De Corpore Politico OR THE ELEMENTS OF LAW Moral Politick WITH Discourses upon severall Heads as Of The Law of Nature Oathes and Covenants Several kinds of Government With the Changes and Revolutions of them By Tho. Hobbs of Malmsbury LONDON Printed by T. R. for J. Ridley and are to be sold at the Castle in Fleetstreet by Ram-Alley 1652. To The Reader Reader YOu may be pleased to take notice That the first Part of the Work depends upon a former Treatise of Humane Nature written by Mr. Hobbs and by a Friend of his committed to the Press for the benefit of Mankind It was thought fit that nothing of so worthy an Author should be left unprinted especially considering that this Piece is most usefull for the Society of reasonaâ—le Creatures being the Grounds and Principles of Policy without which there would be nothing but Confusion in the World I am confident if mens Minds were but truly fixt upon the Center of this Discourse they would not prove such Weather-cocks to be turned about with the wind of every false Doctrine and vain Opinion VVe should then be free from those Disorders which threaten distraction to the Soul and Destruction to the Common VVealth But let others write never so well if our practise doe not second their instructions we may bee wise enough to foresee our misery but never know how to prevent it What pitty is it that such rare Conclusions as these are should produce no other effect but to informe our Knowledg and confute our Conversation whilest we neglect the Truth that is apprehended Yet there is some hope that such Observers whose VVisdome hath received the stamp of Goodnesse will improve their skill to a reall Advancement of those benefits which lye horded up in this curious Cabinet To whose use and behoof these excellent notions are commended as the best that ever were writ in this kind and may serve for a generall Ground and Foundation to all regular Conceptions that concern the Essence and Existence of Man the Government of Kingdoms and Common-VVealths and by consequence our eternall Salvation De Corpore Politico CHAP. I. 1.2 Men by Nature Equall 3. By vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves to others 4. Apt to provoke another by Comparisons 5. Apt to incroach one upon another 6. Right defined 7. Right to the End implyeth right to the Means 8 Every Man his own Judge by Nature 9. Every Mans strength and knowledge for his owne Use 10. Every Man by nature hath right to all things 11. Warr and Peace defined 12. Men by noture in the state of Warr 13. In Manifest Inequality Might is Right 14. Reason dictateth Peace IN a former Treatise of Humane nature already printed hath beene set forth the whole nature of Man consisting in the Powers naturall of his Body and Mind and may all be comprehended in these four Strength of Body Experinece Reason and Passion 2. In this it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our Nature hath placed us and what probability it hath left us of continuing and preserving our selves against the violence of one another And first if we consider how little Odds there is of Strength or knowledge between Men of Mature Age and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in Wit or in both may utterly destroy the Power of the stronger since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a Mans life we may conclude that men considered in meer Nature ought to admit amongst themselves Equality and that he that claimeth no more may be esteemed Moderate 3. On the other side considering the great difference there is in Men from the Diversity of their Passions how some are vainly glorious and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows not only when they are equall in power but also when they are Inferiour we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow that those men who are moderate and look for no more but Equality of nature shall be obnoxious to the Force of others that will attempt to subdue them And from hence shall proceed a generall diffidence in mankind and mutuall fear one of another 4. Farther since Men by natural passion are divers wayes offensive one to another every man thinking well of himself and hating to see the same in others they must needs provoke one another by Words and other signes of contempt and hatred which are incident to all comparison till at last they must determine the preheminence by Strength and force of Body 5. Moreover considering that many mens Appetites carry them to one and the same end which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided it followeth that the stronger must enjoy it alone and that it be decided by Battell who is the stronger And thus the Greatest part of Men upon no assurance of Odds do neverthelesse through Vanity or Comparison or Appetite provoke the Rest that otherwise would be contented with Equality 6. And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire Bonum sibi that which is good for themselves and to avoid that which is hurtfull but most of all the terrible enemy of Nature Death from whom we expect both the losse of all Power and also the greatest of bodily paines in the losing It is not against Reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his owne body and limbs both from Death and Paine And that which is not against reason men call Right or Jus or Blameâ—esse liberty of using our own naturall Power and Ability It is therefore â— right of nature That every man may preserve his owne life and limbs with all the Power he hath 7. And because where a man hath right to the End and the end cannot be attained without the Meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the End it is consequent that it is not against Reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his Body 8. Also every man by right of Nature is Judge himself of the necessity of the means and of the greatnesse of the Danger For if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine owne danger my Self then it is reason that another Man be Judge thereof But the same Reason that maketh another man Judge of those Things that concern me maketh me also Judge of that that concerneth him And therefore I have reason to Judge of his sentence whether it be for my benefit or not 9. As a mans Judgment in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit so also the Strength Knowledg and Art of every man is then rightly imployed when he useth it for himselfe else must not a man have right to preserve himselfe 10. Every man by Nature hath right to all Things that is to say to do whatsoever he listeth to whom
to stand to their Covenants is taught Psal. 15. Where the Question being asked vers. 1. Lord who shall dwell in thy Tavernacle c. It is answered vers. 4. He that sweareth to hâ—s own hinderance and yet changeth not And that men ought to be gratified where no Covenant passeth Deut. 25.4 Thou shalt not muzzle the Ox that treadeth out the Corn which S. Paul 1 Cor. 9.9 interpreteth not of Oxen but of Men 6. That men content themselves with Equality as it is the Foundation of Natural Law so also is it of the second Table of the Divine Law Matth. 22 39.40 Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self On these two Laws depend the whole Law and the Prophets which is not so to be understood as that a man should study so much his Neighbours profit as his own or that he should divide his Goods amongst his Neighbours but that he should esteem his Neighbour worthy all Rights and Priviledges that himself enjoyeth and attribute unto him whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself which is no more but that he should be humble meck and content with Equality 7. And that in Distributing of Right amongst Equalls that Distribution is to be made according to the Proportions of the Numbers which is the giving of aequalia aequalibus proportionalia proportionalibus we have Numb. 26.53.54 the Commandement of God to Moses Thou shalt divide the land according to the Number of Names to many thou shalt give more to few thou shall give lesse to every one according to his Number That Decision by Lot is a Means of Peace Prov. 18.18 The lot causeth contention to cease and maketh Partition among the Mighty 8. That the Accommodation and forgiveness of one another which have before been put for Lawes of Nature are also Law Divine there is no Question For they are the Essence of Charity which is the Scope of the whole Law that we ought not to reprâ—ach or reprehend one another is the Doctrine of our Saviour Matth. 7.1 Judge not that ye be not judged vers. 3. Why seest thou the Mote that is in thy Brothers eye and seest not the Beam that is in thine own eye Also the Law that forbiddeth us to press our Councell upon others further then they admit is a Divine Law For after our Charity and desire to rectifie one another is rejected to presse it farther is to reprehend him and condemn him which is forbidden in the text last recited as also Rom. 14.12 Every one of us shall give account of himself to God Let us not therefore judge one another any more but use your Judgment rather in this that no man put an occasion to fall or a stumbling block before his Brother 9. Farther The Rule of men concerning the Law of Nature Quod tibi fieri non vis alteri ne feceris is confirmed by the like Matth. 7.12 Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you that do you unto them for this is the Law and the Prophets And Rom. 2.1 In that thou judgest another thou condemnest thy self c. 10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures That these Laws concern only the Tribunall of our Conscience and that the Actions contrary to them shall be no farther punished by God Almighty then as they proceed from Negligence or Contempt And first that these Lawes are made to the Conscience appeareth Matth. 5.20 For I say unto you Except your Righteousnesse exceed the Righteousnesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall not enter into the Kingdome of Heaven Now the Pharisees were the most exact among the Jews in the external performance they therefore must want the sincerity of Conscience else could not our Saviour have required a greater Righteousnesse then theirs For the same Reason our Saviour Christ saith The Publican departed from the Temple iustified rather then the Pharisee And Christ saith his Yoke is easie his Burthen Light which proceedeth from this that Christ required no more then our best Endeavour And Rom. 14.23 He that doubteth is condemned if he eat And in innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament God Almighty declareth that he taketh the Will for the Deed both in Good and Evill Actions By all which it plainly appears that the Divine Law is dictated to the Conscience One the other side is no less plain that how many and hainous actions soever a man commit through Infirmity he shall nevertheless whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own Conscience be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong For at what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sinns from the bottome of his Heart I will put all his Iniquties out of my remembrance saith the Lord 11. Concerning Revenge which by the Law of Nature ought not to aym as I have sayd Chap. 3. Sect 10. at present delight but future profit there is some difficulty madâ— as if the same accorded not with the Law Divine by such as obiect the continuance of punishment after the Day of Judgement when there shall be no place neither for amendment nor for example This Obiection had been of some force if such punishment had been ordained after all sinnes were past but considering the punishment was instituted before sinne it serveth to the benefit of Mankinde because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terrour And therefore such Revenge was directed to the Future only 12. Finally There is no Law of Natural Reason that can be against the Law Divine for God Almighty hath given Reason to a man to be a Light unto him And I hope it is no Impiety to think that God Almighty will require a strict Account thereof at the Day of Judgment as of the Instructions which we were to follow in our Peregrination here notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now adayes to rationall and morall Conversation CHAP. VI 1. That men notwithstanding these Lawes are still in the State of War till they have security one against another 2. The Law of Nature in War is nothing but Honour 3. No Security without the Concord of many 4. That Concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe 5. The cause why Concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrationall Creatures and not of men 6. That Vnion is necessary for the maintaining of Concord 7 How Union is made 8. Body politick defined 9. Corporation defined 10. Soveraign Subiect defined 11. Two sorsts of Bodies Politick Patrimonia and Common Wealth IN Chap. 12. Sect. 16. of the treatise of human Nature it hath been shewed that the Opinions men have of the Rewards and Punishments which are to follow their Actions are the Causes that make and govern the Will to those Actions In this Estate of man therefore wherein all men are equal and every man allowed to be his own Judge the Fears they have one of another are equal and every mans
before in the two last Chapters For from thence cometh the Right of soveraigns over their Subjects in a Common Wealth Institutive Concerning the second Title which is when a man submitteth to an Assailant for fear of Death thereby accrueth a Right of Dominion For where every man as it happeneth in this case hath Right to all things there needs no more for the making of the said Right effectual but a Covenant from him that is overcome not to resist him that overcometh And thus cometh the victor to have right of absolute Dominion over the conquered By which there is presently constituted a little Body politick which consisteth of two Persons the one Soveraign which is called the Master or Lord the other subiect which is called the Servant And when a man hath acquired right over a number of Servants so considerable as they cannot by their Neighbours be securely invaded this Body politick is a Kingdome Despotical 3. And it is to be understood that when a Servant taken in the VVars is kept bound in natural Bonds and Chaines and the like or in prison there hath passed no covenant from the Servant to his Master For those natural Bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal Bonds of Covenant and they shew that the Servant is not trusted But Covenant Part 1. Chap. 15. Sect. 9. supposeth Trust There remaineth therefore in the Servant thus kept bound or in Prison a Right of delivering himself if he can by what means soever This kind of Servant is that which ordinarily and without passion is called a Slave The Romanes had no such distinct name but comprehended all under the name of Servus whereof such as they loved and durst trust were suffered to go at liberty and admitted to places of Office both neer to their Persons in their affaires abroad the rest were kept chained or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their Resistance And as it was amongst the Romanes so it was amongst other Nations the former sort having no other Bond but a supposed Covenant without which the Master had no reason to trust them the later being without Covenant and no otherwise tyed to Obedience but by Chains or other like forcible custody 4. A Master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those whose Bodies he leaveth at Liberty then over those he keepeth in Bonds and Imprisonment and hath absolute Dominion over both and may say of his servant that he is his as he may of any other thing And whatsoever the servant had and might call his is now the Master's for he that disposeth of the Person disposeth of all the person could dispose of insomuch as though there be Meum Tuum among servants distinct from one another by the dispensation and for the benefit of their Master yet there is no Meum Tuum belonging to any of them against the Master himselfe whom they are not to resist but to obey all his Commands as Law 5. And seeing both the Servant and all that is committed to him is the property of the Master and every man may dispose of his own and transfer the same at his pleasure the Master may therefore alienate his Dominion over them or give the same by his last Will to whom he list 6. And if it happen that the Master himself by Captivity or voluntary subjection become servant to another then is that other Master Paramount those servants of him that becometh servant are no farther obliged then their Master Paramount shall think good forasmuch as he disposing of the Master subordinate disposeth of all he hath and consequently of his servants So that the restriction of absolute Power in Masters proceedeth not from the Law of Nature but from the Political Law of him that is their Master Supream or Soveraign 7. Servants immediate to the supream Master are discharged of their servitude or subiection in the same manner that subiects are released of their Allegiance in a Common Wealth Institutive As first by Release For he that captiveth which is done by accepting what the captive transferreth to him setteth again at lâ—berty by transferring back the same And this kinde of Release is called Manumission Secondly by Exile For that is no more but Manumission given to a Servant not in the way Benefit but punishment Thirdly By a new Captivity where the Servant having done his Endeavour to defend himself hath thereby performed his Covenant to his former Master and for the safety of his life entring into new Covenant with the Conquerour is bound to doe his best endeavour to keep that likewise Fourthly Ignorance of who is Successor to his diceased Master dischargeth him of Obedience for no Covenant holdeth longer then a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it And lastly that Servant that is no longer trusted but committed to his Chains and Custody is thereby discharged of the Obligation in foro interno and therefore if he can get loose may lawfully goe his way 8. But servants subordinate though manumitted by their immediate Lord are not thereby discharged of their subiection to their Lord Paramount for the Immediate Master hath no propertie in them having transferred his Right before to another namely to his own and supream Master Nor if the chief Lord should manumit his immediate servant doth he thereby release his servants of their Obligation to him that is so manumitted For by this Manumission he recovereth again the absolute Dominion he had over them before For after a Release which is the discharge of a Covenant the Right standeth as it did before the Covenant was made 9. This Right of Conquest as it maketh one man master over another so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational Creatures For if a man in the state of Nature be in Hostility with men and thereby have lawful Title to subdue or kill according as his owne Conscience and Discretion shall suggest unto him for his safety and Benefit much more may he doe the same to Beasts that is to say save and preserve for his own service according to his Discretion such as are of Nature apt to obey and commodious for use and to kill and destroy with perpetual War all other as fierce and noysome to him And this Dominion is therefore of the Law of Nature and not of the Divine Law Positive For if there had been no such Right before the revealing of Gods Will in the Scripture then should no man to whom the Scripture hath not come have right to make use of those his Creatures either for his Food or sustenance And it were a hard Condition of mankind that a fierce and salvage Beast should with more right kill a man then a man a Beast CHAP. IV. 1. The Dominion over the Child c. 2. Preheminence of Sex giveth not the Child to the Father rather then to the Mother 3. The Title of the Father or Mother c. 4.
