Qualities and Dispositions which we perceive by observation and arise either from Constitution or Education or Company or acquired Habits 2. As to the true ground of the real Difference between the Existence of one Individual from the rest it depends upon the separate Existence which it hath from all others For that which gives it a Being distinct from all others and divided by Individual Properties is the true ground of the difference between them and that can be no other but the Will of God And no consequent Faculties or Acts of the Mind by Self-Reflection c. can be the reason of this difference because the difference must be supposed antecedent to them And nothing can be said to make that which must be supposed to be before it self for there must be a distinct Mind in Being from all other Minds before it can reflect upon it self But we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter For as to Individual Persons there are these things still to be consider'd 1. Actual Existence in it self which hath a Mode belonging to it or else the humane Nature of Christ could not have been united with the divine but it must have had the personal Subsistence and consequently there must have been two Persons in Christ. 2. A separate and divided Existence from all others which arises from the actual Existence but may be distinguished from it and so the humane Nature of Christ although it had the Subsistence proper to Being yet had not a separate Existence after the Hypostatical Vnion 3. The peculiar manner of Subsistence which lies in such properties as are incommunicable to any other and herein lies the proper reason of Personality Which doth not consist in a meer Intelligent Being but in that peculiar manner of Subsistence in that Being which can be in no other For when the common Nature doth subsist in Individuals there is not only a separate Existence but something so peculiar to it self that it can be communicated to no other And this is that which makes the distinction of Persons 4. There is a common Nature which must be joyned with this manner of Subsistence to make a Person otherwise it would be a meer Mode but we never conceive a Person without the Essence in Conjunction with it But here appears no manner of contradiction in asserting several Persons in one and the same common Nature 5. The Individuals of the same kind are said to differ in number from each other because of their different Accidents and separate Existence For so they are capable of being numbred Whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts and may be said to be one by the Union of them whatever is separated from another is capable of number by distinction But where there can be no Accidents nor Division there must be perfect Unity 6. There must be a Separation in Nature where-ever there is a difference of Individuals under the same kind I do not say there must be an actual Separation and Division as to place but that there is and must be so in Nature where one common Nature subsists in several Individuals For all Individuals must divide the Species and the common Nature uâ—ites them And this Philoponus understood very well and therefore he never denied such a Division and Separation in the divine Persons as is implied in distinct Individuals which is the last thing to be consider'd here 3. We are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the Persons in the Trinity and whether it be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the Godhead and but one God We are very far from disputing the Vnity of the divine Essence which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible as not to be capable of such a difference of Persons as is among Men. Because there can be no difference of Accidents or Place or Qualities in the divine Nature and there can be no separate Existence because the Essence and Existence are the same in God and if necessary Existence be an inseparable Attribute of the divine Essence it is impossible there should be any separate Existence for what always was and must be can have no other Existence than what is implied in the very Essence But will not this overthrow the distinction of Persons and run us into Sabellianism By no means For our Vnitarians grant That the Noetians and Sabellians held that there is but one divine Substance Essence or Nature and but one Person And how can those who hold three Persons be Sabellians Yes say they the Sabellians held three relative Persons But did they mean three distinct Subsistences or only one Subsistence sustaining the Names or Appearances or Manifestations of three Persons The latter they cannot deny to have been the true sense of the Sabellians But say they these are three Persons in a classical critical Sense We meddle not at present with the Dispute which Valla hath against Boethius about the proper Latin Sense of a Person and Petavius saith Valla's Objections are mere Iests and Trifles but our Sense of a Person is plain that it signifies the Essence with a particular manner of Subsistence which the Greek Fathers called an Hypostasis taking it for that incommunicable Property which makes a Person But say our Vnitarians a Person is an intelligent Being and therefore three Persons must be three intelligent Beings I answer that this may be taken two ways 1. That there is no Person where there is no intelligent Nature to make it a Person and so we grant it 2. That a Person implies an intelligent Being separate and divided from other Individuals of the same kind as it is among men and so we deny it as to the Persons of the Trinity because the Divine Essence is not capable of such Division and Separation as the humane Nature is But say they again The Fathers did hold a specifical Divine Nature and the Persons to be as so many individuals This they repeat very often in their late Books and after all refer us to Curcellaeus for undeniable Proofs of it Let us for the present suppose it then I hope the Fathers are freed from holding Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity for what Contradiction can it be to hold three individual Persons in the Godhead and One common Nature more than it is to hold that there are three humane Persons in One and the same common Nature of Man Will they make this a Contradiction too But some have so used themselves to the Language of Iargon Nonsense Contradiction Impossibility that it comes from them as some men swear when they do not know it But I am not willing to go off with this Answer for I do take the Fathers to have been men of too great Sense and Capacity to have maintained such an absurd Opinion as that of a Specifick Nature in God For either it is a mere Logical Notion and Act
God that he saith The Consequence must be that the three Persons must be three Gods as three humane Persons are three Men. And in another place That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are One in the same individual Nature And what saith Curcellaeus to these places for he was aware of them To the latter he saith That by individual he means Specifick This is an extraordinary Answer indeed But what Reason doth he give for it Because they are not divided in Place or Time but they may have their proper Essences however But where doth S. Augustin give any such Account of it He often speaks upon this Subject but always gives another Reason viz. because they are but One and the same Substance The Three Persons are but One God because they are of One Substance and they have a perfect Vnity because there is no Diversity of Nature or of Will But it may be said That here he speaks of a Diversity of Nature In the next Words he explains himself that the three Persons are One God propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis but the Union of three Persons in one Specifick Nature is no ineffable Conjunction it being one of the commonest things in the World and in the same Chapter propter Individuam Deitatem unus Deus est propter uniuscujusque Proprietatem tres Personae sunt Here we find one Individual Nature and no difference but in the peculiar Properties of the Persons In the other place he is so express against a Specifick Vnity that Curcellaeus his best Answer is That in that Chapter he is too intricate and obscure i. e. He doth not to speak his Mind Thus much I thought fit to say in Answer to those undeniable Proofs of Curcellaeus which our Vnitarians boast so much of and whether they be so or not let the Reader examine and judge CHAP. VII The Athanasian Creed clear'd from Contradictions III. I Now come to the last thing I proposed viz. to shew That it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in the Trinity and but one God and for that purpose I shall examine the charge of Contradictions on the Athanasian Creed The summ of the first Articles say they is this The one true God is three distinct Persons and three distinct Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost are the one true God Which is plainly as if a Man should say Peter James and John being three Persons are one Man and one Man is these three distinct Persons Peter James and John Is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous Indignity to go about thus to make Asses of all Mankind under pretence of teaching them a Creed This is very freely spoken with respect not merely to our Church but the Christian World which owns this Creed to be a just and true Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity But there are some Creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking as for their Stupidity And is not this great skill in these Matters to make such a Parallel between three Persons in the Godhead and Peter Iames and Iohn Do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect Being and such finite limited Creatures as Individuals among Men are Do they suppose the divine Nature capable of such Division and Separation by Individuals as human Nature is No they may say but ye who hold three Persons must think so For what reason We do assert three Persons but it is on the account of divine Revelation and in such a manner as the divine Nature is capable of it For it is a good rule of Boethius Talia sunt praedicata qualia subjecta permiserint We must not say that there are Persons in the Trinity but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine Nature and if that be not capable of Division and Separation then the Persons must be in the same undivided Essence The next Article is Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance But how can we say they not confound the Persons that have as ye say but one numerical Substance And how can we but divide the Substance which we find in three distinct divided Persons I think the terms numerical Substance not very proper in this case and I had rather use the Language of the Fathers than of the Schools and some of the most judicious and learned Fathers would not allow the terms of one numerical Substance to be applied to the divine Essence For their Notion was That Number was only proper for compound Bâ—ings but God being a pure and simple Being was one by Nature and not by Number as S. Basil speaks as is before observed because he is not compounded nor hath any besides himself to be reckon'd with him But because there are different Hypostases therefore they allow'd the use of Number about them and so we may say the Hypostases or Persons are numerically different but we cannot say that the Essence is one Numerically But why must they confound the Persons if there be but one Essence The relative Properties cannot be confounded for the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father and on these the difference of Persons is founded For there can be no difference as to essential Properties and therefore all the difference or rather distinction must be from those that are Relative A Person of it self imports no Relation but the Person of the Father or of the Son must and these Relations cannot be confounded with one another And if the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father then they must be distinct from each other But how By dividing the Substance That is impossible in a Substance that is indivisible It may be said That the Essence of created Beings is indivisible and yet there are divided Persons I grant it but then a created Essence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one Person from another which cannot be supposed in the divine Nature and withall the same power which gives a Being to a created Essence gives it a separate and divided Existence from all others As when Peter Iames and Iohn received their several distinct Personalities from God at the same time he gave them their separate Beings from each other although the same Essence be in them all But how can we but divide the Substance which we see in three distinct divided Persons The question is whether the distinct Properties of the Persons do imply a Division of the Substance We deny that the Persons are divided as to the Substance because that is impossible to be divided but we say they are and must be distinguished as to those incommunicable Properties which make the Persons distinct The essential Properties are uncapable of being divided and the Relations cannot be confounded so that there must be one undivided Substance and yet three distinct Persons But every Person must have his own proper Substance and so the
