in the one being intrinsecal and substantial the other extrinsecal and accidental And that Hypostasis is the same with the Divine Nature and yet is most closely united with the Human Nature which is so different from the Divine so that it is incomprehensible by us how in that Union the Natures are not confounded or the Hypostasis divided Pr. Suppose now we grant all this that there is an incomprehensible Mystery in the Incarnation what follows from thence Have I not hitherto owned that there must be something incomprehensible by us in what relates to the Divine Nature And it is the less wonder it is so in the Incarnation wherein an Union is implied between an Infinite and Finite Nature when the Union of the Soul and Body though both Finite is above our Comprehension though we our selves consist of Souls and Bodies so united But what Consequence is it if we are not able to explain this that then we must admit that the same Body may be not meerly in two but in ten thousand places at the the same time i. e. If we cannot explain the Hypostatical Union then all manner of Absurdities must go down with us that relate to things of a very different Nature from it P. I am glad to find you are set at last and that now you have a Difficulty before you which you can never get through Pr. Be not too confident I have only hitherto denied the Consequence as to the Difficulties of Transubstantiation But it is possible that setting aside the Confusion of School-Terms I may be able to give a far more intelligible and reasonable Account of the Incarnation it self than you can ever do of Transubstantiation P. First shew that it is possible and then explain the manner of it Pr. But let us in the first place agree what we mean by it P. By the Incarnation I mean the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature so as to make one Person in Christ. Pr. If this be not possible it must either be 1. Because two Natures different from each other cannot be united to make one Person The contrary whereof appears in the union of Soul and Body to the Person of a Man. Or 2. because it is impossible that an Infinite Nature should be united to a Finite P. How can there be an Union possible between two Beings infinitely distant from each other Pr. Not in that respect wherein the Distance is Infinite but if there be nothing destructive to either Nature in such an Union and the Infinite Nature do condescend to it why may it not be so united to an Intelligent Finite Being as to make one Person together with it For in respect of Union the Distance is not so great between Finite and Infinite as between Body and Spirit P. The Distance is Infinite in one Case but not in the other Pr. I do not speak of them with Respect to Perfections but to Union and an infinite Distance in that must imply an absolute Repugnancy which you can never prove For since Body and Spirit may be united to make one Person an Infinite Spirit may be united to a Finite Nature P. But the manner of the Hypostatical Union is impossible to be conceived Pr. Let the thing be granted possible and the difficulty of conceiving the manner may be as great in the Union of Soul and Body Will you undertake to explain that to me and yet I hope you believe it But let us hear your Difficulties again which you object from Bellarmine P. That there should be but one Hypostasis in two Natures and that in the Union the Natures should not be confounded nor the Hypostasis divided Pr. All these Difficulties arise from the sense of the word Hypostasis Which originally signifies a Real Being and not such which depends only on Fancy and Imagination from thence its signification was enlarged not only to things real in opposition to meer Appearances and Creatures of the Mind but to such a thing which did subsist of it self and had not its subsistence in another as Accidents had So that an Hypostasis was a real Substance which had subsistence in it self But such are of two kinds as the Greek Fathers observe 1. Such as are real Substances in themselves but yet are capable of being joined with another to make up a Person thus the Soul and Body have two different Hypostases and make up but one Person of a Man. 2. It is taken for a compleat individual Subsistence which is not joined with any other as a Part and so Hypostasis is the same with a Person which is nothing else but a compleat intelligent individual Hypostasis And in this sense there can be but one Hypostasis in Christ i. e. one Person tho there be two Natures P. But our Divines say that the Humane Nature after the Union hath no Hypostasis it being swallowed up by the Divine Pr. I know they do but if they mean that the Humane Nature after the Union loses that subsistence which is proper to the Humane Nature it is impossible for them to avoid the Eutychian Heresy condemned by the Council of Chalcedon but if they mean no more than that there is a true Nature but no Person save only