merits of the cause nor comes to dispute that which was most material in the Controversy I wonder why he shoâ—ld lay so much stress upon Children and Foolâ— and debaucht Persons to make their aâ—sent or dissent so availeable one way or other I am no friend to Dogmatizing yet I humbly conceive that no one has any just reason to think the worsâ— of any Opinion merely because such Persons do not assent unto it Neither do they who plead for this general consent make it so universal as to include every particular Pa. 24. § 20. I desire these Men to say whether by Education and Custom these Notions can or cannot be blurr'd and blotted out Since he is so Positive in his demand why may not we be aâ— positive in our answer and say that they can And what then Why then truly he drops that part of the disjunction and only says If they may suffer â—ariation by adventitioâ—â— Notions which is a very gentle way of blotting out but what then follows Why then we must find â—â—em cleâ—rest and most perspicuous nearest the Fountainâ— in Children c. We must he says but he never yet prov'd the necesâ—ity of that consequence And then as for Illiterate Persons if he mean plain honest illiâ—â—â—atâ—â— Heathens such as are less Learned â—â—t less corrupted by â—â—lse Principles and wicked Practises I doubt not but these Notions will appear clearer in such But however we still remain in the full and undisturb'd possession of that side of the disjunction that these notions may by bad Custom and Education be blotted out which ground thus gain'd will be of great disadvaâ—tage to his cause As for what he says Pa. 18. of the wicked Practices and Atheistical Opinions of some Heathen Nations some think that his Authors were not so exact in their observations as they might have been but suppose they were it makes nothing to the advantage of his cause unless he had prov'd before that these Notions cannot be blotted out of the minds of Men. Neither will it follow hence that they are of no use to Mankind if they may be thus defac'd For 1 st It may be in some measure oweing to these that all the Nations of the Heathen World are not sunk lower into wickedness than indeed they are 2 dly 'T is probable these Innate Notions will be instrumental in the Conviction and Conversion of these People when God in the wisdom of his Providence shall think â—it to do it and I doubt not but the Apostles in their Preaching did appeal to these and make use of 'em for this pâ—rpose Rom. 2. 14 15. Pa. 21. § 14. Here speaking of these Moral Rules he is very urgent with us â—o tell which they are if he means that we should give the exact determinate number of 'em I think this is a very unreasonable demand however I shall at present instanâ—e in those whichâ— Mr. Nye mention◠〈…〉 f His naturall Religion 1 st A tenderness for and care of our Children 2 d. A commiseration of the oppressions and wants of such as are distressed and not by their own fault but thro' mishap or the iniquity of others 3 d. A propensity to favour worthy Persons and actions And here I would only give him this caution that in his reply he do not draw his Answer and Arguments from Children and Fools for such Evidence will be excepted against nor from such as by Vicious customes have blotted these notions out of their minds for no one thinks the worse of the Belief of a God because the whole Club of professed Athests denys it Here give me leave to add one thing further tho' out of its proper place as for those that assert these innate notions I know noâ— how they can well otherwise express it than by saying that the Soul upon occasion exerts 'em and as for that other wâ—y of exerting themselves if it wanted any defence I have very good authority for it Mr. Locâ— P. 13. of his Essay § 27. 'T is â— great presumption that these geâ—erall maâ—imes are not innate since they are lâ—ast known to thoâ—â— in whom if they were â—nnate they must neâ—ds 〈◊〉 theâ—selves with most force and vigour That there is a reall and unalterable distinction betwixt good and evill is a very great and important truth and such as ought to be fixt upon the best and surest foundations but I cannoâ— think Mr. Becconsalls Argument pa. 194. so â—ogâ—nt as the nature of the thing requires Moral good he says always inâ—ludes a nâ—turall good and naturall good is evidâ—ntly establish'd in the frame of created naturâ—â— and consequently if the frame of nature be unalterable mâ—ral good must be sâ— too Here if by moral good always including a naturall good he meâ—nes that moral good is always attended with some râ—al advantage naturally accruing from the practice of it this I grant is generally true but then may we not say here as he says of pleasure pa. 188. In respect of Natural good that it seemes to be a consequencâ— â—ather then a measure and constituent principle of morall good so thiâ— naâ—â—râ—l good which he says iâ— always included in morall good seemes to be the consequence rather then the measure and constituent principle of moral good But then if he makes moral good only a part of as indeed he seems to make it the same with naturall good only distinguish'd by the accession of a free choice pa. 186. and so included in the frame of created nature this will only prove that moral good is what God at first Creation made it and so not in the highest Sense eternal and immutâ—ble as depending merely upon Gods free and Arbitrary will and positive determination and thus this Learned Author will fall in with P. Poiretts opinion in this particular vide former discourse of humane nature pa. 95. Whereas I am willing to carry the reasons of good and evill higher founding them in that relation they bear to the essential wisdom purity and holiness of the Divinâ— nature which relation is in some measure made known to us by those native notices and naturall impressions upon the minds of Men. And whereas he tells us pa. 192. That the proper measures of morall good muâ—t be taken from the original frame ends and intrests of our beings I am afraid that all these in respect to each individual and abstracted from all Law to direct us would be found so variable and uncertain that morall good would upon this hypothesis prove a much more unfixt and unsettled thing then God and Nature ever made it vide pa. 72. Of humane Nature So that I humbly conceive it would not be a sufficient asserting the eternall and immutable nature of moral good to say that it is as immutable as the frame of created nature for we know that this has in some particular instances been changed and may be so againe but the reasons of good and evill never were never can be
Religion either by rational deduction or Natural inscription Orall Traditionâ— haveing not found that good success in the World as to Divinity as much to encourage others â—o urge or to prosecute thâ— same in morality But he says that tho' relations of matters of fact ancient customs and difficult articles of Faith may suffer much by â—eing convey'd this way c. But was not Gods instructing Adam in these things matter of fact Or may not matters of Fact done by God be misrepresented as well as those done by Men As for difficult Articles of Faith if he mean such as are of a more complex nature and include a long series of propositions or if he supposes this Tradition to extend to the modes and circumstances of things then this way might be very lyable to mistake and corruption by passing through so many hands but suppose God had taught Adam to believe a Trinity in the God-head the Resurection of the Body with out the respective modes of either I doe not see but that these might as safely and securely have been delivered down to posterity as those other precepts he mentionsâ— but these plain Rules of morality he says such as worship God Honour thy Parents c. Are so natural to the understanding so easy â—o be imbraced by it and appear upon proposal to be so extreamly usefull â—o Mankind c. Here he seemes to relinquish his own principle Tradition and to found the belief and ready reception of these rules of Morallity in their being so natural to the understanding c. That they must be assented to and can never be mistaken or forgot But pa. 33. he tells us that there are some very barbarous People who we are very certain want most of these Moral Notions so that here must have been some mistake or forgetfulness on some hand or other But he says Pa. 37. If Morality was inscrib'd on Mens hearts Parents might with as muh wisdom pretend to teach their Children to eat and drink to love their Children c. So that it seems there is such a Natural Duty or instinct for Parents to love their Children that they cannot but do it But why is not the Duty reciprocal Why may not Children be in the same way bound to honour their Parents as Parents to love their Children and yet he says Pa. 72. That among the ancient Heathens it was a common thing to throw their Children when born into the next ditch they met with No great Argument of such a Natural Love and Affection towards 'em as they could not but show and exercise Pa. 33 he tells us 't is odd to think that these Propositions should come into the minds of Men by such an unaccountable way as that of Inscription and yet he says Pa. 92. That Gods permission of Vice is no sign of his liking it he having otherwise declar'd his will by giving to all Men a Law of Vertue This cannot be understood of the traditionary Law because that has not by some defect or other extended to all Men. Pa. 38. 'T is further remarkable that Parents Deut. 6.6 are commanded by God to teach their Children these Moral Dutys But what then Did ever any body assert that this Natural Inscription doth superâ—ede the necessity of other Instructions or the use of those other means which God and Nature have made requisite in order to the more perfect knowledge of our Dutys But after the recital of the Ten Commandments viz. The Moral Law Moses adds and these words which I command Thee this day shall be in thy heart and thou shalt teach them diligently to thy Children c. But these words were not introduc'd immediately after the recital of the Ten Commandmentsâ— The ten Commandments were recited about the middle of the 5 th Chap. and v. 31. God there speaking to Moses says Stand thou here by me and I will speak unto thee all tâ—e Commandments and Statutes and Iudgments which thou shalt teach them that they may do-them in the Land which I give them to posssess it Now these words Commandments Statutes and Iudgments are generally understood to signifie all the Precepts of the Moral Ceremonial and Judicial Law and certainly the Jewes were oblig'd to observe some other Laws besides the Tenâ— Commandments in the Land which theâ— Lord gave 'em to possess it The like words are repeated Ch. 6. 1. Whereupon â— 6. it follows These words which I command the this day shall be inâ— thy heart He proceeds 'T is further remarkable that what Moses here says shall be in the Iewes hearts the Apostle says Rom. 2. 15. was written in the Gentiles hearts so that unless there can be a substantial difference evinc'd between being in the heart and written there all the Doctrine of inscrib'd Propositions falls to the ground I perceive that those who are any ways concern'd for the Doctrine of Inscrib'd Propositions must either now speak or else for ever hereafter hold their peace But to this I answer 1. That if that expression of Moses of Being in their hearts relate only to the Ten Commandments viz the Moral Law Why then may not Moses be as well explain'd by St. Paul as St. Paul by Moses and so Natural inscription be understood by both 2. I know not whether I can show a substantial difference betwixt â—â—ose expressions or no yet I hope I shall sâ—ow such an one as may be sufficient to satisfie any impartial and considerate Reader 1 Moses and St. Paul do not speak Secundum idem or ad idem Moses speaks of the Precepts of all the three Laws Moral Ceremonial and Iudicial St. Paul only of the Moral 2. They do not speak Eodem modo Moses's expression of being in their hearts according to the best Interpreters signifies no more than being in their Memory 's and affections St. Pauls being written in their hearts signifies something more as supposing the Gentiles naturally conscious of the observation and breach of the Moral Law So that I humbly conceive there can be no Argument drawn from the comparing those two places of Moses and St. Paul in prejudice to the Doctrine of Natural Inscriptions rightly understood Pa. 129. No body says that God reveals these Natural truths to us but only gives us facultyes of discerning them And may not the same be said of some Moral truths which we commonly call Natural Religion that God does not reveal these truths to us but only gives us facultys by vertue whereof we may either find or frame such propositions as are agreeable to the morral as well as to the Natural frame and constitution of the Soul I cannot too often remind the Reader that I never asserted these Natural ot Innate notions to be imprinted upon the mind in any gross or litterall sense upon which mistaken Ground and perswasion only I am apt to believe that they are oppos'd by some Pa. 83. Of my former discourse there speaking of the Archetypall formes and
