that can be here pretended is this that indeed it would have reslected dishonourably upon God to have created us so at first as that errour should be the natural result of our faculties But then what if by some offence either of our own or of some other in our stead this be brought upon us as a just punishment the contrary sate to Cassandra that as she always spake true yet never was believed so on the contrary we should always believe our faculties though they never spoke true But those that make this objection do either believe the Scriptures or they do not If they do then it must be the Sin of Adam that had this malignant influence upon all Mankind But then by the same Scriptures we are as fully assur'd that the punishment hereof did not extend so far as we are that it did at all descend upon his Posterity That our faculties are weakned and we hereby become more liable to errour by Adam's Fall is certainly true but that our faculties are so corrupted that we are become uncapable of perceiving natural truth is that which the Scriptures deny and what the assertors of Original Sin in its greatest latitude do not affirm If they be such as do not believe the Scriptures yet the objection it self doth suppose a God that is a being infinitely Wise Iust and Good Now upon this supposal we may easily refute this unreasonable surmise For this would introduce such disorder and confusion into the World as would be inconsistent with the nature of God who is a God of Order to suffer it According to this supposal we could never come to the certain knowledge of our fault for which this punishment was inflicted for if our faculties should any ways acquaint us with such a thing what reason had we to think that they should rightly inform us in this particular and be false in all the rest Nor could we ever come to the certain knowledge of the means and methods of amendment for according to this we ought to act contrary to our reason in obedience to our Principles as supposing the dictates of our faculties to be false and several other such like absurdities would follow hence which would be unworthy of a wise and good Man to suffer in the World if it was in his power to help much more unworthy of an infinitely wise and good God 2. If we should once suppose our faculties to be false I am afraid we should be condemn'd to Eternal Scepticism however beyond the power of the most wary experience to relieve us Lastly he tells us That the only way to be satisfy'd of the truth of these notions is to examine them by a wary and discreet Experience and if so to what purpose do they serve for before I have made tryal I cannot use them because I have no reason to trust 'em and Experience makes 'em useless because Experimental Knowledge is of all others the most certain and most indubitable To this I Answer That suppose these natural Notions were not so certain in themselves but that they stood in need of some further confirmation by experience yet would they not be altogether useless both as they would encourage us in our Tryals with fair hopes of success and then afterwards when we found the experiment fully to answer to and agree with our former Conceptions the concurrent testimony of these two Witnesses would more fully assure us in the belief of those things thus variously attested tho' indeed it would be very hard to try the truth of some Propositions by Experiment such as this Nihili nullae sunt affectiones c. But here a little more positively to lay down my apprehensions herein I conceive that God from all Eternity did see and know the natures of things and the several Relations they either did or possibly could bear to one another and this is that which some call Ideas in the Divine Intellect or objects of the Divine Understanding Thus what God understands to be either true or good that is necessarily so as a Learned Man expresses it the Divine Will and Omnipotence it self has no Dominion over the Divine Understanding For if the nature of truth and goodness did wholly depend upon the meer positive Command of God and the arbitrary determination of his Will then could we not be so fully assur'd but that the whole Scheme both of Truth and Morality might be changed and that which is now Vertue might afterwards become Vice and so on the contrary the very possibility whereof is very unworthy of God and inconsistent with that notion which we have of him Thus I conceive things are in respect of God Now in respect of us he hath communicated something of a Divine Ray relating both to Intellectual and Moral Notices into the very constitution of our humane Nature something that is both a light and a law unto us and this the very Nature and end of such Creatures as God design'd to make us that is Rational and Religious did require I know I must expect to meet with great opposition in the management of this Argument I am very conscious to my self of my own inabilities but I thank God I am not conscious of having said any thing against but as far as in me lies to promote the designs of truth and holiness Veniam petimusque damusque vicissim D. Carles though he grant Eternal Truths yet these he only derives from the Divine Will God says he is not only the Author of the Existences but of the Essences of things and as it was in his power whether any thing had existed or no so also their Essences depended upon his free determination Ep. 37. Part I. He tells us that it was equally free sor God at first to have made this true that the Lines drawn from the Center of a Circle to the Circumference should not be equal But doth not this weaken the force of his own Argument drawn from clear and distinct perception for we do as clearly and distinctly perceive that the lines in that case should be equal as we do the truth of this Proposition Cogito ergo sum If it be here reply'd That supposing such a Constitution of our Natures as at present we have then things cannot be otherwise than now we apprehend them but if either the srame of our Natures had been otherwise at first or shall afterwards be changed then the things also had been or may be otherwise But now the only way to consute such an extravagant Supposal is to appeal to Men's more serious and impartial Thoughts would not the very possibility of such a thing be very dishonourable to God would it not introduce such a Fate into the World as would also introduce a necessity of asserting an immoral Deity Or should we be ever able to assert and desend the just Rights and Interests of Truth and Goodness upon this Supposal So that as before I observed of Experimental
essentialiter proprietatem for these truths are only things of an intellectual nature such as terminate the act of Divine Wisdom and Understanding but no body says that they have any radical or essential propriety univocally equal or like to God But further What inconsistency or what unbecomingness would there be in the Notion if we thus conceiv'd of God that he is an insinitely wise and Omnipotent Being comprehending Himself and the extent of his own Power that is the Idea's of all the possibilities of things together with all their several either necessary or accidental relations one towards another So that according to this Scheme of things these truths are but the necessary objects of Omniscience or infinite Wisdom so that it is impossible that these necessary and immutable truths should any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections seeing we cannot suppose God to be Omniscient that is infinitely perfect without 'em neither would these truths be so absolutely Independent of themselves for we can scarce suppose any moral good or evil unless we first suppose a God in Conformity or Non-Conformity to whose pure and holy nature and to his Will acting always according thereunto consists the nature of both The second thing I shall observe from his management of this Question is this that as to things which relate to moral goodness such is the awful power of truth such is the natural modesty of Mankind that inward sense they have of and profound veneration for these things that many times they are asham'd openly to assert that which yet may be the natural consequence of some false Principles they have entertain'd And this seems the Case of this Author in this particular for it is observable through his whole Discourse he no where plainly and expresly asserts which yet according to his Principles will necessarily follow that God might if he had so pleas'd have appointed a quite contrary Scheme of Morality or a Set or Systeme of moral truths just contrary to what they now are Indeed he does say p. 126. that this Divine Placitum was of its own nature indifferent vel ad haec statuenda vel plane omittenda vel diversa decernenda and that God might have represented himself to the minds of Men per alia nescio quae quam per naturas rerum quales jam sunt p. 136. Yet these seem to come short of asserting the quite contrary way and method But some perhaps will say that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words but suppose it be yet I would rather err on this side than on the other yet if it be but thus far true it will be notwithstanding a sufficient confutation of his Opinion But give me leave only to suggest the reason of that my charitable interpretation viz. because he osten mentions a certain decency which he seems to make the Rule of Divine Actions even antecedent to the Divine Will Thus p. 131. he says that the justice of God did appoint things modo ipsum decenti in a way becoming him which would seem an impertinent expression if all the decency that things have arise only from God's appointing 'em to be so and immediately after speaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus he says that he was indifferent vel ad nulla statuenda vel ad alia stabilienda quae aequè Deum decuissent which words seem to imply that there was something truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of God antecedent to his positive appointment But then let us see how he answers that Objection that according to his Principles the hatred of God might have been good and the love of him evil if he had so appointed Now this might either have been so or not if it might then why did he not plainly say so if it could not then his Principles are false viz. that there is something good or evil antecedent to the divine positive appointment But when Men either cannot or will not return plain Answers to a plain Question it is a certain Argument that they ly under either some natural or some moral defect that their notions either do not ly smooth and clear in their Heads or else upon some worse design they thus purposely wrap themselves in Clouds But he tells us p. 136. amor praesupponit mentis naturam haec voluntatem sive placitum Dei sese hoc modo adumbrandi But we must abstract he says from all these but now to comply with him in his own way I am willing to abstract as far as is possible for us to abstract only he must not abstract us into nothing he must suffer us to remain subjects capable of abstracting and yet I believe after all these he is not that hardy Man as in plain words to say That God might have made the lovc of himself a Sin and the hatred of him a vertue However it doth not seem any good Argument of the truth or any great commendation of the goodness of an Opinion that we must abstract from every thing that is at least at present either rational or religious before we can possibly frame any conception of it And yet this is the opinion which he is so fond of and seems to value himself so much upon that in his Appendix p. 304. where he makes some reflections upon his former work he particularly commends this 10th Ch. de Dei dominio cujus excellentiam sine jactantiâ ob ipsam rei veritatem utilitatem non satis possum commendare And yet this seems a truer Character of it that it is in it self false unworthy of God and of dangerous consequence to Men. I shall only here clear one place of Scripture relating hereunto from a forc'd and false interpretation which Cuperus p. 246. Arcana Atheismi has put upon it Rom. 2. 14. the Gentiles having not the Law do by Nature the things contain'd in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves The Apostle here designs to assert that natural knowledge which the Gentiles had of good and evil But says he before this can be made appear we must prove these two things 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be understood the Pagan Gentiles those who had neither heard of the Law of Christ nor the Law of Moses 2. That the words by Nature are not to be join'd with those going before thus the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature do the things contain'd in the Law But first he has no warrant from any Copy or good Authority thus to place the Comma and so to read it now if Men may take that liberty to place Comma's where they please they may soon make the Scripture quite another thing But then further it would not be worthy of the Apostles way of discoursing to tell us that the Gentiles had not the Law of Moses by Nature for who ever imagin'd they had Now he does not grant here any other Law not
can commit any sin provided they do but follow their own natural Inclinations According to him there is no sin but when a Man is guilty of such a strange piece of Self-denial as not to comply with his own natural Appetites when there is nothing as in this case that forbids him so to do Thus p. 260. he tells us That no actions with respect to the Worship of God by the mere Light of Nature can be counted sin Praeter illas à quibus vel omnium hominum natura abhorret vel in certis hominibus illas quae ipsorum naturae sunt contrariae Where by Nature he means nothing but natural Affections Appetites and Inclinations But certainly a Man must have a new Nature and a new Bible given him before this will pass either for Reason or Religion But then for the better understanding of that place before cited some say That St. Paul there doth not speak in his own Person but in the Person of a Iew brought up under such Masters who did not understand coveting as it includes the inward act only to be a sin Others say That sin was known to be so by the Law of Nature before the giving of Moses his Law thus Theophylact 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. How was the Deluge brought upon the World And why were the Sodomites destroy'd by fire if Lust was not known to be a sin before the Law So that the Law did not first make Lust to be a sin but did more expresly declare it to be so He quotes indeed several other places of Scripture but to as little purpose p. 254. Si pietatis officia specialia c. if the special Offices of Piety were known by the Light of Nature then there must be some certain foundation from whence they might be drawn Here he mentions three 1. Natural Instinct 2. The Sanctity of God 3. Divine Power or Dominion As for the first Natural Instinct this indeed he says is not the rule of humane Actions to them who live under the Gospel but according to his Principles it must be to them who only enjoy the Light of Nature Nor Secondly says he can the Sanctity of God be the rule of our Actions but the reason he there gives is a very strange one and very odly express'd viz. because God acts nothing but by instinct of his Nature nor is there any thing holy in God but what his Nature desires But to this I Answer First That God sometimes acts as an absolute Soveraign of the Universe and Governour of the World and in these cases his Actions are not in all particulars to be the rule of ours Secondly It seems an irreverend way of speaking to say That God acts