God that he saith The Consequence must be that the three Persons must be three Gods as three humane Persons are three Men. And in another place That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are One in the same individual Nature And what saith Curcellaeus to these places for he was aware of them To the latter he saith That by individual he means Specifick This is an extraordinary Answer indeed But what Reason doth he give for it Because they are not divided in Place or Time but they may have their proper Essences however But where doth S. Augustin give any such Account of it He often speaks upon this Subject but always gives another Reason viz. because they are but One and the same Substance The Three Persons are but One God because they are of One Substance and they have a perfect Vnity because there is no Diversity of Nature or of Will But it may be said That here he speaks of a Diversity of Nature In the next Words he explains himself that the three Persons are One God propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis but the Union of three Persons in one Specifick Nature is no ineffable Conjunction it being one of the commonest things in the World and in the same Chapter propter Individuam Deitatem unus Deus est propter uniuscujusque Proprietatem tres Personae sunt Here we find one Individual Nature and no difference but in the peculiar Properties of the Persons In the other place he is so express against a Specifick Vnity that Curcellaeus his best Answer is That in that Chapter he is too intricate and obscure i. e. He doth not to speak his Mind Thus much I thought fit to say in Answer to those undeniable Proofs of Curcellaeus which our Vnitarians boast so much of and whether they be so or not let the Reader examine and judge CHAP. VII The Athanasian Creed clear'd from Contradictions III. I Now come to the last thing I proposed viz. to shew That it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in the Trinity and but one God and for that purpose I shall examine the charge of Contradictions on the Athanasian Creed The summ of the first Articles say they is this The one true God is three distinct Persons and three distinct Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost are the one true God Which is plainly as if a Man should say Peter James and John being three Persons are one Man and one Man is these three distinct Persons Peter James and John Is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous Indignity to go about thus to make Asses of all Mankind under pretence of teaching them a Creed This is very freely spoken with respect not merely to our Church but the Christian World which owns this Creed to be a just and true Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity But there are some Creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking as for their Stupidity And is not this great skill in these Matters to make such a Parallel between three Persons in the Godhead and Peter Iames and Iohn Do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect Being and such finite limited Creatures as Individuals among Men are Do they suppose the divine Nature capable of such Division and Separation by Individuals as human Nature is No they may say but ye who hold three Persons must think so For what reason We do assert three Persons but it is on the account of divine Revelation and in such a manner as the divine Nature is capable of it For it is a good rule of Boethius Talia sunt praedicata qualia subjecta permiserint We must not say that there are Persons in the Trinity but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine Nature and if that be not capable of Division and Separation then the Persons must be in the same undivided Essence The next Article is Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance But how can we say they not confound the Persons that have as ye say but one numerical Substance And how can we but divide the Substance which we find in three distinct divided Persons I think the terms numerical Substance not very proper in this case and I had rather use the Language of the Fathers than of the Schools and some of the most judicious and learned Fathers would not allow the terms of one numerical Substance to be applied to the divine Essence For their Notion was That Number was only proper for compound Bâ—ings but God being a pure and simple Being was one by Nature and not by Number as S. Basil speaks as is before observed because he is not compounded nor hath any besides himself to be reckon'd with him But because there are different Hypostases therefore they allow'd the use of Number about them and so we may say the Hypostases or Persons are numerically different but we cannot say that the Essence is one Numerically But why must they confound the Persons if there be but one Essence The relative Properties cannot be confounded for the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father and on these the difference of Persons is founded For there can be no difference as to essential Properties and therefore all the difference or rather distinction must be from those that are Relative A Person of it self imports no Relation but the Person of the Father or of the Son must and these Relations cannot be confounded with one another And if the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father then they must be distinct from each other But how By dividing the Substance That is impossible in a Substance that is indivisible It may be said That the Essence of created Beings is indivisible and yet there are divided Persons I grant it but then a created Essence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one Person from another which cannot be supposed in the divine Nature and withall the same power which gives a Being to a created Essence gives it a separate and divided Existence from all others As when Peter Iames and Iohn received their several distinct Personalities from God at the same time he gave them their separate Beings from each other although the same Essence be in them all But how can we but divide the Substance which we see in three distinct divided Persons The question is whether the distinct Properties of the Persons do imply a Division of the Substance We deny that the Persons are divided as to the Substance because that is impossible to be divided but we say they are and must be distinguished as to those incommunicable Properties which make the Persons distinct The essential Properties are uncapable of being divided and the Relations cannot be confounded so that there must be one undivided Substance and yet three distinct Persons But every Person must have his own proper Substance and so the
Philoponus But in that divided time there were some called Theodosiani who made but one Nature and one Hypostasis and so fell in with the Sabellians but others held That there was one immutable divine Essence but each Person had a distinct individual Nature which the rest charged with Tritheism Which consequence they utterly rejected because although they held three distinct Natures yet they said They were but one God because there was but one invariable Divinity in them Nicephorus saith that Conon's Followers rejected Philoponus but Photius mentions a conference between Conon and others aâ—out Philoponus wherein he defends him against other Severians Photius grants that Conon and his Followers held a consubstantial Trinity and the Unity of the Godhead and so far they were Orthodox but saith They were far from it when they asserted proper and peculiar Substances to each Person The difference between Conon and Philoponus about this point for Conon wrote against Philoponus about the Resurrection seems to have been partly in the Doctrine but chiefly in the consequence of it for these rejected all kind of Tritheism which Philoponus saw well enough must follow from his Doctrine but he denied any real Division or Separation in those Substances as to the Deity Isidore saith That the Tritheists owned three Gods as well as three Persons and that if God be said to be Triple there must follow a Plurality of Gods But there were others called Triformiani of whom S. Augustin speaks Who held the three Persons to be three distinct parts which being united made one God which saith he is repugnant to the divine Perfection But among these Severians there were three several opinions 1. Of Philoponus who held one common Nature and three Individual 2. Of those who said there was but one Nature and one Hypostasis 3. Of those who affirm'd there were three distinct Natures but withal that there was but one indivisible Godhead and these differ'd from Philoponus in the main ground of Tritheism which was that he held the common Nature in the Trinity to be only a specifick Nature and such as it is among Men. For Philoponus himself in the words which Nicephorus produces doth assert plainly that the common Nature is separated from the Individuals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a mere act of the Mind so that he allow'd no individual Vnity in the divine Nature but what was in the several Persons as the common Nature of Man is a Notion of the Mind as it is abstracted from the several Individuals wherein alone it really subsists so that here is an apparent difference between the Doctrine of Joh. Philoponus and the new Explication for herein the most real essential and indivisible Unity of the divine Nature is asserted and it is said to be no Species because it is but one and so it could not be condemned in Joh. Philoponus 2. We now come to Abbat Joachim whose Doctrine seems to be as much mistaken as it is represented in the Decretal where the Condemnation of it by the Lateran Council is extant But here I cannot but observe what great Authority these Unitarians give to this Lateran Council as if they had a Mind to set up Transubstantiation by it which they so often parallel with the Trinity Thence in their late Discourse they speak of it as the most general Council that was ever called and that what was there defined it was made Heresie to oppose it But by their favour we neither own this to have been a general Council nor that it had Authority to make that Heresie which was not so before But that Council might assert the Doctrine of the Trinity truly as it had been receiv'd and condemn the opinion of Joachim justly But what it was they do not or would not seem to understand Joachim was a great Enthusiast but no deep Divine as Men of that Heat seldom are and he had many Disputes with Peter Lombard in his Life as the Vindicator of Joachim confesses After his Death a Book of his was found taxing Peter Lombard with some strange Doctrine about the Trinity wherein he called him Heretick and Madman this Book was complained of in the Lateran Council and upon Examination it was sound that instead of charging Peter Lombard justly he was fallen into Heresie himself which was denying the essential Vnity of the three Persons and making it to be Vnity of Consent He granted that they were one Essence one Nature one Substance but how Not by any true proper Unity but Similitudinary and Collective as they called it as many Men are one People and many Believers make one Church Whence Thomas Aquinas saith that Joachim fell into the Arian Heresie It is sufficient to my purpose that he denied the individual Vnity of the divine Essence which cannot be charged on the Author of the new Explication and so this comes not home to the purpose 3. But the last charge is the most terrible for it not only sets down the Heresie but the capital punishment which follow'd it Yet I shall make it appear notwithstanding the very warm Prosecution of it by another hand that there is a great difference between the Doctrine of Valentinus Gentilis and that which is asserted in this Explication 1. In the Sentence of his Condemnation it is expressed That he had been guilty of the vilest Scurrility and most horrid Blasphemies against the Son of God and the glorious Mystery of the Trinity But can any thing of this Nature be charged upon one who hath not only written in Defence of it but speaks of it with the highest Veneration 2. In the same Sentence it is said That he acknowledged the Father only to be that infinite God which we ought to worship which is plain Blasphemy against the Son But can any Men ever think to make this the same case with one who makes use of that as one of his chief arguments That the three Persons are to be worshipped with a distinct divine Worship 3. It is charged upon him That he called the Trinity a mere human Invention not so much as known to any Catholick Creed and directly contrary to the Word of God But the Author here charged hath made it his business to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity to be grounded on Scripture and to vindicate it from the Objections drawn from thence against it 4. One of the main Articles of his charge was That he made three Spirits of different Order and Degree that the Father is the one only God by which the Son and Holy Ghost are excluded manifestly from the Unity of the Godhead But the Person charged with his Heresie saith The Reason why we must not say three Gods is because there is but one and the same Divinity in them all and that entirely indivisibly inseparably But it is said that although there may be some differences yet they agree in asserting
