world without a Law and a common Power over him and others the Law is that writ in their hearts and this is it which St. Paul speake's Rom. 2.15 Which shewe's the law written in their hearts that law of Nature that practique law which is writ in the heart of every man and this common Power is GOD and therefore as St. Paul speakes there their Conscience also bearing witness and their thoughts the mean while accusing or excusing one another where there is evidence accusing excusing there is supposed a common Power so that there is a Common Power and this secretly acknowledged by men and that he hath given them certain lawes for the breach of which there is a horror and dread insomuch as a man cannot live or it is a prodigie to see a man without all Conscience of the principal and fundamentall rules of reason although men may doe and act against those Lawes yet untill a long custom of living have hardned their hearts or some such wicked principles as his have by degrees stollen an approbation in their their understandings by degrees I say for I think it not possible to be done in an instant untill then it is not pospossible for men to sin against these without an accusation of their Consciences He proceed's Sect. 8. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal vertues In a war actually waged force is of great use and may well be called one of the best hinges upon which war is moved yea if we take force not for strength but violence as I think he doth but in the posture of war or in war only in expectation violence is the chiefe support of all injustice but certainly it is most improperly called a vertue in any but a most forced and violent way for vertues are those things which perfect the soule which make the work and worker good but no force doth that neither doth it assist in doing but it is indifferent to good or bad then againe force even in war may be a help to increase the wickednesse of it if the war be unjust it is doubly evill which is fortified with force If the acts of that war be cruell it is doubly bloudy which is effected by force And then for fraud although stratagems are lawfull yet falshood in war is wicked which is comprehended under that notion of fraud as to promise one thing and doe another all Stratagems have a double sense by which the enemy deceive's himself taking the visard from the true face but they having a true face discernable are not all visards and forces where there is no war engaged in but only some private end or design of one man against another they are in themselves wicked and provoke the just vengeance of a war from the injured party upon them He should have said valour and prudence were cardinal vertues in war but force and fraud are these degenerated and when they get these names of force and fraud they never retaine that excellent nature of being Vertues Sect. 9. He urgeth further Iustice and Injustice saith he are none of the faculties neither of the body nor the mind I think if he take Faculty as he seem's to doe for an innate quality no man ever said they were therefore his proof is needlesse when he come's on if they were they might be in a man that were alone in the world as well as his Senses and Passions although they are not innate faculties but acquisite habits I meane the vertue justice or the vice injustice yet the habits may be when they are acquired with that man who is alone and when he is alone though to act accordingly require's a present Object now denominations are given from the habits not the acts He proceed's They are qualities that relate to men in society not in solitude our dispute is of a third sort of men neither in such Society as a civill policy nor a Solitude but men without all relations of being under one common sublunary governance and yet men cohabiting in the same neighbourhood where may be perpetrated those horrid and unjust actions of Murder and Theevery c. And again although the acts of Justice doe suppose other men to doe justice upon yet it is other men not other men in the same City or polities and when by the use of those acts a habite is got it remaine's in Solitude Sect. 10. He draw's another Conclusion Hence thus it is consequent also to the same Condition that there be no propriety no dominion no mine and thine distinct but only that to be every mans that he can get and for so long as he can keep it The wickednesse of this Proposition will best appeare betwixt two States two neighbour Nations they certainly have distinct Dominions and it is injustice for one to take by force from the other or detaine by force what he hath gotten ill which is against all the consent of men from the beginning of the world now these two Nations are without any other coercive power in this world and from that reason are justly paralleld by him to such men as he formerly spake of and therefore these Nations should have no propriety as he explaines himself not in any thing Consider therefore Gen. 12. and the 20. Chap. How in two places Abraham's wife Sarah was like to have been taken from him by the Kings of those Nations where he lived but God punished them for it and they acknowledged it would have been a great sin to have layne with another mans wife Mr. Hobbes would have pleaded with God there is no propriety in any thing All men have title to all things where is no coercive power upon earth there is no injustice the woman is any mans who can get her by fraud or force so long as he can keep her they who have no common power above them as these had not to make Lawes which might appropriate interests to particular persons these are bound to no law nor have any propriety but such as force gives them and then both Abimelek and Pharaoh or other of them might lawfully have kept Sarah Abrahams wife from him but the Principles of the law of Nature say it was unjust and they did not doe it Thus it fared concerning the propriety of Wives now we will examine what propriety men had in Estates where was no such humane authority without doubt the first that ever gave outward Lawes to governe a Nation by was Moses and I conceive the Decalogue to be like our Magna Charta which was not a new law but a briefe and pithy expression of what was the old law by which this people was governed so were the Ten Commandements not a new law but an expression in tables of that morall law of nature which was writ in the heart of men before and practised before his time in particular this of Stealing which injured the possessor of Meum tuum
be only such things as are honest I think no man ever justified his Conclusion as he understands these termes of profit and right He ends this Sect. with an endeavour to prove his Conclusion For saith he there is little use and benâ—fit of that right a man hath when another as strong or stâ—engtâ— then himself hath right to the same This Argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid which was that every man had right to every thing even in anothers possâ—ssion but that appeares to be a mistake in him and therefore this Argument is weak which is drawne ex non concessis CHAP. XXV Concerning nature's right liberty power Of warre and self-preservation by it For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty c. Sect. 1. THus having finished my discourse upon this subject as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be the liberty every man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature This definition I except against as not cut out even to the thing defined First it is too narrow for this right of nature concernes not himself alone but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life Yea if it have such a liberty which consisteth in to do or not to doe as he expound's it presently after then it is a right of nature to forbeare to use his owne power for the preservation of his life aswell as to use it so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature Secondly like an ill made garment as it is too streight in one place so it is too wide in another the liberty a man hath to use his power as he will himself for the preservation of his owne life is not a right of nature for the right of nature as I have shewed is a result out of the law of Nature which impower's him for that action but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation c. as I have shewed before but only such things as are just and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of Nature to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that Nature which gives him his nature are to be preferred before his life Sect. 2. The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty thus By liberty is understood according to the proper signification of the word the absence of externall impediments This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right for externall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition take away the right to have it especially this natural right for other rights by civill institution and donation do in some manner depend upon outward things because those Nationall lawes which give them these rights are outward although right and title be an inward thing the issue of that outward law but in natural right the very law which give 's a man this right is an internall law a law writ in man's heart and therefore the liberty which attend's this right and which he saith this right is can in no sense be understood to be the absence of externall impediments he adds Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would This is weakly said or most impertinently or both for external impediments can take away no part of natural power which alone is necessary to natural right this may hinder nature in its operations but this cannot take away the power of operating and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him These rights are internal things which are not much concerned in what is outward but remaine and keep their being whatsoever outward things happen Sect. 3. His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this A law of nature Lex naturalis is a precept or general Rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of preserving the same and to omit that by which it may be best preserved He is a most unhappie man in his definitions which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with First for this we may observe that if he had said such a Precept as he seâ—s down had been a law of nature or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature he had spoke truth but saying a law of Nature is such a precept he makes this precepe to be the Predicate as we University-men abused with Universityâ—learning terme it and then it must be as large as the subject A law of nature is what this is not for first he makes this precept to be only a prohibition To a negative law A precept saith he by which a man is forbidden c. when certainly although there are negative precepts yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts no negative which is not supported by an affirmative and this law forbidding must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoyned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned University learning he would have writ more properly and have seduced himself into fewer errors next observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse that he makes Nature aiming in all her intendments at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the universal when indeed the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique and particulars only as they are parts of the publique The latter part of that Section I have shewed erroneous already which affirmes law and right inconsistent Sect. 4. His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus And because the condition of man as hath been declared in the precedent Chap. is a condition of war of every one against every one in which case every one is governed by his own reason He said somewhat like truth when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a
thing no mâ—nner of proof that had shew of reason Posito quolibet sequitur quidlibet if men suppose impossible things they may from thence-argue impossibilities Uno absurdo concesso mille sequuntur an errour in the foundation in the first drawing a line multiplie's its self all the way thus in this instance he goes on And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies it followeth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion First that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature Secondly that as bad of the law of Nature Thirdly That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man without all which this cannot follow that every man hath right to one anothers bodies for certainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world besides that gave every man a propriety in his owne body and none had interest in it but by jus naturae as Parents or by some concession expressed or implyed as in polities yea in warre saith he certainly not so neither for by the law of Armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition there are inhumanities in warres which men have no right to use as perhaps will be shewed hereafter so that then all these Propositions which are all appâ—rently false must be granted or else the Conclusion which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness yet take his Conclusion altogether it hath some likeness of truth with it That in such a Condition every man hath right c. In such a condition which was never knowne which is impossible in such a condition a man may have such a right he proceeds in the same place And consequently it is a Precept or generall rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtaine it that he may seeke and use all helpes â—nd advantages of warre This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it only one terme added to the last clause which is when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it then he may make use of the advantages of warre for without this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace and upon any deniall or pause at the first he might with justice engage in a war which were most unjust Sect. 5. That which followe's is against his own Principles the first branch of which rule saith he containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is to seeke peace and follow it this according to his principles can be but a deduction out of the law of nature for if the law of nature be as he defined it just before in this page a Precept by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive to his life this can be no other but a deduction out of that The second saith he is the summe of the right of nature which is by all meanes we can to defend our selves The second branch is not the summe of this right c. but a branch of it for there are many other meanes to preserve our selves besides war although in a desperate case war may be one What followe's in that Chap. concerning the second law of nature deduced out of this that a man should lay downe his right to all things c. I think it needless to speake of for first there is no man hath by nature right to any person but his owne secondly a man need 's lay down his right to nothing for his right to any thing returnes to him if any thing lack an owner which is not disposed of by such powers which by deduction from the law of nature are authorised to settâ—e them otherwise and therefore all those needless definitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right what renouncing what transferring what obligation duty injustice are which are touched in the 65. Page I let goe at present and for altogether unlesse some just occasion hereafter may make me look back upon them only that require's a censure which he deliver's in the bottome of that Page and the beginning of the next which discourse as I conceive it wicked in its self so it render's all which he spake before exceeding malicious Sect. 6. This discourse begin's thus Whensoever a man transferreth his right or renounceth it it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeth for thereby This I grant so far as the words expresse it but there is something he implies which will render it fit for censure anon his reason likewise I allow which followe's for it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself as for his deduct on which is layd therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signes to have abandoned or transferred this in generall hath some truth for since the end of man is his happiness which he must needs love happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will as colours to the sight or any other yet this applyed to any particular thing will be found erroneous for although good and happiness must needs by the law of nature be desired yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent when that good and happinesse shall be instanced in any particular it will not be universally received Now I will consider his examples As first saith he a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life This is a mistake in him a man can and many men have done it a man can for a man can preferre other things before his life and therefore can exchange hâ—s life for that men ought to preferre their Countries good before their owne both being in its self a greater good and of greater durance men may preferre their souls eternall good beyond this life the hope of which give 's the greatest comfort this life is capable of one may and ought to preferre the glory of God before his own life by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him these men may and ought to preferre who are Christians and as Reason guide's to these actions so Experience of them who have done it for these ends shewe's it may be done but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it those of honour in severall kinds for riches for present pleasures and there is almost no worldly contentment for which some men have not adventured and lost
that abominable Aphorisme before refuted that all men are naturally at war one with another untill I come to the last Clause where he fall's foule againe upon all manner of writers page 80. where he saith that the Science of Vertue and Vice is Moral Philosophy This so far is true that it is a good piece of moral Philosophy to treat of the Law of Nature and to shew how all vertuous actions are deduced out of it and agree with it but this is not all the Office of a moral Philosopher he is first to teach the end which is man's Summum bonum his chiefe good his felicity happinesse then to teach the meanes which are those vertues deduced out of the Law of nature and to shew how they conduce to the end so that he confined moral Philosophy in too narrow bounds when he restrayned it to Virtue and Vice which are only the meanes and are handled by a moral Philosopher onely in order to his end Now he come's to his high strain againe censuring the world Sect. 9. But saith he the writers of moral Philosophy though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices yet not seeing wherein consisteth their Goodnesse nor that they come to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living place them in a mediocrity of passions as if not the cause but the Degree of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality There are many things in this Period to be cenâ—ured First I blame him for accusing the whole Company of the Philosophers of ignorance in so weighty a businesse not so much as pardoning any one when for my part who have turned over hundreds of bookes in this businesse I know no one so blind as himselfe in this particular point I say no one either Christian or other for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction betwixt a good man and a good Citizen acknowledged by multitudes of Philosophers and must needs be by any man who consider's that a man may be discoursed of either concerning himselfe in his owne nature and the wayes of perfecting it or else in relation to others in the first consideration that Science which perfect's him is called Ethicke or Morall Philosophy for the second which referre's him to others it is either to a family then it is Oeconomick or else to a State or City and then it is Politick Now the writers of moral Philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himselfe so that they give Ruâ—es which way he should be happy in a desart in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world in the midst of worldly plenties miseries such surely are perfect in this world and such onely and this is the foundation of all Oeconomicks and Politicks no man can be either Oâ—conomically or Politickly vertuous who is not so in himselfe and being so in himself having neither family nor City to dispose himself to he may not be such to other men Mr. Hobbes dedicate's a mâ—n wholly to others in this place as in others he make's a man dispose all things to himself and consider's not the divers shâ—res which his Parents his friends I may adde his Children and above all his God is to have out of him as well as his Country Now Mr. Hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others when in this period he saith in effect That Sect. 10. The Philosophers did not know that humane vertues came to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living which are things onely in respect of others but I may tell Mr. Hobbes that in their politicks and Oâ—conomicks they teach this relative perfection as fully and much truer then hd as will appear but in Ethicks they teach how these vertues are excellent in themselves and doe perfect the owner this is done by all sorts of Philosophers to begin with the Epicureans whose Philosophy doth in many things agree with his although in some things he consent's with the Stoicks in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both first Epicurus agree's with him in this that he makes pleasure the happinesse the chiefe good of man as Mr. Hobbes doth in many places and I know Lactantius favour's Epicurus so much as to say he meant the pleasures of the soule yet surely it seemes to be the sensuall part of the Soule only for in that Epistle he writes to Menoeceus which is the chiefe we have of his moral Philosophy he seeme's to me to doe otherwise and places man's happinesse as Mr. Hobbes doth elsewhere in the enjoying sensuall Contentments now Mr. Hobbes in those other places did better then in this where he placed man's happinesse within himself and the use of his vertues conducing to himselfe but here in relation to others which is so extrinsecall a thing as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men to converse and be sociable and affable with and then he is not happy who can be miserable which Epicurus himself denied to be possible to a vertuous and prudent man so that in respect of the end although Epicurus make the same happinesse as Mr. Hobbes in other places yet Epicurus and Mr. Hobbes in other places speake righter then Mr. Hobbes in this Then consider the meanes of obtaining this end Epicurus first writes against the fear of the Gods as he call's them a thing which Mr. Hobbes countenanceth although he let 's fall in one place as Mr. Hobbes now and then will that God doth punish wicked men and blesse the honest and vertuous yet he after speake's against man's feare of any such thing because saith he nothing must be spoken of the Gods but eternal felicity which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affaires therefore denies prayers or any religious duty to have any power with the deities as I remember Mr. Hâ—bs out of his Stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belong's to all things and actions Cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both like as Herod and Pilate joyne together in nothing but crucifying Truth To the same purpose Lucretius a follower of Epicurus speak's in his first fifth and sixth books and diverse times make's it the greatest piece of happinesse to abhorre Religion and contemne it and make's man by that act to be the greatest Conquerour Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim Obteritur nos exaequat victoria Caelo And one of Mr Hobbes his Principles of religion is made by him to be the chiefe the ignorance of second causes Thus doe men who conspire against Religion meet likewise in the meanes But Epicurus and Lucretius spake out fully Mr. Hobbes darkely thus they joyne in one Principle by which happinesse may be acquired but in another Epicurus farre