out of Instinct of Nature which is commonly and properly attributed to meer Animals yet granting the Expression in sano sensu it cannot be suppos'd that God doth daily alter the Determination of his Will concerning the same Object Thirdly Yet this we may safely say That the holiness of God is the rule of our Actions so far as either by the Light of Nature or Divine Revelation it is made known to us to be so But in the Third placo He resolves all into the absolute Power and Dominion of God That nothing is just and good but that only which he commands and for no other reason but because he does so And yet in the very next Sentence p. 255. as if something from within had whisper'd better things to him he tells us That God indeed may command any thing Madò Dei naturae non sit contrarium ut talia siant c. provided it be not contrary to his Nature that it should be done This indeed is a very pious and prudent a true and rational Assertion but then it contradicts the design of the whole Chapter Some things indeed may be more evidently and directly contrary to the Nature of God as not to love or not to obey him but then to forbid all due resemblance of himself all Vertue and Goodness and to command all filthiness both of Flesh and Spirit in rational Creatures this certainly is also contrary to the Divine Nature He then proceeds as he says to examine the principal parts both of Natural and Christian Religion in order to see whether there lies any obligation upon us to 'em but meerly by the Divine Command And here I grant That those Truths and those Duties viz. the belief of a Trinity and Faith in Christ that depend meerly upon Divine Revelation cannot be known to be such by the Light of Nature But then the reason is not the same in those other Moral Duties which Christianity did not first reveal but only further illustrate and confirm to us Nor shall I here follow him through all the parts of Natural Religion which he there instances in I shall only pitch upon one which yet seems of the greatest weight and moment that of Iustice. This he says cannot be recommended to us from the Nature of God because it doth not appear by Nature Deum neminem injuriâ afficere That God does no Body any wrong For he says that if that be injury when we hurt those who have not deserved any such thing at our hands Quid infantes in Deum peccaverunt Wherein have Infants sin'd against God who yet many times are grievously afflicted by him To this I answer 1. That I before premised this That God sometimes acts as a Soveraign or Lord of the World and in this case some actions may be injurious or unjust in Men which are not so in God 2. The consideration of original sin might give easie Solutions to what he there urges But because he doth not acknowledge any such thing I shall not therefore here insist upon it 3. It is no ways contrary to Divine Iustice to inflict very high degrees of Asflictions on rational Creatures provided that the Mercies they injoy be more than the Miseries they undergo And he will never prove that God ever inflicted such Miseries upon Infants but that if they had the power of Election they would rather chuse to undergo 'em than their own Annihilation But he lays great stress upon that action of the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians which was done by God's Command or Allowance and therefore was no sin Therefore nothing is just or unjust in it self but only as God commands or forbids it In Answer to this some say That God herein acted as the universal Creator and original Proprietor of all things and here transfer'd the Property as he justly might from the Egyptians to the Israelites Others say That as Soveraign Legislator he dispens'd with the Law in this particular yet it will not follow hence that there is nothing good or evil but with respect to God's positive Command For I humbly conceive there are some other rationes boni mali more sacred and indispensable than those of Property If the Reader here Object That my Stile
Imprimatur May 16. 1693. Gul. Lancaster A DISCOURSE Concerning the Nature of MAN BOTH IN HIS Natural and Political Capacity Both as he is A Rational Creature AND Member of a Civil Society With an Examination of some of Mr. Hobbs'sOpinions relating hereunto By IA. LOWDE Rector of Settington in Yorkshire sometime Fellow of Clare-hall in Cambridge LONDON Printed by T. Warren for Walter Kettilby at the Bishop's-head in St. Paul's Church-yard 1694. TO THE Most Reverend Father in GOD IOHN By Divine Providence Lord Archbishop of Canterbury Primate of all ENGLAND and Metropolitan AND One of Their Majesties Most Honourable Privy-Council THIS TREATISE With all Duty and Gratitude Is most Humbly Dedicated by His GRACE's Most Obedient Faithful and Obliged Servant Ia. Lowde THE PREFACE TO THE READER NOtwithstanding the many tho' undeserved Reproaches cast upon Mankind as if Man by Nature was a very Wolf or Tyger yet I shall at present so far presume upon the falseness of these Scandals hoping hereafter to prove that they really are so as freely to expose this small Treatise to thy more favourable reception I would willingly suppose thee and the rest of Mankind as good and gentle as possibly I could so far as with Truth and Prudence I might do it yet I do not here go about to flatter thee into good nature or to impose upon thy Iudgment by bespeaking thy Affections 'T is true indeed if we consult the present state of Affairs if we look into our selves at home or consider the Practices of the World abroad we shall not find such an universal Love and Benignity to prevail therein as the Poets describe in their Golden Age or such as we might certainly have experienc'd had Man continued in Innocence But then to assert Humane Nature in general as the great Patroness of all Vice and Villany because 't is now faln from its original perfection and adulterated with some vicious mixtures is just as if we should say that there is no Gold in the mass of Ore because mixt with greater quantity of Dross or Sand. That which I here design in reference to Humane Nature is Likeness rather than Curiosity So that I must not so far favour thee as to represent thee without any Deformity or Imperfection nor yet be so injurious as to draw both Mankind in general and thee in particular so much like Devils as some have gone about to do I shall not here make any Apology for the publication of these few Papers nor trouble thee with those many pretended Reasons the commonness whereof makes â—â—m suspected even then when perhaps they may be real If upon thy perusal thou canst find any tolerable ground of excuse for me it will be more proper for thee to make than for me to plead in my own defence And thus to thy own Candour I submit'em nor do they go about to enter into compacts for their own security nor are they so sollicitous about their own preservation as to desire any one common Reader to transfer his Right of judging and condemning too if he so think fit As for those learned persons from whom I differ in some particulars I know that nothing unless it be their Learning is greater than their Candour and Ingenuity therefore I hope they will not attribute this my freedom of declaring my own sentiments to any spirit of contradiction or to any pleasure I take in opposing theirs But there can be no greater Friend to Truth and the Common-wealth of Learning than he who with calmness and unconcernedness far from Passion and Personal Reflection seriously debates things of this nature And though I may err in my Opinions or mistake in my Reasonings yet I will not be confident in 'em so that I shall still reserve a fair opportunity of changing my Mind when either by any kind notice from others or by my own maturer thoughts I shall be better inform'd However I do not pretend to set up for singularity if I do err I err with very good company The Argument here handled has already been variously treated of by learned men yet the Subject seems not so wholly exhausted but that others yet may with profit both to themselves and others employ their Meditations hereupon The knowledge of our selves and of Human Nature was always counted a good Foundation both of Piety towards God and of Iustice and Charity towards Men and 't is probable that a great many of the Errors that have crept into Religion it self have been occasion'd by the want either of the true knowledge or due consideration of our Natures as rational and of the Duties and Obligations that lye upon us therefrom for the Scripture doth every where exhort us to the practice of Moral Duties but doth not go about to explain the natures of 'em as supposing that sufficiently known to us already There is nothing of greater force even if possible to patronize Vice and Error than those powerful Names of Nature and Reason thus those that have gone about to disparage the one and oppose the other have yet done it under the plausible pretences of advancing both Thus the Soicks whose Tenents were the most contrary to Human Nature rightly understood yet did they prevail above and grow more numerous than any other Sect and that probably for no other reason than that of their constant boasting of living 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to Nature Thus the Atheists of our Age oppose Reason to Religion and think they may justly reject the one seeing they are such devout Proselytes or at least such great Pretenders to the other So that there seems to be nothing wherein all sorts of men tho' otherwise differing both in Principles and Practices do more agree than in this That there is a certain due Respect owing to the Dictates of Nature and Reason Of what great concernment therefore is it rightly to understand both these lest the Devil and his Instruments make use of those very Faculties which GOD implanted in Man on purpose to promote the Designs of Virtue and Piety to the carrying on his own base Ends of Vice and Error Thus we may be sure there is some falsity in the Citation or some Malice in the Design when the Devil quotes Scripture And the like may be said that some fallacy is in the Argument when Reason and Nature are made use of to patronize Vice and Error My Design then here is to vindicate the Honour and Innocence of those great and worthy Names Nature and Reason from the bad usage they meet withal when challenged by those unjust Pretenders The nature of the Subject will necessarily engage me in the examination of some of Mr. Hobbs's Opinions which I shall do with as much fairness and impartiality as possibly I can He has indeed made several ingenious Observations upon Human Nature in general but that wherein he seems very often to fail is either that he doth not carefully avoid those Faults himself which he
who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
informs his Understanding then assists and inclines his will by his Grace and so applys himself to his inferiour Appetites in a way suitable to their Natures in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reason and Religion I shall here rather enquire how far God made use of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himself to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy and this I shall rather do because of the dangerous Opinions that some Men have of late vented on this Subject thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation truly so call'd For they think if they can but once sufficiently disparage the manner of God's revealing himself to the Prophets under the Old Testament they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New I shall here therefore make some short reflections upon the Author of Tractatus-Theol Polit in his two first Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy In Order thereunto I shall premise 1st God in the Communications of himself to Mankind is not ty'd to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Persons he pleases to make use of For what ever is wanting either as to the vigorousness of the Fancy or strength of understanding God can supply the defects hereof some other way or act more immediately by himself in absence of them all 2dly Yet notwithstanding God commonly makes use of Second Causes and of Instruments duly qualified in order to the effecting his Designs in the World particularly in Prophecy According to the constant Opinion of the Iewish Doctors there were certain previous preparatory dispositions in order to it and these were of three Sorts Natural Acquir'd and Moral 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body a due mixture of the Humours without any predominancy of Melancholy a Mind naturally Calm and Chearful a Fancy Active and Vigorous an Understanding Clear and Strong without any Crazedness or Inconsistency 2. All these improv'd to the highest Degrees of perfection by Study and Industry 3. To these must also be added a vertuous and well-disposed Temper of Soul free from all vicious habits and inclinations Thus the Iews had their Schools of the Prophets for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars which they call'd the Sons of the Prophets for that imployment Now this sufficiently shews that something more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy Yet this is not so to be understood as if Prophecy was the Natural result of any of these singly or of all joyntly unless God was pleas'd to Communicate himself to some as he saw fit For all these who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets did not presently prophesie Thus neither the absence of the usual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet Prophecy in the formal Notion and Nature of it being no ways in the power of Man but wholly depends upon the will of God Hence we see what little reason the soresaid Author had to say that tho' God did make use of the Fancy sometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets yet that Prophecy Non nisi ope imaginationis persicitur à solâ imaginatione pendet and this he proves no other ways than because they prophesied But this is not to prove but to beg the Question He first makes an injust Comparison betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation 1. In respect of the Name and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other because they are both deriv'd from the same Fountain viz. God But thus by the same way of arguing he must and indeed doth assert That either there are no Miracles at all or else that all the effects of Nature are such because the power of Nature is the Divine Power as well as that of Miracles But in order to either of these he should first make good one or both of these Positions either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himself distinct from the ordinary course of Nature or else that since the constitution of the Natural Frame of the Universe he hath not reserv'd to himself a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power neither of which will he be ever able to prove 2. Suppose Natural Knowledge may also be call'd Prophecy or Divine Revelation in respect of it's Original yet how can it be call'd aequali jure as he says Divine because in other respects both as to the manner of their conveyance and largeness of extent there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em however why should Natural Knowledge be call'd Divine Revelation since Custom and good Reason have justly affix'd them to several things for he that goes about to unhinge the signification of Words which Use and Custom has truly appropriated to 'em in Divinity has probably no better design than he that removes the ancient Land-Marks in a common Field viz. Injury Disorder and Confusion Tho' this must be also granted that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to those respective Duties which it dictates even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation For we are first Men and then Christians and by both these ways God hath made known his Will and claims our Obedience He grants indeed that Humanae Naturae Leges in se consideratae non possunt ejus i. e. Divinae Revelationis esse causa Why he should thus mince the matter as to insert these Words in se consideratae I know not whereas 't is certain That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cause of Divine Revelation I know his meaning here is suspected by some to be this that the Laws of Nature consider'd in themselves that is without the supposal of a God which is one integral part of the Universe so indeed they cannot be the cause of Divine Revelation but then supposing a God so interwoven with the Laws of Nature as that he shall be either really the same with or very little different from the Universe and the Laws thereof under this consideration how far the Laws of Nature may be the cause of Divine Revelation that is of that which he calls such is the grand mysterious Question The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy is in respect of certainty wherein Natural Knowledge he says comes no ways short of Prophetical If we consider the certainty the Prophet himself had of those things which were reveal'd to him we are now at a loss how certainly to determine this Question for he only could fully assure us of the truth of these things they relating to himself Yet it seems very reasonable to believe that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall short of but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge seeing we may casily suppose that God may by the secret influences of his Spirit by the