that which results from both Natures they then agree with the Sense of the Church which condemned the Eutychians For as much as the Heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches differ'd in themselves they were both built on the same Ground viz. that there could be no true Nature but there must be a Person and that two Natures could not make one Person From whence Nestorius asserted there were two Persons in Christ and Eutyches denied that there were two Natures P. What doth all this signify but that the Authority of the Church must determine whether there be two Natures or two Persons in Christ Pr. It seems then the whole Business wherein the General Councils were so warmly concerned was only to make an Ecclesiastical Dictionary and to appoint what words are to be used and what not Do you think then there were no such real Heresies as Nestorianism and Eutychianism but only they happened to take the words Nature and Person in another sense than the Church would have Men use them P. I trust the Church for all these things Pr. Then if the Church would have you affirm two Persons and one Nature or two Natures and one Person it were all one to you P. Why not since the Church must determine Pr. What if you had been to dispute with Nestorius and Eutyches P. I would have told them they must submit to the Church about the use of words Pr. And they would have laughed at you for your pains For the Controversy was really about the Truth of Christ's Incarnation as the Fathers proved and the Councils determined which in Consequence was rejected by both of them as I will evidently prove if you have any longer Patience P. I beg your pardon Sir I
my Point Pr. I leave you to try your Skill upon them The first shall be from the Proofs of the Truth of Christ's Incarnation and I hope this will not hold against the Trinity And those Arguments which they brought to prove Christ Incarnate do overthrow Transubstantiation effectually So that either we must make the Fathers to reason very ill against Hereticks or if their Arguments be good it was impossible they should believe Transubstantiation For can you suppose that any can believe it who should not barely assert but make the force of an Argument to lie in this that the Substance of the Bread doth not remain after Consecration And this I now prove not from any slight inconsiderable Authors but from some of the greatest Men in the Church in their time I begin with St. Chrysostom whose Epistle to Coesarius is at last brought to light by a learned Person of the Roman Communion who makes no question of the Sincerity of it and faith The Latin Translation which only he could find entire was about five hundred years old but he hath so confirm'd it by the Greek Fragments of it quoted by Ancient Greek Authors that there can be no suspicion left concerning it P. What means all this ado before you come to the Point Pr. Because this Epistle hath been formerly so confidently denied to be St. Chrysostom's and such care was lately taken to suppress it P. But what will you do with it now you have it Pr. I will tell you presently This Epistle was written by him for the satisfaction of Caesarius a Monk who was in danger of being seduced by the Apollinarists P. What have we to do with the Apollinarists Do you think all hard words are akin and so the affinity rises between Apollinarists and Transubstantiation Pr. You shall find it comes nearer the matter than you imagined For those Hereticks denied the Truth of the Human Nature of Christ after the Union and said that the Properties of it did then belong to the Divine Nature as appears by that very Epistle P. And what of all this Do we deny the truth of Christ's Human Nature Pr. No but I pray observe the force of his Parallel He is proving that each Nature in Christ contains its Properties for saith he as before Consecration we call it Bread but after it by Divine Grace sanctifying it through the Prayer of the Priest it is no longer called Bread but the Body of our Lord altho the nature of Bread remains in it and it doth not become two Bodies but one Body of Christ so here the Divine Nature being joyned to the Human they both make one Son and one Person P. And what do you infer from hence Pr. Nothing more but that the Nature of Bread doth as certainly remain after Consecration as the Nature of Christ doth after the Union P. Hold a little For the Author of the single Sheet saith That the Fathers by Nature and Substance do often mean no more than the natural Qualities or visible Appearances of Things And why may not St. Chrysostom mean so here Pr. I say it is impossible he should For all the Dispute was about the Substance and not about the Qualities as appears by that very Epistle for those Hereticks granted that Christ had all the Properties of a Body left still they do not deny that Christ could suffer but they said the Properties of a Body after the Union belonged to