But if we suppose a personal Union of the Word with the human Nature in Christ then we have a very reasonable Sense of the Words for then no more is imply'd but that Christ as consisting of both Natures should ascend thither where the Word was before when it is said that the Word was with God and so Grotius understands it 2. Grotius doth not make the Word in the beginning of S. John 's Gospel to be a mere Attribute of Wisdom and Power but the eternal Son of God This I shall prove from his own Words 1. He asserts in his Preface to S. Iohn's Gospel that the chief cause of his writing was universally agreed to have been to prevent the spreading of that Venom which had been then dispersed in the Church which he understands of the Heresies about Christ and the Word Now among these the Heresie of Cerinthus was this very opinion which they fasten upon Grotius viz. that the Word was the divine Wisdom and Power inhabiting in the Person of Iesus as I have shew'd before from themselves And besides Grotius saith That the other Evangelists had only intimated the divine Nature of Christ from his miraculous Conception Miracles knowing Mens Hearts perpetual Presence promise of the Spirit remission of Sins c. But S. John as the time required attributed the Name and Power of God to him from the beginning So that by the Name and Power of God he means the same which he called the divine Nature before 2. He saith that when it is said The Word was with God it ought to be understood as Ignatius explains it with the Father what can this mean unless he understood the Word to be the eternal Son of God And he quotes Tertullian saying that he is the Son of God and God ex unitate Substantiae and that there was a Prolation of the Word without Separation Now what Prolation can there be of a meer Attribute How can that be said to be the Son of God begotten of the Father without Division before all Worlds as he quotes it from Iustin Martyr And that he is the Word and God of God from Theophilus Antiochenus And in the next Verse when it is said The same was in the beginning with God it is repeated on purpose saith he That we might consider that God is so to be understood that a Distinction is to be made between God with whom he was and the Word who was with God so that the Word doth not comprehend all that is God But our Wise Interpreters put a ridiculous Sense upon it as though all that Grotius meant was That Gods Attributes are the same with himself which although true in it self is very impertinent to Grotius his purpose and that the Reason why he saith That the Word is not all that God is was because there were other Attributes of God besides But where doth Grotius say any thing like this Is this Wise interpreting or honest and fair dealing For Grotius immediately takes notice from thence of the Difference of Hypostases which he saith was taken from the Platonists but with a change of the Sense 3. When it is said v. 3. That all things were made by him Grotius understands it of the old Creation and of the Son of God For he quotes a passage of Barnabas where he saith The Sun is the Work of his hands and several passages of the Fathers to prove That the World and all things in it were created by him and he adds That nothing but God himself is excepted What say our Wise Interpreters to all this Nothing at all to the purpose but they cite the English Geneva Translation when they pretend to give Grotius his Sense and add That the Word now begins to be spoken of as a Person by the same Figure of Speech that Solomon saith Wisdom hath builded her house c. Doth Grotius say any thing like this And yet they say Let us hear Grotius interpreting this sublime Proeme of S. John 's Gospel But they leave out what he saith and put in what he doth not say is not this interpreting like Wise men 4. The VVord was made flesh v. 14. i. e. say the Vnitarians as from Grotius It did abode on and inhabit a humane Person the Person of Iesus Christ and so was in appearance made flesh or man But what saith Grotius himself The Word that he might bring us to God shew'd himself in the Weakness of humane Nature and he quotes the words of S. Paul for it 1 Tim. 3.16 God was manifest in the flesh and then produces several Passages of the Fathers to the same purpose Is not this a rare Specimen of Wise interpreting and Fair dealing with so considerable a Person and so well known as Grotius Who after all in a Letter to his intimate Friend Ger. I. Vossius declares that he owned the Doctrine of the Trinity both in his Poems and his Catechism after his reviewing them which Epistle is Printed before the last Edition of his Book about Christ's Satisfaction as an account to the World of his Faith as to the Trinity And in the last Edition of his Poems but little before his Death he gives a very different Account of the Son of God from what these Vnitarians fasten upon him And now let the World judge how wisely they have interpreted both S. Iohn and his Commentator Grotius IV. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise men to make our Saviour's meaning to be expressly contrary to his Words For when he said Before Abraham was I am they make the Sense to be that really he was not but only in Gods Decree as any other man may be said to be This place the late Archbishop who was very far from being a Socinian however his Memory hath been very unworthily reproached in that as well as other Respects since his Death urged against the Socinians saying That the obvious Sense of the Words is that he had a real Existence before Abraham was actually in Being and that their Interpretation about the Decree is so very flat that he can hardly abstain from saying it is ridiculous And the wise Answer they give is That the words cannot be true in any other Sense being spoken of one who was a Son and Descendant of Abraham Which is as ridiculous as the Interpretation for it is to take it for granted he was no more than a Son of Abraham V. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise men to say that when our Saviour said in his Conference with the Iews I am the Son of God his chief meaning was That he was the Son of God in such a Sense as all the faithful are called Gods Children Is not this doing great Honour to our Saviour Especially when they say That he never said of himself any higher thing than this which is true of every good man I am the Son of God And yet the Iews accused him of
And these are called different Modes of Subsistence on which the distinct Personalities are founded which can be no other than relative But a Person is that which results from the divine Nature and Subsistence together and although a Person cannot be said to be a relative consider'd as such yet being joyned with the manner of Subsistence it doth imply a Relation and so a Person may be said to be a relative Being But say they If the three Persons have all the same individual Substance then they are truly and properly only three Modes and therefore aâ—though among Men Personalities are distinct from the Persons because the Persons are distinct intelligent Substances yet this cannot hold where there is but one individual Substance The question is Whether those they call Nominal Trinitarians are liable to the charge of Sabellianism the answer is That they cannot because they assert far more than three Names viz. That each Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him But say they These Persons are but mere Modes No say the other We do not say that the Person is only a Modus but that it is the divine Nature or Godhead subsisting under such a Modus so that the Godhead is still included in it joyned to it and distinguished by it Grant all this the Vnitarians reply yet where there is the same individual Substance the Person can be only a Modus To which it is answer'd That this individual Substance hath three distinct ways of subsisting according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the three divine Persons So that here lies the main point whether it be Sabellianiâ—m to assert the same individual Substance under three such different Modes of Subsistence If it be the most learned and judicious of the Fathers did not know what Sabellianism meant as I have shewd at large in the following Discourse for they utterly disowned Sabellianism and yet asserted That the several Hypostases consisted of peculiar Properties in one and the same divine Substance But it is not the authority of Fathers which they regard for they serve them only as Stones in the Boys way when they quarrel viz. to throw them at our Heads Let us then examine this matter by reason without them Persons among Men say they are distinguished from Personalities because they have distinct Substances therefore where there is but one Substance the Person can be only a Mode and therefore the same with the Personality I answer that the true original Notion of Personality is no more than a different Mode of subsistence in the same common Nature For every such Nature is in it self one and indivisible and the more perfect it is the greater must its Vnity be For the first Being is the most One and all Division comes from Distance and Imperfection The first foundation of Distinction is Diversity for if there were no Diversity there would be nothing but entire and perfect Vnity All Diversity comes from two things Dissimilitudâ— and Dependence Those Philosophers called Megarici did not think much amiss who said That if all things were alike there would be but one Substance or Being in the World and what we now call different Substances would be only different Modes of Subsistence in the same individual Nature The difference of Substances in created Beings arises from those two things 1. A Dissimilitude of Accidents both internal and external 2. The Will and Power of God whereby he gives them distinct and separate Beings in the same common Nature As for instance the Nature or Essence of a Man consider'd in it self is but one and indivisible but God gives a separate Existence to every Individual whereby that common Nature subsists in so many distinct Substances as there are Individuals of that kind and every one of these Substances is distinguished from all others not only by a separate internal vital Principle and peculiar Properties but by such external Accidents as do very easily discriminate them from each other And the subject of all these Accidents is that peculiar Substance which God hath given to every Individual which in rational Beings is called a Person and so we grant that in all such created Beings the Personality doth suppose a distinct Substance not from the Nature of Personality but from the condition of the subject wherein it is The Personality in it self is but a different Mode of Subsistence in the same common Nature which is but One but this Personality being in such a subject as Man is it from thence follows that each Person hath a peculiar Substance of his own and not from the Nature of Personality But when we come to consider a divine Essence which is most perfectly one and is wholly uncapable of any separate Existence or Accidents there can be no other way of distinction conceived in it but by different Modes of Subsistence or relative Properties in the same divine Essence And herein we proceed as we do in our other Conceptions of the divine Nature i. e. we take away all Imperfection from God and attribute only that to him which is agreeable to his divine Perfections although the manner of it may be above our comprehension And if this be owning the Trinity of the Mob I am not ashamed to own my self to be one of them but it is not out of Lazyness or affected Ignorance but upon the greatest and most serious consideration They may call this a Trinity of Cyphers if they please but I think more modest and decent Language about these matters would become them as well as the things themselves much better And they must prove a little better than they have done that different Modes of Subsistence in the divine Nature or the relations of Father and Son are mere Cyphers which is so often mentioned in Scripture as a matter of very great consequence and that when we are baptized in the Name of the Father Son and Holy Ghost we are baptized into a Trinity of Cyphers But our Unitarians proceed and say that the same Author affirms not only the Personalities but the Persons to be merely Relative For he saith That every Person as well as every Personality in the Trinity is wholly Relative But it is plain he speaks there not of the Person in himself but with respect to the manner of Subsistence or the relative Properties belonging to them But if the Notion of a Person doth besides the relative Property necessarily suppose the divine Nature together with it how can a Person then be imagined to be wholly Relative But they urge That which makes the first Person in the Trinity to be a Person makes him to be a Father and what makes him to be a Father makes him to be a Person And what follows from hence but that the relative Property is the Foundation of the Personality But by no means that the Person of the Father is nothing but the relative Property
The instance of Solomon is not at all to the purpose unless we asserted three Persons founded upon those different Relations in his individual Nature Who denies that one Person may have different Respects and yet be but one Person subsisting Where doth the Scripture say That the Son of David the Father of Rehoboam and he that proceeded from David and Bathsheba were three Persons distinguished by those relative Properties But here lies the foundation of what we believe as to the Trinity we are assured from Scripture that there are three to whom the divine Nature and Attributes are given and we are assured both from Scripture and Reason that there can be but one divine Essence and therefore every one of these must have the divine Nature and yet that can be but One But it is a most unreasonable thing to charge those with Sabellianism who assert That every Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him and that the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son Did ever Nâ—etus or Sabellius or any of their Followers speak after this manner Is the divine Essence but a mere Name or a different respect only to Mankind For the asserting such relative Persons as have no Essence at all was the true Sabellian Doctrine as will be made appear in the following Discourse And so much is confess'd by our Unitarians themselves for they say That the Sabellians held that Father Son and Spirit are but only three Names oâ— God given to him in Scripture by occasion of so many several Dispensations towards the Creature and so he is but one subsisting Person and three relative Persons as he sustains the three Names of Father Son and Spirit which being the Relations of God towards things without him he is so many relative Persons or Persons in a Classical Critical Sense i. e. Persons without any Essence belonging to them as such But those who assert a Communication of the divine Essence to each Person can never be guilty of Sabellianism if this be it which themselves affirm And so those called Nominal Trinitarians are very unjustly so called because they do really hold a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead 2. Let us now see what charge they lay upon those whom they call Real Trinitarians and they tell us That the Nominals will seem to be profound Philosophers deep Sages in comparison with them These are very obliging expressions to them in the beginning But how do they make out this gross Stupidity of theirs In short it is That they stand condemned and anathematized as Hereticks by a general Council and by all the Moderns and are every day challenged and impeached of Tritheism and cannot agree among themselves but charge one another with great Absurdities and in plain terms they charge them with Nonsense in the thing whereas the other lay only in words Because these assert three divine subsisting Persons three infinite Spirits Minds or Substances as distinct as so many Angels or Men each of them perfectly God and yet all of them are but one God To understand this matter rightly we must consider that when the Socinian Pamphlets first came abroad some years since a learned and worthy Person of our Church who had appear'd with great