Observation That the highest degree of Certainty we can arrive at by that Principle is only this That such or such a Thing so far as has been yet observed is true So here though such or such a Thing I speak now of such as we call universal Truths be at present clearly and distinctly perceiv'd to be true yet at first it might have been otherwise and may for ought we know be so hereafter And what he asserts of speculative Truths the same also he says of moral Notions of Good and Evil. Resp. 6. There 's nothing neither matter of actual Existence nor reason of Truth and Goodness but what depends upon God If by depending upon God he means dependance upon his Will so that it was free for God to have made these Reasons just contrary to what they now are which seems to be what he there means then in this sense they do not depend upon the Divine Will If by dependance upon God he means this That there is nothing either of actual existence or reasons of Truth and Goodness but what owes its being to some relation it bears to God This I grant for even these Rationes veri boni do owe their Essences to the relation they bear to the Rectitude and Sanctity of the Divine Nature these were the proper and necessary Objects of Infinite Wisdom from all Eternity and do there only originally exist So that perhaps that which seem'd harsh to Des Cartes was this That there should be any Thing that was absolutely independent of God which no one here asserts only we say those Rationes veri boni depend upon or consist in that relation they bear to the Divine Understanding as the existence of other things of more indifferency do upon his Will Not but that these notions of Good and Evil have yet receiv'd a further impression of their respective obligations to perform the one and avoid the other from the Divine Will that though they were not only therefore good because God will'd them yet he hath made them now more absolutely and indispensibly so by adding the ratification of the Divine Will to their antecedent Natures Nor can that place of Genesis That God saw that all things were good that is says he according to the determination of his Will yet granting this this place cannot with any just reason be extended further than the material Creation so that though that was therefore good because God will'd so to make it yet it doth not therefore follow that those Rationes veri boni were only so upon the same account or if it be extended further than the material Creation then why may not things be good because God knew them to be so before the determination of his will I do indeed here suppose some kind of distinction betwixt the Divine Understanding and the Divine Will and if it be here objected that there is no such distinction of these in God yet I humbly conceive that we may in obedience to our own imperfect modes of conception conceive of God according to our best and utmost Capacity provided that we do not wilfully and maliciously derogate from the excellency of his Nature Now it seems more honourable to God and more agreeable to those Revelations he hath made of himself in Scripture to assert that Good and Evil do not so depend upon his will as that he can altar the fundamental Grounds and Reasons of them though our highest conceptions cannot answer the excellency of the Divine Nature yet certainly we may mediate upon God without any danger of committing Idolatry or dishonouring him in our Thoughts provided that we act according to the best of our possibilities Dr. Camberland also the present learned Bishop of Peterborough seems to be no great Favourer of these common or natural Notions though I humbly conceive that the design of that great Man in his Book De legibus Naturae is not directly to oppose ' erm as may appear 1. if we consider the Persons against whom he writ that is the Epicureans as he himself asserts in his 5th Paragraph of his Prolegomena against whom he thought that way and method would not be so Argumentative seeing it was wholly rejected and dehy'd by ' em Or 2dly The times in which he writ thus in the 4th Paragraph of his Prolegomena he chose rather that method there made use of Hisce saltem temporibus that is in an Age more Philosophically curious and inquisitive in an Age that will-not believe any thing but what comes fairly attested and sufficiently prov'd And lastly If we consider his own declaration of his Opinion which he lays down with the greatest Candour thus Non impossibile est ut nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae ab extra denuò imprimantur So that we see he doth not absolutely oppose these natural Notions only he thought it more convenient in respect of the Persons against whom and the times and places in which he writ rather to pitch upon another method Thus his design in that Book was to shew That the universal practice of Vertue and Piety was not only our Duty but our Interest and so founded the Obligation of the Laws of Nature in that more universally acknowledg'd and more generally prevailing principle of real advantage to our selves Now this was a design suitable to the profoundness of his Meditations very agreeable to the Genius of the present Age and indeed every way so noble and generous that none that are Friends to Vertue can with any reason oppose his undertaking especially considering with what respect he treats that Opinion which though he doth not contradict yet there seems less to favour Thus doth he streugthen Vertue there where it seems the weakest and not in the mean time to deprive it of any of its former assistances he fortifies it against the new Assaults of its modern Enemies and resuses not to joyn issue with them in a way wherein they think they have the most advantage But yet that first part of his own Assertion Non impossibile est ut nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae This I look upon as so great a Truth that I shall beg leave a little further to illustrate it As for his Opinion that these Notices are again imprinted srom without I shall not oppose it only I humbly conceive there are such good Reasons for the former part that of their being born with us that it ought not to be excluded As 1. This seems more agreeable to the plain simplicity of former times and to the less Philosopical Genius of many of those places wherein notwithstanding these Laws of Nature were generally receiv'd and acknowledg'd and seeing they were so and that by those who had neither opportunity nor capacity to enquire more profoundly into the formal Reasons and Causes of them any further than as they were conscious to themselves both of their truth and obligation hence it seems very probable that there was some
other way by which they might and did attain to the Knowledge of 'em without such Philosophical Disquisitions And indeed the very attempt to search into the Causes and Reasons of a Thing seems to suppose that we have at least some knowledge of the Thing before-hand as to matter of fact for Men would scarce go about to enquire into the Reasons and Causes of the Laws of Nature if they had not some consciousness to themselves that there were such Things in Nature and we cannot for the reason before-mention'd say that they then only first came to be known when the Causes of 'em were thus search'd into And though 't is true that the whole Order of Nature duly consider'd doth generally conspire to the confirmation of this Truth that the doing our duty is the best way to secure our Interest yet such is the intricacy many times of Divine Providence and the visible inequality in the distribution of Rewards and Punishments in this life that without the Motives and Encouragements of some other Arguments Men would hardly be perswaded to the practice of that of which they did not see the present Advantage And though Vice and Wickedness especially in any high degree do naturally tend to the prejudice of our Healths and ruine of our Estates yet if there were no other way to attain to the knowledge of our Duty or of our obligation to it we might perhaps sometimes with too much reasos plead ignorance thereof and might pretend a liberty to be vicious at least so far as might be without any considerable prejudice to our Healths or Fortunes not but that Rewards and Punishments are naturally interwoven in the frame and order of the Universe without us and the constitution of humane Nature within us that so though sometimes there may be an unequal distribution of outward Rewards and Punishments yet that Vertue might always be sure at least of a secret recompence and Vice not altogether go unpunish'd even here in this Life But though our duty be always our real Interest and Honesty the best Policy yet such is the disorder and confusion which Sin has introduc'd into humane Nature such the general depravation of Mankind that the truth of these Propositions is not readily many times acknowledg'd by us but Men commonly without any regard either to the present nature of things or their future consequences do make Lust and Passion and a mistaken Self-Interest the Rule of all their Actions 2. I would here propound it to consideration whether our now being able to resolve these Laws of Nature into their further Causes as it is call'd and to demonstrate their Obligations from reasons fetch'd from the Constitution of the Universe whether I say this doth not depend upon that clearer Revelation which God hath made of those things in Scripture for hereby we come to a clearer Knowledge of the Nature and End of the Creation how that the whole Universe acts in subserviency to the glory of God and to the promoting those noble ends of Providence of promoting Vertue and discouraging Vice in the World hereby we are also more fully assur'd of a future state of Rewards and Punishments And these also must be comprehended in the full and adequate Sanction of the Laws of Nature for without these the other of temporal Rewards and Punishments would be found many times deficient and ineffectual for what they were there design'd Now these things being more clearly reveal'd and sully confirm'd to us by holy Scripture and the belief hereof made habitual to us by the long succession of many Ages hence probably that method becomes now more evident to us than otherwise it would have been yet if this should be granted that at least the evidence of that Proposition studium communis boni totius systematis agentium naturalium conducit ad bonum singularum partium quo nostra velut partis unius continetur foelicitas doth in some measure depend upon some further Revelations made known to us by the Christian Religion yet it would be no small or inconsiderable advantage hereby gain'd to Vertue if it be prov'd that that Proposition is of equal extent with the Christian World both as to its Truth and Evidence and both these methods of probation being join'd together seem an undeniable Argument of the Divinity of these Laws in that the God of Nature hath both made 'em natural to the minds of Men which is that which I here mean by Impression and hath also further added the respective Sanctions of rewards and punishments thereunto in the natural frame of the Universe Not as if that other way of resolving these Laws of Nature into those natural Notions and Obligations resulting therefrom was destitute of its proper Sanctions of rewards and punishments but then we say according to this method they are not resolv'd only into these penal Sanctions but that the will of the Law-giver being publish'd with an intent to be obey'd is the intrinsick form of a Law though it did not come attended with outward force not but that these penal Sanctions do also further declare and inforce the Law If it be here objected that it is not easy to conceive the way and manner how these natural Notions are or can be imprinted upon the minds of Men. I answer there is no more difficulty in conceiving how these truths and obligations may be the natural results of our Minds rightly qualify'd at first than it is to conceive how those Ioys and Torments which ariso from the sense of our Innocence and Guilt should be the natural results of our Consciences afterwards which yet are acknowledg'd by those who make the objection That a Vertuous and holy Life doth naturally tend to promote the honour of God and the good of all Men in general and of our selves in particular is readily granted especially by those who believe the Christian Religion but then this Proposition doth suppose First That we know what it is to be Vertuous Secondly That this Vertuous and holy Life is a duty incumbent on us and both these in order of nature before we understand that these tend to the glory of God and the good of Men otherwise the Virtuoso's of our Age those who pretend to be Philosophically Religious might perhaps plead this in excuse of their present Wickedness that they are only at present making an Experiment whether Vice may not as well tend to the publick good as Vertue but as soon as they find the contrary by Experience then they will become devout Proselytes to Vertue But Mr. Tyrrell p. 199. tells us That though all Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that single Proposition of endeavouring the common good of all rational beings or may not have an explicit Notion of it yet it a Man be but thoroughly convinc'd that he is not made for himself alone that he doth truly observe the Laws of Nature towards himself by a temperate and rational Life