exceed's him for placing happinesse as he doth in the enjoyment of this world's contentments Epicurus contemne's and despiseth death and will not allow it to be any evill and dispute's most excellently to prove it is not to be feared for saith he that is not to be feared which hurt 's not a true rule for those things are onely to be feared being absent which when they are present will hurt us Now saith he death hurt 's no man for when death come's man is not therefore not hurt by it It hurt 's neither the living nor the dead saith he not the living for whilst men live death is not not the dead for where death is man is not The force of this Argument is necessary because in all Injuries or hurts that come there must be these two Termes the thing hurting and that hurted but these can never be together death and man now herein he excell's Mr. Hobbes for whether Mr. Hobbes make's man's happinesse to consist in the enjoying the world or in a Complacencie or contentment with other men yet when he make's death so fearfull a thing as he doth it is in vaine for that man to look for happinesse who knowe's he must die when he shall lose this happinesse and he may dy this day and suddenly lose it by that which he and such men make their greatest evill death so that Epicurus and his Sect went beyond Mr. Hobbes and spake more justifiably out of these Principles then he did But Epicurus goe's on and deliver's how these sensuall pleasures are to be preserved by Frugality and temperance two vertues which I cannot find in Mr. Hobbes his whole booke which yet necessarily conduce to the preservation of this felicity Frugality that so the stock may be supported which must maintaine his pleasures Temperance which is a moderate use of them that so he may enjoy them the fuller Frugality preserve's the fuel Temperance the fire and as he speake's the enjoyment of a mans pleasure doth not consist in the use of luxurious superfluities but in the proportion the object hath to the appetite or the necessity of the man who enjoye's it So a hungry needy and necessitous man find's as great pleasure in a Crust of bread and a draught of water as any riotous person doth in his greatest excesse of dainties Now I read in Mr. Hobbes nothing of these two which are as necessary as any for the happinesse which sensuall pleasures can bring to a man and therefore although I thinke this Sect erred as much as any in his moralls yet I thinke likewise that these writers did thinke more truly then he wherein the goodnesse of these vertues of which he speake's consisteth that is making men happy and gave better reasons for what they said then he I have dwelt longer upon this Sect both because few men have described it aright which I have read and likewise because it containing as ill or worse opinions then any other hath suffered most justly under the generall Censure of Writers And although it being a doctrine which flattered our flesh and blood and thereby for a while got a great applause amongst men and the readers of this Philosophy like Ranters in divinity were much followed for a while yet in the passages of an age or two it was cryed down and I know not of any late writers who hath so nearly insinuated his worst opinions as this Author with whom I have to doe unlesse it be the Mahumetans who agree with the Epicureans in this that sensuall pleasure is the happinesse of man but here they differ the Mahumetans make that happinesse eteâ—nall hereafter but Epicurus with whom Mr. Hobbes seeme's to shake hands in this world onely Sect. 11. To discourse of the Stoicke Philosophy were needles because the common Authors which are read by the generality of men as Tully Seneca Epictetus doe manifestly shew how they placed humane happinesse in his owne breast and in his power which is the injoyment of himself without the disturbance of passions And to this end they imposed that impossible meanes of rooting out passions as living onely by reason which certainly if it could be done would make man's life like that of the Angels or his bodily life like his spirituall And these Cardinal vertues Prudence Justice Fortitude Temperance to be the supports of all this worke and that man's happinesse hath no dependence upon any thing without him these certainly carried with them much more perswasive reason to induce the end which these vertues aimed at then any thing Mr. Hobbes hath delivered Then for Aristotle who as appeare's in the tenth of his Ethickes Cap. 7. make's first the happinesse of man to consist in action and that in the noblest action of man which is of man's Understanding then in the excellentest Act of his Understanding which is Contemplation and last of all in the perfectest act of Contemplation which is the Contemplation of God I will not discourse his reasons which were worthy his writing this way A man may be happy alone without any reference to a Common-wealth yea the businesse of publique affaires would but hinder and distract this and throughout that book these vertues are taught in relation of this chief Good of man his happinesse in which he may well rest and seek no further but in his Politiques he shewe's how the same vertues conduce to the publike Mr. Hobbes therefore was much to blame when he in generall passed so weake though cruell a Censure upon the universality of morall Philosophers as to say they did not see wherein the goodnesse of these Vertues they wrote of consisted and his instance is as much to blame which is that Sect. 12. Those Writers place them in the mediocrity of passions as if not the Cause but the Degrees of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but quantity of a gift made liberality He is mistaken almost in every word he writ First that morall vertue called Iustice is not in the passions nor in any thing thâ—t hath not reason So I may say by prudence nor doe Philosophers say it is nor are many of the lawes of nature as he calle's them written in these inferiour faculties but in the superiour nor doe these men who write of these things so foolishly discourse of those vertues whose nature is busied about the moderating of passions as if there were no more to doe but to bridle a mans passions but then finding it necessary for the attayning man's happinesse in this World that men's passions must be curbed without which like an unruly horse these passions will transport a man to a thousand inconveniencies and not be governed by Reason but runne away with it these vertuous habits subdue those passions that they act so far and no farther then prudence and right Reason shall direct them so that mens passions facilitated by Custome to the yoke are made to stop turne or move
bono to what purpose all this learning bestowed not only the foxes have been nibling the fruits and branches but the wild Bore hath been in the Vineyard and hath so far digged at the roots of Religion that the principal Vines hang by little strings and do only live yea would die if not succoured These were my reflexions on those times I therefore thought it necessary for some body and applyed my particular endeavours to cast fresh Earth about those roots of Religion to chase if I could that wild Bore out of the Vineyard into his former Forest of heathenish principles and surely if any one man for some hundreds of years might be called that Bore it is Mr. Hobbes no one man ever writing so destructively to the principles of Christianity as he hath done Upon this reason I bent my study against him and his Books and did heretofore publish two pieces in an unknown name being willing to have the businesse done but not caring if my name were lost in the World the first was meerly Philosophicall against the two first Chapters of his Leviathan which yet because he made that the Introduction and Foundation of his Divinity I thought it necessarily conducing to my intentions against the other to begin with Since my writing that I have found some men of great worth and deserved reputation in Letters that have opined with some things in that piece upon which I thought to have suspended my putting it out again untill I had enlarged my Discourse with them but upon perusal supposing they could not prophesie nor had foreseen by reason what I urged I resolved to publish it as it is and take some other leisure to censure them if God give me life The other piece was against the 12 th 13 th and 14 th Chapter both so falsly printed that when I saw them I could scarce know them for mine own I have writ against most part of his great errours but my condition in those times was such that I was forced upon frequent and sudain searches of inquisitive souldiers to huddle up my papers and throw them I know not where nor can yet find divers of them those which I can find at this present I now print considering how lamely such duties are performed by Executors and my self grown to that Age as I must commit most things to them shortly how soon I know not the rest God willing shall come out as I shall discover them or else can repair what is defective by my memory at such snatches of time as I can recover from my necessary duties who love not my life nor any piece of it but as it shall conduce to the glory of God and the good of Christian men that they may lead a peaceable and godly life in unity and charity which is the whole endeavour of Your brother and servant in and for Jesus Christ Will Lucy Bishop of St. David's A Table of Generall Heads I. OBservations c. Upon the first Chapter of Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan entituled Of Sense Page 1 II. Observations upon the second Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Imagination 53 III. Upon the twelfth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Religion 79 IV. A Transition to some select places in his Element of Philosophy 94 V. A Paraeneticall Digression to Mr. Hobbes 117 VI. Observations upon the thirteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery 137 VII Upon the fourteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of the first and second Naturall Lawes and of Contracts together with the first Chapter in his Book De Corpore Politico 164 VIII Upon the fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of other Laws of Nature 200 IX Upon the sixteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Persons Authors and things Personated 272 X. Upon some Writings of the Socinians 291 XI A Digression to the Reader preceding the Bishop's Additional Animadversions upon a Latin Apologist for Mr. Hobbes 417 A TABLE To the severall Chapters Sections and Series of the whole Book CHAP. I. Sect. I. SEnse something else beside representation Page 2 II. The cause of sense discussed 3 Not the pressure of the Orgâ—n and consequently the heart or brain ibid. Which implie's sense to be before sense 4 III. Not seeming but some action must be sense ibid. Sight consisteth not in light or colour figur'd 5 Mr. Hobbes's Aphorisme confuted that motion produceth nothing but motion ibid. No motion in Place but to Place 6 Philosophy-Schools and Universities how necessary to Christendom ibid. CHAP. II. I. Whether the subject wherein colour is be the object of sight Colour and Image not the same nor in the same 8 II. His instance of the Sun's appearance by reflexion censur'd ibid. III. Whence it is that we see the same object double ibid. Colour is in the Object Image or species not 9 IV. Where it is by reflexion Mr. Hobbes's fallacie between that and colour 10 CHAP. III. I. His tedious proposition ibid. II. Image what 11 The apparition of the Object not of the Brain much lesse of Motion ibid. III. As is also Colour 12 IV. Mr. Hobbes's inconstancy in the production and seat of sense ibid. V. Sparkes appearing after a stroke upon the eye not from any concussion of the brain 13 Not from the optick nerve but rather from the White or Crystalline humour ibid. The like from a white Cat or white Napkin struck in the dark ibid. Which may be only the strong emission of species 14 The great Axiome upon which Philosophy if not Divinity is founded ibid. VI. Mr. Hobbes illogicall in his proofs ibid. He playe's the Mahomet in arguing 15 VII No Image of Light 16 VIII But as incorporated into some body 17 IX The apparition of Light such as Mr. Hobbes's would make prove's not Image and Colour to be the apparitions of Motion 18 X. Fire move's rather upward then equally every way ibid. XI Not presently extinguished when inclosed and how when it is 19 XII The motion of Fire what It hath no positive contraction 20 XIII No rejection of the contiguous Medium 21 An Instance in two fired Beacons ibid. XIV The apparition of Fire after a stroke is not by any rebound from the Brain to the Optick Nerve 22 The difference great between the apparition of such Fire and the species issuing from any visible Object 23 XV. Improbable that the Sun worketh as Mr. Hobbes fancyeth Fire to do ibid. XVI The indepence of Mr. Hobbes's Illatives 24 XVII Light and Colour two things ibid. CHAP. IV. I. Colour or Image not the apparition of Motion but of the Object the former proved by two Arguments 25 II. The later by three 26 c. III. Colour and Light not the same thing 28 IV. Two Arguments for the negative 30 CHAP. V. I. The first Argument against the reality of Colours answered 32 Wherein the being and nature of things consist's and how they are distinguished ibid. II. The second Argument against
first argument for it answered ibid. Invocation taken for the whole worship of God 126 Practised by Adam Abel Seth c. ibid. Or for some peculiar additional Devotion ibid. Service vulgarly used to signifie Common Prayer Gloria Patri the Doxology at the end of every Psalm c. 127 Invocation Gen. 4.26 not improbably taken for some peculiar Devotion introduced in Enos's time 128 III. The second argument for idolatry before the Floud answered ibid. The punishment in this world many times disproportionate to the sin ibid. Of what sort their sins were who perished in the Floud 129 IV. Revelation not Reason did dictate the first Religion ibid. V. The difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of Religion 130 Which prevaileth according to the congruity it hath to the will of God ibid. Whatsoever men's opinion be of the Person that introduceth it 131 VI. How this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a God 132 Why the promised discourse of the Jewish and Christian Religion is omitted ibid. CHAP. XVII I. Mr. Hobbes abstruse in making out his Conclusion of suspected Governours and their Religion 133 II. Christian Religion depend's not upon the integrity and sufficiency of Church governours 134 III. Religion formed by divine Revelations may oblige to a belief of seeming contradictions 135 IV. The singular excellency of Faith to be as well against as above Reason 136 V. Mr. Hobbes's subtilty in his citation and pretermission of examples 137 Which though pertinent are dangerous to weak capacities ibid. CHAP. XVIII I. Mr. Hobbes's scandalous description of Man ibid. II. The equality of men by nature not universal 138 III. The estate in which Adam and Evah were made ibid. That wherein others 139 IV. Memory Experience and Prudence distinguished ibid. V. Mr. Hobbes confuse if not contradictory to himself in arguing about Prudence 140 VI. Men universally no such opiniatours of their own prudence as Mr. Hobbes pretendeth 141 CHAP. XIX I. Equality of hopes doe's not render men enemies 142 II. Nor of desires as appeare's by the agreement between Abraham and Lot 143 III. Nor self-conservation much less delectation ibid. IV. How and by what Hopes and Feares work upon us 144 Not Ahab's but Jezebel's malice destroyed Naboth 145 Objection answer'd ibid. The title of Occupancy sacred c. ibid. Reason secureth men from feares ibid. Who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury 146 Which is generally restrained by the thoughts of God's punitive Justice ibid. How Reason or Armes decide the controversy before occupancy 147 CHAP. XX. I. Three sorts of men although without a common humane power to awe them not in the condition called War 148 II. How a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutuall friendship ibid. Objection about St. Paul's entertainment in Malita answer'd 149 III. Time being no essentiall constitute's no war ibid. IV. Mr. Hobbes's instance in foul weather to illustrate erroneous 150 V. A disposition to war before any act of hostility make's no warre 151 His impropriety of speech ibid. VI. Men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive war 152 CHAP. XXI I. An universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented 153 Nor proved by Mr. Hobbes's instances ibid. II. What in the Passions make's sins which are not such in themselves 154 The severall constitutions in the objects of our Passions what and whence ibid. III. Affected ignorance of the Law a sin 155 Every man born under a Law-maker and a Law ibid. IV. The Americans have Kings and justice executed amongst them 156 Private families not at war with the Kings and Nations among whom they live ibid. The concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust ibid. V. The exorbitances of a Civil war prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature ibid. VI. The mutuall jealousies of Soveraignes render them not like Gladiatours in a direct posture of war 157 VII Conscience dictate's to men what is right and wrong what Law and common Power they must submit to 158 VIII Military Valour and Prudence degenerated into Force and Fraud lose the nature and deserve not the name of the two Cardinal Vertues in war 159 IX Justice and Injustice no faculties but habits and may be in a military person 160 X. Nations have propriety in Dominions 161 Persons in their wives ibid. And estates ibid. XI Their title to which may be various 163 That of Occupancy most evident ibid. CHAP. XXII I. The right of Nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life 164 II. Severall acceptions of Necessity and the different effects of it accordingly 165 Nothing Necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law ibid. III. Necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life 166 IV. It being not in nature the principal of man's happiness ibid. V. Nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gain'd by Death 167 VI. Which is not so terrible and painful as pretended 168 Ancient instances 169 The most signal that of Otho and his souldiers ibid. Cato's double attempt to dispatch himself 170 Arria's magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband Paetus 171 A modern instance in a young child 172 VII Death seizeth upon men like Sleep ibid. Diogenes take's them for Brother and Sister ibid. A young child mistook one for the other 173 Mis-representations make it otherwise apprehended ibid. VIII The three periods of Death ibid. In which of them and when otherwise pain most affect's the sick 174 IX In what cases Life should not be prefer'd to Death ibid. CHAP. XXIII I. He that hath right to the end hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end 176 The ultimate end excepted ibid. II. He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment 177 To which he is obliged by Reason ibid. III. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispensed with 178 As the right for a man's preserving some piece of his estate ibid. IV. Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right and division of it from Law 179 V. What right is properly and what wrong 180 Whence is proved the consistence of Right with Law ibid. CHAP. XXIV I. What is the Law what the Right of Nature 181 Man in his most peculiar dominion subject and tributary to God ibid. II. Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over the creatures but not over other men 182 Man's will not to be the rule of his judgment nor the reason of of his actions 183 III. Why men are exempt from God's generall Charter of dominion at Man's creation ibid. To put a restraint on any Vice which had no positive Law against it ibid. As the sin of Sodom it may reasonably be suppos'd had none 184 How Mr. Hobbes would have out Cained
Cain in the justification of Fratricide ibid. The contradiction in mutuall dominion every man over every man 185 IV. No new Patent made to Noah but that to Adam re-enforced ibid. Noah's Sons like co-heires or inâ—er-commoners in their right 186 They had not the world divided among them by consent but by casuall occupancy or choice as every of them thought fit 187 V. An Objection answer'd ibid. The Children of Israel dâ—spossessed the Canaanites by God's prerogative which he had revealed ibid. The first generation of men understood their titles of propriety without God's peremptory command 188 VI. Jus and Utile not the same thing ibid. Places c. not appropriated become duly his that first seizeth 189 How Tully understood Utile far otherwise then Mr. Hobbes ibid. Mr. Hobbes's Argument ex non concessis ibid. CHAP. XXV I. The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbes define's it 190 II. Not liberty as he describe's it 191 Externall impediments may hinder but not take away natural power ibid. III. Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes's definition of the Law of Nature 192 A veine of errours that run through his Book 193 IV. Mr. Hobbes may be allow'd to say he declare's when he prove's nothing but not to suppose a multitude of falshoods to make the horridness of one Conclusion ibid. A term wanting to Mr. Hobbes's just engagement in a War 194 V. And to him a remembrance of his own principles 195 War not the only preservative of Man's right or Nature's ibid. The discourse of Man's laying down his right to all things c. unnecessary ibid. VI. That is not alwayes really good for which a man part 's with his right 196 A man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good 197 Objection answer'd ibid. Tertullian's signal instance in the Christians of his time ibid. VII He may suffer imprisonment c. without reluctance for the same reason 199 Obedience being better then sacrifice ibid. VIII A man may renounce his right pro aris focis 200 For the good of his posterity ibid. Monastick retreats 201 CHAP. XXVI I. Diversity of merit 202 The Catcher's title to scatter'd money ibid. II. Benignity to a Musician varyeth not the nature of this or that Donor's Contract 203 III. How the owner keep 's his property who intended to renounce it ibid. IV. The distinction ex congruo and ex condigno misunderstood by Mr. Hobbes 204 How otherwise expounded by the Schools 205 CHAP. XXVII I. Mr. Hobbes's vain supposition of transferring right c. 208 His justifying most horrid sins where no Covenant had been made against them ibid. His reason frustrate 209 As instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited ibid. His imperfect definition of injustice 210 II. Suspicion make's not Covenants void ibid. The Case put between two Nations entring League of Confederacy 211 The evil consequences of his opinion ibid. Plato's ingenious Fable ibid. III. The Casuists Metus cadens 212 IV. A propriety where is no coercive Power 213 The foundations whereon Mr. Hobbes build's a Common-wealth and the justice of it 214 V. The Fool 's argument against Justice unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes's principles 215 His doctrine more honest then Mr. Hobbes's ibid. Taking away the fear of God an unreasonable supposition 216 Uncertain whether taught or learned of the other the Fool or Mr. Hobbes ibid. VI. Mr. Hobbes's horrid supposal of getting Heaven by unjust violence 217 VII He pretend's to confute the Fool ibid. But by inadvertence fight 's against himself 218 VIII The violation of faith not allow'd for a Kingdom 219 IX Mr. Hobbes mistake's the question ibid. And changeth the terms fraudulently here and otherwhere 220 He that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent 221 The Bishop's Conclusion about deceit and injustice 222 X. Mr. Hobbes's illogicall answer about getting Heaven by violence ibid. Another like it ibid. The Law of Nature give 's rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death 223 XI The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken 224 As that enter'd into by Theeves ibid. The other by an Adulteresse ibid. XII Mr. Hobbes's subtilty in writing against Rebellion 225 Which cannot be by his doctrine ibid. CHAP. XXVIII I. Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he put 's upon naturall knowledge 226 II. What a perswasive the natural knowledge or belief we have of eternal happinesse is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity 227 III. The transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternall happinesse 228 For which we loath worldly pleasures ibid. And welcome tortures 229 IV. Objection answer'd ibid. The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happinesse ibid. The Merchant-adventurers hazard 230 V. Mr. Hobbes can render himself no more secure of temporall then he seem's to be with little satisfaction of eternal felicity 231 VI. The promises and oaths of men which he make's his greatest assurance being very fallible ibid. VII His scornful scale of knowledge 232 Our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julius Caesar ibid. VIII Being not only deliver'd to us by Tradition but most consonant to Reason 233 IX In Man's fellowship with other creatures and his excellency above them 234 X. A very child require's the satisfaction of his Will. 236 A man's will satisfyed with no worldly goods whether bodily sensuall or intellectual ibid. XI His knowledge is defective and cannot do it 237 Nor ought else which is not infinite and that infinite is God 238 Riches do it not which bring with them an impatient covetousnesse of getting more when men have most 239 XII Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life 240 None positively of his eminencies but by revelation 241 What Faith doe's toward it 242 What Dreames Visions Ecstacies c. ibid. XIII The severall parts acted by the Understanding and the Will both which faculties are imperfect in this world 243 XIV The certainty of felicity after death resum'd and prov'd ibid. XV. The Objection answer'd touching Man's felicity in the knowledge c. he hath though imperfect 245 A second Objection answer'd about eternall felicity being the last Article of our Faith 246 The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason 247 An Argument to confirm this drawn from the holy Martyrs constancy in their sufferings ibid. Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design to disparage the foresaid Article of our Faith 248 CHAP. XXIX I. Several qualifications good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants 249 II. No dammage without injury 250 III. The explication of Commutative and Distributive Justice 251 To which is premised that of common or legal Justice 252 Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two 253 IV. Argument 1. against an Arithmetical proportion in Commutative Justice examined 254 By what the price