of one question and Answer in the Catechism Dost thou not think that thou art bound to belâ—â—ve and do as they have promis'd for thee Ans Yes verily and by Gods help so I willâ— and I heartily thank our Heavenly Father that he hath called me to this state of Salvation throâ— Iesus Christ our Saviour Now a state of Salvation is certainly something moreâ— than a mere faederal Relation And I pray unto God to give me his grace that I may continue in the same to my Lifes end â—â—t this learned Author says â—hat all Caâ—â—châ—mens are not Converted oâ— Râ—generated and some by â—heir own faultâ— never will be but certainly it would be the greatest curse imaginable to teach a Child to pray that he may remain in a state of unregeneration The Reverend Dr. doth not take the least notice of this part of that Answer in his explication of it so that I do not certainly know what his particular sentiments are herein It is to on purpose to tell us that it is not easily conceiveable how Children can be regenerate in Baptism since the Scripture doth warrant it and the Church affirmâ— it perhaps it would be dfficult for them to explain the manner how adult Persons are Regenerate Iohn 3. 8. The wind bloweth where it listeth and thou hearest the sound thereof but thou knowest not whence it come thanâ— whether it goeth So is every one that is born of the Spirit But to return from this digression He urges further cuj tandem bono indulgebitur nobis illa naturalis lex c. Is it that there might be some previous dispositions in the Soul by degrees to dispose it to better obedience to its precepts Let us suppose this for once and see what Answer he returns unto it He tells us that these previous dispositions to virtue are things altogether as unintelligible as Aristotle's substantial forms which lye hid no body knows how in the bosom of the matter till at last they show themselves in their proper shapes But here he seemes again Eâdem Chord â— oberrare before heargu'd from supernatural things to Natural now he argues from Physical to things of a moral and more immaterial nature Aristotles substantial forms are unintelligible ergo the Law of Nature is so too for they are as like one annother as ever they can look for like as substantial forms lye hid in matter till they find or take occasion of coming out â—o these Natural principles do just the same in reference to the Soul This indeed is evident affirmation but I see little of proof in it There are indeed real difficulties and absurditys urg'd against substantial forms but I know none against these Natural notions in the sence before asserted All that seems to be materially objected against this natural inscription is that there is they say no need of it in order either to the knowledge of truth or obligation to duty these they say may be accounted for other ways But supposing this for once to be true but not granting it to be so this is no argument against what is here asserted viz Natural Inscription for what if God should afford us more ways in order to the coming to the knowledge of truth and goodness then we fancy to be absolutely necessary have we any reason to blame providence for it But he tells us Pa. 336. c. That the Soul doth make certain Aphorisms or generall Rules for the direction of humane Life Post maturam tandem experientiam After mature experience Such as these Honestum vitio ac libidini esse praeferendum c. Which afterwards he calls genealis norma de honesto apud homines stabilita But I would only ask him in what place and in what Age it was that Men thus generally met to determine and fix the Rules of right and wrong by a general consent For a further answer hereto I shall refer my Reader to my former discourse of humane naâ—ure Pa. 54. There is one thing more wherein this Gentleman seems to affect some kind of peculiarity tho' I think it is rather in expression than in notion That the Christian Religion especially as to the Dutys of it are no ways contrary to Natural reason but highly agreeable thereunto is certainly true and tends much to the honour and reputation of Christianity But then why we should so far strain the common sence and acceptation of the word Natural as to apply it to all the misteriâ—s and miracles of our Religion I do not understand We have sufficient reason from the nature of God and from Divine Revelation to believe all the instituted parts of Christianity but I know no reason why we should asâ—ert the Naturalness of em ' if I may so speak But he designs here to advance a seeming paradox pa. 263. Quoniam res videtur ardua firme inaudita pa. 248. grandia suscipimus cum omnes quâ—tquot vidimus sunt huic opinioni oppositi ut qui maximè He makes use indeed of a peculiar way of speaking but when he has explain'd what he means by it and in what sense he understands it the notion is common and ordinary per naturam intelligo rectam rationem usum morem hominum communem tandem traditionem receptam Pa 264. a very large acceptation of Nature If God has adapted some of his institutions either to the custom of former Ages or to the apprehensionâ— of Mankind we have so much more reason to acknowledg his condescension to our infirmitiesâ— but we have none from hence to call em ' Natural Pa. 271. nec communi usui aut rerum naturae adversantur seu miracula seu prophetiâ—â— Iesu Christi One might almost think here that he asserted Spinosa's opinion that miracles were not above nor contrary to Nature but his meaning is more innocent he only means that Miracles were pretended to by other Religions and that they were made use of by Christ in naturae restaurationem for the benefit of Mankind and the support of humane Nature Pa. 286. There he tells us that even Evangelical Faith it self doth no way interfere with his former Doctrine But his Reason seems very strange and not much for the honour of Christianity sed si nos ipsos consulamus comperiemus corda nostra spontè paâ—ere anilibus fabulis ut qui credulitati naturâ nostrâ obnoxij simus c. It were to be wish'd that Men would â—xpress common thoughts in a common and ordinary way But some Men think to gain to themselves the Reputation of great Notionalists by dressing up common and ordinary Notions in a new form of words thus seeming to speak something great and aboue the oâ—dinary pitch of other Men when many times there is vâ—ry little or nothing in their pompousâ— ways or speaking If the learned Author of the Catechetical Lectures hath in any other part of his Book which yet I have not met with explained the point before mentioned in a way
agreeable to the Office of Baptism I then recall what I have said upon that particular only I could have wish'd that he had not given that oâ—â—asion to others of misapprehending him Some Remarks upon Monsieur Malebranch his Opinions of the non-efficiency of Second Causes and of seeing all thingâ—s in God THE true liberty of Phylosophizing and the free and ingenuous use of â— Mans own Reason is certainly a very great perfection of a Rational creature a just freedom of thinking together with that of â—hoice being two great prerogatives of humane nature but the best things may be abused and perverted to bad purposes thus Men sometimes under the plausible pretence of free thinking give their fancyes leave to Rove about for new Opinions and then presentlyâ— are so enamour'd of their own inventions that it is very difficult if at all possible eveâ— to convince 'em of the conâ—rary and that which more confirms them in their own way is that they fancy themselves the only Men that enjoy the true genius of contemplation and those who differ from em and cannot assent to their way of reasoningâ— they look upon to be Men whose understandings are crampt by the prejudice of an unhaâ—py Education Here I shall propound these two things to Considerationâ— 1. No Opinion in Philosphy is either to be rejected oâ— imbraced merely upon account of its Antiquity or novelty but only as it comes attended or noâ— attended with the Evidence of reason and probability at least of truth thus a more true genius of Philosophysing may appeaâ—â— in the defence of an old truth than in the asserting of a new error 2. In things purely Physical relating to things meerely of a material Nature wâ— may indulge a greater liberty of thinking but in things that terminate more immediately upon God as this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch does in seeing all things in God in such I conceive we ought to be more wary and guide both our Thoughts and Words with greater caution There are some positive Moralists if I may so call 'em such who tell us that there is nothing good or evill in its own nature but that things are so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only because of the positive decree and determination of God that they should be so Monsieur Malbranch seemes in some respect to be the same in Natural Phylosophy that those others are in Moral that is he grants no Natural efficiency to 2 d. Causes and that they are only signes and occasions upon which God will and without which he will not produce such effects Thus what Mr. Norrisâ— Pa. 59. Of his Remarks upon the Aâ—henian Society says concerning sensible impressions in respâ—ct of Ideas may be said of all other causes thaâ— God has established a certain Order or connexion betwixt such impressions made upon our sences and such Ideas not that these impressions doe cause or produâ—e these Ideas but that they are conditions upon the presence of which God will raise them or to speak more properly exhibit them to our mâ—nds Now according to this Hypothesis if God had ordered things so at first or shall hereafter do so then the running of a feather tho' never so lightly over a Mans hand might have caus'd the most exquisite pain imaginable then Tentâ—rden Steeple might have been as much the cause of Goodwins Sands as any second cause is of the effect which yet seems to follow from it But then if we consider what he sayes pa. 116. of his Illustrations he there seems not much to differ from the common Hypothesis ad deum seu ad causam Vniversalem â—bi effectuum specialium ratio postulatur recurrendum non esse fateor but withall he says naturae inestigatio fallaâ—eâ— omnino vana ubi in eâ aliae verae causae quaeruntur quà m voluntates omnipotentis Again in the same place si fieri possit effectuum de quibus agitur causa naturalis specialis est explicanda but again he says actio istarum causarum consistit duntaxat in vi movente quâ agitantur illa vero vis movens nihil aliâ—d est quà m ipsa dei voluntas But it is no great sign of truth or of a good Cause when its Patron seems as it were thus opprest by its weight and thus operosely labours in the explication of it But it s observable that he himself grants that itâ— would be more agreeable if it could be done to assigne special natural causes of particular effects But now would it not be more Phylosophical to say that there are such particular causes in Nature tho' at present we are not able to assign 'em then thus to run to the more immediate power of God for the salving of every ordinary Phaenomenon of Nature I grant that it is very difficult to assign the just limits betwixt Natural and Supernatural power to determine justly where the one ends and the other begins or indeed fully to explain all the modes of Natural Phaenomena's but yet methinks it is not altogether so Philosophycal to ascribe these commonly reputed ordinary Phaenomena's of gravitation for example or the growing of a pile of Grass to the constant efficiency or Supernatural influence of almighty God I do not say that we are able to give a full solution of these things as to all the minutest circumstances of 'em nor would I ascribe too much to Natural causes but yet I think presently to have recourse to Divine power for the solution of all things this would damp all our further enquirys into Nature which is an employment very worthy of a rational Creature provided it does not extend too far I mean to the excluding of providence out of the World besides to ascribe all things immediatly to God exclusively of second causes might perhaps seem to detract from the trâ—e Notion and nature of providence it self in that just and wise order of things in that exact harmony betwixt the Naturalâ— and moral World which God has constituted in the Universe And it would be difficult to give any tolerable account worthy of the wisdom of God of those things commonly call'd second causes if they be but bare signes or conditions of those things which they seem to have some causal influence upon But he tells us Pa. 124. Of his Illustrations which I should have mentioned before â—â—m voluntas mea determinaâ— voluntatem dei certe brachium meum movebitur non voluntate meâ quae inessicax est perse sed voluntate dei quae effectu suo nunquam frustratur But why should he call the will of Man Inefficax when at the same time he tells us that it determins the will of God Might not Mans will if God had so pleas'd as well determine the motion of his own Arme as determine the will of God And I do not yet see how he has prov'd Gods pleasure to be otherwise Neither will those words per se do him any service for no