vigour and reason against our Adversaries of the Church of Rome in the late Reign which ought not to be forgotten undertook to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity against the History of the Unitarians and the Notes on the Athanasian Creed but in the warmth of disputing and out of a desire to make this matter more intelligible he suffer'd himself to be carried beyond the ancient Methods which the Church hath used to express her Sense by still retaining the same fundamental Article of three Persons in one undivided Essence but explaining it in such a manner as to make each Person to have a peculiar and proper Substance of his own This gave so great an advantage to the Author of those Treatises that in a little time he set forth his Notes with an Appendix in answer to this new Explication Wherein he charges him with Heresie Tritheism and Contradiction The very same charges which have been since improved and carried on by others I wish I could say without any unbecoming Heat or Reflections But I shall now examine how far these charges have any ground so as to affect the Doctrine of the Trinity which is the chief end our Adversaries aimed at in heaping these Reproaches upon one who appear'd so early and with so much zeal to defend it We are therefore to consider these things 1. That a Man may be very right in the Belief of the Article it self and yet may be mistaken in his Explication of it And this one of his keenest Adversaries freely acknowledges For he plainly distinguishes between the fundamental Article and the manner of explaining it and affirms That a Man may quit his Explication without parting with the Article it self And so he may retain the Article with his Explication But suppose a Man to assent to the fundamental Article it self and be mistaken in his Explication of it can he be charged with Heresie about this Article For Heresie must relate to the fundamental Article to which he declares his hearty and unfeigned Assent but here we suppose the mistake to lie only in the Explication As for instance Sabellianism is a condemned and exploded Heresie for it is contrary to the very Doctrine of the Trinity but suppose one who asserts the Doctrine of three Persons should make them to be three Modes must such a one presently be charged with Heresie before we see whether his Explication be consistent with the fundamental Article or not For this is liable to very obvious Objections that the Father begets a Mode instead of a Son that we pray to three Modes instead of three real Persons that Modes are mutable things in their own Nature c. but must we from hence conclude such a one guilty of Heresie when he declares that he withall supposed them not to be mere Modes but that the divine Essence is to be taken together with the Mode to make a Person Yea suppose some spitefull Adversary should say That it is a Contradiction to say That the same common Nature can make a Person with a Mode superadded to it unless that be individuated for a â—erson doth imply an individual Nature and not a mere relative Mode Is this sufficient to charge such a Person with the Sabellian Heresy which he utterly disowns Is not the like Equity to be shewâ—d in another though different Explication Suppose then a Person solemnly professes to own the fundamental Doctrine of the Trinity as much as any others but he thinks that three Persons must have distinct Substances to make them Persons but so as to make no Division or Separation in the Godhead and that he cannot conceive a Communication of the divine Essence
without this must this presently be run down as Heresie when he asserts at the same time three Persons in the same undivided Essence But this is said to be a Contradiction so it was in the other case and not allow'd then and why should it be otherwise in this I speak not this to justifie such Explications but to shew that there is a difference between the Heresie of denying an Article and a mistake in the Explication of it Even the greatest Heresie-makers in the world distinguish between Heresies and erroneous Explications of Articles of Faith as any one may find that looks into them And even the Inquisitors of Heresie themselves allow the distinction between Heresie and an erroneous Proposition in Faith which amounts to the same with a mistaken Explication of it and they all grant that there may be Propositions that tend to Heresie or savour of it which cannot be condemned for Heretical And even Pegna condemns Melchior Canus for being too cruel in asserting it to be Heresie to contradict the general Sense of Divines because the Schools cannot make Heresies 2. It is frequently and solemnly affirmed by him That the Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible inseparable Unity that there is but one divine Nature which is originally in the Father and is substantially communicated by the Father to the Son as a distinct subsisting Person by an eternal ineffable Generation and to the Holy Ghost by an eternal and substantial Procession from Father and Son Do the others who maintain a Trinity deny this By no means For we have already seen that they assert the same thing So that they are fully agreed as to the main fundamental Article And even the Unitarians yield that from the beginning he asserted That the three divine Persons are in one undivided Substance Wherein then lies the foundation of this mighty Quarrel and those unreasonable Heats that Men have fallen into about it to the great scandal of our Church and Religion In short it is this that the same Author asserts 1. That it is gross Sabellianism to say That there are not three personal Minds or Spirits or Substances 2. That a distinct substantial Person must have a distinct Substance of his own proper and peculiar to his own Person But he owns that although there are three distinct Persons or Minds each of whom is distinctly and by himself God yet there are not three Gods but one God or one Divinity which he saith is intirely and indivisibly and inseparably in three distinct Persons or Minds That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by the Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Division or Separation and so it remains one still This is the substance of this new Explication which hath raised such Flames that Injunctions from authority were thought necessary to suppress them But those can reach no farther than the restraint of Mens Tongues and Pens about these matters and unless something be found out to satisfie their Minds and to remove Misapprehensions the present Heat may be only cover'd over and kept in which when there is a vent given may break out into a more dangerous Flame Therefore I shall endeavour to state and clear this matter so as to prevent any future Eruption thereof which will be done by considering how far they are agreed and how far the remaining difference ought to be pursued 1. They are agreed That there are three distinct Persons and but one Godhead 2. That there are no separate and divided Substances in the Trinity but the divine Nature is wholly and entirely one and undivided 3. That the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son and from both to the holy Spirit So that the charge of Sabellianism on those who reject this new Explication is without ground For no Sabellian did or could assert a Communication of the divine Essence Which being agreed on both sides the Dispute turns upon this single point whether a communicated Essence doth imply a distinct Substance or not On the one side it is said That there being but one God there can be but one divine Essence and if more Essences more Gods On the other side that since they own a communicated Essence necessary to make a distinction of Persons in the Son and Holy Ghost if the Essence be not distinct the foundation of distinct Personalities is taken away But how is this clear'd by the other Party They say That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost So that the Communication of the divine Nature is owned to the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost But how then comes it not to make a distinct Essence as it makes distinct Persons by being communicated The answer we see is That it is a peculiar Prerogative founded on the infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection of the divine Nature But they further add That when the Son and Holy Ghost are said to have the same divine Nature from the Father as the Origin and Fountain of the Divinity not by the Production of a new divine Nature but by a Communication of his own which is one and the same in all three without Separation Difference or Distinction that this is indeed a great Mystery which hath been always look'd upon by the greatest and wisest Men in the Church to be above all Expressions and Description So that the greatest difficulty is at last resolved into the incomprehensible Perfection of the divine Nature and that neither Man nor Angels can give a satisfactory answer to Enquiries about the manner of them And the Author of the Animadversions saith That in the divine Persons of the Trinity the divine Nature and the personal Subsistence coalesce into one by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction But do those on the other side think that the asserting three distinct Substances in one and the same individual Substance tends to clear and explain the Notion of the Trinity and make it more easie and intelligible The Divinity they say is whole intire indivisible and inseparable in all three But can one whole entire indivisible Substance be actually divided into three Substances For if every Person must have a peculiar Substance of his own and there be three Persons there must be three peculiar Substances and how can there be three peculiar Substances and yet but one entire and indivisible Substance I do not say there must be three divided Substances in place or separate Substances but they must be divided as three Individuals of the same kind which must introduce a Specifick Divine Nature which I think very
inconsistent with the divine Perfections but of this at large in the following Discourse I do not lay any force upon this argument that there can be no ground of the Distinction between the three Substances if there be but one Substance in the Godhead as some have done because the same Substance cannot both unite and distinguish them for the ground of the distinction is not the Substance but the Communication of it and where that is so freely asserted there is a reason distinct from the Substance it self which makes the Distinction of Persons But the difficulty still remains how each Person should have a Substance of his own and yet there be but one entire and indivisible Substance for every Person must have a proper Substance of his own or else according to this Hypothesis he can be no Person and this peculiar Substance must be really distinct from that Substance which is in the other two so that here must be three distinct Substances in the three Persons But how then can there be but one individual Essence in all three We may conceive one common Essence to be individuated in three Persons as it is in Men but it is impossible to conceive the same individual Essence to be in three Persons which have peculiar Substances of their own For the Substances belonging to the Persons are the same Essence individuated in those Persons and so there is no avoiding making three individual Essences and one specifick or common divine Nature And Maimonides his argument is considerable against more Gods than one If saith he there be two Gods there muâ—t be something wherein they agree and something wherein they differ that wherein they agree must be that which makes each of them God and that wherein they differ must make them two Gods Now wherein doth this differ from the present Hypothesis There is something wherein they differ and that is their proper Substance but Maimonides thought that wherein they differ'd sufficient to make them two Gods So that I fear it will be impossible to clear this Hypothesis as to the reconciling three individual Essences with one individual divine Essence which looks too like asserting that there are three Gods and yet but one And the Author of this Explicaâ—ion doth at last confess that three distinct whole inseparable Same 's are hard to conceive as to the manner of it Now to what purpose are new Explications started and Disputes raised and carried on so warmly about them if after all the main difficulty be confess'd to be above our Comprehension We had much better satisfie our selves with that Language which the Church hath receivâ—d and is express'd in the Creeds than go about by new Terms to raise new Ferments especially at a time when our united Forces are most necessary against our common Adversaries No wise and good Men can be fond of any new Inventions when the Peace of the Church is hazarded by them And on the other side it is as dangerous to make new Heresies as new Explications If any one denies the Doctrine contained in the Nicene Creed that is no new Heresie but how can such deny the Son to be consubstantial to the Father who assert one and the same indivisible Substance in the Father and the Son But they may contradict themselves That is not impossible on either side But doth it follow that they are guilty of Heresie Are not three Substances and but one a Contradiction No more say they than that a communicated Substance is not distinct from that which did communicate But this whole dispute we find is at last resolved into the infinite and unconceivable Perfections of the Godhead where it is most safely lodged and that there is no real Contradiction in the Doctrine it self is part of the design of the Discourse afterwards But here it will be necessary to take notice of what the Unitarians have objected against this new Explication viz. That it was condemned by the ancients in the Person of Philoponus in the middle Ages in the Person and Writings of Abhor Ioachim but more severely since the Reformation in the Person of Valentinus Gentilis who was condemned at Geneva and beheaded at Bern for this very Doctrine To these I shall give a distinct answer 1. As to Joh Philoponus I do freely own that in the Greek Church when in the sixth Century he broached his opinion That every Hypostasis must have the common Nature individuated in it this was look'd upon as a Doctrine of dangerous consequence both with respect to the Trinity and Incarnation The latter was the first occasion of it for as Leontius observes the dispute did not begin about the Trinity but about the Incarnation and Philoponus took part with those who asserted but one Nature in Christ after the Vnion and he went upon this ground That if there were two Natures there must be two Hypostases because Nature and Hypostasis were the same Then those on the Churches side saith Leontius objected That if they were the same there must be three distinct Natures in the Trinity as there were three Hypostases which Philoponus yielded and grounded himself on Aristotle's Doctrine that there was but one common Substance and several individual Substances and so held it was in the Trinity whence he was called the leader of the Heresie of the Tritheius This is the account given by Leontius who lived very â—ear his time A. D. 620. The same is affirmed of him by Nicephorus and that he wrote a Book on purpose about the Vnion of two Natures in Christ out of which he produces his own words concerning a common and individual Nature which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which can agree to none else And the main argument he went upon was this that unless we assert a singular Nature in the Hypostases we must say that the whole Trinity was incarnate as unless there be a singular humane Nature distinct from the common Christ must assume the whole Nature of Mankind And this argument from the Incarnation was that which made Roscelin in the beginning of the disputing Age A. D. 1093 to assert That the three Persons were three things distinct from each other as three Angels or three Men because otherwise the Incarnation of the second Person could not be understood as appears by Anselm's Epistles and his Book of the Incarnation written upon that occasion But as Aâ—selm shews at large if this argument hold it must prove the three Persons not only to be distinct but separate and divided Subâ—â—ances which is directly contrary to this new Explication and then there is no avoiding Tritheism But to return to Joh. Philoponus who saith Nicephorus divided the indivisible Nature of God into three Individuals as among Men Which saith he is repugnant to the Sense of the Christian Church and he produces the Testimony of Gregory Nazianzen against it and adds that Leontius and Georgius Pisides confuted
