency than to grant unto the Magistrate any power of determining of Rites Laws Altogether like that Macedonian who with his Sword did cut that Gordian knot asunder which by no Art he was able to untye In this as in many other things the true Disciples of the old Stoicks who asserted that there was nothing indifferent to a wise man but that he mannageth all things from the greatest to the least even to the paring of his nayles with the highest point of discretion But they so took away this indifferency out of affairs with words only that at last being enforced to it by the reasons of their adversaries they in deeds did grant it having invented some frivolous distinctions more honestly to hide their errour that they might not seem to have erred at all But there have been found some amongst us who have been so bold as to defend their odious exploded Doctrine in their publick writings that more pertinaciously than the Stoicks themselves did heretofore Two especially the one of them a Divine a man of some account amongst those of his own party the other a Lay-man one of the Peers of the Land both of them now dead with whom because I believe their Doctrine to be dead also and not easily to be received into the belief of sober men much lesse to find a patron amongst them I think it not worth my labour to insist on the confutation of it XXIV I do receive therefore as granted that there are things and actions indifferent at least in their own nature and in the Species of them which I believe there is no man so Stoicized that will deâ—y Of which in reference to our present purpose â—â—is is next to be advertised that an Act indifferent in its own nature that is in respect of the matter or the object of it if it be commanded by the Law from good and lawful doth become honest and necessary and if it be forbidden by the Law from good and lawful it becomes evil and unlawful which comeâ— not to passe by reason of any change made of the thing it self which whether it be commanded or forbidden both physically and morally doth remain the same as it was before for there is no respect that alters nature but proceedeth from that obligation which the Law induceth From whence it is that being before both in nature and of it self so also in use and as to us free unto both the authority of the Law being added to it it becomes in the use of it and as to us no longer free but it is either necessary or unlawful according to the exigence of the Law XXV If it be demanded seeing the Law appeareth to have an equal power on either side how comes it to passe that the Law by forbidding an Act can make it of being good and lawful to become evil and unlawful but the same Law as heretofore we have denyed it cannot by commanding an Act make it from being evil unlawful become good and lawful I answer the reason of the difference is most manifest from that most known Axiome Bonum ex causâ— integrâ malum ex quolibet defectu An Act therefore that is evil in its own Species and in the respect of the object of it must of necessity be always evil neither in any exercising of it be the circumstances what they will may it be made good by reason of the defect of goodness in the part of the object which defect is sufficient to corrupt the whole Act But an Act good in its own kind or at least not evil if it be attended but with some one circumstance that is indirect it becometh wholy
vitious by reason of the defect of a due rectitude in that circumstance From whence ariseth another difference betwixt an affirmative and a negative Humane Law or a Law commanding or forbidding For a Law affirmative doth not give any goodness to the Act which it commandeth if it be otherwise evil in any part of it But a Law negative doth contribute evilnesse to the Act which it forbiddeth although it be otherwise good in every part of it Or which is the same again a Humane Precept affirmative doth make that necessary which it finds to be good a humane precept negative doth make that unlawful which it found to be good both of them what they found evil do leave it to be evil as they found it Notwithstanding both do oblige in their manner and as to us this to the doing of that which by commanding is now made necessary and that to the not doing of that which by forbidding is now made unlawfull XXVI The seventh Doubt remaineth of Ecclesiastical Lawes in Special By Lawes Ecclesiastical I do not understand those Lawes which are constituted by Ecclesiastical Persons without the Authority of the Civil Magistrate which consideration pertains not to this case but to a Cause of an other kind to wit the Cause efficient but those which being made by any lawful Power doe treat of Ecclesiastical things for at this present we dispute only of the material Cause I have never heard of any besides those two above named who denyed all Indifferency or who would not grant to the political Magistrate some Power in things indifferent meerly political But we meet every where with a great number of Innovators who would take from men all Power of making Rites and Ceremonies in the publick worship of God besides those which are prescribed by Christ and his Disciples in the Gospel But sincerely I professe that to give satisfaction to my self and to others in this particular Having perused many Books written by many Authors but especially of our own Nation concerning this Subject I find not any one that can produce any just or any likely Reason of Difference why there may not be a Power of ordaining and determinating concerning things indifferent as well in Cases Ecclesiastical as Political For the Arguments which are urged from Scandal and Christian Liberty and other common Places of the same Nature doe equally fight against the Lawes and Constitutions of both Kinds and do overthrow them both or neither of them Those which are thought to carry a peculiar force against Ecclesiastical Laws and Rites are four which as the time will permit I will briefly and orderly examine they are derived 1. From Christ the Lawgiver 2. From the perfection of the Scripture 3. From the nature of holy Worship 4. From the example of the antient Church XXVII In the first place they object that of the Apostle James 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver who can save and destroy In the reign of Elizabeth many who were the Coriphaei of that Disciplinary Faction did make very much of this argument as the foundation of their whole Cause They alleged that Christ was the only Prince and Legislator of his Church And the Laws which he made did oblige the Church to a perpetual observation of them and that no other Laws ought to be admitted nor any other Legislator acknowledged whosoever shall presume to make any other Lawes besides those which Christ made shall act the part of Anti-Christ and declare himself a rash Invader into the Office of Christ We have discoursed on this place and expounded it already as occasion did require especialy where it was to be proved that God only and his Christ did exercise an absolute and a direct Command on the Consciences of Men But that this hath no greater a place in Lawes politick than in Ecclesiastick he must needs be blind that doth not observe it For why can the obligation of humane Laws in civil things consist with the legislative Power of Christ alone and why cannot there be the same consistence in Lawes Ecclesiastical Who can discover or produce the least shadow of any difference from that Text. Be Christ the Law-giver of the Christian Church Is he not as well the Law-giver of the Christian Common-wealth But the Apostle in that place made not the least mention of the Church nor instituted the least disputation concerning things Ecclesiastical neither doth he treat there at all of Political Lawes or Rites but of the Censures of Private Men. He would have the faithful admonishâ—d to be mindfâ—â—l of Christian Charity and that they should forbear from passing a rash Judgment on their Brothers for God was only the Judge of Consciences who alone made that Law by which every man in the last Day shall be judged This is the true scope of that place This is the mind of the Apostle What is here I pray you that tendeth to the condemning of Humane Lawes or if to the condemning of them why of Ecclesiastical Lawes more than Civil Neither of which either the one or the other are asserted by us by themselves and of their own Vertue to oblige the Conscience XXVIII In the second place they object the Perfection of the Holy Scripture This they say is the Rule both of Life and Manners and which can make a man of God wise to every good work to which if any man shall adde any thing of his own he shall commit a most remarkable trespasse against God and pull most heavy punishments on himself All this is most certain But if the Scripture in all considerations be the absolute rule of our lives of all things whatsoever to be done and if we may believe these Stoicks it extends to the slightest things insomuch that it is not lawful to take up a straw unlesse it be by the prescribed word of God will it not suffice as well for the regulating of things Civil as Ecclesiastical or how can the Laws of â—he Church derogate more from the perfection of the Scripture than the Laws of the Commonwealth or who is he who rightly can say that he hath added something to the word of God who for Honesty and Orders sake did make the Ecclesiastical Laws seeing he propounded not his Laws unto the people as the word of God and God in his word hath commanded that all things in the Church shall be done honestly and in order XXIX In the third place they object the Nature of worship to wit that the worship of God is a thing sacred in which worship all things are to be done by the Command of God and all Humane inventions are to be driven far away as superstitious nay plainly Idolatrous and traditionary Rites Indeed the worship of God is a sacred thing neither is it lawful for man to institute any other worship besides that which God hath ordained But because there is an Ambiguity in the word we are to distinguish of the worship of God which is taken
that Deliverance which God vouchsafed to the Nation of the Jewes under Ahasuerus King of the Persians Esther 9. Thirdly when Moses commanded but one day only in the year to be observed in the seaventh month for a solemn Fast the Kings and Magistrates of that people for what causes it is not known but likely in the remembrance of some remarkable Judgements of God did by their own Authority institute annual solemn Fasts insomuch that in the dayes of the last of â—he Prophets there were four solemn Fasts kept every year viz three others besides that of the seventh month in the fourth fifth and tenth month of all which mention is made Zach. 8. 19. Fourthly the Feast of the Dedication of the Altar called Encoenia was instituted by the Asamonians without any command of God The History is to be read Maccab. 4. 59. And by the Judgement of the most and best Interpreters Christ himself is thought not only to have approved of it but to have honoured it with his presence Joh. 10. 20. Fifthly we find it no where to be enjoyned by any Commandment of God that in solemn Fasts and penitential mourning they should put on Sack-cloth and strew Ashes on their hair but amongst the Jews for some Ages past the long custom was so received and so obtained the force of a Law that Christ himself did use that manner of Speech as from the custom of that Nation and showed not the least dislike of it Mat. 11. 