believes no man can tell what it is For how can such actual sensation be imagin'd to be union As well might the use of sense its self speaking of any thing singly to which it belongs be said to be its constituent form or consequently the doing any thing that proceeds from Reason be the form of a Man So the writing a Book should be the Author And whereas he says it is certain the Dean took it to be so and therefore he did not leave out a natural external union it follows indeed that he did not leave it out in his Mind and Design but he nevertheless left it out of his Book and therefore said not enough there to salve the unity of the Godhead but ought to have insisted upon somewhat prior to mutual consciousness as constituent of that unity and which might make the three one and not meerly argue them to be so 2. But now p. 105. he comes to find as great fault with the Enquirers way of maintaining this unity and because he is resolv'd to dislike it if he can't find it faulty sets himself to make it so The Temper of Mind wherewith he writes to this purpose what follows p. 105. and onwards to the end so soon and so constantly shews it self that no man whose mind is not in the same disorder will upon Tryal apprehend any thing in it but such heat as dwells in darkness And he himself hath given the Document which may be a measure to any apprehensive Reader True divine Wisdom rests not on an ill natur'd and perverse Spirit I understand it while the ill fit lasts But 't is strange he could write those words without any self-reflection The Thing to be reveng'd is that the Enquirer did freely speak his Thoughts wherein he judg'd the Dean's Hypothesis defective his not taking notice of what he reckon'd naturally antecedent and fundamental to mutual consciousness A most intimate natural necessary eternal union of the sacred Three If the Enquirer spake sincerely as he understood the matter and him and it evidently apppear the Defender did not so I only say the wrong'd person hath much the advantage and wishes him no other harm than such gentle Regrets as are necessary to set him right with himself and his higher Judge He says he the Enquirer represents this Unity by the union of soul and body and by the union of the divine and humane nature c. 'T is true he partly doth so but more fully by the supposed union of three created Spirits to which he that will may see he only makes that a lower step and he says with respect especially to the former of these That an union supposeable to be originally eternally and by natural necessity in the most perfect being is to be thought unexpressibly more perfect than any other But he adds these are personal unions and therefore cannot be the unity of the Godhead And he very well knew for he had but little before cited the passage that the Enquirer never intended them so but only to represent that the union of the three in the Godhead could not be reasonably thought less possible What he farther adds is much stranger and yet herein I am resolv'd to put Charity towards him to the utmost stretch as he professes to have done his understanding for he says as far as he can possibly understand and that he should be glad to be better informed tho' there is some reason to apprehend that former displeasure darkned his understanding and even dimn'd his Eye-sight which yet I hope hath it's more lucid Intervals and that his distemper is not a fixed habit with him And what is it now that he cannot possibly understand otherwise that no other union will satisfie him viz. the Enquirer but such an union of three spiritual Beings and individual natures as by their composition constitute the Godhead as the composition of soul and body do the Man i. e. He cannot understand but he means what he expresly denies Who can help so cross an understanding If he had not had his very finger upon the place where the Enquirer says in express words I peremptorily deny all composition in the Being of God this had been more excusable besides much said to the same purpose elsewhere It had been ingenuous in any man not to impute that to another as his meaning which in the plainest terms he disavows as none of his meaning And it had been prudent in the Dean or his Defender of all Mankind not to have done so in the present case as will further be seen in due time But he takes it for an Affront when he fancies a man to come too near him He adds for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the divine Nature and will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God and distinguished into different Conceptions by us only through the weakness of our understandings which cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts I know not what he means by earnestly the matter was weighty and it is true he was in writing about it in no disposition to jeast But it 's said he disputed against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature I hope the Defender in this means honestly but he speaks very improperly for it supposes him to think that the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity so earnestly disputed against did really belong to the Divine Nature but I can scarce believe him to think so and therefore he should have said his disputation tended to prove it not to belong If he viz. the Defender or the Dean did really think it did they or he must be very singular in that sentiment I would have them name me the man that ever laid down and asserted such a position Some I know have said of that Sacred Being that it is summè simplex or more simple than any thing else but that imports not universal absolute omnimodous simplicity which is impossible to be a perfection or therefore to belong to the Divine Nature No man that ever acknowledged a Trinity of persons even modally distinguished could ever pretend it for such simplicity excludes all modes Nay the Antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it as the Calm Discourse hath shewn And if the Dean be he is gone into the remotest extream from what he held and plainly enough seems still to hold that ever man of sense did But for what is added that he will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God This is not fairly said Civility allows me not to say untruly There is no word in the place he cites nor any where in that book that signifies not allowing 't is intimated we are not instructed by the Scripture to conceive of the Divine Nature as in every respect most absolutely