of any thing may be enhaunced ibid. The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the siege of Samaria 255 When the Arithmetical proportion must be applyed to the value of the thing ibid. V. Argument 2. against it answer'd 256 A Judge or Umpire limited by the rule of Justice ibid. VI. What may be due by both kinds of justice without covenant 257 VII The justice of an Arbitratour different according to the case 259 Mr. Hobbes too nice and singular in his language ibid. His mistake in the division of justice 260 In his measure of commutative ibid. His boldness in confronting all the learned men before him ibid. Bodin's cavil ibid. His aâ—ery conceit of an harmonical proportion 261 VIII Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy ibid. IX His censure of all Philosophers 262 He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good citizen ibid. The foundation of Ethicks Oeconomicks Politicks ibid. X. Personal and relative perfection how taught by Philosophers 263 Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus ibid. With that of Lucretius 265 Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death ibid. Frugality and Temperance 266 Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans 267 XI Wherein the Stoicks placed humane happiness ibid. Wherein Aristotle 268 XII Mr. Hobbes mistake's the Philosopher's discourse of moderating Passions ibid. St. Paul's Philosophy 269 XIII Of Fortitude and Liberality 270 CHAP. XXX I. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial 272 II. No less applicable to a feigned then a true person 273 III. Person not Latine ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum 274 Person differently used in several arts and faculties ibid. IV. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes 275 No man personate's himself ibid. Cicero mis-interpreted ibid. Person how taken by the Criticks 276 V. Boethius's definition of a person ibid. Rich. de sancto Victore object 's against it ibid. His other definition of it more difficult 277 Scotus's Objections against the former ibid. VI. The definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop 278 The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo ibid. Reasonable of what extent 279 The Philosophers and School-men could have rectified Mr. Hobbes's mistake of a person ibid. The Etymology and common acception of Persona 280 VII Not the actor but the acted is the person ibid. VIII No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature 281 With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept ibid. IX The first part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroy's the second 282 God to be obeyed before Man ibid. An instance in the Hebrew Midwives ibid. Whâ— probably had covenanted 283 X. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind 284 XI The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated ibid. Moses though instead of God did not personate him 285 Nor do Kings ibid. Nor Priests ibid. XII How Moses was instead of God to Aaron 186 Hohim used for God what name ibid. How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh ibid. How fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him 287 XIII The Israelites how the people of God how of Moses 288 XIV Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God 289 XV. God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and General ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and them 290 CHAP. XXXI I. Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God 291 Who was really God ibid. II. Proved to be so from Acts 20.17 28. 292 Against Bernardinus Ochinus 293 Refuted by Smiglecius ibid. To whom Smalcius reply's having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus 294 Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ibid. Smalcius attempt's in vain to evacuate the Divinity of Christ. 295 III. Châ—ist's bloud not to be called the bloud of the Father according to Smiglecius 297 Smalcius's answer that argue's how it may ibid. His argument uâ—ged to the farthest by the Bishop 298 Who find's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's ibid. The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word 299 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated ibid. The Text which want's it retorted upon the Socinians 300 IV. How Christ is the Son of God 301 What a Son is ibid. V. The particulars in the definition applyed to our Saviour 302 VI. The mystery of our Saviour's divine and humane generation signifyed Mic. 5.2 303 The Bishop's observation upon that Text ibid. Faustus Socinus answer'd 304 And Valkelius 305 With other of the Socinians 307 VII The Text taken in pieces and vindicated from their Objections 308 One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers 309 Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun 310 VIII How from the beginning may signifie from eternity 311 A two-fold consideration of the word Beginning 312 A or Ab often denote causations ibid. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of Dâ—vid's reign ibid. The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto 313 IX God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of his Attributes 314 Particularly that of his Eternity ibid. X. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop 315 Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arrian 316 CHAP. XXXII I. The next name of our Saviour the Word 318 Socinus answer'd in his exâ—lication of St. John Chap. 1. ibid. The opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed 319 The shifts of the Socinians 322 II. St. John's reason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgeth ibid. Beza's genuine lection 323 Socinus singular in his ibid. But for a little consonance with Tremelius ibid. III. How the Socinians interpret John 1.1 324 With reference to the Baptist's preaching ibid. IV. Their Metaphor And Metonymie 325 V. Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the Text is to be understood ibid. So that of a Vine A Sheepheard A Doore 326 His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection ibid. The Truth and Life may be taken without a figure 327 VI. Christ called the Word according to none of those figures 328 But according to the Catholick sense is the internall word of God 329 How Aaron was Moses's mouth ibid. John Baptist called a Voice ibid. The word taken for Christ in a far different sense 330 VIII Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity 331 Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically ibid. IX Socinus's shift 332 X. A brief Paraphrase on the first words in St. John ibid. A word internall and externall both of God and Man 333 XI The Philosophers of old call'd the Son of God his word 335 XII As well they who writ after as who before St. John 336 XIII Which is yielded by Socinus ibid XIV Their language used by the Primitive Fathers and Saint Paul 337 That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John 338 Plato's description of Heaven parallel'd to that
consists in a tract of time It is true time is necessary to warre it is the measure of all rest or actions in the world it is the measure of their existence how long they stay and tarry in the world and so may be reckoned amongst those outward accommodations with which all natural things are fitted but it is no essential part of any To say that the nature of warre or peace a Horse or Tree or Men consists in time were foolish they are in time measured by time but time is not essentiall constitutively as his friends the Schoolmen and University learning teacheth but consecutively they doe not make these things follow them and therefore it was weakly explained by him when he said that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warres Sect. 4. But he illustrates this by foule weather saith he the nature of foule weather lyeth not in a shower or two of raine but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together So the nature of warre consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary His instance by which he illustrates this Conclusion is erronious for foule weather is not an inclination of time as he seemes to speak or else he prove's not that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warre but of the heavens in that time nor is the weather foule if there be onely an inclination to foulnesse as hap's in lowring cloudy weather where is no raine yet it is faire as weather is faire effectively in making the wayes faire and this distinction is often observed by our writers of Almanacks when they will be exact in their Prognostiques of weather they say now it is inclinable to raine then it will be raine and when it doth raine or in such a time as raine hath such a predominance to make the wayes foule we call it a foule day or weeke but if there be only a disposition to raine or so little as allayes the dust only we say for all that it is faire weather not foule Sect. 5. As his Illustration is to blame so is his Conclusion the disposition to warre no not the known disposition to it is warre for that disposition is nothing but an inclination to warre but an actual or habitual hostility not enmity only makes warre a man may hate another one King another and yet not make warre upon him yet that hatred is a disposition to war So that a disposition to war makes not war and then the knowledge of it cannot make it other then it is but then is war when two Nations endeavour the subjugation or assaulting one another or one doth it alone for although true friendship requires a mutual consent of both parties yet a war doth not for war may be and is commonly begun by one party before the other undertakes it and we say often that one Nation makes war and invade's the other unprovided But because he vaunts often of the propriety of speech I may tell him that war is not properly spoke of single men but Kings or Nations for single men hate one another cantend one with another fight one with another are at enmity one with the other but not at war that is proper to publique persons or Nations only Sect. 6. What he writes afterwards of the incommodities of war is ingenious but the application is not rightly made to those men of which he speaks who live without other security then what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withall For let us consider these men either planting neare other men or alone we shall still unlesse war disturbe them find them adopting and fitting their habitations for their own profit and content if a man should in an Hermeticall way live alone he would fit his habitation for such a solitary life if he should live amongst neighbours he would accommodate his affaires the best way he could to have a neighbourly friendship with them The application I cannot see how it can be forced unlesse his conclusion that all men are at war were granted for instance we can have none but of Hermites but for the plantation of families upon the same territories with others we see Abraham and Lot planting amongst the Canaanites who having ground sufficient lived peaceably with them and they fitted themselves with all usefull things for a good time having no warre I goe on with him therefore on the last particle of the 62. Page he there begins CHAP. XXI The conceit of an universal war by nature vain Of the passions and their objects The great Law-maker and his Laws Justice done among the Americans The law of Nature and dictate of Conscience Of militarie valour and prudence The habits of Justice and Injustice Of propriety occupancy c. Sect. 1. IT may seeme strange to some man who hath not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another and he may therefore not wresting to this inference made from the passions desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience It is true the inference from those passions being too weake to prove his conclusion that every man is at war with every man we can hardly assent to such an universal proposition concerning a war with all by all men the practise of whâ—ch was never experimented by any Let us see his instance briefly it consist's in three things that men travel armed they keep their doores locked these two might be spared in my particular who do neither and that in his house he lock's his chests by these saith he this man accuseth mankind as much by his deeds as he doth by his words he saye's so but I say no. For he accuseth not mankind of this wickednesse that all the world and each man naturally is at war one with another but these mistrust that there are some evill and wicked men in the world these know men may be ill by these actions they expresse it but he conclude's they are so for certainly as Love and Friendship are mighty excellencies in the conversation of man with man so hatred and warres the greatest evill which he affirme's to be in every man towards every man Sect. 2. But saith he neither of us accuse nature in it the desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sins no more are the actions which proceed from those desires till they know a Law that forbids them which till lawes be made they cannot know nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it Thus he we agree both that the passions are not sins nor the acts proceeding out of them men may love hate feare hope c. but the misapplication of the act to the wrong objects to love that we should hate
or hate what we should love or to mistake the degrees over-love that which is lesse lovely or lesse love that which is more lovely and the like this is it make's a sin now the frame and constitution of the Objects of our passions is either such by Divine Institution or humane by divine that is the amiableness and fitness things have to man by that gift of God in nature or else in the positive law of God in the book of God That which is by Humane institution is that which humane lawes make desirable or hateful of the first sort are these combinations of Parents and Children of Brethren one amongst another yea of men in general as men for men are all made with natural abilities to doe one another good of the second sort are Sacraments and all such rites which having no force in their natural constitution receive a great loveliness and sweetness from the Covenants of God to us in them of the last sort are all our proprieties as goods and such things which by neither God in nature not his written book are appropriated to us but are only given us by the law of the Land wherein we live Sect. 3. What is said of Desire may be applyed to any other passion which affecting any thing contrary to these rules is a sin now what he adde's untill they know a Law is not universally material for Ignorantia juris non excusat such as he are so farre from knowing that they will have contradictoriam ignorantiam they will deny and oppose the very bond of Nature and teach what is crosse to it not knowledge in such cases is a sin and the mother of such a sin as leade's to Perdition when men hide their eyes and will not see the Sun but draw vailes betwixt them and it which saith he untill Lawes be made cannot be known but there is no man made without a law to guide him Nor saith he can any Law be made untill they have agreed upon the person that shall make it As men who are borne in a Commonwealth doe not choose their lawmaker but submit to him whose government they were under so every man is borne a Citizen of the world and he must submit to that great Governour and Law-maker of the world God and that law he hath made for him to doe so that whether a man agree upon a Law-maker or no there is a law-maker and a Law under which he is borne and to which he ought to submit Pag. 63. he undertake's to satisfie another question thus Sect. 4. It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time or condition of men as this is and I beleeve it was never generally so over all the world but there are many places where they live so now for the savage people in many places of America except the government of small families the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust have no government at all and live at this day in that brutish manner as I said before Thus farre he His instances in the Americans is false for they had divers Kings and Kingdomes and have Justice executed amongst them for misdemeanours as may appeare to any who reade's their stories but howsoever although they had but private families yet it doth not follow that they should be at war with all other we see Abraham's Lot's private families lived peaceably in that land where were two Nations the Canaanites and the Perizites cohabiting that Country with them Gen. 13. Nay not so onely but little families may live at peace with mighty Kings so you may see Iudges the 4. and 17. That there was peace betwixt Iabin a mighty King who brought a puissant Army into the field and the house of Heber the Kenite it was a most unworthy expression when he said that the concord of these families dependeth on natural lust no it depend's upon the natural authority of Parents the natural duty of Children the reciprocal returnes of obedience and protection betwixt Master and Servant I hasten to his and my maine designe Sect. 5. Howsoever saith he it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where there were no common Power to feare by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceable Government use to degenerate into a civill war This instance nothing illustrate's his conclusion to prove that men of themselves are at war by an instance drawn from a civill war or indeed from any other warre for the conditions of war must needs be with those that are at war but he should prove that they are such before any warlike act or menaces hath passed betwixt them and that he seeme's to doe in what follow 's Sect. 6. But saith he though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a conditirn of war one against another yet in all time Kings and persons of soveraign Authority because of their independency are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of Gladiators having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed one on another This was so handsomly expressed that I could willingly have let it alone but least it should by the ingenuity of it steale a credit of his opinion into a Reader I must censure it as nothing to the purpose for all this can prove no war but that these Soveraignes imagine each other may be wicked and Faith-breakers just as before because there may be Thieves in his family he lock's his Chest. This prove's only that they are in a posture of war but not in war it self or indeed this is not absolutely a posture of war for that require's men pressed drawne into the field And by this reckoning all Nations should be at war one with another and indeed there is the same condition betwixt them and particular persons who have no supreame coercive power amongst them to restraine them but to say that all Nations are at war one with another even those who are in peace were to say as he did before that all things are motion even rest its self But now I come to the upshot which he aimed at and I think most wicked for which cause it was necessary for me lightly to sâ—eep away the rubbige which being done I come to his following discourse Sect. 7. To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust He must understand this of such men who are not joyned in a politique society now I deny that there is nothing unjust to such men he affirme's it let us consider his proofes he prove's it thus the actions of right or wrong justice and injustice have there no place this is the same in other words but his proof lye's in what followe's where there is no common Power there is no Law where no law no injustice thus he To this I answer that there is no man born in this
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine for it often happens that there is little paine and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness and so with some impatience I have found complaining of common accidents and such which had no participation of death in them and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death as Aches in particular parts sometimes they were galled and that troubled them sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed c. All which shewed that these paines not those of Death were more sensible then even death its selfe Sect. 9. He proceeds It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him justly and honestly he had said truth but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is that a man to save himself from a little pain should act things prejudiciall to the glory of God the publique good or else some greater good of his own any man who hath sense of any thing but sense and unworthy ease cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse such are those before specified Therefore in such Cases that they for paine or death its self are relinquished is against reason What he adde's And that which is not against reason we call right c. I agree to for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason but his deduction It is therefore a right of Nature that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath This deduction by what is already said cannot be true but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good CHAP. XXIII Of using or misusing meanes in order to their end The regulation of mans judgment in it The preservation of life and estate when necessary Of right and wrong Law c. Sect. 1. 1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus And because where a man hath right to the end and the end cannot be attained without the meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the end it is consequent that it is not against reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body How vile and illogicall is this had he proved that the body were the end of man or instead of body had he said for the preservation of that end his axiome explained thus might have borne him out in it but as it is puâ— there is no connexion for suppose a man hath right to the end his own happiness and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end his application of it to the body is of no force Well I will examine his Aphorisme First he who hath right to the end hath not right to all meanes of getting it is apparent for he who hath right to an estate or an house hath not right to take it by force he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it and so though a man have right to his body or life yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions It is a most just rule of law that a man must so use his owne as he must not hurt another a man hath right to water and a Meadow but he must not so use his water and his meadow as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him for the preservation of that life to hurt others and destroy their lives But once again for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe that it hath no truth but concerning the last end and in that it hath for since all mens actions are for an end that is his summum bonum his happiness every man out of necessity of nature doth what he doth for it and the utmost he can for it but this life or body is not mans happiness and for any second end there being no necessity of the end it self there is much less of any means which conduce to it and therefore of such ends of which nature mans temporall life and body are there is no manner of truth in it no more then if we should say it were right for a man to doe what he can any thing to obtain pleasure or profit upon which he sets his heart Sect. 2. His 8. Numb must be likewise examined which saith Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes and of the greatness of the danger This hath some truth in it and yet not to be so understood that by right of nature a man may judge what he will and accordingly act and what he acts is right as he seems to imply here from hence enforces afterwards for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated and what they act contrary to those rules or Lawes although it may be effected yet it is wicked so it is in those no doubt but every man will in such an impossible state as he supposeth man judge of the meanes and necessity but yet there is a law of nature in every man by which his judgement should be guided and what he judgeth though never so congruent to his will contrary to this law is not right so that as a Judge though what he judgeth must be performed and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge all other judgement is by power but not by right so is it with this man he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe but if not right it is wicked to doe so The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion convinceth not me For saith he if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self then it is reason that another may be Judge c. It is reason say I that in such a Case I am Judge but it is reason likewise that I judge according to Law and make my will be guided by reason not my reason regulated by my will because it is mine it is not therefore right but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason of which he himself afterwards
grants there are divers lawes both of men in society to men single and to men that live together although not united in a policy Sect. 3. In his 9. Number he affirms As a mans judgement in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit so also the strength c. of every man is then rightly imployed when he useth it for himself To use the Phrase of the time this Gent. is very selfish and indeed there is some reason in what he writes for as his judgement so his strength c. but his judgement is to be imployed according to the law of nature only for himself and so his strength when some greater good shall be proposed to him the good of his family his Nation the glory of God in his vertuous death then this life is to be neglected and contemned as a limb is to be lost rather then a life the lesse good rather then the greater so a private life rather then that of a Nation But his Argument is feeble and of no force when he saith Else a man hath no right to preserve himself for although it be right for a man to preserve himself yet not with those other greater losses it is right for a man to preserve each piece of his estate yet to preserve it by force or losse of a Sons life or his owne when that piece of his estate shall be inconsiderable it is not right for him to doe it In a word a mans understanding strength or whatsoever a man hath he hath right to bestow upon the preservation of this life but then when they are not called for by some more excellent and more desirable good then this life then they are to be bestowed upon that better imployment not this Sect. 4. Now I am arrived at his 10. and last Number which I meane to handle in this Chapter which begins thus Every man by nature hath right to all things that is to say to doe whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth to possess use and enjoy all things he will and can A good large Commission I will examine it and to the understanding it I will return to his Leviathan where I left Pag. 64. and discussing the beginning of that 14. Chap. lay a foundation for that truth which this Number occasions me to deliver First then let me observe that as in the beginning of this Chap. he define's right by equity liberty so immediately after he define's liberty to be the absence of external impediments and again a little after putting a distinction betwixt right and law he saith that Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and Liberty which in one and the same matter are inconsistent in which proposition he discovers a mighty weakness for in his definition of right he make's it nothing but the power and ability to doe what he will as indeed he make's it afterwards when right implies an equitable title to what he doth and a man may have right when he hath not power to doe accordingly but is hindred by externall impediments from acting according to his right that definition of his is therefore very weak for what he speaks that Law and Right are inconsistent I am so directly in my judgement against it that I think there is no right to any thing but by law which I will thus confirme by what followes Sect. 5. Right and wrong or injury are opposite termes so that right is the convenience or agreement which one thing hath with another and wrong is the disagreement as it is a right line which agree's with the rule of streightness a crooked line or a wrong one which deviates from those rules a right shot that which hit's the white and a wrong which misseth So it is a right action which is according to the rules of Actions and a wrong which differ's from them These rules are that we call law which regulate's our actions and when they are done accordingly they are right and we have right to doe them and to this purpose he said in the preceding Chap. Where no law no injustice and I may say where can be no injustice there can be no justice contraries appertaine to the same subject and expell each other out of it So then if right be an agreeing with some rule or law it is so farre from being inconsistent with it that it cannot be without it As in a Common-wealth a man hath only such a right to use or act any thing as the law of that Common-wealth gives him so in the generality of this world a man can only have right to doe or act such things which the universal law of nature direct's or impowers him to doe Thus his Leviathan being touched concerning this point I will returne to his De Corpore politico where I left and shew what manner of right the law of Nature gives a man and whether there be such a large Charter as he expresseth or no. CHAP. XXIV Of the law and right of nature Man's subjection to God and dominion over the Creatures The rules of his actions Man exempted out of Adam's charter why Noah's Patent And his Sons pâ—ssâ—ssing themselves of the world The titles of propriety discussd Jus Vtile c. Sect. 1. TO understand which let us conceive that the law of Nature belonging to every thing is that law which was given it at the Creation and the right of nature or jus Naturale must be that authority or title is granted by that law to use or doe any thing which title can be nothing but that jus or right which God gave him Gen. 1.28 29. Which we find to extend to the Earth the Fowle the fishes the living things that move upon the earth the herbs and trees This is his Jus Naturale but yet this is not to be used as he will although he be Lord of them there are lawes for Lords as well as servants Kings as well as subjects and they must be subject to the King of heaven as their subjects to them yea in these things which they are made Lords over We may see in the 4. of Genesis that Cain and Abel brought Oblations to GOD of those things over which they had a most peculiar dominion they pay'd God as it were a tribute out of those things he gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave them at their creation from whence it appeare's that man hath not such right to any thing much lesse to all things to do what he pleaseth with or to them for then they had had no right to have neglected that duty of Oblation and then they could have done nothing by which God should have put a difference betwixt Cain and his Oblation and Abel and his Oblation as he did Sect. 2. Then secondly let us consider that here is not in this Charter expressed any right a man hath over other men but this