21. Sixthly it is manifest by the writings of the Rabbins that it was the manner also of the Jews before the supper of the Passeover that the Master of the Family should stoop solow as to wash the feet of those of his own houshold which although commanded by no Law of God we find it to be observed by Christ as it is manifest in the History of the Gospel John 13. Why shall I here number up the Synagogues every where builded in so many Cities and Towns for the Conveniency of sacred Conventions and many other things a long Catalogue whereof the Jewish Commentaries doe afford us From all which this may be concluded If so many things pertaining to the worship of God were lawful for the Jews to alter under that yoak of Severer Discipline there can no probable Argument be derived from their Example to overthrow the force of Ecclesiastical Humane Laws THE SEVENTH LECTURE Concerning the obligation of humane Laws in relation to the Efficient Cause thereof PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things IN the last Term we did treat of the obligation of humane Laws both in the Generality of them to wit that Laws rightly constituted do oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to obedience so also in the Species as to those doubts which seemed properly to pertain to the material cause to wit how humane Laws do oblige them First we treated of things impossible Secondly of things possible but very burthensome Thirdly of things necessary Fourthly of things unlawfull and dishonest Fifthly of Evils to be permitted Sixthly of Things of a middle Nature indifferent in general Seventhly of Ecclesiastical Rites in Special of all these things which have been spoken that I may not appear too tedious in repetition the Sum is this That Subjects are obliged to obey just Laws but they are not obliged to obey Laws that are unjust And so Solomon in this Text requireth of the makers of Laws that they do decree nothing but what is just I must now proceed to prosecute those things which are yet remaining to be spoken of In the handling of which I will use as much brevity as the subject will permit that so in its due time I may finish the whole work or at least so much of it as pertaineth to the obligation of Laws II. In the order of Causes according to the method which I have elsewhere observed the Efficient Cause doth follow next to the Material And the Formal next to that the Final Cause is the last of all and doth both head the Rear and shuts it up Concerning the Efficient Cause of Laws I have already sufficiently shewed in the third Conclusion of the fifth Lecture That humane Lawes do not oblige unless they are made by a person invested with a legitimate Authority This in the first place is now remaining to be considered of In whom is the just and lawful power of making of Laws or who are those makers of Laws to whom according to the mind of Solomon The Right of discerning righteous things belongeth To give a full Answer to this first doubt which is the chiefest of all by farr in this kind of Cause two things are to be supposed In the first place I suppose the legislative power to be the power of a Superior as to give a Command in which appellation I do also comprehend a Prohibition which is a proper Act of the Law to be the Act of a Superior You are to observe that in this consideration there is not a little difference betwixt these three A Promise A Petition and a Command Without the least distinction it is common to all Superiors Inferiors and Equals to promise For a Father may promise something to his Son and the Son to the Father and the Brother or a Neighbour to his Brother or to his Neighbour But to Crave or to Petition belongeth properly to Inferiors and sometimes in some respect to Equals As the Son beseecheth his Father or the Neighbour his Neighbour to excuse him or to receive the acknowledgment of his thankfulnesse but this belongeth not unto Superiors unlesse it be very improperly and by discending to a lower degree than their condition is But it is so peculiar to Superiors and of Men placed in a preheminence of Dignity to Command that he would be altogether ridiculous whosoever he is whether an Equal or an Inferior that seriously should command his Superior or Equal to the performance of any thing For every Act doth require a Beginning proportionated to it And an Equal hath no Command on an Equal III. Now as to an obligation concerning these three it is thus to be Stated He who craveth one thing of another man obligeth by that petition neither himself nor the party of whom he craveth it for it is a petition and a petition is an Act of Indigence and not of power whose effect because it depends on another and proceeds not from the Agent it self cannot induce any obligation But he who promiseth something to another man doth by his promise oblige himself but he obligeth not him to whom the promise is made for a promise being the Act of a free will every man as he is a free Agent and hath a power over his own will as the Apostle speaketh 1 Cor. 7. 37. can exercise on himself that Right and Power which he hath over his own will but
force and Vigor of a Law which lest it may seem to make a way for tyrannical Domination being ill understood hath heretofore been thus expounded by our Country-man Bracton What pleaseth the Prince that is not every thing which headily and out of the heat of his troubled mind is suddenly conceived and resolved upon but that which by the Counsel of his Peers his Royal Assent giving Authority unto it and deliberation and a debate being had thereon shall maturely and rightly be defined Cui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 legibus ipsis legum vim imponendi potestatem Deus dedit Finch Nomotech in Epist dedic And in our Laws In the dayly proceedings in our Courts of Pleas the Laws according to the solemn Form of Appellation are called the Kings Lawes for no other Cause as our Lawyers have informed us but because the Kings of England are the Fountains of Justice and Laws and the Laws themselves in the reading of them professing it because from Almighty God they have granted to them an autocratical or a self-Ruling Power of giving force unto the Laws themselves that they may passe for and be esteemed as Laws This is so plain that we need not take any further pains in producing more witnesses XI And indeed this were enough and might give abundant satisfaction were it not for the impudence of an idle person that conceals his own Name who by a ruinous and a nasty fiction and which was never heard off in the world before these unhappy times hath endeavoured to cast a mist over so clear a light by raising an Invention of I know not what coordinate Power And to flatter the nefarious Counsels and Endeavours of some Neotericks in these dayes which being destitute of all defence of Right were nevertheless for the time to be supported by some specious pretence although never so weak and slender he doth in a Book published for that purpose earnestly labour to make the people sensible of that wild Philosophy which hither to had been imposed on them by way of contradiction viz. That the King being supreme and having no equal is notwithstanding at the same time not supreme and hath an equal yet is it not so much to be admired as lamented that there were found some who greedily snatched at and imbraced this ridiculous Invention as slid down from heaven and indeed because it concerned their Interest that the people should be seduced into such a false Belief they therefore suffered themselvs to be so insnared by this grosse Sophism as to become guilty of the foulest Perjury For what can deserve to be called Perjury if this be not Perjury in the highest Nature As to acknowledge and constitute a Power equal to him in his Kingdom whom in expresse words you have sworn to be the only and the supreme Power in the Kingdom Away then with this our so absurd Coordinator and with all his portentuous Jugglings and having so cleanly rid our hands of him let us proceed XII The said position or Conclusion is thirdly proved by reason the chiefest Act of Governing doth require the chiefest Power for every Act being the exercise of some Power doth presuppose in the Agent a Power proportionate to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the making of Laws is the supreme chief Act of Governing It cannot therfore be excercised unless by a person who is invested himself or who by his virtue and authority doth derive unto another the supreme power and jurisdiction over the Commonalty subjected to him For seeing there are two most noble parts and Species of jurisdiction and publick power and remarkable above the rest viz. the Legislative power and the power Judicial both of which consist in jure dicundo that is in pronouncing the Law from whence the name of jurisdiction doth proceed but with this difference that the jurisdiction of the Judge is the speaking of a Law only as it is already given or exhibited but the Jurisdiction of the Lawgiver is the speaking of a Law that is as yet unmade and remaineth still to be exhibited it followeth that the power of the Judge is far more narrow and not of such a noble extension as that of the Law-giver It is the office of the Judge to speak and give Laws unto the people by a Law already made but it is the office of the Law-giver to give Laws unto the Judge himself and to ordain a new Law which may be a Rule unto him in his seat of Judicature the Judge is obliged to pronounce according to the prescript of the Law constituted The Law-giver out of the plenitude of his power doth prescribe and constitute the Law which the inferiour Judge is no lesse bound for the future to observe than the people themselves It is therefore no wayes inexpedient that the judicial power being a power of an inferiour nature be ordinarily exercised by an inferiour person but it is as necessary as expedient that the supreme architectonical power of making Laws should be excercised by none but only by that person who hath in his hands the supreme power and so much of the first Doubt XIII The second demand or Quaere is Whether the consent of the people be required to the obligation of the Law For by what hath been already spoken a man may peradventure conceive that the power of making Laws doth pertain unto a Prince by so absolute and full a power that the Subjects have no part in this great affair and in whatsoever he determineth there remaineth nothing for the people to do but to perform his commands and to humble their necks under the yoak of his obedience And indeed according to the lusts of those who heretofore bore sway it may appear by their sic volo sic jubeo that this excesse of command did take such place amongst the Kings of former ages when the meer arbitrations of Princes stood for Laws that the name of a Tyrant of an innocent at the first and of an honest signification did grow at the last into a great ignominy by the foul abuse of so saving a power and even in our days it doth convey somthing that is horrid into our ears as often as we hear it spoken But that some consent of the people is at least required I have both heretofore manifested and it is granted by all of the most approved Authors that I have read Insomuch much that the Jesuits themselves the most stout Defenders of the Popes oecumenical omnipotence and which by them is by no limits to be included do yet hold that many in Germany and other places are to be excused for the non-observing of the Laws of the Council of Trent and the Bulls of the Sea of Rome only upon this Account that those Laws were never received into use amongst those Nations I affirm therefore and it is the common received opinion that the Laws propounded and instituted by a Prince or the Head of a Commonalty do not