he himself is best able to resolve Vid Mr. Becconsall P. 199. 200. c. But I must confess that if I was mistaken in any thing it was in what he tells us immediately after that in that place I there quoted and if so then by consequence in all those other places which in the same Chapter may seem liable to the same exception That he only reported as matter of fact what others call Vertue and Vice c. I shall therefore here briefly lay down the reasons why I did not so apprehend him and then leave it to Mr. Lock 's own candour to pass judgment I shall not need to Premise that it is only the 1 st Edition of his Book that I am concern'd in without taking notice of any alterations or explications he has made in his 2 d. my discourse being writ before his 2 d. Edition was Printed and therefore 1 st Besides what I have already mentionedâ— there are some other passages in that Chapter wherein he seemes to speak his own opinion rather then mere matter of â—act what others call vice or virtue 158. P. § 7. By the relation our actions bear to the Divine Law Wee judge whether they be sins or dutys by the 2d The Civil Law whether they be criminall or innocent By the 3d. By the Philosohhicall Law whether they be Virtues or Vices So P. 160. § 14. There having resolved the complex Idea we signifie by the word Murther into its simple Ideas he proceeds this Collection of simple Ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the Country I have been bred in and to be held by most Men there worthy praise or blame I call the action vertuons or vicious Now I had thought that Wee and I especially being joyned with such Words as these Wee judge and I call together with this expression found by me had included a Mans selfe Chap. of Identity § 20. Vrbem quam dicunt Romam Melibaee putavi Stultus Ego hunc nostroe similem Truly I imagin'd that in things of this nature Men had generally spoken after the same manner all England over About the Year 1284. There were some Grammaticall heresies that is some false Latin and false Grammer condemn'd by Arch Episcopal Authority such as these Ego currit nullum nomen est tertiae personae far be it from me to impute any such Sollaecismes to this Learned Author however I think that I had very good reason to apply these expressions to the 1 st Person rather than to any third 2 ly 'T is observeable that he pleads for this 3 d. Law and that with all the force of reason perhaps that the thing is capable of now when Men relate things as mere matter of fact what others either do or say they usually leave 'em to stand or fall by their own evidence I question whether ever any did so much towards the giving Mens actings according to custome or opinion the formality and grandeur of a Law before and as for the sanction with all the Elaborate circumstances he has annext to it I think it is perfectly his own P. 159. 160. § 12. But I must beg leave here to say that the most Hetrodox writer absit verbo invidia might perhaps thus take upon him only the same character of a Relator after he had used and urged all the Arguments that either reason or Authority could afford him for his particular opinion I do not here say he so far pleaded for this Law of custom or opinion as to make it the standing Rule of Vice or Vertue truly so call'd or of right and wrong as he some times calls 'em but only that he espous'd the cause and pleaded for that Law further than the thing would well bear And these are the reasons that did more especially induce me to think that he did not there take upon him the bare Offâ—ce of a Relator To which I might also add if it was necessary what he says P. 159. § 12. If any one shall imagin that I have forgott my own notion of a Law when I make the Law whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice to be nothing else but consent of private Men c. This is not spoken like one who barely relates matter of fact Others indeed may and that justly too act in obedience to that rule of decency and common repute yet I think he was one of the first that made it a Law especially such where by Men judge of Vertue and Vice I shall only add one or two considerations more upon this Subject before I leave it 1 st It seemes a peculiar way of speaking not yet grown common in the World when he assignes the Names of vice and vertue to such actions as are agreeable or dissagreeable to common reputation and for that reason because they are so whereas it always was and still is the more usual way not only of judging what things are in their own nature but also of denominating actions vertuous or vicious rather from theire agreeableness or disagreeableness to the dictates of reason and the law of Nature rather than from the custom of the Place I grant indeed that what ever is truly vertuous is generally counted laudable but it is not therefore vertuous because laudable but therefore laudable because vertuous Now I think that neither Names nor the grounds and reasons of 'em ought more to be alter'd than the Ancient Landmarks in Publick Fields ought to be remov'd for nothing but disorder confusion and needless disputes will arise from both I cannot pretend to be acquainted with all the perticular Modes of speaking throughout the World yet I much question whether this be the most common and general acceptation of that word Vertue that it is taken most commonly for those actions which according to to the different opinions of several Countrys are accounted laudable pag. 23. § 18. or however not under that formality because they were so counted I do not here dispute concerning the true and proper acceptation of the word Vertue as Mr. Lock has rightly stated it in the very next period but only as to matter of fact even what apprehensions other Nations generally had of it I grant indeed that we shall sometimes find different practices in different places about the same thing and all abounding in their own sense and pleading for the fitness and decency of their own perticular way Thus some thought it the most Decent and Honourable way of burying their Dead by eating of 'em others by Burning others by Enterring and no doubt all thought their own Method the best But these are matters of indifferency and so do not strictly come up to our present case but however it may be further ask'd whether or no these several sorts of People did count themselves only Vertuous herein and all the rest Vicious Quakers are very rude and uncivil in Thouing People as we call it especially those that are not
of their own Club but I wish they had no greater Vices to answer for than this I have heard of a King that was both blind and Lame whereupon it was grown in fashion and a laudable custom in that Court not to appear but with one Eye cover'd and with some counterfeiting at least a lameness These were indeed very complaisant Courtiers but why they should be call'd Vertuous for their dissimulation I know not nor whether they were accounted so even in that Place where the thing was grown so fashionable Thieves live in good Repute and Credit among themselves and no doubt applaud their own Exploits in their own Clubs but yet I much question whether they think violence and rapine to be Vertues or no or do indeed call 'em so They may perhaps employ their wits and fancy's to excuse their way of living but not to justifie it nor to raise it to a degree of Vertue or if we should suppose one among the rest more modest in his apprehensions and not retain such Heroick thoughts of Theft and Murderâ— as the others did yet I fancy his Life would not be so uneasie to him as Mr. Locks Sanction would seem to make it pa. 159. I scarce think that any Christian Nation and the Christian World is a Scene large enough for this dispute doth call that a vertue which either is in it self or by any other Christian Nation is called a vice Whoredome tho' in some Countries permitted and but too much in fashion yet it is not even there call'd a vertue tho' perhaps it may be counted a lesser vice And why should we here in England begin to unhinge and unsettle 〈…〉 whose sense and meaning always was and still ought to be more fix'd and constant 2. this Law of Opinion and Reputation as it is made to Constitute a distinct Law is not well grounded for a Law is always suppos'd to bring men under an obligation now the things in fashion among men if they be contrary to the Law of Nature let mens opinions of 'em be what they will yet they are no Law to any one and if they be agreeable to the Law of Nature then they do so far coincidere with the Divine Law and do not constitute a new Species of Law But I must remember what Mr. Lock reminds me of that he only relates what others say not what he defends But if so then I can mention several other rules which men sometimes make Lawes to themselves viz. their respective tempers and humours and the prejudices of Education which are as much Laws to these men in their respective Clubs as opinion and reputation are to others in theirs But he goes on whatsoever Authority he says I place in my old English Dictionary it no where tells me that the same action is not in credit call'd and reputed a vertue in one place which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another But with submission I must tell him that what ever Authority he places in his new way of speaking yet tho' our English Dictionarys his as well as mine no where say that the same actions are not variously reputed so or so in various places for that is not their business yet they no where say that they are For both our Dictionarys and Moral Philosophers I appeal to both tell us that vice and vertue are much what the same with good and evil sin and duty and by consequence that they did not at least in those times so much as receive their denomination from Custom but if he had instanc'd in one perticular action in the whole Christian World which in one Place was counted a vertue and in another a vice it would have added much light to the whole and better explain'd his meaning The taking notice that Men bestow the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation is all I have done or can be laid to my charge to have done towards the making of vice vertue and vertue vice Here I would only ask whether this of Mens bestowing the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation be in it self a just well grounded and reasonable action if it be why doth he not assert and defend it if it be not why doth he found a Law viz. of opinion and reputation upon the unwarrantable and ill grounded actions of Men. But he seemes to commend me upon what account I know not for taking the alarm as he calls it euen at expressions which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected I know not what he means by expressions standing alone by themselues I hope he will grant that several expressions standing alone by themselves that is at certain distances yet all upon the same account justly exceptionable may be taken notice of and I suppose he now understands that it was not only one single expression dropt as it were by chance from his Pen that I found fault with but with his whole way of arguing upon that perticular 'T is to this zeal allowable in his Function Some think this to be a reflection upon my Function as if its proper business was to be employ'd in impertinencies but I am willing according to my Function to put the most favourable interpretation upon things that they are capable of bearing that I forgive his Citing my words as he there does c. 'T is my happiness that I find that some Men as they are great so they are also merciful I also thank him for the respect he seems to show to the Function but Zeal without knowledge as he must suppose mine to be for otherwise I should never have found fault where there was no ground for it is no more pardonable in my Function than in others pâ—rhaps less But no one they say refuses Gods and the Kings Pardon I will go a little further and not only accept but humbly beg his Pardon too if I be in the wrong but I hope I may contestari litem He blames me for not taking notice of those words immediately preceding those of his The exhortations of inspired Teachers c. But it was not much material to my Purpose nor any way Prejudiâ—ial to his Cause whether I did or no as I hope will appear in the Sequel He also blames me for quoting that Place of St. Paul Phil. 4. 8. Whatsoever things are lovely whatsoever things are of good report if there be any vertue if there be any Praise c. In a sense he us'd it not Truly I am not yet convinced that I quoted it in any other sense than the Apostle spoke it and if he us'd it in any other I cannot tell how to help it he must look to that but he says he brought this passage of St. Paul to show that for reasons he there gives Men in that way of denominating their actions do not for the moâ—t part much vary from the Law of Nature which
is that standing and unalterable rule by which they ought c. I am of his opinion too in this perticular viz. that in so doing they do not for the 〈…〉 c. And yet not for this reason becausâ— St. Paul says watsoever thiâ—gs are of good report if there be any vertue if there be any praise think of these things For indeed St. Paul here supposes some things either in themselves of good report or in their own natures indifferent and by the Innocent and laâ—dable custom of that place made so and then they are the subject matter of a Command think of these things but then by bare mentioning things of good report he does not concern himself in that question how far Men in denominating their actions according to common repute may or may not vary from the Law of Nature Tho' by the way it seems but a very humble commendation of this Law of opinion or reputation which is attended with all these diminutions That it is such as only for the most part doth not much vary from the Law of Nature That is it may sometimes nay frequently too and in some degree vary from it But St. Paul being an inspired Teacher certainly would not appeal to common repute under those Formalitys and disadvantagious circumstances seeing he was there laying down Rules for the guidance of all succeeding Ages of the Church So that the things of good report which the Apostle appeals to 〈…〉 but alwayes agree with the Law of Nature or at least were not contrary to it The Exhortations of Inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute c. By this must be understood such an appeal as refers to Practice think of these things now I durst appeal to Mr Lock himself whether the Apostle would exhort Men to the practice of things of good report without any restriction or limitation since he himself doth acknowledge that Men in denominating their actions according to this Law do only For the most part not much vary from the Law of nature Whereby even in the Corruption of manners the true Boundarys of the Law of nature whiâ—h ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice were prtty well preserved These are the Words upon account of which he blam'd me because I did omit 'em but doth he indeed think that the Apostle in this case would have appealed to such a state of things without exception wherein the true Boundarys of the Law of Nature were only pretty well preserv'd T is granted on all hands that the Law of Nature ought indeed to be the Rule of vertue and vice but it seems it is not always actually so If this be not the meaning of that