seemeth not only most equal but also least sensible and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it For there is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money to the Publick as to think they are over-rated and that their Neighbours whom they envy do thereupon insult over them and this disposeth them to Resistance and after that such Resistance hath produced a mischief to Rebellion 6. An other thing necessary for the maintaining of peace is the due execution of iustice which consisteth principally in the right performance of their Duties which are the Magistrates ordained for the same by and under the Authority of the Soveraign Power which being private men in respect of the Soveraign and consequently such as may have private Ends whereby they may be corrupted with gifts or Intercession of Friends ought to be kept in awe by an higher Power lest people greived by their Injustice should take upon them to make their own Revenges to the Disturbance of the common Peace which can by no way be avoided in the prineipal and immediate Magistrates without the Judicature of the Soveraign himself or some extraordinary power delegated by him It is therefore necessary that there be a power extraordinary as there shall be occasion from Time to Time for the syndication of Judges and other Magistates that shall abuse their Authority to the Wrong and discontent of the People and a free and open way for the presenting of Grievances to him or them that have the Soueraign Authority 7. Besides these Considerations by which are prevented the Discontents that arise from Oppression there ought to be some meanes for the keeping under of those that are disposed to Rebellion by Ambition which consist principally in the constancy of him that hath the Soveraign Power who ought therefore constantly to grace and encourage such as being able to serve the Common Wealth do nevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of Modesty without repining at the Authority of such as are imployed and without aggravating the Errours which as men they may commit especially when they suffer not in their own particular and constantly to shew displeasure dislike of the contrary And not only so but also to ordain severe punishments for such as shall by Reprehension of publick Actions affect popularity and applause amongst the multitude by which they may be enabled to have a faction in the Common Wealth at their Devotion 8. Another thing necessary is the rooting out of the Consciences of men all those opinions which seem to iustifie and give pretence of Right to Rebellious Actions such as are the Opinions That a man can do nothing lawfully against his private Conscience That they who have the Soveraignty are subiect to the civil Laws That there is an Authority of Subiects whose Negative may hinder the Affirmative of the Soveraign Power That any Subiect hath a propriety distinct from the Dominion of the Common Wealth That there is a body of the People without him or them that have the Soveraign power that any lawful Soveraign may be resisted under the name of a Tyrant which Opinions are they which Part 2. Chap. 8. Sect. 5.6 7 8 9 10. have been declared to dispose men to Rebellion And because Opinions which are gotten by education and in length of time are made habitual cannot be taken away by force and â—pon the sudden they must therefore be â—aken away also by Time and Education And â—eeing the said Opinions have proceeded â—rom private and publick Teaching and â—hose Teachers have received them from Grounds and Principalls which they have â—earned in the Universities from the Doctrine of Aristotle and others who have dilivered nothing concerning Morality and Policy demonstratively but being passionately addicted to Popular Government have insinuated their Opinions by eloquent Sophistry There is no doubt if the true Doctrine concerning the Law of Nature and the Properties of a Body Politick and the Nature of Law in general were prespicuously set down and taught in the Universities but that Young men who come thither void of preiudice and whose minds are as white paper capable of any Instruction would more easily receive the same and afterwards teach it to the people both in Books and otherwise then now they do the contrary 9. The last Thing contained in that Supream Law Salus Populi is their Defence and consisteth partly in the Obedience and Unity of the Subiects of which hath been already spoken and in which consisteth the Means of levying Souldiers and of having Money Arms Ships and Fortified places in readiness for Defence and partly in the avoiding of unnecessary Wars For such Common Wealths or such Monarchs as affect War for it self that is to say out of Ambition or of Vain Glory or that make account to revenge every little Iniury or Disgrace done by their Neighbours if they ruine not themselves their Fortune must be better then they have reason to expect CHAP. X. 1. All Expressions c. concerning future Actions are either Covenant Councel or Command 2. The Difference between a Law and a Covenant 3. The Command of him whose Command is Law in one thing is Law in every thing 4. The Difference between Law and Counsell 5. The difference between Jus and Lex 6. The Division of Laws ctc. 7. That the Divine Morall Law and the Law of Nature is the same 8. That the Civil Lawes are the Common Measure of Right and Wrong c. 9. Martiall Law is Civil Law 10. Written Laws c. unwritten c. Customes and Opinions c. THus far concerning the Nature of man and the constitution and properties of a Body Politick There remaineth only for the last Chapter to speak of the Nature and sorts of Law And first it is manifest that all Laws are Declarations of the Mind conâ—erning some Action future to be done or omitted And all Declarations and Expresâ—ions of the Mind concerning Future Actions and Omissions are either Promissive as I will do or not do or provisive As for Example If this be done or not done this will follow or Imperative as Do this or do it not In the first sort of these Expressions consisteth the Nature of a Covenant in the second consisteth Counsel in the third Command 2. It is evident when a man doth or forbeareth to do any action if he be moved thereto by this only Consideration that the same is Good or evil in it self and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his Deliberation that then neither to do nor omit the Action deliberated is any Breach of Law-And consequently whatsoever is a Law to a man respecteth the Will of another and the Declaration thereof But a Covenant is a Declaration of a mans own Will And therefore a Law and a Covenant differ And though they be both obligatory and a Law obligeth no otherwise then by vertue of some covenant made by
him who is subiect thereunto yet they oblige by severall sorts of promises For a Covenant obligeth by promise of an Action or Omission especially named and limited but a Law bindeth by a promise of Obedience in general whereby the Action to be done or left undone is referred to the determination of him to whom the Covenant is made So that the Difference between a Covenant and a Law standeth thus In Simple Covenant the Action to be done or not done is first limited and made known and then followeth the Promise to do or not to do but in a Law the obligation to do or not to do precedeth and the Declaration what is to be done or not done followeth after 3. And from this may be deduced that which to some may seem a Paradox That the Command of him whose Command is a Law in one thing is a Law in every thing For seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known he is obliged to obey in general that is to say in every thing 4. That the Counsel of a man is no Law to him that is counselled and that he who alloweth another to give him counsell doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same is manifest enough And yet men usually call Counselling by the name of Governing not that they are not able to distinguish between them but because they envy many times those men that are called to Counsel are therefore angry with them that they are Counselled But if to Counsellours there should be given a Right to have their Counsell followed then are they no more Counsellours but Masters of them whom they Counsel and their Counsels no more Counsels but Lawes For the difference between a Law and a Counsel being no mor but this that in Counsel the Expression is Do because it is best In a Law Do because I have a right to compel you or Do because I say Do when Counsel should give the Reason of the Action it adviseth to because the reason thereof it self is no more Counsel but a Law 5. The Names Lex Jus that is to say Law and Right are often confounded and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification For Right is that Liberty which Law leaveth us and Laws those Restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge on anothers Liberty Law and Right therefore are no less different then Restraint and Liberty which are contrary and whatsoever a man doth that liveth in a Common Wealth Jure he doth it Jure Civili Jure Naturae and Jure Divino For whatsoever is against any of these Laws cannot be said to be Jure For the Civill Law cannot make that to be done Jure which is against the Law Divine or of Nature And therefore whatsoever any Subiect doth if it be not conrary to the Civil Law and whatsoever a Soveraign doth if it be not against the Law of Nature he doth it Jure Divino by Divin right But to say Lege divina by Divine Law is another thing For the Laws of God and Nature allowing greater liberty then is allowed by the Law Civil for subordinate Laws do still bind moâ—e then Superior Laws the Essence of Law being not to loose but to bind A man may be commanded that by a Law Civil which is not commanded by the Law of Nature nor by the Law Divine So that of things done Legâ— that is to say by Command of the Law there is some place for a Distinction between Lege Divina Lege Civili As when a man giveth an Alms or helpeth him that is in need he doth it not Lege Civili but Lege Divina by the Divine Law the Precept whereof is Charity But for things that are done Jure nothing can be said done Jure Divino that is not also Jure Civili unless it be done by them that having Soveraign Power are not subiect to the civil Law 6. The Differences of Law are according to the Differences either of the Authors and Lawmakers or of the promulgation or of those that are subiect to them From the Difference of the Authors or Law makers cometh the Division of Law into Divine Natural and Civil From the Difference of Promulgation proceedeth the Division of Laws into Written and unwritten And from the Difference of the persons to whom the Law appertaineth it proceedeth that some Laws are called simply Laws and some Penal As for Example Thou shall not steal is simply a Law but this He that stealeth an Ox shall restore four-fold is a Penal or as other â—all it a Judicial Law Now in those Laws which are simply Laws the Commandement is addressed to every man but in Penal Laws the Commandement is addressed to the Magistrate who is only guilty of the Breach of it when the Penalties ordained are not iâ—flicted To the Rest appertaineth Nothing but to take notice of their Danger 7. As for the first Division of Law into Divine Natural and Civil the first two Breaâ—hes are one and the same law For the law of Nature which is also the Moral law is the law of the Author of Nature God Almighty and the law of God taught by our Saviour Christ is the Morall law For the Sum of Gods law is Thou shalt love God above all and thy Neighbour as thy self and the same is the sum of the Law of Nature as hath bâ—en shewed Part 1. Chap. 5. And although the Doctrin of our Saviour be of three Parts Moral Theological and Ecclesiasticall the former part only which is the Moral is of the Nature of a Law Universal the latter part is a Branch of the Law Civil and the Theological which containeth those Articles concerning the Divinity and Kingdome of our Saviour without which there is no Salvation is not dilivered in the Nature of Laws but of Counsel and Direction how to avoid the punishment which by the Violation of the Moral Law men are subiect to For it is not Infidelity that condemneth though it be Faith that saveth but the Breach of the Law and Commandements of God Written fiâ—st in mans heart and afterwards in Tables and delivered to the Jews by the Hands of Moses 8. In the state of Nature where every man is his own Judge and differeth from other concerning the Names and Appellations of things and from those Differences arise Quarels and breach of Peace it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in Controversie As for Example Of what is to be called Right what Good what Virtue what Much what Little what Meum Tuum what a Pound what a Quarter c. For in these Things Private Judgements may differ and beget Controversie This Common measure some say is Right Reason with whom I should consent if there were any such thing to be found or known in rerum natura But commonly they that call for Right Reason to decide any controversy
he listeth to possesse use and enjoy all things he will and can For seeing all things he willeth must therfore be Good unto him in his own judgment because he willeth them and may tend to his preservation some time or other or he may judg so and we have made him Judg thereof Sect. 8. it followeth that all things may rightly also be done by him And for this cause it is rightly sayd Natura dedil omnia omnibus that nature hath given all things to all men insomuch that Jus Utile Right and Profit is the same thing But that right of all men to all things is in effect no better than if no man had Right to any thing For there is little use and benefit of the Right a Man hath when another as strong or stronger then himselfe hath Right to the same 11. Seeing then to the Offensivenesse of Mans nature one to another there is added a Right of every man to every thing whereby one man invadeth with right and another man with Right resisteth and men live thereby in perpetuall Diffidence and study how to pâ—eoccupate each other The estate of men in this naturall Liberty is the estate of Warr For Warr is nothing else but that Time wherein the Will and Contention of contending by Force is either by words or Actions sufficiently declared and the time which is not Warr is Peace 12. The estate of Hostility and War being such as thereby nature it selfe is destroyed and men kil one another as we know also that it is both by the experience of Salvage Nations that live at this day and by the Histories of our Ancestors the old Inhabitants of Germany and other now civill Countries where we find the people few and short-lived and without the ornaments and comforts of life which by Peace and Society are usually invented and procured He therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all contradicteth himselfe For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good to which this estate is contrary wherin we suppose contention between men by nature equal and able to destroy one another 13. Seeing this Right of Protecting our selves by our own discretion and force proceedeth from danger and that danger from the Fquality between mens Forces much more reason is there that a man prevent such Equality before the Danger cometh and before the necessity of Battell A man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule or govern to do good to or harm hath right by the advantage of this his present power to take Caution at his pleasure for his security against that other in time to come He therefore that hath already subdued his Adversary or gotten into his power any other that either by Infancy or weaknesse is unable to resist him by right of nature may take the best caution that such Infant or such feeble and subdued person can give him of being ruled and governed by him for the time to come For seeing we intend allwaies our one safety and preservation we manifestly contradict that our intention if we willingly dismiss such a one and suffer him at once to gather strength and be our Enemy Out of which may also be collected That inresistable Might in the state of Nature is Right 14. But since it is supposed by the Equality of strength and other natural faculties of men that no man is of might sufficient to assure himselfe for any long time of preserving himself therby whiles he remaineth in the state of Hostility and War Reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good to seek after Peace as far forth as there is Hope to attain the same and strengthen himselfe with all the help he can procure for his own defence against those from whom such Peace cannot be obtained and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto CHAP. II. 1. The Law of Nature consisteth not in consent of men but reason 2. That every man devests himself of the Right he hath to all things is one precept of nature 3. What it is to relinquish and transferr ones Right 4. The Will to transfer and the will to accept both necessary to the passing away of Right 5. Right not transferred by words De futuro onely 6. Words De futuro together with other signes of the Will may transferr Right 7. Free Gift defined 8. Contract and the sorts of it 9. Covenant defined 10. Contract of mutuall trust is of no validity in the Estate of Hostility 11. No Covenant of men but with one another 12. Covenant how dissolved 13. Covenant extorted by feare in the Law of nature valid 14. Covenant contrary to former Covenant voyd 15. An oath defined 16. Oath to be administred to every man in his own Religion 17. Oath addeth not to the Obligation 18. Covenants binde but to endeavour WHat it is we call the Law of Nature is not agreed upon by those that have hitherto wtitten For the most part such writets as have occasion to affirm that any thing is against the law of Nature do alledge no more than this That it is against the consent of all Nations or the wisest and most civill Nations But it is not agreed upon who shall judge which Nations are the Wisest Others make that against the Law of Nature which is contrary to the consent of all Mankind which Definition cannot be allowed because then no man could offend against the Law of Nature for the Nature of every man is contained under the Nature of Mankind But forasmuch as all men are carried away by the violence of their Passion and by evill customes do those things which are commonly said to be against the Law of Nature It is not the consent of Passion or consent in some Errour gotten by Custome that makes the Law of Nature Reason is no less of the nature of man then Passion and is the same in all men because all men agree in the Will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain namely their own Good which is the work of Reason there can therefore be no other Law of Nature then Reason nor no other Precepts of Natural Law then those which declare unto us the wayes of Peace where the same may be obtained and of Defence where it may not 2. One Precept of the Law of Nature therefore this is That every man devest himself of the right he hath to all things by Nature For when divers men having Right not only to all things else but to one anothers persons if they use the same there ariseth thereby Invasion on the one part and Resistance on the other which is War and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature the Sum whereof consisteth in making Peace 3. Wen a man devesteth and putteth from his Right he either simply relinquisheth it or transferreth the same to another man To Relinquish