That there are three distinct eternal Spirits or Minds in the Trinity and Genebrard is brought into the same Heresie with them But Genebrard with great indignation rejects the Doctrine of Valentinus Gentilis because he held an Inequality in the Persons and denied the individual Vnity of the Godhead in them but he saith he follow'd Damascen in asserting three real Hypostases and he utterly denies Tritheism and he brings a multitude of reasons why the charge of Tritheism doth not lie against his opinion although he owns the Hypostases to be three distinct individuals but then he adds That there is an indivisible and insepâ—rable Union of the divine Nature in all three Persons Now to deal as impartially in this matter as may be I do not think our understandings one jot helped in the Notion of the Trinity by this Hypothesis but that it is liable to as great difficulties as any other and therefore none ought to be fond of it or to set it against the general Sense of others and the current Expressions of Divines about these Mysteries nor to call the different opinions of others Heresie or Nonsense which are provoking Words and tend very much to inflame Mens Passions because their Faith and Vnderstanding are both call'd in question which are very tender things But on the other side a difference ought to be made between the Heresie and Blasphemy of Valentinus Gentilis and the opinion of such who maintain the individual and indivisible Unity of the Godhead but withal believe that every Person hath an individual Substance as a Person and that Sabellianism cannot be avoided otherwise Wherein I think they are mistaken and that the Fathers were of another opinion and that our Church owns but one Substance in the Godhead as the Western Church always did which made such difficulty about receiving three Hypostases because they took Hypostasis for a Substance but yet I see no reason why those who assert three Hypostases and mean three individual Substances should be charged with the Heresie of Valentinus Gentilis or so much as with that of Abbaâ— Joachim or Philoponus because they all rejected the individual Unity of the divine Nature which is constantly maintained by the Defenders of the other Hypothesis But it is said and urged with vehemency that these two things are inconsistent with each other that it is going forward and backward being Orthodox in one Breath and otherwise in the next that all this looks like shuffling and concealing the true meaning and acting the old Artifices under a different Form For the Samosatenians and Arians when they were pinched seem'd very Orthodox in their Expressions but retained their Heresies still in their Minds and there is reason to suspect the same Game is playing over again and we cannot be too cautious in a matter of such Consequence I grant very great caution is needfull but the mixture of some Charity with it will do no hurt Why should we suspect those to be inwardly false and to think otherwise than they speak who have shew'd no want of Courage and Zeal at a time when some thought it Prudence to say nothing and never call'd upon their Superiours then to own the cause of God and to do their Duties as they have now done and that in no very obliging manner And if the same Men can be cool and unconcerned at some times when there was so great reason to be otherwise and of a sudden grow very warm and even to boil over with Zeal the World is so ill natur'd as to be too apt to conclude there is some other cause of such an alteration than what openly appears But there is a kind of bitter Zeal which is so fierce and violent that it rather inflames than heals any Wounds that are made and is of so malignant a Nature that it spreads and eats like a Cancer and if a stop were not given to it it might endanger the whole Body I am very sensible how little a Man consults his own ease who offers to interpose in a dispute between Men of Heat and Animosity but this moves me very little when the interest of our Church and Religion is concerned which ought to prevail more than the fear of displeasing one or other Party or it may be both I do heartily wish that all who are equally concerned in the common Cause would lay aside Heats and Prejudices and hard Words and consider this matter impartially and I do not question but they will see cause to judge as I do that the difference is not so great as our Adversaries for their own advantage make it to be And since both sides yield that the matter they dispute about is above their reach the wisest course they can take is to assert and defend what is revealed and not to be too peremptory and quarrelsom about that which is acknowledged to be above our comprehension I mean as to the manner how the three Persons partake of the divine Nature It would be of the most fatal consequence to us if those Weapons which might be so usefully imploy'd against our common Adversaries should still be turned upon one another I know no manner of advantage they have against us but from thence and this is it which makes them write with such Insolence and Scorn towards those who are far their Superiours in Learning and Wit as well as in the Goodness of their cause And is it possible that some of our most skilfull Fencers should play Prizes before them who plainly animate them against each other for their own Diversion and Interest Sometimes one hath the better sometimes the other and one is cried up in Opposition to the other but taken alone is used with the greatest Contempt One Man's work is said to be learned and accurate and the more because it follows that he concerns not himself with the Socinians The wiser Man no doubt for that Reason At another time it is called the Birth of the Mountains and the Author parallel'd with no less a Man than Don Quixot and his elaborate Writings with his Adventures and they ridicule his Notion of Modes as if they were only so many Gambols and Postures And then for his Adversary they hearten and incourage him all they can they tell him He must not allow to the other the least Title of all he contends for least their sport should be spoiled and to comfort him they tell him that his Adversary is a Socinian at bottom and doth not know it that all his Thingums Modes Properties are only an Addition of Words and Names and not of Persons properly so called and that his whole Scheme is nothing but Socinianism drest up in the absurd Cant of the Schools That his Book hath much more Scurrility than Argument that his usage of him was barbarous and a greater Soloecism in manners than any he accuses him of in Grammar or Speech and in short That
there were two Persons in Christ one Divine and the other Humane and two Sons the one by Nature the Son of God who had a Pre existence and the other the Son of David who had no subsistence before This is the opinion which Dionysius sets himself against in that Epistle and which therefore â—ome may imagine was written after Nestorius his Heresie But that was no new Heresie as appears by the Cerinthians and it was that which Paulus Samosatenus fled to as more plausible which not only appears by this Epistle but by what Athanasius and Epiphanius have delivered concerning it Athanasius wrote a Book of the Incarnation against the followers of Paulus Samosatenus who held as he saith Two Persons in Christ viz. One born of the Virgin and a divine Person which descended upon him and dwelt in him Against which opinion he disputes from two places of Scripture viz. God was manifest in the Flesh and the Word was made Flesh and from the ancient Doctrine of the Christian Church and the Synod of Antioch against Paulus Samosatenus And in another place he saith that he held That the divine Word dwelt in Christ. And the words of Epiphanius are express to the same purpose That the Logos came and dwelt in the Man Iesus And the Clergy of Constantinople charged Nestorius with following the Heresie of Paulus Samosatenus And Photius in his Epistles saith That Nestorius tasted too much of the intoxicated Cups of Paulus Samosatenus and in the foregoing Epistle he saith That Paulus his followers asserted two Hypostases in Christ. But some think that Paulus Samosatenus did not hold any subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before but that the Word was in God before without any subsistence of its own and that God gave it a distinct subsistence when it inhabited in the Person of Christ and so Marius Mercator and Leontius understand him who say that he differ'd from Nestorius therein who asserted a Divine Word with its proper subsistence But according to them Paulus by the Word undersâ—ood that Divine Energy whereby Christ acted and which dwelt in him but Dionysius saith he made two Christs and two Sons of God But the Doctrine of the Christian Church he saith was that there was but one Christ and one Son who wâ—s the Eternal Word and was made Flesh. And it is observable that he brings the very same places we do now to prove this Doctrine as In the beginning was the Word c. and Before Abraham was I am It seems that some of the Bishops who had been upon the examination of his Opinions before the second Synod which deposed him sent him an account of their Faith and required his answer wherein they declare the Son not to be God according to God's Decree which he did not stick at but that he was so really and substantially and whosoever denied this they said was out of the Communion of the Church and all the Catholick Churches agreed with them in it And they declare that they received this Doctrine from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament and bring the same places we do now as Thy Throne O God was for ever c. Who is over all God blessed for ever All things were made by him c. And we do not find that Paulus Samosatenus as subtle as he was ever imagin'd that these places belong'd to any other than Christ or that the making of all things was to be understood of the making of nothing but putting it into mens power to make themselves new Creatures These were discoveries only reserved for the Men of Sense and clear Ideas in these brighter Ages of the World But at last after all the arts and subterfuges which Paulus Samosatenus used there was a Man of Sense as it happen'd among the Clergy of Antioch called Malchion who was so well acquainted with his Sophistry that he drove him out of all and laid his Sense so open before the second Synod that he was solemnly deposed for denying the Divinity of the Son of God and his Descent from Heaven as appears by their Synodical Epistle It is pity we have it not entire but by the Fragments of it which are preserved by some ancient Writers we find that his Doctrine of the Divinity in him by Inhabitation was then condemned and the substantial Union of both Natures asserted I have only one thing more to observe concerning him which is that the Arian Party in their Decree at Sardica or rather Philippopolis do confess that Paulus Samosatenus his Doctrine was condemned by the whole Christian World For they say That which passed in the Eastern Synod was signed and approved by all And Alexander Bishop of Alexandria in his Epistle to Alexander of Constantinople affirms the same And now I hope I may desire our Men of Sense to reflect upon these Matters Here was no Fire nor Faggot threatned no Imperial Edicts to inforce this Doctrine nay the Queen of those parts under whose Jurisdiction they lived at that time openly espoused the cause of Paulus Samosatenus so that here could be nothing of interest to sway them to act in opposition to her And they found his interest so strong that he retained the Possession of his See till Aurelian had conquer'd Zenobia and by his authority he was ejected This Synod which deposed him did not sit in the time of Aurelian as is commonly thought but before his time while Zenobia had all the power in her hands in those Eastern parts which she enjoy'd five years till she was dispossess'd by Aurelian from whence Ant. Pagi concludes that Paulus kept his See three years after the Sentence against him but upon application to Aurelian he who afterwards began a Persecution against all Christians gave this rule That he with whom the Italian Bishops and those of Rome communicated should enjoy the See upon which Paulus was at last turned out By this we see a concurrence of all the Christian Bishops of that time against him that denied the Divinity of our Saviour and this without any force and against their interest and with a general consent of the Christian World For there were no mighty Awes and Draconic Sanctions to compell of which they sometimes speak as if they were the only powerfull methods to make this Doctrine go down And what greater argument can there be that it was then the general sense of the Christian Church And it would be very hard to condemn all his Opposers for men that wanted Sense and Reason because they so unanimously opposed him Not so unanimously neither say our Vnitarians because Lucian a Presbyter of the Church of Antioch and a very learned man joyned with him It would have been strange indeed if so great a Man as Paulus Samosatenus could prevail with none of his own Church to joyn with him especially one that came from the same place of Samosata as