expression pretty well preserved I know not what is And what advantage is this to his cause I hope Mr. Lock is not one of those who would here tell us that the rule which the Apostle here layes down is not absolutely certain and infallible but only such as for the most part and more generally is true For this would ill comport with the Caracter of an Inspired Teacher Nor do I see what tolerable Sense can be made of these words If there be any vertue If there be any prayse Or why they are introduc'd according to Mr. Lock 's way of interpreting the Place I have insisted the longer upon this Subject and represented my thoughts the more variously that if possible I might the more certainly hit the Authors meaning for I must confess that such is either the obscurity of his Expresâ—ion or of his way of Arguing here or such the dulness of my capacity that I cannot be assured that I fully apprehend his meaning in this perticular But then as to Naturall notions he says we are better agreed than I thought of if so I am glad of it for I can assure him I take no pleasure in having any difference with any one But I am afraid there will upon examination be found some small difference betwixt us in this particular also In stating the Question he says I leave nothing in it contrary to what he had said I shall here first Transcribe my stating of it so far as is necessary in this perticular that so the Reader may be the better able to judge betwixt us P. 52. These Naturall notions are not so Imprinted upon our Soules as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous cultivation for thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some Supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sence connaturall to the Soul as Reason it self is And farther the use of our understanding being First supposed that is our faculties laboring of no naturall defect nor deprived of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary there unto then our Souls have a natural power of finding or framing such principles or propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no wayes depends upon the evidence of sence or observation And now doth Mr. Lock indeed say that these notions are in the same sense Connatural to the Soul as reason it self is Doth he indeed grant to our Souls a native power of finding or frameing such principles or propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the Evidence of sense or Observation and yet methinks he must grant this too if he hold to his intuitiue certainty and if so then we are better agreed than I thought of But then what becomes of that pompous principle that sensation and reflexions upon sensible Impressions are the Originals of all our knowledge but he proceeds All that he says for innate imprinted or inpress'd notions for of innate idea's he says nothing at all amounts only c. Here he seemes to blame me for not speaking of innate ideas But 1 st What reason had I to enter upon any such discourse seeing that neither he believes any suâ—h nor do I Universally assert â—em nor did my subject naturally lead me hereunto For I cannot be convinc'd of the force of his argument P. 27. That if there be innate notions that then there must be innate idea's I doe indeed assert innate notions in the sense before explain'd but yet I do not say that all the respective ideas viz. simple ideas relating to those notions are innate I shall only instance in one or two Cogito ergo sum bare nothing cannot produce any real Being P. 312. Of his Essay of these Mr. Lock says he has an intuitiue knowledge or certainty and yet I do not believe that there are any innate ideas of Cogitation Existence Production nothing c. The respective ideas that these notions are composed of 2. I had no mind to ingage in
a discourse of that nature because I looked upon the Doctrine of ideaâ—s as it is now generally mannag'd to be a very intricate and perhaps not altogether such an usefull speculation The old way of reâ—olving knowledge was into these three operations of the mind 1 st Simple apprehension 2 d. Composition and Division 3 d. Discourse from both the former Now if this ideal Scheme with all its various Divisions and Sub-divisions be either the same or do in a great meaâ—ure concidere with the former why should the World be amused either with making new Words or using Old ones in a new Signification I know Mr. Lock tells us P. 73. § 4. That it is unavoidable in Discourses differing from the ordinary received notions either to make new Words or use Old onesâ— in somewhat a new signification But then such Men ought to consider whether theâ—e Notions which appear different from the Ordinary reccieved ones do not in a great measure owe their extrordinarinesse if I may so speak rather to the Authors expressing them in new words or words of a new signification rather than to any newnâ—ss in the notion it self Nor do I see how this way of resolveing knowledge into thâ—se ideas conveyed into our minds by Sensation and Reflexion there upon doth any way more effectually tend to the reall advancement of usefull knowledge than the other for it rather supposes us already to have attain'd to that knowledge which we thus resolve into these idea's than to enable us to make any further advances in it Thus I have a generall notion of a Book for example at the first sight now if I should resolve this notion into its ideall principles into all its simple ideas c. I believe I should at last have no better notion or idea of it than I had before I shall only instance in another of his own P 160. § 14. For example Let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word Murther and when we have taken it asunder and examin'd all the particulars we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple ideas derived from sensation or reflection First from Reflection on the operation of our own minds we â—ave the ideas of willing considering purposing beâ—ore-hand malice or wishing ill to another and also of life or perception and self motion 2ly From Sensation we have the Collection of the simple sensible ideas of a Maâ— and of some action by which we put an end to that perception and motion in the Man all whieh simple ideas are comprehended in the word Murther I suppose he design'd here more particularly to explain to us the nature of Murther according to his ideall way by sensation and reflection Now if we should thus explain the Word or go about to instruct an honest Country-Iury-maâ— in the nature of the thing Viz. Of Murther he would certainly stare at us and perhaps think that we were not much overgrown either with Law or Reason but never understand the nature of Murther one jot the better for it I never yet observ'd that Lushington's Logick which is either a new way of thinking or a new way of expressing old thoughts ever made that improvement of knowledge in the World which the Author at first perhaps promised himself it would do P. 44. § 24. The impressions then that are made upon our selves by outward Objects that are extrinsecall to the mind and its own operations about these impressions reflected on by its self as proper Objects to be contemplated by it are I conceive the original of all knowledge Here t is observeable that the reflection is made upon the operations of the mind as employed and exercised about these outward impressions now one might have thought that the streames would not have risen above the Fountains head and that the reflections upon these outward impressions would not have produc'd idea's of a quite different nature from the rest So that that which Mr. Norris P. 61. Of his remarks upon the Athenian Society puts upon these ideas seemes to be the most naturall and obvious sense and meaning of 'em Viz. That these ideas of reflection are but a secondary sort of ideas that result from the various compositions and modifications of these primary ones of sensation Otherwise this notion of his which he seems to advance with some kind of pompous traine of thought as if something out of the common road of former methods will at last dwindle into this which hath been the common and generall opinion of all the considering part of Mankind herein that all knowledge proceeds either from the senses or from the understanding in its most extensive capacity however qualified and disposed for that purpose But by reflection among other things he includes the power of negation Thus from conception of some thing by negation hereof he forms an idea of nothing But now methinks we are got far aboue the sphere of sensation for nothing cannot be the object of sense nor make any impression upon the outward organs and yet the Soul can frame propositions of as great truth and evidence from this nothing as it can from something Ex. gr bare nothing cannot produce a reall being but to proceed He sayes that I make innate notions conditionall things depending upon the concurrence of severall other circumstances in order to the Souls exerting them and so leave nothing in the stating of the Question contrary to what he had said before But I shall quit the place upon which he grounds this and then leave it to the Reader to judge whether he hath done me right or no P. 78. Of my former discourse I was there complaining of some Men who will put such a sense upon these Words innate or naturall as if a thing could not be thus naturall or innate to the Soul unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the face that they must necessarily assent thereto even before by the common course of nature they are capable of assenting to any thing whereas those who defend this Question make these naturall or innate notions more conditionall things depending on the concurrence of severall other circumstances c. Now I appeal to the Reader whether these notions may not be more conditionall things or not such absolute ones as necessarily to stare Children or Fools in the Face and yet not such as Mr. Loâ—k makes ' â—m and yet not such as owe their origionall to senâ—â—â—ion or reâ—lection upon sensible impreâ—sions But hâ— sâ—ys â—hat all I say for innate notions amounâ—s only to this that there are certain proposâ—tions which tho the Soul from the beginning or when â— Man is born does not know yet by assistance from the outward senâ—es and the help oâ— some previous cultivation it may afterward come certainly to know the truth of 1 st I do not say that Infants have that actuall knowledge of these propositions any more than they have the actuall
the atributes than the being of God this is rather supposed than gon about to be prov'd in Scripture But then I would only aske these opposers of this Naturall character of God upon our mindes whether they do grant any Naturall notions of good or evill if they do I know not why they should deny this of God upon which the other do dependâ— If they do not they then must make morality a more Mechanicall and Factitious thing than God and Nature ever design'd to make it So that I humbly conceive that these Men whilest they thus goe about to answer the Cavill do indeed rather cut than lose the knot by granting the truth of this consequence that if God hath made any original impression of himself upon the minds of Men then it must be necessary and irresistible as to the produceing such and such effects upon all Men and at all times For by this meanes they lay a necessâ—ity upon themselves of denying any such thing as this naturall Character or idea of God whereas they might sufficiently have answered this Cavill of the Atheists by granting the being of such a naturall impression and by denying the consequence that then it must be irresistible in the sense they assert it and I beleeve it would require more wit then the Atheist either is or ever will be master of to prove it Addenda to the former Chapterâ— Concerning the Law of Custom and Innate notions MR. Lock in his Preface says he was in the Chapter there mentioned not laying down morall Rules but enumerating the Rules Men made use of in morall rela +tions whether those Rules were true or false but certainly it is not so well consistent with that great Character that Mr. Lock beares in the World to spend time in laying down Rules in things relating to morality without any respect to their being either true or false considering the bad use the vulgar and inconsiderate People may and frequently do make of such doubtfâ—ll discourses Men may thus write for ever and yet the World never the better but possibly much worse for their Writeing But the Rules he there takes notice of are these three 1 st The Divine Law 2 d. Humane Law 3 ly The Law of Opinion or Reputation Now the Divine Law is always true Humane Law always Obligatory but the Law of Fashion or Opinion which is neither always true nor always Obligatory seemes to be very unjusâ—ly joynd with the two former But I must doe Mr. Lock â—hat right as to take notice of what he says in the last § of that Chapter There he tells us that tho' the Rule be erronious and I mistaken in it yet the agremeent or disagreement of that which I compare with it is evidently known by me wherein consists my knowledge of relation But what an insignificant piece of knowledge is this thus to know Relation for when I see a Pedler measuring me off so much Stuffe by a false Yard I see indeed the relation that one bears to the other and that agreement betwixt 'em but what satisfaction is that to me for the Cheat that is put upon me by the false measurer But tho' measuring by a wrong Rule I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of iâ—'s morall rectitude because I have tryed it by that which is not the true rule c. Here Mr. Lock confesses that morall rectitude consists in the truth of the rule not in the agreement of any action to a rule whether that rule be true or false Now let us compare such or such an action to the Law or Rule of Fashion or reputation I find it agreeable thereunto What then follows Why then it follows that it is agreeable thereunto nothing further can follow hence because as yet I know not whether that Law of Custome or reputation be true or no. So that Mr. Lock here seems to make use of his own authority in a great measure to repeal that Law of Custom or fashion which in the former part of that Chap. he seems to enact But now in his Preface he says he never endeavour'd to make it a Law if so then what meanes the 12 th § Wherein he seems to assume to himself the honour of making it such and further adds a Sanction thereunto I think perfectly of his own Elaboration Tho' indeed the Sanction doth not seem to stand good even upon his own principles For § 5. He tells us that morall good and evill is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some Law whereby good and evill is drawn on us from the will and power of the Law-maker and by the Decree of the Law maker Now I suppose no particular Society or Club of Men ever met together to constitute such respective sanctions to actions agreeable â—r disagreeable to Fashion or Reputation for he tells us § 10. That this approbation or dislike doth by a secret and tacit consent which certainly is some thing different from the will power and Decree of the Law-maker establish it self in the severall Societies and Clubs of Men in the World And § 6. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the action of another if he had it not in his power to reward or punish the compliance with or deviation from this Rule by some good and evill that is not the natural product and consequence of the action it self for that being a naturall convenience or inconvenience would operate of it self without a Law Now if an action be truly morally good praise and approbation is the natural product and consequence of such an action and if it be really bad then blame and censure but now these do not come up to the rewards and punishments above mentioned such as are extrinsick to the nature of the action and not the natural and necessary results of it But Mr. Becconsall hath in a great measure prevented me on this Subject for which I thank him But I.S. P. 271. p. 199.200 Of his reflections upon Mr. Lock there speaking of this little Controversy betwixt Mr. Lock and me says that Mr. Lock has so perfectly clear'd that point in his Preface ' that none can now remain unsatisfi'd for who can hinder Men from sancying and nameing things as they list none indeed can hinder Men from doing thus but this they ought not to do unless they think and Write without any respect either to truth or goodness and when Men fancy and name things as they list if this be done without any ground of reason and contrary to the generall practice of Mankind I humbly conceive there is no reason that this should satisfy any one But then pa. 274. He says I think it had been better and more unexceptionable to have called such good and bad dispositions Reputed vertues and vices than to joyne those qualities in an univocall appellation c. Here he seemes to cast the Cause on my side againe But we are
indeed nothing has a necessary connexion with nothing is certainly true but then it seems to border too near upon those Propositions which add no light to the understanding which bring no encrease to our knowledg that is trifleing Propositions P a. 307. of Eâ—say Mr. Norris blames Mr. Lock because he has not given us a just and real difinition of an Idea and may â—ot Mr. Lock blame Mr. Norris his difiâ—iâ—ion Pa. 30 of his reflexions upon Mr. Lock 's Essay when he tells us that an Idea is a partial representation of the Divine omniformity or the omniâ—orm Essence oâ— God partially represented eitâ—er as in it selfe unintelligible or as not so agreeable to the honour and dignity of the Divine â—ssence I could have wish'd that Mr. Lock had further explain'd what relation those opperations of the mind which he calls Ideas of reflexion have to the precedent impressions made upon the sense Pa. 44. § 24. That seems to suppose sensible impressions alwayes to preceed the reflexions of the mind But on the other hand Intuitive knowledge viz. of the existence of our Souls doth neither suppose nor is it self any operation of the mind about any sensible impressions going before Mr. Lock charg'd me with some kind of a inconsistency of expression in one place saying that the Soul exerted those notions in one another that they exerted themselves But t is a great sign that matter and Argument run low when Men thus meanly carp at words I hope I have sufficiently vindicated my self as to that particular but if I should follow the example of so great a Master and be thus severely critical it perhaps would be difficult for himself to avoid the like censures pa. 323. of his Essay § 14. 1 st Edit Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds what ever they are and produce generall certain pâ—opositions I dare not be over confident that I rightly understand the period but if this be the sense of it which seemes to be so that the ideas produce these generall certain propositions I humbly conceive it the more proper way of speaking to say that the Soul by the aids and assistance of these ideas produce those propositions than that the ideas themselves should do it I do not speak this as if there was here any just occasion of exception but only to show how easily men may be ill natur'd if they pleas'd I am sorry I have not the concurrence of Mr. Becconsall's opinion in this point too of innate notions I shall therefore briefly examine some passages of his relating to this subject first I do not well understand why he should grant the Law of nature to be innate or implanted in the minds of Men as he tells us Pa 2 d. That â—he Gentiles had a Law of action implanted in â—he very frame and Constitution of their Natures and Pa. 6. The Law of Nature is implanted in the minds of Men as rationall beings And yet at the same time to reject the Doctrine of innate inscriptions as he calls ' em Pa. 75. Whereas I humbly conceive that the Law of Nature is either the same with these naturall inscriptions or innate notions or the one so Founded in the other that they must both stand or fall together if by being implanted in the minds of Men he mean only a power or faculty in the Soul of collecting those truths by rational disquisitions then I think he has not done right neither to himself nor his Reader by so expressing it But he says Pa. 75. that the frame and order of things both within and without us with the exercise of our own facultys upon 'em will present us with a Scheme of moral duty and a true measure of action and that too as clearly as if it was imprinted upon the mind with the first lineaments of its being I do not deny the great use and advantage of our naturall faculties in order to that end that is to those whose circumstances are such that they have abilitys and opportunities to employ 'em so that is Christians may possibly do it but a great part of the Gentile world cannot But how does he prove that this Scheme of duty will thus be as clearly presented to us as if it was imprinted with the First lineaments of our beings This seemes to be barely asserted without proof Whereas the contrary seemes more probable that the double evidence of natural inscription and Rationall deduction would add to the cleareness of the thing And therefore he says There seemes to be no visible necessity for haveing recourse to innate ideas or inscriptions Those who assert innate inscriptions justly suppose themselves on the defensive part and they who write against 'em can challenge no other than that of opponents Now barely to plead the no necessity of a thing is no necessary argument against him who positively asserts the matter of fact that it is so for many things may be and are so of which perhaps there is no necessity that they should be so And this seemes sufficient to abate the force of the Argument If nothing further could be added for what if God has given us greater assistances than perhaps were absolutely necessary in a thing of so great concernment we have no reason to take it ill But then why may we not assert if not a necessity yet a great conveniency of these naturall notions viz. In respect of that part of the Gentile world who have neither ability nor inclination to make such profound disquisitions into the nature of Man and the reason of things as are necessary to attain to the naturall knowledge of duty And if Mr. Becconsall had more fully consider'd the Barbarous state of the greatest part of the Heathen World t is probable he would have found 'em subjects not capable of such rationall enquiry's as his way of Arguing supposes ' em But he goes on If innate ideas be serviceable to Mankind they must be so in order to supply the defects â—f reason and consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of reason These natural notions of truth and goodness are some of the greatest strokes wherein consists the Image of God imprinted upon the minds of Men in order to make them what they are rational and Religious now if this Learned Author or any else call this a supplying the defects of Reason I shall not much oppose it only I should rather call 'em the fundamental principles of all Reasoning And consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of Reason I do not understand the necessity of this consequence at all for how can these things be fit and proper aids to supply the defects of reason if they themselves cannot or dare not undergoe the most exact trialls and disquisâ—tions of reason He gives his reason in the following words For if innate ideas are to be examined and judged on by the working of reason What then We might have
imagin'd that the inference from hence would have been either 1 st That then there are no such things as these Native Inscriptions or 2 ly That they are not serviceable in order to supply the defects of reason or 3 ly That they were exempt from the disquisitions of reason but it s none of these but only this Then reason it self will answer all the ends and designes of a reasonable being But if it does this seemes only to extend to the Christian World reason does but very indifferently perform this among the Heathens But he says It does it as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind But how doth he prove that the Heathens may not thank those Native impressions that they are not sunk lower into Barbarisme than indeed they are or supposing that they did enjoy a greater and freer use of reason than I am afraid they do yet how doth he prove that they owe the light of truth and obligation to duty merely to their rationall enquirys in contradistinction to or seperation from these innate notions or not rather to the benign influence that these later however in conjunction with the former have upon them But pa. 76. He says That the Doctrine of innate ideas must be laid aside since we cannot conceive that a wise Creator should establish any ordinance without some special ends and use annex'd to it I mean such as are not served any other way But to this I answer 1 st That what he there supposes is not yet sufficiently demonstrated viz. That Men generally may as well come to the knowledge of their Duty by such rational enquirys as they may by these native inscriptions 2 ly How doth he prove that it is inconsistent with the wisdom of Divine providence to appoint the joint concurrence of two things as in this case naturall inscription and rational deduction as meanes in order to the same end they mutually supporting defending and confirming each other Pa. 77. In a word then tho' the sacred language seems to favour the notion of native inscriptions yet it may be justly râ—solved into metaphor and figure c But it is some advantage to the notion that the sacred Language favours it especially since the assertors thereof are defenders of that Text and found their opinion upon it And therefore 't is not sufficient for him to say that the Sacred Language may be resolved into a Metaphor but he must prove that it must necessarily be so interpreted and here the assertors of these Inscriptions may more justly say that the Text may be understood in the plain obvious and literal sense of the words therefore there is no need no occasion of a Metaphor I do not here speak any thing to derogate from the excellency and usefulness of those powers and facultys that God has endued us with in order to discover a rule of action yet I can scarce be perswaded that the mere exercise of reason in those circumstances of time and place before mentioned will do it as clearly and as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind tho' I do not say that any such digest is thus recorded only some of the primary original and fundamental Laws of Nature or some greater stroaks thereof are originally communicated to the Soul yet in a way suteable to the nature of the things thus communicated and to the nature of the Soul the Subject of ' em But here if I may speak my own private conjecture I think these rational enquirys by the use of our facultys may better serve the designes of truth than they can those of goodness and be more available for the founding of intellectual and notional rather then Moral and practical Principles upon Pa. 75. He says that if it be allow'd that probabilitys may determine our judgments in this matter the doctrine of innate Ideas is rather to be rejected than retain'd But if probabilitys will avail any thing I doubt not but the Doctrine of innate Ideas has its probabilitys too as 1. Since this Doctrine of native Ideas or inscriptions he means the same by both is not matter of mere indifferency but has a very useful influence both upon natural and Reveal'd Religion is it not therefore the more probable to be true And further â—s it probable that the Apostle Ro. 2. 