by the Covenantor when that time cometh either by the Performance or by the Violation For a Covenant is void that is once impossible But a Covenant not to do without time limited which is as much as to say a Covenant never to do is dissolved by the Covenantor then only when he violateth it or dyeth And generally all Covenants are dischargeable by the Covenantee to whose benefit and by whose right he that maketh the Covenant is obliged This Right therefore of the Covenantee relinquished is a release of the Covenant And universally for the same reason all Obligations are determinable at the will of the Obliger 13. It is a Question often moved Whether such Covenants oblige as are extorted from men by Fear As for example Whether if a man for feare of Death hath promised to give a Theef an hundred pounds the next day and not discover him whether such Covenant be obligatory or not And though in some Cases such Covenant may be void yet it is not therefore void because extorted by Fear For there appeareth no reason why that which we do upon Fear should be lesse firme then that which we do for Covetousnesse For both the One and the Other maketh the Action Voluntary And if no Covenant should be good that proceedeth from feare of Death no conditions of Peace betweene Enemies nor any Laws could be of Force which are all consented to from that Fear For who would lose the liberty that nature hath given him of governing himselfe by his own will and power if they feared not Death in the retaining of it What Prisoner in War might be trusted to seek his Ransome and ought not rather to be killed if he were not tyed by the Grant of his life to perform his Promise But after the Introduction of Policy and Laws the case may alter for if by the Law the performance of such a Covenant be forbidden then he that promiseth any thing to a Theif not only may but must refuse to perform it But if the Law forbid not the performance but leave it to the will of the Promiser then is the performance still lawfull and the Covenant of things lawfull is obligatory even towards a Theif 14. He that giveth promiseth or covenanteth to one and after giveth promiseth or covenanteth the same to another maketh void the later Act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that Right which he himselfe hath not and that Right he hath not which he himself hath before transferred 15. An Oath is a clause annexed to a Promise containing a Renuntiation of Gods mercy by him that promiseth in case he perform not as far as is lawfull and possible for him to doe And this appeareth by the words which make the Essence of the Oath So helpe me God So also was it amongst the Heathen And the forme of the Romans was Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh as I kill this Beast The Intention therefore of an Oath being to provoke Vengeance upon the Breakers of Covenant it is to no purpose to sweare by Men be they never so great because their punishment by divers Accidents may be avoided whether they will or no but Gods Punishment not Though it were a Custome of many Nations to sweare by the life of their Princes yet those Princes being ambitious of Divine Honour give sufficient Testimony that they beleeved Nothing ought to be sworne by but the Deity 16. And seeing men cannot be afraid of the Power they beleeve not and an Oath is to no purpose without fear of him they swear by it is necessary that he that sweareth doe it in that forme which himself admitteth in his owne Religion and not in that forme which he useth that putteth him to the oath For though all men may know by nature that there is an Almighty Power neverthelesse they beleeve not that they sweare by him in any other form or name then what their own which they think the true Religion teacheth them 17. And by the definition of an Oath it appeareth that it addeth not a greater Obligation to perform the Covenant sworne then the Covenant carryeth in it self but it putteth a man into greater danger and of greater punishment 18 Covenants and Oaths are De Voluntariis that is De Possibilibus Nor can the Covenantee understand the Covenantor to promise Impossibles for they fall not under Deliberation and consequently by Chap. 13. Sect. 10. which maketh the Covenanter Interpreter no Covenant is understood to bind further then to our best endervour either in performance of the thing promised or in something Equivalent CHAP. III. 1. That men stand to their Covenants 2. Injury defined 3. That Iniury is done onely to the Covenantee 4. The signification of those Names Just Uniust 5. Justice not rightly divided into Commutative and Distributive 6. It is a Law of Nature that He that is trusted turn not that trust to the Damage of Him that trusteth 7. Ingratitude defined 8. It is a Law of Nature to endeavour to accommodate one another 9. And that man forgive upon caution for the future 10. And that revenge ought to respect the future onely 11. That reproach and contempt declared is against the Law of Nature 12. That Indifference of Commerce is of the law of nature 13. That Messengers imployed to procure or maintaine Peace ought to be safe by the Law of Nature IT is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain And it is most certaine that as the truth of a conclusion is no more but the truth of the premises that make it so the force of the Command or Law of Nature is no more then the Force of the Reasons inducing thereunto Therefore the Law of Nature mentioned in the former Chapter Sect. 2. namely That every man should devest himself of the Right c. were utterly vaine and of none effect if this also were not a Law of the same Nature That every man is obliged to stand to and perform those Covenants he maketh For what benefit is it to a man that any thing be promised or given unto him if he that giveth or promiseth performeth not or retaineth still the Right of taking back what he hath given 2. The breach or violation of Covenant is that which men call Iniury consisting in some Action or Omission which is therefore called Uniust For it is Action or Omission without Jus or right which was transferred or relinquish before There is a great Similitude between that we call Iniury or Iniustice in the Actions and Conversations of Men in the World and that which is called Absurd in the arguments and Disputations of the Schools For as he which is driven to contradict an Assertion by Him before maintained is sayd to be reduced to an Absurdity so he that through passion doth or omitteth that which before by Covenant he promised to doe or not to omit is sayd to commit Injustice And there is in every breach of Covenant a
contradiction properly so called For he that covenanteth willeth to do or omit in the time to come And he that doth any Action willeth it in that present which is part of the future time contained in the Covenant And therefore he that violateth a Covenant willeth the Doing and the not doing of the same thing at the same time which is a plaine contradiction And so Iniury is an Absurdity of conversation as Absurdity is a kind of Iniustice in Disputation 3. In all violation of Covenant to whom soever accrueth the Damage the Iniury is done onely to him to whom the Covenant was made For example If a man covenant to obey his Master and the Master command him to give Money to a Third which he promiseth to doe and doth not though this be to the Damage of the third yet the Iniury is done to the Master onely For he could violate no covenant with him with whom none was made and therefore doth him no Iniury For Iniury consisteth in violation of covenant by the definition thereof 4. The Name of Just Uniust Justice Iniustice are Equivocall and signifie diversly For Justice and Iniustice when they be attributed to Actions signifie the same thing with No Iniury and Iniury and denominate the Action Just or Uniust but not the Man so For they denominate him Guilty or Not Guilty But when Justice or Iniustice are attributed to Men they signifie Pronenesse and Affection and Inclination of Nature that is to say Passions of the minde apt to produce Just and uniust Actions So that when a man is sayd to be Just or Uniust not the Action but the Passion and Aptitude to do such Actions is considered And therefore a Just man may have committed an uniust Act and an uniust man may have done iustly not only one but most of his actions For there ts an Oderunt peccare in the uniust as well as in the Just but from different Causes For the uniust man who abstaineth from Iniuries for fear of punishment declareth plainly that the Justice of his Actions dependeth upon Civill Constitution from whence punishments proceed which would otherwise in the Estate of Nature be uniust according to the Fountaine from whence they spring This distinction therefore of Justice and Iniustice ought to be remembred that when Iniustice is taken for Guilty the Action is uniust but not therefore the Man and when Justice is taken for Guiltlesness the Actions are iust and yet not alwayes the Man Likewise when Justice and Iniustice are taken for habits of the mind the Man may be iust or uniust and yet not all his Actions so 5. Concerning the Justice of Actions the same is usually divided into two kinds wherof men call the one Commutative and the other Distributive and are sayd to consist the one in proportion Arithmetical the other in Geometrical And Commutative Justice they place in Permutation as Buying Seling and Barter Distributive in giving to every man according to their deserts Which distinction is not well made in as much as Iniury which is the Iniustice of Action consisteth not in the Inequality of the things changed or distributed but in the Inequality that men contrary to nature and reason assume unto themselves above their Fellowes Of which Inequality shall be spoken hereafter And for Commutative Justice placed in Buying and Selling though the thing bought be unequall to the price given for it yet for as much as both the Buyer and the seller are made Judges of 〈◊〉 Value and are thereby both satisfied there can be no Iniury done on either side neither Party having trusted or covenanted with the other And for Distributive Justice which consisteth in the Distribution of our own benefits seeing a thing is therfore said to be our own because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure it can be no Iniury to any man though our liberality be farther extended towards another then towards him unlesse we be thereto obliged by Covenant and then the Iniustice consisteth in the Violation of that Covenant and not in the Inequality of Distribution 6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth or contributeth to the Power of another without any Covenant but onely upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favor of that other whereby he may procure a greater or no lesse benefit and assistance to himselfe For by necessity of Nature every man doth in all his voluntary Actions intend some good unto Himself In this Case it is a Law of nature That no man suffer him that thus trusteth to his Charity or good affection towards him to be in the worse Estate for his trusting For if he shall so do men will not dare to confer mutually to each others defence nor put themselves into each others mercy upon any tearmes whatsoever but rather abide the utmost and worst even of Hostility by which general diffidence men will not only be inforced to Warr but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another as to make any Overture of Peace But this is te be understood of those onely that confer their benefits as I have sayd upon trust onely and not for tryumph or ostentation For as when they do it upon trust the End they aimed at namely to be well used is the Reward so also when they do it for Ostentation they have the Reward in themselves 2. But seeing in this Case there passeth no Covenant the breach of this Law of nature is not to be called Iniury It hath another Name to wit Ingratitude 8. It is also a Law of Nature That every man do help and endeavor to accommodate each other as far as may be without danger of their Persons and losse of their Means to maintaine and defend themselves For seeing the Causes of Warr and Desolation proceed from those Passions by which we strive to accommodate our selves and to leave others as far as we can behind us it followeth that tha◠Passion by which we strive mutually to accommadate each ather must be the cause of Peace And this Passion is that Charity defined Chap. 9. Sect. 17. 9. And in this Precept of Nature is included and comprehended also this That man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong upon his repentance and caution for the Future For Pardon is Peace granted to him that having provoked to War demandeth it It is not therefore Charity but Feare when a man giveth Peace to him that repenteth not nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in the time to come For he that repenteth not remaineth with the affection of an Enemy as also doth he that refuseth to give caution and consequently is presumed not to seek after Peace but advantage And therefore to forgive Him is not commanded in this Law of nature nor is Charity but may sometime be prudence Otherwise not to pardon upon repentance and caution considering men cannot abstain from provoking one another is never to give Peace And that is
against the generall definition of the Law of Nature 10. And seeing the Law of Nature commandeth Pardon when there is repentance and caution for the Future it followeth that the same Law ordaineth That no Revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past but of the benefit to come that is to say That all Revenge ought to tend to amendment either of the Person offending or of others by the example of his punishment which is sufficiently apparent in that the Law of Nature commandeth Pardon where the future time is secured The same is also apparent by this That revenge when it considereth the offence past is nothing else but present Triumph and Glory and directeth to no End and what is directed to no end is therefore unprofitable and consequently the Triumph of Revenge is Vain-Glory And whatsoever is vain is against Reason and to hurt one another without Reason is contrary to that which by supposition is every mans Benefit namely Peace and what is contrary to peace is contrary to the Law of Nature 11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of Hatred and Contempt provoke in the highest degree to Quarrell and Battel in as much as Life it self with the condition of enduring scorn is not esteemed worth the enjoying much lesse Peace it must necessarily be implyed as a Law of Nature That no man reproach revile deride or any otherwise declare his Hatred Contempt or Disesteem of any other But this Law is very little practised For what is more ordinary then reproaches of those that are rich towards them that are not or of those that sit in place of Judicature towards those that are accused at the Bar although to greive them in that manner be no part of the punishment for their Crime nor contained in their Office But Use hath prevailed That what was lawful in the Lord towards the Servant whom he maintaineth is also practised a◠lawful in the more Mighty towards the lesse though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance 12. It is also a Law of Nature That one man allow Commerce and Traffick indifferently to one another For he that alloweth that to one man which he denyeth to another declareth his hatred to Him to whom he denyeth And to declare Hatred is Warr And upon this title was grounded the great War between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer the Megareans their Neighbours to traffick in their Ports and Markets that War had not begun 13. And this also is a Law of Nature That all Messengers of Peace and such as are imployed to procure and maintaine Amity between Man and Man may safely come and goe For seeing Peace is the general Law of Nature the meanes thereto such as are these men must in the same Law be comprehended CHAP. IV. 1. A Law of Nature that every man acknowledge other for his Equal 2. Another That men allow aequalia aequalibus 3. Another that those things which cannot be divided be used in common 4. Another That things indivisible and incommunicable be divided by Lot 5. Natural Lot Primogeniture and first possession 6. That men submit to arbitration 7. Of an Arbitrator 8. That no man presse his counsel upon any man against his will 9. How to know suddenly what is the Law of Nature 10. That the Law of Nature taketh place after security from others to observe the same 11. The Right of Nature not to be taken away by Custome nor the Law of Nature abrogated by any Act. 12. Why the Dictates of Nature are called Lawes 13. Whatsoever is against Conscience in a man that is his owne Judge is against the Law of Nature 14. Of Malum Poenae Malum Culpae Virtue and Vice 15. Aptitude to society fulfilleth the Law of Nature THe Question which is the Better man is determinable onely in the Estate o◠Government and Policy though it be mistaken for a Question of Nature not onely by Ignorant men that thinke One man Blood better then Anothers by Nature but also by Him whose Opinions are at this day and in these parts of greater authority then any other humane writings For he puttet so much difference between the Powers 〈◊〉 men by Nature that he doubteth not to s◠down as the ground of all his Politick That some men are by Nature worthy to govern and Others by Nature ought to serve Which Foundation hath not only weakne◠the whole Frame of his Politicks but hath also given men Colour and Pretences whereby to disturb and hinder the Peace of one another For though there were such a Difference of Nature that Master and Servant were not by consent of men but by Inherent Virtue yet who hath that Eminency of Virtue above others and who is so stupid as not to govern himself shall never be agreed upon amongst men who do every one naturally think himself as able at the least to govern another as another to govern him And when there was any contention between the Finer and the Courser Wits as there hath been often in Times of Sedition and Civill War for the most part these latter carried away the Victory and as long as men arrogate to themselves more Honour then they give to others it cannot be imagined how they can possibly live in Peace and consequently we are to suppose that for Peace sake Nature hath ordained this Law That every man acknowledg other for his Equall And the Breach of this Law is that we call Pride 2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his Right to every thing so also was it that he should retain his right to some Things to his own Body for example the Right of Defending whereof he could not transfer To the Use of Fire water Free Aire and Place to live in and to all things necessary for Life Nor doth the Law of Nature command any devesting of other Rights then of those only which cannot be retained without the losse of Peace Seeing then many Rights are retained when we enter into peace one with another Reason and the Law of Nature dictateth Whatsoever Right any man requireth to retain he allow every other man to retain the same For he that doth not so alloweth not the Equality mentioned in the former Section For there is no acknowledgement of Worth without attribution of the Equality of Benefit and Respect And this allowance of aequalia aequalibus is the same thing with the allowing of Proportionalia Proportionalibus For when a man alloweth to every man a like the allowance he maketh will be in the same proportion in which are the Numbers of men to whom they are made And this is it men mean by distributive Justice and is properly termed Equity The Breach of this Law is that which the Greeks call {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} which is commonly rendred coveteousness but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word