Nestorius were agreed and that he did not deny the Word to be Conâ—substantial with God but that he was not the Son of God till Christ was born in whom he dwelt By which we see how little reason our Vnitarians have to boast of Photinus as their Predecessor As to the boast of the first Unitarians at Rome that theirs was the general Doctrine before the time of Victor it is so fully confuted by the ancient Writer in Eusebius who mentions it from the Scriptures and the first Christian Writers named by him that it doth not deserve to be taken notice of especially since he makes it appear that it was not heard of among them at Rome till it was first broached there by Theodotus as not only he but Tertullian affirms as I have already observed Thus I have clearly proved that the Doctrine of the Trinity was so far from being embraced only on the account of force and fear that I have shewed there was in the first Ages of the Christian Church a free and general Consent in it even when they were under Persecution and after the Arian Controversie broke out yet those who denied the Pre-existence and Co-eternity of the Son of God were universally condemned even the Arian Party concurring in the Synods mention'd by Hilary But our Vnitarians are such great Pretenders to Reason that this Argument from the Authority of the whole Christian Church signifies little or nothing to them Therefore they would conclude still that they have the better of us in point of Reason because they tell us that they have clear and distinct Perceptions that what we call Mysteries of Faith are Contradictions Impossibilities and pure Nonsense and that they do not reject them because they do not comprehend them but because they do comprehend them to be so This is a very bold Charge and not very becoming the Modesty and Decency of such who know at the same time that they oppose the Religion publickly established and in such things which we look on as some of the principal Articles of the Christian Faith CHAP. V. Of their Charge of Contradiction in the Doctrine of the Trinity BUT I shall not take any Advantages from thence but immediately proceed to the next thing I undertook in this Discourse viz. To consider what Grounds they have for such a Charge as this of Contradiction and Impossibility In my Sermon which gave occasion to these Expressions as is before intimated I had undertaken to prove that considering the infinite Perfections of the Divine Nature which are so far above our reach God may justly oblige us to believe those things concerning himself which we are not able to comprehend and I instanced in some Essential Attributes of God as his Eternity Omniscience Spirituality c. And therefore if there be such Divine Perfections which we have all the Reason to believe but no Faculties sufficient to comprehend there can be no ground from Reason to reject such a Doctrine which God hath revealed because the manner of it may be incomprehensible by us And what Answer do they give to this They do not deny it in general that God may oblige us to believe things above our Comprehension but he never obliges us to believe Contradictions and that they Charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with and for this they only referr me to their Books where they say it is made out But I must say that I have read and consider'd those Tracts and am very far from being convinced that there is any such Contradiction in this Doctrine as it is generally received in the Christian Church or as it is explained in the Athanasian Creed And I shall shew the unreasonableness of this Charge from these things 1. That there is a Difference between a Contradiction in Numbers and in the Nature of things 2. That it is no Contradiction to assert three Persons in One Common Nature 3. That it is no Contradiction to say that there are three distinct Persons in the Trinity and not three Gods If I can make out these things I hope I may abate something of that strange and unreasonable confidence wherewith these men charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with Contradictions 1. I begin with the first of them And I shall draw up the Charge in their own words In one of their late Books they have these Words Theirs they say is an Accountable and Reasonable Faith but that of the Trinitarians is absurd and contrary both to Reason and to it self and therefore not only false but impossible But wherein lies this Impossibility That they soon tell us Because we affirm that there are Three Persons who are severally and each of them true God and yet there is but one true God Now say they this is an Error in counting or numbring which when stood in is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable and not to discern it is not to be a Man What must these men think the Christian Church hath been made up of all this while What were there no Men among them but the Vnitarians none that had common sense and could tell the difference between One and Three But this is too choice a Notion to be deliver'd but once we have it over and over from them In another place they say We cannot be mistaken in the Notion of One and Three we are most certain that One is not Three and Three are not One. This it is to be Men But the whole Christian World besides are in Brutal and Inexcusable Errors about One and Three This is not enough for they love to charge home for one of their terrible Objections against the Athanasian Creed is That here is an Arithmetical as well as Grammatical Contradiction For in saying God the Father God the Son and God the Holy Ghost yet not three Gods but one God a Man first distinctly numbers three Gods and then in summing them up brutishly says not three Gods but one God Brutishly still Have the Brutes and Trinitarians learnt Arithmetick together Methinks such Expressions do not become such whom the Christian Church hath so long since condemned for Heresies But it may be with the same Civility they will say It was brutishly done of them But can these Men of Sense and Reason think that the Point in Controversie ever was whether in Numbers One could be Three or Three One If they think so I wonder they do not think of another thing which is the begging all Trinitarians for Fools because they cannot count One Two and Three and an Vnitarian Jury would certainly cast them One would think such Writers had never gone beyond Shop-books for they take it for granted that all depends upon Counting But these terrible Charges were some of the most common and trite Objections of Infidels St. Augustin mentions it as such when he saith the Infidels sometimes ask us what do you call the Father We answer God What the Son
with deducing our Certainty of Knowledge from clear and simple Ideas I do not go about to justifie those who lay the whole stress upon that Foundation which I grant to be too weak to support so important a Truth and that those are very much to blame who go about to invalidate other Arguments for the sake of that but I doubt all this Talk about clear and distinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty came Originally from those Discourses or Meditations which are aimed at The Author of them was an ingenious Thinking man and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of Certainty as well as he could The first thing he found any certainty in was his own Existence which he founded upon the Perception of the Acts of his Mind which some call an Internal infallible Perception that we are From hence he proceeded to enquire how he came by this Certainty and he resolved it into this that he had a clear and distinct Perception of it and from hence he formed his general Rule That what he had a clear and distinct Perception of was true Which in Reason ought to go no farther than where there is the like Degree of Evidence for the Certainty here was not grounded on the clearness of the Perception but on the Plainness of the Evidence Which is of that Nature that the very Doubting of it proves it since it is impossible that any thing should doubt or question its own Being that had it not So that here it is not the Clearness of the Idea but an immediate Act of Perception which is the true ground of Certainty And this cannot extend to things without our selves of which we can have no other Perception than what is caused by the Impressions of outward Objects But whether we are to judge according to those Impressions doth not depend on the Ideas themselves but upon the Exercise of our Judgment and Reason about them which put the Difference between true and false and adequate and inadequate Ideas So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves but from the Evidence of Reason that those Ideas are true and just and consequently that we may build our Certainty upon them But the Idea of an infinite Being hath this peculiar to it that necessary Existence is implied in it This is a clear and distinct Idea and yet it is denied that this doth prove the Existence of God How then can the Grounds of our Certainty arise from clear and distinct Ideas when in one of the clearest Ideas of our Minds we can come to no Certainty by it I do not say That it is denied to prove it but this is said That it is a doubtful thing from the different make of mens Tempers and Application of their thoughts What can this mean unless it be to let us know that even clear and distinct Ideas may lose their Effect by the difference of mens Tempers and Studies so that besides Ideas in order to a right Judgment a due Temper and Application of the mind is required And wherein is this different from what all men of Understanding have said Why then should these clear and simple Ideas be made the sole Foundation of Reason One would think by this that these Ideas would presently satisfie mens Minds if they attended to them But even this will not do as to the Idea of an infinite Being It is not enough to say They will not examine how far it will hold for they ought either to say that it doth hold or give up this Ground of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas But instead of the proper Argument from Ideas we are told That from the Consideration of our selves and what we find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being All which I readily yield but we see plainly the Certainty is not placed in the Idea but in good and sound Reason from the Consideration of our selves and our Constitutions What! in the Idea of our Selves No certainly for let our Idea be taken which way we please by Sensation or Reflection yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our Selves But we find in our selves Perception and Knowledge It 's very true but how doth this prove that there is a God It is from the clear and distinct Idea of it No but from this Argument That either there must have been a knowing Being from Eternity or an unknowing for something must have been from Eternity but if an unknowing then it was impossible there ever should have been any knowledge it being as impossible that a thing without knowledge should produce it as that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones Allowing the Argument to be good yet it is not taken from the Idea but from Principles of true Reason as That no man can doubt his own Perception that every thing must have a Cause that this Cause must either have Knowledge or not if it have the Point is gained if it hath not nothing can produce nothing and consequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing Again If we suppose nothing to be first Matter can never begin to be if bare Matter without Motion eternal Motion can never begin to be if Matter and Motion be supposed Eternal Thought can never begin to be For if Matter could produce thought then Thought must be in the power of Matter and if it be in Matter as such it must be the inseparable Property of all matter which is contrary to the Sense and Experience of mankind If only some parts of Matter have a power of Thinking how comes so great a difference in the Properties of the same Matter What disposition of Matter is required to thinking And from whence comes it Of which no account can be given in Reason This is the Substance of the Argument used to prove an infinite spiritual Being which I am far from weakning the force of but that which I design is to shew That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas but upon the force of Reason distinct from it which was the thing I intended to prove 2. The next thing necessary to be clear'd in this Dispute is the Distinction between Nature and Person and of this we can have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity depend upon the right understanding of it For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person and the grounds of Identity and Distinction But that these come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection I shall now make it appear 1. As to Nature That is sometimes taken for the Essential