right is equally granted to Man over those creatures there specified but none to any man over another Therefore all right that any man hath to doe any thing to another must either be by nature as Parents in regard of whose origination of their Children's lives and educaâ—â—â—â— of them they have naturally a right to governe and 〈◊〉 any things concerning them or else it must be by 〈◊〉 Covenant concession or yielding expressed or 〈◊〉 of one to the other but in the original Charter 〈◊〉 is not any grant or priviledge given to one over 〈◊〉 and therefore barbarous acts of inhumanity 〈◊〉 it is to be supposed that no man would yield 〈◊〉 should act upon him no man can have right to 〈◊〉 Upon these Considerations his proposition must 〈◊〉 perish when he saith every man hath right to any 〈◊〉 but he seemes to prove it thus For seeing all 〈◊〉 he willeth must therefore be good to him in his owne â—â—dgement because he willeth them and may tend to his preâ—â—â—vation some way or other or he may judge so and we have â—ade him judge thereof Sect. 8. If he had said I have â—ade him judge thereof the force of the Argument would quickly have been shatâ—ered because his authority is weake to constitute a Judge in so weighty affaires but when he said we I wonder who he meanes I am sure I was none of them nor doe I remember to have read any other but himself of that mind That every man must be judge of his own Cause I know every man will judge and act according to his judgement who is an honest and vertuous man but to be a Judge Authoritativè which that phrase we have made him judge thereof doth imply is that which no man saith but himself how he is a Judge I have shewed before by what right to judge by the law of Nature not by his making him his will hath not right with it to act any thing because he willeth it but because it is regulated by the lawes of nature and acts according to those rules therfore only he hath right to doe what he doth by them and therefore his Conclusion which he saith follow 's out of his premises is vain which is that all things may be rightly done by him Sect. 3. He goe's on with another for saith he for this cause it is rightly said Natura dedit omnia omnibus that nature hath given all things to all men the truth of this must next be examined Nature may be said to have given all things to all men those things before expressed in Gods charter at mans Creation but nature hath not given men right over one another which is mainly importuned by him in both these Treatises and must be understood in the latitude of that universall terme all things for unless other men all things cannot be given to him now that other men are not given to each other will appeare out of this that then God should not be offended with those acts which were done one to another where is no positive law for where there is no positive law of God's or man's prohibiting them only the law of nature is of force to restraine mens actions and to give right to every thing and without doubt God can be displeased with nothing that is right well then let us cast our eyes upon the 19. Chap. of Genesis we shall find there the Sodomites attempting a most wicked and unjust act upon two strangers way-faring men as they thought because the assault was so universal by the old and young of the City it is reasonable to think there was no positive law against that sin for men universally would not confront a positive law and againe if there had been any positive law it is probable Lot would have urged it to them but there being none and these men by the height of their lust which is one of Mr. Hobbes his titles having smothered the light of nature pursued the design and had the wrath of God falling on them by Fire why was God so angry Mr. Hobbes would have told him there is no positive law forbidding it and thou hast given all things to all men by Nature and it is lawfull for any man to doe any thing to any man Let us ascend higher and consider in the 4. of Genesis that Cain kills Abel in the 9 vers God questions Cain about him Where is thy brother Abel His answer was somwhat like Mr. Hobbes's I know not am I my brothers keeper and yet this was but like him it was very short of Mr. Hobbes's his impiety he only pleaded that he was not accomptable for him he was not to be charged with his condition be it what it will Mr. Hobbes he would have told God thou hast given him to me and I had right to doe what I would with him by thy Commission this villain wan thy favour from me and now I have taken him away by that naturall right which thou hast given me Mr. Hobbes he would have out-Cained Cain himself in his justification of these horrid acts by his Principles but because God whose anger is never but most just did express himself so severely against him could not be just unlesse these Sodomites and Cain had transgressed some Law which could be none but the law of Nature it must needs shew that these men had no right to doe what they would with any thing that is with other persons but had their right confined in many acts by the law of natuâ—e againe if every man had right over every other person then those men have mutually right over one anâ—â—her and the same persons in the same cause in respect of the same persons should be both superiours and infeâ—â—ours which is a contradiction and impossible to be I let this passe therefore without further trouble and come to examine how Nature hath given all those other things the Earth the Fowles the beasts to all men Sect. 4. To understand this we must have recourse to the Charter before mentioned in the first of Genesis as likewise Psal. 115.16 The earth hath he given to the Children of men which gift was made by the law of nature at the first Creation for else we find no other Grant unless some men may think it a new Patent which was made to Noah and his sons Gen. 9. Which yet upon examination will appeare no other but a renewing of the former Charter which being given to man in his integrity he might justly suspect to be lost by his sinne God therefore in this replanting the world repeats the former priviledges almost word for word after the Flood and therefore if it were a gift of God by nature at the first or with nature in the Creation it is now either a positive law or else a renewing of the former Charter Let us now examine it and begin with Noah for whâ—tsoever the other Charter to
Adam was if it differ from that to Noah as sure it doth not in any materiall thing yet it would advance the knowledge of this truth but little because all that was passed wâ—s so washed with the flood as there was utterly a new beginning now we may observe then in the 9. Chap. of Gen. vers 1. That God blessed Noah and his sonnes and gave the possession of all sublunary things to them indifferently for although there was a principality in Noah without doubt over his Sons yet it seemes by that terme yee in the plurall number that a right to all these Creatures was granted to them all and by that universall phrase over every beast c. Iâ— seemes that every one had a right to all these though Noah had his paternall dominion over his sonnes onely and this generall right is described by some Casuists to be like that of Coheires to the same inheritance when their father is dead each of which hath his right to the whole untill they come to a partition and this is called Non plenum dominium they have a right to the whole but not a full right there is no grasse upon that inheritance which you can say any of these Coheirs have not a right unto untill the partition yet no one hath a full dominion of the whole they cannot sell or alien the whole Or methinkes it was like entercommoners in the same pasture every entercommoner hath right to the whole Common and his Cattle hath right to feed in any place and eate what they will and can get and so hath every mans Cattle that entercommunes with him they have all the same right yet that which any mans Cattle hath seised on is proper only to those Cattle and when he hath mouthed any grass it is an injustice in another entercommoner to take that away out of his mouth which his Cattle had seised upon So was it with those sons of Noah they were entercommoners of the world they might de jure any one seize upon any thing any part of it and being seized of it it was then his and he had a propriety in that which before he was only a Commoner of this was the donation of God and they were all put out into their Common and you shall find not long after how they took their shares and severall possessions and from thence forward it was unlawfull to dispossesse any of what they were seised For my part I cannot beleeve as some men that are over-wise do think that the world was divided by consent amongst such a handfull of men none of all which I can guesse knew half the world but as I expressed before being entercommoners thrust into the same Common as they found places fit for them and not possessed of others they entred upon them and enjoyed them and those places they enjoyed in common before and every one had a title to them before that entrance but afterwards the possessed enjoyed by their private title and it were injustice to defraud them of those possessions Sect. 5. I know it may be objected how that the Children of Israel dispossessed the Canaanites and it is clearly answered that God who gave men their titles never gave them so absolutely no not in any Commission by the law of Nature its self but he reserved a prerogarive to dispose of any thing otherwise when it should please him and that God by that prerogative did give to the Children of Israel their title to that land to the Egyptians goods to many other things which gift of Gods if any man can shew to any thing which is anothers it ceaseth to be that others and becomes his for the earth is the Lords he is the absolute Proprietor our propriety is but usu-fructuary and that dum Domino placuerit yet untill his will is revealed to dispose otherwise of it it is injustice to take any mans estate from him For these proprieties although no man can shew an universal peremptory command of Gods that thus or thus these or those worldly goods shall be appropriated to thâ—se or those men yet men in the very first plantation of the world did apprehend God that granted this power of â—ppropriating some parts peculiar to themselves in the Charter of entercommoning So it appeares that Noah understood it in the 9. Chap of Genesis presently upon the sin of Cham verse 27. God shall enlarge Iaephet and he shall dwell in the Tents of Shem and Canaan shall be his servant which could not be but that there must be a propriety in Shem. So that then it seemes evident to me that both the rights of Common and propriety were passed in the same deed because as the other was expressed in the beginning of the Chapter so this implyed or supposed in the latter end I think I have said enough of this Conclusion how Nature gave all things to all men If you will have a Law-phrase they had juc ad rem not in re they had a title to the thing to any thing a remote title every man is capable to have any thing and if the true Proprietor desert it it may be his but they have only a title in re which have lawfull possession of it to enjoy and make use of it He proceeds Sect. 6. So that jus utile right and profit is the same thing I am sure such a right is the greatest wrong in the world to pretend right to what another is rightfully seised of is most unjust the world untill it was possessed and each piece of it was indifferent to any man and so is still but when possessed it is injustice to deprive the possessor of what he enjoye's He againe But that right of all as to all things is in effect no better then if no man had right to any thing thiâ— were true of his manner of right he delivered but not of that I have expressed for by that right I spake of all the first planters of the world had right to what they planted and yet at this day when any land is found inhabited only by beasts whether such as was never before discovered or deserted by the former inhabiters it becomes the right of him that enters upon it so likewise all such Fowlâ— Beâ—sts fishes precious stones which by no Civill law of particular Nations are appropriated are his who seiseth first upon them and it is an injustice by force or fraud to deprive them of what they have so seised I remember Tullie hath an excellent discourse in one Paradox to shew That Honestum utile is the same but then in that he takes Utile not as Mr. Hobbes for gaine or what conduceth to the saving this life these things he utterly contemnes and shewe's they are not profitable but unprofitable or many times hurtfull to man but he understands this word profitable for that which conduceth to mans happiness and â—his he affiâ—ms to
where delivered in the Schooles for with one consent unlesse some passages in Gregorius Ariminensis and Durand expounded otherwise The Schooles both old and later agree to deliver that Heaven or Glory which he calls Paradise is merited ex Condigno because that righteous men acting such things by the assistance of God's grace in the mystical union with Christ their head to which God hath promised heaven heaven is due to them as a reward of such actions not for their owne ' excellency in an Arithmeticall proportion as some but a Geometrieal or as others by their Arithmetical proportion taken vertually as a seed is vertually a Tree and hath abilities vertually as a tree hath actually so these gracious acts have glory vertually in them as being the seed of glory and then although God can be no debtor to any mans Merits yet he having put such a prise upon them in his Gospell these have such a blessing due to them not out of Congruity onely but Condignity at which rate God doth value them by his standard but then as they say Heaven is merited by the righteous ex Condigno so they say that these Graces which enable a man to merit heaven ex Condigno by Gods Covenant those graces are merited ex Congruo by that man before he is justified or righteous so that then to understand the distinction better lest a Reader should be misguided by him who is no way acquainted with School-Divinity know that Merit ex Condigno necessarily requires a Covenant but ex Congruo none The first can never faile because founded upon justice and title the other may because built onely upon Grace as thus a man promiseth that he who fights this day well shall be made a Captaine or a King promiseth that he who plead's such a cause ably shall be made a Judge these places are due to him who doth it there is another who by industry in the Law hath greater abilities then he and hath pleaded a hundred causes better another man who hath fought in twenty battailes better yet not being imployed in these services to which the promise was made they deserve those places ex Congruo but the other ex Condigno the one is truly and as truly merit as the other but he deserves it not legally out of a law or Covenant but his owne vertue and the gallantry of his Commander in chiefe who rewards vertue or thus he who meeting a poore man in necessity shall bargaine with him to pay him doubly for those Clothes he supplies him with when he comes to a better fortune which he then adventures upon when he doth come to such a Condition the other merits that ex Condigno he must ought to have it payd it is his due the who seeing that or such another in that sad case should without any compact supply him when he came to a happier estate ex Congruo merits a returne from him although he cannot claime any thing upon debt or due yet out of Congruity it is fit he should be satisfied I do not here justifie the distinction in its application by the Schoole-men but onely set downe my observation of his unjust dealing with them and how unlike their meaning is to his for the Prise he speaks of which is proposed to him who winneth it out of Covenant that man who gaineth it hath it out of right of Condignity not out of the equality his worke hath to the reward in its self intrinsecally but out of that extrinsecall value which is added to it by the owners Covenant and therefore what he adds may have some truth that Because writers are not agreed upon the signification of the termes of Art he will determine nothing in it I beleeve all circumstances will hardly be agreed upon yet thus much as I have delivered which is contrary to what he writes is universally consented unto by them and there is none of them but sayes that what God hath Covenanted for is merited ex Condigno by them who act their part NOTES UPON THE Fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan CHAP. XXVII Of transfering right Sinnes independence on Covenants Which are not voyd by suspiiion Of propriety and Coercive Power An arbitration between the Fool and Mr. Hobbes concerning Justice the feare of God getting Heaven by violence c. Faith not to be violated Concerning the Law of nature in order to aeternal faelicity Breach of Covenant Rebellion Sect. 1. CAp. 15. Pag. 71. In the beginning of this Chap. will appeare the unhappinesse of his former discourse concerning mens natural right over one another here in his first words he supposeth That law of nature by which men are obliged to transferre their right one to another The vanity of which I have discussed before from this he drawes a third That men must keep their Covenants made one to another The conclusion is good and of the highest consequence in all commerce betwixt men that possibly can be but his Commendation of it is not so commendable as his conclusion but most dangerous his words are these And in this Law of nature consisteth the fountaine and original of justice This Law is of keeping of Covenants Let the Reader look back upon Cap. 14. Sect. 4. and he shall find the wicked Sins of the Sodomites of Cain in which no man can say that there was any Covenant betwixt those parties preceded concerning such actions and then upon that score they were just because not unjust now if the fountaine of Justice were Covenant then those actions being where was no Covenant preceding could not be unjust His reason by which he confirm's this is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man which is this for where no Covenant hath preceded there hath no right been transferred and every man hath right to every thing and consequently no action can be unjust See here Reader how necessary it is timely to stop an Errour it is a Sicknesse in a man's soul and ought to be nipt in its growth it is an ill Guest which is easier kep't out then thrust out especially when it come's with force of a Law or Axiome as this did Had he proved before that every man hath right to every thing even in the possession of another's person yea to another's person as he pretended to doe then this Conclusion would have justly been deduced thence but I think that being confuted this Conclusion must likewise fall with it Let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some before not inhabited place were it not unjust against the law of nature that one should murther or maime the other without any injury from him were it not just that they should help one another in distresse by the Law of humanity If he say not consider his owne saying for a man so learned as he is cannot but in many things acknowledge the universall rules which governe the world although
he may misapply them see therefore pag. 65. Cap. 14. This saith he is that law of the Gospell Whatsoever ye require that others should doe to you that doe you to them and that law of all men Quod tibi fieri non vis alteri ne fâ—ceris apply this law to these men without any Covenant expressed or imply'd but onely that would any of these think it just that the other should doe him violence or Injury It is unjust then by this law that he should doe it to the other He againe labour's to confirme his Conclusion from the definition of injustice which saith he is The not performance of Covenant this definition was never I think writ before although a thousand have treated of injustice yet never any defined it so It is true every breach of Covenant is Injustice but Injustice is what is not a breach of Covenant as I have shewed and therefore will insist no further upon it Sect. 2. He goe's on But because Covenants of mutual trust where there is a feare on either part as hath been saide in the former chap. are invalid The place he mentioned is pag. 68 where he deliver's that If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the pâ—â—â—les performe presently but trust one another in the condition of mere nature which is a condition of war of every man against every man upon any reasonable suspition it is voyd but if there be a common power set over them both with right and force sufficient to compell performance it is not voyd This proposition although it make a faire shew upon a superficial view yet we shall find it upon diligent examination to be full of unhappy errours Had he said such Covenants are dangerous to be kept and that men with wicked principles will not keep them he had said somewhat that might have borne him out in it but to say they are voyd is to affirme they have no obliging nature or Tye with them which is not to be indured by Iustice. I will first put him the Case betwixt two neighbouring nations they enter Leagues of Confederacy they covenant upon Articles these two are just like such particular men unbodied in a common-wealth can any man think that when any of these are afrayd of the other's breach of Articles it shall therefore be fit for him to breake can his feare dissolve his Covenant yes perhaps as in his 14. Chap. to which this related If this suspition be reasonable A suspicion though reasonable is but a suspicion and it is possible for any man to finde reasons for suspicions by this all bargains and Contracts of nations one with another will be made nothing for no doubt but all nations may and will suspect one another and yet dare not breake their promises and Covenants which they make If this doctrine of his were received it would make all Commerce betwixt nations voyd yea I will tell him betwixt men in private so that those sacred Sponsalia betwixt man and woman were voyd if no Witnesses to them all those promises yea Oathes for they are but a stronger bond of the same Covenant should be voyd if no Witnesses to testify the Covenant If mens Covenants cannot bind them before they make a Leviathan why should that Covenant binde them for the Covenant concerning their superiour must be before he is who is an effect of it Plato in his Protagoras tell 's a most ingenious fable the result of which is this that the world being uninhabited Iupiter appointed Epimetheus to make all sorts of beasts but Prometheus he appointed to make men and indued them with Wisdome these men built Cities fenced themselves from beasts but by their wisdome were more wicked then beasts and injured one another most impiously upon that he sent Mercury amongst them who brought the men two Sisters Iustice and Modesty which regulated them in all vertue and Civility one towards another These are universally given to men and are with them where evill principles and wicked customes hâ—ve not extirpated them So that that which the School from the Philosophers call's Synderâ—sis dictateâ—s to men those great Axiomes of practice doe to others as ye would be done unto and keep your faith and promise with the like and no man doth violate these but with an Injury to the rest and quiet of his mind I could tell stories of morall men innumerable who would keep Covenant even with their ruine and death but they are obvious It is apparent that although men may and doe break Covenants yet they are not voyd they have a Tye upon man in his Conscience which makes them affraid to offend in Scandalous and great Injuries Sect. 3. He proceed's Though the original of Iustice be the making of Covenants yet injustice there can be none till the cause of such feare be taken away which while men are in the condition of warre cannot be done Thus farre he This phrase such feare must be understood of that feare a man hath of another's violation of Covenant I think all this is satisfied that there may be injustice before Covenant injustice against the practicke law of nature injustice after Covenant in the violation of it and although he imagine's feare to secure a man from violating Covenant it must certainly be such as the Casuists speak of metus cadens such as would shake a valiant or constant man as some certaine argument of Death or ruine not suspicion's that another will not keep his Covenant which must excuse Againe I have already shewed that men are not naturally in a condition of warre so that he build's upon very false foundations I will not trouble the Reader with nine or tenne lines together which are nothing but repetitions of formerly refuted conclusions but in the next page 72. neare the beginning he bring 's somthing like a new Argument from the usuall definition of justice among the Schoolemen thus Sect. 4. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Iustice in the Schooles for they say that Justice is the constant rule of giving to every man his own And therefore where there is no owne that is no propriety there is no Injustice and where there is no coercive Power erected that is where there is no Commonwealth there is no propriety all men having Right to all things Therefore where there is no Commonwealth there nothing is unjust I am glad to find him speaking something in the Schooles although not fully approving it the definition shall passe without any further trouble although I thinke it not perfect yet it will prove much better then any thing he hath produced Let us examine his inference which is drawne into some Syllogistical form and therefore will abide a juster answer His Major is undeniable where is no propriety there is no injustice but his minor is mightily to blame unproved any where which is where is no coercive Power erected