Incroaching 3. If there passe no other Covenant the Law of Nature is That such things as cannot be divided be used in common proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same or without Limitation when the Quantity thereof sufficeth For first supposing the thing to be used in common not sufficient for them that are to use it without Limitation if a few shall make more use thereof then the rest that equality is not observed which is required in the second Section And this is to be understood as all the rest of the Laws of Nature without any other Covenant antecedent for a man may have given away his Right of Common and so the case be altered 4. In those things which neither can be divided nor used in common the Rule of Nature must needs be one of these Lot or Alternate use for besides these two wayes there can no other equality be imagined and for alternate Use he that beginneth hath the advantage and to reduce that advantage to Equality there is no other way but Lot In things therefore indivisible and incommunicable it is the Law of Nature That the Use be alternate or the Advantage given away by Lot because there is no other way of Equality And Equality is the Law of Nature 5. There be two sorts of Lots One Arbitrary made by men and commonly knowne by the Names of Lot Chance Hazard and the like and there is Natural Lot such as is Primogeniture which is no more but the Chance or Lot of being first born which it seemeth they considered that call Inheritance by the name of Kleronomia which signifieth Distribution by Lot Secondly Prima occupatio first feizing or finding of a thing whereof no man made Use before which for the most part also is meerly Chance 6. Although men agree upon these Laws of Nature and endeavour to observe the same yet considering the Passions of men that make it difficult to understand by what actions and circumstances of Actions those Laws are broken there must needs arise many great controversies about the Interpretation thereof by which the peace must needâ— be dissolved and men return again to their former estate of hostility For the taking away of which Controversies it is necessary that there be some common Arbitrator and Judge to whose sentence both the Parties to the Controversies ought to stand And therefore it is a Law of Nature That in every Controversie the Parties thereto ought mutualâ—â— to agree upon an Arbâ—trator whom they botâ— trust and mutually to covenant to stand to the Sentence he shall give therâ—in For where every man is his own Judge there properly is no Judg at all as whâ—re every man caâ—veth out his own right it hath the same effect as if there were no right at all and where is no Judge there is no End of Controversie And therefore the Right of Hostility remaineth 7. An Arbitrator therefore or he that is Judge is trusted by the Parties to any controversie to determine the same by the Declaration of his own Judgement therein Out of which followeth first that the Judge ought not to be concerned in the Controversie he endeth for in that case he is a Party and ought by the same Reason to bee judged by another Secondly that he maketh no Covenant with either of the Parties to pronounce sentence for the One more then for the Other Nor doth he covenant so much as that his sentence shall be just for that were to make the Parties Judges of the Sentence whereby the Controversie would remaine still undecided Neverthelesse for the Trust reposed in him and for the Equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the Parties he violateth that Law if for favour or hatred to either party he give other sentence then he thinketh Right And thirdly that no man ought to make himself Judge in any Controversie between others unlesse they consent and agree thereto 8. It is also the Law of Nature That no man obtrude or presse his Advice or Counsell to any man that declareth himselfe unwilâ—ing to heare the same For seeing a man taketh Counsel concerning what is Good or Hurt of himself onely and not of his Counsellor and that Counsel is a Voluntary Action and therefore tendeth also to the good of the Counsellor there may be often iust cause to suspect the Counsellor and though there be none yet seeing Counsell unwillingly heard is a needlesse offence to him that is not willing to hear it and offences tend all to the Breach of Peace it is therefore against the Law of Nature to obtrude it 9. A man that shall see these Lawes of Nature set down and inferred with so many words and so much adoe may think there is yet much more difficulty and subtilty required to acknowledge and do according to the said Laws in every sudden occasion when a man hath but a little time to consider And while we consider man in most passions as of Anger Ambition Coveteousness Vain-Glory and the like that tend to the excluding of natural Equality it is true But without these Passions there an easie rule to know upon a sudden whether the Action I be to do be against the Law of Nature or not And it is but this That a man imagine Himself in the Place of the Party with whom He hath to do and reciprocally him in His Which is no more but a changing as it were of the Scales For every mans Passion weigheth heavy in his owne Scale but in the Scale of his Neighbour And this Rule is very well knowne and expressed in this Old Dictate Quod tibi fieri non vis alteri ne feceris 10. These Lawes of Nature the Sum whereof consisteth in forbidding us to be our own Judges and our own Carvers and in commanding us to accommodate one another In case they should be observed by some and not by others would make the Observers but a prey to them that should neglect them leaving the good both without Defence against the Wicked and also with a Charge to assist them which is against the scope of the said Lawes that are made only for the protection and defence of them that keepe them Reason therefore and the Law of Nature over and above all these particular Lawes doth dictate this Law in general That those particular Lawes be so far observed as they subiâ—ct us not to any Incommodity that in ouâ— owne Judgments may arise by the neglect thereof in those towards whem we observe them and consequently requireth no more but the Desire and constant Intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them unlesse there be cause to the contrary in other mens refusall to observe them towards us The Force therefore of the Law of Nature is not in foro externo till there be security for men to obey it but is alwaies In foro interno wherein the Action of obedience being unsafe the Will and Readiness to
performe is taken for the Performance 11. Amongst the Lawes of Nature Customes and Prescriptions are not numbred For whatsoever Action is against Reason though it be reiterated never so often or that there be never so many Precedents thereof is still against Reason and therefore not a Law of Nature but contrary to it But consent and Covenant may so alter the Cases which in the Law of Nature may be put by changing the Circumstances that that which was Reason before may afterwards be against it and yet is Reason still the Law For though every man be bound to allow equally to another yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same make himself inferior then if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior he breaketh not thereby that Law of Nature that commandeth to allowâ— Equallity In sum A mans owne Consâ—nt may abridge him of the liberty which the Law of Nature leaveth him but custome not nor can either of them abrogate either these or any other Law of Nature 12. And forasmuch as Law to speake properly is a Command and these Dictates as they proceed from Nature are not Commands they are not therefore called Laws in respect of Nature but in respect of the Author of Nature God Almighty 13. And seeing the Laws of Nature concern the Conscience not he only breaketh them that doth any Action contrary but also he whose action is conformable to them in case he think it contrary For though the Action chance to be right yet in his Judgment he despiseth the Law 14. Every man by naturall passion calleth that Good which pleaseth him for the present or so far forth as he can foresee and in like manner that which displeaseth him Evil And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his Proservation which is the End that every one by nature aymeth at must also call it good and the contrary evil And this is that Good and Evil which not every man in passion calleth so but all men by Reason And therefore the fulfilling of all these Laws is Good in Reason and the breaking of them Evill And so also the habit or disposition or intention to fulfill them Good and the Neglect of them Evill And from hence cometh that Distinction of Malum Poenâ— and Malum Culpae for Malum Pâ—nâ— is any pain or molestation of the Mind whatsoever but Malum Culpae is that action which is contrary to Reason and the Law of Nature As also the habit of doing according to these and other Laws of Nature that tend to our preservation is that wee call Virtue and the Habit of doing the contrary Vice As for Example Justice is that Habit by which we stand to Covenants Iniustice the contrary Vice Equity that Habit by which we allow Equality of Nature Arrogancy the contrary Vice Gratitude the Habit whereby we requite the Benefit and trust of others Ingratitude the contrary Vice Temperance the Habit by which wee abstain from all things that tend to our Destruction Intemperance the contrary Vice Prudence the same with Virtue in general As for the common opinâ—on that Virtue consisteth in Mediocrity and Vice in extreames I see no ground for it nor can find any such Mediocrity Courage may be Virtue when the Daring is Extream if the Cause be Good and extream fear no Vice when the danger is Extream To give a man more then his Due is no iniustice though it be to give him less and in Gifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality but the reason And so in all other Virtues and Vices I know that this Doctrine of Mediocrity is Aristole's but â—is Opinions concerning Virtue and Vice are no other then those which were received then and are still by the generality of men unstudyed and therefore not very likely to be accurate 15. The Sum of Virtue is to be Sociable with them that will be Socâ—able and Formidable to them that will not And the same is the Sum of the Law of Nature For in being Sociable the Law of Nature taketh place by the way of Peace and Societie and to be Formidable is the Law of Nature in War where to be feared is a Protection a man hath from his own Power and as the â—ormer consisteth in Actions of Equity and Justice the latter consisteth in Actions of Honour And Equity Justice and Honour contain all virtues whatsoever CHAP. V. A Confirmation out of holy Scripture of the principall points mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature THe Lawes mentioned in the former Chapters as they are called the Lawes of Nature for that they are the Dictates of Naturall Reason and also Morall Lawes because they concern the Manners and Conversation one towards another so are they also Divine Lawes in respect of the Author thereof God Almighty and ought therefore to agree or at least not to be Repugnant to the Word of God revealed in Holy Scripture In this Chapter therefore I shall produce such places of Scripture as appear to be most consonant to the said Lawes 2. And first the Word of God seemeth to place the Divine Law in Reason by all such Texts as ascribe the same to the Heart and understanding as Psal. 40.8 Thy Law is in my Heart Heb. 8.10 After those Dayes saith the Lord I will put my Lawes in their Mind And Heb. 10.16 The same Psal. 37.31 speaking of the Righteous man he saith The Law of God in his Heart Psal. 19.7 8. The Law of God is perfect converting the soul It giveth Wisdome to the simple and light unto the eyes Jer. 31.33 I will put my Law in their inward parts and write it in their Hearts And Joh. 1. The Law-giver Himself God Almighty is called by the Name of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} which is also called ver. 4. The Light of men And vers. 9. The light which lighteth every man which cometh inâ—o the World All which are Descriptions of Naturall Reason 3. And that the Law Divine for so much as is Morall are those Precepts which tend to Peace seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of Scripture as these Rom 3.17 Righteousnesse which is the fufilling of the Law is called The way of Peace And Psa. 85.10 Righteousness and Peace shall kiss each other And Matth. 5.9 Blessed are the Peacemakers And Heb. 7.2 Melchisedeck King of Salem is interpreted King of Righteousness and King of Peace And ver. 21. Our Saviour Christ is said to be a Preist for ever after the order of Mâ—lchisedeck Out of which may be inferred that the Doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the Fulfilling of the Law to peace 4. That the Law of Nature is unalterable is intimated by this that the Preisthood of Melchisedeck is everlasting and by the Words of our Saviour Matth. 5.18 Heaven and Earth shall passe away but one jot or tittle of the Law shall not passe till all things be fulfilled 5. That Men ought
hopes consist in his own sleight and strength consequently when any man by his natural passion is provoked to break these Lawes of Nature there is no security in any other man of his own Defence but Anticipation And for this cause every mans right howsoever he be inclined to peace of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes remaineth with him still as the necessary means of his Perservation And therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the Law of Nature one towards another men are still in the Estate of war and nothing is unlawfull to any man that tendeth to his own safety or Commodity And this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutuall ayd and Help of one another whereby also followeth the mutuall Fear of one another 2. It is a proverbiall saying Inter arma silent Leges There is little therefore to be said concerning the Lawes that men are to observe one towards another in Time of War wherein every mans Being and Wâ—ll-being is the rule of his Actions Yet thus much the Law of Nature commandeth in War that men satiate not the cruelty of their present Passions whereby in their own Conscience they foresee no benefit to come For that betrayeth not a necessity but a disposition of the mind to war which is against the Law of Nature And in old Time we read that Rapine was a Trade oâ— life wherein nevertheless many of them â—hat used it did not only spare the lives of those they invaded but left them also such things as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them as namely their Oxen and Instruments for Tillage though they carried away all their other Cattel and substance And as the Rapine it self was warranted in the Law of Nature by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same Law of Nature unless Fear suggested any thing to the contrary For nothing but Fear can justâ—fie the taking away of anothers life And because Fear can hardly be made manifest but by some Action dishonorable that bewrayeth the Conscience of ones own Weakness all men in whom the Passion of Courage or Magnanimity hath been Predominant have abstained fâ—om cruelty insomuch that though there be in War no Law the breach wherof is Iniury yet there are in War those Lawes the breach whereof is dishonour In one word therefore the only Law of Actions in War is Honour and the Right of War Providence 3. And seeing Natural ayd is necessary for Defence as mutual fear is necessary for Peace wee are to consider how great Ayds are required for such Defence and for the causing of such mutual fear as men may not easily adventure on one another And first it is evident that the mutual Ayd of two or three men is of very little security For the odds on the other side of a man or two giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault And therfore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another their number must be so great that the Odds of a few which the enemie may have be no certaine and sensible advantage 4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence yet shall not the effect follow unless they all direct their Actions to one and the same End which direction to one and the same End is that which Chap. 12. Sect. 7. is called Consent This consent or concord amongst so many men thougâ— it may be made by the fear of a present Invader or by the hope of a present Conquest or Bootie and endure as long as that action endureth nevertheless by the Diversity of Judgements and Passions in so many men contending naturally â—or honour and advantage one above another it is impossible not only that their consent to ayd each other against an enemie but also that the Peace should last between themselves with out some mutual and common fear to rule them 5. But contrary hereunto may be obiected the experience we have of certain living Creatures irrational that nevertheless continually live in such good Order and Government for their common benefit and are so free from Sedition War amongst themselves that for Peace Profit and Defence nothing more can be imaginable And the Experience we have in this is in that little Creature the Bee which is therefore reckoned amongst Animalia Politica Why therefore may not men that foresee the Benefit of Concord continually maintain the same without compulsion as well as they To which I answer That amongst other living Creatures there is no Question of Precedence in their owne Species nor strife about Honour or acknowledgement of one anothers wisdome as there is amongst Men from whence arise Envie and Hatred of one towards another and from thence Sedition and War Secondly those living Creatures aim every one at Peace and Food common the Will of Man being voluntary but the Beginning of Voluntary actions is not subject to Deliberation and Covenant yet when a man covenanteth to subject his Will to the command of another he obligeth himself to this that he resigne his strength and meanes to him whom he covenanteth to obey And hereby he that is to command may by the use of all their means strength be able by the terrour thereof to frame the Will of them all to Unity and Concord amongst themselves 8. This Union so made is that which men call now adayes A Body Politick or Civil Society and the Greeks call it {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} that is to say a City which may be defined to be a multitude of men united as one Person by a common power for their common Peace Defence and Benefit 9 And as this Union into a City or Body Politick is instituted with common Power over all ther particular Persons or Members thereof to the common good of them all so also may there be amongst a multitude of those Members instituted a subordinate Union of certain men for certain common actions to be don by those men for some commoâ— Benefit of theirs or of the whole City aâ— for subordinate Government for Counsell for Trade and the like And these Subordinate Bodies Politick are usually calleâ—Corporations and their power such over the particulars of their own Society as the whole City whereof they are Members have allowed them 10. In all Cities or Bodies politick not Subordinate but Independent that One man or one Councell to whom the particular Members have given that common Power is called their Soveraign and his power the Soveraign power which consisteth in the power and the strength that every of the Members have transferred to him from themselves by Covenant And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another or for that other to receive it it is to be understood that to transfer a mans power and strength is no