there were two Persons in Christ one Divine and the other Humane and two Sons the one by Nature the Son of God who had a Pre existence and the other the Son of David who had no subsistence before This is the opinion which Dionysius sets himself against in that Epistle and which therefore â—ome may imagine was written after Nestorius his Heresie But that was no new Heresie as appears by the Cerinthians and it was that which Paulus Samosatenus fled to as more plausible which not only appears by this Epistle but by what Athanasius and Epiphanius have delivered concerning it Athanasius wrote a Book of the Incarnation against the followers of Paulus Samosatenus who held as he saith Two Persons in Christ viz. One born of the Virgin and a divine Person which descended upon him and dwelt in him Against which opinion he disputes from two places of Scripture viz. God was manifest in the Flesh and the Word was made Flesh and from the ancient Doctrine of the Christian Church and the Synod of Antioch against Paulus Samosatenus And in another place he saith that he held That the divine Word dwelt in Christ. And the words of Epiphanius are express to the same purpose That the Logos came and dwelt in the Man Iesus And the Clergy of Constantinople charged Nestorius with following the Heresie of Paulus Samosatenus And Photius in his Epistles saith That Nestorius tasted too much of the intoxicated Cups of Paulus Samosatenus and in the foregoing Epistle he saith That Paulus his followers asserted two Hypostases in Christ. But some think that Paulus Samosatenus did not hold any subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before but that the Word was in God before without any subsistence of its own and that God gave it a distinct subsistence when it inhabited in the Person of Christ and so Marius Mercator and Leontius understand him who say that he differ'd from Nestorius therein who asserted a Divine Word with its proper subsistence But according to them Paulus by the Word undersâ—ood that Divine Energy whereby Christ acted and which dwelt in him but Dionysius saith he made two Christs and two Sons of God But the Doctrine of the Christian Church he saith was that there was but one Christ and one Son who wâ—s the Eternal Word and was made Flesh. And it is observable that he brings the very same places we do now to prove this Doctrine as In the beginning was the Word c. and Before Abraham was I am It seems that some of the Bishops who had been upon the examination of his Opinions before the second Synod which deposed him sent him an account of their Faith and required his answer wherein they declare the Son not to be God according to God's Decree which he did not stick at but that he was so really and substantially and whosoever denied this they said was out of the Communion of the Church and all the Catholick Churches agreed with them in it And they declare that they received this Doctrine from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament and bring the same places we do now as Thy Throne O God was for ever c. Who is over all God blessed for ever All things were made by him c. And we do not find that Paulus Samosatenus as subtle as he was ever imagin'd that these places belong'd to any other than Christ or that the making of all things was to be understood of the making of nothing but putting it into mens power to make themselves new Creatures These were discoveries only reserved for the Men of Sense and clear Ideas in these brighter Ages of the World But at last after all the arts and subterfuges which Paulus Samosatenus used there was a Man of Sense as it happen'd among the Clergy of Antioch called Malchion who was so well acquainted with his Sophistry that he drove him out of all and laid his Sense so open before the second Synod that he was solemnly deposed for denying the Divinity of the Son of God and his Descent from Heaven as appears by their Synodical Epistle It is pity we have it not entire but by the Fragments of it which are preserved by some ancient Writers we find that his Doctrine of the Divinity in him by Inhabitation was then condemned and the substantial Union of both Natures asserted I have only one thing more to observe concerning him which is that the Arian Party in their Decree at Sardica or rather Philippopolis do confess that Paulus Samosatenus his Doctrine was condemned by the whole Christian World For they say That which passed in the Eastern Synod was signed and approved by all And Alexander Bishop of Alexandria in his Epistle to Alexander of Constantinople affirms the same And now I hope I may desire our Men of Sense to reflect upon these Matters Here was no Fire nor Faggot threatned no Imperial Edicts to inforce this Doctrine nay the Queen of those parts under whose Jurisdiction they lived at that time openly espoused the cause of Paulus Samosatenus so that here could be nothing of interest to sway them to act in opposition to her And they found his interest so strong that he retained the Possession of his See till Aurelian had conquer'd Zenobia and by his authority he was ejected This Synod which deposed him did not sit in the time of Aurelian as is commonly thought but before his time while Zenobia had all the power in her hands in those Eastern parts which she enjoy'd five years till she was dispossess'd by Aurelian from whence Ant. Pagi concludes that Paulus kept his See three years after the Sentence against him but upon application to Aurelian he who afterwards began a Persecution against all Christians gave this rule That he with whom the Italian Bishops and those of Rome communicated should enjoy the See upon which Paulus was at last turned out By this we see a concurrence of all the Christian Bishops of that time against him that denied the Divinity of our Saviour and this without any force and against their interest and with a general consent of the Christian World For there were no mighty Awes and Draconic Sanctions to compell of which they sometimes speak as if they were the only powerfull methods to make this Doctrine go down And what greater argument can there be that it was then the general sense of the Christian Church And it would be very hard to condemn all his Opposers for men that wanted Sense and Reason because they so unanimously opposed him Not so unanimously neither say our Vnitarians because Lucian a Presbyter of the Church of Antioch and a very learned man joyned with him It would have been strange indeed if so great a Man as Paulus Samosatenus could prevail with none of his own Church to joyn with him especially one that came from the same place of Samosata as
Qualities and Dispositions which we perceive by observation and arise either from Constitution or Education or Company or acquired Habits 2. As to the true ground of the real Difference between the Existence of one Individual from the rest it depends upon the separate Existence which it hath from all others For that which gives it a Being distinct from all others and divided by Individual Properties is the true ground of the difference between them and that can be no other but the Will of God And no consequent Faculties or Acts of the Mind by Self-Reflection c. can be the reason of this difference because the difference must be supposed antecedent to them And nothing can be said to make that which must be supposed to be before it self for there must be a distinct Mind in Being from all other Minds before it can reflect upon it self But we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter For as to Individual Persons there are these things still to be consider'd 1. Actual Existence in it self which hath a Mode belonging to it or else the humane Nature of Christ could not have been united with the divine but it must have had the personal Subsistence and consequently there must have been two Persons in Christ. 2. A separate and divided Existence from all others which arises from the actual Existence but may be distinguished from it and so the humane Nature of Christ although it had the Subsistence proper to Being yet had not a separate Existence after the Hypostatical Vnion 3. The peculiar manner of Subsistence which lies in such properties as are incommunicable to any other and herein lies the proper reason of Personality Which doth not consist in a meer Intelligent Being but in that peculiar manner of Subsistence in that Being which can be in no other For when the common Nature doth subsist in Individuals there is not only a separate Existence but something so peculiar to it self that it can be communicated to no other And this is that which makes the distinction of Persons 4. There is a common Nature which must be joyned with this manner of Subsistence to make a Person otherwise it would be a meer Mode but we never conceive a Person without the Essence in Conjunction with it But here appears no manner of contradiction in asserting several Persons in one and the same common Nature 5. The Individuals of the same kind are said to differ in number from each other because of their different Accidents and separate Existence For so they are capable of being numbred Whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts and may be said to be one by the Union of them whatever is separated from another is capable of number by distinction But where there can be no Accidents nor Division there must be perfect Unity 6. There must be a Separation in Nature where-ever there is a difference of Individuals under the same kind I do not say there must be an actual Separation and Division as to place but that there is and must be so in Nature where one common Nature subsists in several Individuals For all Individuals must divide the Species and the common Nature uâ—ites them And this Philoponus understood very well and therefore he never denied such a Division and Separation in the divine Persons as is implied in distinct Individuals which is the last thing to be consider'd here 3. We are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the Persons in the Trinity and whether it be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the Godhead and but one God We are very far from disputing the Vnity of the divine Essence which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible as not to be capable of such a difference of Persons as is among Men. Because there can be no difference of Accidents or Place or Qualities in the divine Nature and there can be no separate Existence because the Essence and Existence are the same in God and if necessary Existence be an inseparable Attribute of the divine Essence it is impossible there should be any separate Existence for what always was and must be can have no other Existence than what is implied in the very Essence But will not this overthrow the distinction of Persons and run us into Sabellianism By no means For our Vnitarians grant That the Noetians and Sabellians held that there is but one divine Substance Essence or Nature and but one Person And how can those who hold three Persons be Sabellians Yes say they the Sabellians held three relative Persons But did they mean three distinct Subsistences or only one Subsistence sustaining the Names or Appearances or Manifestations of three Persons The latter they cannot deny to have been the true sense of the Sabellians But say they these are three Persons in a classical critical Sense We meddle not at present with the Dispute which Valla hath against Boethius about the proper Latin Sense of a Person and Petavius saith Valla's Objections are mere Iests and Trifles but our Sense of a Person is plain that it signifies the Essence with a particular manner of Subsistence which the Greek Fathers called an Hypostasis taking it for that incommunicable Property which makes a Person But say our Vnitarians a Person is an intelligent Being and therefore three Persons must be three intelligent Beings I answer that this may be taken two ways 1. That there is no Person where there is no intelligent Nature to make it a Person and so we grant it 2. That a Person implies an intelligent Being separate and divided from other Individuals of the same kind as it is among men and so we deny it as to the Persons of the Trinity because the Divine Essence is not capable of such Division and Separation as the humane Nature is But say they again The Fathers did hold a specifical Divine Nature and the Persons to be as so many individuals This they repeat very often in their late Books and after all refer us to Curcellaeus for undeniable Proofs of it Let us for the present suppose it then I hope the Fathers are freed from holding Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity for what Contradiction can it be to hold three individual Persons in the Godhead and One common Nature more than it is to hold that there are three humane Persons in One and the same common Nature of Man Will they make this a Contradiction too But some have so used themselves to the Language of Iargon Nonsense Contradiction Impossibility that it comes from them as some men swear when they do not know it But I am not willing to go off with this Answer for I do take the Fathers to have been men of too great Sense and Capacity to have maintained such an absurd Opinion as that of a Specifick Nature in God For either it is a mere Logical Notion and Act
But if we suppose a personal Union of the Word with the human Nature in Christ then we have a very reasonable Sense of the Words for then no more is imply'd but that Christ as consisting of both Natures should ascend thither where the Word was before when it is said that the Word was with God and so Grotius understands it 2. Grotius doth not make the Word in the beginning of S. John 's Gospel to be a mere Attribute of Wisdom and Power but the eternal Son of God This I shall prove from his own Words 1. He asserts in his Preface to S. Iohn's Gospel that the chief cause of his writing was universally agreed to have been to prevent the spreading of that Venom which had been then dispersed in the Church which he understands of the Heresies about Christ and the Word Now among these the Heresie of Cerinthus was this very opinion which they fasten upon Grotius viz. that the Word was the divine Wisdom and Power inhabiting in the Person of Iesus as I have shew'd before from themselves And besides Grotius saith That the other Evangelists had only intimated the divine Nature of Christ from his miraculous Conception Miracles knowing Mens Hearts perpetual Presence promise of the Spirit remission of Sins c. But S. John as the time required attributed the Name and Power of God to him from the beginning So that by the Name and Power of God he means the same which he called the divine Nature before 2. He saith that when it is said The Word was with God it ought to be understood as Ignatius explains it with the Father what can this mean unless he understood the Word to be the eternal Son of God And he quotes Tertullian saying that he is the Son of God and God ex unitate Substantiae and that there was a Prolation of the Word without Separation Now what Prolation can there be of a meer Attribute How can that be said to be the Son of God begotten of the Father without Division before all Worlds as he quotes it from Iustin Martyr And that he is the Word and God of God from Theophilus Antiochenus And in the next Verse when it is said The same was in the beginning with God it is repeated on purpose saith he That we might consider that God is so to be understood that a Distinction is to be made between God with whom he was and the Word who was with God so that the Word doth not comprehend all that is God But our Wise Interpreters put a ridiculous Sense upon it as though all that Grotius meant was That Gods Attributes are the same with himself which although true in it self is very impertinent to Grotius his purpose and that the Reason why he saith That the Word is not all that God is was because there were other Attributes of God besides But where doth Grotius say any thing like this Is this Wise interpreting or honest and fair dealing For Grotius immediately takes notice from thence of the Difference of Hypostases which he saith was taken from the Platonists but with a change of the Sense 3. When it is said v. 3. That all things were made by him Grotius understands it of the old Creation and of the Son of God For he quotes a passage of Barnabas where he saith The Sun is the Work of his hands and several passages of the Fathers to prove That the World and all things in it were created by him and he adds That nothing but God himself is excepted What say our Wise Interpreters to all this Nothing at all to the purpose but they cite the English Geneva Translation when they pretend to give Grotius his Sense and add That the Word now begins to be spoken of as a Person by the same Figure of Speech that Solomon saith Wisdom hath builded her house c. Doth Grotius say any thing like this And yet they say Let us hear Grotius interpreting this sublime Proeme of S. John 's Gospel But they leave out what he saith and put in what he doth not say is not this interpreting like Wise men 4. The VVord was made flesh v. 14. i. e. say the Vnitarians as from Grotius It did abode on and inhabit a humane Person the Person of Iesus Christ and so was in appearance made flesh or man But what saith Grotius himself The Word that he might bring us to God shew'd himself in the Weakness of humane Nature and he quotes the words of S. Paul for it 1 Tim. 3.16 God was manifest in the flesh and then produces several Passages of the Fathers to the same purpose Is not this a rare Specimen of Wise interpreting and Fair dealing with so considerable a Person and so well known as Grotius Who after all in a Letter to his intimate Friend Ger. I. Vossius declares that he owned the Doctrine of the Trinity both in his Poems and his Catechism after his reviewing them which Epistle is Printed before the last Edition of his Book about Christ's Satisfaction as an account to the World of his Faith as to the Trinity And in the last Edition of his Poems but little before his Death he gives a very different Account of the Son of God from what these Vnitarians fasten upon him And now let the World judge how wisely they have interpreted both S. Iohn and his Commentator Grotius IV. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise men to make our Saviour's meaning to be expressly contrary to his Words For when he said Before Abraham was I am they make the Sense to be that really he was not but only in Gods Decree as any other man may be said to be This place the late Archbishop who was very far from being a Socinian however his Memory hath been very unworthily reproached in that as well as other Respects since his Death urged against the Socinians saying That the obvious Sense of the Words is that he had a real Existence before Abraham was actually in Being and that their Interpretation about the Decree is so very flat that he can hardly abstain from saying it is ridiculous And the wise Answer they give is That the words cannot be true in any other Sense being spoken of one who was a Son and Descendant of Abraham Which is as ridiculous as the Interpretation for it is to take it for granted he was no more than a Son of Abraham V. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise men to say that when our Saviour said in his Conference with the Iews I am the Son of God his chief meaning was That he was the Son of God in such a Sense as all the faithful are called Gods Children Is not this doing great Honour to our Saviour Especially when they say That he never said of himself any higher thing than this which is true of every good man I am the Son of God And yet the Iews accused him of
which makes them so Is it the attributing a general Name to them No certainly but that the true and Real Essence of a Man is in every one of them And we must be as certain of this as we are that they are Men they take their Denomination of being Men from that common Nature or Essence which is in them 4. That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas by the meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances but from Reason and Consideration of the true Nature of Things For when we see so many Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties we thence infer that there must be something common to all which makes them of one kind and if the difference of Kinds be real that which makes them of one kind and not of another must not be a Nominal but Real Essence And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substance whereby Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds for let them mistake in the Complication of their Ideas either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them and let their Ideas be what they please the Real Essence of a Man and a Horse and a Tree are just what they were and let their Nominal Essences differ never so much the Real common Essence or Nature of the several Kinds are not at all alter'd by them And these Real Essences are unchangeable For however there may happen some variety in Individuals by particular Accidents yet the Essences of Men and Horses and Trees remain always the same because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator who hath made several sorts of Beings 2. Let us now come to the Idea of a Person For although the common Nature in mankind be the same yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from one another So that Peter and Iames and Iohn are all of the same kind yet Peter is not Iames and Iames is not Iohn But what is this Distinction founded upon They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses as to difference of Features distance of Place c. but that is not all for supposing there were no such external difference yet there is a difference between them as several Individuals in the same common Nature And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not Communicable to another An Individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence which agrees to one and to none else of the Kind and this is it which is called Personality But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Person We may understand the difference between abstracted Ideas and particular Beings by the Impressions of outward Objects and we may find an Intelligent Substance in our selves by inward Perception â—ut whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other Way for if the meer Intelligent Substance makes a Person then there cannot be the Union of two Natures but there must be two Persons Therefore a Person is a compleat Intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence so that if it be a part of another Substance it is no Person and on this account the Soul is no Person because it makes up an entire Being by its Union with the Body But when we speak of Finite Substances and Persons we are certain that distinct Persons do imply distinct Substances because they have a distinct and separate Existence but this will not hold in an infinite Substance where necessary Existence doth belong to the Idea of it And although the Argument from the Idea of God may not be sufficient of it self to prove his Being yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him which is inconsistent with necessary Existence therefore if we suppose a Distinction of Persons in the same Divine Nature it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite Perfections of it And no objection can be taken from the Idea of God to overthrow a Trinity of Co-existing Persons in the same Divine Essence For necessary Existence doth imply a Co-existence of the Divine Persons and the Unity of the Divine Essence that there cannot be such a difference of individual Substances as there is among mankind But these things are said to be above our Reason if not contrary to it and even such are said to be repugnant to our Religion 2. That therefore is the next thing to be carefully Examin'd whether Mysteries of Faith or Matters of Revelation above our Reason are to be rejected by us And a Thing is said to be above our Reason when we can have no clear and distinct Idea of it in our Minds And that if we have no Ideas of a thing it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it and that if such Doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand we must have new Powers and Organs for the Perception of them We are far from defending Contradictions to our natural Notions of which I have spoken already but that which we are now upon is whether any Doctrine may be rejected when it is offer'd as a Matter of Faith upon this account that it is above our Comprehension or that we can have no clear Idea of it in our Minds And this late Author hath undertaken to prove That there is nothing so Mysterious or above Reason in the Gospel To be above Reason he saith may be understood two ways 1. For a thing Intelligible in it self but cover'd with figurative and mystical Words 2. For a thing in its own Nature unconceivable and not to be judged of by our Faculties tho' it be never so clearly revealed This in either Sense is the same with Mystery And from thence he takes occasion to shew his Learning about the Gentile Mysteries and Ecclesiastical Mysteries which might have been spared in this Debate but only for the Parallel aimed at between them as to Priest-craft and Mysteries without which a Work of this nature would want its due relish with his good Christian Readers Others we see have their Mysteries too but the Comfort is that they are so easily understood and seen through as when the Heathen Mysteries are said to have been instituted at first in Commemoration of some remarkable Accidents or to the Honour of some great Persons that obliged the World by their Vertues and useful Inventions to pay them such Acknowledgments He must be very dull that doth not understand the meaning of this and yet this Man pretends to vindicate Christianity from being
Creed is not liable to their charges of Contradiction Impossibilities and pure Nonsense 2. That we own no other Doctrine than what hath been received by the Christian Church in the several Ages from the Apostles Times 3. And that there are no Objections in point of reason which ought to hinder our Assent to this great point of the Christian Faith But the chief Design of this Preface is to remove this Prejudice which lies in our way from the different manners of Explication and the warm Disputes which have been occasion'd by them It cannot be denied that our Adversaries have taken all possible advantage against us from these unhappy differences and in one of their latest Discourses they glory in it and think they have therein out-done the foreign Unitarians For say they We have shewed that their Faiths concerning this pretended Mystery are so many and so contrary that they are less one Party among themselves than the far more learned and greater number of them are one Party with us this is spoken of those they call Nominal Trinitarians and for the other whom they call Real they prove them guilty of manifest Heresie the one they call Sabellians which they say is the same with Unitarians and the other Polytheists or disguised Pagans and they borrow arguments from one side to prove the charge upon the other and they confidently affirm that all that speak out in this matter must be driven either to Sabellianism or Tritheism If they are Nominal Trinitarians they fall into the former if Real into the latter This is the whole Design of this late Discourse which I shall here examine that I may remove this stumbling Block before I enter upon the main business 1. As to those who are called Nominal Trinitarians Who are they And from whence comes such a Denomination They tell us That they are such who believe three Persons who are Persons in Name only indeed and in truth they are but one subsisting Person But where are these to be found Among all such say they as agree that there is but one only and self-same divine Essence and Substance But do these assert that there is but one subsisting Person and three only in Name Let any one be produced who hath written in defence of the Trinity for those who have been most charged have utterly deny'd it That learned Person who is more particularly reflected upon in this Charge is by them said to affirm That God is one divine intellectual Substance or really subsisting Person and distinguished and diversified by three relative Modes or relative Subsistences And Mr. Hooker is produc'd to the same purpose That there is but one Substance in God and three distinct relaâ—ive Properties which Substance being taken with its peculiar Property makes the distinction of Persons in the Godhead But say they These Modes and Properties do not make any real subsisting Persons but only in a Grammatical and Critical Sense and at most this is no more than one Man may be said to be three Persons on the account of different Relations as Solomon was Son of David Father of Rehoboam and proceeding from David and Bathsheba and yet was but one subsisting Pâ—rson This is the force of what they say But then in a triumphing manner they add That the Realists have so manifest an advantage against them that they have no way to deâ—end themselves but by Recrimination i. e. by shewing the like Absurdity in their Doctrine And thus they hope either side will baffle the other and in the mean time the Cause be lost between them But in so nice a matter as this we must not rely too much on an Adversaries Representation for the leaving out some expressions may make an opinion look with another Appearance than if all were taken together it would have We must therefore take notice of other passages which may help to give the true Sense of the learned Author who is chiefly aimed at 1. In the very same Page he asserts That each of the divine Persons has an absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him though not a distinct absolute Nature and to the same purpose in another place 2. That the eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son and communicating his Essence to another And elsewhere that the Relation between Father and Son is founded on that eternal Act by which the Father communicates his divine Nature to the Son 3. That the foundation of the Doctrine of the Trinity is this 1. That there can be but one God 2. That there is nothing in God but what is God 3. That there can be no Composition in the Deity with any such positive real Being distinct from the Deity it self But the Church finding in Scripture mention of three to whom distinctly the Godhead does belong expressed these three by the Name of Persons and stated their Personalities upon three distinct Modes of Subsistence allotted to one and the same Godhead and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct Relations What do these men mean to charge one who goes upon these grounds with Sabellianism Doth he make the three Persons to be mere Names as S. Basil in few words expresses the true nature of Sabellianism that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One thing with different Denominations Can the communicating the divine Essence by the Father to the Son be called a Name or a Mode or a Respect only And these Men of wonderfull Subtilty have not learnt to distinguish between Persons and Personalities Where is the least Intimation given that he look'd on the divine Persons as Modes and Respects only That is impossible since he owns a Communication of the divine Essence and that each of the divine Persons hath the divine Nature belonging to him could it ever enter into any Man's head to think that he that owns this should own the other also But the Personality is a thing of another consideration For it is the reason of the distinction of Persons in the same undivided Nature That there is a distinction the Scripture assures us and withall that there is but one divine Essence How can this distinction be Not by essential Attributes for those must be in the divine Essence and in every Person alike otherwise he hath not the entire divine Nature not by accidents as Men are distinguished from each other for the divine Nature is not capable of these not by separate or divided Substances for that would be inconsistent with the perfect Vnity of the Godhead since therefore there can be no other way of distinction we must consider how the Scripture directs us iâ— this case and that acquaints us with the Father Son and Holy Ghost as having mutual Relation to each other and there is no Repugnancy therein to the divine Nature and therefore the distinction of the Persons hath been fixed on that as the most proper foundation for it