the Divine Nature the Human Nature being swallowed up by the Union And therefore St. Chrysostom by Nature must understand Substance and not Qualities or else he doth by no means prove that which he aimed at So that St. Chrysostom doth manifestly assert the Substance of the Bread to remain after Consecration P. But doth not St. Chrysostom suppose then that upon Consecration The Bread is united to the Divinity as the Human Nature is to the Divine else what Parallel could he make Pr. I will deal freely with you by declaring that not St. Chrysostom only but many others of the Fathers did own the Bread after Consecration to be made the real Body of Christ but not in your Sense by changing the Substance of the Elements into that Body of Christ which is in Heaven but by a Mystical Union caused by the Holy Spirit whereby the Bread becomes the Body of Christ as that was which was conceived in the Womb of the Blessed Virgin. But this is quite another thing from Transubstantiation and the Church of England owns that after Consecration The Bread and Wine are the Body and Blood of Christ. P. But altho this be not Transubstantiation it may be something as hard to believe or understand Pr. By no means For all the difficulties relating to the taking away the Substance of the Bread and the Properties of Christ's Body are removed by this Hypothesis P. Let us then keep to our Point but methinks this is but a slender appearance yet St. Chrysostom stands alone for all that I see Pr. Have but a little Patience and you shall see more of his mind presently But I must first tell you that the Eutychians afterwards were condemned in the Council of Chalcedon for following this Doctrine of Apollinaris and that Council defines that the differences of the two Natures in Christ were not destroyed by the Union but that their Properties were preserved distinct and concur to one Person And against these the other Fathers disputed just as St. Chrysostom had done before against the Apollinarists Theodoret brings the same Instance and he affirms expresly That the Nature of the Elements is not changed that they do not lose their proper Nature but remain in their former Substance Figure and Form and may be seen and touched as before Still this is not to prove any Accidental Qualities but the very Substance of Christ's Body to remain P. But was not Theodoret a Man of suspected Faith in â—he Church and therefore no great matter can be made of his Testimony Pr. Yield it then to us and see if we do not clear Theodoret but your own learned Men never question him as to this matter at least and the ancient Church hath vindicated his Reputation And he saith no more than St. Chrysostom before him and others of great Esteem â—fter him P. Who were they Pr. What say you to a Pope whom you account Head of the Church Pope Gelasius writing against the same Hereticks produces the same Example and he expresly saith The Substance of the Bread and Wine doth not cease P. I thought I should find you tripping Here you put a Fob-head of the Church upon us For the Author of the single Sheet saith this was another Gelasius as is prov'd at large by Bellarmin Pr. In truth I am ashamed of the Ignorance of such small Authors who will be medling with things they understand not For this Writer since Bellarmin's time hath been evidently proved from Testimonies of
the courage to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity in point of Reason but I see you are a bold Man and will venture farther than wiser Men. Pr. It may be others have not had the leisure or curiosity to examine a Mystery believed to be so much out of the reach of our Understanding or have confounded themselves and others so much with School-â—erms as to leave the matter rather more obscure than it was before But I shall endeavour to make things as clear as they will bear And that which I insist upon is that the Absurdities are not to appearance so great as those of Transubstantiation And therefore I desire you to produce those which appear the most dreadful P. I shall reduce all to these two which comprehend the rest 1. How there can be three Persons and but one God. 2. How these can agree in a third and not agree among themselves For the first it seems very absurd that there should be three Persons really distinct whereof every one is God and yet there should not be three Gods for nothing is more contradictions than to make three not to be three or three to be but one Pr. I hope now you will give me leave to make an Answer to your Difficulty as distinct as possible We do not say that three Persons are but one Person or that one Nature is three Natures but that there are three Persons in one Nature If therefore one Individual Nature be communicable to three Persons there is no appearance of Absurdity in this Doctrine And on the other side it will be impossible there should be three Gods where there is one and the same Individual Nature