towards his Neighbour by observing the great Rule of doing as he would be done by such an one tho' never so ignorant in other things yet contributes his share to the common good c. There is no doubt but he doth but then may we not rather argue thus that since Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that one single Proposition as indeed having no explicit notion of it and yet do their Duties both towards God their Neighbours and themselves that therefore they have some other way of coming to the Knowledge of their Duty without resolving the Laws of Nature into their proper Causes as it is called Dr. Lock the Ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Vnderstanding has spent the First Part of his Book wholly against these innate Principles relating either to Speculation or Practice One great objection that he brings against 'em is this that Children and Ideots have no apprehension of 'em and therefore they cannot be any original Impressions upon the minds of Men because if they were they would soonest appear in such these being suppos'd now to be in puris naturalibus not tinctur'd with any adventitious prejudices of Art or Education and upon this account also there cannot be pleaded that universal consent that is pretended to be given to these original Notions or common Principles seeing thus perhaps one third part of Mankind do not assent to ' em In Answer hereto 1. I observe that those who make this objection as I before intimated will not give the Defendant leave to state his own Question and explain his own sense and meaning of it but will put such a sense upon these words innatâ—â—â—r natural as if a thing could not be thus natural or innate to the Soul unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the Face that they must necessarily assent thereto even before by the common course of nature they are capable of assenting to any thing whereas those who defend this Question make these â—â—â—â—â—â—l or innate notions more conditional things depending upon the Concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the Souls exerting of ' em Thus the Ingenious Mr. Tyrrell has well observ'd of Mr. Hobs that he only takes the measure of humane nature from those Passions which precede the use of reason and as they first and chiesly shew themselves in Children and Fools and Persons unexperienc'd where as according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers we suppose the truer nature of man ought rather to be taken from his utmost perfection viz. his reason c. p. 256. So here 't is thought that the truer judgment of these natural notions ought to be taken rather from the most perfect state of Man rather than as they either do or do not show themselves in Children and Ideots And whereas 't is asserted that these general Maxims are assented to as soon as propos'd and the terms rightly understood to this the Ingenious Author Dr. Lock replies that then there must be an infinite number of innate notions even those which no one ever yet pretended to be such as an Apple is not an Oyster black is not white c. Now these and such as these he says are more readily assented to than those quicquid agit est contradictories cannot be both true at once c. because Children and Fools will readily assent to the former but these latter require more attentive-thought and consideration for the understanding of ' em I shall not here mention that distinction which the Logicians perhaps would make use of in this Case of some things being more known in themselves and yet not so to us because I know not what credit now a-days may be given to Men of that old-fashion'd way of thinking But the Ingenious Author himself doth assert these three ways of acquiring Knowledge First By intuition thus we have the knowledge of our being p. 318. Man also knows by intuitive certainly that bare nothing cannot produce any real being p. 312. The second way of Knowledge is by Reason Thirdly By Sensation Now the Knowledge of these Universal Truths or general Maxims I conceive is by the first way rather by intuition than by reasoning or by the consent or dissent of the terms For these Propositions Cogito ergo sum or that upon which this depends quicquid agit est bare nothing cannot produce a real being the truth of these Propositions doth not so much depend upon any consideration of the terms but seems rather the summary result of the whole which that Author seems very well to express by intuition or intuitive certainly But then as to those other Propositions wherein we deny one Idea of another as a Man is not an Horse blue is nor yellow c. The truth of these depends upon the actual existence of Things and the consensus dissensus terminorum But Mr. Norris the ingenious Author of the Reflections upon the foresaid Essay of Humane Vnderstanding pag. 20. doth not allow any such Things as Mental Impressions or Characters upon the Mind what way soever they may pretend to come there So that though he agrees with Dr. Lock in denying all natural and innate Notions in the Mind of Man yet it is for other Reasons than those which Dr. Lock goes upon and upon a far different Hypothesis So that Mr. Norris his Reflections may be a sufficient Answer to Dr. Lock 's Opinion as it is defended by him shewing the invalidity of the Grounds and Reasons upon which he founds it though in the mean time he agrees with him in the conclusion in denying all Natural and Native Characters upon the Soul Which thing says he in the place above cited Of Mental Impressions or Characters written upon the Mind if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor I take to be meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. But here I humbly conceive that when we speak of Natural Notions or Native Impressions of Truth and Goodness made upon the Minds of Men though perhaps there may be something of Metaphor in it yet the sense and meaning of it is generally understood nor is there any danger lest any one should hence conclude the Soul to be made of White-paper and the Knowledge we find there to be written with Pen and Ink Heb. 10. 26. I will put my laws in their hearts and in or upon their minds will I write them That is says Dr. Taylor Duct Dubit p. 4. You shall be govern'd by the Law of natural and essential Equity and Reason by that Law which is put into every Man's Nature and besides this whatsoever else shall be super-induc'd shall be written in their Minds by the Spirit who shall write all the Laws of Christianity in the Tables of your Consciences Now I do not see any need of any such curious Remark either upon the Text or Comment that if this pretend to any thing more than Figure or
Metaphor then it is meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. 2. Those who assert these Natural Notions do not suppose them super-induc'd or imprinted upon the Soul In esse completo but suppose them to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul as it is such as God first design'd to make it that is Rational and Religious Now it can be no meer Iargon to ascribe to a Subject its own natural and essential Properties such as are the very essential parts of its Constitution They do also suppose with Mr. Norris the ideal World or Idea's in the Divine Intellect which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth these they say are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion suitable to such a being that is they are made either the natural Properties of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its Faculties in the right use and free exercise of 'em But the Author in the forementioned place tells us That he accounts for the mode of Humane Understà nding after a very different way viz. by the presentialness of the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal World to our Souls wherein we see and perceive all things So that denying all mental Impressions not only innate Notions but also those which according to Dr. Lock derive their Original from Sensation or Reslection he asserts all sensible moral and intellectual Objects are only seen and understood in the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus in his Book of Reason and Religion p. 85. This ideal World this Essence of God consider'd as variously exhibitive and representative of things is no other than the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second Person in the ever blessed Trinity this I think says he is highly agreeable to Reason for I know no Hypothesis that would so intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God Against this Opinion I shall briefly suggest these few Prejudices which whether they be real or only imaginary I shall leave to the Reader to judge 1. I grant that every good Christian so far as in him lies ought to defend against the Socinians the Mysteries of the Trinity from all palpable and down-right Contradictions But then it is question'd by some whether it be either modest or indeed possible to invent Hypotheses which may as the Authour speaks Intelligibly make out these Mysteries or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain as indeed it is an Incomprehensible Mystery as thus explain'd by making the ideal World and the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing 2lv Though the natural parturiency of the Authors own Mind p. 185. of his Reason and Religion did early pitch upon this Notion of seeing and knowing all things in God as easy and obvious even before he had consulted any Authors herein yet other Mens Capacities may be so dull as not easily to apprehend the manner of it even now after such an exact Elaboration 3. According to his Hypothesis there seems not a sufficient difference and distinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation seeing God must immediately apply himself to the Souls of Men in both and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other 4. It seems not so becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majesty of God thus to make the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were the Glass of every trivial perception of sensible objects 5. May not his Hypothesis of seeing and perceiving all things in God seem to discourage or lessen the diligent use of our Faculties in the search of Truth or may it not encourage Enthusiasm by giving Men occasion to think that the only way to Knowledge is fantastically to give themselves up to the Impressions of the Ideal World These things I here propound to Consideration though withal I think that it is more easy to oppose the particular manner of any Mans explaining humane Understanding than it is to lay down a true one of his own But lastly That which seems of the greatest consequence is that the Author dangerously forces some places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion Thus Io. 1. 3. all things were made by him or according to him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 89. Reason and Religion and p. 90. Heb. 1. By him God is said to make the Worlds that is says he according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World Now if the Arrians were justly blam'd for putting that interpretation upon those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thereby to signify an Instrumental Cause as if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was only an Instrument in the hand of God in creating the World how much more then ought this interpretation to be rejected which makes the second Person in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform according to which God made the World but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a Genitive Case in Scripture generally signifies the efficient Cause And however I believe he will no where in Scripture find it in that sense which he there puts upon it So that this ingenious Author seems not so successful in assigning his own particular way of humane Understanding as he was in confuting that of Dr. Lock 's And here I would further appeal to the considerate Reader whether this way of seeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor whether it be not as meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant as the other Anima est abrasa tabula nihil est in intellectu quod non priùs erat in sensu These and such like Opinions seem to owe that general reception they meet withal rather to the Authority of their first Founder than to any strength of reason that would be found in 'em did they once undergo a severer Examination this Opinion seems to tye the Soul to its particular Seat or at most gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senses not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad but also for all the knowledge it enjoys at home That the Soul by the very Laws of Creation was at first dependant upon the Body and by the first transgression of the Divine Law is now more deeply immers'd in matter and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature is certainly true but then the Image of God wherein Man was at first Created did first more especially respect the Soul 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will viz. in Knowledge and Righteousness And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul by the assistance of the outward Senses but in something at first actually existent in it self And supposing this to be the true state
upon the 9th and 10th Chap. 2. lib. of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi concerning Eternal Truths Some Reflections upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes rationales de Deo lib. 3. Cap. 10. concerning Eternal Truths The Question he thus states p. 125. That God indeed doth necessarily conceive those Truths which immediately relate to him-self his Nature Essence and Attributes He was never indifferent as to these but as for all other Truths Quae ipse Deus non sunt which are not God himself these wholly depend upon the most free and arbitrary Determination of his own Will and are therefore only true because he appointed them to be so and that there might if God had so pleas'd either have been none of these at all or else quite different from what they now are and he extends his Assertion to all Propositions whether Mathematical or Moral relating either to Truth or Goodness and this he mannages with as much subtlety both of Argument and Answers as perhaps the thing is capable of But before I come more closely to examine his Opinion I shall premise in general 1. That it is very strange that God who created Man after his own Image in Knowledge and Righteousness should yet assign the Methods of Knowledge and Understanding in Men quite different from those of his own we know the respect and relation that the Actions of the Understanding bear to those of the Will in Men viz. That the one those of the Understanding always precede those of the Will But now according to his Way and Method it is quite contrary in God for according to him God doth not know or understand any thing but what he first determines to be so I know not whether I may urge this in strictness of Argumentation yet it seems at least a great presumption against the truth of his Opinion 2. It is a plausible pretence of Piety a seemingly profound Veneration and Respect for the absoluteness of the Divine Perfections which seems either the chiefest Argument for or the greatest Motive and Perswasive to his Opinion This tender care for the Honour of the Divine Nature is indeed a thing very commendable in it self and very worthy of a Philosopher and a Christian yet Men ought to be very careful and considerate herein lest they lessen and derogate as much from the excellency of the Divine Nature one way as they seem to advance it another Now in order to a more particular Answer to his Opinion I shall observe 1. How in the Progress of his Discourse he relinquishes his own Principle and limits the general extent of the question as it was at first stated so as that in effect he Answers himself for he either doth himself tacitly at least or from his own