And these are called different Modes of Subsistence on which the distinct Personalities are founded which can be no other than relative But a Person is that which results from the divine Nature and Subsistence together and although a Person cannot be said to be a relative consider'd as such yet being joyned with the manner of Subsistence it doth imply a Relation and so a Person may be said to be a relative Being But say they If the three Persons have all the same individual Substance then they are truly and properly only three Modes and therefore aâ—though among Men Personalities are distinct from the Persons because the Persons are distinct intelligent Substances yet this cannot hold where there is but one individual Substance The question is Whether those they call Nominal Trinitarians are liable to the charge of Sabellianism the answer is That they cannot because they assert far more than three Names viz. That each Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him But say they These Persons are but mere Modes No say the other We do not say that the Person is only a Modus but that it is the divine Nature or Godhead subsisting under such a Modus so that the Godhead is still included in it joyned to it and distinguished by it Grant all this the Vnitarians reply yet where there is the same individual Substance the Person can be only a Modus To which it is answer'd That this individual Substance hath three distinct ways of subsisting according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the three divine Persons So that here lies the main point whether it be Sabellianiâ—m to assert the same individual Substance under three such different Modes of Subsistence If it be the most learned and judicious of the Fathers did not know what Sabellianism meant as I have shewd at large in the following Discourse for they utterly disowned Sabellianism and yet asserted That the several Hypostases consisted of peculiar Properties in one and the same divine Substance But it is not the authority of Fathers which they regard for they serve them only as Stones in the Boys way when they quarrel viz. to throw them at our Heads Let us then examine this matter by reason without them Persons among Men say they are distinguished from Personalities because they have distinct Substances therefore where there is but one Substance the Person can be only a Mode and therefore the same with the Personality I answer that the true original Notion of Personality is no more than a different Mode of subsistence in the same common Nature For every such Nature is in it self one and indivisible and the more perfect it is the greater must its Vnity be For the first Being is the most One and all Division comes from Distance and Imperfection The first foundation of Distinction is Diversity for if there were no Diversity there would be nothing but entire and perfect Vnity All Diversity comes from two things Dissimilitudâ— and Dependence Those Philosophers called Megarici did not think much amiss who said That if all things were alike there would be but one Substance or Being in the World and what we now call different Substances would be only different Modes of Subsistence in the same individual Nature The difference of Substances in created Beings arises from those two things 1. A Dissimilitude of Accidents both internal and external 2. The Will and Power of God whereby he gives them distinct and separate Beings in the same common Nature As for instance the Nature or Essence of a Man consider'd in it self is but one and indivisible but God gives a separate Existence to every Individual whereby that common Nature subsists in so many distinct Substances as there are Individuals of that kind and every one of these Substances is distinguished from all others not only by a separate internal vital Principle and peculiar Properties but by such external Accidents as do very easily discriminate them from each other And the subject of all these Accidents is that peculiar Substance which God hath given to every Individual which in rational Beings is called a Person and so we grant that in all such created Beings the Personality doth suppose a distinct Substance not from the Nature of Personality but from the condition of the subject wherein it is The Personality in it self is but a different Mode of Subsistence in the same common Nature which is but One but this Personality being in such a subject as Man is it from thence follows that each Person hath a peculiar Substance of his own and not from the Nature of Personality But when we come to consider a divine Essence which is most perfectly one and is wholly uncapable of any separate Existence or Accidents there can be no other way of distinction conceived in it but by different Modes of Subsistence or relative Properties in the same divine Essence And herein we proceed as we do in our other Conceptions of the divine Nature i. e. we take away all Imperfection from God and attribute only that to him which is agreeable to his divine Perfections although the manner of it may be above our comprehension And if this be owning the Trinity of the Mob I am not ashamed to own my self to be one of them but it is not out of Lazyness or affected Ignorance but upon the greatest and most serious consideration They may call this a Trinity of Cyphers if they please but I think more modest and decent Language about these matters would become them as well as the things themselves much better And they must prove a little better than they have done that different Modes of Subsistence in the divine Nature or the relations of Father and Son are mere Cyphers which is so often mentioned in Scripture as a matter of very great consequence and that when we are baptized in the Name of the Father Son and Holy Ghost we are baptized into a Trinity of Cyphers But our Unitarians proceed and say that the same Author affirms not only the Personalities but the Persons to be merely Relative For he saith That every Person as well as every Personality in the Trinity is wholly Relative But it is plain he speaks there not of the Person in himself but with respect to the manner of Subsistence or the relative Properties belonging to them But if the Notion of a Person doth besides the relative Property necessarily suppose the divine Nature together with it how can a Person then be imagined to be wholly Relative But they urge That which makes the first Person in the Trinity to be a Person makes him to be a Father and what makes him to be a Father makes him to be a Person And what follows from hence but that the relative Property is the Foundation of the Personality But by no means that the Person of the Father is nothing but the relative Property
inconsistent with the divine Perfections but of this at large in the following Discourse I do not lay any force upon this argument that there can be no ground of the Distinction between the three Substances if there be but one Substance in the Godhead as some have done because the same Substance cannot both unite and distinguish them for the ground of the distinction is not the Substance but the Communication of it and where that is so freely asserted there is a reason distinct from the Substance it self which makes the Distinction of Persons But the difficulty still remains how each Person should have a Substance of his own and yet there be but one entire and indivisible Substance for every Person must have a proper Substance of his own or else according to this Hypothesis he can be no Person and this peculiar Substance must be really distinct from that Substance which is in the other two so that here must be three distinct Substances in the three Persons But how then can there be but one individual Essence in all three We may conceive one common Essence to be individuated in three Persons as it is in Men but it is impossible to conceive the same individual Essence to be in three Persons which have peculiar Substances of their own For the Substances belonging to the Persons are the same Essence individuated in those Persons and so there is no avoiding making three individual Essences and one specifick or common divine Nature And Maimonides his argument is considerable against more Gods than one If saith he there be two Gods there muâ—t be something wherein they agree and something wherein they differ that wherein they agree must be that which makes each of them God and that wherein they differ must make them two Gods Now wherein doth this differ from the present Hypothesis There is something wherein they differ and that is their proper Substance but Maimonides thought that wherein they differ'd sufficient to make them two Gods So that I fear it will be impossible to clear this Hypothesis as to the reconciling three individual Essences with one individual divine Essence which looks too like asserting that there are three Gods and yet but one And the Author of this Explicaâ—ion doth at last confess that three distinct whole inseparable Same 's are hard to conceive as to the manner of it Now to what purpose are new Explications started and Disputes raised and carried on so warmly about them if after all the main difficulty be confess'd to be above our Comprehension We had much better satisfie our selves with that Language which the Church hath receivâ—d and is express'd in the Creeds than go about by new Terms to raise new Ferments especially at a time when our united Forces are most necessary against our common Adversaries No wise and good Men can be fond of any new Inventions when the Peace of the Church is hazarded by them And on the other side it is as dangerous to make new Heresies as new Explications If any one denies the Doctrine contained in the Nicene Creed that is no new Heresie but how can such deny the Son to be consubstantial to the Father who assert one and the same indivisible Substance in the Father and the Son But they may contradict themselves That is not impossible on either side But doth it follow that they are guilty of Heresie Are not three Substances and but one a Contradiction No more say they than that a communicated Substance is not distinct from that which did communicate But this whole dispute we find is at last resolved into the infinite and unconceivable Perfections of the Godhead where it is most safely lodged and that there is no real Contradiction in the Doctrine it self is part of the design of the Discourse afterwards But here it will be necessary to take notice of what the Unitarians have objected against this new Explication viz. That it was condemned by the ancients in the Person of Philoponus in the middle Ages in the Person and Writings of Abhor Ioachim but more severely since the Reformation in the Person of Valentinus Gentilis who was condemned at Geneva and beheaded at Bern for this very Doctrine To these I shall give a distinct answer 1. As to Joh Philoponus I do freely own that in the Greek Church when in the sixth Century he broached his opinion That every Hypostasis must have the common Nature individuated in it this was look'd upon as a Doctrine of dangerous consequence both with respect to the Trinity and Incarnation The latter was the first occasion of it for as Leontius observes the dispute did not begin about the Trinity but about the Incarnation and Philoponus took part with those who asserted but one Nature in Christ after the Vnion and he went upon this ground That if there were two Natures there must be two Hypostases because Nature and Hypostasis were the same Then those on the Churches side saith Leontius objected That if they were the same there must be three distinct Natures in the Trinity as there were three Hypostases which Philoponus yielded and grounded himself on Aristotle's Doctrine that there was but one common Substance and several individual Substances and so held it was in the Trinity whence he was called the leader of the Heresie of the Tritheius This is the account given by Leontius who lived very â—ear his time A. D. 620. The same is affirmed of him by Nicephorus and that he wrote a Book on purpose about the Vnion of two Natures in Christ out of which he produces his own words concerning a common and individual Nature which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which can agree to none else And the main argument he went upon was this that unless we assert a singular Nature in the Hypostases we must say that the whole Trinity was incarnate as unless there be a singular humane Nature distinct from the common Christ must assume the whole Nature of Mankind And this argument from the Incarnation was that which made Roscelin in the beginning of the disputing Age A. D. 1093 to assert That the three Persons were three things distinct from each other as three Angels or three Men because otherwise the Incarnation of the second Person could not be understood as appears by Anselm's Epistles and his Book of the Incarnation written upon that occasion But as Aâ—selm shews at large if this argument hold it must prove the three Persons not only to be distinct but separate and divided Subâ—â—ances which is directly contrary to this new Explication and then there is no avoiding Tritheism But to return to Joh. Philoponus who saith Nicephorus divided the indivisible Nature of God into three Individuals as among Men Which saith he is repugnant to the Sense of the Christian Church and he produces the Testimony of Gregory Nazianzen against it and adds that Leontius and Georgius Pisides confuted