drawn from a declaration that that man should make that he think 's iâ— fit to deceive which no man but a verier foole then he who objected it did ever doe there is no power to act any great wickedness but under the shew of Piety not by professing to deceive but by professing not to deceive oathes covenants protestations cursings of themselves are the horrid maskes of Impiety which wicked men use to deceive with the Devill can no way so efficaciously deceive as by putting on the shape or likeness of an Angel sometimes by putting a false glosse upon the Text as with Adam sometimes urging the Scripture its self as with our Saviour That child of the Devil 's who will prosper in this world must not protest and declare that he will deceive but protest against it and utterly defy it so excellently the Poet makes Sinon in that high fraud of his Cozen by the denying of Cozenage nec si miserum fortuna Sinonem Finxit vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget· Mr. Hobbes I am confident well knowe's that he who is premonished of his danger will avoyd it even birds do avoyd the net openly layd before them so that certainly this come's not close to Mr. Hobbes his purpose which should prove that it were not wisely done according to his wisdome to deceive when he speak's onely of such who manifest and declare they will deceive and it is a maine fault which runne's throughout his whole book that he attempt's one proposition and by shuffling and changing the Tearmes prove's another Now my conclusion is that all deceit is injustice all injustice unprofitable because against the most sacred Law-maker who will avenge it here or hereafter whether men take notice of it or no evil and injustice will hunt the wicked person onely honesty and justice will bring a man peace and prosperity at the last Sect. 10. Afterwards he bring 's another Answer concerning the getting of heaven by violence which is not logical for although he sayes truth that there is but one way of getting heaven which is not breaking but keeping of Covenant yet the Fool supposing the impossibility that men might get heaven by unjust violence he was to answer logically out of the premisses and not to deny the supposition Then he comes to answer that argument which amused me concerning the getting sovereignty by rebellion for let a man read his manner of writing and judge whether in that he did not seem to make this an argument against the fool as indeed it was when sayes he from such reasoning as this succesâ—ful wickedness is called Vertue now from the hatefulness of this Conclusion he overthrow's the fools Conclusion I allow his answer but think he had had more reason to have confirmed the argument then overthrown it because as I have shewed it was a doctrine corroborated by the main principles of his book then he raiseth a new discourse about another opinion There be some saith he that proceed farther and will not have the Law of Nature to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life upon earth but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death I am of that mind that the Law of Nature doth give rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death for it is a most undoubted rule of the Law of Nature as to the general that bonum est appetibile so to the particular that according to the degrees of goodnesse that which is majus bonum is magis appetibile and ought to be more desired then what is minus and this is so universally delivered by Nature that no reasonable man heare's the tearme's and understand's them but he assent's to them here is a major one rule delivered concerning eternal life hereafter if we can find a Minor corresponding it will be I think one of the clearest delivered truths that can result out of that habit called by Philosophers intellectus or habitus principiorum but here in these Tearmes he puts it there can be no doubt of it for if it be an eternall felicity as he call's it and all Christians believe the very Tearmes render it cleare that an Eternall is more to be desired then a Temporary and therefore more to be endeavoured for I insist no further upon this at this instant I come to that he applye's this to Sect. 11. To which saith he they think the breach of Covenant may conduce and consequently to be just and reasonable I think he never read in any Author this Conclusion delivered that the breach of Covenant doth conduce to eternal felicity for he put 's it in unlimited Terms It is true if any man or men make a Covenant to do any wicked thing although they bind it by an oath they are bound and in order to heaven they ought to repent of that Covenant and not keep it but it is not the breach of Covenant as a Covenant which disposeth them to heaven but the acting of that holy thing which that wicked Covenant forbid's them to do Suppose a Combination of Thieves should covenant with each other to act whatsoever such a person whom they make their supreme should command one of this College should have a sense of that wicked life he live's in knowing that it lead's to hell and perdition can any man think he is not bound to leave that Society and disobey whatsoever command is imposed upon him of Robbery or Murther Suppose an Adulteress married woman should by her oath covenant with her Adulterer to appropriate her body to him do not you think she was bound in order to heaven to break that wicked Covenant So is it with all Covenants to do evil they ought to violate them but it is not the violation of Covenant but the doing of righteousness which is acceptably pleasing to God but he instance's in his following words Sect. 12. Such are they saith he who think it a work of merit to kill or depose or rebell against the soveraign power constituted over them by their own consent This instance he give 's because he hoped that writing against such a horrid diabolical doctrine would usher in the rest of his wicked opinions plausibly I am not intended to defend their opinions who think so but yet I will say this for them that I think they that write for killing of kings which are the Papists and some others as destructive of civill Society as they will pretend that those Sovereignes are not constituted over them by their own consent they will say they never consented to his Coronation to his acception never took the Oath of Alleageance and Supremacy And I will say that if this be all the ground of this sinne in rebellion there is no such thing as rebellion by Mr. Hobbes his doctrine for Mr. Hobbes as will be seen hereafter make's no Sovereign or Leviathan but such as is consented unto by
true I read of Iob and many others that have had a restitution of worldly comforts but that is not so with all and those that dye for him leave the world can have no reward in this world Againe is it possible that this God of an infinite excellency wisdome power justice c. should suffer so many villaines to eat up his Children and Servants as it were bread to commit Sacriledge in all kinds perjury blasphemy and the like persevering in those sins to passe without any punishment whâ—ch some doe in this world although but a few supposing a God men cannot think so and therefore supposing a God it is not to be imagined but that there is an eternall happinesse provided for such as serve God which is all I contend for Sect. 9. Againe let us consider man in himself as he is a fellow creature wiâ—h beasts plants stones c. we shall upon consideration of all the Creatures in the world find that every Creature hath an object fitted to any power it hath and some matter or other fit to fill every empty roome in it and satisfie every natural desire in it to see this cleare let us first view the lowest sort of things stones earth water aire c. which have no life in them if they have power to operate by their qualitie to heat or coole there are objects in the world fit for such actions if they have appetites of this place or that high or low there are room 's in the world to receive them if the matter as Aristotle desire's formes there are formes to fit it you may find this truly applyed to any thing according to that sacred Axiome so often urged by both Divines and Philosophers Deus et Natura nihil faciunt frustra whereas if there were nothing to satisfy those powers and appetites they were in vaine if we climb higher to plants and Trees which have life and no sense it is evident in them that their powers and desires of nutrition generation augmentâ—tion by which they exceed these inferiour things have whilest they are in this world enough plentifully in this world to satisfy these appetites as well as those which they have in common with those other inferiour things Then come to that other degree higher to beasts and such things which do not live only but have a power of moving themselves of apprehending by Sense of delighting themselves in sensual things these appetites have that which can satisfie yea fill their desires so that more cannot be desired yea there is to be had in this world not onely a Satisfaction but a satiety of sensual pleasure not a belly full onely but enough to surfeit so that for all those things below man whatsoever they are there is something which can sufficiently satâ—sfy all the powers and appetites they have Can we think God is so liberal to these things and lesse to man As the Apostle dispute's doth God take care of Oxen that is in comparison of us men As our Saviour if he so clothe the grasse of the field shall he not much rather take care for us if he hath so provided for them in these mean faculties and appetites which have here as the Schoolemen speake vestigium Dei onely a footstep of God in them shall he not much raâ—her for these noble powers and appetite of Reason and Will in man which are made after his image certainly it were a high ingratitude to think so well then let us inquire what satisfaction there can be found for these humane powers of Reason and Will by which he excells all other things that must be it which a man desire's for every thing endeavour's the perfecting of its powers and the satisfaction of its appetite which is truly the good of that thing to which it belong's Sect. 10. It is an undoubted conclusion a Principle if not the Principle which the inbred Law of nature which governe's man hath taught every Child of man and so powerfully imprinted it in him thâ—t no Child which hath reason will deny but that he would be happy and in particular if he understâ—nd the Tearmes that that is his happinesse to have all his desires to have his Will satisfied for untill that be he hath some deficiency there is something farther to be enquired after he is not at hâ—s journey's end â—hus it is with all things there is enough for any thing below man to fulfill its appetite to â—urfeit but not so for mans appetite this will appeare ouâ— of the consideration of the things in this world which are reputed good those that are bodily sensuall intellectuall bodily strength beauty health these cannot satisfy a man's soule though altogether joyn to these all sensuall delights meates drinkes luxuriousnesse in any kind for hearing seeing smelling let a man have all those are but things which beasts may enjoy as well as he and in these he cannot excell them yea they excell him in a fuller fruition of them then he can have then they are apt to have many casualties to deprive us of them and a certainty that one day they must be lost which to a man that hath a forecast with him which other inferiour Creatures have not must needs disturb the content he might take in enjoying them consider those humane intellectual things which have pretended a title to man's felicity either the Stoick's Apathy freedome from passion or the Aristotelian way of governing Passions by Reason although those were handsome and ingenious and those men trod some steps towards felicity yet they were but the first Steps onely and those the lowest for if the Subjects be tumultuous the King cannot be in safety The Stoicke instead of ruling would kill his Subjects take away all Passions and then the King in man will lack fitting instruments to effect his businesse the Aristotelian governed or at the leâ—st prescribed rules to governe the Passions but left the Palace of Reason unrectâ—fied and although he freed it from the rebellion of Passions yet satisfied it noâ— with plenty at home to conclude that which make's a man happy and satisfie's his Soule must be something in him by which he excell's beasts that must be his Reason and reasonable Will this Will is not satisfied but by knowledge no satisfaction of it but the enjoying that it love's no love without knowledge and therefore though the Will be the seat of happinesse yet the Understanding is the Conduit by which thâ—s happinesse is brought to the Will Sect. 11. Now let us then examine what there can be in the Will brought by the Understanding which can satisfie it and make it happy in this life certainly all the things in the world cannot doe it for although a man desire 's to know any thing every thing yet he cannot be happy in knowing all the things in the world I will not dispute concerning those things which men doe know for alas it is mighty short of
satisfaction of the powers but a curbing them which yield's but a half enjoyment such as may be proper for a Viator a Traveller to it not a possessor of happiness in hope as the Prophet David say'th but God is our portion in the land of the living we are here in the land of the dying where others and we die dayly and our happiness here is God but God in hope when we come to the land of the living God will be our portion and possession to conclude men may have a begun happiness here but noâ— perfect untill hereafter man perhaps may have content here but felicity onely in heaven after life A Traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy Palace where he hope 's for comfort but he is not satisfied untill he come there so it is with us in our Journey to heaven the happiness we have here is our hope of it but hereafter our possession The next Objection may be That this future Felicity is an Article of our Faith the Conclusion of all the Twelve The resurrection of the body and the life everlasting Now if it were demonstrable thus by reason an act of Faith is not necessary to it I can here bring the first and last Articles of our Faith together that which concern's God's creation and this which concern's man's salvation man's beginning and end which are both from God and say That for both of them there is abundance of reason but those Reasons cannot be easily argued by every man and yet though every man cannot Philosophize in high points of learning every man can believe these Conclusions which are proved by learned men and that belief is requâ—red of every man and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they upon good grounds believe no man know's who is his Mother but by his belief of very easie people to deceive and to be deceived and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men so that men dare depose that such a one was this man's Mother and such this man's none of us that are not travelled in those parts know that there is a Constantinople yet we are assured by hear-say and are most confident there is such a City and stronger than all these may our Faith be of this Tâ—uth as I have shewed Faith and Reason doe not destroy but help one the other for it is with our way to heaven as to other places when a man hath shewed us one way we can by that guess at another which hath proportion and convenience to that like lights when you have kindled one Candle you may easily light others at that when the Soul of man is enlightened by Faith it can with much more ease afterwards inlighten Reason which perhaps else it would never have thought upon and Reason sometimes assist's Faith for when the persons we believe deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable it is with comfort swallowed down and entertained and the work of Faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing Thus you see the same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason and therefore although proved in one yet exalted as an Article in the other I could now insist upon the Article of Faith how confirmed by Scripture but that is done by an hundred men before and is evident too to every one that looke's upon the New Testament I could further enlarge upon that I have already touched concerning the Credibility and Fitness to believe those men which delivered it to us that certainly as Festus said to S. Paul not he onely but all the rest were mad with learning or something else who did endure so many afflictions yea death for Religion if there were no reward hereafter and the Story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate Centuryes and continued by the most universally consented Story in the world so that for certainty we have not so much reason to believe any Article of the Faith I speak of reason nor any Conclusion delivered by relation as this one That there is a Blessedness hereafter for God's servants because this is the reason and chief reason why these men durst dye for Religion this made Shadrach Meshach and Abednego Dan. 3. despise the fire for Gods cause the Heroick Sons 2 Mac. 7. contemn Tortures with a most noble Constancy because they looked for a better and happier life so as it is phrased Hebr. 12.1 We are compassed about with a mighty cloud of Witnesses or indeed a cloud of mighty Witnesses to evidence the Truth Mr. Hobbes therefore did not doe this noble heavenly Conclusion right when he say'd It is received onely upon a belief grounded upon other mens saying that know it supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally which was a disgracefull expression and I can justly fear intended to that purpose to disparage this Article for let a man consider his Conclusion which follows Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason or Nature This he saith was opposed by some who held killing of Sovereigns lawfull this seemed out of his premisses to be argued for thus That which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done but the breach of faith in killing of Sovereigns conduceth to future felicity therefore c. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven it might have served his turn much better to have shewed how the God of Truth love's Truth and hate's Falshood how unpossible it is that Error and Falshood should be the way to Truth how inconsistent they are these things would abundantly have served his turn and have contented the Reader but to leave that and fall foule without occasion upon our hope of heaven was very ill done of him CHAP. XXIX Of Covenants and keeping faith Of dammage and injury The exercise of justice in its several kinds Arithmetical proportion is that call'd Commutative What in it and distributive may be due without Covenant The justice of an Arbritratour Mr. Hobbes's mistakes about justice merit c. Bodin's harmonical proportion The old Philosophers unjustly censur'd by Mr. Hobbes Of Epicurus and his Philosophy The Stoicks c. Fortitude and Liberality stated better by them then he pretend's Sect. 1. I Leave this now and on with him Others saith he that allow for a Law of Nature the keeping of Faith doe neverthelesse make exception of certaine persons as hereticks c. I condemn this with him but doe not approve his reason for it which is If any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it I allow not this answer because it destroye's that supposition upon which it was grounded which is that men have made a Covenant now
the question is whether that Covenant may lawfully be broke this is no satisfaction to say that there was the same reason not to make the Covenant as to breake it for both may be amisse to make it rashly and to break it rashly and one may be well another ill as to covenant to doe any honest thing the Covenant was good the breach ill So likewise the Covenant may be ill and the breach good as in those examples before instanced in not as it is a 〈…〉 of â—aith but of that wicked bond nay I can shew made a Covenant with another may doe it with an orthodox man or with one not apparent to be other and yet the man afterwards turne heretique or discover his heresy in that case it is not possible for the Covenanter to find the same reason in making as was in breaking his Covenants so that although his Conclusion be true that faith is to be kept with all men yet his foundation and ground upon which he built it was faulty Indeed the ground upon which his conclusion is established is that God is the God of truth that Religion destroye's not but perfects morall vertues amongst which veracity Truth-speaking is a principal one and therefore cannot teach to break faith with any one I would have these men who taught that doctrine consider how it had been possible for the Apostle to have enlarged Christian Religion amongst the Gentiles if they had broached such a doctrine so odious to humanity but they taught the quite contrary as is evident I let it passe and proceed Sect. 2. His application of Iustice and Injustice to men and actions is ingenuous but at the bottome of the page 74. he endeavours to shew that sometimes dammage is done to one when the Injury is done to another As when the Master commands his Servant to give mony to a Stranger if it be not done the Injury is done to the Master whom he had before Covenanted to obey but that dammage redoundeth to the stranger to whom he had no obligation this is handsome but a little too fine for I am perswaded that no dammage can be where is no losse losse cannot be where a thing is not had he that hath nothing can lose nothing for his instance the Stranger had right to his Master's kindnesse and the same bond which tyed the Servant to obey his Master in that command obliged him likewise to give it to the stranger and that bounty of the Master so justly entitled the stranger to it as that Servant who defrauded him of it is bound in Conscience to make him restitution afterwards for that injury He hath another instance by which he endeavour's to illustrate this proposition at the top of 75 page In commonwealths private men may remit to one another their debts but not robberyes or other violences whereby they are endammaged how doth this prove that injury may be done to one and the dammage to another any man may forgive or remit any dammage or injury no dammage without Injury so far as it concerne's himselfe but not wherein it concerne's another nor doth his following reason speak any more Because saith he the detayning of debt is an Injury to themselves but Robbery and violence are injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth So then it seemâ—s by him that dammage is not without Injury when the Common-wealth is dammaged it is injured where a private man is dammaged he is injured either of these may remit those dammages or Injuries are done to them and their parts in the same act when one and the same act doth often endammage and injure both but neither can justly intermeddle with the other's interest Sest 3. He proceed's Iustice of actions is by writers divided into Commutative and Distributive This distinction he censure 's I shall censure him for it but before I doe that that my judgement may appeare more cleare when it is applyed to the several particulars I will permit an explication of that division how it is understood by the consent of those he call's writers which are Schoolemen Casuists and Morall Philosophers Thus they discourse of Iustice Iustice of actions is either in the actâ—ons of a particular relating to the whole body of the Common-wealth or of the body or whole to parâ—iculars or of particulars one to anoâ—her The first â—hey call Communis Iustiâ—ia or legalis common or legall Justice Common because it concerne's the community and legall because it hath the same intent with all Lawes which is the publike benefit or else because it is required by the law of that nation or some Aphorisme of the law of nature which dictâ—te's that the whole should be preserved rather then any particular of this sort are the performance of those duties and services which are required by â—he lawes of the Land as the repaires of High-wayes paying publick Taxes in to the Exchequer yea to expose a man's life to danger for the publick good and preservation of either Church or State The second sort of the whole to particulars is that they call Distributive justice which is apparent in the rewarding and punishing of men and in this is required a Geometrical proportion which require's four tearms as thus such a proportion as two hath to four hath three to six it is just half or such as six hath to eight fifteen hath to twenty it is three parts of four thus when a Parish relieve's the poor wâ—th the publick Stock such a family as hath three bed-rid people in it must have treble the relief of that which hath but one out of the publick Stock So in disposing Offices it is justice that he who merit 's accordingly should be exalted to dignity and rewards proportionable he who hâ—th merit for a Captain a Captain 's place a Colonel a Colonel's and so in all professions and it is not justly done in him who hath the dispensation of these Dignities to give the lesse worthy the place of more worth and the more worthy the place of less worth The third kind is of particular men one with another and this they tearm Commutative Justice which consist's in exchanges and the trade and negotiation one man hath with another to this they assign the measure Arithmetical which is so much as the other five for five he who hath right to five shillings must have five shillings and no more he who hath so much dammage must in justice have so much satisfaction and no more without any consideration of merit or demerit vertue or vice a shilling's worth of work must be payd with a shilling this is the generall Doctrine which is delivered by Writers concerning Justice Let us see what he except's What he writ is not true Justice of Actions is not by Writers divided into Commutative and Distributive when he saith Justice of Actions he must understand Justice in its generall notion which by the consent of all Writers is first