jurisdiction do wholy attribute the universal right of the external Government of the Church to the Civil Magistrate And moreover as for these our own Disciplinarians at home Good God! what Monsters of names and opinions as full of Deformity as of Difformity have these last seven years fruitful of prodiges brought forth and nursed under the pretence of Reformation XXX I have neither the leisure nor resolution unless I should appear too troublesom to you to grapple at this time with both these Adversaries But in these as in many other Debates that opinion seemeth to be the truer and is truly the safer which is lodged in the middle betwixt the two extremes and I am confident you will be so much the more willing to imbrace it by how much it is more agreeable to the Doctrine of the English Church as also to the Laws of the Kingdom which is That the Right of making Ecclesiastical Laws is in the Power of Bishops Elders and other Persons duely elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom But so nevertheless that the Exercise of the same Right and Power in all Christian Common-wealthâ— ought to depend on the Authority of the supreme Magistrate both a Parte ante as the Schoolmen have it a parte post on the part precedent on the part subsequent to wit that they ought not of themselves to assemble for the making of Ecclesiastical Canons Laws unless they be called to it by his Mandate or Command or at least defended by his Authority a fâ—ll free leave being both asked obtained and being thus called and warranted their Laws or Canons to which they have consented are not ratified not have any Power of obliging untill the Assent of the supreme Magistrate be obtained by whose approbation and Authority as soon as they are confirmed they are presently to pass for Laws and do oblige the Subject And these things may suffice to be spoken of the Cause Efficient THE EIGHTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws from the Formal Cause where Of 1 The Promulgation of Laws 2 Of Laws Penal Ezra 10. 7 8. 7. And they made proclamation throughout Judah and Jerusalem unto all the Children of the Captivity that they should gather themselves together unto Jerusalem 8. And that whosoever would not come within three days according to the Counsel of the Princes and the Elders all his substance should be forfeited OF the obligation of humane Lawes as to their material and efficient Causes we have spoke enough and as much as conduceth to our present purpose in those points which have already been handled by us In this place we are to speak of such as may be reduced to the Formal kind of Causes and although peradventure not so properly if examined according to the acurate and exact Method yet in my Judgment not altogether incongruous to our Discourse on this present Subject They may all of them be reduced to two Heads The one of the publication of Lawes and the other of the penalty adjoined to them to be inflicted on Delinquents Both of which as they are expressly contained in the Text above cited The Publication of the Law in the seventh verse and the penalty of it in the eighth verse so the use of them is very necessary both by the Nature of the Law it self and to obtain the Effect of the Law For seeing the Law by its own Nature and as it is a rule of things to be done ought to have a double Power viz. A Power of Directing by shewing unto the Subjects what is to be done and what is not to be done and a Power of obliging by suggesting into their minds a necessity of obeying The Law could not duely and effectually exercise this twofold Power unless the Subject were informed what is the will of the Prince which is done by publication and understood withall by the penalty annexed to it how much it doth concern him to perform it II. Concerning the Publication of the Law the first Doubt is Whether this publication be meerly on the Account of and as it were intrinsecal to the Law That is to enquire Whether that as the Law hath the Power of directing and obliging the promulgation of it be so necessary that it wanteth of that Power unless it be promulgated Now in all this Discourse you are to understand that I take not this word Promulgation as it is used in Cicero other Roman writers but according to the received manner of speaking amongst the Schoolmen the Canonists of the latter Ages for in that Promulgation of the Antients the Law not yet established or fully made was propounded to the people publickly on three Market days of their approbation of it But the Publication of which we now speak is the Promulgation of a Law already made that the People may take notice of it I therefore shall briefly answer to the Doubt proposed and say That this Publication is so necessary and so intrinsecal to the Law that in some manner it may be called the Form of it and thereupon amongst many Authors it is a part of the Definition of it and indeed it is absolutely necessary to this that the Law may exercise the Office of a Law which is to direct and to oblige the Subjects whom it cannot direct much less oblige although made by never so just and undoubted Authority unless it be known to them and it cannot be known unless it be published For that which properly induceth the obligation is the Will and Authority of the Prince or Governor not as a single but as a publick Person and the Head of the Commonalty But unless by some publick means he shall cause his Will to be propounded and made known unto the People it cannot by any Law be manifest at least according to the interpretation of the Law that it is his Will and proceedeth from his Authority as he sustaineth a publick Person Dist 4. Sect. In isâ—is And from hence is that of the Canon Law Leges constituuntur cùm promulgantur Lawes are constituted when they are published And that also of the Civil Law Leges quae constringunt vitas hominum ab omnibus intelligidebent The Laws which do bind the lives of men ought to be understood by all which being approved by the Common Consent of all Doctors and the Dictates of Reason we need not here for the confirmation of iâ— to instance the Example of God him self solemnly pronouncing his Law unto the Israelites from the Mount of Sinai or the Practice of the most flourishing Common-wealths and Cities in the whole world who as soon as their Laws were made did in the most publick places expose them to the observation of the people engraven in Tables of Brass or Wood the words are most known which every where we meet with amongst antient Authors and to this classis pertain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifie nothing
else but the Tables in which the Athenians wrote their Laws Of the same nature were the twelve Tables of the Romans and others of other Nations concerning which let those men who have the leisure to be curious of such antiquities consult with the Philologers and the writers of Dictionaries of both languages we must proceed to other things III. The necessity of the publication of Laws being thus granted and determined there ariseth a second Doubt What this promulgation of the Law ought to be that it may pass for lawfull and inferre an obligation In answer to which I say in the first place that the manner and the reason of publishing a Law as to the particular Rites and Circumstances may be varyed according to the Customs of diverse Nations But all do agree in this and by common use it is required that the Law-giver take caâ—e to have his will so propounded and manifested to his Subjects by some external sign that it may publickly be known unto them all so that none of those who are bound to observe the Law maybe ignorant that the said Law is extant and this is therefore required because the power of directing is intrinsecal and essential to the Law Subjects cannot direct their actions according to the will of their Prince unlesse they know what his will is how can they know it unlesse by proclamation or by writing or insculpture or some other outward sign it be sufficiently exposed and manifested to them IV. I say in the second place To the publication of a Law to oblige the Subjects it is not only required that the Lawgiver doth publickly signifie his will unto them but he is to proceed further that is to have it done in a solemn manner or at least that it be so done which is even as much as a solemn Right that it may be sufficiently testified and made known unto his Subjects that the Law-giver intended that this will of his may have the power of a Law and that it may oblige them the reason is because not every will of the Superiour although known unto the Subject doth presently and in ipso facto oblige him unless withall it be manifest that the Superiour had an intention that it should oblige him For every Superiour endued with a Legislative power and sustaining a double person the one private as a single man the other publick as a Lawful Superiour doth come under a double consideration In the midst of these late tumults the unhappy caprichiousness of some wits did put me to this new distinction concerning the personal and political Capacity of a King The Distinction in my judgment is something more proper to our present business than to the Subject then in hand It is this the will of a Prince if a Prince be considered as in his personal capacity that is as he is a single and as it were a private person carries not with him the respect of a Law and obligeth not his Subjects to direct their Actions according to it Therefore to oblige the Subjects It is not enough for a Prince any way to signify unto them that he will have this or that done unlesse upon some other account it be manifest that it is his will to have it so done as he is in his Political Capacity that is as he is a Prince and the Head of the Commonalty and as he sustaineth a publick person with a Legislative Power which seeing it cannot be made manifest enough by the bare signification of his Will it is needful that by some more publick and solemn Ceremony it should be attested unto those whom it concerns to have the knowledge of it lest any man for the excuse of his Disobedience might pretend that rotten and that vulgar one I had not thought of it V. I say in the third place In large Empires which contain many Provinces it is requisite that the publication of a new Law be made in every Province of the Empire Some there are who think this to be simply necessary and to be required from the nature of the Law which doth not oblige unlesse it be received of the people And therefore if be only published in a Princes Court or in the Metropolis of the whole Kingdom or some chief Cities thereof the promulgation of it is no way sufficient to oblige those who do live in the more remote places and provinces But although this be not absolutely necessarily neither doth the nature of the Law seem to require it and the common opinion of the Doctors as well as the common practice of most Nations are of another Judgment yet it is profitable that it should be done that so the Law to which all men are bound as much as may be may come to the knowledge of all men which by how much the more easily it may be done in our times than in Ages heretofore before the Art of printing was found out by so much the more inexcusable is the neglect But to make no digression The manner of publishing our Laws which is received amongst us doth not only seem to be the most sufficient but the most easy and commodious of all others viz. that the Laws signed and passed by the King by the consent of the Representatives of the whole Kingdom in the Houses of Parliament the Parliament being dissolved be committed to the presse and printed by the Kings Printer and in a known Character that no man may doubt but that the said Laws are lawfully made and sufficiently published VI. The third Doubt It being supposed that the Law is sufficiently published When doth iâ— begin to oblige the Subjects presently after the publication of it or some time afterwards I answer in the first place that it is beyond all controversie that those Laws in which a certain time of obligation is defined As soon as that time is arrived the said Laws begin presently to oblige and the obligation of them is perpetual unless there be a time for the obligation of them which in the same Laws is expressed or they become to be abrogated by a new Law or by a contrary custome And hence it is that according to the common consent of the Civil Lawyers the Laws of the Emperour being newly made do not oblige the Subjects of the said Empire unless after the space of two months after the promulgation of them because that this time by some Authority in the Novels as in all other of their Laws is to be observed is universaly prefixed defined for this intent that it is presumed that in the space of two months the knowledge of the said Law may easily be brought unto all the Subjects I say in the second place That in the Kingdoms and Common-wealths where nothing of any certainty is either defined by Law or received by custome concerning the time in which Laws new made do begin to oblige the said Laws having no certain time of obligation affixed to them do