be the same but must be two No man is his own Image nor is an Image the Image of it self And he adds this is so self evident c. But whereas the distinction all this while might be understood to be but modal and that appears to be the Defenders present what ever was the Deans former meaning that the three subsistences differ only in their different manner of subsisting yet with this meaning his other words do little agree for he plainly asserts a real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature And who did ever make a real distinction to be but modal More expresly he had said before p. 18. the Divine Nature is one individual nature but not one single nature for one single nature can be but one person whether in God or man I shall not here discuss with him the Criticism upon which he lays so mighty stress of one individual nature and one single nature but take the terms he chooses and if the Divine Nature be not one single nature it must be double it must be triple And what doth this come to less than three Natures unless all ordinary forms of speech must be quite abandon'd and forsaken And wherein doth it come short of what is said by the Enquirer p. 50. and 51. This term individual must in the case now supposed as possible not as certain admit of a twofold application either to the distinct essence of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Ghost or to the entire essence of the Godhead in which these three do concurr Each of these conceived by it self are according to this supposition individual essences but conceived together they are the entire individual essence of God for there is but one such essence and no more and it can never be multiplied nor divided into more of the same name and nature Duplicity triplicity are admitted simplicity rejected if simple and single be of the same signification Where is the difference but that the one thinks absolute omnimodous simplicity is not to be affirmed of the Divine Nature as he often speaks The other says downright it is not single or simple without limitation The one denies multiplication of it so doth the other The one indeed speaks positively the other doth but suppose what he says as possible not certain And there is indeed some difference between supposing a thing as possible for ought one knows and affirming it so positively as to impute Heresie and Nonsense to all Gainsayers But both bring for proof the same thing The incarnation as in the Postscript the Defender takes notice the Enquirer doth p. 102. And so doth he himself in his letter p. 102. The Divine Nature was incarnate in Christ he was perfect God and perfect man and if there was but one single Divine Nature in all three persons this one single Divine Nature was incarnate and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost who are this single Divine Nature as well as the Son must be as much incarnate as the Son was He makes the contrary absurd And brings in fitly enough Victorinus Afer teaching that we ought not to say nor is it lawful to say that there is but one substance i. e. as he paraphrases it one single subsisting nature therefore there must be three single subsisting natures and three persons For if this same substance did and suffer'd all Patri-passiani et nos we must be Patri-passians which God forbid And what the Defender alledges from the Ancients against the Sabellians allowing only a Trinity of Names and his taking the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the concrete not in the abstract fully enough speaks the Enquirers sense his accounting the contrary too Fine and Metaphysical for him was what was writ to Dr. Wallis Calm Discourse p. 107. too fine or too little solid c. In short till it can be effectually prov'd that Mind and Spirit do not signifie somewhat as absolute as Nature or Essence or rather more than the former which signifies the Principle of Operation as the other of Being And till it can be as well prov'd that asserting a thing as certain so as to pronounce it Heresie and Nonsense to think otherwise is less than only to propose it as possible or enquire whether it be so or no The Dean must be judg'd by every one that understands common sense to have heightened the Distinction of three Persons at least as much as the Enquirer And whether the Enquirer have supposed more than is defensible against the Defenders objections will be considered by and by in its proper place In the mean time let it 2. Be examin'd whether the Dean has said as much for salving the Unity of the Godhead as the Enquirer or as much as is requisite to that purpose And here our Business will be short for it all turns upon that one single point whether mutual Consciousness be that Union which must be acknowledged or suppose it only For which we need only appeal to common Reason whether Being do not in the natural Order precede even the Power of working and consequently whether being united vitally precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state whereupon the Enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only but as he speaks Consciousness Is it possible any three Persons or Intelligent Subsistences should naturally have vital Perception of each others internal Motions and Sensations without being vitally preunited I say naturally for that God might give to three created Spirits a temporary Perception of each other without bringing them into a stated Union each with other is little to be doubted as a Spirit may assume a Body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it And if that Body were also a Spirit they might pro tempore for ought we know by extraordinary Divine Disposition for within the ordinary course of Nature we know of no such intimacy of created Spirits to another be quasi animae to one another But if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse Sensations mutually into each other they must be naturally first in vital union with one another Nor therefore did the Enquirer mistake the Dean's Notion as the Defender fancies in the passage he quotes p. 104. as if he took mutual Consciousness for meer mutual Perspection For tho' scire abstractly taken doth not signifie more than perspicere yet the Enquirer in that passage speaking of a never so perfect mutual perspection properly enough express'd thereby as great a feeling such Spirits were supposed to have of each other in themselves as mutual consciousness is apt to signifie or as the Dean can yet be supposed to have meant that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the Object than that which stays in meer speculation only And upon the whole it seems very strange the Defender should say if such an internal vital sensation be not an essential union he