we answer God What the Holy Ghost we answer God So that here the Infidels make the same Objection and draw the very same Inference Then say they the Father Son and H. Ghost are three Gods But what saith S. Augustin to this Had he no more skill in Arithmetick than to say there are Three and yet but One He saith plainly that there are not three Gods The Infidels are troubled because they are not Inlightend their heart is shut up because they are without Faith By which it is plain he look'd on these as the proper Objections of Infidels and not of Christians But may not Christians have such doubts in their minds He doth not deny it but then he saith Where the true foundation of Faith is laid in the heart which helps the Vnderstanding we are to embrace with it all that it can reach to and where we can go no farther we must believe without doubting which is a wise resolution of this matter For there are some things revealed which we can entertain the notion of in our minds as we do of any other matters and yet there may be some things belonging to them which we cannot distinctly conceive We believe God to have been from all Eternity and that because God hath revealed it but here is something we can conceive viz. that he was so and here is something we cannot conceive viz. How he was so This Instance I had produced in my Sermon to shew that we might be obliged to believe such things concerning God of which we cannot have a clear and distinct Notion as that God was from all Eternity although we cannot conceive in our minds how he could be from himself Now what saith the Vnitarian to this who pretended to Answer me He saith If God must be from himself then an Eternal God is a Contradiction for that implies that he was before he was and so charges me with espousing the cause of Atheists I wish our Vnitarians were as free from this Charge as I am But this is malicious cavilling For my design was only to shew that we could have no distinct conception of something which we are bound to believe For upon all accounts we are bound to believe an Eternal God and yet we cannot form a distinct and clear Idea of the manner of it Whether being from himself be taken positively or negatively the matter is not cleared the one is Absurd and the other Unconceivable by us But still I say it is a thing that we are bound to believe stedfastly although it is above our comprehension But instead of Answering to this he runs out into an Examination of one notion of Eternity and as he thinks shews some Absurdities in that which are already answer'd But that was not my meaning but to shew that we could have no clear and distinct Notion of Eternity And if his Arguments were good they prove what I aimed at at least as to that Part and himself produces my own Words to shew that there were such Difficulties every way which we could not master and yet are bound to believe that necessary Existence is an inseparable Attribute of God So that here we have a clear instance of what S. Augustin saith That we may believe something upon full Conviction as that God is eternal and yet there may remain something which we cannot reach to by our understanding viz. the manner how Eternity is to be conceived by us which goes a great way towards clearing the Point of the Trinity notwithstanding the Difficulty in our conceiving the manner how Three should be one and One three But S. Augustin doth not give it over so Let us keep stedfast saith he to the Foundation of our Faith that we may arrive to the top of Perfection the Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God the Father is not the Son nor the Son the Father nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son And he goes on The Trinity is one God one Eternity one Power one Majesty Three Persons one God So it is in Erasmus his Edition but the late Editors say that the word Personae was not in their Manuscript And it is not material in this Place since elsewhere he approves the use of the word Persons as the fittest to express our meaning in this Case For since some Word must be agreed upon to declare our Sense by he saith those who understood the Propriety of the Latin tongue could not pitch upon any more proper than that to signifie that they did not mean three distinct Essences but the same Essence with a different Hypostasis founded in the Relation of one to the other as Father and Son have the same Divine Essence but the Relations being so different that one cannot be confounded with the other that which results from the Relation being joyned with the Essence was it which was called a Person But saith S. Augustin The Caviller will ask if there be Three what Three are they He answers Father Son and Holy Ghost But then he distinguishes between what they are in themselves and what they are to each other The Father as to himself is God but as to the Son he is Father the Son as to himself is God but as to the Father he is the Son But how is it possible to understand this Why saith he Take two men Father and Son the one as to himself is a Man but as to the Son a Father the Son as to himself is a Man but as to the Father he is a Son but these two have the same common Nature But saith he Will it not hence follow that as these are two Men so the Father and Son in the Divine Essence must be two Gods No there lies the difference between the humane and Divine Nature That one cannot be multiplied and divided as the other is And therein lies the true Solution of the Difficulty as will appear afterwards When you begin to count saith he you go on One two and Three But when you have reckon'd them what is it you have been Counting The Father is the Father the Son the Son and the Holy Ghost the Holy Ghost What are these Three Are they not three Gods No Are they not three Almighties No They are capable of Number as to their Relation to each other but not as to their Essence which is but One. The substance of the Answer lies here the Divine Essence is that alone which makes God that can be but One and therefore there can be no more Gods than one But because the same Scripture which assures us of the Unity of the Divine Essence doth likewise joyn the Son and Holy Ghost in the same Attributes Operations and Worship therefore as to the mutual Relations we may reckon Three but as to the Divine Essence that can be no more than One. Boëthius was a great Man in all respects for his Quality
as well as for his Skill in Philosophy and Christianity and he wrote a short but learned Discourse to clear this Matter The Catholick Doctrine of the Trinity saith he is this the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost but they are not three Gods but one God And yet which our Vnitarians may wonder at this very man hath written a learned Book of Arithmetick But how doth he make this out How is it possible for Three to be but One First he shews That there can be but one Divine Essence for to make more than One must suppose a Diversity Principium enim Pluralitatis Alteritas est If you make a real difference in Nature as the Arians did then there must be as many Gods as there are different Natures Among men there are different individuals of the same kind but saith he it is the Diversity of Accidents which makes it and if you can abstract from all other Accidents yet they must have a different Place for two Bodies cannot be in the same place The Divine Essence is simple and immaterial and is what it is of it self but other things are what they are made and consist of Parts and therefore may be divided Now that which is of it self can be but One and therefore cannot be numbred And one God cannot differ from another either by Accidents or substantial Differences But saith he there is a twofold Number one by which we reckon and another in the things reckoned And the repeating of Units in the former makes a Plurality but not in the latter It may be said that this holds where there are only different Names for the same thing but here is a real Distinction of Father Son and Holy Ghost But then he shews That the difference of Relation can make no Alteration in the Essence and where there is no Diversity there can be but one Essence although the different Relation may make three Persons This is the substance of what he saith concerning this Difficulty which as he suggests arises from our Imaginations which are so filled with the Division and Multiplicity of compound and material things that it is a hard matter for them so to recollect themselves as to consider the first Principles and Grounds of Vnity and Diversity But if our Vnitarians have not throughly consider'd those foundations they must as they say to one of their Adversaries argue like novices in these questions For these are some of the most necessary Speculations for understanding these matters as what that Vnity is which belongs to a perfect Being what Diversity is required to multiply an infinite Essence which hath Vnity in its own Nature whether it be therefore possible that there should be more divine Essences than one since the same essential Attributes must be where ever there is the divine Essence Whether there can be more Individuals where there is no Dissimilitude and can be no Division or Separation Whether a specifick divine Nature be not inconsistent with the absolute Perfection and necessary Existence which belongs to it Whether the divine Nature can be individually the same and yet there be several individual Essences These and a great many other Questions it will be necessary for them to resolve before they can so peremptorily pronounce that the Doctrine of the Trinity doth imply a Contradiction on the account of the Numbers of Three and One. And so I come to the second Particular CHAP. VI. No Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common Nature II. THat it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in one common Nature I shall endeavour to make these matters as clear as I can for the greatest difficulties in most mens minds have risen from the want of clear and distinct apprehensiâ—ns of those fundamental Notions which are necessary in order to the right understanding of them 1. We are to distinguish between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being or between Essence and Existence 2. Between the Vnity of Nature or Essence and of Existence or Individuals of the same Nature 3. Between the Notion of Persons in a finite and limited Nature and in a Being uncapable of Division and Separation 1. Between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being By the former we mean the Nature and Essential Properties of a thing whereby it is distinguished from all other kinds of Beings So God and his Creatures are essentially distinguished from each other by such Attributes which are incommunicable and the Creatures of several kinds are distinguished by their Natures or Essences for the Essence of a Man and of a Brute are not barely distinguished by Individuals but by their kinds And that which doth constitute a distinct kind is One and Indivisible in it self for the Essence of Man is but one and can be no more for if there were more the kind would be alter'd so that there can be but one common Nature or Essence to all the Individuals of that kind But because these Individuals may be or may not be therefore we must distinguish them as they are in actual Being from what they are in their common Nature for that continues the same under all the Variety and Succession of Individuals 2. We must now distinguish the Vnity which belongs to the common Nature from that which belongs to the Individuals in actual Being And the Vnity of Essence is twofold 1. Where the Essence and Existence are the same i. e. where necessary Existence doth belong to the Essence as it is in God and in him alone it being an essential and incommunicable Perfection 2. Where the Existence is contingent and belongs to the Will of another and so it is in all Creatures Intellectual and Material whose actual being is dependent on the Will of God The Vnity of Existence may be consider'd two ways 1. As to it self and so it is called Identity or a thing continuing the same with it self the Foundation whereof in Man is that vital Principle which results from the Union of Soul and Body For as long as that continues notwithstanding the great variety of changes in the material Parts the Man continues entirely the same 2. The Vnity of Existence as to Individuals may be consider'd as to others i. e. as every one stands divided from every other Individual of the same kind although they do all partake of the same common Essence And the clearing of this is the main point on which the right Notion of these matters depends In order to that we must consider two things 1. What that is whereby we perceive the difference of Individuals 2. What that is which really makes two Beings of the same kind to be different from each other 1. As to the reason of our Perception of the difference between Individuals of the same kind it depends on these things 1. Difference of outward Accidents as Features Age Bulk Meen Speech Habit and Place 2. Difference of inward