assertions will be forc'd to acknowledge That there is some truth antecedent to the Divine Placitum or appointment In his Answer to the first Objection that God knows what it is that he either will or will not appoint so that his knowledge must precede his determination to these Premises he returns no plain positive Answer but only holds to the Conclusion and says that they who assert this do pre-suppose that there is something different from God quod ante Dei arbitrium seu placitum habeat veritatem possibilitatem à parte sui which he says is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the grand original mistake here he asserts that God knows nothing to be true nothing to be possible before his own respective determination of both As to the first I shall only return what Dr. Cudworth says p. 646. of his Intellectual Systeme This is to destroy the Deity by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another insinite will and power insinite understanding and reason for to suppose God to understand and to be wise only by his will is all one as to suppose him really to have no understanding at all As to the other the possibility of things I would only ask him whether or no there was not a possibility in God of Creating or doing more things than ever he actually Created or did now this possibility must be something and something which God knew he had in his power antecedent to his determination But notwithstanding he confidently holds to the Conclusion non datur nec concipitur ullum quid ante Dei placitum and in the very next words he tells us and he doth not here suppose any Divine Placitum to intervene Absurdum est dicere c. it is not much material to repeat what he there asserts But how comes he to call any thing absurd in this Case the thing perhaps may be so in it self and may be counted so by others but according to his Principles how can any thing be absurd antecedent to the Divine Placitum or appointment For an absurdity doth suppose Truth and Falshood according to the agreeableness or disagreeableness to which rules a thing is said to be absurd or not absurd but it is very hard for a man who has undertaken such a Province not sometimes to contradict himself Res ipse nolunt malè determinari He further grants that there is a necessary truth in this Proposition that a thing cannot simul esse non esse that it is impossible that contradictories should be true at the same time as may be seen at large p. 133. for this would make God to be Statuens non statuens volens non volens ponens non ponens eandem operationem absurda haec sunt c. I am of his Opinion too herein But then doth not this one concession destroy his former assertion for why should this truth only be exempted from the common fate of all the rest I think Des Cartes acted at least more consistently with himself when he went thorough with what he had undertaken and tells us that if God had pleas'd contradictories might have been true at once nor is it sufficient for him to say that this would be absurd both for the reason before mention'd and also because several other of his assertions might be thus answer'd That they are absurd But he tells us p. 126. That the contrary to his opinion destroys both the unity and absolute perfection of God for there would not be one absolutely perfect God if he did conceive any thing necessarily true and immutable habens similem secum radicitùs essentialiter proprietatem besides himself But then what will he say to his former priviledg'd Proposition nihil potest esse non esse simul This will either be a sufficient Answer to his Arguments of this Nature or else he must make it an addition of another Person to the Trinity and make it God himself But why should he be so sollicitous lest granting these moral and intellectual truths to be necessary and immutable they should thus derogate from the divine perfection for it doth not thence follow that these truths have Similem cum Deo radicitùs
so much as any Law of Nature but then he says that it is false that the Gentiles not believing in Christ either did or could perfectly observe the Law and who ever said they could The Text only says That the Gentiles not having the Law that is not any reveal'd Law did by nature the things of the Law Now he will needs make doing the things of the Law to be perfectly to observe the Law and further if by Gentiles be understood those that believed in Christ how can it be said that these are a Law unto themselves seeing they had both the Law of Moses and the Law of Christ to direct ' em But from hence it will be obvious to observe what hard shifts Men are commonly forc'd to make when once they engage in the defence of a false Opinion Some Reflections upon the Tenth Chapter of the Second Book of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi THE Position he there endeavours to defend is this That by the mere light of Nature without Divine Revelation it cannot be made appear that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Vertue although we were already assur'd that there was a God etiamsi nobis jam innotuisset esse Deum Vertue therefore and Vice in respect of God can be nothing else quà m religiosus numinis cultus Vertue indeed may but how Vice can be a religious worship of the Deity is hard to understand Some would think such a stumble as this in the very Threshold was very ominous Others perhaps more agreeably to his Principles tell us that Vice and Vertue in respect of God are the same as to this particular and that God if he had so pleas'd might as well have been worship'd by the one as by the other Now worship he says necessarily requires the certain knowledge of these three things 1. That he to whom we pay it requires any such thing at our hands 2. What it is that he does require 3. Upon what conditions viz. What Rewards he will give in case of observance and what punishments he will inflict in case of neglect Now he would seem to infer that we have no natural knowledge of any of these three I shall here once for all remind the Reader that in the stating of the question he supposes not only that there is a God but also that we certainly know it Now as to the first requisite he grants that there is a worship due to God when it doth appear that we are his Creatures p. 250. So that by his own confession it doth appear that God requires this worship at our hands unless we may know that there is a God and yet at the same time not know that we are his Creatures which would be a strange position for a Christian Philosopher to assert And secondly if we know that there is a God then we know in general how and with what actions he will be worship'd If God be a Spirit then he is to be worship'd with a pure mind was a natural and easy consequence made by an honest Heathen This I say will follow unless we suppose an Immoral God But this though it be both absurd and impious to do yet I am afraid it will not be counted either by him As to his third Requisite we grant that we owe it only to Divine Revelation that God will reward our imperfect obedience with such degrees of eternal happiness yet this even Nature teaches us that holiness doth either entitle us to happiness or at least to a freedom from misery And as for what he says That it cannot be known among Men whether or how they will be served unless they first openly declare it the Argument is no ways conclusive if it be apply'd to this case because Men have no other way to make known their Will but by outward Declarations butGod has viz. those natural Notions which he inwardly inserted into the Minds of Men. But to this he answers That since Men draw these things from natural reason they must also by the same reason prove the existence of a God but since that cannot be done neither can there be any natural knowledge of good and evil of Vice and Vertue But here though I do not grant That the Being of God cannot be prov'd by the light of Nature yet I must remind him that he flies here from the Question as it was by himself first stated where he supposes the Bing of God to be now known to us But then as if he was himself conscious of his Evasion herein he immediately adds Vel st aliqua inde petenda esset scilicet vitii vel virtutis cognitio c. if there was any knowledge of Vice and Vertue to be drawn from Nature then it could be no other than that that should be counted vicious from which any Man's Nature doth abhor and that honest to which Men are carryed by a natural Propension But this is a strange account of Morality to make every Man 's exorbitant Lusts and Passions the rule and measure of good and evil nay according to these Principles there can searce be any thing evil for p. 254. he tells us Nihil fere est nec ullum flagitium ad quod natura multorum c. that there is scarce any wickedness to which the Nature of many Men is not naturally inclin'd I shall not here particularly examine his Opinion concerning Original Sin only herein he shows himself neither a sound Divine nor good Philosopher seeing many of the Heathens themselves did acknowledge the Substance that is the general depravation of humane Nature tho' they were unacquainted with the Name and Nature of it But he again resumes his former Argument That if the way how God is to be Worshipped may be known by the light of Nature then the reward of eternal Life might be known also by the same light But this is no good consequence as I before show'd 'T is true neither the way and method of Divine Worship nor eternal Life are so clearly known by the Light of Nature as they are now made manifest to us by Divine Revelation yet it doth not thence follow but that Nature hath in some measure discover'd Both unto us 2 Tim. 1. 10. Christ hath indeed brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel that is made clearer manifestations of it but then this hinders not but that both Iews and Gentiles might have some more obscure and imperfect Notions of it before But he goes on and tells us p. 252. Virtutis vitii Christiani notitia c. That the knowledge of Vice and Vertue both among Iews and Christians is no otherwise convey'd to either of 'em but by Divine Revelation And here he urges Rom. 7. 7. I had not known Sin but by the Law and I had not known Lust if the Law had not said Thou shalt not covet But here first I would ask him Whether those People who have no outward Law given 'em either do or
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
under that mean design of self-preservation in the narrowest sense as if right reason had no other or higher end and design than that of a Man's private security here in this World It would be tedious to reckon up all those several Senses which in several places he gives to those words accordingly as may best serve the purpose he is then about Now in the midst of these various Significantions how must we interpret those places where he tells us That the Dispositions of Men are naturally such that unless they be restrained through fear every Man will distrust and dread each other that Men by Nature are in such a state wherein their Wills are their supreamest Law with respect to their Self-preservation How shall we know whether by Nature here be meant the Dictates of right reason truly so call'd or only the irregular motions of Passion and sensitive Appetite But I shall here leave Mr. Hobbs to the just severity of his own censure and a little examine Chap. 13. of his Leviathan wherein he makes the State of Nature a State of Equality and a State of War These are the two imaginary Poles upon which his State of Nature moves First He tells us That Men are by Nature equal 1. As for strength of Body the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest and to kill is the greatest thing and they that can do the greatest thing are equal quod erat demonstrandum The Confutation of some kind of errors may give occasion to something worth the Writer's Thoughts or the Reader 's Pains but the confuting of such insipid stuff as this cannot but be tedious to both By this way of arguing he might prove that the meanest Creature in Nature is or may be equal to Man For did not a Fly once kill a Pope And may not a Spider poyson an Emperor But then how this should become a Principle of Policy any other way than as by considering this casual Power which the weakest Man or meanest Creature may have over us thereby to incite our utmost care and circumspection and to beget in us an inoffensive behaviour towards all Men how I say this should be an Argument to prove the natural equality of all Men as the Phrase is us'd in Politicks is hard to understand Then as to the Faculties of the Mind he says he finds a greater equality among Men than that of strength of Body for Prudence is nothing but Experience which equal time gives equally to all but suppose that Men were equal as to Prudence which yet is evidently false yet there are other faculties or habits of the Mind wherein one Man may excel another Here it is not material to enquire whether the Souls of Men were equal as to their first Creation we are now to consider 'em in a more complex'd capacity as join'd with such and such Bodies wherein we find as much variety in their several abilities and inclinations now as if they were really created unequal but certainly Prudence must be something more than mere Experience for Prudence is a further habit super-induc'd upon the Faculty whereby we are enabled to manage our affairs according to the Rules of Reason and Equity thus Experience to Prudence is but as undigested meat to the nourishment of the Body Experience indeed may collect general Rules for the mannagement of the affairs of Life but then it is Prudence which by considering matters of fact in all their Circumstances by comparing them with the present state of things and the possibilities of future contingencies doth as it were digest experience into laudable nourishment but if we did suppose Men equal in their natural yet it will not thence follow that they are so in their Political capacity too For since Men did not at first spring out of the Earth like Mushrooms but came into the World by the ordinary methods of Generation by way of Father and Son therefore there must needs be a subordination and inferiority among 'em a dependance upon one another in respect of Causality and an Obligation in respect of Duty and Obedience Nor secondly is the state of Nature a state of War if any two men says Mr. Hobbs desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy they become Enemies and in their way to their end endeavour to destroy or subdue each other If he speak this in reference to Dominion or Empire that common Mistress courted by all as he says in the state of Nature it may be justly question'd whether all do thus inordinately affect superiority and whether all find themselves thus naturally enclin'd to destroy those that seem to stand betwixt them and the Throne or are there not some more modestly vertuous who out of consciousness of their own inabilities and out of due respect to other Mens Merits above their own who would quit their pretences to Empire and willingly live in obedience to others Is it not inordinate Pride and Ambition rather than the dictates of nature and right reason in those who thus unreasonably aim at nothing less than a Crown Secondly These natural Usurpers do not make use of the most proper means in order to their own self-preservation Here I would only apply Mr. H. his own way and method of reasoning against the attempt of obtaining Soveraignty by Rebellion to the present Case Pa. 73. Lev. 'T is manifest says be that though the event should follow yet because it cannot reasonably be expected but rather the contrary and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner the attempt thereof is against reason Now doth not this equally hold good against the attempt which these natural Usurpers do propound to themselves of an Universal Empire would not the great hazard of any ones particular design succeeding make the action in Mr. Hobbs his own account very unreasonable So that there is but little reason for Men to betake themselves to that way of anticipation in this state of nature that is for a Man to endeavour to Master all before him so long till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him seeing that very equality which he supposes should more effectually perswade 'em to Peace or some more Friendly way of composing differences rather than urge 'em to War seeing no single Person can in reason ever hope to attain to Empire since he must always have ten thousand as strong and as cunning as himself to oppose all his designs Thus that equality which seems to give him right doth at the same time hinder him from the actual procurement of it He grants indeed That this condition of War was never generally over all the World yet he says in many places they live so now for the Savage people in many places of America except the Government of small Families the Concord whereof depends upon natural Lust have no Government at all c. But how is Government though of small Families consistent