for three Gods must have three several Divine Natures since it is the Divine Essence which makes a God. But to make this more plain Do you make any difference between Nature and Person P. Yes Pr. Wherein lies it P. Excuse me Sir for you have undertaken to explain these things Pr. I will begin with Person Which Name was originally taken among the Romans from some remarkable distinction of one from another either by some outward appearance as a Vizard or Habit or some particular Quality or Disposition And from hence it came to be applied to those inward Properties whereby one Intelligent Being is distinguished from another and from those Properties to the Person who had them Thus Person is used even by Tully himself at least twenty times in his Books of Rhetorick and the old Civil Law speaks of Personal Rights and Personal Actions So that the Criticks such as Valla and others had no cause to find fault with Boethius for applying the Notion of a Person to an intelligent Being subsisting by it self and so the Soul is no Person in Men but the Man consisting of Soul and Body having some incommunicable Properties belonging to him Therefore I cannot but wonder at the niceness of some late Men who would have the Names of Person and Hypostasis and Trinity to be laid aside since themselves confess Boëthius his definition of a Person to be true enough but they say it belongs to the Creatures and not to God for it would make three Gods. Which is to suppose without proving it that the Divine Nature can communicate it self after no other manner than a created Nature can This is now to be more strictly enquired into And it is very well observed by Boëthius de Trin. l. 1. Principium pluralitatis alteritas est That Diversity is the Reason of Plurality And therefore in the Trinity so far as they are different they are three i. e. in regard of Personal Properties and Relations but so far as they agree they are but O N E that is as to the Divine Nature It is very true that according to Arithmetick Three cannot be One nor One Three but we must distinguish between the bare Numeration and the Things numbred The repetition of three Units certainly makes three distinct Numbers but it doth not make three Persons to be three Natures And therefore as to the Things themselves we must go from the bare Numbers to consider their Nature Where-ever there is a real distinction we may multiply the Number tho the Subject be but One. As suppose we say the Soul hath three Faculties Understanding Will and Memory we may without the least absurdity say there are Three and One and those three not confounded with each other and yet there is but One Soul. P. But the Socinians object that there is a difference between three Properties and three distinct Persons because a Person is an Individual Being and so three Persons must be three Individual Beings and therefore as there is but one Divine Being there can be but one Person Pr. This is the main strength of the Cause to which I answer That altho a Person be an Individual Being yet it implies two Things in it 1. Something common with others of the same Nature as three Men have one and the same Nature tho they be three Persons 2. Something peculiar and incommunicate to any other so that John cannot be Peter nor Peter James P. But what is it which makes one not to be the other when they have the same common Nature Pr. You ask a hard Question viz. about the Principle of Individuation but if it be so hard to resolve it as to created Beings there is certainly far less Reason for us to be unsatisfied if it appear difficult to clear the Difference of Nature and Person in an infinite Being Yet all Mankind are agreed in the Thing viz. That there is a Community of the same Nature and a real Distinction of Persons among Men tho they cannot tell what that is which discriminates the Humane Nature in John from the same Humane Nature in Peter and James And it is observable that as Beings arise in Perfection above each other it is still so much harder to assign that which is called the Principle of Individuation In gross and material Beings we can discern a number of Accidents or peculiar Modes and Properties which distinguish them from each other but it is much harder to assign it in Spiritual and Intellectual Beings whose Natures and Differences lie not so open to our Understandings If so be then it appears more difficult in an infinite and incomprehensible Being what Cause have we to wonder at it But we must always make a difference between what we have reason to believe and what we have a power to conceive Altho we have all the Reason in the World to believe that there is a God i. e. a Being Infinite in all Perfections yet we must yield that his Essential Attributes are above our comprehension As for Instance 1. We must believe God to be Eternal or we cannot believe him to be God. For if he once were not it is impossible he should ever be And therefore we conclude necessary Existence to be an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature But then how to