Objections of Scotus and his followers which I would answer immediately in their order but that I think the bare explication of Boethius his Definition will doe it without more business which thus I doe Sect. 6. First a person is a substance by that Term it is opposed to all accidents and things onely imaginary it is an individual substance by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances the general or spâ—cial natures of substances which are dividual into many of the same nature as a Man a Lyon there are many of the same kind under each of these notions but there are no more the same as one person yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business which is it is incommunicable he may use it and by that may be denyed that the Soul of man separated is a person because although it is incommunicable ut quod as the Scotists speak yet it is not absolutely for it is communicable ut quo which distinction may be thus explained that thing is communicable ut quod which communicate's its self wholly and in recto as they speak so that it communicate's in such a manner as a man can say another is this so doe general or special any universal natures as we can say Socrates is a man a sensitive thing and the like but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature yet not such as that we may say another thing is this but that it hath this or is made such or such by it so whiteness heat coldness or any form the Soul of man the form of any thing these communicate themselves ut quo by which that thing to which they are communicated may be say'd to be white or have whiteness to be hot or have heat not to be whiteness or heat to be animated or have a Soul but not to be that soul and the like thus they say that the Soul of man separated is communicable ut quo though incommunicable ut quod it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again though it be now separated but a person is absolutely incommunicable The last Term in this Definition is that it is rationalis of a reasonable nature this word reasonable must be understood of any intellectual nature whether by discourse or else and so it comprehend's all Divine Angelical or whatsoever and if I am not deceived this mere exposition will satisfie all the Objections which have been made that of Richardus who saith this agree's to the Divine Nature which is the Trinity No saith my Definition that Divine Nature is Dividual communicable to three persons Scotus his first Argument that it agree's with a Soul separated No say I that is communicable ut quo His second which saith that individuum must be of that is divisible I think I might deny that Proposition howsoever to that which followe's that God cannot be divided I say not into Beings or Natures but he is into Persons and that without all Composition His third that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God is true in a gross sense as no words we use can yet reason may be affirmed of God in a superexcellent manner which excell's our knowledge or Discourse and Angels although they discourse not as most think yet they have an Angelical reason which discern's in a finer manner those things without Discourse which we doe by Discourse nor is it necessary that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge beyond beasts Thus you may discern what a person is esteemed to be amongst such as know how to define and Mr. Hobbes if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books might easily have discovered this amongst them and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage onely for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players rather than Philosophers in words we are not alwayes to consider their Etymologie but how they are used yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word the most commonly received amongst the Schools is significant of the true use which is per se una a person because it is by its self one nor are we to consider onely how words have been used but how they are now in our English formerly a Knave signified a servant now a dishonest man Bawdery signified onely bravery now obscenity with hundreds of the same nature So that since the Exposition which I have given of this word Person is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers when he give 's another sense of it he ought to have shewed more reason for it then he hath But he hath a Design in it I will therefore consider that Sest 7. Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent and then the Person is the Actor and he that owneth his words or actions is the Author I am of another mind not the Actor but the acted is the person as will appear manifestly A Constable hath his actions and his words legally spoke in the King's name owned as the King 's yet he is not the person of the King but the King in his own person act 's by him he beare's the person represent's the person of the King but the King is the person he the Actor or Representer the Author according to his phrase is the person not the actor I commend his observations upon Authority and what followe's in that page onely I can by no meanes approve what he saith in the middle of that page Sect. 8. When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him not he but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature This is very erroneous or else it make's an impossible supposition for this supposition if he be obliged by a former Covenant must either be understood that some former Covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the Law of Nature and that is impossible for no Authority but that of the God of nature can have right to crosse the Law of Nature and then it is most consonant to the Law of Nature to obey him contrary to all Covenants made to any other by any authority yea even of God himself and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his onely Son which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be was most honourable or else must be understood that some Covenant of one man to
another of generall obedience in all things should have power to oblige him to breake the Law of Nature upon such a man's command and then it is most wicked First it is sinfull to make such a Covenant and it is doubly wicked to keep it for when a man make's such a bargaine it is supposed to be in licitis et honestis in lawfull and honest things not against the Law of Nature yea should a man in expresse termes Covenant or bargaine in particular to doe this individual thing which is unlawful he were bound to repent and not to doe it his reason he give 's for the Conclusion is not strong enough to enforce it which is Sect. 9. For though the Action be against the Law of Nature yet it is not his but contrarily to refuse to doe it is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant This answer consist's of two parts I shall examine them distinctly First he saith it is not his that is his that doth it he put 's these relative termes very doubtfully to this I reply if it be not his he is not responsible for not doing of it for no mâ—n can be responsible for that which belong's not to him for any act but what is his own that which he hath not power and Authority to doe his doing is not vertuous nor his not doing viticus so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second which make's the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature when he hath covenanted to doe it but certainly those actions are the actors owne acts and he shall answer for them be blessed or cursed for them and because a man owe's obedience to God onely and to men onely for God's sake therefore whatsoever any man shall command contrary to Gods Law written in the Bible or the nature of man is a sin against God and disobedience to men commanding against the Law of God is true obedience with God See one Instance in the first of Exodus begin the Story at the fifteenth verse you shall find Pharaoh commanding the Hebrew Midwives that they should destroy â—he Male Children of the Hebrews it is said in the 17 verse the Midwives feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded and in the 21. verse it is said because the Midwives feared God that God made them houses that is blessed them here it is evident that when a Command was given to act that horrid sin of murder which is against the Law of Nature God blessed those persons who feared God more then men and would not be actors in that which was against the Law of Nature to destroy innocent Children nor can Mr. Hobbes have any evasion to say they had not covenanted to doe this act for it is exceeding probable that when Pharaoh commanded them to doe it he would not have dismissed them without a promise as it is reasonable to think when he convented them and charged them with their fault they would have excused themselves with saying they did not promise but besides this Mr. Hobbes a little after this which I intend to treat teacheth that every Subject make's a Covenant with Leviathan to owne his actions and obey him now then although there were no other Covenant these Midwives living under that Government where Leviathan Pharaoh commanded it they had covenanted to obey him yet God blessed them because they did not So that it seeme's their actions were their own for which God blessed them though contrary to the command of Pharaoh Sect. 10. The second part of his answeare is this But contrarily to refuse to doe it that is what is commanded is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant It is true that the breach of Covenant considered in its self is against the Law of Nature for a man by Covenant give 's away his liberty of using or acting that thing for which he covenanted otherwise then by his Covenant but consider now if a man that hath alienated away formerly his right to an estate or had no right to it should make a deed of that estate to another man such an act could be of no benefit to that other This is that man's case who shall Covenant to act against the Law of God written in books or hearts he cannot covenant to doe it it is voyd ipso facto it is God's due and he cannot alien it and what he shall act according to such a Covenant is wicked the very pretence to have power to doe it is a Conspiracy against God and his right of Dominion over us so that there can be no breach of such a Covenant which had no right to tye or bind any man that Conclusion therefore was a great mistake of Mr. Hobbes and is justly censured here because conducing to other ill Consequences hereafter Sect. 11. In the 82. page having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated towards the midst of that page he saith that the true God may be personated This phrase gave me an amazement for I cannot call to mind any such expression made either in Scripture or Orthodox ecclesiasticall writers and understanding personating in that sense that Mr. Hobbes doth to say the Actor is the person it was too boldly affirmed by him I think without any ground had he spoke of the true God as he did before of Idols to say man might be trusted for those Gods in things which are dedicated to pious uses and so in the place of God receive and dispose such Legacies and in that sense say they personate God quoad haec thus farre there might have been some excuse but to say that the true God may be personated by any thing which is not God was too great an exaltation of the Creature and diminution of his excellency but yet thus he doth as appear's by his Instance as he was first by Moses who governed the Israelites that were not his but Gods people not in his own name with hoc dicit Moses but in Gods name with hoc dicit Dominus first by Moses I am perswaded he can never shew me that the true God was ever personated by Moses A man may be instead of God in divers Offices to the poor are in the room of God instead of his hands receive in God's stead those Almes which for Gods sake are given them Kings and those which are in Authority are in God's stead to govern and rule us and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them because for this purpose they are ordained of God Priests are loco Dei in the place of God in Sacris holy Duties so that they open or shut the gates of heaven absolve and bind mâ—n and he that despiseth them in those holy dispensations despiseth Christ himself but none of these can be say'd to personate God nor can any Creature doe it he who personate's God must
battails as God directed and to judge their Causes according to God's Lawes which he had given them and we shall find that Moses used that Authority but sparingly for he had recourse to God still in any weighty matter of that nature and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the Law So you may find Leviticus 24.11 12 13 14. that the Lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name he was in the 12. verse put in ward that the mind of the Lord might be knowne in the 13. verse the Lord spake unâ—o Moses not his person but his Officer bring forth c. verse 14. See likewise Numbers 15.35 The Lord declared to Moses what should be done to the man who gathered stickes on the Sabbath day and the like you may find in the Case of Zelophehad Numbers 27. verse 1. and Moses brought their cause before the Lord verse 5. and verse 6. the Lord spake unto Moses saying c. so that Moses was so far from personating God that he did nothing but as a Messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them delivering God's will to them their requests and many times his owne for them to God and therefore though God in 32. of Exodus when he was angry with the abominations of the Israelites would disown them and his peculiar interest in them he as it were threw them off to Moses and called them his people yet Moses pleading for them verse 11. c. returne's them to God againe and calle's them his people which he brought forth of the Land of Egypt he owned none of those glorious workes to be his of which he was but an Instrument but attributed all to God Well then we see Moses was but an instrument a Judge a Generall and those Offices in a weake manner performed not without a perpetuall direction from God but in nothing did he personate him so that I think Mr. Hobbes was deceived in using this unheard of phrase concerning Moses but I would he had rested in this and had gone no further me thinke's I could have forgiven this although somewhat too bold a language taking personating in a very large sense that Moses and all Kings might be sayd in a little weake manner to personate God although I did distast it but what followe's is worse CHAP. XXXI Christ personated not God being really God himsâ—lfe His Divinity asserted against Smalcius and other Socinians Christ's bloud not the bloud of the Father the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appropriating it to him Acts 20.28 His Filiation and eternal Generation vindicated from the Subtile exceptions of Valkelius c. And our Saviour justified in his first name of being the Sonne of God Sect. 1. SEcondly by the Son of man his own Son our Saviour Jesus Christ I will stop here and leave the intent of our Saviour's coming to another place he make's here our Saviour to personate God he call's him truly the Sonne of man and the Son of God but in saying he personated God he used a phrase no whit comely to expresse such a sacred Mystery by no man can properly be said to personate another who is that other now this son of man is the son of God and he is God and thought it no robbery to be equall with God if he be God he cannot be said in any propriety of speech to personate God for he who personate's another is not really that other but counterfeitly onely Now our blessed Saviour is really God which he would have him personate and therefore cannot personate God This truth not long since had had no need to have been spoken of amongst Christians whosoever heretofore professed the name of Christ did readily assent to it but of late it hath been denied by many in Polonia and the infection hath come into our nation and that infection hath Antidotes prepared for it which are able to remove it from the heart of those who would cordially apply it to them so that there need no more to be said to it yet because they who read this little treatise may perhaps not have opportunity or leasure to look upon other writers I shall adde a word or two to satisfie the Reader concerning this businesse and shew that Mr. Hobbes hath very unhandsomely expressed himself in it and deâ—ogatorily from the eternall deity of our most blessed Saviour and first in saying he doth personate God for although he say he is the Sonne of God his own Son which in its self were enough to satisfy a Reader that he must be of the same nature with his father for every Son is such yet since the waywardnesse of men hath studied so many foolish distinctions to beguile the simple amongst which that is one of a naturall and adopted Son of an eternally and a temporary begotten Son to which sense are expounded that Christ is his Son but an adopted Christ is his own but a Temporary begotten Son either when the holy Ghost overshadowed the blessed Virgin as soon or before the world was made as others â—his phrase of his cannot shelter him from many peevish and perverse doctrines when he make's him not to be but to personate God I shall first shew that he is God and then how it is not incongruous to reason to say it labouring in all to make my Reason ascend up to my Faith not my Faith descend to my Reason crosse to which I have thought since first I was acquâ—inted with their writings that the Socinians first laid a plot for Religion by Reason then laboured to wrest Scriptures to that plot Sect. 2. In proving our blessed Saviour to be God I shall not use many places of Scripture one or two will be enough so they be cleare and evident the first shall be Acts 20. where you shall find that St. Paul verse 17. did at Miletum sâ—nd to Ephesus for the elders of the Church which were there and verse 28. he gave them a charge in these words Take heed therefore to your selves and to all the flock over which the holy Ghost hath made you overseeers to feed the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own bloud I observe that the Church is called the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood this Article he can relate to none but God he therefore who hath purchasâ—d this Church with his blood is God I will spare nothing that I find brought by any in the way of answeare but doe hope this place will vindicate its selfe and this cause very cleerely First then Bernardinus Ochinus in his second book of his Dialogues Dialogue 19. but the first of that book page 100. in mine edition bring 's this place and answeares it thus First that this is not spoke of the blood of God but of Christ of whom a little before Saint Paul spake but this is so faâ—re from all reason as nothing can be more for the Apostle
as much as these irreconciliable things amount unto and therefore here I could with Mr. Hobbes declaim bitterly against the School who so boldly intrude their busy Wits into the unsearchable things of God by rashly according to their imagination determining twenty yea an hundred things about the Trinity which God hath not revealed and yet lazily sitting still and not endeavouring to make their understandings mount up to those things which God hath revealed it is a most vertuous industry in man to make his Reason wait upon Faith as close as it can but it is an effect of a most busy and presumptuous undertaking to adventure to pry into that Ark which God hath concealed and hid as I have attempted the one so I have abstained from the other Sect. 15. But yet perhaps I may be censured for undertaking to handle this question by reason which hath been so generally denyed by the School to which I have already given an answer but farther although the generality of the School have deserted this debate yet many men of high learning have undertaken it as not onely the mighty Lully but that learned Cusanus in two Books of his de visione Dei cap. 17. and 18. as likewise de cribratione Alchoran lib. 2. cap. 2. usque ad 12. aliis locis so likewise Raymundus de Sabuâ—di in his Theologia naturalis cap. 47. sequentibus Dionysius Carthusianus de fide catholicâ lib. 2 Petrus Pasnonieâ—sis iâ— his decisiones Theologica speculativae morales lib. 1. cap. 4. quaest 1. conclusione 1. who think his and Scotus his reason in that place unanswerable some things likewise in Richardus de Sancto victore and others by reading of which Author 's a man may discern what I have excerpted and what added But yet I may seem to have neglected Antiquity in seldom or never quoting the Fathers for this I can give divers reasons first my Genius doth detest that foolish ostentation and secondly the use of it is unnecessary in this Controversy where neither Mr. Hobbes nor the Socinians with whom I have to do make any esteem of that Argument from such Authority and thirdly besides that it hath been long since laboriously done by the mighty industry of Bernardus Paxillus de Buzezeb concerning the first four Centuries whether he went further I know not which is enough in this Controversy the latter Ages having been secured from these questions by the decrees of Councills and harmony of the Universall Church consenting with them untill Ochinus or Socinus unhappâ—ly awaked them againe Reader once before I printed my Observations upon 12 13 14. Chapters of this Book then when it was in the Press I found one Argument which I had urged in the matter of Religion opposed in another Book by Mr. Hobbes which became me to satisfie the false printing of that make's me reprint it now and when that and the rest were ready for the printer I find now again a Latine Book printed at Amsterdam Entituled Epistolica dissertatio de principiis justi decori continens Apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei de cive wherein are divers things contrary to that which I have observed upon his 13. and 14. Chap. and therefore in the second edition conceive my self bound to vindicate my Dâ—scourse from what is objected against it which I here endeavour CHAP. XXXVI Concerning preservation of life and preference of publick interest Of Faculties Passions and Parts subservient to the guidance of Reason Particular men can have no universall right being limited in their proprieties and pretenses The danger of allowing it and not allowing the right of Occupancy Sect. 1. IN the 9. page of this Treatise he supposeth a God which I like well and that he created the world in wisdom and that he will exercise the vertues of justice and truth in the government of it These are well supposed he draw's from hence that God proposed to himself some end in this creation I will dispute nothing which may be granted to which some fitting meanes are disposed Secondly that those means in themselves ought to have an aptitude to the procuring that end And thirdly that a man shall be blessed or punished according as he useth or neglect's these means These are in the 9. and 10. pages Then in the 14. page he deduceth that that whatsoever in its own nature hinder's the attaining that end which was intended by Nature is forbidden As likewise whatsoever is in its own nature so disposed as without it the end intended by Nature cannot be attained this is commanded Again he saith that there are many things which not from their own nature but from outward circumstances do acquire the fitness or opposition to the end and these are permitted by the Law of Nature and of such consist's the Laws of men This pag. 16. These are the chief Aphorisms out of which he draw's his whole Discourse and not to trouble the Reader with any unnecessary quarrells I will come to the application of these generalls which we may find page 32. and not meddle with any of these rules unless some urgent occasion make's me look back upon them in that 32. page he thus discourseth I contemplating my self as part of the world it must needs be that not by chance but by the Counsell of the most prudent and wise God I am brought forth This was an excellent foundation to build upon but to consider what I shall observe hereafter the better remember that he contemplated himself not onely in relation to himself but as part of the world we must therefore saith he examine what God would have done by me a noble quaere but remember that this must be here made by the word of God or Scripture which he fore-warned us of before but by the rules of right Reason what they should do who have read no Scripture nor can but have these principles only that there is a God a Governour of the world who will punish evill and reward vertue I will go on with him Sect. 2. That saith he without doubt God would have conserved in me which if it be taken away he had in vain given me certain partes and proprieties There is a truth in that proposition but we must consider this Phrase God would have conserved in me I suppose he means by me else if he mean it absolutely without doubt God intend's by the fabrick of man and many times by his justice upon wicked men not to conserve that man to whom he hath given many parts and proprieties for no other purpose then to preserve his life Secondly if he take it as I think he doth for a conservation by that man himself it will be so farre true only that a man must preserve that life that being in order to which those parts and proprieties were aimed untill some greater good then that at which those parts were directed shall arise out