presently as soon as ever they are published according to the manner of the Country oblige all those Subjects to whose notice they are arrived or where it was not in the fault of the Lawmaker but that they might have come to the knowledge of them For seeing the obligation of the Law dependeth on the will of the Law-giver and not on the notice of the Subject it followeth that the obligation of the Law is of force when the Law-giver hath sufficiently expressed his will to his Subjects by some outward sign whether it were made known to all his Subjects or whether it so fell out that some of them peradventure were ignorant of it For grant but the Law and the obligation is granted which hath its dependency on the Law as it is a Law and necessarily followeth it as every necessary Effect doth follow its proper Cause as already we have often mentioned Therefore there being nothing wanting to a Law that is required to the compleating of its essence after that it is made and sufficiently published it altogether followeth that a Law so made and published ought presently to inferre an obligation neither is it any wayes inconvenient that an obligation be made and become ours by the will only Act of another we not knowing it if the said obligation doth carry with it the nature construction of a moral Debt as the Schoolmen speak it Although from obligations and debts w ch arise from contracts the case is otherwise VII The fourth Doubt How the Law doth reach unto those who though after a sufficient publication of it and the elapse of the time prefixed by the Law have not yet actually any knowledge of it Which is to demand whether he to whom the Law is not actually known be so guilty of the fault that he transgresseth if he doth any thing against it and thereupon deserveth that punishment which that Law inflicteth on the transgressors of it The reason of this Doubt is on the one side because that obligation is vain or rather none at all which obligeth neither to the fault nor to the punishment And on the other side both because it is absurd to be bound to that which is impossible but to observe a Law which we know not is certainly impossible as also because from the two Offices of the Law above specified it is necessary that the power of directing as first by Nature must go before the other power of obliging so that the Law cannot oblige any but whom it directeth and it cannot direct any but those to whom it is known This being laid down in the first place which admits of no scruple viz. that the Subject to whom the Law is known is obliged both to the fault and to the punishment As for those that know not the Law I answer to the propounded doubt and say in the first place that he who by his grosse negligence is ignorant of the Law when it proceeds from his own fault that he is ignorant of it is no lesse or at least not much lesse guilty of the fault and deserveth punishment as well as he who doth know the Law and doth it not For the Ignorance of that thing which every man ought to know and may know doth excuse no man And in the interpretation of the Law there is no great difference betwixt a wilful Ignorance and a fault committed VIII I say in the second place That he who is therefore ignorant of the Law because he was a little more carelesse or negligent than in a businesse of that moment he ought to be although the fault be never so light as the Civilians term it yet because it is manifest it was done by a fault and by his own Fault he is not altogether free from the obligation of the Law My Reason is because that Ignorance was vincible as the Schoolmen speak that is which could be overcome for if the Subject had been so diligent as he ought to have been and as the dignity of the cause required and as wise men use to be in their imployments of greater weight he could not be ignorant it is presumed of the promulgation of the Law Now his Ignorance of that Law according to which every man is bound to direct his Actions being in him an ignorance that might have been helped this Ignorance cannot be but culpable and if culpable in whatoever degree it be it cannot but accordingly be inexcusable It may be argued But by how much the lighter the fault is the Ignorance in both Courts is so much the more excusable and amongst the equal Arbitrators of things doth deserve a more easy pardon It is to be answered that he was before obliged by the Law although he was ignorant of it And it is manifest by this because as soon as ever by the Testimony of some man of Reputation he understood that the Law was published he immediately in his own Conscience judged himself to be obliged by that Law now there could arise no obligation from a new report or by the Testimony of this man neither is there any power of obligation either in himself or in his Testimony therfore without doubt he was obliged before by that Law although he had neither notice of the Law nor any Conscience of the Obligation IX I say in the third place He who in earnest and invincibly either by accident or any other impediment and by no neglect of his own is ignorant of the promulgation of a Law as if any man should be visited with madness or labour under some long or grievous disease or being newly returned from forein Countries should never hear of the publication of such a Law nor indeed could hear of it he is not by that Law obliged either unto the fault or any punishment of the fault so properly named Nevertheless by the same Law which he is invincibly ignorant of he may become so far lyable to a punishment improperly so called that is to some losse to be sustained The first part of this position is thus proved No man committeth a fault or deserveth punishment who doth not Sin but he who keeps not a Law of which he is invincibly ignorant doth not Sin for if he should sin he were obliged to that which is impossible therefore he cannot deservedly be blamed nor justly punished But that he may be obliged to some dammage to be sustained by that Law which is the other part of our assertion shall appear to be most clear by this example Suppose there be a Law prohibiting some certain kind of Trassiquings and Contracts by which Law amongst other things it is decreed that all such contracts made one month after the promulgation of the said Law shall be altogether void and of no effect If any man after that month is run out being in good earnest and invincibly ignorant of the promulgation of that Law shall strike such a bargain which is by the said Law forbidden he will be
should still retain the Lands and Houses upon such a condition bequeathed to her in the Will and should not restore them to the Heir The reason of both the examples is the same because in both of them the obligation was not pure simple and absolute but only conditinal For always a condition of its own nature doth suspend the obligation so that the condition being kept the obligation immediately as if the Bonds were loosed doth fall to the Ground The Case is the very same in Laws that are purely penal as to the manner and measure of obliging which they will easily understand who have the will and the leisure to compare these considerations amongst themselves so that we need not any longer to insist in the explication of them XX. But peradventure some one may yet instance that no man can be obliged to the Punishment but he must be obliged to the Fault also for a Penalty cannot justly be imposed on any unless for some antecedent Fault according to that of St. Augustin Omnis poena si justa est peccati poena est Every punishment if it be just is the punishment of some sin The second objection is derived from the Nature of the Law they urge which is to command something therfore that Law which we have said is purely penal hath not the Nature of a Law if it commands nothing or if implicitly at least it containeth some Command it must also oblige unto the Fault for a fault is nothing else but a Transgression or a Violation of a just Command XXI To the first objection we may answer several ways For in the first place it may truly be said that indeed eternal Punishment as it is under the absolute Notion of Punishment and cannot otherwise be considered but in the true Nature of Punishment must therfore necessarily suppose some antecedent fault which hath deserved it and for which without any other respect whatsoever he who is guilty of that Fault is afflicted with the Punishment but there is not the same consideration in all spiritual Punishments much more in temporal Punishments For although both of them as it is a Punishment doth suppose some precedent fault worthy of such a Punishment for otherwise it would not be just yet because they may be otherwise considered than under the bare notion of a punishment viz. In respect to the End â—ntended by the party punishing that is not so much as ordinated to revenge a fault past as to prevent a fault to come it comes thereupon to passe that neither God himself when he afflicts a man either with a spiritual or a temporal punishment neither man when he inflicts upon a man a temporal punishment doth always precisely respect their Sins or offences but very often they do propound other ends unto themselves To this purpose belongeth that answer of our Saviour when his Disciples asked him concerning the blind man whether it were for his Sins or his Fathers that he was born blind Joh. 9. 3. His answer was that neither his Sins nor his Fathers were the occasion of his blindnesse but that the works of God might be manifested in him The reason is because in morals the Estimation of things and the Denomination of them is taken rather from the final than from the efficient and meritorious Cause XXII Secondly it may be said that the relation of a temporal punishment to a Sin doth properly consist only in that punishment which relatively is opposed to the Sin and not in that punishment which only contrarily is opposed to it which is the looser and more improper signification of the word We have heretofore made use of this distinction and explained it in the second Praecognisance to this Doubt therefore there needs no repetition of it It may suffice to put you in mind that the punishment affixed to the Law that is purely penal is not called a punishment strictly and properly but improperly and more largely as it signifies another kind of Evil diverse from the Evil of the Fault which kind of punishment may be infflicted on a person without any legal injustice and for a profitable end as to avoid some publick Inconvenience without the delinquency of the person suffering for the word punishment so taken doth contain all losses mâ—â—fortunes or adversities or whatsoever befalls a man which he desireth might never have to come to pass XXIII If these things shall not satisfie the Reader yet this will be very remarkable which here in the third place I shall propound unto you and which will quite remove all this Doubt and very aptly meet with another objection which is that the Intent of a penal Law of which we now speak being to oblige the Subject and yet but conditionally to oblige him may be considered two or three ways First precisely as to that to which it intendeth to oblige under such a condition to be done Secondly as precisely to the condition it self by which it intendeth to oblige the one whereof containeth the ordination of the Law and the other the punishment annexed to it Thirdly as to the whole aggregate that is the whole Law it self which at once consisteth of the complexion of them both This distinction being laid down I say in the first place that that part of the Law which containeth only the condition or the punishment doth not of it self oblige unto the fault for a bare condition is of no prevalence as all do grant and it is manifest of it self He doth not therefore transgress nay rather he very well performs his office who avoids the penalty of the Law provided he performeth that which the Law ordaineth Secondly I affirm that that part of the Law which contains the ordination doth not of it self oblige unto the fault for no Law obligeth beyond the intention of the Law-giver certain it is that the Legislator by that part of the Law did not intend per se or by it self to oblige the Subject to the fault for then it had intended to have obliged him simply â—r that part taken precisely and by it self doth contain no condition in it but by the condition of the Law added in the other part it is manifest that he did not intend simply to oblige to the doing of that which the Law ordaineth but under a condition in that Law expressed I say thirdly that a penal Law taken wholy and joyntly doth oblige to the Fault in this sense that he is guilty of the Fault and sinneth against the Law who when he ought to observe both parts performeth neither For as amongst Logicians the truth of a disjunctive proposition depends upon the truth of some one part of it so that it is all of it true if either of the parts of it be true and not false unless both parts of it be false So in morals he observeth a disjunctive Law and every Law purely penal is disjunctive or formally or equivalently who performeth one of the two parts