more but to lay by or relinquish his own Right of Resisting him to whom he so transferreth it And every Member of the Body Politick is called a Subiect to wit to the Soveraign 11. The cause in generall which moveth a man to become subiect to another is as I have sayd already the fear of not otherwise preserving himself And a man may subiect himself to him that invadeth or may invade him for fear of him or men may joyne amongst themselves to subject themselvs to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others and when many men subject themselves the former way there ariseth thence a Body politick as it were naturally From whence proceedeth Dominion Paternal and Despotique And when they subiect themselves the other way by mutual agreement amongst many the Body politick they make is for the most part called a Common Wealth in distinction from the former though the name be the generall name for them both And I shall speak in the first place of Common wealths and afterward of Bodies politick Patrimoniall and despotical The Second part CHAP. I. 1. Introduction 2. A Multitude before their Union c. 3. Expresse Consent of every particular c. 4. Democratical Aristocraticall Monarchiall Union may be instituted for ever or c. 5. Without security no private Right relinquished 6. Covenants of Government without Power of Coertion are no Security 7. Power coercive c. 8. The Sword of War c. 9. Decision in all Debates c. annexed to the Sword 10. Laws Civil c. 11. Appointment of Magestrates c. 12. Soveraign Power includeth Impunity 13. A supposed Common Wealâ—h where Lawes are made first and the Common-Wealth after 14. The same refelled 15. Mixt Formes of Government supâ—osed in Soveraignty 16. That refelled 17. Mixt Government c. 18. Reason and Experience to prove absolute Soveraignty some where in all Common Wealths 19. Some principal c. marks of Soveraignty IN that Treatise of humane nature which was formerly printed hath been wholly spent in the consideration of the naturall power and the Natural Estate of Man namely of his cognition and Passions in the first eleven Chapters and how from thence proceed his Actions in the Twelfth how men know one anothers minds In the last in what Estate Mens passions set them In the first Chapter of this Treatise what Estate they are directed unto by the Dictates of reason that is to say what be the principall Articles of the Law of Nature in the 2.3.4.5 And lastly how a multitude of persons Naturall are united by Covenants into one person civil or Body Politick In this part therefore shall be considered the Nature of a Body politick and the Lawes thereof otherwise called Civill Laws And whereas it hath been sayd in the last Chapter and last Section of the former part that there be two wayes of erecting a Body politick One by Arbitrary Institution of many men assembled together which is like a creation out of nothing by humane Wit the other by Compulsion which is as it were a Generation thereof out of natural force I shall first speak of such erection of a Body politick as proceedeth from the Assembly and consent of a Multitude 2. Having in this place to consider a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a Body politick for their security both against one another and against common Enemies and that by Covenants the knowledge of what Covenants they must needs make dependeth on the Knowledge of the persons and the knowledge of their end First for their persons they are many and as yet not one nor can any Action done in a multitude of People met together be attributed to the multitude or truly called the Action of the multitude unless every mans Hand and every mans Will not so much as one excepted have concurred thereto For Multitude though in their persons they run together yet they concur not alwaies in their Designes For even at that time when men are in tumult though they agree a number of them to one mischeife and a number of them to one another yet in the whole they are amongst themselves in the state of Hostility and not of Peace like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem that could joyn against their enemies and fight amongst themselves Whensoever therefore any man saith that a number of men hath done any Act it is to be understood that every particular man in that number hath consented therunto and not the greatest part only Secondly Though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves they are yet in that Estate in which every man hath right to every thing and consequently as hath been sayd Chap. 1. Sect. 10. in an Estate of inioying nothing And therefore Meum Tuum hath no place amongst them 3. The first thing therefore they are to do is expresly every man to consent to something by which they may come neer to their Ends which can be nothing else imaginable but this that they allow the Wills of the maior part of their whole number or the Wills of the maior part of some certain number of men by them determined and named or lastly the Will of some one man to involve and be taken for the Wllis of every man And this done they are united and a Body Politick And if the maior part of their whole Number be supposed to involve the Wills of all the particulars then the wills of the particulars then are they said to be a Democracie that is to say a Government wherein the whole Number or so many of them as please being assembled together are the Soveraign and every particular man a Subject If the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars then are they said to be an Oligarchy or Aristocracy which two words signifie the same thing together with the divers Passions of those that use them For when the men that be in that Office please they are called an Aristocracy or otherwise an Oligarchy where in those the major part of which declare the Wills of the whole multitude being assembled are the Soveraign and every man severally a Subiect Lastly if their Consent be such that the Will of one man whom they name shall stand for the Wills of them all then is their Government or Union called a Mornarchy and that one man a Soveraign and every of the rest a Subiect 4. And those several sorts of Unions Governments and Subiections of Mans Will may be understood to be made either absolutely that is so say for all future time or for a time limited only But forasmuch as we speak here of a Body politick instituted for the perpetuall Benefit and defence of them that make it which therefore men desire should last for ever I will omit to speak of those that be temporary and consider of those that be for ever 5. The end
for which one man giveth up and relinquisheth to another or others the right of protecting defending himself by his own power is the security which he expecteth thereby of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it and a man may then account himself in the estate of security when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him from which the Doer may not be deterred by the power of that Soveraign to whom they have every one subiected themselves and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own Advantages and make himself a prey to others And therefore when there is not such a Soveraign power erected as may afford this security it is to be understood that every mans right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes remaineth still with him and contrarywise where any Subiect hath right by his own Judgment and discretion to make use of his force it is to be understood that every man hath the like and consequently that there is no Common Wealth at all established How far therefore in the making of a Common Wealth man subiecteth his Will to the power of others must appear from the End namely Security For whatsoever is necessary to be by Covenant transferred for the attaining thereof so much is transferred or else every man is in his naturall Liberty to secure himself 6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a Common Wealth and put in writing without erecting of a power of Coercion are no reasonable Security for any of them that so covenant nor are to be called Laws and leave men still in the Estate of Nature and Hostility For seeing the Wills of most men are governed only by Fear and where there is no power of Coercion there is no Fear the Wills of most men will follow their Passions of Covetousness Lust Anger and the like to the breaking of those Covenants whereby the rest also who otherwise would keep them are set at liberty and have no Law but from themselves 7. This power of Coercion as hath been sayd Chap. 2. Sect. 3. of the former part consisteth in the transferring of every mans right of Resistance against him to whom he hath transferred the Power of Coercion It followeth therefore that no man in any Common Wealth whatsoever hath right to resist him or them on whom they have transferred this Power Coercive or as men use to call it the Sword of Justice supposing the not Resistance possible For part 1. Chap. 2. Sect. 18. Covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour 8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security by the means of this Sword of Justice that keep them all in awe are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without if there be not some means found to unite their Strengthâ— and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies their peace amongst themselves is but in vain And therefore it is to be understood as a Covenant of every Member to contribute their several forces fore the Defence of the whole whereby to make one power as sufficieâ—t as is possible for their Defence Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the Use of his strength to him or them that have the Sword of Justice it followeth that the Power of Defence that is to say the Sword of war be in the same Hands wherein is the Sword of Justice and consâ—quently those two Swords are but One and that inseperably and essentially annexed to the Soveraign Power 9. Moreover seeing to have the Right of the Sword is nothing else but to have the Use thereof depending onely on the Judgement and discretion of Him or Them that have it it followeth that the Power of Indenture in all Controversies wherein the Sword of Justice is to be used and in all deliberations concerning War wherein the Use of that Sword is required the right of Resolving and determining what is to be done belong to the same Soveraign 10. Farther considering it is no less but much more necessary to prevent Violence Rapine then to punish the same when it is committed all violence proceedeth from Controversies that arise between men concerning Meum Tuum Right and Wrong Good and Bad and the like which men use every one to measure by their own Judgements it belongeth also to the Judgment of the same Soveraign Power to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his and what anothers what is good and what bad and what he ought to do and what not and to command the same to be observed And these measures of the Actions of the Subiects are those which men call Laws politick or Civil The making whereof must of right belong to him that hath the power of the Sword by which men are compelled to observe them for otherwise they should be made in vain 11. Farthermore seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such Soveraign Power can be able in person to hear and determine all Controversies to be present at al deliberations concerning common good and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto whereby there will be necessity of Magistrates and Ministers of publique affaires it is consequent that the appointment nomination limitation of the same be understood as an inseperable part of the same soveraignty â—o which the sum of all iudicature and execution hath been already annexed 12. And forasmuch as the right to use the forces of every particular member is transferred from themselves to their soveraign a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself that to soveraign power whatsoever it doth there belongeth Impunity 13. The sum of these Rights of Sovâ—râ—ignty namely the absolute use of the Sword in Peace and War the making and abrogating of Laws Supream Judicature Decision in al Debate iudiciall and deliberative the nomination of all Magistrates and Ministers with other Rights contained in the same make the soveraign power no less absolute in the common-wealth then before Common-wealth every man was absolute in himself to do or not to do what he thought good which men that have not had the experience of that miserable estate to which men are reduced by long War think so hard a condition that they can not easily acknowledge such covenants and subiection on their parts as are here set down to have been ever necessary to their peace And therefore some have imagined that a Common-Wealth may be constituted in such manner as the Soveraign Power may be so limited and moderated as they shall think fit themselves For Example They suppose a Multitude of men to have agreed upon certain Articles which they presently call Lawes declaring how they will be governed and that done to agree farther upon some man or number of men to see the same Articles performed and put in
execution and to enable Him or Them thereunto they allot unto them a Provision limited as of certain Lands taxes Penalties and the like then which if mispent they shall have no more without a new Consent of the same men that allowed the former And thus they think they have made a Common Wealth in which it is unlawfull for any private man to make use of his owne Sword for his Security wherein they deceive themselves 14. For first if to the Revenue it did necessarily follow that there might be Forces raised and procured at the Will of him that hath such Revenue yet since the Revenue is limited so must also the Forces bâ—t limited Forces against the Power of an Enemy which wee cannot limit are unsufficient Whensoever therefore there happeneth an Invasion greater then those Forces are able to resist and there be no other right to levy more then is every man by Necessity of Nature allowed to make the best provision he can for himself and thus is the Private Sword and the estate of War again reduced But seeing Revenue without the right of commanding men is of no use neither in Peace nor War it is necessary to be supposed that he that hath the Administration of those Articles which are in the former Section supposed must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men And what reason soever giveth him that right over any one giveth him the same over all And then is his Right absolute For he that hath Right to all their Forces hath right to dispose of the same Again supposing those limited forces and Revenue either by the necessary or negligent use of them to fail and that for a supply the same multitude be again to be assembled who shall have power to assemble them that is to compel them to come together If he that demandeth the supply hath that Right to wit the right to compell them all then is his Soveraignty absolute if not then is every particular man at liberty to come or not to frame a new Common wealth or not and so the right of the private Sword returneth but suppose them willingly and of their own accord assembled to consider of this supply if now it be stil in their choice whether they shall give it or not it is also in their choice whether the Common Wealth shall stand or not And therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil Obligation that may hinder them from using force in case they think it tend to their defence This Device therefore of them that will make Civil Laws first and then a Civil Body afterwards as if Policy made a Body Politick and not a Body Politick made Policy is of no effect 15. Others to avoid the hard condition as they take it of absolute subiection which in hatred thereto they also call slaverie have despised a Government as they think mixed of three sorts of Soveraignty As for Example They suppose the power of making Laws given to some great Assembly Democratical the Power of Judicature to some other Assembly and the Administration of the Laws to a Third or to some one Man and this Policy they call mixt Monaâ—chy or mixt Aristocracy or mixt Democracy according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate And in this estate of Government they thinke the use of the Private Sword excluded 16. And supposing it were so How were this condition which they call slavery eased thereby For in this Estate they would have no man allowed either to be his own Judge or own Carver or to make any Lawes unto himself and as long as these three agree they are as absolutely subject to them as is a Child to the Father or a Slave to the Master in the state of Nature The ease therefore of this Subjection must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom they have distâ—ibuted the rights of soveraign power But the same Disagreement is War The division therefore of the Soveraignty either worketh no effect to the taking away of simple Subjection or introduceth War wherein the private Sword hath place againe But the Truth is as hath been already shewed in 7 8 9 10 11 12. precedent Sections the Soveraignty is indivisible And that seeming mixture of severall kinds of Government not mixture of the things themselves but Confusion in our understandings that cannot find out readily to whom we have subiected our selves 17. But though the Soveraignty be not mixt but be alwaies either simple Democracy or simple Aristocracy or pure Monarchy nevertheless in the Administration thereof all those sorts of government may have place subordinate For Suppose the Soveraign power be Democracy as it was sometimes in Rome yet at the same time they may have a Counsel Aristocratical such as was the Senate and at the same time they may have a Subordinate Monarch such as was their Dictator who had for a time the exercise of the whole Soveraignty such as are all Generals in war So also in Monarchy there may be a Councel Aristocratical of men chosen by the Monarch or Democratical of men chosen by the consent the Monarch permitting of all the particular men of the Common Wealth And this mixture is it that imposeth as if it were the mixture of soveraignty As if a man should think because the great Councel of Venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose Magistrats Ministers of State Captains and Governours of Towns Ambassadors Councellors and the like that therefore their part of the soveraigt is only chusing of Magistrates that the making of War and Peace and Laws were not theirs but the part of such Counsellors as they appointed thereto wheras it is the part of these to do it but subordinately the supream authority therof being in the Great Councel that chuse them 18. And as Reason teacheth us that a man considered out of subjection to Lawes and out of all Covenants obligatory to others is free to do and undo and deliberate as long as he listeth every member being obedient to the Will of the whole man that Liberty being nothing else but his naturall Power without which he is no better then an inanimate Creature not able to help himself so also it teacheth us that a Body politick of what kind soever nor subiect to another nor obliged by Covenants ought to be free and in all actions to be assisted by the members every one in their place or at least not resisted by them For otherwise the power of a Body politick the Essence whereof is the not resistance of the Members is none nor a Body politick of any Benefit And the same is confirmed by the Use of all Nations and Common-Wealths wherein that man or Councel which is virtually the whole hath any absolute power over every particular member or what Nation or Common-Wealth is there that hath not power and Right to constitute a General in their wars But the power of a General is absolute