15. would positively and plainly say that this Law of Nature was written upon the hearts of the Gentiles if it really and truly was not â—o 2. Is it probable that God would leave the Gentile World to the guidance of that reason which in their circumstances could not be any tolerable direction to 'em either in the ways of truth or holyness without some other at least more probable means to keep em if possible from sinking too much below themselves 3 d. This is the most that can be said against the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or natural inscription that there is no need they say of having recourse hereunto reason it self sufficiently serving for those purposes without it Now this is such an argument as may perhaps be urg'd with equal force against all the Moral that is no small part of the Gospel for may not nay do not some Men say that there was no need of any such Revelation reason it self they say had done that without it But perhaps it may seem too much a receding from the Divine Authority of Scripture to plead that over again by probabilitys which 't is granted on all hands is favourd by plain expressions of Scripture But Mr. Becconsal in his Chapt. of Parental love and affâ—ction Pa 122. speaking of the lower Order of Creatureâ— says they as well as we must conclude that Parental Love is the effect of some peculiar propension wove in with the Frame and Constitution of our beings and Pa. 126. For a Man to love and cherish his Offspring is certainly the result of an inward Propension Now I do not know that the assertors of Innate Principles do understand any thing more by them then what is here granted 'T is true indeed it follows but the exercise of it from the consideration of the close affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood is a work of reason But is it the less Innate because it is also rational Or may not a Man actually love his Child out of that inward propension so to do thoâ— at the same time he doth not consider that affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood But the ground and reason of the difference betwixt Mr. Becconsal and me in this particular seems to be this Pa. 74. that he thinks the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or practical Principles serves not any real purposes of Religion and I think it does Mr. Lock in his Reply to what I had said concerning Innate Notions imploys the most of his discourse upon that which is least considerable he sâ—irmishes about the outworks but never enters into the
standing Rule to direct 'em for those first Ages of the World soon degenerated into Idolatry and this and worse would be the Fate of the present Age if God in judgment â—â—ould remove the Gospel from us But to return the Deist must 2 dly prove that it is a thing contrary to the Divine Nature to make any further Declaration of his will than what he has made known by the light of Nature he cannot say that this is contrary to the free and positive determination of the Divine Will for how can he know this seeing he doth not suppose any outward Declaration of Gods will ever made to Man If he say that God never made any but only this viz. That he would make no more but what he had discovered to Man by the Light of Nature I hope he will prove what he says and show where ever God made any such Declaration If he say that there was no need of any further This is a very weak way of argueing against matter of fact If I should say that there is nothing writ in a certain Book call'd the Oracles of Reason in defence of Deisme because there was no need of it there was enough writ of that before I believe he would not grant the Argument to be of any force Some are of Opinion that that Book call'd the Oracles of Reason is not worth the taking notice of by way of Answer it being they say such as would soon dye of it self I must confess I have no great opinion of the performance therein viz. Of the Letters of those Gentlemen one to another I do not speak of the Translations not that I here reflect upon the abilitys of the Persons but of the weakness of the cause that was not capable of a better defence Si Pergama dextrâ Defend si possint Etiam hâc But because some are apt to look upon this as an argument of the strength of a cause when no one vouchsafes an answer to it tho' perhaps the true reason is because they think it does not deserve any I shall therefore briefly consider that part of it which is writ in favour of Deisme if not for its own sake yet for the sake of those who are too apt to overvalue every thing that may seem to gratify their own private inclinations and if some think as meanly of this as others do of that I am very well satisfy'd if they should dye both together The Summary account of the Deists Religion examin'd pa. 88. I Shall not need to advertise the Reader that the Deist here meant and so often mentioned in this and the like discourses is not one barely that never heard of Divine revelation but being born and living several years in the outward prâ—fession of Christianity having now at last taken some distaste at it has in effect renounced it or at least the necessity of believing the fundamentals of it Chap. 1 st He here tells us that whatever is adoreable amiable or imitable by Mankind is in one supreme infinite and perfect being that is they believe one infinite supreme perfect being and do adore love and imitate his imitable perfections The worst of Spirits believe the one and the best of Heathens practise the other and if the World has liv'd it self back again into Genâ—ilism it may thank the Deists for it Chap 2 d. That God is not to be worshiped by an Image we willingly grant 2 d. Nor by Sacrifice I know the Deists now are for no Sacrifices at all but here I would propound it to consideration whether they do not owe this truer notion and righter apprehension of things to that clearer light which they have received from Divine Revelation tho' they are not so ingenuous as to acknowledge it for why should they now abstractedly considered from all communication with Christians oppose the constant opinion and practise of their great Patriarchs and Apostles the Heathen Philosophers in this particular I know indeed the Stoicks tell us that it is below their wise Mâ—n to repent and by consequence that there is no need of Sacrifices But these were a sort of Fanaticks in their Religion and dream'd of I know not what kind of perfection which their State was not capable of their discourses many times contradicting their practises I grant also that the Heathen Poets and Philosophers about the time of our Saviours appearance in the World began to speak very meanly and undervaluingly of â—acrifices but then they may thank the Christian Religion for this Sâ—criâ—iceing was a thing early prevailing in the World and it will be very difficult for the Deists according to their principles to give any tolerable account hereof Indeed Christians are divided in their opinions herein some asserting a Divine positive command and Revelation of God to Adam tho' not mention'd in Scripture neither is this say they any Argument that there was no such thing because Scripturae silentium non est semper argumentativum Others suppose Sacrifices founded in nature tho' this say some is not altogether so reasonable because they cannot conceive how naturall reason abstracted from a Divine command could suggest that God could be acceptably worship'd by the destruction of his Creatures Others distinguish betwixt Typical and Eucharisticall Sacrifices these latter they say may be founded in Nature tho' the same cannot be so easily granted of the other What the reall truth herein is perhaps is not so easie to determine However the Deists seem here to have a particular notion of their own Viz. That Sacrifices were only Typicall of repentance and sorrow for sin but this without any ground either from reason or authority Having premised this in generall I shall come now more particularly to examine what he says upon this subject God is not to be worshiped by Sacrifices he says because Sponsio non valet ut alter pro altero puniatur Here he seemes to reflect upon the Sacrifice of our blessed Saviour But why should any such maxim be of more authority than those of St. Paul Neither doth this when rightly understood any ways contradict that commutation of punishment asserted by Christianity For we commonly say that volenti non fit injuria and that truly too with the concurrence of these two conditions 1 st That the Person so undertaking may lawfully do it that is if he be not under any moral or political obligation to the contrary 2. If the Person be not imposed upon by want of a full and true understanding of the thing so undertaken Now both these conditions did concur in our blessed Saviour 1 st He had power to lay down his Life and he had power to take it up againe 2 It would be profane to think that the Son of God did not well understand what he did when he undertook the work of Mans Redemptiom However no such sponsion can be made with a brute Creature Here he seemes to reflect upon the Iewish Sacrifices But 1 st He should
such of this that matter cannot think But Mr. Lock tells us Pa. 270 That it is impossible for us by the contemplation of our Ideas without Revelation to discover whether omnipotence has given to matter fitly dispos'd a power of perceiving and thinking or else joyn'd and fixt to matter so dispos'd a thinking immaterial substance it being equally easy in respect of our notions to conceive that God can if he pleases superad to our Idea of matter a faculty of thinking as that be should add to it another substance with a faculty of thinking To this I Answer 1. It is no derogating from Divine omnipotence to say that God cannot doe any thing in a subject contrary to the nature of the thing it selfe thus if matter be in its own nature incapable of thinking 't is no lessening of Divine power to say that God cannot make it it still remaining matter to think now that matter cannot think is evident not only from the Idea we have of it but from all that evidence of reason that results from thence that is and from all those absurdities and inconveniences that would follow from such a supposal 2. It is not very Philosophicall to have such frequent recourse to the Divine omnipotence and to argue from the utmost extent of possibility for this would take away in a great measure all our present grounds of certainty and by degrees lead us to the very borders of Scepticisme would any one believe Epicurius's opinion concerning the originall of the World the sooner because we cannot prove that it implyes any Logicall contradiction that the fortuitous concourse of atomes might possibly at last hit upon such a regular frame of a World as we now behold Tho' I believe the case here before us viz. That of matters thinking is much fuller of absurdity and contradiction 3. Whereas he says in his â—irst Edition t is Equally easy to conceive that God can if he pleases superad c. I finâ— it thus quoted by the Bp. of worcester I suppose out of his latter Editions in respect of our notionsâ— it is not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases c. Equally easie to conceive and not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive are expressions that do not altogether signify the same thing so that this learned Author seemes somewhat to waver in his Opinion as to this particular But then what difficulty is there in supposing a thinking substance joyned to an unthinking one and the thinking one to perform those operations which the other could not Is it equally easy or not much more remote from our comprehensions to conceive how we may add to a Fool or Ideot the power or faculty of Wisdom as to conceive how we may joyn to him a wise Guardian to direct him in all his actions Seeing therefore this opinion of the possibility of matters thinking is a Novel one the proof hereof must lye upon those that assert it and here 't is not sufficient to say that they know not how far the power of matter doth or may extend but they must possitively prove that it extends so far But Mr. Lock tells us Pa. 270. That Philosophers ought not Magisterially to determine in doubtful Cases and that there is a certain Modesty which very well becomes Philosophy This is very true and yet this Modesty may err in the excess the Scepticks are in some sense the most modest Sect of Philosophers and yet not the bettet for that And whereas he saith that all the great ends of Morallity and Religion are well enough secured without Philosophical proofes of the Souls immateriallity c. So what if another should say that all the ends of Nature are sufficiently secured tho' God always when we went to sleep annihilated the Soul but then when either the Body was sufficiently refreshed or violently press'd upon by some suddain accident that then God always created it again As for those Arguments which may seem to be drawn from our night Dreams these I doubt not may be solv'd in a way suitable to the Hypothesis that is that tho' the Main body of the Soul as it were be annihilated yet the Atmossphere or some â—ot Steams thereof may remain still in the Body which like so many Centinels are left here behind to give some small intimations of what pass'd during her absence or state of non-entity I know no demonstration can be brought against this and yet I fancy whoever should go about to Philosophize at this rate would sooner be laught at than believed Some things may be asserted which can neither be fully and clearly confuted or shown to be false nor proved to be really true And in such things as these the advantage always lyes on the side of the de-defendant thus in that question whether the Soul doth always think or no either side may be defended but neither sufficiently confuted But to proceed The 7 th is this that when we err from the rules of our Duty we ought to repent and trust in Gods mercy for pardon This indeed we ought to do and it is very reasonable we should do so But then it may be question'd what kind of sorrow it is that is availeable for the remission of sins for tho' some kind of Natural sorrow be the necessary result of Conscieâ—ce from the sense of having done some foolish or wicked action yet it may be question'd whether this be that ingenuous sorrow which is both in its own nature and by Gods appointment so expiatory of sin And further how can we have any just ground to trust in God for pardon of sin even according to the dictates of natural reason unless to our Repentance we add also not only a resolution of amendment but actual Reformation also of our Lives if time and opportunity doe permit I shall now examine that Oracular Syllogisme which seemes to be spoken as it were ex Tripode and which I suppose he lookes upon as no less than demonstration That Rule which is necessary to our future happyness ought to be made known to all Men. But no Rule of reveal'd Religion was or ever could be made known to all Men. Therefore no reveal'd Religion is necessary to our future happiness No instituted Rules tho' it be in Logick it selfe can meet with any approbation among some Men I shall therefore examine this Syllogisme even according to the Rules of natural Logick it self And First how doth he prove that it is necessary that there should be one single determinate Rule for the future happiness of all Men The Gentiles had the Law of Nature the Iews the Law of Moâ—es the Christians the Gospel or the Law of Christ for their Rule I would further ask him what he meanes by Our happiness in the major proposition If we apply it to Christians it makes the proposition absolutly false for what necessity is there that the Gospel should be made known to