which makes them so Is it the attributing a general Name to them No certainly but that the true and Real Essence of a Man is in every one of them And we must be as certain of this as we are that they are Men they take their Denomination of being Men from that common Nature or Essence which is in them 4. That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas by the meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances but from Reason and Consideration of the true Nature of Things For when we see so many Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties we thence infer that there must be something common to all which makes them of one kind and if the difference of Kinds be real that which makes them of one kind and not of another must not be a Nominal but Real Essence And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substance whereby Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds for let them mistake in the Complication of their Ideas either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them and let their Ideas be what they please the Real Essence of a Man and a Horse and a Tree are just what they were and let their Nominal Essences differ never so much the Real common Essence or Nature of the several Kinds are not at all alter'd by them And these Real Essences are unchangeable For however there may happen some variety in Individuals by particular Accidents yet the Essences of Men and Horses and Trees remain always the same because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator who hath made several sorts of Beings 2. Let us now come to the Idea of a Person For although the common Nature in mankind be the same yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from one another So that Peter and Iames and Iohn are all of the same kind yet Peter is not Iames and Iames is not Iohn But what is this Distinction founded upon They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses as to difference of Features distance of Place c. but that is not all for supposing there were no such external difference yet there is a difference between them as several Individuals in the same common Nature And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not Communicable to another An Individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence which agrees to one and to none else of the Kind and this is it which is called Personality But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Person We may understand the difference between abstracted Ideas and particular Beings by the Impressions of outward Objects and we may find an Intelligent Substance in our selves by inward Perception â—ut whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other Way for if the meer Intelligent Substance makes a Person then there cannot be the Union of two Natures but there must be two Persons Therefore a Person is a compleat Intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence so that if it be a part of another Substance it is no Person and on this account the Soul is no Person because it makes up an entire Being by its Union with the Body But when we speak of Finite Substances and Persons we are certain that distinct Persons do imply distinct Substances because they have a distinct and separate Existence but this will not hold in an infinite Substance where necessary Existence doth belong to the Idea of it And although the Argument from the Idea of God may not be sufficient of it self to prove his Being yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him which is inconsistent with necessary Existence therefore if we suppose a Distinction of Persons in the same Divine Nature it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite Perfections of it And no objection can be taken from the Idea of God to overthrow a Trinity of Co-existing Persons in the same Divine Essence For necessary Existence doth imply a Co-existence of the Divine Persons and the Unity of the Divine Essence that there cannot be such a difference of individual Substances as there is among mankind But these things are said to be above our Reason if not contrary to it and even such are said to be repugnant to our Religion 2. That therefore is the next thing to be carefully Examin'd whether Mysteries of Faith or Matters of Revelation above our Reason are to be rejected by us And a Thing is said to be above our Reason when we can have no clear and distinct Idea of it in our Minds And that if we have no Ideas of a thing it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it and that if such Doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand we must have new Powers and Organs for the Perception of them We are far from defending Contradictions to our natural Notions of which I have spoken already but that which we are now upon is whether any Doctrine may be rejected when it is offer'd as a Matter of Faith upon this account that it is above our Comprehension or that we can have no clear Idea of it in our Minds And this late Author hath undertaken to prove That there is nothing so Mysterious or above Reason in the Gospel To be above Reason he saith may be understood two ways 1. For a thing Intelligible in it self but cover'd with figurative and mystical Words 2. For a thing in its own Nature unconceivable and not to be judged of by our Faculties tho' it be never so clearly revealed This in either Sense is the same with Mystery And from thence he takes occasion to shew his Learning about the Gentile Mysteries and Ecclesiastical Mysteries which might have been spared in this Debate but only for the Parallel aimed at between them as to Priest-craft and Mysteries without which a Work of this nature would want its due relish with his good Christian Readers Others we see have their Mysteries too but the Comfort is that they are so easily understood and seen through as when the Heathen Mysteries are said to have been instituted at first in Commemoration of some remarkable Accidents or to the Honour of some great Persons that obliged the World by their Vertues and useful Inventions to pay them such Acknowledgments He must be very dull that doth not understand the meaning of this and yet this Man pretends to vindicate Christianity from being
Creed is not liable to their charges of Contradiction Impossibilities and pure Nonsense 2. That we own no other Doctrine than what hath been received by the Christian Church in the several Ages from the Apostles Times 3. And that there are no Objections in point of reason which ought to hinder our Assent to this great point of the Christian Faith But the chief Design of this Preface is to remove this Prejudice which lies in our way from the different manners of Explication and the warm Disputes which have been occasion'd by them It cannot be denied that our Adversaries have taken all possible advantage against us from these unhappy differences and in one of their latest Discourses they glory in it and think they have therein out-done the foreign Unitarians For say they We have shewed that their Faiths concerning this pretended Mystery are so many and so contrary that they are less one Party among themselves than the far more learned and greater number of them are one Party with us this is spoken of those they call Nominal Trinitarians and for the other whom they call Real they prove them guilty of manifest Heresie the one they call Sabellians which they say is the same with Unitarians and the other Polytheists or disguised Pagans and they borrow arguments from one side to prove the charge upon the other and they confidently affirm that all that speak out in this matter must be driven either to Sabellianism or Tritheism If they are Nominal Trinitarians they fall into the former if Real into the latter This is the whole Design of this late Discourse which I shall here examine that I may remove this stumbling Block before I enter upon the main business 1. As to those who are called Nominal Trinitarians Who are they And from whence comes such a Denomination They tell us That they are such who believe three Persons who are Persons in Name only indeed and in truth they are but one subsisting Person But where are these to be found Among all such say they as agree that there is but one only and self-same divine Essence and Substance But do these assert that there is but one subsisting Person and three only in Name Let any one be produced who hath written in defence of the Trinity for those who have been most charged have utterly deny'd it That learned Person who is more particularly reflected upon in this Charge is by them said to affirm That God is one divine intellectual Substance or really subsisting Person and distinguished and diversified by three relative Modes or relative Subsistences And Mr. Hooker is produc'd to the same purpose That there is but one Substance in God and three distinct relaâ—ive Properties which Substance being taken with its peculiar Property makes the distinction of Persons in the Godhead But say they These Modes and Properties do not make any real subsisting Persons but only in a Grammatical and Critical Sense and at most this is no more than one Man may be said to be three Persons on the account of different Relations as Solomon was Son of David Father of Rehoboam and proceeding from David and Bathsheba and yet was but one subsisting Pâ—rson This is the force of what they say But then in a triumphing manner they add That the Realists have so manifest an advantage against them that they have no way to deâ—end themselves but by Recrimination i. e. by shewing the like Absurdity in their Doctrine And thus they hope either side will baffle the other and in the mean time the Cause be lost between them But in so nice a matter as this we must not rely too much on an Adversaries Representation for the leaving out some expressions may make an opinion look with another Appearance than if all were taken together it would have We must therefore take notice of other passages which may help to give the true Sense of the learned Author who is chiefly aimed at 1. In the very same Page he asserts That each of the divine Persons has an absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him though not a distinct absolute Nature and to the same purpose in another place 2. That the eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son and communicating his Essence to another And elsewhere that the Relation between Father and Son is founded on that eternal Act by which the Father communicates his divine Nature to the Son 3. That the foundation of the Doctrine of the Trinity is this 1. That there can be but one God 2. That there is nothing in God but what is God 3. That there can be no Composition in the Deity with any such positive real Being distinct from the Deity it self But the Church finding in Scripture mention of three to whom distinctly the Godhead does belong expressed these three by the Name of Persons and stated their Personalities upon three distinct Modes of Subsistence allotted to one and the same Godhead and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct Relations What do these men mean to charge one who goes upon these grounds with Sabellianism Doth he make the three Persons to be mere Names as S. Basil in few words expresses the true nature of Sabellianism that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One thing with different Denominations Can the communicating the divine Essence by the Father to the Son be called a Name or a Mode or a Respect only And these Men of wonderfull Subtilty have not learnt to distinguish between Persons and Personalities Where is the least Intimation given that he look'd on the divine Persons as Modes and Respects only That is impossible since he owns a Communication of the divine Essence and that each of the divine Persons hath the divine Nature belonging to him could it ever enter into any Man's head to think that he that owns this should own the other also But the Personality is a thing of another consideration For it is the reason of the distinction of Persons in the same undivided Nature That there is a distinction the Scripture assures us and withall that there is but one divine Essence How can this distinction be Not by essential Attributes for those must be in the divine Essence and in every Person alike otherwise he hath not the entire divine Nature not by accidents as Men are distinguished from each other for the divine Nature is not capable of these not by separate or divided Substances for that would be inconsistent with the perfect Vnity of the Godhead since therefore there can be no other way of distinction we must consider how the Scripture directs us iâ— this case and that acquaints us with the Father Son and Holy Ghost as having mutual Relation to each other and there is no Repugnancy therein to the divine Nature and therefore the distinction of the Persons hath been fixed on that as the most proper foundation for it
Philoponus But in that divided time there were some called Theodosiani who made but one Nature and one Hypostasis and so fell in with the Sabellians but others held That there was one immutable divine Essence but each Person had a distinct individual Nature which the rest charged with Tritheism Which consequence they utterly rejected because although they held three distinct Natures yet they said They were but one God because there was but one invariable Divinity in them Nicephorus saith that Conon's Followers rejected Philoponus but Photius mentions a conference between Conon and others aâ—out Philoponus wherein he defends him against other Severians Photius grants that Conon and his Followers held a consubstantial Trinity and the Unity of the Godhead and so far they were Orthodox but saith They were far from it when they asserted proper and peculiar Substances to each Person The difference between Conon and Philoponus about this point for Conon wrote against Philoponus about the Resurrection seems to have been partly in the Doctrine but chiefly in the consequence of it for these rejected all kind of Tritheism which Philoponus saw well enough must follow from his Doctrine but he denied any real Division or Separation in those Substances as to the Deity Isidore saith That the Tritheists owned three Gods as well as three Persons and that if God be said to be Triple there must follow a Plurality of Gods But there were others called Triformiani of whom S. Augustin speaks Who held the three Persons to be three distinct parts which being united made one God which saith he is repugnant to the divine Perfection But among these Severians there were three several opinions 1. Of Philoponus who held one common Nature and three Individual 2. Of those who said there was but one Nature and one Hypostasis 3. Of those who affirm'd there were three distinct Natures but withal that there was but one indivisible Godhead and these differ'd from Philoponus in the main ground of Tritheism which was that he held the common Nature in the Trinity to be only a specifick Nature and such as it is among Men. For Philoponus himself in the words which Nicephorus produces doth assert plainly that the common Nature is separated from the Individuals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a mere act of the Mind so that he allow'd no individual Vnity in the divine Nature but what was in the several Persons as the common Nature of Man is a Notion of the Mind as it is abstracted from the several Individuals wherein alone it really subsists so that here is an apparent difference between the Doctrine of Joh. Philoponus and the new Explication for herein the most real essential and indivisible Unity of the divine Nature is asserted and it is said to be no Species because it is but one and so it could not be condemned in Joh. Philoponus 2. We now come to Abbat Joachim whose Doctrine seems to be as much mistaken as it is represented in the Decretal where the Condemnation of it by the Lateran Council is extant But here I cannot but observe what great Authority these Unitarians give to this Lateran Council as if they had a Mind to set up Transubstantiation by it which they so often parallel with the Trinity Thence in their late Discourse they speak of it as the most general Council that was ever called and that what was there defined it was made Heresie to oppose it But by their favour we neither own this to have been a general Council nor that it had Authority