and consequently there was absolute power in the Common Wealth from whom it was derived For no person natural or civill can transfer unto another more power then himself hath 19. In every Common VVealth where particular men are deprived of their Right to protect themselves there resideth an Absolute Soveraignty as I have already shewed But in what man or in what Assembly of men the same is placed is not so manifest as not to need some Marks whereby it may be discerned And first it is an infallible mark of absolute Soveraignty in a man or in an Assembly of men if there be no Right in any other person Naturall or Civil to punish that man or to dissolve that Assembly For he that cannot of right be punished cannot of Right be resisted and he that cannot of right be resisted hath coercive power oveâ— all the rest and thereby can frame and govern their Actions at his pleasure which is absolute soveraignty Contrariwise he that in a Common-Wealth is punishable by any or that Assembly that is dissolvable is not soveraign For a greater power is alwaies required to punish and dissolve then theirs who are punished or dissolved and that Power cannot be called Soveraign then which there is a greater Secondly that man or Assembly that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other may make Laws or abrogate them at his or their pleasure have the Soveraignty absolute For seeing the Laws they make are supposed to be made by right the Members of the Common Wealth to whom they are made are obliged to obey them and consequently not resist the Execution of them which not resistance maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them It is likewise a mark of this soveraignty to have the Right Originall of appointing Magistrates Judges Councellors and Ministers of State For without that Power no Act of Soveraignty or Government can be performed Lastly and generally whosoever by his own authority independent can do any act which another of the same Common Wealth may not must needs be understood to have the soveraign power For by Nature men have equal Right This Inequality therefore must proceed from the Power of the Common-Wealth He therefore that doth any Act lawfully by his owne Authoritâ— which another may not doth it by the Power of the Common-wealth in himself which is Absolute Soveraignty CHAP. II. 1. Democracy precedeth all other c. 2. The Soveraign people covenanteth not with the Subiects 3. The Soveraign c. cannot c. do iniury c. 4. The faults of the Soveraigne People c. 5 Democracy c. an Aristocracy of Orators 6. Aristocracy how made 7. The Body of the Optimates not properly said to iniure the Subiects 8. The Election of the Optimates c. 9. An Elective King c. 10. A Conditional King c. 11. The word People Equivocal 12. Obedience discharged by Release 13. How such Releases are to be understood 14. Obedience discharged by Exile 15. By Conquest 16. By ignorance of the Right of Succession HAving spoken in generall concerning instituted Policy in the former Chapter I come in this to speak of the sorts thereof in special how every of them is instituted The first in order of time of these three sorts is Democracy and it must be so of necessity because an Aristocracy and a Monarchy require nomination of persons agreed upon which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part and where the Votes of the maior part involve the votes of the rest there is actually a democracie 2. In the making of a Democracie there passeth no Covenant between the Soveraign and any Subiect For while the Democracy is a making there is no Soveraign with whom to contract For it cannot be imagined that the Multitude should contract with it seif or with any one man or number of men parcell of it self to make it self Soveraign nor that a mulritude considered as One Aggregate can give it self any thing which before it had not Seeing then that Soveraignty Democraticall is nat conferred by the Covenant of any multitude which supposeth Union and Soveraignty already made it resteth that the same be conferred by the particular Covenants of evry several man that is to say every man with every man for and in consideration of the Benefit of his own Peace and Defence covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the maior part of their whole number or the Maior part of such a number of them as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place shall determine and command And this is that which giveth being to a Democracy wherein the soveraign Assembly was called of the Greeks by the name of Demus that is the People from whence cometh Democracy So that where to the supreame and Independent Court every man may come that will and give his vote there the Soveraign is called the People 3. Out of this that hath been sayd may readily be drawn that whatsoever the People doth to any one particular Member or Subject of the Common Wealth the same by him ought not to be stiled Iniury For first Iniury by the Definition Part 1. Chap. 3. Sect. 2. is Breach of Covenant but Covenants as hath been said in the precedent Section there passed none from the People to any private man and consequently to wit the People can do him no Iniury Secondly how uniust soever the action be that this Soveraigne Dâ—mus shall do is done by the will of every particular man subiect to him who are therefore guilty of the same If therefore they stile it Iniury they but accuse themselves And it is against Reason for the same man both to do and complain implying this Contradiction that wheras he first ratified the Peoples Acts in general he now disalloweth the same of them in particular It is therefore said truly Volenti non fit Injuria Nevertheless nothing doth hinder but that divers Actions done by the people may be uniust before God Almighty as Breaches of the Law of Nature 4. And when it hapneth that the People by plurality of voices that decree or command any thing contrary to the Law of God or Nature though the Decree and Command be the act of every man not only present in the assembly but also absent from it yet is not the Iniustice of the Decree the Iniustice of every particular man but only of those men by whose express-sufferagâ—s the Decree or Command was passed For a Body politick as it is a Fictious Body so are the Faculties and will thereof Fictious also But to make a particular man uniust which consisteth of a Body and Soul natural there is required a Naturall and very Will 5. In all Democracies though the Right of Soveraignty be in the Assembly which is virtually the whole Body yet the use therof is alwaies in one or a few particular men For in such great
Assemblies as those must be whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure there is no means any waies to deliberate and give Councel what to do but by long and set Orations whereby to every man there is more or less hope given to incline sway the Assembly to their own Ends In a multitude of speakers therefore where alwaies either one is eminent alone or a few being equal amongst themselvs are eminent above the rest that one or few must of necessity sway the whole Insomuch that a Democracy in effect is no more then an Aristocracy of Orators interrupted sometimes with the temporary Monarchy of one Orator 6. And seeing a Democracy is by Institution the beginning both of Aristocracy and Monarchy we are to consider next how Aristocracy is derived from it When the particular Members of the Common Wealth growing weary of attendance at publick Courts as dwelling far off or being attentive to their private Businesses and withall displeased with the Government of the People assemble themselves to make an Aristocracy there is no more required to the making thereof but putting to the Question one by one the Names of such men as it shall consist of and assenting to their Election and by plurality of Vote to transfer that power which before the People had to the number of men so named and chosen 7. And from this manner of erecting an Aristocracy it is manifest that the Few or Optimates have entred into no Covenant with any of the particular Members of the Common VVealth wherof they are Soveraign and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man that can be called Injury to him howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God according to that which hath been sayd before Sect â— Farther it is impossible that the People as one Body Politick should covenant with the Aristocracy or Optimates on whom they intend to transfer their Soveraignty For no sooner is the Aristocracy erected but the Democracy is annihilated and the Covenants made unto them void 8. In all Aristocracies the Admission of such as are from time to time to have Vote in the soveraign assembly dependeth on the Will and Decree of the present Optimates For they being the Soveraign have the nomination by the 11. Section of the former Chapter of all Magistrates Ministers and Counsellors of State whatsoever and may therefore chuse either to make them elective or hereditary at their pleasure 9. Out of the same Democracy the Institution of a Political Monarch proceedeth in the same manner as did the Institutioâ— of the Aristocracy to wit by a Decree of the Soveraign People to passe the Soveraignty to One Man named and approved by Plurality of Suffrage And if this Soveraignty be truly and indeed transferred the Estate or Common-Wealth is an absolute Monarchy wherein the Monarch is at liberty to disposâ— as well of the Succession as of the Possession and not an Elective Kingdome For supposâ— a Decree be made first in this manner Thaâ— such a One shal have the Soveraignty for hiâ— life and that afterward they will chuse a new In this Case the Power of the People is dissolved or not if dissolved then after the Death of him that is chosen there is no man bound to stand to the Decrees of them that shall as Private men run together to make a new Election and consequently if there be any man who by the advantage of the Raign of Him that is dead have strength enough to hold the multitude in Peace and Obedience he may lawfully or rather is by the Law of Nature obliged so to do if this power of the people were not dissolved at the chusing of their King for life then is the people Soveraign still and the King a Minister thereof only but so as to put the whole Soveraignty in Execution A Great Minister but no otherwise for his time then a Dictator was in Rome In this case at the death of him that was chosen they that meet for a new Election have no new but their old Authority for the same For they were the Soveraign all the time as appeareth by the Acts of those Elective Kings that have procured from the People that their children might succeed them For it is to be understood when a man receiveth any thing from the Authority of the people he receiveth it not from the People his Subiects but from the people his Soveraign And farther though in the Election of a King for his life the People grant him the Exercise of their Soveraignty for that time Yet if they see cause they may recall the same before the Time As a Prince that conferreth an Office for life may nevertheless upon suspition of Abuse thereof recall it at his pleasure in as much as Offices that require lobour and care are understood to passe from him that giveth them as Onera Burthens to them that have them the recalling whereof are therefore not Injury but Favour Nevertheless if in making an Elective King with Intention to reserve the Soveraignty they reserve not a Power at certaine known and determined times and places to assemble themselves the reservation of their Soveraignty is of no effect in as much as no man is bound to stand to the Decrees and Determinations of those that assemble themselves without the Soveraign Authortiy 10. In the former Section is shewed that elective Kings that exercise their Soveraignty for a Time which determines with their Life either are Subjects or not Soveraigns And that it is when the people in Election of them reserve unto themselves the right of Assembling at certaine times and places limited and made known Or else Absolute Soveraigns to dispose of the Succession at their Pleasure and that is when the people in their Election have declared no time nor place of their meeting or have left it to the power of the Elected King to assemble and dissolve them at such times as he himselfe shall think good There is another kind of Limitation of time to him that shal be elected to use the Soveraign Power which whether it hath been practised anywhere or not I know not but it may be imagined and hath been obiected against the Rigor of Soveraign Power and it is this that the People transfer their Soveraignty upon Conditions As for Example for so long as he shall observe such and such Lawes as they then prescribe him And here as before in elected Kings the Question is to be made whether in the Electing of such a Soveraign they reserved to themselves a right of Assembling at times and places limited and known or not if not then is the Soveraignty of the People dissolved and have neither power to iudge of the Breach of the Conditions given him nor to command any Forces for the Deposing of him whom on that Condition they had set up but are in the Estate of war amongst themselves as they were before they made themselves a Democracy and consequently
if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the publick meanes be able to compel them to Unity and Obedience he hath not only of the right of Nature to warrant him but of the Law of Nature to Oblige him thereunto But if in Electing him they reserved to themselves a right of Assembling and appointed certain times and places to that purpose then are they Soveraign still and may call their conditional King to account at their pleasure and deprive him of his Government if they judge he deserve it either by breach of the condition set him or otherwise For the Soveraign power can by no Covenant with a subiect be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their Command as a Burden imposed not particularly for his good but for the good of the Soveraign People 11. The Controversies that arise concerning the Right of the People proceed from the Equivocation of the Word For the word People hath a double signification In one sense it signifieth onely a Number of Men distinguished by the place of their habitation as the People of England or the People of France which is no more but the Multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those Regions without consideration of any Contracts or Covenants amongst them by which any one of them is obliged to the rest In another sense it signifieth a Person civill that is to say either one Man or one Councel in the Will whereof is included and involved the Will of every one in particular As for example in this later sence the lower House of Parliament is all the Commons as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto but after they be dissolved though they remain they be no more the People nor the Commons but only the Aggregate or Multitude of the particular men there sitting how well soever they agree or concur in Opinions amongst themselves whereupon they that do not distinguish between these two significations do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved Multitude as belong only to the People virtually contained in the Body of the Common Wealth or Soveraignty And when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation they usually give them the name of the whole Nation In which sense they say the People rebelleth or the People demandeth when it is no more then a dissolved multitude of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something yet the heap or multitude cannot be said to demand or have right to any thing For where every man hath his right distinct there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto and when the particulars say this is mine this is thine and this is his and have shared all amongst them there can be nothing whereof the Multitude can say this is mine nor are they one Body as behoveth them to be that demand any thing under the name o Mine or His and when they say Ours every man is understood to pretend in severall and not the multitude On the other side when the Multitude is united into a Body politick and thereby are a People in the other signification and their wills virtually in the Soveraign there the rights and Demands of the particulars do cease and he or they that have the Soveraign Power doth for them all demand and vindicate under the name of his that which before they called in the plural Theirs 12. VVe have seen how particular men enter into subiection by transferring their Rights It followeth to consider how such subiection may be discharged And first if He or they that have the Soveraign Power shall relinquish the same voluntarily there is no doubt but every man is again at Liberty to obey or not Likewise if he or they retaining the Soveraignty over the rest do neverthless exempt some one or more from their subiection every man so exempted is discharged for he or they to whom any man is obliged hath the power to release him 13. And here it is to be understood that when he or they that have the Soveraign power give such exemption or Priviledge to a Subiect as is not seperable from the Soveraignty and nevertheless directly retaineth the Soveraign Power not knowing the consequence of the priviledg they grant the Person or persons exempted or priviledged are not thereby released For in contradictory significations of the will Part 1. Chap. 13. Sect. 9. That which is directly signified is to be understood for the will before that which is drawn from it by Consequence 14. Also Exile perpetual is a Release of Subiection forasmuch as being out of the protection of the Soveraignty that expelled him he hath no meanes of subsisting but from himself Now every man may lawfully defend himself that hath no other Defence else there had been no necessity that any man should enter into voluntary subiection as they do in Common Wealths 15. Likewise a man is released of his subiection by conquest For when it cometh to pass that the Power of a Common wealth is overthrown and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of his Enemy yeildeth himself Captive he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him and consequently discharged of his Obligation to the former For no man can serve two Masters 16. Lastly Ignorance of the Succession dischargeth Obedience For no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom CHAP. III. 1.2 Titles to Dominion Master and Servant c. 3. Chaines and other c. Bonds c. Slave defined 4. Servants have no property against their Lord c. 5. The Master hath right to alienate his Servant 6. The Servant of the Servant c. 7. How Servitude is discharged 8. The middle Lord c. 9. The title of Man c. Over Beasts HAving set forth in the two preceding Chapters the Nature of a Common Wealth Institutive by the Consent of many men together I come now to speak of Dominion or a Body politick by acquisition which is commonly called a Patrimonial Kingdome But before I enter thereinto it is necessary to make known upon what Title one man may acquire Right that is to say Property or Dominion over the person of another For when one Man hath Dominion over another there is a little Kingdome And to be a King by Acquisition is nothing else but to have acquired a Right or Dominion over many 2. Considering men therefore again in the Estate of Nature without Covenants or Subjection one to another as if they were but even now all at once created Male and Female there be three Titles only by which one man may have Right and Dominion over another whereof two may take place presently and those are voluntary offer of Subjection and yeilding by Compulsion The third is to take place upon the supposition of Children begotten amongst them Concerning the first of these three Titles it is handled