of the Laws is the good of the Commonalty or the publick peace and tranquillity This is proved first from those very words of the Apostle that we may live a quiet a peaceable life The Apostle doth here exhort that both privately but especially in publick Congregations for so I conceive this place to be understood and the best Interpreters are of the same opinion with me Requests Prayers and Supplications with thanksgivings may be made as first for all men in general out of Charity and in order to a Spiritual end viz. Eternal happiness in the life to come as they are men and either in Act or in Power Members of the mystical Body of Christ so more especially for Kings and others invested with supreme Authority and this out of Prudence and in order to a Temporal end to wit external felicity in this present life as they are the chief Members of the body politicks from whose legislative and executive power accordingly as they have administred it whether rightly or unjustly either the chief happiness or unhappiness of the rest of the Members and by consequence of the whole Body doth depend Therefore the making of Laws being the chief Act of the supreme political Jurisdiction that which is the supreme End of that supreme Jurisdiction is also the supreme End of the making of Laws to wit the good of the Commonalty It is proved secondly from the Nature of the End as by a Demonstration a priori That in its order is the ultimate End of everything to which all the Acts of that thing are reduced 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 8. Ethic. 11. as to their first regulative principle and to which they are referred as to that for whose sake they are ultimately ordained Therefore the Final Cause is commonly called by Aristotle That for which But all the Acts of Laws are regulated by the Common good as by their first Rule and Principle and are referred to the Common good as to that for whose sake they are made as may appear by running over the several Acts Therefore c. For wherefore are good things commanded or evil ones forbidden and things indifferent and of a middle Nature permitted Or wherefore are Rewards decreed to men that have deserved well of the Common-wealth or wherefore are punishments appointed to the Violators of Laws or wherefore are the Laws in the Courts indifferently pleaded unto both of which those are the first Acts of Laws and by the way of Form and the other more remote and by the way of Effect Is it not for that end that the Common-wealth may flourish in peace and safety and that private men according to their measure and degrees may partake rejoyce in the publick happinesse in a word that they may be all inservient to the Common good Thirdly it is proved a posteriori from the posterior by the sence and consent of all men For the Law-makers who do decree just judgements do indeed appear and those who meditate on Evil as a Law do notwithstanding desire to seem to have an Eye to the Common good and profit in the making of their Laws and to preferr the publick interest above their own Whether they sincerely intend or craftily pretend they all professe that in the making of their Laws their chiefest Intention was the publick Good II. This foundation of the present discourse being laid to wit That the End of Laws is the good of the Common-wealth I proceed to the Doubts whereof let this be the first Whether there be any necessary use at least of Humane Laws And indeed we should not have needed to have made any Doubt of it did not the mad errors of the Anabaptists and some others of their faction make this businesse for us from whose Principles seeing they affirm it is not lawful for a man that is a Christian to be a Magistrate or to contend by war or by sutes in Law to swear or to administer an oath to any one it seems to follow that there is no need at all of Humane Laws For take away but Jurisdiction there will be no man to make Laws and take away the Seats and Courts of Justice there will be no man that will fear them What need sad complaints if the offence be not redressed by punishment what will vain Laws profit without the execution of them The Directive power of the Law must of necessity fall unto the ground if the Coactive power doth not assist it The reason of this Doubt is for the Law of Nature may suffice to leave the Gentiles inexcusable which dictates to them to eschew all Sins and trespasses to injure no man and the like But if that be defective the Christian hath at hand a more sublime and a more perfect Law to wit the Law of Faith Justice and Charity made by our Saviour Jesus Christ whom St. James acknowledgeth to be the only Judge and Law-giver James 4. 12. This place in my Judgement doth neerly touch our Innovatours who have derived and drawn most of their opinion from the unclean wells of the Anabaptists whilst they collect from that place of the Apostle that it is lawful for no man besides Christ alone to make Ecclesiastical Laws for it no wayes appeareth either by the force of the words or by the scope and order of the whole perioch that the Apostle hath spoke more there of Ecclesiastical Laws then of Civil And unless they had rather deal unfaithfuly and deceitfuly with us than be ruled by reason they must do one of these two things which they please either turn absolute Anabaptists and take away altogether from mankind all the power of making Laws or grant unto supreme Magistrates as it is fit they should the power of making Ecclesiastical Laws III. But how these our Brethren can disintangle themselves from the snares of the Anabaptists it doth not much concern us let them look unto it themselves We easily do answer that the Law of Nature is written in our hearts and the Law of Christ is revealed in the Gospel and that both of them in their kind are most perfect but so that for all that it is most manifest that the profit of humane Lawes is very great and their use as necessary Because those divine Laws do contain only general Principles of things to be done From which as Conclusions from their Principles more special Rules are to be deduced accommodated to the right Institution of publick Societies of the manners of single persons Neither is it any way to be feared that it may derogate at all from the perfection of the Law of God For the makers of humane Laws do not go about to add any new stock to the most rich Treasure of the divine Law but they rather take from thence what they judge most profitable to themselves and to their people and the good of the Common-wealth Humane Laws therfore if they are just are nothing else but the Relicts of
the Law of God that is particular determinations of the general Rules which the Law of Nature and the word of God have exhibited indeterminatly wisely accommodated to the Condition Utility of certain people according to the consideration of Times and Places For Examples sake The Law of Nature doth teach in general that we are to offer an Injury to no man and he who doth so is bound to make restitution but to descend to the specialty what injury he hath done unto his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge and let in his Cattel into his Grounds and what is the restitution to be made for such an Injury is not determined by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law And the Scripture doth openly hold forth that wicked men are to be punished by the Magistrate Rom. 13. 4. and in other places But what kind of wickednesse the Magistrate is to punish what punishment to afflict and after what proportion is no where defined in the Law of God Power being transmitted to Princes Law-makers by God to define of themselves by Laws well constituted what accordting to their wisdome they shall find most safe and profitable to the Common-wealth The Rights therefore and the Laws of God and of a Legislator and a Judge are distinct and proper to themselves and disposed in so excellent an order that the Precepts and Commandments of God which are general and indeterminate are by the Law-maker determined and accommodated to certain Species of persons and actions and being so determined by the Laws the Judge doth effectually apply them to the particular causes of persons actions so that if a Legislator should make a Law which is not complacent to the Law of God he is to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law and if a Judge in any particular Cause shall pronounce Sentence which is not congruous to the Law constituted by the Prince he is to be judged himself to have pronounced an unjust Sentence IV The second Doubt is whether a Law-maker be obliged if possibly he can effect it to command all the acts and offices of all Virtues and to forbid all Sins of whatsoever nature they are or if he cannot all whether he be bound to command and forbid as many of both kinds as possibly he can The Reason of the Doubt is because there is nothing more conducing to the proper end of the Law which is the common good than as much as possibly may be that all the Citizens may be good and none of them evil Therefore it is the part of a Law-maker who always is to have before his eys this end which is the common good to take all possible care he can to command the practice of all Acts of all Vertues that so all his Citizens may be good to forbid all Sins whatsoever that there be no unrighteousnesse amongst them and the two chief of the Apostles doe seem to require this of the political Magistrate Rom. 13. 