Antiquity such as Fulgentius and John the second to have been Pope Gelasius and that by some of the most learned Persons of the Roman Communion such as Cardinal Du Perron Petavius Sirmondus and others P. Have you any more that talk at this rate Pr. Yes What think you of a Patriarch of Antioch who useth the same Similitude for the same purpose and he affirms that the sensible Substance still continues in the Eucharist tho it hath Divine Grace joyned with it And I pray now tell me seriously did the Tradition of Transubstantiation lie unquestion'd and quiet all this while when we have three Patriarchs of Constantinople Rome and Antioch expresly against it and one of them owned by your Selves to be Head of the Church and held by many to be Infallible especially when he teaches the Church which he doth if ever when he declares against Hereticks P. I know not what to say unless by Nature and Substance they meant Qualities and Properties Pr. I have evidently proved that could not be their meaning P. But I am told Monsieur Arnaud in his elaborate Defence against Claude goes that way and he saith The Eutychians and Apollinarists did not absolutely deny any Substance to remain in Christ's Body but not so as to be endued with such Properties as ours have Pr. I grant this is the main of his Defence but I confess Monsieur Arnaud hath not so much Authority with me as a General Council which declared the contrary viz. That the Eutychians were condemned for not holding two Substances or Natures in Christ after the Union And Domnus Antiochenus who first laid open the Eutychian Heresie saith It lay in making a mixture and confusion of both Natures in Christ and so making the Divinity passible and to the same purpose others There were some who charged both Apollinaris and Eutyches with holding that Christ brought his Body from Heaven and that it was not con-substantial with ours but Apollinaris himself in the Fragments preserved by Leontius not only denies it but pronounces an Anathema against those that hold it And Vitalis of Antioch a great Disciple of his in discourse with Epiphanius utterly denied a Coelestial Body in Christ. Vincentius Lerinensis saith his Heresie lay in denying two distinct Substances in Christ. St. Augustin saith he held but one Substance after the Union so that he must deny any Substance of a Body to remain after the Union which he asserted to be wholly swallowed up and the Properties to continue Which was another kind of Transubstantiation for no more of the Substance of Christ's Body was supposed to remain after the Union than there is supposed to be in the Elements after Consecration But in both Cases the Properties and Qualities were the same still And it is observable that in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon Eutyches rejected it as a Calumny cast upon him that he should hold that Christ brought a Body from Heaven But the Eutychian Doctrine lay in taking away the Substance of the Body and making the Divinity the sole Substance but with the Accidents and Properties of the Body And for this they produced the Words of Saint John The Word was made Flesh which they urged with the same Confidence that you now do This is my Body And when they were urged with Difficulties they made the very same recourse to God's Omnipotency and the Letter of Scripture and made the same Declamations against the use of Reason that you do and withal they would not have the Human Nature to be annihilated but to be changed into the Divine just as your Authors do about the Substance of the Bread. So that it is hard to imagin a more exact Parallel to Transubstantiation than there is in this Doctrine and consequently there can be no more evident Proof of it than the Fathers making use of the Instance of the Eucharist to shew thaâ— as the Substance of Bread doth remain after Consecration so the Substance of Christ's Body doth continue after the Union And when the Fathers from the remaining Properties do prove the Substance to remain they overthrow the possibility of Transubstantiation For if they might be without the Substance their whole Argument loses its force and proves just nothing P. But all this proves nothing as to the Faith of the Church being only Arguments used by Divines in the heat of Disputes Pr. Do you then in earnest give up the Fathers as Disputants to us but retain them as Believers to your selves But how should we know their Faith but by their Works P. I perceive you have a mind to be pleasant but my meaning was that in Disputes Men may easily over-shoot themselves and use ineffectual Arguments Pr. But is it possible to suppose they should draw Arguments from something against the Faith of the Church As for instance Suppose now we are disputing about Tran substantiation you should bring an Argument from