this is no other then the former for it is not Lawfull for me to kill another man if I can avoid his assault but when there is an extreme necessity and his assault is otherwise unavoidable so that it is still in an extreme necessity and that may be relieved with a few things much lesse then the whole world Sect. 12. Here he make's an objection thus How doth all this prove that one single man hath right to the whole world and that nothing out of the part of my neighbour doth hinder it this is page 107. he answer's it doth very much conduce for it For defence of my life my liberty my priviledges it is Lawfull to kill another to break out into war against another much rather will it be lawful for any man to vindicate these goods to himself which now submit themselves to the first possessor and to spoile my neighbour of all those things by which he contend's to out me of my possession For answer surely there is much difference in these cases In the first I defend my life and estate from an unjust invader In the second I invade another's right and interest and when he saith that the other keep 's him out of his possession quibus possessione mea me contendâ—t exuere is his Phrase I would fain know what possession he can say he hatâ— when the other according to his own language is the occupant but if he take possession here for the right of possession what right can he pretend to more then the occupant or by what Law doth that title accrue to him That which he adde's is of no Great force or saith he when there shall be a just fear that he will do the like by me if he gain opportunities this fear he speak's of entitle's a man to nothing but a care of himself untill hostility or injury be offer'd and then one may be provoked to a just war since saith he these things which I take from my neighbour before Covenant are no more his then mine I doubt not but I have and shall shew that those things which are in the possession of another are his own if in his lawful possession without any other Covenant but the Law of nature in the mean time it must needs be granted that the title is equall and melior est conditio possidentis and since he offer 's no force to the other there can be no justice for the other to offer violence to him What he add's further is a Comparison between this case and war that what is gotten in war is the Conquerours because then all Covenants cease and the ancient rights return Certainly both the antecedent is weak and the consequent the antecedent because the goods gotten by conquest are acquired by conquest not by an ancient right many a man get's goods by conquest in a lawfull war who had no title before to them I say else all such gain is but Robbery nor doth this simile agree the Difference is great betwixt the taking of a man's estate from him who offer'd me no injury and him who is my enemy and labour's my destruction At the bottom of the 108. page he begin's with a third Argument which he thus fâ—ameâ—s because the right to the use and possession of things is to be taken from the profit which I conceive will redound to me by them therefore what I shall trust will be profitable for me I have a title to This Argument he is tedious in I have reduced the whole force of it to this narrow compass and do return answer that mine or any man's judgment of the profitableness give 's me no title to it but the just and right judgment I may be deceived in my judgment and judge that profitable which is unprofitable nay although I judge truly that it is profitable yet so may any man's estate be thought that it would be profitable for me if I could get it nevertheless I have no right to it Sect. 13. At the bottom of the 110. page he enter's into another discourse against a Conclusion which I have been engaged in and must therefore undertake his Argument is thus Prima occupatio The first occupancy before Covenant shew's no right of my neighbour in any creature his main reason is this because then in no right in any case of necessity they can return to me again because that right is onely in such things which are yieldâ—d or forsaken which is a language I remember I have used and therefore do think this reflect's upon me First to observe the weakness of this Argument consider that this Argument fight 's equally against himself as against me for he hold's a right is obtained by covenant and yet that right yield's to extreme necessity therefore a man may say that it follow 's with no more force against Occupancy then against Covenant Secondly I deny that the right return's in this condition but a supposed right of humanity invade's all mankind in such states so that although a particular man have occupancy yet that Law which dictate's Do as you would be done unto appoint's the owner to relieve the necessitous person yet I have delivered and that truly that men in general have right to all things as citizens of the world but when any thing is appropriated by occupancy or civil Laws it belong's onely to that person Certainly saith he ye shall find nothing here but gentium institutio the institution of nations which give 's the occupant right but not to him in whose view it come's first My answer will be short and clear there is not the same reason for detection to give right as there is for the other of occupancy first an hundred may see the Countreâ— yea ten thousand yet cannot all these have any title to it which must be in one If a man had right to what he see 's any man's estate might be his but whosoever hath a possession hath an interest Many men see the same bird fly the same fish in the Sea yet it is onely his who catcheth and get's possession of it not sight but occupancy yield's title and right He give 's a third reason towards the 111. page Finge feign saith he two men the one swift of foot the other slow it appear's how unequal this pair of men are in acquiring dominion I believe they are and it is so in all conditions one is strong another weak one cunning another foolish and these may by those abilities according to his method get right from another why then not the swift from the slow as well as in the other disparities His Conclusion therefore from these premisses is exceeding weak when he bring 's it in with a Therefore Therefore saith he to the first occupation out of nature no right is due the vanity of which conclusion is evident out of what hath been said What he add's
p. 8. Colour in the object when Image is not sect 2. ib. Colour varyed according to the medium sect 3. p. 9. Colour in the object sect 4. p. 10. Colour no apparition of motion in the brain chap. 3. sect 3. p. 12. chap. 4. sect 1. p. 25. Colour a reall thing in the object chap. 4. sect 2. p. 26. Different colours dissipating and congregating the Sun-beams ibid. Colour and Light not the same thing sect 4. p. 30. Some colours opposite to Light ib. Light not therefore the form of colours because it produceth them into act chap. 5. sect 1. p. 32. sect 3. p. 34. The difference between reall and intentionall colours sect 3. p. 33. Intentionall colours not the same with Light chap. 5. sect 3. p. 35. Whence the fancy of colours in the dark chap. 9. sect 4. p. 66. The foundations whereon Mr. Hobbes build's a Commonwealth and theâ— justice of it ch 27. sect 4. p. 214 The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo chap. 29. sect 6. p. 278. The Concord of little families not dependent upon lust ch 21. sect 4. p. 156. How vulgar speech hath appropriated Confession chap. 16. sect 2. p. 126. Carthagena confine's God's infinite power unto his fancy chap. 35. sect 1. p. 393. The right to goods by Conquest what chap. 36. sect 12. p. 436. Conscience dictate's submission to a common power and Laws chap. 21 sect 7. p. 158. The restraint of Conscience from scandalous and great injuries chap. 27. sect 2. page 212. When Man resolve's things into their constitutive causes he need not lose himself in the inquest chap. 14. sect 6. p. 100. Benignity to a Musician varyeth not the nature of this or that Donor's contract cha 26. sect 2. p. 203. The original of Justice consisteth not in the Law of Nature for keeping Covenants ch 27. sect 1. p. 208. Propriety good without Covenant p. 209. chap. 36. sect 12. p. 436. Suspicion make's not Covenants void ch 27. sect 2. p. 210. The evil consequences of Mr. Hobbes's opinion in it p. 211. The Fool 's doctrine about Covenants more honest then Mr. Hobbes's sect 5. p. 215. The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken sect 11. p. 224. As that enter'd into by Thieves ib. The other by an Adulteresse ibid. Several qualifications good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants chap. 29. sect 1. p. 249. No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature chap. 30. s. 8. p. 281. With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept ib. The Hebrew Midwives had probably Covenanted sect 9. p. 283. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind sect 10. p. 284 The Creation of the World asserted by the same authority Mr. Hobbes pretend's he will submit to p. 119. The world's Creation not the Gospel's renovation the subject matter of St John 1.3 ch 33. sect 5. p. 357. Christ's interest in the Creation re-inforced against the Socinians glosse upon that Text sect 6. p. 359. Wherein he was a principal no baâ—e instrumental cause ibid. The Creation by Him not to be taken for recreation or regeneration sect 10. p. 365. much lesse for an endevour to regenerate p. 367 Creatures acting by naturall inclinations and appetites compared unto a Clock How God can enlarge the capacity of his creature and how make the object of knowledge approach the limits of its nature ch 35. sect 1. p. 393. D. No dammage without injury chap. 29. sect 2. p. 250. Death desired by such as foresee the happinesse they are to enjoy chapter 22. section 4. page 167. No losse but rather increase of power by death ib. section 5. Our Druâ—ds opinion of it p. 168. Death not so terrible and painful as pretended ib. section 6. Ancient instances to confirm it That of Otho and his souldiers most â—â—gnal page 169. Arria's encouragement of self-dispatcâ— to her husband Paetus page 171. A modern instance in the Bishop's child against the supposed pains of death ibid. Death as sleep to many and a-like desirable section 7. page 172. Diogenes took them for Brother and Sister ibid. Another young child of the Bishop's mistook Death for sleep p. 173 Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended ibid. The three periods of Death ibid. section 8. In which of them and when otherwise pain affect's the sick page 174. Epicurus's excellent discourse against the fear of death chapter 29. section 10. page 265. He that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent chapter 27. section 9. page 221. Devotion what and whence chaptâ—r 13. section 4. page 89. How Dogs and other sensitive creatures come acquainted with words and signs chapter 11. section 1. page 75. Man in his most peculiar Dominion subject and tributary to God chapter 44. section 1. page 181. Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over other creatures but not over other men section 2. page 182. Why men are exempt section 3. page 183. The contradiction of mutual dominion every man over every man page 185. How Christ call's himself a Door chapter 32. section 5. page 326. Dreams improperly assimilated to moved water in its return to rest chapter 9. section 2. page 64. Prophetike Dreams such as are recorded in holy Scripture arise not from an agitation of the inward paâ—ts chapter 10. s. 1. p. 71. f. 2. p. 72. Dreams according to Solomon come from the multitude of businesse ibid. Oâ—d men not alwayes subject to more dreams then young section 3. page 73. The Bishop's opinion of Naturall Constitutionall and Phantastike dreams ib. of coherent and incoherent dreams page 74. E The Philosophers first opinion cerning Echoes chapter 6. sect 2. p. 40. Their second opinion page 41. Their third opinion ib. What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was chapter 33. section 8. page 362. Why the Evangelist chose it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 page 363. what hard luck that word has among the Socicians section 10. page 365. Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun chapter 31. section 7. page 310. ELOHIM the name of God often given to Kings and Princes chapter 30. section 12. page 286. Equality of hopes oâ— desires render's not men alwayes enemies chapter 19. section 1. page 142. An instance in the contract between Abraham and Lot section 2. page 143. Nor self-conservation nor delectation ib. section 3. Not Equality of desires chapter 19. section 4. page 145. Ahab's and Naboth's case ib. Upon what hard conditions an Estate is not to be preserved chapter 23. section 3. page 178. No Eternity à parte ante which is not likewise à parte pâ—st chapter 14. section 2. page 93. An Eternity to be found in all the different principles of Philosophers section 6. page 99. How before and after may be applyed to God's Eternall being section 11. page 106. The double conceipt we may have of
principles of humanity keep men from acting violence unprovoked chapter 2. section 2. page 148. I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated chapter 31. section 3. page 299. The Bishop's oâ—inion that there was no Idolatry before the Floud chapter 16. section 1. page 125. Men's beginning to call upon the Lord Gen. 4. no argument for Idolatry before the Floud ibid. Noâ— God's punishment of the world by the floud section 3. page 128. Jesus increas'd in wisdom c. with God and men otherwise then Socinus interpret's it chapter 32. s. 16. page 343. Ignorance of second causes apter to produce Atheisme then Religion châ—pâ—er 13. s. 3. â—age 86. Affâ—cted ignoâ—ance of the Law sin chapter 21. s. 3. page 155. The Image in the glâ—sse chapter 2. s. 4. page 10. Image no apparition of motion in the brains chapter 3. s. 2. page 11. Imagination something besides decaying sense chapter 9. s. 3. page 64. Imagination and Memory proved not to be the same thing s. 7. page 68. No Infinity of causations nor of causes chapter 14. s. 2. page 92. Man hath some knowledge of infinite s. 3. page 94. s. 4. page 95. s. 5. page 98. The nature of infinite explained page 96. No infinity of number s. 10. page 103. were there such no one infinity could exceed another page 104. Why no man can have right to act any thing inhumanely chapter 4. s. 2. page 182. A standing instant of two thousand yeares chapter 14. s. 14. page 111. How sacred amongst all people hath ever been the preservation of interest chapter 29. s. 10. page 162. How invocation in Genesis may be taken for the whole worship of God chapter 16. s. 2. page 126. Or for some signal additional devotion ibid. That St. John writ against Ebion and Cerinthus proved contrary to Socinus chapter 32. s. 1. page 321. St. John's reaâ—on of his writing not solitary as Socinus allegeth s. 2. p. 322 The Israelites how the peoâ—le of God and how of Moses chapter 30. s. 13. page 288. God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and Generall s. 15. page 289. Justice and Injustice as acquired habits may be in a solitary person chapter 21. s. 9. page 160. Mr. Hobbes's imperfect definition of Injustice chapter 27. s. 1. page 210. Likewise of Justice s. 4. page 213. The Fool 's argument against Justice unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes's principles s. 5. page 215. With what reason Injustice will stand taking away the fear of God chapter 27. s. 5. page 216. The explication of Commutative and Distributive Justice chapter 29. s. 3. page 251. To which is premised that of common or legal justice page 252. Many acts of justice being not comprehended under the other two page 253. Giving or not giving have nothing to do with Justice s. 5. page 256 In Commutative justice restitution of reâ—aration due without contract s. 6. page 257. so likewise in Distributive justice ibid. The preference of the lesse worthy to the better place against Distributive Justice page 258. The justice of an Arbitrator may be Commutative or Distributive according to the case s. 7. page 259. The difference between Equity and Distributive Justice ibid. Mr. Hobbes's boldnesse in confronting all learned men before him touching Commutative and Distributive Juâ—â—ice page 260. Bodin onely excepted who has an aery conceipt of harmonical proportion ibid. K Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he put 's upon naturall knowledge chapter 8. s. 1. page 226. His scornfull scale of knowledge s. 7. page 232. Man's knowledge so defective as it cannot satisfie his Will s. 11. page 237. Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life s. 12. page 240. None of his eminences but by Revelation page 241. The parcells of knowledge in this life make up no accumulative or collective happinesse s. 15. page 245. L Every man born under a Law-maker and a Law chapter 21. s. 3. page 155. s. 7. page 158. The Decalogue was no new Law s. 10. page 161. Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes's definition of the Law of Nature chapter 25. s. 3. page 192. How the Law of Nature obligeth strangers to mutuall succour in distresse chapter 27. s. 1. page 209. How it give 's rules for the attaining eternall felicity after death s. 10. page 223. Mr. Hobbes make's the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature chapter 30. s. 9. page 282. Liberality what chapter 29. s. 13. page 270. Liberty no such thing as Mr. Hobbes describe's it chapter 25. s. 2. page 191. Light or colour figured how conducible to sight chapter 1. s. 3. page 5. Light illustrate's the medium but doe's not terminate sight chapter 3. s. 7. page 16. s. 8. page 17. How our Saviour is said to be a Light c. Luke 2.32 chapter 32. s. 17. page 344. How Christ is called the Light according to Socinus how according to the Bishop chapter 33. s. 7. page 362. Preservation of life not the principall of mans happinesse chapter 22. s. 4. page 166. When and how to be regarded chapter 36. s. 12. page 436. In what cases life should not be prefer'd to death chapter 22. s. 9. page 114. chapter 36. s. â— page 420. s. â— page 421. s. 4. page 423. s. 11. page 434. How Christ call's himself the life chapter 32. s. 5. page 327. Eternal life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angels blessed souls Prophets Philosophers ib. s. 15. page 341. although not till afterward manifested to others ibid. page 342. What life is mean't by Saint John to be in the Word chapter 33. s. 7. page 361. and what the light of men ibid. Raymund Lully's adventures and sufferings for the conversion of the Turks and Moores chapter 35. s. 5. page 398. M Man's abilities both to know and prosecute what is good chapter 8. s. 2. page 58. The inequality of men by nature considerably different chapter 18. s. 2. page 138. Adam and Evah made in no state of enmity nor absolute equality ibid. s. 3. The debility and helpless condition of other men by nature page 139. Plato's ingenious fable about the making of men and beasts chapter 27. s. 2. page 211. The constancy of the holy Martyrs a most strong reason for eternal happinesse chapter 28. s. 15. page 247. Means no otherwise usefull then as they relate to an end that is such chapter 36. s. 4. page 422. s. 5. page 424. All conducing to a private person's advantage not to be used s. 6. page 425. Memory not alwayes weakned by extent of time chapter 9. s. 5. page 67. Memory likened to a box whereof Attention is the key ibid. To a book s. 7. page 69. The distinction of Memory Experience and Prudence chapter 18. s. 4. page 139. The diversity of Merit chapter 25. s. 8. page 202. The diâ—â—inction of it ex congruo and ex condigno misunderstood by Mr. Hobbes chapter 26. s. 4. page 204. How otherwise
expounded by the Schools page 205. Christ had a plenarity of power in his mission from the Father chapter 33. s. 18. page 385. Moral Philosophy hath a subject of a greater extent then Mr. Hobbes seem's to allow it chapter 29. s. 8. page 261. How Moses was instead of God to Aaron chapter 30. s. 12. page 286. How made a God to Pharaoh ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and his people s. 15. page 290. Motion aim's at quiet chapter 1. s. 3. page 5. All things produced by it p. 6. Things without us are not motions causing apparitions chapter 6. s. 9. page 48. The six kinds of motion page 49. No eternity of motion in things moved unto which no stop or impediment occurre's chapter 7. s. 2. page 55 How standing water recover's its rest after motion chapter 9. s. 1. p. 63. A bladder's sudain stopping its motion of ascent on the top of the water s. 2. page 64. The first mover immoveable chapter 14. s. 8. page 101. How naturall bodies move themselves without being moved by that which is moved page 102. N Naboth destroyed not by Ahab's but Jezabell's malice chapter 19. s. 4. page 145. The being and nature of things consist's not in their second but their first act c. chapter 5. section 1. page 32 The right of nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life chapter 22. section 1. page 164. Necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life section 3. page 166. He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment chapter 23. section 2. page 177. To which he is oblig'd by Reason ib. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispens'd with page 178. What is the Law what the Right of Nature chapter 24. section 1. page 181. Not such as Mr. Hobbes define's it chapter 25. section 1. page 190. External impediments may hinder but not take away naturall power section 2. p. 191. Nature's aiming at the benefit onely of particulars an errour which run's through Mr. Hobbes's whole discourse section 3. p. 193. How far naturall abilities conduce to the knowledge of God chapter 33. section 13. page 372. Actions not alwayes answerable to the principles of his or its nature which act's section 17. page 383. Severall acceptions of necessity and the different effects of it accordingly chapter 22. section 2. page 165. Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law ibid. No new Patent made to Noah but that to Adam re-enforced chapter 24. section 4. p. 185. Noah's sonne 's like co-heires or enter-commoners in their right page 186. O Obedience due in submission to any punishment by a lawful Magistrate chapter 25. section 7. p. 199. God to be obeyed before man chapter 30. section 9. p. 282. an instance in the Hebrew midwives ibid. The title of Occupancy sacred chapter 19. section 4. page 145. Before Occupancy Reason or Armâ— decide the title p. 147. Of all titles to Interest Occupancy most evident section 11. page 163. How far in case of necessity to be remitted chapter 36. section 13. p. 437 Discovery give 's not an equall right with Occupancy p. 438. Little peace to be expected if the right of Occupancy be not allowed p. 440. Ochinus pervert's the sense of Acts 20.17 28. to detract from the divinity of Christ chapter 31. section 2. page 293. Refuted by Smiglecius ib. To whom Smalcius replie's p. 294. Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ib. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishâ—p chapter 31. section 10. p. 315. One in essence may be plurally expressed when the effects are divers section 7. p. 309. The heathen Gods not believed for their Oracles but the Oracles for their Gods chapter 13. section 5. page 90. P The right of Parents over their Children chapter 24. section 2. page 182. What make's passions sinful chapter 21. section 2. p. 154. The various constitutions of the objects to our passions ibid. The passions to be moderated by prudence and right reason the ancient Ethnick Philosophy and Saint Paul's chap. 29. section 12. p. 269. ch 36. s. 3. p. 421. The barbarous Persecutions endured by the Primitive Christians chapter 25. section 6. p. 197. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantiall chapter 30. section 1. p. 272. No lesse applicable to a feigned then a true Person section 2. p. 273. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum anciently used to denote what we term Person section 3. p. 274. Person differently used in severall Arts and Faculties ibid. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes section 4. p. 275. No man Personates hiâ—self ibid. That of Cicero interpreted Vâ—us sustineo tres personas Mei Adversarii Judicis ibid. Perâ—on how taken by Criticks page 276. Boethius's definition of a Person section 5. ibid. objected against by Ri. de Sancto Victore ibid. By Scotus p. 277. Boethius's other definition of a person more difficult ibid. The former definition explain'd and vindicated by the Bishop section 6. page 278. The Etymology and common acception of Persona p. 280. Not the Actor but the acted is the person ib. The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated chapter 30. section 11. p. 284. Moses though instead of God did not personate him p. 285. s. 12. p. 287. Nor do Kings Nor Priests ibid. Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God section 14. p. 289. Uncomly to say our Saviour personated God who was really God himself chapter 31. section 1. p. 291. Personality what chapter 33. section 15. page 379. What that of Christ in the flesh ib. Diversity of persons imply's not diversity of things section 17. page 384. The whole Divine nature not necessarily engaged in the acts of any single person in the Trinity ibid. The eternal plurality of Persons by production in the holy Trinity syllogistically proved chapter 35. section 7. p. 404. Why no more persons then three in the holy Trinity section 11. p. 410. How the product of two Divine Agents may be one and the same Person section 12. p. 411. How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and holy Ghost section 13. page 412. St. Augustine's argument for their being called three Persons which is no Scripture-language section 14. p. 414. How great is the Personal distinction in the holy Trinity a mystery yet unrevealed chapter 35. section 14. p. 415. Personal and relative perfection taught by Philosophers chapter 29. section 10. p. 263. How man's knowledge is from Phantasms chap. 14. s. 4. p. 95. The foundation of Ethick Oeconomick and Politick Philosophy chapter 29. section 9. p. 262. Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus section 10. p. 263. With that of Lucretius page 265. The Philosophers language used by the Primitive Fathers and St. Paul chapter 32. section 14. p. 337. That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John p. 338.