The Child of a Woman-servant c. 5. The Right to the Child given from the Mother c. 6. The Child of the Concubine c. 7. The Child of the Husband and the Wife c. 8. The Father or he or she that bringeth up the Child have absolute power over Him 9. Freedome in Subiects what it is 10. A Great Family is a Patrimonial Kingdome 11. Succession of the Soveraign Power c. 12. Though the Successor be not declared yet there is alwayes One to be presumed 13. The Children preferred to the succession c. 14. The Males before Females 15. The Eldest before the rest of the Brothers 16. The Brother next to the Children 17. The Succession of the Possessor c. OF three wayes by which a man becometh subiect to another mentioned Sect. 2. Chap. the last namely Voluntary Offer Captivity and Birth the former two have been spoken of under the name of Subiects and Servants In the next place we are to set down the Third way of subiection under the name of Children and by what Title one-man commeth to have propriety in a Child that proceedeth from the Common Generation of two to wit of Male and Female And considering men again dissolved from all Covenants one with another and that Part 1. Chap. 4. Sect. 2. every man by the Law of Nature hath right or propriety to his own Body the Child ought rather to be the proprietie of the Mother of whose Body it is part till the time of separation then of the Father For the understanding therefore of the Right that a man or woman hath to his or their Child two things are to be considered First what Title the mother or any other originally hath to a child new born Secondly how the Father or any other man pretendeth by the Mother 2. For the first they that have written of this subiect have made Generation to be a Title of Dominion over persons as well as the consent of the persons themselves And because Generation giveth Title to two namely Father and Mother whereas Dominion is Indivisible they therefore ascribe Dominion over the Child to the Father only Ob praestantiam Sexus but they shew not neither can I find out by what coherence either Generation inferreth Dominion or Advantage of so much strength which for the most part a man hath more then a woman should generally and universally entitle the Father to a propriety in the Child and take it away from the Mother 3. The Title to Dominion over a Child proceedeth not from the Generation but from the preservation of it and therefore in the Estate of Nature the Mother in whose power it is to save or destroy it hath right thereto by that power according to that which hath been sayd Part 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 13. And if the Mother shall think fit to abandon or expose her Câ—ild to Death whatsoever man or woman shall finde the child so exposed shall have the same Right which the Mother had before and for this same reason namely for the Power not of Generating but preserving And though the child thus preservd do in time acquire strength whereby he might pretend Equality with him or her that hath preserved him yet shall that pretence be thought unreasonable both because his strength was the Gift of him against whom be pretendeth and also because it is to be presumed that he which giveth sustenance to another whereby to strengthen him hath received a Promise of Obedience in Consideration thereof For else it would be Wisdome in men rather to let their Children perish while they are Infants then to live in their Danger or Subiection when they are grown 4. For the Pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the Mother they be of divers kinds One by the absolute Subiection of the Mother another by some particular Covenant from her which is less then a Covenant of such subiection By absolute subiection the Master of the Mother hath Right to her Child according to Sect. 6. Chap. 3. whether he be the Father thereof or not And thus the Children of the servant are the Goods of the Master in Perpetuum 5. Of Covenants that amount not to subiection between Man and Woman there be some which are made for a time they are Covenants of Cohabitation or else of Copulation only And in this later case the children pass by Covenants particular And thus in the Copulation of the Amazones with their Neighbours the Fathers by Covenant had the Male children only the Mothers retaining the Females 6. And Covenants of Cohabitation are either for Society of Bed or for Society of all things if for Society of Bed only then is the Woman called A Concubine And here also the Child shall be his or hers as they shall agree particularly by Covenant For although for the most part a Concubine is supposed to yeild up the Right of her Children to the Father yet doth not Concubinate enforce so much 7. But if the Covenants of Cohabitation be for societie of all things it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both without which as hath been often said before Societie cannot last And therefore the man to whom for the most part the woman yeildeth the Government hath for the most part also the sole Right and Dominion over the Children And the man is called the Husband and the Woman the VVife But because sometimes the Government may belong to the VVife only sometimes also the Dominion over the Children shall be in her only As in the case of a Soveraign Queen there is no Reason that her Marriage should take from her the Dominion over her Children 8. Children therefore whether they be brought up and preserved by the Father or by the Mother or by whomsoever are in most absolute subjection to Him or Her that so bringeth them up or preserveth them And they may alienate them that is assign his or her Dominion by selling or giving them in Adoption or Servitude to others or may pawn them for Hostages kill them for Rebellion or sacrifice them for Peace by the Law of Nature when he or she in his or her conscience think it to be necessary 9. The Subiection of them who institute a Common Wealth amongst themselves is no less absolute then the subiection of servants And therein they are in equal estate But the hope of those is greater then the hope of these For he that subiecteth himself uncompelled thinketh there is no reason he should be better used then he that doth it upon Compulsion and coming in freely calleth himself though in subiection a Freeman whereby it appeareth that Liberty is not any exemption from subiection and obedience to the Soveraign power but a State of better hope then theirs that have been subiected by force and conquest And this was the reason that the Name which signifieth Children in
the Latine tongue is Liberi which also signifieth Free men And yet in Rome nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others as children in the Family of their Fathers For both the State had power over their life without consent of their Fathers and the Father might kil his son by his own authority without any warrant from the State Freedome therefore in Common-Wealths is nothing but the Honour of Equality of Favour with other Subiects and Servitude the Estate of the rest A Free-man therefore may expect employments of Honour rather then a Servant And this is al that can be understood by the Liberty of the Subiect For in all other senses Liberty is the State of him that is not subiect 10. Now when a father that hath children hath servants also the children not by the right of the child but by the natural indulgence of the Parents are such fremen And the whole consisting of the Father or Mother or both of the children of the servants is called a Family wherin the Father or Mother of the Family is soveraign of the same and the rest both children and servants equally subiects The same Family if it grow by multiplication of children either by Generation or Adoption or of servants either by Generation Gonquest or voluntary submission to be so Great and Numerous as in probability it may protect it self then is that Family called a Patrimoniall Kingdome or Monarchy by acquisition wherein the Soveraignty is in one man as it is in a Monarch made by Politicall institution So that whatsoevâ—r Rights be in the One the same also be in the other And therefore I shall no more speake of them as distinct but of Monarchy in general 11. Having shewed by what right the several sorts of Common-wealths Democracy Aristocracy and Monarchy are erected it followeth to shew by what right they are continued The Right by which they are continued is called the Right of Succession to the Soveraign Power whereof there is nothing to be said a Democracy because the Soveraign dyeth not as long as there be Subjects alive Nor in any Aristocracy because it cannot easily fall out that the Optimates should every one fail at once And if it should so fall out there is no question but the Common Wealth is thereby dissolved It is therefore in a Monarchy only that there can happen a Question concerning the Succession And first forasmuch as a Monarch which is absolue Soveraign hath the Dominion in his own Right he may dispose thereof at his own Will If therefore by his last Will he shall name his Successor the Right passeth by that Will 12. Nor if the Monarch dye without any Will concerning the Succession declared it is not therefore to be presumed it was his Will his Subiects which are to him as his children and Servants should return again to the State of Anarchy that is to War and Hostility For that were expresly against the Law of Nature which commandeth to procure Peace and to maintain the same It is therefore to be conjectured with reason that it was the intention to bequeath them Peace that is to say a Power Coercive whereby to keep them from sedition amongst themselves and rather in the Form of a Monarchy then any other Government forasmuch as he by the exercise thereof in his own person hath declared that he approveth the same 13. Farther it is to be supposed his Intention was that his own Children should be preferred in the Succession when nothing to the contrary is expresly declared before any other For men naturally seek their own Honour and that consisteth in the honour of their Children after them 14. Again seeing every Monarch is supposed to desire to continue the Governmenâ— in his Successors as long as he may and that generally men are indued with greateâ— parts of Wisdom and Courage by which alâ— Monarchies are kept from disâ—olution then Women are it is to be presumed where no express Will is extant to the contrary he preferreth his Male children before the Female Not but that Women may governe and have in divers ages and places governed wisely but are not so apt thereto in generals as men 15. Because the Soveraign Power is indivisible it cannot be supposed that he intended the same should be divided but that it should descend intirely upon one of them which is do be presumed should be the Eldest assigned thereto by the Lot of Nature because he appointed no other Lot for the Decision thereof Besides what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the Brethren the Odds shall be adiudged to the Elder because no Subiect hath authority otherwise to judge thereof 16. And for want of issue in the possessor the Brother shall be presumed Successor For by the Judgement of Nature next in Blood is next in Love and next in Love is next to preferment 17. And as the Succession followeth the first Monarch so also it followeth Him or Her that is in possession and consequently the Children of Him in possession shall be prefeâ—red before the Children of his Father or Predecessor CHAP. V. 1. The Utility of the Common-Wealth c. 2. The losse of liberty c. 3. Monarchy approved c. 4. Monarchy less subiect to Passion c. 5.6 Subiects in Monarchy c. 7. Laws in Monarchy less changeable c. 8. Monarchies less subiect to dissolution HAving set forth the Nature of a Person Politick and the three sotts thereof Democracy Aristocracy and Monarchy In this Chapter shall be declared the Convencies and Inconveniencies that arise from the same both in general and of the said several sorts in particular And first seeing a Body Politick is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular men the benefit and damage thereof consieth in the benefit or damage of being ruled The benefit is that for which a Body Politick was instituted namely the Peace and Preservation of every particular man then which it is not possible there can be a greater as hath been touched before Part 1. chap. 1. Sect. 12. And this Benefit extendeth equally both to the Soveraign and to the Subjects For he or they that have the Soveraign Power have but the Defence of their Persons by the Assistance of the Particulars and every particular man hath his Defence by their Union in the Soveraign As for other Benefits which pertain not to their safetie and sufficiency buâ— to their well and delightfull being such as are superfluous riches they so belong to the Soveraign as they must also be in the Subject and so to the Subiect as they must also be in the Soveraign For the Riches and Treasure of the Soveraign is the Dominion he hath over the riches of his Subiects If therefore the Soveraign provide not so as that particular men may have means both to preserve themselvs and also to preserve the Publick the common or soveraign treasure can be none And on the
declared out of the Holy Scriptures as matter of Faith but the Belief of those Fundamental Articles before set forth neverthelesse there are required other things as matter of obedience For as it is not enough in Temporal Kingdoms to avoid the punishment which Kings may inflict to acknowledge the Right and Title of the King without Obedience also to his Laws So also it is not enough to acknowledge our Saviour Christ to be the King of Heaven in which consisteth Christian Faith unless also we endeavour to obey his Lawes which are the Lawes of the Kingdome of Heaven in which consisteth Christian Obedience And forasmuch as the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven are the Laws of Nature as hath been shewed Part. 1. Chap. 5. not only Faith but also the Observation of the Law of Nature which is that for which a man is called Just or Righteous in that sense in which Justice is taken not for the Absence of Guilt but for the Endeavor and constant Will to do that which is Just not only Faith but this Justice which also from the effect thereof is called Repentance and sometimes Works is necessary to salvation So that Faith and Justice do both concur thereto and in the several acceptation of this word Justification are properly said both of them to justifie and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn For not only he that resisteth a King upon doubt of his Titlâ— but also he that doth it upon the inordinatenesse of his Passions deserveth punishment And when Faith and Works are separated not only the Faith is called Dead without Works but also Works are called Dead Works without Faith And therefore S. James Chap. 2.17 saith Even so the Faith if it have no works is dead in it self and vers. 26. For as the Body without the Spirit is dead even so Faith without works is dead And S. Paul Heb. 6.1 calleth Works without Faith Dead Works where he saith Not laying again the Foundation of Repentance from Dead Works And by these Dead Works is understood not the Obedience and Justice of the inward Man but the opus operatum or external Action proceeding from fear of punishment or from vain glory and desire to be honoured of men and these may be separated from Faith and conduce no way to a Mans Justification And for that cause S. Paul Rom. 4. excludeth the Righteousness of the Law from having part in the Justification of a sinner For by the Law of Moses which is applyed to mens Actions and requireth the Absence of Guilt all men living are liable to Damnation and therefore no man is iustified by Works but by Faith only But if Workes be taken for the endeavour to doe them that is if the Will be taken for the Deed or Internal for External Righteousness then doe works contribute to Salvation And then taketh place that of S. James Chap. 2.24 Ye see then how that of works a man is iustisted and not of faith only And both of these are ioyned to salvation as in S. Mark 1.5 Repent and believe the Gospel And Luk. 18.18 when a certain Ruler asked our Saviour what he ought to doe to inherit eternal life he propounded to him the keeping of the Commandements which when the Ruler said he had kept he propounded to him the Faith Sell all that thou hast and fellow me And Joh. 3.36 He that beleeveth in the Son hath everlasting life And He that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life Where he manifestly ioyneth Obedience and Faith together And Rom 1.17 The Just shall live by Faith not every one but the Just For also the Devils beleeve and tremble But though both Faith and Justice meaning still by Justice not absence of Guilt but the Good Intentions of the Mind which is called Righteousness by God that taketh the Will for the Deed be both of them said to iustifie yet are their Parts in the Act of Justification to be distinguished For Justice is said to iustifie not because it absolveth but because it denominates him Just and setteth him in an estate or capacity of salvation whensoever he shal have Faith But faith is said to justifie that is to absolve because by it a iust man is absolved of and forgiven his uniust Actions And thus are reconciled the places of S. Paul and S. James that Faith only iustifieth and A man is iustified by Faith onely and shewed how Faith and Repentance must concur to salvation 11. These things considered it will easily appear That under the Soveraign power of a Christian Common VVealth there is no Danger of Damnation from simple Obedience to Humane Lawes for in that the Soveraign alloweth Christianity no man is compelled to renounce that Faith which is enough for his Salvation that is to say the Fundamental Points And for other Points seeing they are not necesâ—ary to salvation if we conform our Actions to the Lawes we do not only what we are allowed but also what we are commanded by the Law of Nature which is the morall Law taught by our Saviour Himself And it is part of that Obedience which must concur to our Salvation 12. And though it be true whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin yet the Obedience in these Cases is neither sin nor against the Conscience For the Conscience being nothing else but a Mans setled judgement and Opinion when he hath once transferred his Right of Judging to another that which shall be commanded is no lesse his Judgement then the Judgement of that other So that in Obedience to Lawes a man doth still according to his owne Conscience but not his private Conscience And whatsoever is done contrary to private Conscience is then a Sin when the Lawes have left him to his own liberty and never else And then whatsoever a man doth not only believing it is ill done but doubting whether it be ill or not is done ill in case he may lawfully omit the doing 13. And as it hath been proved that a man must submit his Opinions in matter of Controversie to the Authority of the Common Wealth so also is the same confest by the practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it For who is there differing in Opinion from another and thinking himself to be in the right and the other in the wrong that would not think it reasonable if he be of the same Opinion that the whole State alloweth that the other should submit his opinion also thereunto or that would not be content if not that one or a few men yet all the Divines of a whole Nation or at least an Assembly of all those he liketh should have the Power to determine all the Controversies of Religion or who is there that would not bee content to submit his Opinions either to the Pope or to a Genenerall Councel or to a Provincial Councel or to a Presbyterie of his owne Nation And yet in all these Cases hee submitteth