all Men in order to its being a Rule for future happiness to Christians The Rule of happiness ought to be made known to all to whom it is a Rule but no further but let us see how he proves the Major viz. Our future happiness depends upon our obeying or our endeavouring to fulfill the known will of God but that Rule which is not generally known cannot be generally obey'd therefore that Rule which is not generally known cannot be the Rule of our happiness Here we may see how the Original sin of the first proposition transfuses it selfe to all its Posterity and renders the whole Argument a mere blunder that Rule that is not generally known cannot be generally obeyed but may not the Gospel tho' it be not known to all be a Rule to those whom it is known and to whom it is intended as such that is to Christians Those who were born in a Christian state and who have liv'd for some time in the profession of the Christian Religion cannot but have the Rule of the Gospell made known to ' em But he tells us again pa. 197. That the natural Religion will suffice for our happiness because it is the only general means propos'd But I cannot yet be satisfy'd with this way of Arguing And that for these two reasons 1. Because this would prove not only that God has not made any other declaration of his will than that contain'd in nature but also that he could not have done any such thing unless he had made it of as large an extent as the light of Nature that is to all the World Now let us suppose that God had actually made such a Revelation of his Will and in the same manner as he has done in the Gospel and I challenge all the Deists in the World to prove the impossibility of such a thing yet the argument would lie as strong against the thing then as it doth now So that this argument proves too much and by consequence nothing at all to the purpose 2. I have often heard it asserted by this Gentleman but never yet any solid reason given why the want of an universal revelation of the Gospel to all the World should make it of less force or obligation where it is Is it the less day with us because it is at the same time Night in otber Places Pa. 198. The several lustrations and expiations formerly practised in the World were but symbolicall and refer'd to our sorrow and repentance That is the true and only expiation for Sin and is so agreed upon by all Men in all Ages and of all Religions The original of Sacrifices is variously disputed by Men of several Opinions but according to the Deists Principles they can only be founded in nature because they do not suppose any positive Revelation of Gods will made afterwards to mankind But now if all Sacrifices were only Symbolical of Repentance I do not know why Nature should go so far about as to enjoyn Sacrifices at all why should not Nature have enjoyned Repentance only without any such Sacrifices as have no Intrinsick prevalency for the pardon of sin But how comes he so much like an Oracle to determine that Repentance has been so agreed upon by all Men in all Ages and of all Religions Whereas the contrary is rather true that no company of Men of all Ages and of all Religions ever agreed that Repentance was the only expiation of sin in opposition to or seperation from otheâ— conditions and qualifications Pa. 199. If one Religion was once known to be true Mankind would all agree in it otherwise those marks of truth in it were not visible which are necessary to draw an universal consent But a reveal'd Religion may have sufficient marks of truth in it so as to be able to satisfie any rational enquiry and yet not be able to draw an universal consent lust passions prejudices and false Opinions may sometimes hinder ttuth from gaining that universal Empire which othewise it might justly challenge Pa. 202 I have already endeavour'd to prove that it is not necessary that God should reveal more and therefore till that point be determined I humbly doubt and suspend my belief And I have already told him that the controversie doth not depend upon that point but upon this whether God hath actualy reveal'd any more than what he first made known by the light of Nature It is not for him to prescribe limits to God or to tell him what is necessary what not Another Objection he says may be this that there is no foundation in natural Religion for a vertuous Life or at least not so great as in a reveal'd Religion where Rewards and Punishments are propos'd If he had urg'd it thus where Rewards and Punishments are more clearly propos'd than in the natural Religion then he had done right to the Objection and in his answer I do not see how in the least he attempts to prove rewards and punishments as clearly propos'd in the Natural as in the Reveal'd Religion which yet he ought to have done in order to the giving a full answer to the Objection Pa. 203. Another Objection is a differenâ—e betwixt our condition and that of the Heathens for if they liv'd up to the height of Vertue and known Reason they might say some Charitable Christians be happy in a Future State we cannot because a Reveal'd Religion has been discover'd to us more than to them tho' we believe it not This seems to be the substance of the Objection The Inference as he calls it is this therefore we ought in our own defence to embrace it But let us see what Answer he returns to the Objection he says it supposes a reveald Religion which is yet to prove But here he may consider that we having been in possession of our reveald Religion so many hundred years we have very good reason to suppose it to be true till such times as he can prove the contrary And perhaps he is one of the â—irst of those hardy Men in England who having been brought up to that age in the Christian profession has now at last in effect renounc'd it And if the Heathens he says living up to the light of Naturall Religion might be happy I see no reasno but why we may be so too We that is Persons bred up in the Christian Religion but now having a mind to pick a quarrel with it design to return to a certain more refined sort of Paganisme But to this I Answer no Christian as such can be eternaly happy except his righteousness exceed the righteousness of mere natural Religion for why may not God require higher degrees of holiness there where he hath given both clâ—arer knowledge of Mens duty and better assistances for the performing of it And can we â—hink it reasonable that God should deal the better with any Man for turning Apostate or indeed that he should be admitted into the same rank of
Epicurism because the assert the Providence of God and a Future State of Rewards and Punishments Only I would heartily and humbly propound to their consideration whether they being happily brought up in the belief and practise of the Christian Religion and their now falling back from it whether I say this may not be a step naturally leading to that worst sort of Deism little better than Atheisme For what better or stronger reasons will they have for retaining the Natural Religion than they had or might have had for Christianity It is to be fear'd that the Purity of the Precepts and the severity of the Christian Doctrine was the great offence they took at the Christian Religion and may they not after such a breach as it were made upon their Consciences be tempted to renounce even Natural Religion it self for the same reasons Nemo repentè fit pessimus Men â—ommonly by degrees arrive at the height of â—ickedness Mr. Blount in his Letter Pa. 87. â—f the Oracles of Reason Tho' Deisme be â— good manureing of a Mans Conscience yet â—ertainly if sow'd with Christianity it will â—roduce the most profitable crop But 't is reâ—orted that before his Death he fell from that more modest and ingenious temper of mind which he here seem'd to express Vriel Acosta in his Life time was very wavering in his Religion and at last turn'd Deist and shot himself The same Fate attended that unfortunatâ— Gentleman both in his Life and Death I shall make no personal reflections only lay down this great truth worthy to be consider'd by the Immortal Deist as he is call'd Pa. 95 That Christianity lays the best and surest foundation of living and dying well I shall here because of the affinity of the subject to this in hand briefly examine some particulars in the Translators preface to Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans Sheet a 4. The proposition he there advanecs is this That it is possible by a due advertency to the light of nature sufficiently to discern betwixt good and evill This is very true unless perhaps there lyes some ambiguity in the word sufficiently that the light of Nature doth or may inform us in the greater stroaks and instances of our duty is certainly true but whether it descends to all the particulars thereof may be justly question'd but then in the proof of this proposition I think he goes further the the nature of the thing reqnired the Heathens might be able by the light of Nature to distinguish betwixt good and evill tho' their Writings did not fully come up to the height of Christianity I do not asserts he says that the Law of Nature was Engraven upon the hearts of Men in as faire Characters as upon the two Tables of Stone for then there would have been little or no use of Revelation Here seems to be some little obscurity both in the proposition he layes down and in the inference he makes from it I shall briefly examine both 1 st It seemes as reasonable to believe that the Law of Nature was Engraven At first in as fair Characters upon the minds of Men as it was afterwaâ—ds upon the two Tables of Stone I do not mean in any gross sense that is Natural Duties might be as well known to Adam in Paradice by the light of Nature as they were afterwards to the Iews by the Promulgation of the Law if the Law of Nature in process of time was so defac'd that it could not be so easily Read this was owing to the vicious principles and practises to the false opinions and wicked Lives of Men afterwards 2 ly As to the inference For then there would have been little or no use of Revelation This may refer either to the Revelation of the Law or of the Gospell to that of Moses or that of Christ. If it refer to that of Moses yet the Revelation of the Law by him might be of great use by seting out as it were a Second Edition of it upon Tables of Stone when it was so miserably defaced before upon the minds of Men. If it refer to the Gospell that also might be of very great use notwithstanding all the clearest Revelations that were made either by the Law of Nature or by the Law of Moses because the Revelation of the Gospell contains in it something that was never designed to be made known at least so fully by either And he will not I suppose say that the method of salvation now revealed in the Gospel is contain'd in the Law of Nature tho' it had been writ in as fair Charâ—cters as that of the two Tables of Stone nor can he say that the Law of Nature fully and clearly Imprinted upon the minds of Men would render any further Revelation particularly that of the Gospel useless But yet he says that in the Writings of the Heathens is contain'd the whole Moral Law and that uot only in the integral parts but in its utmost intention nor is there one Precept of Christianity so exalted and Heroical but may be paralell'd in an Heathen No Man can deny this he says who has read the Morals of Plutarch Seneca Epictetus Cicero to these he also adds Juvenal and Persius I am not in the least willing to lessen the great excellencys that some of the Heathens have attain'd to but yet I kâ—ow no reason why they should be equall'd with the Christians As for those Moralists and Poets he mentions 't is observable that all of 'em except Cicero liv'd after the time of our Saviour and the promulgation of the Gospel and it is certain that the Christian Religion had very much improv'd the Morals of the Heathen world at that time and that they owe a great deal of that light which appears in their writings to the Sun of Rightousness tho' they were not so ingenious as to acknowledge it So that there can be no necessary Argument drawn from these to prove that the Heathens purely as such can vie with Christians in this particular What was said of Seneca may in some measure be said of the rest si Christianus Paganice Si Paganus Christiane Scripsit Then as for those Heathens that liv'd â—befoe our Saviours time I think I shall do 'em nothing but right and justice in these following particulars 1. They had no right notion of original sin that general depravation and corruption of humane nature either as to the true cause or cure of it without which I think there cannot be laid any such firm foundation of Vertue and Piety as Christianity thereby now affords us 2. The Heathens were not alwayes consistent with themselves in their discourses of this nature their Candle did not only burn dim But like one in thâ— Socket it had sometimâ—s its lucid intervals and then somtimes seem'd to be quite extinguish'd they had light enough to shew 'em their own darkness but not sufficient to assure 'em of the right way the light of their understandings was