3 4. St. Paul hath these words Do good and thou shalt have Praise but if thou dost evil fear for the Magistrate is a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil that is on him who doth any manner of evil And St. Peter in his first Epistle second Chapter and fourteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the punishment of evil doer◠but the Praise of them that do well that is of all well-doers and of all evil-doers For that which is pronounced indefinitely is equipollent to an universal it is consonant to the Rule of the Logicians in a necessary matter and to the will of God who forbiddeth the Magistrate the acceptation of Persons V. For answer I say first and generally that the Law-maker is bound to use his utmost Indeavour that his Citizens be all of them good men and none of them evil and by consequence to command all Acts of Vertues and to forbid all Vices so far as the Reason of the Beginning from whom and the End for which he worketh doth require but beyond that he hath no obligation at all For the Beginnining and the End in the operations of all work they naturally or work they freely are the adaequate measure of all Intermedial Acts so far as those Acts are proportionate conformable with the Beginning from whence they proceed with the End to which they tend The Acts therefore of Commanding and Forbidding and others in which the Exercise of the legislative Jurisdiction doth consist must be proportionated both to their Beginning in whose Vertue they are done to wit the Higher Powers granted by God and to their End for whose sake they are done to wit the Common Good A Law-maker therefore ought so far to command prohibit permit and to perform all other Dutyes as they are agreeable to the power granted to him by God and is expedient for the Commonalty which God hath committed to his change VI. But these considerations are general and indefinite To satisfie therefore the Doubt propounded we must descend to something which is more particular but which howsoever may rely on this general foundation I say therefore in the second place the acts of Virtues and Vices some of them being internal of which nature are the freer acts of the Will as to will and not to will and the movings of the affections to love to hate to grieve and if there be any other cogitations and intentions of the heart and mind and some of them being external of which sort are all the commanded acts of the will and the indeliberate motions of the affections which are exercised by bodily Organs as to see to speak to strike to plunder and innumerable others the Legislative power is only exercised on the outward acts but not on the inward A Law-maker may therefore command the payment of a debt the restitution of stollen goods and the outward worship of God He also may forbid Theft Adultery Manslaughter Blasphemy and the like But he cannot command the loving of his Neighbour the confidence to be had in God the contempt of the world nor prohibit the coveting of his Neighbours goods unchast cogitations the hate of his Neighbour and the Atheism of the heart The reason is because to determine of internal actions is neither proportionate to the beginning from which nor to the end for which the Legislator worketh For Almighty God hath only permitted to the Magistrate the Government of the external man and hath reserved to himself alone the knowledge and judgment of the inward actions and the inspection into the hearts of men for the Legislator and the Judge is the same as we have already proved by the testimony of St. James and the Legislative power would be altogether ineffectual to obtain its proposed end if it were only directive and coactive First therefore seeing an external Court cannot understand nor judge of inward actions And secondly seeing it were a vain thing to command or prohibit that
which is spoken of the people in the first sence to be accommodated to them in the latter There is no sober man will deny that the safety of the people that is of the whole Commonalty as that word comprehends the King together with the Subjects is the supreme Law But that the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects the King being excluded is the supreme Law there is no man will affirm it unless he be a fool or an Imposter A fool if he doth believe what he himself saith and an Imposter if he doth not believe it But if any man will seriously look into the original of this Aphorism I do believe he will more easily grant that it ought more precisely to be understood of the safety of the Prince than of the safety of the Subjects This saying so tossed up and down in the mouths of all men came to us from the Romans and was then used by them when their Republick did flourish most of all under a popular State And there is no great Reason that any man should wonder that the peoples Safety was the supreme Law with them with whom the people themselves were the supreme Power In the Judgment therefore of those wise Antients who were the first Authors of this Aphorism the safety of the supreme Power was the supreme Law of the people indeed in a Democracy but of a King in Monarchy XVIII I say in the second place it being admitted but not granted that this Aphorism is properly understood of the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects it is nevertheless perversly wrested to the prejudice of Regal Dignity which even so doth render its Power more ample and illustrious In this sence A King that gives Lawes and Statutes to his people will not be so bound up by his Laws that it shall not be lawful for him the Safety of the Common-wealth being in an apparent danger to provide for the Safety of Kingdom and people committed to him by God even against the words of the Law Not that it is lawful for Subjects under the pretence of the defence of their liberty to break all the bonds of Laws and fidelity and by an intollerable presumption to trample on the Authority of their King but that it is lawful for the Prince in the preservation of his own his Subjects Safety to lay aside for a while all strict observance of the Laws to make use a little of an arbitrary Right lest by a too unseasonable and superstitious Reverence of the Laws he may suffer both his own person and his people that are subject to him and even the Laws themselves to fall into the Power of his Enemies XIX I say in the third place it being again admitted but not granted that by this Aphorism some licence were indulged to the Subjects themselves as necessity so requiring to lay by the Laws to provide for the publick Safety yet from hence that cannot be inferred which may would conclude For it is not lawful for the Subjects when they find their liberty in any thing to be injured or when they cry out they are sensible of it to break through all Bars of Laws and Duty and without the knowledge of their Prince to have immediately their recourse to Arms and to fill all things with tumults seditions But when the defence of their Princes their own liberties against all forein or domestick Enemies upon an urgent necessity doth so call them to it that a pious a prudent man would make no doubt of it but if the Law-maker himself was present he would dispense with his own Laws it is then lawful for the Subjects to have a greater regard of the Common safety which is the supreme Law and the end of all Laws than to be fearful to prejudice any particular Laws which were therefore made to be subservient only to the publick safety XX. The sum of all is The safety of the Common-wealth that is to say of the Prince and of the Subjects is the supreme Law to which all inferiour Laws are so to submit that present necessity so requiring it is lawful for the Prince by the prerogative of his own power yea and it is lawful for the Subjects the consent of their Prince being according unto reason presumed to recede sometimes from the words of particular Laws to assist their indangered Country and to be careful of its safety as the supreme Law but so that unless the will and consent of the supreme power be expresly obtained or according unto reason presumed they are not to attempt any thing under the pretence of the publick safety and liberty but what the Laws do permit them to XXI There are not a few Doubts that are yet remaining which in some manner do pertain to this Final Cause as concerning Privileges and Dispensations and the Relaxation of the obligation in the danger of life and others of the same nature which unto some may peradventure appear not altogether to agree with the End of Humane Laws The Solution whereof I have thought it more expedient for to deferre unto another time although never so long than by too much prolixity to tire and to torment so attentive and so courteous an Auditory THE TENTH LECTURE In which that most vulgar Speech The safety of the People is the Supreme Law is more largely examined and unfolded that it may more rightly be understood 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and Holiness I At this time and place if peradventure you do remember it Courteous Readers did intend to finish compleat this Treatise concerning both the obligations of Conscience to wit the Passive and the Active In the unfolding of the former having in first place and in a Scholastical manner excussed the Definition of Conscience I was as elabourate as I could be in examining and discovering that proper and Adequate Rule of Conscience from the directions whereof it ought to exercise all and every one of its Acts both of Dictating and Judging It was then represented to you that the Holy Scripture was the principal part of that Rule we held forth but the Adaequate part was that Will of God which the School-men call the Will of the sign in some degree made manifest to every man whether first by an inbred light by Practical Principles preserved in the Synteresis and known by themselves which the Philosophers 〈◊〉 Common Notions and the Apostle the Law of God written in our hearts Or secondly by an inferred Light by some external Revelation partly extraordinary and private to some single persons by visions dreams c. at sundry times and in sundry manners Partly ordinary and made publick to all mankind in the written word Or lastly by an acquired light by conclusions rightly and duely drawn from those practical principles or from the written word of God or
to all Laws Kings Ordinances and Customs whatsoever VI. From so loose and dangerous an Interpretation of this vulgar Axiom not only a window but a spacious door being opened to seditious tumults and all manner of popular licence It is manifest that they who defend their horrible wickednesse with this forbidden buckler do not entertain the pure and genuine construction of that Axiom but do feign another to themselves which by an inforced Interpretation may give some shew of Patronage to their depraved Counsails and their Cause For as often as any man to serve his Avarice Ambition Hatred or Anger shall attempt new designs and fill all things with Rapine Blood and Plunder he incontinently may pretend the Safety of the People for his nefarious Villanie Examine I pray you the Annals and Chronicles of all times throughout the world both sacred prophane antient modern exotick or our own you shall every where find that the Catilines and Cethegi of all times and places did constantly practise these things under the pretence of liberty and popular safety so that he may seem to have a Melonin stead of a Heart they are Tertullians own words that will suffer himself to be thus Circumvented and deluded But whether unwarily hath this Tempest hurried me whiles I let loose the reigns to my just Indignation I therefore do contain my self and that I may appear a Disputant and not an Orator I return to the matter in hand VII Where in the first place this is to be considered what in that vulgar Axiom is meant by the word Safety For it any man finds his dignity or liberty affronted or injured in some small thing nay and if it be a great one he is not presently to complain that he hath endangered or lost his Safety For every Hurt or Blemish is not directly opposed to the Safety of any thing or person but the Ruine or Destruction of it It is altogether the same thing a due Analogy being reserved in a body Politick and Republick as it is in a humane body and a single person By reason of the jarring of the contrary qualities in a mans body because of the defect or excesse of inward Heat and Cold and a various Immutation of extrinsecal Accidents it may so come to passe that a man may hardly enjoy his health but very often in one part or other of his body he may endure that either within or without which may be very troublesome to him it may also come to passe that by the Stone the Tooth-ach or the Gou◠or by some other disease in some other part he may feel an extreme pain or be so sick in every part that he may lye down yet in the mean time it may be neither necessary nor seasonable to have recourse unto extraordinary Remedies as if he were in apparent danger of his life and safety So in a Common-wealth we must not presently attempt against the Laws and Ordinances We must not gather together a rabble of the vulgar and raise tumults we must not presently cry out Arms Arms for the safety of the people as soon as any popular Souldier or bold Babler shall complain unto the people and accuse the Prince the Peers the Magistrates and Judges or their Ministers or any one of them of violating the Laws doing Injurie or neglecting their duties although peradventure they have deserved it There ever were and will be under the best Kings and the best govern'd Common-wealths some oppressions of the meaner Citizens proceeding from the abuse of Power and many other grievances for the preventing or redressing of which no care or industry of the Governours no severity of the Laws could prevail for if it shall be lawful for the factious Citizens as soon as ever they see one or another example of this nature to despise all Laws and Ordinances and under the pretence of the publick safety to revenge themselves upon the oppressors by force of Arms Kingdoms and Common-wealths will never be free from troubles and tumults Our Saviour saith Luke 17. 