with that state of absolute independency before describ'd where every one hath a right to every thing and every Man an Enemy each to other So that this exception of particular Families doth indeed destroy his general Rule but then he interposes these two things 1. That these Families are small 2. Their Concord depends upon natural Lust. But first he grants Lev. Pag. 105. that a great Family if it be not part of a Common-wealth as to rights of Soveraignty is a little Monarchy but he will not grant the same priviledge to a little Family viz. unless it be of that power as not to be subdued without the hazard of War but the rights of governing is that wherein the nature and essence of any Government doth consist and not in strength and greatness now these proportionally are as much in a little Family as in a great one and we may with the same reason say that the Essence of a natural as well as of a Political Body doth consist in such a proportion of strength and greatness below which a Man cannot truly be call'd a Man 2. He says that the Concord of these Families depends upon natural Lust Solâ cupiditatum similitudine Lat. Translation But let the Concord depend upon what it will 't is not material the Government and Constitution of Families is not consistent with such a state of nature as M r Hobbs describes and here he might as well say That Bastards are not Men because they are gotten for the gratification of unlawful Lust for the different grounds or reasons or ends Men may have in making a thing do not alter the nature and essence of it when once made The Question here is not whether the Families be small or great or upon what their Concord doth depend but whether the notion and being of a Family doth not destroy his suppos'd state of Nature But how doth he prove that the Concord of those Families depends only on natural Lust as his English for War seems the more genuine result of Lust than Concord or on similitude of desires as his Latin Translation renders it for this he makes the great Cause of competition and contest when several desire and are not able to enjoy the same thing Thus similitude of desires must be sometimes the cause of War sometimes of Peace thus doth he at once out of the same Mouth blow both hot and cold What the meaning of the Author of the device was when he made two Pitchers floating upon the Waters with this Inscription Si collidimur frangimur I know not but it seems very applicable to Mr. Hobbs his methods of reasoning if they be consider'd singly they may perhaps bear some plausible shew of Argument but if they be compar'd with each other they will often be found as inconsistent with themselves as they are singly inconsistent with the truth But he tells us that in all times Kings and Princes because of their Independency are in continual Iealousies in a State and posture of Gladiators Here 't is observable how cunningly he joins those two words State and Posture seeming thereby to insinuate that Men could not be in a posture of Defence unless they were in a state of War for Kings to put themselves into a condition to repel injuries when violently offer'd is no more than what reason and Prudence dictates but this doth not infer Mr. Hobb's his State of War but rather the contrary when we see some Kingdoms able and yet not willing to oppress their Neighbours That Men may awfully do something in the time of War which is not lawful to do in the time of Peace is certainly true but then we mast not think that the same blast of the Trumpet that Proclaim'd the War did at the same time blow away all those airy Notions of just and unjust which according to him have no other being in Nature but what they receiv'd from humane Compacts Iustice and Injustice are none of the faculties either of the Body or Soul they are qualities that relate to Man in Society not in Solitude Further in this slate of Nature nothing can be unjust here Force and Fraud are two Cardinal Pertues that the practice and external exercise of Iustice and many other moral Duties doth suppose a Society or at least a state of Friendship that so Men may have proper objects of those respective Vertues is certainly true yet the reasons of their obligation are founded in the nature of each single Man and so may belong to a Man in Solitude for the reasons of Iustice and other Moral Vertues are not ultimately to be resolv'd into that natural support and advantage they bring to a Society and Common-wealth and that they cannot without great disadvantage be banished out of it but into that Conformity they bear to the Divine Nature and to the participation thereof in our selves God indeed in the wise and benign disposals of his Providence has twisted our duty and our interest together Goodness and Vertue have a natural tendency to make us as perfectly happy as 't is possible even in our civil and political Capacities but then they are not therefore only Vertues because profitable to the publick but upon some other higher grounds and reasons being Vertues they thus also as parts of Godliness become prositable to all things having the promise of the Life that now is and of that which is to come But why are Iustice and Injustice qualities that relate to Men only in Society and not in Solitude seeing these may as well be in a Man alone in the World as some of his Passions which also necessarily relate to their proper objects Mr. Hobbs some where approves of that definition which the Schools give of Iustice constans perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi so that according to this a Man may be just if he have a real and sincere desire to give every one his own though he have not where withal to do it Thus also why may not a Man be just and charitable though he want fit objects to exercise these Vertues upon for why should the want of the object more destroy the nature of the Vertue than the want of the subject matter or material part as in the former Case of the necessitous just Man There were some fatal Philosophers of old and some such there are still who make good and evil just and unjust mere factitious things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such as depend only upon the free and arbitrary determination of the Divine Will but then to make 'em to depend merely upon the pleasure of the Civil Magistrate this seems to be a peculiar flight proper only to Mr. Hobbs thus to make a God of his Leviathan This Opinion of his doth either suppose no God at all or such an one as doth not much concern himself in the Government of the World but leaves all to his Vicegerent here below obey
the King and you can scarce according to him disobey God Some will scarce allow that granting Mr. Hobbs his Principles that his Conclusions do ever necessarily or but seldom follow that is that there is but little strict and severe ratiocination in all his Writings yet this I think we must grant that his dangerous Errours in Government and Religion are but necessary deductions from his false Principles first laid in humane Nature That Man is naturally a sociable Creature fit for Society is granted by most and not deny'd by Mr. Hobbs himself but then he tells us that Man is not born fit for it this he is fitted for not by Nature but by Education and the reason hereof is because he is not born at Years of discretion not at Age to Seal a Bond and without this there is no entring into Compacts or Civil Society But he tells us Pa. 21. Lev. that Children are called reasonable Creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come and I know not why we may not by the same reason grant Men to be born sociable Creatures or fit for Society for the like apparent possibility though they were not actually enter'd into Covenants for they are born with all those dispositions and aptitudes to Society which they have for reason it self now that Man is thus really a SociableCreature will appear both from the nature and necessities of Mankind 1. From the nature of Man for the very fundamental Laws of Nature suppose either a Society or something answerable to it Quod tibi non vis sieri alteri ne feceris Do to others as me desire others should do to us and we are generally as much oblig'd to the duties of Iustice and Honesty to others as of Prudence and Caution to our selves and this necessarily supposes a Society or something like it a state of Friendship 2. The necessities of Mankind seem to argue us to be sociable Creatures such whose very subsistence necessarily requires the aid and assistance of others otherwise the very Birth of a Child would be the certain exposing of it to destruction Mr. Hobbs will not grant any Laws of Nature truly so call'd in the state of Nature they are only certain Theorems or Maxims tending to Peace rather than Laws that bring us under any obligation But why do not these Laws of Nature which he grants to be dictates of reason lay as great an obligation upon us for Obedience as those inordinate Passions of Nature Especially if we consider that obedience to these dictates of reason are more fit and proper means in order to self-preservation than the prosecution of those mere rights of nature as he calls them violence and anticipation And if we reflect upon matters of fact and the several instances that History furnishes us withal we shall find Examples of Mercy and Compassion to others of a generous condescention and self-denyal of our selves and of an universal love and good will to Mankind sufficient to confute the scandals cast upon humane nature upon this account Though it must also be granted that there has been too many barbarous and inhumane actions committed both by Heathens and Christians too but then those actions were not approved by the more wise and sober Persons of those very Nations that committed ' em 2. They were universally Condemn'd by the more civiliz'd part of the World 3. They were so far from tending to their advantage that they have many times prov'd the cause or occasion of many and grievousCalamities brought upon themselves and Nation by the just Providence of God Now Mr. Hobbs his Principles in general seem to be the suiting or fitting the vicious practises of Mankind to an Hypothesis thereby endeavouring to enact wickedness by a Law and to prove the lawfulness of all possible violence and injustice by the Magna Charta of Self-preservation This bad use has he made of the general viciousness of Mens Lives from thence to gather Principles which might if possible legitimate their actions like Machiavel who from the small respect that Princes generally bore to Leagues and Oaths taught his Prince that there was no obligation lay upon him from 'em but only to consult his own interest and advantage by 'em and whereas his Compurgator admires the bad fortune of Machiavel to see one Man inherit in particular the Mass of reproaches due to all Princes and Statesmen in general he might have ceas'd his wonder if he had consider'd that it was one thing to act wickedly and another to teach Men that they might do so Personal bad actions are but the failures of particular Men such as they themselves perhaps may go about some ways to excuse or extenuate but not to justify but now Machiavel his thus becoming an Advocate for Vice is of more pernicious consequence it emboldens Sin and endeavours to confound the notions of good and evil for he that shall break one of the least Commandments and teach men so he shall be called the least in the Kingdom of Heaven It is further pleaded for Machiavel that all his Documents he gives only to a Prince for had he recommended this practice to a Son or any else circumscrib'd in a narrower compass than a Kingdom he might have been more justly Condemn'd Now this Apology however weak and insufficient it is for Machiavel himself yet is Mr. Hobbs utterly uncapable of any such excuse because his bad Principles are of a more universal influence and reach not only to Prince but People too I call'd Mr. Hobbs his Principles an Hypothesis now if any be offended at the word as a term of diminution I shall here further do these two things 1. Show that it is only so and no more being something that is rather suppos'd than sufficiently prov'd 2. That it is not a good Hypothesis as wanting those conditions and qualifications which are requisite to any Hypothesis in general much more to such an one as the nature of the subject requir'd his to be 1. It is an Hypothesis and no more and I have very good Authority so to call it from Mr. Hobbs his own words 8 Ch. de Cive Let us return again sayes he to the slate of nature and consider Man as even now sprang out of the Earth and suddenly like Mushromcs come to full maturity without all kind of Government to each other Now this I conceive the most proper and genuine interpretation that can be put upon the place to call it an Hypothesis For I would not willingly think that Mr. Hobbs did really believe that once upon a time Men started out of the Earth like Mole-hills especially if we consider that he himself doth Satyrically reflect upon such a supposal where he compares some kind of ignorant persons to Children that having no thoughts of Generation are made believe by the Women that their Brothers and Sisters are not born but found in the Garden here we may observe how little