many time like that of an ignis fatuus desultory and uncertain Or if sometimes a more then ordinary Heroick Precept dropt as it were from a Pagan penn yet this will not be sufficient to equal Natural Religion with Christianity which is a constant uniform uninterrupted Series and Constellation as it were of Divine Precepts One Excellent Precept is not enough to form an institution especially if we consider that the influence thereof commonly reach'd no further than the particular Sect by which it was deliver'd and many times not so far neither and then the greater quantity of common rubbish and perhaps vicious mixtures did quite sully the beauty of the celebrated Maxime and render the influence of it very ineffectual 3. What ever their notions might be yet they wanted that which is the very life of all Religion and the peculiar happyness of Christianty viz. That inward strength and assistance which might enable 'em to put their knowledge into practise He adds what exaâ—ted thoughts of vertue had Aristotle when he made the very formality of happiness to consist in the exercise of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Happiness is the act of a rational Soul according to the most perfect vertue in a life most perfect I take this says he to be the most Noble and Sublime conception of Vertue that ever was or can be fram'd by the mind of Man 'T is true the Wise Man tells us Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace that is says he they are attended with pleasure aâ—d peace But that the exercise of vertue should not only be attended with but be all one with happiness it self is such a superlative encomium oâ— it that neither the love nor contemplation of a Seraphim can suggest a greater Greater things than these cannot be spoken of Thee O thou City of God! He might as well have gone on and prefer'd this definition of Aristotle above any thing that was ever said either by our Saviour or his Apostles upon this Subject Christ in his Sermon on the Mount if he had a mind to have come up to the Aristotelian Altitudes should have given no other reason of the blessedness of such and such Persons but only because they were such that is Vertuous Blessed are the merciful because they are merciful c. But our Saviour was pleas'd rather to make use of this more humble way and more accommodated to the State of Mankind viz. To place the reason of the happiness in the reward But suppose I should take the same liberty with Aristotle that he doth with Solomon that is insert some words into the deâ—inition to make the sense of it more dilute as Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace That is says he attended with pleasure and peace then Aristotle would have no advantage over Solomon but I think there is no need of this Aristotle has done it to my Hand For â—irst we may observe that in the definition it is not said that the formality of happiness consists in the exercise of vertue but only that happiness is the Act of the rational Soul according to the most perfect vertue c. 2. It is not every vertue in the exercise whereof happiness doth consist but it is the most perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Si plures sint verâ—utes tunc ex vertute perfectissima 3. It must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in vita perfecta And here he tells us that as one Swallow makes not spring 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. One day or a short time is not sufficient to make a Man happy That happiness is founded in vertue or that a Man cannot be happy without it is certainly true but that vertue alone is suffâ—icient to make one so Aristotle himselfe doth not assert It is generlly supposed that in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There must be the concurrence of all outward good things to the consummation of this happiness 1 Cor. 15. 10. If in this World only we have hope in Christ then are we of all Men the most miserable and yet the Apostles were as happy as vertue could make ' em He proceeds next to compare and equall Heathens with Christians as to their practices I do not say that an actuall formal intention of referring all to God is absolutely necessary either in Heathens or Christians but yet this we may assert that the nearer we approach thereto and the more we refer all our actions to the glory of God the better they are and come nearer to perfection I am of his opinion in this that if a Man do what is agreeable to right reason because it is agreeable he does well tho' perhaps he doth not think of God at that present provided he has no contrary intention in it This I believe is true tho' not for the reason there assign'd viz. Because he says to constitute the nature of Sin wâ—ich is contrary t is not required that there be an intention of transgressing the dictates of natural reason much less of offending God But to this it may be replyâ—d 1 st That Vertue and Vice are not in a strict and proper sence contrarys they are only privativè opposita 2 ly Perhaps it is not possible for any one directly and formally to design the transgression of the Law of Nature or the Law of God and yet notwithstanding be guilty of Sin If the action be in its own nature bad or if it want any necessary circumstance to make it morally good it will have the nature and denomination of an evill action let the intention be what it will Bonum ex causa integrà malum ex quolibet defectu But he is not satisfy'd unless he bring the Heathens upon all accounts to an equal level with Christians sheet B. 3 tho' I confess I see no reason why an Heathen may not have this intention as well as a Christian. How far an Heathen may somtimes possibly have such an intention is not my busines to dispute only this I say that there is this reason why an Heathen should not have such an intention as well as a Christian because he has no such plain and possitive Precept in this case 1 Cor. 10. 31. Whether ye eat or drink or whatsoever ye do do all to the glory of God and I think I may further observe from this Chapter that there are not any such plain and positive commands to be met withal in any Heathen Author to teach us to use our liberty in things indifferent so as not to give any just occasion of scandall or offence to others as we have laid down in that Chapter for tho' perhaps there may be something met withal in those which may be Wire drawn as it were to these purposes yet probably this was never either the intent of the Author or ever so generally understood at that time Thus much briefly as to that particular I also
patterns of all truth in the Divine intellect These I say are communicated to the soul in a way and proportion suteable to such a being that is they are either made Naturall propertyes of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its faculties in the right use and exercise of em ' For it is not easie to conceive how either any senfible impressions from without or any reâ—lections of the Soul upon its own operations about those impressions can be connatural causes of morall truths I grant indeed that vertue has a natural tendency to promote both publick and private interest but yet I think the Soul finds as it were an intrinsick sutâ—bleness of these truths to it selfe and of it self to them antecedently to any such external considerations Some Remarks upon Mr. Chauvin de Religione Naturali ONE designe of his Book he tells us was Orthodoxarum Ecclesiarum fratres ad concordiâ—m vocare An excellent design this and worthy to be prosecuted with all the prudence and pious Zeall that the thing is capable of but it is to be wish'd that he had brought a more humble and modest temper of mind to such a work as this it did not become him to reflect unhansomly upon the constitution and government of that Church which both as to Doctrine and Discipline comes the nearest to that of the Primitive of any in the Christian World It is not for private Persons much less for Strangers and Forraigners to prescribe new formes and methods to a Church that has been so long and so well constituted as this has been when this Gentleman has more fully considered and better understood things of this naâ—ure he wâ—ll be better satisfy'd with some of our â—â—cleâ—iastical constitutions than at present he â—eems to be I shall not presume to take notice of any thing in his Epistle Dedicatory because it is to a learned and Reverend Bishop of our own Church tho' withall I believe there are some things in it writ without his knowledge or approbation But least my charge here against him might seem too general and so groundless I shall instance in one particular pa 419. Where he unhansomly and rudely reflects upon our Convocations But these are things above my sphere but under the carefull and watchfull Eye of our Superiours My deâ—ign here is of a lower nature Pa. 131 Nobis jam ostendendumest quâ viâ illa lex quae naturalis dicitur in corda nostra irrepserit utrum nempe naturaliter sit menti nostrae inscripta quod vulgoasseritur nos vero Evidenter asserimus illud esse falsissimum A little more Evidence in the proof tho' less in the assertion might do very well But here it will be very difficult to reconcile this Author either to Scripture or to himself St. Paul tells us Rom. 2. 15. That the Gentiles show the work of the Law that is the Naturall Law written in their hearts Now it must be granted that this Natural inscription even à primo ortu is the most plaine and obvious interpretation of the place and where that may be reâ—tained we ought not to look for another And tho' t is true that the Natural Law is agreeable to the dictates of reason it self when come to perfect maturity yet if this had been all the Apostle designed to express I am apt to believe he would not have thus worded it by being written in their hearts for by thus doing he did almost inevitably and invincibly confirm Men in that false opinion if it be one which was then more generally received in the World Nor can any argument be drawn from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the following part of the Verse in prejudice of this opinion of Natural inscription Dr. Hammond here tells us that these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are practicall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common notions of good and evill which are among the generality of Men even Heathens without any light from the Mosaicall Law c. I shall now see how difficult it is to reconcile him to himself in other places pa. 5. There speaking of the belief of a Deity he tells us Consentanea utique est illis connaturalibus rationis principijs quae nobis insunt paulatim augescunt Pa. 38. quid nobis esse debet antiquius quam religio quae si verum fatearis insculpta fuerat in hominum mentibus Pa. 45. speaking of the belief of the Unity of a God haec opinio demonstrat naturae rudera quae in imis illorum medullis infixa sunt nec ullâ de causa possunt amoveri I might easily tyre my self and Reader too in citing places to this purpose in favour of these natural principles which seem â—ven at first implanted in the minds of Men tho' it cannot be expected they should show themselves before the actual use of reason I shall now briefly examine the reasons he gives of his opinion if says he the Law of Nature be writ by the finger of God upon the hearts of Men à primo ortu then it must be either to direct us to good or to deter us from evil but it cannot serve for either of these Not the first nam ubi omnia sunt turbata c. Where all things are disturb'd and out of order by reason of the tenderness and weakness of Age altogether unfit for prudence there the Voice of the Law cannot be heard But will he argue barely from the Laws not being heard that therefore there is none We commonly say that in war the Laws are silent or howsoever cannot be heard and yet they are Laws even there too If he supposes us in the state of Infancy beforâ— the use of reason what should he talk of the rules of good and evil to such â—s know neither If he supposes us in the State of juvenility tho' our passions be strong and turbulent yet methinks there should be more need at such a time more especially of a Law to direct us Nor 2 dly Says he can it deter us from evil because there is no actual sin in Children before the use of Reason but would it be in vain to have this Law imprinted upon the minds of Children because they cannot yet make use of it May not the the Soul of a Child properly be call'd a rational Soul tho' as yet it cannot form a Syllogism may there not be natural inclinations and dispositions to truth and holyness Some semina vitae moralis tho' these do not show themselves until such prefixt times as Providence and the nature of things have appointed for ' em And till this be prov'd either absâ—lutely impossible or highly irrational the opposers of these natural Principles do prove nothing to their purpose nor gain any strength or credit to their cause 2. Another ground of his Opinion is drawn from a parity of reason betwixt faith and this Law of Nature there being he says the same reason for both quoniam