1. It cannot be avoyded but that offences will come and we must go out of the world as the Apostle saith 1 Cor. 5. 10. or seek some Eutopia or Platonick Common-wealth to preserve us if we shall make such an Interpretation of the safety of the people that unless every one of the lowest degree of Citizens be altogether secure from all unjust force and unrighteous Domination of some Superiour or other there shall be no publick peace at all The safety of the Common-wealth is then indeed in danger when by the incursions of Exotick Enemies or by the depraedations of wicked Citizens the affairs are brought into so manifest a danger that unless some timely help be provided the City and Country undoubtedly will be destroyed VIII We have seen what our Innovators do mean by the word Safety In the next place we are to observe how rightly that word People is interpreted by them The People as St. Augustine defines them from the lost books of Cicero in his Repub. is Coetus multitudinis Hominum juris consensu utilitatis Communione Sociatus * De 〈…〉 A multitude of men associated by the consent of Law and Right and the Communion of profit 〈◊〉 in this appellation of people all the Roman Citizens of every Order and Condition were contained For besides Kings in their first times and Emperors in their last the Romans had a threefold degree of distinction Patricians Knights and the Common people But in what a latitude this word is to be received amongst the Latine writers wheresoever it is found the Reader may collect by the adjoyned circumstances which for the most part for a most sure argument for this purpose may best be done by those words which are annexed viz. the opposite Terms The word People is taken three wayes by the Roman Writers First and of all the most unusual it is taken for the Common People alone which was the lowest order of the People of Rom◠as in that of Martial Dat populus dat gratus eques dat thura Senatus Where the word People being opposed to the Senate and the Knights can signifie nothing but the Common-People Secondly for both the inferior orders of People viz. the Common People and the Knights together the Supreme or Patrician order being excluded For in the beginning of the constitution of that Common-wealth the Kings being expelled the Fathers thought good to retain among themselves a kind of Prerogative of Honour and Dignity above other Citizens and for the signification of it to separate themselves by that name from the rest of the Turba of the People From whence came those solemn Forms The Senate and the People of Rome It seemed good to the Senate and the People of Rome In which the name of People doth comprehend all the other Citizens both Knights and Common-People the Senate excepted Thirdly it is taken for all the Citizens of all degrees without difference both
as too burthensome and therefore because too insolently he domineereth over them to drive him out of his house to seize upon his Keys Truncks and all his goods and to mannage themselves the Government of the Family at their own pleasure under this pretence only that The safety of the Family is the supreme Law oeconomical There is no man but will confesse but that these wicked and nefarious Counsels may by some lawful consequence be deduced from these Principles which Principles being rightly understood are most true and profitable And yet an egge is not more like unto an egge than the Arguments of those men who by pretending the peoples safety fill all things with sedition are to this wild kind of reasoning as if and that very eminently also the safety of the General were not contained and included in the safety of the Army and the safety of the Master in the safety of his Family and the safety of a Prince in the safety of his people To be short we must acknowledge the safety of the People that is of the King and People together is the supreme Law but the safety of the People that is of the Subjects the King being excluded is not so XIV In the second place I am to add something more And though I conceive that I have clearly enough proved that in this Axiom by the word People neither the Subjects without the Prince nor the Prince without the Subjects ought precisely and by themselves to be understood but both of them conjunctively yet if any man will more exactly consider either the dignity of the persons or the original of this Aphorism he will willingly grant it to be understood more precisely of the safety of the King than precisely of the safety of the People For first that the Kings Majesty is sacred hath not been only most copiously acknowledged by all the Fathers of the Church even at that time when there were no Christian Kings who have reverenced them as men second to God and lesse only than God himself and have offered Vows and Prayers unto God for their safety and have taught that on their safety the safety and happinesse of the whole people did depend But God himself as largely may be shown if need required hath been pleased that abundantly it should be testified in the holy Scriptures From whence it came to passe that all good Subjects and endued with a right understanding in the height and heat and the extremest danger of Battel have judged that the safety of the King alone was to be preferred above the safety to them all which as it became good Subjects those Israelites gallantly professed who at the time of the execrable Conspiracy of Absolon preserved their fidelity which they vowed to King David 2 Sam. 18. 3. And of the same mind were they who not basely flattering a mortal man for their own profit but speaking according to the Dictates of the Spirit of God have called the King the breath of their nostrils for so that godly Prophet and sanctified from his mothers womb the Prophet Jeremy speaketh it Lamen 4. 20. In a most apt signification That breath which is attracted and emitted through the nostrils being that vital breath Animus Râ—publica tu es illa corpus tuum Senec. 1. de clem 5. Ille spiritus vitalis quem haec tot millia trabunt Ibid. c. 4. with which the soul as with a Bond is united to the Body and which failing the living Creature must forthwith necessarily expire and perish His Breath goeth forth he returneth to his Earth Psal 146. 4. XV. This also is worthy your observation that the Axiom of which we now treat hath been brought unto us from the Roman Nation and then in use with them when Rome did most flourish in a popular state And there is no reason we should wonder That the safety of the people was to them a supreme Law to whom the people themselves were the supreme Power The Lawes were then the Peoples the judgments the Peoples the whole jurisdiction the Peoples the entire Government and autocratical Majesty was the Peoples And from hence it is that amongst all the Historians and in Cicero also and other Writers of that age so frequent a mention is made of the majesty of the Roman people as being in a state Democratical which in a state Monarchical is not the Peoples but the Kings Therefore as much as the safety of the People was to them with whom was the Majesty of the People which how much it was by the Aphorism they would it should be testified to the world so much unto us if we will make use of of that Aphorism an Analogy in the so different forms of both Republicks being rightly observed as fit it should be so should be the safety of our Kings who acknowledge no other majesty but the Kings only XVI From these things which have been spoken I believe it is manifest enough that neither in the appellation of Safety nor in the appellation of People there is any force at all in this vulgar Axiom as to wrest it to the prejudice of Kingly dignity unless with the greatest injury that can be done unto it And if the two other remaining words of it viz. The supreme Law should be rightly weighed they would acknowledge I believe if they had but any Modesty or Reason that nothing can be spoken in this Axiom which is more ample and illustrious to establish the soveraign Power of Kings For these words the supreme Law do suppose that in every Common-wealth there ought necessarily to be somewhere a soveraign Power which is above all humane Laws positive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 5. Ethic. 14. Nulla tanta providentia potuit esse eorum qui leges compoâ—ebant ut species criminum complecterentur Quintiâ— declam 331. to which he ought to look and by his Authority to take care that neither by the defect of Laws or the too superstitious observance of them the Common-wealth may receive any dammage And the reason of this is plain enough for the wisest Law-maker cannot so foresee all circumstances of events to come neither can he make such a sufficient precaution by the Laws as to prevent all those Evils inconveniencies which he suspects may come to pass and this is not by the fault of the Laws or of the Law-makers but as Aristotle hath excellently observed it it is by reason of the nature of those things that are to be defined by the Laws which being indefinite by Reason of their variety and uncertain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ibid. because depending on futurity cannot be comprehended within some certain Rules of Limitation The Law-maker therefore hath discharged his part if by his Laws he hath ordained those things which are for the most part just Aristot 1. and profitable to the Commonalty Ethic. 14. although it may so fall out as indeed often times it doth that on