is that makes Experience There have been prognostick dreams and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts Solomons opinion of dreams different from Mr. Hobbes's His reasons invalide Old mens dreams Constitutional dreams Phantastick dreams Whence coherent and incoherent dreams Sensitive creatures become acquainted with words and signs by custom or the suggestions of appetite not by understanding 〈◊〉 specifick souls signal differences distinguishing them each from other Their Sagacity Religion defined Why reckoned among the duties of justice The seed of Reâ—igion in man onely because rational Mr. Hobbes's reasons invalid and his discourse impertinent His opinion of the feigned God invisible Agents Ghosts c. Invisible Agents what Mr. Hobbes sticks an absurd opinion of mans soul undeservedly upon Idolaters His discourse of Spirits and Ghosts c. too perplexed Mr. Hobbes sowes ambiguous seeds to produce false and true Religion The opinion of Ghosts could not introduce the assurance that there is a God Ignorance of second causes apter to produce Atheisme then Religion Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit then seed of Religion A taking things casual for Prognostiquâ—s no seed of the taâ—â—e Religions There have been Sibyls that prophesied of our Saviour The sole immediate seed of Religion an innate principle To be prov'd from the chain of causes An eternity of the world with an infinity of causations why not to be admitted A transition to Mr. Hobbes's Element of Philosophy c. Somewhat of God though infinite may be known And that from Phantasms The conceit of fiâ—ite and infinite explain'd What conceit may be had of infinite An Eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions Mr. Hobbes's indiffâ—rence be the world finite or infinite His contradâ—ction of himself by inadvertence The first mover prov'd immoveable Mr Hobbâ—s's paralogisme His disputing ex non concessis No infinity at all of numbers Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration And yet God the Creatour may and must No before or after in Eternity and yet how these terms are applicable to Gods duration or coexistencâ— not to his simple or absolute existence Our double conceipt of Gods eternity to which no computation of time is applicable The doctrine of eternity most agreeable to H. Scripture No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing instant The difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to Eternity Eternity coexâ—sts with no infinite number of dayes God so manifest in the Creatures as all ignorance is inexcusable Mr. Hobbes contradict's himself as touching the seeds of Religion Which are more then only an opinion of a Deity c. Mr. Hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the Schoolemen How farre the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature What may be supposed Mr. Hobbes mean's by a Formed Religion How he imposeth upon his Reader Formed Religion not founded upon his phantastike Faith The Jewish and Christian principally to be examined No probâ—liâ—y of Idolatry before the floud 1. Argument Answ. Invocation taken for the whole worship of God Practis'd by Adam Abel Seth c. Or for some peculiar additional Devotion A like instance in Confession The Church Service Gloria Patri That peculiar devotion introduced in Enos's time 2. Argument Answ. The punishmâ—nt disproportionate to sin in this world Of what sort were their sins who perished in the Floud Revelation not reason did dictate the first Religion The difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of a Religion Which prevaiâ—eth according to the congruity it hath to the will of God Whatsoever mens opinion be of the Person that introduceth it How this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a God Why the promised discourse of the Iewish and Christian Religion is omitted Mr. Hobbes abstruse in making out his conclusion of suspected Governours and their Religion Christian Religion depends not upon the integrity and sufficiency of Church Governours Religion formed by divine revelations may oâ—lâ—ge to a beleeâ—e of seeming contradictions The singular excellency of Faith to be as well against as above Reason Mr. Hobbes's subtiltie in his citation and praetermission of examples Which though pertinent are dangerous to weak capacities Mr. Hobbes's scandalous description of man The equality of men by nature not universal The estate in which Adam and Evâ—h were made That wherein others Memory Experience and Prudence distinguished Mr Hobbes confuse â—f not contradictâ—â—y to himself in arguing Men universally no such opiniatours of their own prudence as Mr. Hobbes pretendeth Equality of hopes does not render men enemies Nor of desires as appeares by the agreement between Abraham and Lot Nor self-conservation much lesse delectation How and by what Hopes and Feares work upon us Not Ahab's but Jezabels malice destroyed Naboth Obj. Ans. The title of Occupancy sacred c. Reason secureth men from feares Who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury Which is generally restrain'd by the thought of Gods punitive justice How Reason or Armes decide the controversy before occupancy Three sorts of men although without a common humane power to awe them not in the condition called Warre How a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutual â—â—iendship Ob. Repl. Ans. Time being no essential constitutes no war His instance in foul weather to illustrate erroneous A disposition to war before any act of hostility makes no war His impropriety of speech Men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive War An universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented Nor is it proved by Mr. Hobbes's instances What in the passions makâ—â— Sinnes which are not such in themelves The several constitutions in the objects of our passions what and whence Affected ignorance of the law a sin Every man borne under a Law maker and a Law The Americans have Kings and justice exeeuted amongst them Private families not at war with the Kings and Nations among whom they live The concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust The exorbitances of a Civil Warre prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature The mutual jealousies of Soveraigns render them not like Gladiatours in a direct posture of war Conscience dictate's to men what is right and wrong what law and common power they must submit to Militarie Vaâ—our and Prudence degenerated into Force and fraud lose the nature and deserve not the name of the the two Cardinal vertues in war Justice and Injustice no faculties but habits and may be in a military person Nations have propriety in Dominions Persons in their wives And estates Thâ—ir title to which may be various That of Occupancy most evident The right of Nature extends farther then to the preservation of life Several acceptions of Necessity and the different effects of it accordingly Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law Necessity of nature makes not every particular
man desirous to preserve his life It being 〈◊〉 in nature the principal of mans happinesse Nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gaind by Death Which is not so terrible and painfull as pretended Ancient instances The most signal that of Otho and his souldiers Cato's double attempt to dispatch himself Arria'â— magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband Paetus A moderne iâ—stance in a young child Death seiseth upon men like sleep Diogenes takes them for brother and Sister A young child mistook one for the other Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended The three periods of death In which of them and when otherwise pain most affects the sick In what cases life should not â—e preâ—er'd to Death He that hath right to the end hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end The ultimate end excepted He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment To which he is oblig'd by Reason When the law of Nature for preservation may be dispenced with c. As the right for a mans preserving some piece of his estate Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right and division of it from Law What right is properly and what wrong Whence is proved the consistence of Right with Law What is the law what the Right of Nature Man in his most peculiar dominion subject and tributary to God Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over the creatures but not over other men Mans will not to bâ— the rule of his judgement nor the reason of his actions Why men aâ—e exempt from Gods general charter of domâ—nion at manâ— creation· To put a restraint on any vâ—ce which had no positive law against it As the sin of Sodomâ— it may be reasonably suppos'd had none How Mr Hobbes would have out-Cained Cain in the justification of fratricide The contradiction in mutuall domiâ—ion every man over every man No new Patent made to Noah but thae to Adam re-enforced Noah's sonnes like coheires or entercommoners in their right They had not the world divided among them by consent but by casual occupancy or choice as every of them thought fit Obj. Ans. The Children of Israel dispossess'd the Canaanites by Gods prerogative which he had receiv'd The first generation of men understâ—od their titles of propâ—iety without Gods peremptory command Jus and Utile not the same thing Places c not 〈…〉 that first sâ—iseth How Tulâ—ie understâ—oâ— Utile far othâ—â—wise then Mâ— Hobbes Mr. Hobbes's Aâ—gument ex non concessis The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbs defines it Nor liberty as he describe's it External impediments may hinder but not take away naturall power Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes definition of the law of nature A veine of erours that run through his book Mr. Hobbes may be allowd to say he declares when he proves nothing But not to suppose a multitude of falshoods to make up the horridness of one conclusion A terme wanting to Mr. Hobbes's just engagement in a war And to him a remembrance of his owne principles War not the onely preservative of mans right or Nature's The discourse of mans laying downe his right to all things c. unnecessary That is not alwayes really good for which a man paâ—ts with 〈◊〉 right A man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good Obj. Ans. Tertullian's signal instance in the Christians of his time He may suffer imprisonment c. without reluctance for the same reason Obedience being better then sacrifice A man may renounce hâ—s right pro â—ris et fociâ— For the good of his posterity Monastick retreats Diversity of Merit The Catchers title so scaâ—terd mony Benignity to a Musician varieth not the nature of this or that Donors contract How the owner keeps his ptoderty who intended to renounce it The distinction ex congruo ex condigno misundâ—â—stood by Mr. Hobbes How otherwise expounded by the Schooles Mr. Hobbes's vaine supposition of transferring right c. His justiying most horrid sins where no Covenant had been made against them His reason frustrate An instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited His imperfect definition of injustice Suspition makes not Covenants voyd The case put between two nations entring League of Confederacy The evil consequences of his opinion Plato's ingenious Fable The Casuists metus â—adens A propriety where is no Coercive Power The foundations wherein Mr. Hobbes builds a Common wealth and the justice of it The Foole 's argument unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes's principles His doctrine more honest then Mr. Hobbes Taking away the feare of God an unreasonable supposition Uâ—certain whether taugh or learned of the other the Foole or Mr. Hobbes Mr. Hobbes's horrid supposal of getting Heaven by unjust violence He pretends to confute the Foole. But by inadvertense fights against himself The violation of faith not â—llowed for a Kingdome Mr. Hobbes mistake's the question And changeth 〈◊〉 termes fraudulently hâ—re and otherwhere He that means to deceive will not declare his intent The Bishops Conclusion Mr. Hobbes's illogical Anâ—wer Another like it The Law of Nature give 's rules for the attaining eternal felicity afrte death The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken As that enterd into by Theeves The other by an Adulteress Mr Hobbes's subtilty in writing against Rebelion which cannot be by his doctrine Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he puts upon natural knowledge What a perswasive the natural knowledge or beliefe we have of eternal happinesse is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity The transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternal happinesse For which we loth worldly pleasures And welcome tortures Obj. Ans. The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happinâ—sse Merchant adventurer Mr. Hobbes can render himself more sâ—cure of temporal then he seemes to be with little satisfaction of eternal felicity The promises and oathes of men which he make's his greatest assurance being very fallible His scornful scale of knowledge Our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julus Caesar. Being not only deliver'd to us by Tradition but most consonant â—o Reason In Mans fellâ—wship with other Creatures and his excellency above them A very chiâ—d requires he satisfaction of his Will A man's Will satisfied wiâ—h no woâ—ldly goods whether bâ—dâ—ly sensual or intellectual Hâ—s knowledge â—s defective and cannot doe it Nor ought else which is not infinite and that infinite is God Riches doe it not whâ—ch bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more when men have most Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life None positively of his eminencies but by revelation What Faith doâ—'s towaâ—d it What dreams visions ecstasies c.
The severall parts acted by the Understanding and the Will both which faculties are imperfect in this world The certainty of felicity after death resum'd and proved Object 1. Ans. The Objection answer'd toâ—ching man's felicâ—ty in the knowledge c. he hath though â—mperfect Objection 2. Answer A second Objâ—ction answer'd about Eternal felicity being the last Article of our Faith The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason An Argument to confirme this drawn from the H. Martyrs constancy in their sufferings Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design to disparage the foresaid Article of our â—aith Several qualificâ—tions good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants No dammage without injuâ—y The explication of Commutative and Distâ—ibutive justice To which is premised that of common or legal justice Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two Argument 1. against an Arithmeticall proportion in Commutative Justâ—ce examined By what the price of any thing may â—e enhaunsed The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the Siege of Samaria When the Arithmeticall proportion must be applied to the value of the thing 2. Argument agaiâ—st it answered A Judge or Umpire 〈◊〉 by the rule of â—ustice What may be due by both kindes of Justice without Covenant The justice of an Arbitrator different according to the Case Mr. Hobbes 〈◊〉 nice and singular in his language His mistake in the division of justice In his measure of commutative His boldnesse in confronting all the learned men before him Bodâ—n's cavill His aieâ—y conceit of an harmonical proportion Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy His censure of all Philosophers He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good Citizen The foundation of Ethikes Oeconomikes Politikes Personall and relative perfectâ—on how taught by Philosophers Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus With that of Lucretius Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death Frugality and Temporance Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans Wherein the Stoicks placed humâ—ne happinesse Wherein Aristotle Mr Hobbes mâ—stake's the Philosophers discouâ—se of moderating assions St. Pauls Philosophy Of Fortitude and liberality Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial No less applicable to a feigned than a true person Person not Latine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Suppositum Person differently used in severall arts and faculties Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes No man personate's himself Cicero mis-interpreted Person how taken by the Criticks Boethius's definition of a person Rich. de Sancto Vâ—ctore object 's against it His other Definition of it More dâ—fficult Scotus's Objections against the former The Definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop The Distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quâ— Reasonable of what extent The Philosophers â—nd School-men could have râ—ctified Mr Hâ—bbes's mistake of a person The Etymologie and common aâ—ception of Persona Not the Actor but the acted is the person No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept The fiâ—st part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroye's the second God to be obeyâ—d before man An instance in the Hebrew Midwives Who probably had covenanted No breach of Covenant which had not a right to biâ—d The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated Moses though instead of God did not personate him Nor doe Kings Nor Priests How Moses was instead of God to Aaron ELOHIM How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh Hoâ— fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him The Israelites how the pâ—ople of Gâ—d and how of Mâ—ses Moses's phrase shewe's he personated not God God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and Generall A messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God Who was really God Pâ—â—ved to be 〈◊〉 from Acts 20.17 28. Against Bernard Ochinus Refuted by Smiglâ—cius To whom Smâ—lcius replies having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus Oâ—hinus deserâ—â—d by the Socinians Smalcius attempt's in vaine to evacuate the divinity of Christ. Christâ—s blood not to be called the blood of the Father according to Smiglecius Smalcius that argue's how it may His argument urged to the farthest by the Bishop Who finde's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's The shifting Genius of the Socinians de luded by a single word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated The text whâ—ch want's it retorted upon the Socinians How Christ is the son of God What a son is The particulars in the definition applyâ—ed to our Saviour The mysterie of our Saviour's divine humane generation signified Mic. 5.2 The Bishop's observation on that Text. Faustus Socinus answâ—â—'d And Valkelius With other Socinians The text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers Christs eternal egression compared to the shining of the Sun How from the beginning may signifie from eternity A twofold consideration of the word Beginning A or Ab often denote causationâ— c. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of David's reigne The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto God's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes Particularly that of his eternity The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arian The next name of our Saviour the Word Socinus answerd in his Explication of St. John Ch. 1. The opinâ—on of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed Epiphanius contra haeret tom 2. cap. 28 The shifts of the Socinians St. Iohn's â—eason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgâ—th Beza's genuine lection Socinus rigulaâ— in his But for a little consonance with Tremelius How the Socinians interpret Joh. 1.1 With reâ—erence to the Baptist's preaching Their Metaphor And Metonymie Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the text is to be understood So that of a vine A Shepheard A Doore His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection c. The Truth and life may be taken without a figure Christ called the Word according to none of those figures But according to the Catholick sense is the internal Word of God How Aaron was Moses's mouth John Baptist call'd a voice The Woâ—d taken for Christ in a farre different sense Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically Socinus's shift A brief Paraphraâ—â— Wâ—â—es the first 〈◊〉 in St John A Word internal and external both of God and Man The Philosophers of old callâ—d the Son of God his Word As well they who writ after as who before St. John Which is yielded by Socinus Their language used by the primitive Fathers and St. Paul That of Plato conâ—onant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John Plato's deâ—â—â—lption of heaven parallel'd to