right reason there is in all Mr. Hobbs his Discourses that depend hereupon for he himself tells us in his De Cive 2 Ch. That right reason is that which concludes from true Principles Now these true Principles in matters of Morality and Policy must be more than supposedly true indeed a certain kind of truth may be in favour granted to an Hypothesis of natural Philosophy if it exactly answer all the Phaenomena of Nature though it self do not answer the real truth but this Indulgence cannot be granted to things of a moral or political concern Neither Secondly is it a good Hypothesis as wanting those qualifications which are requir'd to any Hypothesis in general which are these three 1. An Hypothesis must be possible this is the least that it can pretend to but it must not be only so according to the utmost extent of possibility but also fairly possible according to the most easy methods of our Conceptions that is probable so contriv'd that we might be thence perswaded that that was the way that God and Nature made use of in that particular that as the Epicureans say of the Universe that though it was the result of blind chance yet all things therein have happen'd as well as if they had been the result of the greatest wisdom and contrivance thus an Hypothesis though perhaps it be not the real truth yet it should give as full and natural Solutions of things as if indeed it were 2. It must be self-consistent and not contain Principles of Self-dissolution within it self for it is impossible that that should be agreeable to the wise and regular methods of Nature and Providence which is not agreeable with it self 3. An Hypothesis ought to employ our Faculties in the search of true and useful Knowledge and also to promote real Piety in the World therefore we ought not to fancy to our selves such an Hypothesis in Philosophy as excludes God out of the World and such an one as asserts a mere material Universe Now here I might easily show that this of Mr. Hobb's is neither 1. Possible much less probable 2. Not consistent with it self 3. So far from promoting sound Knowledge and true Piety that it is really destructive of both Whether such a state of Nature as Mr. Hobbs describes be a proper and effectual means in order to a Mans self-preservation may be justly question'd and indeed he himself seems not to be of that Opinion seeing he makes his natural Statesmen to get out of it as soon as they can in order to the bettering of their condition yet this is certain that he makes private interest the great and ultimate end of all humane actions in general and of his Levia in particular as being that wherein he thinks he has laid the best and surest foundations of all humane happiness I shall therefore here by way of Appendix to this Chapter speak something in general concerning this great Principle of Self-Preservation It is the natural folly of Mankind to run out of one extream of Vice and Errour into another thus perhaps the ignorant Zeal and blind Devotion of some who attributed too little might first give occasion to others to ascribe too much to Sels-preservation however we must not deny it its due regard so far as Reason and Religion admit because others have extended it further than in either it ought I shall therefore freely grant what the greatest Patrons of Self-preservation can with any just ground or reason demand and hereby I shall gain this double advantage 1. It will hence appear that it is not out of any preiudice or heat of opposition that I contradict any thing even in that Opinion I do oppose 2. Hereby I shall come to a truer stateing of the Question and so shall be better able to defend it for this disadvantage there is even to Truth it self in the false stating of a Question that we either undertake to oppose that in an adversary which is really true and so irresragable or else to defend something that is false and so not capable of being defended To deny that which is true is altogether needless for we need not fear any prejudice to a good Cause from truth elsewhere because all truths of this nature are consistent with themselves and no ways contrary to each other whereas the denyal of any thing that is true tho' in an adversary may break that continuity of truth and some way or other weaken our own cause I shall ad two or three general considerations relating hereunto 1. That God has imprinted in Man a principle of self preservation is not only true but very agreeable to the goodness of God and very subservient for the carrying on the designs of Prudence and Piety in the world for it would have reflected dishonourably either upon the goodness or wisdome of God to have made such an excellent creature as Man and taken no care for his preservation so far as it should not be in the power of any one upon every slight occasion to throw away himself and so destroy Gods peculiar Image or to have expos'd him to all the dangers that either his own inadvertency or the malice of others might have brought upon him without some innate inclinations of self preservation and suitable principles of prudence to inable him thereunto Thus Religion it self doth not only permit but command us to act with a due respect to those two grand Principles of a Christian Life Prudence and Innocence to be wise as Serpents and innocent as Doves Further without this we had wanted that most exact and easy rule of Charity to others Whatsoever you would that Men should do unto you even so do you unto them where our love to our selves is made the rule and measure of our Charity to others But Mr. Hobbs makes self preservation without any respect to the lawfulness of the means to be the first and great dictate of Reason and Nature and charges Christianity with folly in that in some cases it so little regards its own safety but exposes its professors to Martyrdome for Religion's sake If says he Chap. 42. we be commanded by our lawful Prince to say that we do not believe in Christ we must obey him for words are but external things and do no more express the assent of the Speaker than any other external action and therefore a Christian in such things hath the same liberty that the Prophet gave to Naaman the Syrian 2 Kings 5. 18. In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant that when my Master goeth into the House of Rimmon to worship there and he leaneth on my hand and I bow my self in the house of Rimmon the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing and he said unto him go in peace Here Mr. Hobbs saith that Naaman believed the true God in his Heart but by worshiping would seem not to believe least he should offend his King But here he supposes but proves not that Naaman here
asks Pardon for what he design'd to do for the time to come whereas the words may be as well render'd so as to signify his asking Pardon for the time past but supposing that he here refers to the time to come yet this is not so much a denying of the true God as if he had deny'd him with his Lips as Mr. Hobbs would have it for here he did not deny the true God at all because he declar'd before that by this incurvation he did not design any adoration of the Idol and this Declaration was as publick as his action viz. that henceforth he would worship no other but the God of Israel Now Mr. Hobbs could not well imagine a Man to deny the true God with his Lips before a persecuting Magistrate and withal suppose him at the same time to declare as it was in Naamans Case that he intended no such thing as he spoke by his words for this in all probability would rather incense the Prince than any ways tend to his own preservation 2. Though the love of God and the love of our selves rightly understood are no ways opposite to one another in as much as God requires nothing of us that is inconsistent with our real interest yet we may truly and properly assert that God is to be lov'd for himself for the Excellency and Amiableness of his own Nature not but that we may and generally do love God too with respect to his relative goodness towards us thus Religion is suited both to the most generous tempers of some and provides objects for the most heroick acts of vertue and takes away all occasion from those who would upon this occasion fix upon it the name of mercenary and also on the other hand it condescends to the more common and ordinary inclinations of Mankind in suffering and encouraging them to act with respect to the recompense of reward But though the constitution of humane nature be such that the considerations of Gods relative goodness to us do generally mingle themselves with all our thoughts of God and exercises of our love towards him I doubt not but we may without any fantastical abstraction so far distinguish betwixt the mercies received and the excellency of the Divine Nature that we may even therein found a reason of our love of him So that the loving of God for his own sake though I believe it seldom occurs in practise yet it ought not to be spoke against in Discourse provided first that it be not made use of to lead men into unwarrantable extravagancies either in opinion or practise Secondly Provided as Bishop Tayler says that what is a great perfection in some be not impos'd as a Law upon all 3. In extreme necessity it is lawful for a Man to do what otherwise he ought not to do here I suppose a Man brought to that exigency that without timely and suitable supplies he certainly perisheth by what means he is here brought into these circumstances I do not here consider only I except this That he be not a Malefactor condemn'd and now about to undergo the just and due Punishment of his Offence but then this necessity must be for the necessary sustentation of Life not for the gratisication of Humour or sensual Appetite we must not think with Mr. Hobbs That we may not only for Preservation but Delectation also endeavour to destroy others He also tells us That in the State of Nature there is nothing further required to make a thing lawful but its being necessary to our Preservation and nothing required to make it necessary but a strong opinion that it is so so that according to him confidence of Belief and strength of Fancy may alter the nature of things and make 'em lawful or unlawful accordingly so that according to him we then principally if not only offend against the Laws of Nature when we pretend something necessarily to tend to our Preservation which indeed either doth not or what we do not confidently enough believe to do so Further This necessity must be real not imaginary urgent and inevitable not such as may be supply'd or prevented by our own Endeavours We must not pretend Necessity when indeed we only indulge our own Laziness and neglect the use of those means whereby we might possibly remove what we now suppose in these circumstances a Man may lawfully make use of those means which necessarily tend to his Preservation and no further Thus in case of extreme Hunger he may take so much of other Mens Goods as are necessary to preserve his Life without incurring the Guilt of Theft and the Reason hereof is not merely because the Owner in such a case is bound to give as much as is sufficient for that purpose for in many cases others may be bound to do what we have no power to force in case of denyal Nor secondly because at the first Division of things the Dividers excepted this case of extreme Necessity wherein they did not design the Right of Dominion and Property to be so strict and severe but that in this case the Ius primaevum should return But first it seems not so reasonable to believe that there ever was that Usus communis of all things as Grotius asserts and consequently no such Division wherein he supposes all Property to be founded Secondly Suppose the Dividers either thrô carelessness or inadvertency had left this as a Casus omissus without making any Provision about it and it doth not any ways evidently appear that they ever made any such or if thro' perverseness and ill nature they had determin'd it otherwise yet the thing would still have been as now we apprehend it so that it is more than probable that both Property and that lawful Power that a Man hath to relieve himself in extreme necessity doth depend upon some antecedent Reason and some higher Principle than that barely suppos'd Agreement of the first Dividers 3. The Reasonableness of laying down our Lives for the sake of Religion will appear from the unreasonableness of the contrary Assertion which must suppose one of these three things either that God has not Authority to command his Creatures such instances of Obedience or not Goodness enough to reward 'em for what he thus enjoyns or that we have not sufficient evidence that his Will and Pleasure is that in some cases he requires it to deny the two former is to deny the Dictates of natural Reason to assert the third is to deny the plain Words and Commands of God in Scripture And further if we consider what it is that we are commanded to part with only the short and transitory satisfactions of a frail Life which at best we cannot enjoy long and which may be otherwise so loaded with Miseries that the very continuance of it may be the greatest Punishment Besides 't is probable the Martyrs notwithstanding the greatness of their Torments being as great as either the Wit or Malice of their
as belonging to humane nature in general 1. The honour that Christ has put upon humane nature by taking it upon himself 2. As Man now is made the Temple of the Holy Ghost 1 Cor. 3. 16. 1 Cor. 6. 19. 3. As humane Nature by being join'd to the Divine is made capable of enjoying Eternal Happiness in the highest Heavens but these are things rather of a Divine than Moral Consideration Thus have I more fully explain'd the definition of Moral Vertue wherein whilst I endeavour'd to do right to Nature I hope I have not any ways injur'd Divine Grace for I count him not worthy to partake of the benefits thereof who speaks the least word to derogate from the excellency and necessity of Divine Assistance How far Vertue Reason or Philosophy for they meant much what the same thing by them all was or is available to the Heathens in order to their future Happiness I shall not here particularly enquire or positively determine this being a Question wherein Scripture is much what silent and Modesty here teaches us not to be wise above what is written nor curiously inquisitive in things wherein we have no certain Rule to guide us Only here give me leave barely to relate their Reasons who are willing to entertain as favourable thoughts as they can concerning the possibility of the Salvation of some Heathens and here first to prevent mistakes they lay down this as an undoubted Principle and a certain Truth that there is no name given under Heaven by which any can be saved but only the name of Iesus So that none was ever saved but with a respect to Christ's Death and by the benefits they receive thereby nor do they here hold an indifferency of Religions as if it was equally possible and easy to be saved in any for tho' some Heathens may be saved yet the advantage on the Christians part above them is much every way both in respect of the means in order thereunto and also in respect of the certainty that God will certainly accept of such conditions as he has requir'd in the Gospel So that a Christian if he be not wanting to himself is not only sase but certain sree not only from danger but from doubt which an Heathen cannot be nor do they frame such notions of God as if he was compos'd wholly of Mercy and that Iustice was only an empty Title for they assert that as mercy appears in the Salvation of a Christian so likewise the Salvation of Heathens if any such thing be will not be in a way or method inconsistent with the Divine Iustice they do not here go about to describe the particular way how it is to be done only they charitably conceive that it is not any thing contrary to the Divine Nature nor to any Declaration that he has made in Scripture CHAP. VIII Some short Observations upon Mr Hobs his first Chapter of his Kingdom of Darkness HE begins this Part of his Leviathan with a pleasant description of the Kingdom of Satan which he makes altogether as phantastick as that of Oberon or the Fairy Land making the notion of Spirits and Immaterial Substances to be as groundless as the Dreams of Madmen and indeed the mere results of the timorous apprehensions of Children or Fools There is mention made in Scripture of the Principality of Belzebub over Demons that is to say over Phantasms that appear in the air and since Belzebub is the King of these Phantasms the Sons of Darkness Phantasms and the Spirits of illusion signify