of the Mind without any real Existence belonging to it as such which is contrary to the very Notion of God which implies a necessary Existence or it must imply a Divine Nature which is neither Father Son nor Holy Ghost Which is so repugnant to the Doctrine of the Fathers that no one that is any ways conversant in their Writings on this Argument can imagine they should hold such an Opinion And I am so far from being convinced by Curcellaeus his undeniable Proofs that I think it no hard matter to bring undeniable Proofs that he hath mistaken their meaning Of which I shall give an Account in this Place because I fear his Authority hath had too much sway with some as to this matter I shall not insist upon his gross mistake in the very entrance of that Discourse where he saith That the Bishops of Gaul and Germany disliked the Homoousion and gave three Reasons against it whereas Hilary speaks of the Eastern Bishops whom he goes about to vindicate to the Western Bishops who were offended with them for that reason as any one that reads Hilary de Synodis may see But I come to the main Point His great Argument is from the use of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may extend to Individuals of the same kind Who denies it But the Question is whether the Fathers used it in that sense so as to imply a difference of Individuals in the same common Essence There were two things aimed at by them in their Dispute with the Arians 1. To shew That the Son was of the same Substance with the Father which they denied and made him of an inferior created Substance of another kind Now the Fathers thought this term very proper to express their Sense against them But then this Word being capable of a larger Sense than they intended they took care 2. To assert a perfect Unity and Indivisibility of the Divine Essence For the Arians were very ready to charge them with one of these two things 1. That they must fall into Sabellianism if they held a perfect Unity of Essence or 2. When they clear'd themselves of this that they must hold Three Gods and both these they constantly denied To make this clear I shall produce the Testimonies of some of the chief both of the Greek and Latin Fathers and answer Curcellaeus his Objections Athanasius takes notice of both these Charges upon their Doctrine of the Trinity As to Sabellianism he declared That he abhorred it equally with Arianism and he saith it lay in making Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person and so they asserted but one Person in the Godhead As to the other Charge of Polytheism he observes That in the Scripture Language all mankind was reckon'd as one because they have the same Essence and if it be so as to Men who have such a difference of Features of Strength of Vnderstanding of Language how much more may God be said to be One in whom is an undivided Dignity Power Counsel and Operation Doth this prove such a difference as is among Individuals of the same kind among men No man doth more frequently assert the indivisible Vnity of the Divine Nature than he He expresly denies such divided Hypostases as are among men and saith That in the Trinity there is a Conjunction without confusion and a distinction without Division that in the Trinity there is so perfect an Vnion and that it is so undivided and united in it self that where-ever the Father is there is the Son and the Holy Ghost and so the rest because there is but one Godhead and one God who is over all and through all and in all But saith Curcellaeus The contrary rather follows from this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or mutual Inexistence for that could not be without distinct Substance as in Water and Wine But this is a very gross mistake of the Fathers Notion who did not understand by it a Local In-existence as of Bodies but such an indivisible Vnity that one cannot be without the other as even Petavius hath made it appear from Athanasius and others Athanasius upon all Occasions asserts the Unity of the Divine Nature to be perfect and indivisible God saith he is the Father of his Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any Division of the Substance And in other places that the Substance of the Father and Son admit of no Division and he affirms this to have been the sense of the Council of Nice so that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of the same indivisible Substance Curcellaeus answers That Athanasius by this indivisible Vnity meant only a close and indissoluble Vnion But he excluded any kind of Division and that of a Specifick Nature into several individuals as a real Division in Nature for no man whoever treated of those matters denied that a Specifick Nature was divided when there were several individuals under it But what is it which makes the Vnion indissoluble Is it the Vnity of the Essence or not If it be is it the same individual Essence or not If the same individual Essence makes the inseparable Union what is it which makes the difference of individuals If it be said The incommunicable Properties of the Persons I must still ask how such Properties in the same individual Essence can make different individuals If it be said to be the same Specifick Nature then how comes that which is in it self capable of Division to make an indissoluble Vnion But saith Curcellaeus Athanasius makes Christ to be of the same Substance as Adam and Seth and Abraham and Isaac are said to be Con-substantial with each other And what follows That the Father and Son are divided from each other as they were This is not possible to be his Sense considering what he saith of the Indivisibility of the Divine Nature And Athanasius himself hath given sufficient warning against such a Mis-construction of his Words and still urges that our Conceptions ought to be suitable to the Divine Nature not taken from what we see among men And it is observable that when Paulus Samosatenus had urged this as the best Argument against the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That it made such a difference of Substances as is among men for that Reason saith Athanasius his Iudges were content to let it alone for the Son of God is not in such a sense Con-substantial but afterwards the Nicene Fathers finding out the Art of Paulus and the significancy of the Word to discriminate the Arians made use of it and only thought it necessary to declare that when it is applied to God it is not to be understood as among individual Men. As to the Dialogues under Athanasius his Name on which Curcellaeus insists so much it is now very well known that they belong not to him but to Maximus and by comparing them with
other places in him it may appear that he intended no Specifick Nature in God But saith Curcellaeus If the Fathers intended any more than a Specifick Nature why did they not use Words which would express it more fully As 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For that very Reason which he mentions from Epiphanius because they would seem to approach too near to Sabellianism S. Basil was a great Man notwithstanding the flout of our Vnitarians and apply'd his thoughts to this matter to clear the Doctrine of the Church from the Charge of Sabellianism and Tritheism As to the former he saith in many places That the Heresie lay in making but one Person as well as one God or one Substance with three several Names As to the latter no man asserts the individual Unity of the Divine Essence in more significant Words than he doth For he uses the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as S. Cyril of Alexandria doth likewise and yet both these are produced by Curcellaeus for a Specifick Nature But saith Curcellaeus S. Basil in his Epistle to Gregory Nyssen doth assert the difrence between Substance and Hypostasis to consist in this That the one is taken for common Nature and the other for individual and so making three Hypostases he must make three Individuals and One common or Specifick Nature I answer That it is plain by the design of that Epistle that by three Hypostases he could not mean three individual Essences For he saith The design of his writing it was to clear the difference between Substance and Hypostasis For saith he From the want of this some assert but one Hypostasis as well as one Essence and others because there are three Hypostases suppose there are three distinct Essences For both went upon the same Ground that Hypostasis and Essence were the same Therefore saith he those who held three Hypostases did make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Division of Substances From whence it follows that S. Basil did look upon the Notion of three distinct Substances as a mistake I say distinct Substances as Individuals are distinct for so the first Principles of Philosophy do own that Individuals make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Division of the Species into several and distinct Individuals But doth not S. Basil go about to explain his Notion by the common Nature of man and the several Individuals under it and what can this signifie to his purpose unless he allows the same in the Godhead I grant he doth so but he saith the Substance is that which is common to the whole kind the Hypostasis is that which properly distinguisheth one Individual from another which he calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the peculiar incommunicable Property Which he describes by a Concourse of distinguishing Characters in every Individual But how doth he apply these things to the divine Nature For therein lies the whole difficulty Doth he own such a Community of Nature and Distinction of Individuals there He first confesses the divine Nature to be incomprehensible by us but yet we may have some distinct Notions about these things As for instance In the Father we conceive something common to him and to the Son and that is the divine Essence and the same as to the Holy Ghost But there must be some proper characters to distinguish these one from another or else there will be nothing but confusion which is Sabellianism Now the essential Attributes and divine Operations are common to them and therefore these cannot distinguish them from each other And those are the peculiar Properties of each Person as he shews at large But may not each Person have a distinct Essence belonging to him as we see it is among Men For this S. Basil answers 1. He utterly denies any possible Division in the divine Nature And he never question'd but the distinction of Individuals under the same Species was a sort of Division although there were no Separation And the followers of Ioh. Philoponus did hold an indissoluble Vnion between the three individual Essences in the divine Nature but they held a distinction of peculiar Essences besides the common Nature which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as appears by Photius who was very able to judge And it appears by one of themselves in Photius that the controversie was whether an Hyposiasis could be without an individual Essence belonging to it self or whether the peculiar Properties and Characters did make the Hypostasis But as to S. Basil's Notion we are to observe 2. That he makes the divine Essence to be uncapable of number by reason of its perfect Unity Here our Vnitarians tell us that when S. Basil saith That God is not one in number but in nature he means as the Nature of Man is one but there are many particular Men as Peter James and John c. so the Nature of God or the common Divinity is one but there are as truely more Gods in number or more particular Gods as there are more particular Men. but that this is a gross mistake or abuse of S. Basil's meaning I shall make it plain from hâ—mself For they say That he held that as to this question How many Gods it must be answered Three Gods in number or three Personal Gods and one in Nature or divine Properties whereas he is so far from giving such an answer that he absolutely denies that there can be more Gods than one in that very place He mentions it as an Objection that since he said That the Father is God the Son God the Holy Ghost God he must hold three Gods to which he answers We own but one God not in Number but in Nature Then say they He held but one God in Nature and more in Number That is so far from his meaning that I hardly think any that read the passage in S. Basil could so wilfully pervert his meaning For his intention was so far from asserting more Gods in Number that it was to prove so perfect a Unity in God that he was not capable of number or of being more than one For saith he That which is said to be one in Number is not really and simply one but is made up of many which by composition become one as we say the world is one which is made up of many things But God is a simple uncompounded Being and therefore cannot be said to be one in Number But the World is not one by Nature because it is made up of so many things but it is one by Number as those several parts make but one World Is not this fair dealing with such a Man as S. Basil to represent his Sense quite otherwise than it is As though he allow'd more Gods than one in Number Number saith he again belongs to Quantity and Quantity to Bodies but what relation
have these to God but as he is the Maker of them Number belongs to material and circumscribed Beings but saith he the most perfect Vnity is to be conceived in the most simple and incomprehensible Essence Where it is observable that he uses those Words which are allow'd to express the most perfect and singular Unity Which Petavius himself confesseth that they can never be understood of a specifick Nature and Curcellaeus cannot deny That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being added to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth restrain the Sense more to a numerical Vnity as he calls it How then is it possible to understand S. Basil of more Gods than one in number And in the very same Page he mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sameness of the divine Nature by which the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is better understood But Curcellaeus will have no more than a specifick Vnity understood Before he said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would have signified more but now he finds it used the case is alter'd So that the Fathers could not mean any other than a specifick Vnity let them use what expressions they pleas'd But these I think are plain enough to any one that will not shut his Eyes In an other place S. Basil makes the same Objection and gives the same answer One God the Father and one God the Son how can this be and yet not two Gods Because saith he the Son hath the very same Essence with the Father Not two Essences divided out of one as two Brothers but as Father and Son the Son subsisting as from the Father but in the same individual Essence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But Curcellaeus hath one fetch yet viz. That S. Basil denied God to be one in Number and made him to be one in Nature because he look'd on a specifick Vnity or Vnity of Nature as more exact than numerical S. Basil look'd on the divine Nature as such to have the most perfect Vnity because of its Simplicity and not in the least speaking of it as a specifick Vnity but Curcellaeus himself calls this an Vnity by a mere Fiction of the Mind and can he imagine this to have been more accurate than a real Unity These are hard shifts in a desperate cause After all our Vnitarians tell us That S. Basil doth against Eunomius allow a distinction in Number with respect to the Deity But how As to the Essence By no means For he asserts the perfect Vnity thereof in the same place even the Vnity of the Substance But as to the characteristical Properties of the Persons he allows of Number and no farther But say they This is to make one God as to essential Properties and three as to Personal How can that be when he saith so often there can be but one God because there can be but one divine Essence and therefore those properties can only make distinct Hypostases but not distinct Essences And is this indeed the great Secret which this bold Man as they call him hath discover'd I think those are much more bold I will not say impudent who upon such slight grounds charge him with asserting more Gods than one in Number But Gregory Nyssen saith Curcellaeus speaks more plainly in his Epistle to Ablabius for saith