the Human Nature of Christ and say That as in the Hypostatical Union the Substance is changed and nothing but the Accidents remain so it is in the Elements upon Consecration Do you think I should not presently deny your Example and say your very Supposition is Heretical So no doubt would the Eutychians have done in case the Faith of the Church had then been that the Substance of the Elements was changed after Consecration And the Eutychians were the most sottish Disputants in the World if they had not brought the Doctrine of Transubstantiation to prove their Heresy P. Methink you are very long upon this Argument when shall we have done at this rate Pr. I take this for your best Answer and so I proceed to a second Argument which I am sure will not hold against the Trinity and that is from the natural and unseparable Properties of Christ's Body which are utterly inconsistent with the belief of Transubstantiation And the force of the Argument in general lies in this That the Fathers did attribute such things to the Body of Christ which render it uncapable of being present in such a manner in the Sacrament as Transubstantiation supposes And no Men who understand themselves will assert that at one time which they must be bound to deny at another but they will be sure to make an Exception or Limitation which may reconcile both together As if you should say That the Body of Christ cannot be in more places than one at once upon the Doctrine of St. Thomas ye would presently add with regard to the Sacrament i. e. not in regard of its natural Presence but in a Sacramental it may So if the Fathers had an Opinion like yours as to the Body of Christ they would have a Reserve or Exception as to the Sacrament But it appears by their Writings that they attribute such Properties in general to the Body of Christ as overthrow any such Presence without Exceptions or Limitations But that is not all For I shall now prove
are all things and we in him and one Lord Jesus Christ by whom are all things and we by him And this is one of the strongest holds of the Socinians But two Considerations will take off the seeming force of it 1. That the Apostle in his disputes with the Gentile Idolaters concerning whom he speaks v. 4 5. doth utterly deny any Divinity in the Beings they worshipped instead of God when he saith An Idol is nothing in the world and that there is none other God but one He knew very well that they worshipped many v. 5. As there be Gods many and Lords many among them but unto us Christians there is but one God and one Lord i. e. we have but one Supreme God to whom we give Divine Worship and instead of the multitude of Mediators we have but one Mediator and so his design is in opposition to their many Gods to assert the Unity of the Divine Nature not so as to exclude a distinction of Persons but thereby to exclude other Gods as the proper Object of Worship and the Unity of a Mediator in opposition to their many Lords 2. That if this place excludes Christ from the Unity of Nature with God it doth exclude him from being the Object of Divine Worship for it saith That there is no other God but One therefore no Creature can be made God And to us there is but One God the Father therefore the Son cannot be God. If therefore the name Lord be taken in opposition to God then Christ cannot be God in any sense for we must have but One God but the plain meaning of the Apostle was That by one Lord he meant one Mediator by whom alone we have in this new frame of things by the Gospel access unto God the Father The third place 1 Cor. 15. 27 28. speaks plainly of Christs Kingdom as Mediator The fourth place Rev. 3. 12. where Christ speaks several times of my God proves no more than his words on the Cross My God my God why hast thou forsaken me For surely Christ might own a particular Relation to God and Interest in him as he was in human Nature without overthrowing the Divine Nature in him P. But he owns That though he is to be our Judg he knows not the time Mark 13. 32. Which seems inconsistent with the Divine Nature which knoweth all things Pr. The Son there spoken of was Christ as endued with a human Soul when he was upon earth which could not understand a secret so much out of the reach of mans understanding without immediate Revelation But it was not necessary by virtue of the Union of both Natures that the Divine Nature should communicate to the human Soul of Christ all Divine Mysteries but as the human Body was notwithstanding subject to Passions and Infirmities incident to it so the human Soul might continue ignorant of the Day of Judgment in this state both to let us know how great that secret is and that Christ had the proper capacity of a human Soul which could not extend to such things without Divine Revelation P. There is one Argument more which seems to prove Christs Divinity and doth not viz. The making of all things visible and invisible being attributed to him John 1. 