the same thing the bare repeating hereof seems a sufficient Answer it being too sancisul to require a serious consutation And yet he makes this one great instance of the Churches being not yet fully emerg'd out of the Territories of Darkness or not yet inserted into the glorious light and liberty of the Sons of God because it believes Spirits to be Immaterial Beings subsisting by themselves and not mere Phantasms as if the Church could never arrive at a perfect purity of Doctrine till it became a Company of Men openly prosessing that which either immediately borders upon or naturally tends to Atheism But then in the beginning of his next Chapter he tells us the manner how Phantasms are produc'd which in short is this by the impression which visible objects make upon the Senses which motion being continued to the place of perception doth there beget in the Mind or Soul the Conception or Phantasm of the object thus communicated to the mind So that a Phantasm according to this way of explaining it is not and cannot be any where existent but in the mind of the Perceiver But then how will this agree with what he had said before concerning Belzebub's being the Prince of Phantasms that inhabit the air But perhaps it would sometimes be as hard a matter to reconcile Mr. Hobs to himself as it would be to reconcile his Opinions to Truth How is Satan Prince of those Phantasms which every Man frames to himself May not every one rather create his own Subjects and become himself Prince of his own Phantasms but when he calls Satan or Belzebub Prince of these Phantasms he seems to grant a greater reality of Existence to him than to them Now I do not see according to his Principles but that Belzebub himself is as great a Phantasm as any of the other Now the first way he assigns by which this Kingdom of Darkness is promoted among Men is by extinguishing the light of Scripture by false Interpretations and I could wish Mr. Hobs was not thus guilty himself of promoting this Spiritual Darkness The first instance he gives of this false interpretation of Scripture is of those who make the Church now in the World the Kingdom of God so often mention'd in Scripture whereas says he 't is manifest to the contrary that the Kingdom of God was instituted by God by the Ministry of Moses over the Iews only who for that reason are call'd The peculiar People of God which Kingdom ceas'd at the Election of Saul and that there never was any Kingdom of God properly so call'd since that on Earth Two things there are generally requir'd to the founding of an Hypothesis 1. To show the reasonableness of it in it self 2. The agreeableness of it to all other Observations relating to such a matter Accordingly Mr. Hobs in his former part of his Leviathan had been laying down the reasons and foundations of his Political Hypothesis and now because he doth not altogether deny the truth of Scripture but that some respect is owing to it therefore he thought himself concern'd to sute it as near as possible to the Scripture also hence he endeavours if he cannot bring his Principles to it he will by forc'd Interpretations bring the Scripture to them This premis'd in general it is easily discernable why Mr. Hobs would not grant now God any Kingdom upon Earth truly so call'd because if he had it would contradict
Opinion of a God there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition But this Argument as it is deficient in other respects so also is it in respect of time for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World notwithstanding the force of this Argument For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself And indeed Mr. Hobs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal Another Artifice by which Mr. Hobs would disparage a truth that he has a mind to oppose is with a Philosophical Gravity to feign an idle and ridiculous original to which judiciously to ascribe it thus he fancies that Aristotle from the consideration of this or such like Propositions Homo est animal from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences Celestial Intelligences and humane Souls Leviat Latin p. 320. Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture is the asserting the immortality of the Soul and its being really distinct from the Body but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture which are commonly alledg'd for it so weak and frivolous many times are they Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it which words says he may suffer this interpretation but then they must undergo a great deal of pain and have a great deal of Patience if they suffer it One great defect which seems to run through all Mr. Hobs his Interpretations of Scripture is this that he supposes himsels on the defensive part and that all that he had to do was only to invent some frivolous Evasion or put some forc'd Interpretation upon the place and then all was done whereas he ought positively to prove that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place both from the generally approv'd concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages from the just and proper acceptation of the words by the best and most approved Authors from the general scope and design of the Context and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has to promote those noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World which God and Christ design'd to carry on by the Scriptures None of which things Mr. Hobs hath as much as attempted to do The Spirit returns to God that gave it that is says he God only knows whence it comes and whither it goes And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present and at what Periods it must return again to Life c. Another place he says which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham Isaac and Iacob to be alive to which he answers That they were indeed alive but not actually but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life but he also tells us That the wicked are sure of eternal Death and thus why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead even whiles they are alive by vertue of the threatning as the Righteous can be said to be alive by vertue of the promise even then when they are suppos'd not to be at all The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein is this he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits and by consequence it dies with the Body not that it is annihilated for matter in this sense is immortal that is not naturally capable of annihilation but that upon such grand indispositions of Body which is called Death the Soul is render'd uncapable of such agitations and such reactions in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist So that according to this Opinion a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead than Quicksilver may for though it be not so Organized as Mans Body is though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other and though it has not the use of Speech yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome yet we may observe that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects yet her Authority is then valued by him when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions thus he cites her Authority to confirm his assertion That Spirits are mere Phantasms because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so I shall here only further observe how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way was those false Opinions concerning God those various modes of Theism which now prevail in the World which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transform'd into other I know not whether I may say into better shapes Now if what I here write may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles and I hope it will rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management If these Papers I say have this good effect I shall not then need to make any other Apology but think my Pains very well bestow'd FINIS AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism an Opinion which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature Pride Ignorance and Ingratitude of Pride as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature of Ignorance as not fully understanding the true state and condition of laps'd Mankind of Ingratitude as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace But Secondly besides these there are others who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man do yet so melt it down as it were below it self till it come to an equal temper with or very little exceed mere natural Religion 3. Others who in words acknowledge a God but denying the common Principles of all Religion the immortality of the Soul and a future State seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus As for the light of Nature which these Men so much Idolize I shall grant to it as much
as in reason it can desire and so satisfy its own just demands 1. The Law of Nature is a Divine Law and brings us under the obligation of its Commands so that whatever is directly contrary hereunto cannot be made part of any suture Revelation because one Divine Light is not contrary to another 2. The rational exercise of their Faculties might be and probably was made use of by the Prophets and Apostles in their revealing the Will of God to Man yet still under the Influence and Superintendence of the Holy Spirit guideing and directing them in such a measure as was necessary in order to such an end 3. This light of natural Reason together with the concurrence of those other means design'd by God in order thereunto may be made use of for the better understanding of God's reveal'd will in Scripture now after such fair Concessions made to it it ought not to exalt it self above or make it self equal to that of Divine Revelation Theism in a Christian state where Men have not only all the Opportunities of knowing and understanding the Christian Religion but also live in the outward profession of it this of all things is the most unreasonable for even the best and wisest Asserters of the Light of Nature and Human Reason do grant that in those places where Christianity is known Reason it self will find more and much stronger Arguments for the Christian than for any other Belief what soever These Theists must also prove one of these two things either 1st That there never were any such persons as the Prophets our Blessed Saviour and his Apostles in the World which is contrary to the universal Consent and Confession of all both Friends and Enemies Or else 2ly That they never made any new revelation of God's Will to Mankind which they can never be able to do As for the practical Duties of Religion we grant they are founded in Nature and agreeable to Reason but then withal we say That Revelation hath both added to the clearness of the Truth and to the necessity of the Obligation of those Duties But here they tell us That Natural Reason has discover'd enough and that there is no need of any farther Revelation to be made to Man but it is a very weak and illogical way of arguing against a Matter of Fact from a supposed needlesness that there should be any such thing we ought rather in this case to argue thus It doth sufficiently appear That God hath made such and such Declarations of his Will to Man therefore it was not needless because God doth nothing in vain Farther It is disingenuous and ungratesul for Natural Reason thus to boast it self upon its own sufficiency and not acknowledge its Benefactor seeing it now owes its present improvement in a great measure to the Benefits and Advantages it has received from Divine Revelation The Author of the Discourse of Human Reason with relation to matters of Religion printed 1690. tell us That the whole Substance of Christianity it self according to St. Iohn's account of it is most certainly founded upon that universal light which enlightens every man that cometh into the World Pa. 4. of his Presatory Letter But to this I answer 1. That St. Iohn there doth not speak of the Light of Nature but of Christ and tho' Christ be the Author of that Light yet his thus enlightning every one that comes into the World doth not supersede the necessity or lessen the excellency of Divine Revelation 2. The whole Substance of Christianity cannot be founded therein because Christianity contains in it Articles of Faith above the natural power of Reason to find out as well as matters of Practice 3. Tho' the practical part be founded in this universal Light of Nature yet Christianity may carry on the Superstructure higher than meer Nature was ever able to do 4. It is not most certain that that is the right Translation of that place of St. Iohn it may be also render'd thus He was that true Light which coming into the World enlightens every man that is every man that hath the Happiness to hear the glad tydings of the Gospel The said Author pag. 92. having before made an exact and full enumeration as he thinks it of the Principles of all or rather of meer Natural Religion In the Belief and Sense says he of these general Traths and in the practice of the Duties that result from 'em according to their full extent and tendency consists all true Religion and whatever else is introduc'd into any Religion either notional or practical I say what either doth not necessarily flow from some of these Branches or tend to enforce the observance of 'em is no essential part of true Religion but the meer Product of Superstition Folly or Design But according to his Scheme of Principles what shall we think of those Articles of the Christian Faith the Trinity the Incarnation and resurrection of the Body for these are neither included in that Enumeration nor do they necessarily flow from any Branch thereof If he say that these may tend to enforce the observance of those Duties before-mentioned this I grant but it seems a preposterous way of proving Articles of Faith to bring 'em in only by the by because the belief thereof may enforce the practice of Christian Duties though this also is true that they do so yet the true reason of our belief of 'em is because they are revealed in Scripture What Monsieur le Clerk's design or whoever else was the Author of those five Letters concerning the Divine Inspiration of holy Scriptures lately translated into English was I shall not here enquire Truth indeed forbids me to think him a Deist in the first sence before mention'd but Charity it self doth not forbid to think him one in the second that is one who would bring Divine Inspiration into as narrow a room as he could and believe as little of it in Scripture as possible Yet we ought not to be too severe in charging the consequences of an Opinion upon its Author especially when he disowns 'em to be his Opinions but on the other side we ought to be very watchful over our selves that we do not broach or defend any Opinion that may any ways tend to unhinge the Principles and undermine the Foundations of Christianity and we ought the more to suspect and carefully examine such from whence men generally draw dangerous consequences That a Papist should industriously set himself to lessen the Authority of holy Scripture and upon all occasions seek advantage against it is not so much to be wonder'd at because hereby he serves a turn and by this means endeavours to advance the Authority of his own Church that what is pretended to be wanting in Scripture may be supplied by Roman Tradition But then why they who call themselves Protestants should joyn in such a Design and pick up all the little Arguments of ill-designing Men against Scripture this is not