he To avoid the difficulty of making three Gods as three Individuals among Men are three Men he answers that truly they are not three Men because they have but one common Essence which is exactly one and indivisible in it self however it be dispersed in Individuals the same he saith is to be understood of God And this Petavius had charged him with before as appears by Curcellaeus his Appendix This seems the hardest passage in Antiquity for this purpose to which I hope to give a satisfactory answer from Gregory Nyssen himself 1. It cannot be denied that he asserts the Vnity of Essence to be Indivisible in it self and to be the true ground of the Denomination of Individuals as Peter hath the name of a Man not from his individual Properties whereby he is distinguished from Iames and Iohn but from that one indivisible Essence which is common to them all but yet receives no Addition or Diminution in any of them 2. He grants a Division of Hypostases among Men notwithstanding this Indivisibility of one common Essence For saith he among Men although the Essence remain one and the same in all without any Division yet the several Hypostases are divided from each other according to the individual Properties belonging to them So that here is a double consideration of the Essence as in it self so it is one and indivisible as it subsists in Individuals and so it is actually divided according to the Subjects For although the Essence of a Man be the same in it self in Peter Iames and Iohn yet taking it as in the Individuals so the particular Essence in each of them is divided from the rest And so Philoponus took Hypostasis for an Essence individuated by peculiar Properties and therefore asserted that where-ever there was an Hypostasis there must be a distinct Essence and from hence he held the three Persons to have three distinct Essences 3. We are now to consider how far Gregory Nyssen carried this whether he thought it held equally as to the divine Hypostasis and that he did not appears to me from these arguments 1. He utterly denies any kind of Division in the divine Nature for in the conclusion of that Discourse he saith it is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Word often used by the Greek Fathers on this occasion from whence Athanasius against Macedonius inferr'd an Identity and Caesarius joyns 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so S. Basil uses it but he adds another Word which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Indivisible Yes as all Essences are indivisible in themselves but they may be divided in their Subjects as Gregory Nyssen allows it to be in Men. I grant it but then he owns a Division of some kind which he here absolutely denies as to the divine Nature for his words are that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any consideration whatsoever Then he must destroy the Hypostases Not so neither for he allows that there is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Hypostases however For he proposes the Objection himself That by allowing no difference in the divine Nature the Hypostases would be confounded To which he answers That he did not deny their difference which was founded in the relation they had to one another which he there explains and that therein only consists the difference of the Persons Which is a very considerable testimony to shew that both Petavius and Curcellaeus mistook Gregory Nyssen's meaning But there are other arguments to prove it 2. He asserts such a difference between the divine and human Persons as is unanswerable viz. the Vnity of Operation For saith he
among Men if several go about the same Work yet every particular Person works by himself and therefore they may well be called many because every one is circumscribed but in the divine Persons he proves that it is quite otherwise for they all concurr in the Action towards us as he there shews at large Petavius was aware of this and therefore he saith he quitted it and returned to the other whereas he only saith If his Adversaries be displeased with it he thinks the other sufficient Which in short is that Essence in it self is one and indivisible but among Men it is divided according to the Subjects that the divine Nature is capable of no Division at all and therefore the difference of Hypostases must be from the different Relations and Manner of Subsistence 3. He expresses his meaning fully in another place For in his Catechetical Oration he saith he looks on the Doctrine of the Trinity as a profound Mystery which three individual Persons in one specifick Nature is far from But wherein lies it Chiefly in this That there should be Number and no Number different View and yet but One a distinction of Hypostases and yet no Division in the Subjects For so his words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is contrary to what he said of human Hypostases Now what is the Subject in this case According to Curcellaeus his Notion it must be an Individual But since he asserts there can be no Division in the Subjects then he must overthrow any such Individuals as are among Men. These are the chief Testimonies out of the Greek Fathers whose authority Curcellaeus and others rely most upon as to this matter which I have therefore more particularly examin'd But S. Ierom saith Curcellaeus in his Epistle to Damasus thought three Hypostases implied three distinct Substances and therefore when the Campenses would have him own them he refused it and asked his Advice Then it is plain S. Ierom would not own three distinct Substances and so could not be of Curcellaeus his mind But saith he S. Ierom meant by three Substances three Gods different in kind as the Arians did But how doth that appear Doth he not say the Arian Bishop and the Campenses put him upon it But who was this Arian Bishop and these Campenses No other than the Meletian Party for Meletius was brought in by the Arians but he joyned against them with S. Basil and others who asserted three Hypostases and the Campenses were his People who met without the Gates as the Historians tell us But it is evident by S. Ierom that the Latin Church understood Hypostasis to be the same then with Substance and the reason why they would not allow three Hypostases was because they would not assert three Substances So that Curcellaeus his Hypothesis hath very little colour for it among the Latin Fathers since S. Ierom there saith it would be Sacrilege to hold three Substances and he freely bestows an Anathema upon any one that asserted more than one But Hilary saith Curcellaeus owns a specifick Vnity for in his Book de Synodis he shews That by one Substance they did not mean one individual Substance but such as was in Adam and Seth that is of the same kind No man asserts the Vnity and Indiscrimination of the divine Substance more fully and frequently than he doth and that without any Difference or Variation as to the Father and the Son And although against the Arians he may use that for an Illustration of Adam and Seth yet when he comes to explain himself he declares it must be understood in a way agreeable to the divine Nature And he denies any Division of the Substance between Father and Son but he asserts one and the same Substance to be in both and although the Person of the Son remains distinct from the Person of the Father yet he subsists in that Substance of which he was begotten and nothing is taken off from the substance of the Father by his being begotten of it But doth he not say That he hath a Legitimate and proper Substance of his own begotten Nature from God the Father And what is this but to own two distinct Substances How can the Substance be distinct if it be the very same and the Son subsist in that Substance of which he was begotten And that Hilary besides a multitude of passages to the same purpose in him cannot be understood of two distinct Substances will appear by this Evidence The Arians in their Confession of Faith before the Council of Nice set down among the several Heresies which they condemned that of Hieracas who said the Father and Son were like two Lamps shining out of one common Vessel of Oil. Hilary was sensible that under this that Expression was struck at God of God Light of Light which the Church owned His Answer is Luminis Naturae Vnitas est non ex connexione porrectio i e. they are not two divided Lights from one common Stock but the same Light remaining after it was kindled that it was before As appears by his Words Light of Light saith he implies That it gives to another that which it continues to have it self And Petavius saith that the Opinion of Hieracas was That the substance of the Father and Son differ'd Numerically as one Lamp from another And Hilary calls it an Error of humane Understanding which would judge of God by what they find in one another Doth not S. Ambrose say as Curcellaeus quotes him That the Father and Son are not two Gods because all men are said to be of one Substance But S Ambrose is directly against him For he saith The Arians objected that if they made the Son true God and Con-substantial with the Father they must make two Gods as there are two men or two Sheep of the same Essence but a Man and a Sheep are not said to be Men or two sheep Which they said to excuse themselves because they made the Son of a different kind and substance from the Father And what Answer doth S. Ambrose give to this 1. He saith Plurality according to the Scriptures rather falls on those of different kinds and therefore when they make them of several kinds they must make several Gods 2. That we who hold but One Substance cannot make more Gods than One. 3. To his instance of Men he answers That although they are of the same Nature by Birth yet the◠differ in Age and Thought and Work and Place from one another and where there is such Diversity there cannot be Vnity but in God there is no difference of Nature Will or Operation and therefore there can be but one God The last I shall mention is S. Augustin whom Curcellaeus produces to as little purpose for although he doth mention the same instance of several Men being of the same kind yet he speaks so expresly against a Specifick Vnity in
and therefore comprehends the whole three Persons so that there is neither a Grammatical nor Arithmetical Contradiction And what say our Vnitarians to this Truly no less Than that the Remedy is worse if possible than the Disease Nay then we are in a very ill Case But how I pray doth this appear 1. Say they Three personal Gods and one Essential God make four Gods if the Essential God be not the same with the personal Gods and tho' he is the same yet since they are not the same with one another but distinct it follows that there are three Gods i. e. three personal Gods 2. It introduces two sorts of Gods three Personal and one Essential But the Christian Religion knows and owns but One true and most high God of any sort So far then we are agreed That there is but One true and most high God and that because of the perfect Vnity of the Divine Essence which can be no more than One and where there is but One Divine Essence there can be but One true God unless we can suppose a God without an Essence and that would be a strange sort of God He would be a personal God indeed in their critical Sense of a Person for a shape or appearance But may not the fame Essence be divided That I have already shew'd to be impossible Therefore we cannot make so many personal Gods because we assert one and the same Essence in the three Persons of Father Son and Holy Ghost But they are distinct and therefore must be distinct Gods since every one is distinct from the other They are distinct as to personal Properties but not as to Essential Attributes which are and must be the same in all So that here is but one Essential God and three Persons But after all why do we assert three Persons in the Godhead Not because we find them in the Athanasian Creed but because the Scripture hath revealed that there are Three Father Son and Holy Ghost to whom the Divine Nature and Attributes are given This we verily believe that the Scripture hath revealed and that there are a great many places of which we think no tolerable Sense can be given without it and therefore we assert this Doctrine on the same Grounds on which we believe the Scriptures And if there are three Persons which have the Divine Nature attributed to them what must we do in this Case Must we cast off the Vnity of the Divine Essence No that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into Question Must we reject those Scriptures which attribute Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost as well as to the Father That we cannot do unless we cast off those Books of Scripture wherein those things are contained But why do we call them Persons when that Term is not found in Scripture and is of a doubtful Sense The true Account whereof I take to be this It is observed by Facundus Hermianensis that the Christian Church received the Doctrine of the Trinity before the Terms of three Persons were used But Sabellianism was the occasion of making use of the name of Persons It 's true That the Sabellians did not dislike our Sense of the Word Person which they knew was not the Churches Sense as it was taken for an Appearance or an external Quality which was consistent enough with their Hypothesis who allow'd but One real Person with different Manifestations That this was their true Opinion appears from the best account we have of their Doctrine from the first Rise of Sabellianism The Foundations of it were laid in the earliest and most dangerous Heresies in the Christian Church viz. that which is commonly called by the name of the Gnosticks and that of the Cerinthians and Ebionites For how much soever they differ'd from each other in other things yet they both agreed in this that there was no such thing as a Trinity consisting of Father Son and Holy Ghost but that all was but different Appearances and Manifestations of God to Mankâ—nd In consequence whereof the Gnosticks denied the very Humanity of Christ and the Cerinthians and Ebionites his Divinity But both these sorts were utterly rejected the Communion of the Christian Church and no such thing as Sabellianism was found within it Afterwards there arose some Persons who started the same Opinion within the Church the first we meet with of this sort are those mention'd by Theodoret Epigonus Cleomenes and Noëtus from whom they were called Noeâ—ians not long after Sabellius broached the same Doctrine in Pentapolis and the Parts thereabouts which made Dionysius of Alexandria appear so early and so warmly against it But he happening to let fall some Expressions as though he asserted an Inequality of Hypostases in the Godhead Complaint was made of it to Dionysius then Bishop of Rome who thereupon explained that which he took to be the true Sense of the Christian Church in this matter Which is still preserved in Athanasius Therein he disowns the Sabellian Doctrine which confounded the Father Son and Holy Ghost and made them to be the same and withal he rejected those who held three distinct and separate Hypostases as the Platonists and after them the Marcionists did Dionysius of Alexandria when he came to explain himself agreed with the others and asserted the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father as Athanasius hath proved at large but yet he said That if a distinction of Hypostases were not kept up the Doctrine of the Trinity would be lost as appears by an Epistle of his in S. Basil. Athanasius saith That the Heresie of Sabellius lay in making the Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person so that in one Respect he is the Father and in another the Son Gregory Nazianzen in opposition to Sabellianism saith We must believe one God and three Hypostases and commends Athanasius for preserving the true Mean in asserting the Vnity of Nature and the Distinction of Properties S. Basil saith That the Sabellians made but one Person of the Father and Son that in Name they confessed the Son but in Reality they denied him In another place that the Sabellians asserted but one Hypostasis in the Divine Nature but that God took several Persons upon him as occasion required sometimes that of a Father at other times of a Son and so of the Holy Ghost And to the same purpose in other places he saith That there are distinct Hypostases with their peculiar Properties which being joyned with the Vnity of Nature make up the true Confession of Faith There were some who would have but One Hypostasis whom he opposes with great vehemency and the Reason he gives is That then they must make the Persons to be meer Names which is Sabellianisn And he saith That if our Notions of distinct Persons have no certain Foundation they are meer Names such as