3. Heb. 1. 10. Col. 1. 16 17 18 19. Pr. Now I confess this doth more than seem to me to be a very strong Argument and that for this Reason the Apostle saith The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things which are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Rom. 1. 20. Was this Argument of the Apostle good or not P. No doubt it was Pr. Then the Creation of the World is an Invincible Proof of the true God. P. What follows Pr. Then if the making of all things be attributed to Christ he must be true God but this is plain in the New Testament in which the making of all things is as clearly attributed to the Son as it is to the Father All things saith St. John were made by him and without him was not any thing made that was made John 1. 3. For by him were all things created saith St. Paul that are in heaven and that are in earth visible and invisible whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers all things were created by him and for him Col. 1. 16. Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the Foundation of the earth and the heavens are the work of thy hands Heb. 1. 10. Now compare these expressions with those wherein the Creation is attributed to the Father The world is said to be made by bim Rom. 1. 20. That he hath created all things Rev. 4. 11. That of him and for him and to him are all things Rom. 11. 36. And let any impartial mind discern the difference Therefore we have as much Reason from Scripture to believe Christ to be God as we have from the Creation of things to believe a God. P. But you do not take notice of the different expressions in Scripture concerning the Father and the Son All things are said to be of the Father and by the Son 1 Cor. 8. 6. And that the Father created all things by Jesus Christ Eph. 3. 9. which proves no more than that the Son was Gods Instrument in the Creation Pr. What do you mean by Gods Instrument in the Creation Do you think one Creature can create another How then can the Creation prove an Infinite Power If you believe the Instrument uncreated then you must assert him to be true God by Nature and then we have all we desire P. But the Socinians do not like this Answer of the Arians and therefore they interpret these places of the state of things under the Gospel and not of the Creation of the World. Pr. They have not one jot mended the matter for 1. Where the new Creation is spoken of some circumstances are added which limit the sense to it as when St. Paul saith We are created in Christ Jesus unto good works that we shoul walk in them Eph. 2. 10. VVho could possibly understand this of the old Creation And so If any man be in Christ Jesus he is a new Creature 2 Cor. 5. 17. But in the other places the same Expressions are used which are attributed to the old Creation without limitation from circumstances or from the Context and occasion of them 2. There are some things said to be created by Christ Jesus which cannot relate to the new Creation for by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth visible and invisible whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or Powers Col. 1. 16. How are these created by Preaching the Gospel when they are uncapable of the proper means of it which are the Doctrine of the remission of Sins upon Repentance and the Renewing and Sanctifiing Grace of God P. But St. Paul doth not
Pr. Then being extended and divisible are the natural and essential Properties of a Body And therefore to suppose a Body not to be extended and divisible is to suppose it not to be a Body which is a plain Contradiction P. You are to distinguish between the Intrinsecal Quantity which is an inseparable Property of a Body and the Extrinsecal Relation it hath to a Place Pr. Intrinsecal Quantity without Relation to Place is intrinsecal Non-sense For how is it possible for extended Parts to have no Relation to Place P. By Relation to Place I mean when the Parts of a Body answer to the Parts of a Place but by Intrinsecal Quantity I mean that there is the real order and proportion of Parts in the Body it self but it doth not fill up the Place Pr. Then you do suppose the Body of Christ in the Eucharist to have all the distinct Parts of a Body with their due Order and Proportion but to be in the Sacrament after an indivisible manner P. Why not Pr. Do you think it possible for the real and entire Body of a Man to be crouded into the compass of a Wafer with all the difference of its Parts so that no true Part of the Body be missing P. Yes by Divine Power Pr. Do you think a far less thing possible than that viz. that a Man's Head and Shoulders and Arms should be contained entire and distinct under the Nail of his little Finger P. Why not Pr. Then why may not the greatest Body be within the least Why may not an Elephant be caught in a Mouse-trap and a Rhinoceros be put into a Snuff-box For either there is a Repugnancy in the Nature of the