Soveraigns ought to establish the Religion they hold for best 3. That to forbid unnatural copulation promiscuous use of Women c. is the Law of Nature 4. That to leave man as much Liberty as may be c is the Duty of a Soveraign by the Law of Nature 5. Meum Tuum to be set out to the Subjects distinct from one another c. a Duty of Soveraigns by the Law of Nature 6. An extraordinary Power for Judging the Abuses of Magistrates necessary c. 7. The suppressing of Popularity c. necessary c. 8. The Institution of Youth c. necessary c. 9. Avoiding of unnecessary War a necessary Duty of the Soveraign ctc. HAving hitherto set forth how a Body Politick is made and how it may be destroyed this place requireth to say something concerning the preservation of the same not purposing to enter into the particulars of the Art of Government but to sum up the general Heads wherein such Art is to be imployed and in which consisteth the Duty of Him or Them that have the Soveraign Power For the Duty of a Soveraign consisteth in the Good Government of the People And although the Acts of Soveraign power be no Injuries to the Subiects who have consented to the same by their implicite Wills yet when they tend to the hurt of the people in general they be Breaches of the Law of Nature and of the Divine Law and consequently the contrary Acts are the Duties of Soveraigns and required at their hands to the utmost of their endeavour by God Almighty under the pain of Eternall Death And as the Art and Duty of Soveraigns consist in the same Acts so also doth their Profit For the end of Art is Profit and Governing to the Profit of the Subiects is Governing to the Profit of the Soveraign as hath been shewed Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 1. And these three 1. The Law over them that have Soveraign power 2. Their Duty 3. Their Profit are one and the same thing contained in this sentence Salus Populi Suprema Lex By which must be understood not the meer preservation of their lives but generally their Benifit and Good So that this is the generall Law for Soveraigns That they procure to the uttermost of their Endeavour the Good of the People 2. And for as much as Eternal is better â—â—en Temporal Good it is evident that they â—ho are in Soveraign Authority are by the â—aw of Nature obliged to further the estaâ—lishing of al such Doctrines and Rules and the Commanding of all such Actions as in â—heir Conscience they beleive to be the true â—ay thereunto For unless they do so it â—annot be said truly that they have done the â—ttermost of their Endeavour 3. For the Tempoâ—al Good of the people â—â—consisteth in four points 1. Multitude 〈◊〉 Commodity of living 3. Peace amongst themselves 4. Defence against Forraign â—ower Concerning Multitude It is the â—uty of them that are in Soveraign Authoâ—â—ty to increase the people in as much as â—â—ey are Governours of Mankind under God â—lmighty who having created but One â—an and One Woman declared That it â—as his Will they should be multiplyed and â—ncreased afterwards And seeing this is to â—e done by Ordinances concerning copuâ—ation they are by the Law of Nature bound â—o make such Ordinances concerning the â—ame as may tend to the Increase of Manâ—ind And hence it cometh that in them â—ho have Soveraign Authority not to forâ—id such Copulations as are against the Use 〈◊〉 Nature not to forbid the promiscuous Use â—f VVomen not to forbid one VVomen to â—ave many Husbands not to forbid Marriages within certain Degrees of Kindred and Affinity are against the Law of Nature For though it be not evident that a private man living under the Law of Natural Reason only doth break the same by doing any of the Things aforesaid yet it is manifestly apparent that being so prejudicial as they are to the Improvement of Mankind that not to forbid the same is against the Law of Natural Reason in him that hath taken into his hands any portion of Mankind to improve 4. The Comodity of Living consisteth in Liberty and VVealth By Liberty I mean that there be no Prohibition without necessity of any thing to any man which was lawful to him in the Law of Nature that is to say That there be no Restraint of Naturall Liberty but what is necessary for the Good of the Common VVealth and that well-meaning men may not fall into the Danger of Lawes as into snares before they be aware It appertaineth also to this Liberty That a man may have commodious passage from place to place and not be imprisoned or confined with the Difficulty of wayes and want of means for transportation of things necessary And for the wealth of people it consisteth in three things The well ordering of Trade Procuring of Labour and Forbiding the superfluous consuming of Food and Apparel All those therefore that are in Soveraign Authority and have taken upon them the Government of People are bound by the Law of Nature to make Ordinances consisting in the Points afore named as being contrary to the Law of Nature unnecessarily either for ones own Fancy to inthrall or ty men so as they cannot move without danger or to suffer them whose maintenance is our benefit to want any thing necessary for them by our Negligence 5. For maintaiinng of Peace at home there be so many Things necessary to be considered and taken order in as there be several Causes concurring to Sedition And first it is necessary to set out to every Subiect his Propriety and distinct Lands and Goods upon which he may exercise and have the Benefit of his own Industry and without which men would fall out amongst themselves as did the Heardsmen of Abraham and Lot every man enchroaching and usurping as much of the common Benefit as he can which tendeth to Quarel and Sedition Secondly to divide the Burthens and Charges of the Common Wealth proportionably Now there is a Proportionably to every mans Abilily and there is a Proportionably to his Benefit by Common Weath And this latter is it which is according to the Law of Nature For the Burdens of the Common Wealth being the Price that we pay for the Benefit thereof they ought to be measured thereby And there is no reason when two men equally enioying by the benefit of the Common Wealth their Peace and Liberty to use their Industry to get their Livings where of one spareth and laieth up somewhat the other spendeth all he gets why they should not equally contribute to the common charge That seemeth therefore to be the most equall way of dividing the burden of publick charge when every man shall contribute according to what he spendeth and not according to what he gets And this is then done when men pay the Common Wealths Part in the payments they make for their own Provision And this
do mean their own But this is certain seeing Right Reason is not existent the Reason of some Man or Men must supply the place thereof and that man or men is He or They that have the Soveraign Power as hath been already proved and consequently the Civil Laws are to all Subiects the Measures of their Actions whereby to determine whether they have Right or Wrong Profitable or Unprofitable Virtuous or Vitious and by them the Use and Definition of all Names not agreed upon and tending to controversie shall be established As for Example When upon the occasions of some strang and deformed Birth it shall not be decided by Aristotle or the Philosophers whether the same be a man or no but by the Laws the Civil Law containing in it the ecclesiastical as a part thereof proceeding from the Power of Ecclesiastical government given by our Saviour to all Christian Soveraigns as his immediate Vicars as hath been said Part 2. Chap. 7. Sect. 10. 9. But seeing it hath been said That all Laws are either Natural or Civil it may be demanded to which of these shall be referred that Law which is called Martial Law and by the Romans Disciplina militaris And it may seem to be the same with the law of nature because the Laws by which a multitude of Souldiers are governed in an Army are not constant but continually changing with the Occasion and that is still a Law which is Reason for the present and Reason is the Law of Nature It is nevertheless true that Martial Law is Civil Law because an Army is a Body Politick the whole Power whereof is in the General and the Laws thereof made by him and though they still follow and change as Reason requireth yet it is not as the Reason of every Private man but as the Reason of the General requireth 10. When He or They in whom is the Soveraign power of a Common Wealth are to ordain Law for the government and good Order of the People it is not possible they should comprehend all Cases of Controversie that may fall out or perhaps any considerable diversitie of them but as time shall instruct them by the rising of new ocasions so are also Laws from time to time to be ordained and in such Cases where no special Law is made the Law of Nature keepeth its Place and the Magistrates ought to give sentence according thereunto that is to say according to Natural Reason The Constitutions therefore of the Soveraign Power by which the Liberty of Nature is abridged are written because there is no other way to take notice of them whereas the Laws of Nature are supposed to be written in mens hearts Written Laws therefore are the constitutions of a Common Wealth expressed and Unwritten are the laws of Natural Reason Custome of it self maketh no laws Nevertheless when a Sentence hath been once given by them that judge by their Natural Reason whether the same be Right or Wrong it may attain to the vigour of a law not because the like Sentence hath of Custome been given in the like case but because the Soveraign Power is supposed tacitely to have approved such Sentence for Right and thereby it commeth to be a Law and numbred amongst the Written laws of the Common Wealth For if Custom were sufficient to introduce a law then it would be in the power of every one that is deputed to hear a Cause to make his Erours laws In the like manner those that goe under the Title of Respons a Prudentum that is to say the Opinions of Lawyers are not therefore Laws because Responsa Prudentum but because they are admitted by the Soveraign and from this may be collected That when there is a Case of private contract between the Soveraign and the Subiect a President against reason shall not preiudice the cause of the Soveraign no President being made a Law but upon supposition that the same was reasonable from the beginning And thus much concerning the Elements and general grounds of Laws Natural and Politick As for the Law of Nations it is the same with the Law of Nature For that which is the Law of Nature between Man and Man before the constitution of Common Wealth is the Law of Nations between Soveraign and Soveraign after FINIS
Tyrant but of a King was hatefull 11. Beside Discontent to the disposing of a Man to Rebellion and Pretence there is required in the third place Hope of Successe which consisteth in foure Points 1. That the discontented have mutual Intelligence 2. That they have sufficient Number 3. That they have Armes 4. That they agree upon an Head For these four must concur to the making of one Body of Rebellion in which Intelligence is the Life Number the Limbs Arms the strength and an Head the Unity by which they are directed to one and the same Action 12. The Authors of Rebellion that is the men that breed these Dispositions to Rebel in others of necessity must have in them these three Qualâ—ties 1. To be discontented themselves 2. To be men of mean Judgment and Capacity And thirdly to be Eloquent men or good Orators And as for their Discontent from whence it may proceed hath been already declared And for the second and third I am to shew now first how they may stand together for it seemeth a contradiction to place small Judgement great Eloquence or as they call it Powerful speaking in the same man And then in what manner they concur to dispose other men to Sedition 13. It was noted by Salust That in Catiline who was Author of the greatest Sedition that ever was in Rome there was Eloquentiae Satis Sapientiae parum Eloquence sufficient but little Wisdome And perhaps this was said of Catiline as he was Catiline But it was true of him as an Author of Sedition For the Coniunction of these two Qualities made him not Catiline but Seditious And that it may be understood how want of Wisdome and store of Eloquence may stand together we are to consider what it is we call Wisdome and what Eloquence And therefore I shall here again remember some things that have been said already Part 1. chap. 5.6 It is manifest that Wisdome consisteth in Knowledge Now of Knowledge there are two kinds whereof the one is the Remembrance of such Things as we have conceived by our Sences and of the Order in which they follow one another And this Knowledge is called Experience and the Wisdom that proceedeth from it is that Ability to coniecture by the present of what is past and to come which men call Prudence This being so it is manifest presently that the Author of Sedition whosoever he be must not be Prudent For if he consider and take his Experience aright concerning the Success which they have had who have been the Movers and Authors of Sedition either in this or any other State he shall find that for one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour twenty have come to a Reproachful end The other kind of Knowledge is the Remembrance of the Names or Appellations of things and how every thing is called which is in matters of Common Conversation a Remembrance of Pacts and Covenants of men made amongst themselves concerning how to be understood of one another And this kind of Knowledge is generally called Science and the conclusions thereof Truth But when men remember not how things are named by general agreement but either mistake mis-name things or name them aright by chance they are not said to have Science but Opinion and the Conclusions thence proceeding are uncertain and for the most part erroneous Now that Scieâ—ce in particular from which proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is Right and Wrong and what is Good and Hurtful to the Beeing and Well-being of Mankind the Latines call Sapientia and wee by the generall Name of Wisdome For generally not he that hath skill in Geometry or any other Science speculative but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the good and government of the people is called a Wise man Now that no Author of Sedition can be wise in this Acceptation of the Word is sufficiently proved in that it hath been already demonstrated that no Pretence of Sedition can be right or Just And therefore the Authors of Sedition must be ignorant of the Right of State that is to say Unwise It remaineth therefore that they be such as name things not according to their true and generally agreed upon Names but call Right and Wrong Good and Bad according to their Passions or according to the Authorities of such as they admire as Aristotle Cicero Seneca and others of like Authority who have given the names of Right and Wrong as their Passions have dictated or have followed the Authotity of other men as we do theirs It is required therefore in an Author of Sedition that he think Right that which is Wrong and profitable that which is pernicious and consequently that there be in him Sapientiae parum little Wisdome 14. Eloquence is nothing else but the Power of winning Belief of what we say And to that end we must have Ayd from the Passions of the Hearer Now to Demonstration and Teaching of the Truth there are required Long Deductions and great Attention which is unpleasant to the Hearer Therefore they which seek not Truth but Belief must take another way and not only derive what they would have to be believed from somewhat believed already but also by Aggravations and Extenuations make Good and Bad Right VVrong appear Great or Lesse according as shall serve their turnes And such is the Power of Eloquence as many times a man is made to believe thereby that hee sensibly feeleth smart and damage when he feeleth none and to enter into rage and indignation without any other cause then what is in the words and passion of the speaker This considered together with the Businesse that he hath to do who is the Author of Rebellion namely to make men believe that their Rebellion is just their Discontents grounded upon great Iniuries and their Hopes great There needeth no more to prove there can be no Author of Rebellion that is not an Eloquent and Powerfull Speaker and withall as hath been said before a man of little Wisdome For the Faculty of speaking powerfully consisteth in an Habit gotten of putting together passionate Words and applying them to the present passions of the Hearer 15. Seeing then Eloquence and want of Discretion concur to the stirring of Rebellion it may be demanded what part each of these acteth therein The Daughters of Pelias King of Thessaly desiring to restore their old Decrepit Father to the Vigour of his Youth by the Counsell of Medea chopped him in pieces and set him a boyling with I know not what Herbs in a Cauldron but could not revive him again So when Eloquence and want of Judgement go together â—ant of Judgment like the Daughters of Pelias consenteth through Eloquence which is as the Witchcraft of Medea to cut the common Wealth in peices upon Pretence or Hope of Reformation which when things are in combustion they are not able to effect CHAP. IX 1. The Law over Soveraigns Salus Populi 2. That