proper unto Potentia's but to Habits to be obtained to be assumed to be layd down or to be lost but men are said to find to lose to take up and to depose their Consciences The Conscience therefore is not a Potentia but a Habit. XVII I do therefore thus state it The Conscience properly and formally and by a direct praedication is a Habit yet notwithstanding it may be a Potentia and that two ways first materially because it is in the Potentia as in the Subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say in which Secondly by approximation for being placed as it were in the midst betwixt Habitum acquisitum and puram potentiam a Habit acquired and a pure potentia it can assume the name of either as the Mediums do participate of either of the Extreams And hereupon it is that Conscience is found in little Children who are not capable of acquired Habits Neither is it altogether necessary that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind and the Conscience in Tit. 1. be contradistinct as bare Potentia's but it seems rather that both words are there taken by a Synecdoche the mind for the speeulative Intellect with all its pertinences as the Schoolmen speak it and the Conscience for the practicall Intellect with all its pertinences that is with all the faculties Habits and Acts and what do respectively pertain to any of them XVIII In the Definition of Conscience I have placed the word Faculty which in some measure doth seem to me to be common to the Potentia's and Habits and is very proper to signifie Habits innate Peradventure you will object that every Habit is acquired by often actings and therefore this doth so appertain to the essence of a Habit that Habits are especially to be known from Potentia's by it as by a specifical difference to wit that the Potentia's are accquired and the Habits natural therefore unless a man will maintain meer contradictions he ought not to say that Conscience is a Habit innate To this I answer that it must be indeed confessed that all Habits whatsoever both are and ought to be called accquired nay even those Habits which seem to be most natural and for this cause because they want the assistance of the sences and many praevious sensible actions that so the Species of things sensible in respect whereof the Soul of it self is like a clear table-Book may be conveyed into the Phantasy and become at last intelligible Neverthelesse some Habits may be called and with great reason too innate for as much as the mind by an inbred-light doth immediately give an assent to the thing propounded without any fear of the opposite to it only the Apprehension of the Terms being supposed neither to procure its assent doth it want the helps of internal study or external institution For example The Intellective Habit of this Principle Omne totum est majus qualibet sui parte Every thing that is whole is greater then any part of it is a Habit innate so far as by the force of the light of Nature and only out of the apprehension of the Terms the truth thereof of its own accord doth enter into the mind without any study or Teacher And yet nevertheless this Habit is acquired so far as it needeth the assistance of the sences that so by often actions in sensible things one may arrive unto the knowledge of the Terms that is to say what belongeth to the whole and what unto the parts XIX If it may be yet objected that the Conscience cannot be called an Innate Habit for those things which are Innate are not capable of errour neither can they be defective and they are the same in all in whomsoever they are but the Conscience can erre and be evil neither is it the same in all men I make answer that it doth indeed follow from this that the Conscience is not a Habit simply innate which no reasonable man will affirm for it is repugnant to Nature but as partly as before mentioned it is innate so also it is partly acquired The Soul of man doth bring with it as it were some seeds of knowledge of good and evil which grow up and are perfected by study and institution In the same manner natural agility is compleated by Exercise and natural Logick by Logick artificial the Conscience therefore in respect of those morall Agibles which as the School-men speak are of the first Dictates of Nature and are its primary objects is a natural or an innate Habit and is alike in all men and is always right without any errour or depravation but in respect of those things which are afterwards learned and come close up unto those first principles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether it be by an internal and proper meditation or an external institution it is a Habit acquired and may be erronious and defective XX. But this is enough if not too much of the Genus of Conscience I shall more briefly dispatch the rest The second member of the Definition is the Subject which is twofold viz. Subjectum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Subjectum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Subject in which and the Subject of which The Subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or of which is man or rather a reasonable creature Math. 8 29. if we will speak more exactly for it is found in holy Writ that the Angels themselves are conscious of their Rebellion James 11 12. and of the punishments thereby due unto them 1 Corinth 6. 3. and that they know they shall be tormented yet neverthelesse they tremble at the revealed word of God as also that they are to be judged at the comming of the Lord and to give an account of all things they have done But because it belongeth not much to this discourse to know the nature of Angelick minds and it hath pleased the most wise God to make but little mention of it in the Scriptures I have appropriated this Definition of the Conscience unto man only For although in brutish creatures there appeareth a shadow of Conscience as of reason and many things are performed by them which do bear a show of Justice and Prudence as indeed what is reported of Elephants and of the policy of Bees and Dogs and of some other living Creatures is much to be admired yet they are all but the works of the Phantasy and not of Reason and they proceed from a natural Instinct and not from Conscience Man therefore is the proper Subject as well of Reason as of Conscience and every man is so the very Heathens the Reprobates and even Infants themselves being not excluded As for the Heathens St. Paul Rom. 2. 15. expressly speaketh that they do show the works of the Law to be written in their hearts their Consciences bearing them witnesse And the same Apostle Tit. 1 15. declareth that the filthiest persons have a Conscience although an impure one for the
uprightnesse and integrity of Conscience is lost by the Fall and not by nature And being regenerate and new born there as no new Conscience infused which before was wanting but the Conscience foul before and impure by sin being sprinkled with the blood of Christ is purified by Faith according to the eternal Counsels of the Almighty God And even in young Children that the name of God may be magnified in sucklings some Sparks do fly from the ashes of the old fire and though but very weakly there is some light of reason to be seen the force of Conscience so early working in them that if they have committed any trespasse they will modestly strive to cover and conceal it XXI Subjectum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Subject in which now the Potentia of the Soul in which the Conscience hath its seate is the practical Intellect I say the Intellect and not the Will and the practical not the Speculative Intellect There is a great controversie amongst the School-men whether the Conscience doth pertain to the Intellect or the Will or unto both I will not thrust my self into these contentions you have had enough if not too much already of the nicetyes and difficulties of the School-men I shall therefore in few words dispatch unto you what I shall find expedient for my present purpose Aristotle in his third Book de anima doth number up three distinct Potentia's of the part intellective two whereof are Cognitive that is to say the speculative Intellect and the practical and the third appetitive which is the Will Of these three the Extreams are the Intellect speculative which looketh on Truth as Truth and precisely resteth in it without any order or respect to practice and the Will which is nothing at all speculative and precisely tendeth to operation Now amongst both these Potentia's the practick Intellect is seated in the middle and according to the Custome of things intermedial doth in some part concord with either of the Extreams and in some part doth differ from them The practical Intellect doth agree with the Speculative in this that it doth look on Truth and with the Will in this that it inclineth to operation As for the Conscience it is most certain that it doth not pertain to the speculative Intellect because it altogether doth direct its Science into practise neither doth it properly pertain unto the Will for if it were so it would be in it as a Potentia and be the same as liberum arbitrium or free-will or as a Habit and so it would become one of the moral Vertues neither of which was ever admitted or asserted by any Divine or any Philosopher It therefore altogether belongeth to the cognitive practical potentia that is to the practical Intellect And thus Aristotle although he had placed the moral virtues in the power appetitive yet he placed the Habits of Arts and Prudence though ordinated to practice in the cognitive power as may be seen in the fifth book of his Ethicks This opinion is confirmed by these Arguments First that Conscience is a kind of Science and all Science is in the Understanding Secondly that it is capable of Error and Error is a Disease of the Understanding Thirdly according to the common use of speaking he who underderstandeth the Kings Secrets whether he approveth them or not approveth them is properly said to be Conscious of them therefore the proper Seat and Subject of Conscience in the Soul of Man is the practical cognitive power which is the practical Intellect XXII We have seen the Genus and the Subject the Object followeth which is that about which the Conscience is versed and they are the particular and proper Moral Acts. In the first place I say Acts that is something done by a Man as he is a Man or a rational Creature whether it be for the future or to be done or whether it be past and already done or present and now in doing The Conscience is compacted of Eyes it seeth and searcheth into all things It beholdeth things to come if you are about to commit any filthynesse it doth Councel you to forbear it it beholdeth things present and in the very act of sinning it murmureth checketh biteth picketh it justles and joggs you to give off It looketh back on things past and when you have sinned it reproveth it stingeth and accuseth it condemneth and tormenteth you On the other side to good deeds it exhorts you and whilst you are a doing of them it doth incourage and excite and provoke you and having done them it crowns your head with Honour and fills your breast with Peace and Joy In the Second place I say particular Acts not by limiting the Subject as if there were some Acts that were not particular but oppositely to that Science which the Conscience doth suppose and apply and although this Science be universal it is yet referred to particular Acts. In the third place I say particular proper Acts to exclude that signification of Conscience which more largely accepted is extended to the Actions of other Men as when a man may be said to be Conscious of the Kings secrets to be conscious of Catilines conspiracy and the like Such Actions do not belong to our intent in this place who do here treat of Conscience properly so called which is exercised in Agibles either performed or to be performed by it self In the fourth place I say Moral Acts where it is to be observed that some things are brought about by necessity and some things do fall out by contingency By necessity as the Rising of the Sun the Eclipse of the Moon c. of which there is a Science by reason of their certitude but they have not the least relation either to Conscience or Free-Will Those things which casually come to passe are either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things in our own power or things not in our power Things not in our power as the flying of Birds a Tempest suddainly raised c. which come not within the compasse of Science by reason of their uncertainty and being out of our power they may be as well put out of our care the Will having nothing to do to choose nor the Conscience to determine of them Again things that are in our power are some of them morally neutral and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is which neither of themselves nor on the account of any permanent circumstance do contain any moral good or evil as to go into the market to write a letter c. And such things indeed may pertain to the freedom of the Will if at least they be worthy to be taken into consideration because they may come under the compass of Choyce but of themselves they do not pertain to the Conscience I say of themselves for they may pertain unto it by accident by reason of some Scandal or any other circumstance of which the Conscience may take cognizance Other things there are which are
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be