thing for a greater Body to be within a less or there is not if not then these mentioned Instances are possible if there be then the supposition of Divine Power can give no relief unless you suppose that God can do things repugnant in themselves i. e. that he can do things which cannot be done But I pray tell me if the very Body of Christ be by Transubstantiation in the Wafer with all its Parts in their due order then the Head must be distant from the Feet and all other Organs in their proper places but this cannot possibly be supposed where there is no measure of distance as Place is and the whole Body is in a point P. I say again there is the just order of Parts considered in themselves but not with respect to Place Pr. Then it is impossible there should be any distance without which it is impossible there should be the order of Parts in a Human Body Thus there is a Repugnancy in the very supposition of Christ's Body being in the Wafer tho there were but one single Wafer but when to this we add that it is equally thus present in thousands of Wafers at what distance of Place soever the Absurdities do increase and multiply so fast upon us that it is hardly possible to imagin any thing concerning a Body which doth imply more than this doth As that one and the same Body should be indivisibly present in many places where it must be divided from it self by so many Bodies interposing so that it is impossible to apprehend how two Bodies can be divided from one another more effectually than such a Body must be from it self if it be present in many places at once P. I pray stop here for reckon up as many Absurdities as you will they are all but the Effects of Carnal Reason and we must captivate our Understanding to the Obedience of Faith. Pr. Then it is to no purpose to argue any farther on the point of Reason and I thought you designed this for one part of your Parallel P. So I did and I still say there are things as hard to make out about the Trinity which you have not yet taken notice of Pr. I pray let us hear them that we may put an end to this Discourse P. What say you then to one and the same Nature being in three distinct Persons which Bellarmin saith is more wonderful than that one Body should be in many Places because the Nature is identified with the Persons but the Body is not so with the Places in which it is present If therefore the same Nature be not divided from it self in the Persons of the Trinity how much more easily may one Body be present in several places and not be divided from it self Pr. It is strange neither Bellarmin nor you should discern the difference For the reason why a Body must be divided from it self being in several places is because it is finite and there being no Penetration of Dimensions in Bodies the interposing of other Bodies must needs divide the same Body in distant places but the Reason why the same Divine Nature may be in several Persons is because it is Infinite and therefore nothing can bound or discontinue it P. You have talked much of Contradictions Is there any greater about Transubstantiation than that of Eternal Generation of the Son in the Mystery of the Trinity for if it be not proper Generation then you cannot infer from it that the Son is of the same Substance with the Father if it be then it must be a proceeding from not being to being and so an Eternal Generation is a Contradiction Pr. It is a Rule in common Reason That all Attributes must be understood according to the Nature of the Subjects And therefore if the Subject here spoken of be of such a Nature as to be uncapable of proceeding from not being to being then whatever is affirmed of it must be so understood as not to destroy its Nature The Term of Generation alone is not it may be sufficient to prove the Son Co-essential with the Father because it might have been used improperly and metaphorically But when from the Scripture it otherwise appears that the Son of God being the Word was in the beginning with God and was God John 1. 1. and we soon after find him called the only begotten of the Father Ver. 14. and the only begotten Son Ver. 18. we have reason to infer from hence his Eternal Generation Which must not be understood in such a mean sense as is agreeable to Creatures but as it is consistent with the Essential Attributes of God of which necessary Existence is one So that by Eternal Generation no more can be meant than such an Emanation of the Son from the Father as doth suppose them to have the same Nature and Co-existence which is best represented by the Rays of the Sun coming from the Fountain of Light if they were permanent and not successive P. What say you then to the Mystery of the Incarnation Is it not more wonderful as Bellarmin observes that there should be one Hypostasis in two Natures than one Body in two Places since the Union is greater between the Hypostasis and the Natures than between the Body and the Places it is