to make that Heresie which was not so before But that Council might assert the Doctrine of the Trinity truly as it had been receiv'd and condemn the opinion of Joachim justly But what it was they do not or would not seem to understand Joachim was a great Enthusiast but no deep Divine as Men of that Heat seldom are and he had many Disputes with Peter Lombard in his Life as the Vindicator of Joachim confesses After his Death a Book of his was found taxing Peter Lombard with some strange Doctrine about the Trinity wherein he called him Heretick and Madman this Book was complained of in the Lateran Council and upon Examination it was sound that instead of charging Peter Lombard justly he was fallen into Heresie himself which was denying the essential Vnity of the three Persons and making it to be Vnity of Consent He granted that they were one Essence one Nature one Substance but how Not by any true proper Unity but Similitudinary and Collective as they called it as many Men are one People and many Believers make one Church Whence Thomas Aquinas saith that Joachim fell into the Arian Heresie It is sufficient to my purpose that he denied the individual Vnity of the divine Essence which cannot be charged on the Author of the new Explication and so this comes not home to the purpose 3. But the last charge is the most terrible for it not only sets down the Heresie but the capital punishment which follow'd it Yet I shall make it appear notwithstanding the very warm Prosecution of it by another hand that there is a great difference between the Doctrine of Valentinus Gentilis and that which is asserted in this Explication 1. In the Sentence of his Condemnation it is expressed That he had been guilty of the vilest Scurrility and most horrid Blasphemies against the Son of God and the glorious Mystery of the Trinity But can any thing of this Nature be charged upon one who hath not only written in Defence of it but speaks of it with the highest Veneration 2. In the same Sentence it is said That he acknowledged the Father only to be that infinite God which we ought to worship which is plain Blasphemy against the Son But can any Men ever think to make this the same case with one who makes use of that as one of his chief arguments That the three Persons are to be worshipped with a distinct divine Worship 3. It is charged upon him That he called the Trinity a mere human Invention not so much as known to any Catholick Creed and directly contrary to the Word of God But the Author here charged hath made it his business to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity to be grounded on Scripture and to vindicate it from the Objections drawn from thence against it 4. One of the main Articles of his charge was That he made three Spirits of different Order and Degree that the Father is the one only God by which the Son and Holy Ghost are excluded manifestly from the Unity of the Godhead But the Person charged with his Heresie saith The Reason why we must not say three Gods is because there is but one and the same Divinity in them all and that entirely indivisibly inseparably But it is said that although there may be some differences yet they agree in asserting
we answer God What the Holy Ghost we answer God So that here the Infidels make the same Objection and draw the very same Inference Then say they the Father Son and H. Ghost are three Gods But what saith S. Augustin to this Had he no more skill in Arithmetick than to say there are Three and yet but One He saith plainly that there are not three Gods The Infidels are troubled because they are not Inlightend their heart is shut up because they are without Faith By which it is plain he look'd on these as the proper Objections of Infidels and not of Christians But may not Christians have such doubts in their minds He doth not deny it but then he saith Where the true foundation of Faith is laid in the heart which helps the Vnderstanding we are to embrace with it all that it can reach to and where we can go no farther we must believe without doubting which is a wise resolution of this matter For there are some things revealed which we can entertain the notion of in our minds as we do of any other matters and yet there may be some things belonging to them which we cannot distinctly conceive We believe God to have been from all Eternity and that because God hath revealed it but here is something we can conceive viz. that he was so and here is something we cannot conceive viz. How he was so This Instance I had produced in my Sermon to shew that we might be obliged to believe such things concerning God of which we cannot have a clear and distinct Notion as that God was from all Eternity although we cannot conceive in our minds how he could be from himself Now what saith the Vnitarian to this who pretended to Answer me He saith If God must be from himself then an Eternal God is a Contradiction for that implies that he was before he was and so charges me with espousing the cause of Atheists I wish our Vnitarians were as free from this Charge as I am But this is malicious cavilling For my design was only to shew that we could have no distinct conception of something which we are bound to believe For upon all accounts we are bound to believe an Eternal God and yet we cannot form a distinct and clear Idea of the manner of it Whether being from himself be taken positively or negatively the matter is not cleared the one is Absurd and the other Unconceivable by us But still I say it is a thing that we are bound to believe stedfastly although it is above our comprehension But instead of Answering to this he runs out into an Examination of one notion of Eternity and as he thinks shews some Absurdities in that which are already answer'd But that was not my meaning but to shew that we could have no clear and distinct Notion of Eternity And if his Arguments were good they prove what I aimed at at least as to that Part and himself produces my own Words to shew that there were such Difficulties every way which we could not master and yet are bound to believe that necessary Existence is an inseparable Attribute of God So that here we have a clear instance of what S. Augustin saith That we may believe something upon full Conviction as that God is eternal and yet there may remain something which we cannot reach to by our understanding viz. the manner how Eternity is to be conceived by us which goes a great way towards clearing the Point of the Trinity notwithstanding the Difficulty in our conceiving the manner how Three should be one and One three But S. Augustin doth not give it over so Let us keep stedfast saith he to the Foundation of our Faith that we may arrive to the top of Perfection the Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God the Father is not the Son nor the Son the Father nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son And he goes on The Trinity is one God one Eternity one Power one Majesty Three Persons one God So it is in Erasmus his Edition but the late Editors say that the word Personae was not in their Manuscript And it is not material in this Place since elsewhere he approves the use of the word Persons as the fittest to express our meaning in this Case For since some Word must be agreed upon to declare our Sense by he saith those who understood the Propriety of the Latin tongue could not pitch upon any more proper than that to signifie that they did not mean three distinct Essences but the same Essence with a different Hypostasis founded in the Relation of one to the other as Father and Son have the same Divine Essence but the Relations being so different that one cannot be confounded with the other that which results from the Relation being joyned with the Essence was it which was called a Person But saith S. Augustin The Caviller will ask if there be Three what Three are they He answers Father Son and Holy Ghost But then he distinguishes between what they are in themselves and what they are to each other The Father as to himself is God but as to the Son he is Father the Son as to himself is God but as to the Father he is the Son But how is it possible to understand this Why saith he Take two men Father and Son the one as to himself is a Man but as to the Son a Father the Son as to himself is a Man but as to the Father he is a Son but these two have the same common Nature But saith he Will it not hence follow that as these are two Men so the Father and Son in the Divine Essence must be two Gods No there lies the difference between the humane and Divine Nature That one cannot be multiplied and divided as the other is And therein lies the true Solution of the Difficulty as will appear afterwards When you begin to count saith he you go on One two and Three But when you have reckon'd them what is it you have been Counting The Father is the Father the Son the Son and the Holy Ghost the Holy Ghost What are these Three Are they not three Gods No Are they not three Almighties No They are capable of Number as to their Relation to each other but not as to their Essence which is but One. The substance of the Answer lies here the Divine Essence is that alone which makes God that can be but One and therefore there can be no more Gods than one But because the same Scripture which assures us of the Unity of the Divine Essence doth likewise joyn the Son and Holy Ghost in the same Attributes Operations and Worship therefore as to the mutual Relations we may reckon Three but as to the Divine Essence that can be no more than One. Boëthius was a great Man in all respects for his Quality
as well as for his Skill in Philosophy and Christianity and he wrote a short but learned Discourse to clear this Matter The Catholick Doctrine of the Trinity saith he is this the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost but they are not three Gods but one God And yet which our Vnitarians may wonder at this very man hath written a learned Book of Arithmetick But how doth he make this out How is it possible for Three to be but One First he shews That there can be but one Divine Essence for to make more than One must suppose a Diversity Principium enim Pluralitatis Alteritas est If you make a real difference in Nature as the Arians did then there must be as many Gods as there are different Natures Among men there are different individuals of the same kind but saith he it is the Diversity of Accidents which makes it and if you can abstract from all other Accidents yet they must have a different Place for two Bodies cannot be in the same place The Divine Essence is simple and immaterial and is what it is of it self but other things are what they are made and consist of Parts and therefore may be divided Now that which is of it self can be but One and therefore cannot be numbred And one God cannot differ from another either by Accidents or substantial Differences But saith he there is a twofold Number one by which we reckon and another in the things reckoned And the repeating of Units in the former makes a Plurality but not in the latter It may be said that this holds where there are only different Names for the same thing but here is a real Distinction of Father Son and Holy Ghost But then he shews That the difference of Relation can make no Alteration in the Essence and where there is no Diversity there can be but one Essence although the different Relation may make three Persons This is the substance of what he saith concerning this Difficulty which as he suggests arises from our Imaginations which are so filled with the Division and Multiplicity of compound and material things that it is a hard matter for them so to recollect themselves as to consider the first Principles and Grounds of Vnity and Diversity But if our Vnitarians have not throughly consider'd those foundations they must as they say to one of their Adversaries argue like novices in these questions For these are some of the most necessary Speculations for understanding these matters as what that Vnity is which belongs to a perfect Being what Diversity is required to multiply an infinite Essence which hath Vnity in its own Nature whether it be therefore possible that there should be more divine Essences than one since the same essential Attributes must be where ever there is the divine Essence Whether there can be more Individuals where there is no Dissimilitude and can be no Division or Separation Whether a specifick divine Nature be not inconsistent with the absolute Perfection and necessary Existence which belongs to it Whether the divine Nature can be individually the same and yet there be several individual Essences These and a great many other Questions it will be necessary for them to resolve before they can so peremptorily pronounce that the Doctrine of the Trinity doth imply a Contradiction on the account of the Numbers of Three and One. And so I come to the second Particular CHAP. VI. No Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common Nature II. THat it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in one common Nature I shall endeavour to make these matters as clear as I can for the greatest difficulties in most mens minds have risen from the want of clear and distinct apprehensiâ—ns of those fundamental Notions which are necessary in order to the right understanding of them 1. We are to distinguish between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being or between Essence and Existence 2. Between the Vnity of Nature or Essence and of Existence or Individuals of the same Nature 3. Between the Notion of Persons in a finite and limited Nature and in a Being uncapable of Division and Separation 1. Between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being By the former we mean the Nature and Essential Properties of a thing whereby it is distinguished from all other kinds of Beings So God and his Creatures are essentially distinguished from each other by such Attributes which are incommunicable and the Creatures of several kinds are distinguished by their Natures or Essences for the Essence of a Man and of a Brute are not barely distinguished by Individuals but by their kinds And that which doth constitute a distinct kind is One and Indivisible in it self for the Essence of Man is but one and can be no more for if there were more the kind would be alter'd so that there can be but one common Nature or Essence to all the Individuals of that kind But because these Individuals may be or may not be therefore we must distinguish them as they are in actual Being from what they are in their common Nature for that continues the same under all the Variety and Succession of Individuals 2. We must now distinguish the Vnity which belongs to the common Nature from that which belongs to the Individuals in actual Being And the Vnity of Essence is twofold 1. Where the Essence and Existence are the same i. e. where necessary Existence doth belong to the Essence as it is in God and in him alone it being an essential and incommunicable Perfection 2. Where the Existence is contingent and belongs to the Will of another and so it is in all Creatures Intellectual and Material whose actual being is dependent on the Will of God The Vnity of Existence may be consider'd two ways 1. As to it self and so it is called Identity or a thing continuing the same with it self the Foundation whereof in Man is that vital Principle which results from the Union of Soul and Body For as long as that continues notwithstanding the great variety of changes in the material Parts the Man continues entirely the same 2. The Vnity of Existence as to Individuals may be consider'd as to others i. e. as every one stands divided from every other Individual of the same kind although they do all partake of the same common Essence And the clearing of this is the main point on which the right Notion of these matters depends In order to that we must consider two things 1. What that is whereby we perceive the difference of Individuals 2. What that is which really makes two Beings of the same kind to be different from each other 1. As to the reason of our Perception of the difference between Individuals of the same kind it depends on these things 1. Difference of outward Accidents as Features Age Bulk Meen Speech Habit and Place 2. Difference of inward