no parts if partiri whence they are so called must not and herein he cannot so fool the whole Christian World as to make it concur with him lose its signification to serve a turn Tho' the things be real there partibility is not real If any indeed will call them parts beeause they may be conceived or contemplated apart as parts meerly conceptible are no prejudice to the perfection of the Divine Being so are such conceivable parts acknowledged by this Author himself in express words we cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one Thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts God can as little admit to be a part of any thing as to have any thing a part of him And yet 't is no prejudice to the Dignity and Perfection of his Being to conceive of him conjunctly with other things as when we make him a part subject or predicate of a Proposition All his disputation therefore against parts and composition in the Deity is against a figment or no present adversary For my part I am of his mind and I should be obliged to thank him that this once he vouchsafes to let me be on his side when he knows I am if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know it How hard a thing is it for an angry man especially when he knows not why to write with a sincere Mind But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the Honour of the Divine Being as God forbid I should think he never hath what is that he supposes injurious to it Is it the words parts and compounds or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being The words he knows to be his own and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how parts that were never put together never parted nor ever shall be the one or other i. e. that never were or will be parts And a compound of such parts But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words three Essences natures or if you please Infinite minds or spirits signified by the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost in eternal union but distinct in the Being of God Let us consider his disputation against them united or in union according to its double aspect First upon the Hypothesis or Supposition of them Secondly upon himself First Consider his Disputation as levell'd against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences natures minds spirits in necessary eternal Union in the Divine Being And one of his arguments against it is in those words of his One principal argument against it here put out parts and composition which are his own and we have no more to do with them is that God is eternal and unmade and whatsoever hath parts saies he hath such essences in it must have a maker And here let him prove his consequence and his business is done viz. both ways as will be seen by and by But let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it as the supposition to be argued against is and before ought to have been justly stated and it 's being eternal and unmade But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as guess confident affirmation against the most obvious Tenour of Gods own Word is of little account who shall ascend into the heavens or fathom the depths or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature as without and visibly against his own revelation to be able without great rashness to pronounce so concerning him But so toyish an Argument as here follows is worse than the Position i. e. when one shall say that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union united into one in the Being of God any man should say and be so vain as to expect to be regarded that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing by it self is to say nothing or is all one with proving a thing by it self He proceeds to what hath no thing in it like an Argument but against his own Conceit of parts and that very trifling too There can be but one eternal nature in God But if there be three there must be three This 't is now come to proving his Point by its self Here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd but then nothing is prov'd no advance is made if there be three there must be three But if there be three what eternal parts There must be three different Natures or else they would be the same What tho' distinct But this supposes some body said the first And who himself therefore he is disproving himself If I had said so I would have deny'd his consequence for there may be similar parts Whereas by different he seems to mean dissimilar He says not only distinct but different natures Now you have that wonderful thing talk'd of some times but never brought to view before a distinction without a difference 'T is strange how any things should be distinct and no way different What distinguishes them if they differ by nothing This different apply'd to this present Case is his own word coined to introduce a Notion that is not new to Christians only but to all Man-kind If by different Natures he means as he seems of a different kind who thought of such a difference But I trow things that differ in number do as truly differ however essentially cohaering tho' not so widely His next is that though we have a natural notion of an eternal Being we have no notion of three eternal Essences which again I put instead of his parts which necessarily coexist in an eternal union Doth he mean we are to disbelieve every thing of God whereof we have not a natural Notion Then to what purpose is a Divine Revelation Is this Notion of God pretended to be Natural 'T is enough if such a Notion be most favoured by his own Revelation who best understands his own Nature and there be no evident natural Notion against it He forgot that he had said Defence p. 5. If every thing which we have no positive Idea of must be allow'd to contradict Reason we shall find contradictions enow adding We must confess a great many things to be true which we have no Idea of c. He adds once more we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature but if there be I here again leave out his three parts because I design to consider if there be any thing of strength brought against what was supposed possible by the Enquirer not against his fiction which I trouble not my self any further with three spiritual Beings
neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite I would rather have said none or no one than neither since the discourse is of more than two I thought the meaning of uter and neuter had been agreed long ago tho' we could suppose their union to make such a perfect Being because they are not the same and neither no one of them is the whole c. This is the only thing that ever came under my notice among the School-men that hath any appearing strengh in it against the Hypothesis which I have proposed as possible for ought I knew They generally dispute against many sorts of Compositions in the Being of God which I am not concern'd in That of Matter and Form which is alien from this affair of quantitative parts which is as alien Of subject and accident which touches us not Of act and power which doth it as little Each subsistent being eternally in utmost actuality And by sundry sorts and methods of argument whereof only this can seem to signify any thing against the present supposition And it wholly resolves into the Notion of Infinity about which I generally spoke my sense in that first Letter to Dr. Wallis And as I there intimated how much easier it is to puzzle another upon that subject than to satisfy one self so I here say that I doubt not to give any man as much trouble about it in respect of quantitative extension as he can me in this I think it demonstrable that one Infinite can never be from another by voluntary production that it cannot by necessary Emanation I think not so In the mean time when we are told so plainly by the Divine Oracles of a sacred three that are each of them God and of some one whereof some things are spoken that are not nor can be of the others I think it easier to count three than to determine of Infiniteness And accordingly to form ones Belief But of this more when we come to compare him with himself And for what he discourses of the aspect this supposition hath upon the Trinity and the Homo-ousion It all proceeds still upon his own fiction of parts and upon the invidious straining of that similitude of the union of soul and body as he himself doth tantum non confess except that he lessens it by saying most untruly that he the Enquirer doth expresly own the Consequence Therefore if he do not own the Consequence then the Defender confesses himself to have invidiously devised it and what is it That if all three by this composition are but one God neither of them by himself is true and perfect God The Divinity is like the English But both his own The Enquirer denies both antecedent which he knows and consequent too Leave out by this composition his own figment and his argument as much disproves any Trinity at all as it doth the present Hypothesis But wherein doth the Enquirer own it because such a Similitude is used as 't is often in that discourse of the union between soul and body declared elsewhere to be unexpressibly defective that therefore the Father Son and Holy Ghost are each of them by himself no more truly Lord or God according to the Athanasian Creed or otherwise than in as improper a sense as the Body of a Man excluding the Soul is a Man or an Humane Person Or as if Deity were no more in one of the Persons than humanity in a Carkass who that looks upon all this with equal Eyes but will rather choose as doubtful a notion than so apparently ill a Spirit Are similitudes ever wont to be alike throughout to what they are brought to illustrate It might as well be said because he mentions with Approbation such as illustrate the Doctrine of the Trinity by a Tree and its Branches that therefore there we are to expect Leaves and Blossoms Is it strange the Created Universe should not afford us an exact Representation of uncreated Being How could he but think of that To whom do ye liken me At least one would have thought he should not have forgot what he had so lately said himself We must grant we have no perfect Example of any such union in nature What Appetite in him is it that now seeks what Nature doth not afford A very unnatural One we may conclude 'T were trifling to repeat what was said and was so plain before that the union between Soul and Body was never brought to illustrate personal union but essential The former is here imagin'd without pretence there being no mention or occasion for the the mentioning of Persons in the place he alledges But to make out his violent Consequence he foists in a supposition that never came into any man's Imagination but a Socinians and his own Which I say contradistinguishing him to them that the matter may as it ought appear the more strange If God be a person he can be but one Is God the appropriate Name of a Person then indeed there will be but one person but who here says so but himself The name God is the name of the Essence not the distinguishing name of a Person But if three intelligent Natures be united in one Deity each will be Persons and each will be God and all will be one God not by parts other than conceptible undivided and inseperable as the Soul and Body of a Man are not Which sufficiently conserves the Christian Trinity from such furious and impotent Attaques as these And the Homoousiotes is most entirely conserved too For what are three spiritual natures no more the same than as he grosly speaks the Soul and Body are no more than an intelligent mind and a piece of Clay by what consequence is this said from any thing in the Enquirers Hypothesis Whereas also he expresly insists that the Father as Fons Trinitatis is first the Son of the Father the Holy Ghost from both Is not the water in the streams the same that was in the Fountain and are not the several Attributes expresly spoken of as common to these three Essential Power Wisdom Goodness which are deny'd to be the precise notions of Father Son and Spirit said by more than a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that may be understood to signify meer presence how intimate soever but by real vital union as much each one 's as any one 's and all other conceivable perfections besides Why were these words read with Eyes refusing their office to let them into the Reader 's mind whence also how fabulous is the Talk of Powers begetting Wisdom c. against what is so plainly said of the order of Priority and Posteriority c. There had been some prudence seen in all this conduct if the Defender could have taken effectual care that every thing should have been blotted out of all the Copies of that Discourse but what he would have thought fit to be permitted to the view of