Sabellius called Persons But by this Foundation he doth not mean any distinct Essences but the incommunicable Properties belonging to them as Father Son and Holy Ghost It is plain from hence that the necessity of asserting three Hypostases came from thence that otherwise they could not so well distinguish themselves from the Sabellians whose Doctrine they utterly disowned as well as Arianism and Iudaism and it appears by the Testimonies of Athanasius Gregory Nazianzen and S. Basil that they look'd on one as bad as the other and they commonly joyn Iudaism and Sabellianism together But yet there arose Difficulties whether they were to hold one Hypostasis or three The former insisted on the generally received Sense of Hypostasis for Substance or Essence and therefore they could not hold three Hypostases without three distinct Essences as the Platonists and Marcionists held Upon this a Synod was called at Alexandria to adjust this matter where both Parties were desired to explain themselves Those who held three Hypostases were asked Whether they maintained three Hypostases as the Arians did of different Substances and separate Subsistences as Mankind and other Creatures are Or as other Hereticks three Principles or three Gods All which they stedfastly denied Then they were asked Why they used those terms They answered Because they believed the Holy Trinity to be more than mere Names and that the Father and Son and Holy Ghost had a real Subsistence belonging to them but still they held but one Godhead one Principle and the Son of the same Substance with the Father and the Holy Ghost not to be a Creature but to bear the same proper and inseparable Essence with the Father and the Son Then the other side were asked When they asserted but one Hypostasis whether they held with Sabellius or not and that the Son and Holy Ghost had no Essence or Subsistence which they utterly denied but said that their meaning was That Hypostasis was the same with Substance and by one Hypostasis they intended no more but that the Father Son and Holy Ghost were of the same individual Substance for the Words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so they held but one Godhead and one divine Nature and upon these terms they agreed From whence it follows that the Notion of three Hypostases as it was received in the Christian Church was to be underâ—â—ood so as to be consistent with the Individual Vnity of the divine Essence And the great rule of the Christian Church was to keep in the middle between the Doctrines of Sabellius and Arius and so by degrees the Notion of three Hypostases and one Essence was look'd on in the Eastern Church as the most proper Discrimination of the Orthodox from the Sabellians and Arians But the Latin Church was not so easily brought to the use of three Hypostases because they knew no other Sense of it but for Substance or Essence and they all denied that there was any more than one divine Substance and therefore they rather embraced the Word Persona and did agree in the Name of Persons as most proper to signifie their meaning which was That there were three which had distinct Subsistences and incommunicable Properties and one and the same divine Essence And since the Notion of it is so well understood to signifie such a peculiar Sense I see no reason why any should scruple the use of it As to it s not being used in Scripture Socinus himself despises it and allows it to be no good reason For when Franciscus Davides objected That the terms of Essence and Person were not in Scripture Socinus tells him That they exposed their cause who went upon such grounds and that if the sense of them were in Scripture it was no matter whether the terms were or not Hâ—ving thus clear'd the Notion of three Persons I return to the Sense of Scripture about these matters And our Vnitarians tell us that we ought to interpret Scripture otherwise How doth that appear They give us very little encouragement to follow their Interpretations which are so new so forced so different from the general Sense of the Christian World and which I may say reflect so highly on the Honour of Christ and his Apostles i. e. by making use of such Expressions which if they do not mean what to honest and sincere Minds they appear to do must be intended according to them to set up Christ a meer Man to be a God And if such a thought as this could enter into the Mind of a thinking Man it would tempt him to suspect much more as to those Writings than there is the least colour or reason for Therefore these bold inconsiderate Writers ought to reflect on the consequence of such sort of Arguments and if they have any regard to Christianity not to trifle with Scripture as they do But say they The question only is Whether we ought to interpret Scripture when it speaks of God according to reason or not that is like Fools or like wise Men Like wise Men no doubt if they can hit upon it but they go about it as untowardly as ever Men did For is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men to take up some novel Interpretations against the general Sense of the Christian Church from the Apostles times Is this to act like wise Men to raise Objections against the Authority of the Books they cannot answer and to cry out of false Copies and Translations without reason and to render all places suspicious which make against them Is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men to make our Saviour affect to be thought a God when he knew himself to be a mere Man and by their own Confession had not his divine Authority and Power conferr'd upon him And to make his Apostles set up the Worship of a Creature when their design was to take away the Worship of all such who by Nature are not Gods Is this like wise Men to tell the World that these were only such Gods whom they had set up and God had not appointed as though there were no Real Idolatry but in giving Divine Worship without God's Command CHAP. VIII The Socinian Sense of Scripture examined BUT they must not think to escape so easily for such a groundless and presumptuous saying that they interpret the Scripture not like Fools but like Wise Men because the true sense of Scripture is really the main point between us and therefore I shall more carefully examine the Wise Sense they give of the chief places which relate to the matter in hand 1. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise Men to make the Author to the Hebrews in one Chapter and that but a short one to bring no less than four places out of the Old Testament and according to their Sense not one of them proves that which he aimed at viz. that Christ was superiour to Angels Heb. 1.5 as will appear by the Sense they give of
we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material Being thinks or not it being impossible for us by the Contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency hath not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive or think If this be true then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking Matter may have a Power of Thinking and if this hold then it is impossible to prove a Spiritual Substance in us from the Idea of Thinking For how can we be assured by our Ideas that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are Especially since it is said That in respect of our Notions it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should super-add to it another Substance with a Faculty of Thinking Whoever asserts this can never prove a Spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking that Matter so disposed cannot Think And he cannot be certain that God hath not framed the matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it It is said indeed elsewhere That it is repugnant to the Idea of Sensless Matter that it should put into it self Sense Perception and Knowledge But this doth not reach the present Case which is not what Matter can do of it self but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it We can have none from the Ideas for those are given up in this Case and consequently we can have no certainty upon these Principles whether we have any Spiritual Substance within us or not But we are told That from the Operations of our Minds we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit How can that be when we cannot from those Ideas be assured but that those Operations may come from a material Substance If we frame an Idea on such Grounds it is at most but a possible Idea for it may be otherwise and we can have no Assurance from our Ideas that it is not So that the most men may come to in this way of Idea's is That it is possible it may be so and it is possible it may not but that it is impossible for us from our Ideas to determine either way And is not this an admirable Way to bring us to a certainty of Reason I am very glad to find the Idea of a Spiritual Substance made as consistent and intelligible as that of a Corporeal for as the one consists of a Cohesion of solid Parts and the Power of communicating Motion by impulse so the other consists in a Power of Thinking and Willing and moving the Body and that the Cohesion of solid Parts is as hard to be conceived as Thinking and we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by impulse as in the Power of exciting Motion by thought We have by daily experience clear Evidence of Motion produced both by Impulse and by Thought but the manner how hardly comes within our Comprehension we are equally at a loss in both From whence if follows That we may be certain of the Being of a Spiritual Substance although we have no clear and distinct Idea of it nor are able to comprehend the manner of its Operations And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas and that they have Reason to reject any Doctrine which relates to Spiritual Substances because they cannot comprehend the manner of it For the same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive Men about the manner of Operation both in material and immaterial Substances It is affirmed That the very Notion of Body implies something very hard if not impossible to be explained or understood by us and that the natural Consequence of it viz. Divisibility involves us in Difficulties impossible to be explicated or made consistent That we have but some few Superficial Ideas of things that we are destitute of Faculties to attain to the true Nature of them and that when we do that we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity and can discover nothing farther but our own Blindness and Ignorance These are very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of humane Understanding with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things which we are most certain of the Being of by constant and undoubted Experience I appeal now to the Reason of mankind whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine proposed to us as of Divine Revelation because we cannot comprehend the manner of it especially when it relates to the Divine Essence For as the same Author observes Our Idea of God is framed from the Complex Ideas of those Perfections we find in our selves but inlarging them so as to make them suitable to an infinite Being as Knowledge Power Duration c. And the Degrees or Extent of these which we ascribe to the Soveraign Being are all boundless and infinite For it is infinity which joyned to our Ideas of Existence Power Knowledge c. makes that Complex Idea whereby we represent to our selves the best we can the Supreme Being Now when our Knowledge of gross material Substances is so dark when the Notion of Spiritual Substances is above all Ideas of Sensation when the higher any Substance is the more remote from our Knowledge but especially when the very Idea of a Supreme Being implies its being Infinite and Incomprehensible I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence because they cannot comprehend the manner of it But of this more afterwards I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reason from clear and distinct Ideas and if we can attain to Certainty without them and where it is confessed we cannot have them as about Substances then these cannot be the sole Matter and Foundation of our Reasoning which is so peremptorily asserted by this late Author But I go yet farther and as I have already shew'd we can have no certainty of an Immaterial Substance within us from these simple Ideas so I shall now shew that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from them by their own Confession concerning the Existence of the most Spiritual and infinite Substance even God himself We are told That the Evidence of it is equal to Mathematical Certainty and very good Arguments are brought to prove it in a Chapter on purpose but that which I take notice of is that the Argument from the clear and distinct Idea of God is passed over How can this be consistent