of the Mind without any real Existence belonging to it as such which is contrary to the very Notion of God which implies a necessary Existence or it must imply a Divine Nature which is neither Father Son nor Holy Ghost Which is so repugnant to the Doctrine of the Fathers that no one that is any ways conversant in their Writings on this Argument can imagine they should hold such an Opinion And I am so far from being convinced by Curcellaeus his undeniable Proofs that I think it no hard matter to bring undeniable Proofs that he hath mistaken their meaning Of which I shall give an Account in this Place because I fear his Authority hath had too much sway with some as to this matter I shall not insist upon his gross mistake in the very entrance of that Discourse where he saith That the Bishops of Gaul and Germany disliked the Homoousion and gave three Reasons against it whereas Hilary speaks of the Eastern Bishops whom he goes about to vindicate to the Western Bishops who were offended with them for that reason as any one that reads Hilary de Synodis may see But I come to the main Point His great Argument is from the use of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may extend to Individuals of the same kind Who denies it But the Question is whether the Fathers used it in that sense so as to imply a difference of Individuals in the same common Essence There were two things aimed at by them in their Dispute with the Arians 1. To shew That the Son was of the same Substance with the Father which they denied and made him of an inferior created Substance of another kind Now the Fathers thought this term very proper to express their Sense against them But then this Word being capable of a larger Sense than they intended they took care 2. To assert a perfect Unity and Indivisibility of the Divine Essence For the Arians were very ready to charge them with one of these two things 1. That they must fall into Sabellianism if they held a perfect Unity of Essence or 2. When they clear'd themselves of this that they must hold Three Gods and both these they constantly denied To make this clear I shall produce the Testimonies of some of the chief both of the Greek and Latin Fathers and answer Curcellaeus his Objections Athanasius takes notice of both these Charges upon their Doctrine of the Trinity As to Sabellianism he declared That he abhorred it equally with Arianism and he saith it lay in making Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person and so they asserted but one Person in the Godhead As to the other Charge of Polytheism he observes That in the Scripture Language all mankind was reckon'd as one because they have the same Essence and if it be so as to Men who have such a difference of Features of Strength of Vnderstanding of Language how much more may God be said to be One in whom is an undivided Dignity Power Counsel and Operation Doth this prove such a difference as is among Individuals of the same kind among men No man doth more frequently assert the indivisible Vnity of the Divine Nature than he He expresly denies such divided Hypostases as are among men and saith That in the Trinity there is a Conjunction without confusion and a distinction without Division that in the Trinity there is so perfect an Vnion and that it is so undivided and united in it self that where-ever the Father is there is the Son and the Holy Ghost and so the rest because there is but one Godhead and one God who is over all and through all and in all But saith Curcellaeus The contrary rather follows from this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or mutual Inexistence for that could not be without distinct Substance as in Water and Wine But this is a very gross mistake of the Fathers Notion who did not understand by it a Local In-existence as of Bodies but such an indivisible Vnity that one cannot be without the other as even Petavius hath made it appear from Athanasius and others Athanasius upon all Occasions asserts the Unity of the Divine Nature to be perfect and indivisible God saith he is the Father of his Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any Division of the Substance And in other places that the Substance of the Father and Son admit of no Division and he affirms this to have been the sense of the Council of Nice so that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of the same indivisible Substance Curcellaeus answers That Athanasius by this indivisible Vnity meant only a close and indissoluble Vnion But he excluded any kind of Division and that of a Specifick Nature into several individuals as a real Division in Nature for no man whoever treated of those matters denied that a Specifick Nature was divided when there were several individuals under it But what is it which makes the Vnion indissoluble Is it the Vnity of the Essence or not If it be is it the same individual Essence or not If the same individual Essence makes the inseparable Union what is it which makes the difference of individuals If it be said The incommunicable Properties of the Persons I must still ask how such Properties in the same individual Essence can make different individuals If it be said to be the same Specifick Nature then how comes that which is in it self capable of Division to make an indissoluble Vnion But saith Curcellaeus Athanasius makes Christ to be of the same Substance as Adam and Seth and Abraham and Isaac are said to be Con-substantial with each other And what follows That the Father and Son are divided from each other as they were This is not possible to be his Sense considering what he saith of the Indivisibility of the Divine Nature And Athanasius himself hath given sufficient warning against such a Mis-construction of his Words and still urges that our Conceptions ought to be suitable to the Divine Nature not taken from what we see among men And it is observable that when Paulus Samosatenus had urged this as the best Argument against the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That it made such a difference of Substances as is among men for that Reason saith Athanasius his Iudges were content to let it alone for the Son of God is not in such a sense Con-substantial but afterwards the Nicene Fathers finding out the Art of Paulus and the significancy of the Word to discriminate the Arians made use of it and only thought it necessary to declare that when it is applied to God it is not to be understood as among individual Men. As to the Dialogues under Athanasius his Name on which Curcellaeus insists so much it is now very well known that they belong not to him but to Maximus and by comparing them with
among Men if several go about the same Work yet every particular Person works by himself and therefore they may well be called many because every one is circumscribed but in the divine Persons he proves that it is quite otherwise for they all concurr in the Action towards us as he there shews at large Petavius was aware of this and therefore he saith he quitted it and returned to the other whereas he only saith If his Adversaries be displeased with it he thinks the other sufficient Which in short is that Essence in it self is one and indivisible but among Men it is divided according to the Subjects that the divine Nature is capable of no Division at all and therefore the difference of Hypostases must be from the different Relations and Manner of Subsistence 3. He expresses his meaning fully in another place For in his Catechetical Oration he saith he looks on the Doctrine of the Trinity as a profound Mystery which three individual Persons in one specifick Nature is far from But wherein lies it Chiefly in this That there should be Number and no Number different View and yet but One a distinction of Hypostases and yet no Division in the Subjects For so his words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is contrary to what he said of human Hypostases Now what is the Subject in this case According to Curcellaeus his Notion it must be an Individual But since he asserts there can be no Division in the Subjects then he must overthrow any such Individuals as are among Men. These are the chief Testimonies out of the Greek Fathers whose authority Curcellaeus and others rely most upon as to this matter which I have therefore more particularly examin'd But S. Ierom saith Curcellaeus in his Epistle to Damasus thought three Hypostases implied three distinct Substances and therefore when the Campenses would have him own them he refused it and asked his Advice Then it is plain S. Ierom would not own three distinct Substances and so could not be of Curcellaeus his mind But saith he S. Ierom meant by three Substances three Gods different in kind as the Arians did But how doth that appear Doth he not say the Arian Bishop and the Campenses put him upon it But who was this Arian Bishop and these Campenses No other than the Meletian Party for Meletius was brought in by the Arians but he joyned against them with S. Basil and others who asserted three Hypostases and the Campenses were his People who met without the Gates as the Historians tell us But it is evident by S. Ierom that the Latin Church understood Hypostasis to be the same then with Substance and the reason why they would not allow three Hypostases was because they would not assert three Substances So that Curcellaeus his Hypothesis hath very little colour for it among the Latin Fathers since S. Ierom there saith it would be Sacrilege to hold three Substances and he freely bestows an Anathema upon any one that asserted more than one But Hilary saith Curcellaeus owns a specifick Vnity for in his Book de Synodis he shews That by one Substance they did not mean one individual Substance but such as was in Adam and Seth that is of the same kind No man asserts the Vnity and Indiscrimination of the divine Substance more fully and frequently than he doth and that without any Difference or Variation as to the Father and the Son And although against the Arians he may use that for an Illustration of Adam and Seth yet when he comes to explain himself he declares it must be understood in a way agreeable to the divine Nature And he denies any Division of the Substance between Father and Son but he asserts one and the same Substance to be in both and although the Person of the Son remains distinct from the Person of the Father yet he subsists in that Substance of which he was begotten and nothing is taken off from the substance of the Father by his being begotten of it But doth he not say That he hath a Legitimate and proper Substance of his own begotten Nature from God the Father And what is this but to own two distinct Substances How can the Substance be distinct if it be the very same and the Son subsist in that Substance of which he was begotten And that Hilary besides a multitude of passages to the same purpose in him cannot be understood of two distinct Substances will appear by this Evidence The Arians in their Confession of Faith before the Council of Nice set down among the several Heresies which they condemned that of Hieracas who said the Father and Son were like two Lamps shining out of one common Vessel of Oil. Hilary was sensible that under this that Expression was struck at God of God Light of Light which the Church owned His Answer is Luminis Naturae Vnitas est non ex connexione porrectio i e. they are not two divided Lights from one common Stock but the same Light remaining after it was kindled that it was before As appears by his Words Light of Light saith he implies That it gives to another that which it continues to have it self And Petavius saith that the Opinion of Hieracas was That the substance of the Father and Son differ'd Numerically as one Lamp from another And Hilary calls it an Error of humane Understanding which would judge of God by what they find in one another Doth not S. Ambrose say as Curcellaeus quotes him That the Father and Son are not two Gods because all men are said to be of one Substance But S Ambrose is directly against him For he saith The Arians objected that if they made the Son true God and Con-substantial with the Father they must make two Gods as there are two men or two Sheep of the same Essence but a Man and a Sheep are not said to be Men or two sheep Which they said to excuse themselves because they made the Son of a different kind and substance from the Father And what Answer doth S. Ambrose give to this 1. He saith Plurality according to the Scriptures rather falls on those of different kinds and therefore when they make them of several kinds they must make several Gods 2. That we who hold but One Substance cannot make more Gods than One. 3. To his instance of Men he answers That although they are of the same Nature by Birth yet the◠differ in Age and Thought and Work and Place from one another and where there is such Diversity there cannot be Vnity but in God there is no difference of Nature Will or Operation and therefore there can be but one God The last I shall mention is S. Augustin whom Curcellaeus produces to as little purpose for although he doth mention the same instance of several Men being of the same kind yet he speaks so expresly against a Specifick Vnity in
to him But who made them subject to him The Man Christ Iesus No God appointed him to be the Lord of every Creature Then they were not created by Christ but by God but the Apostle saith they were created by Christ. But God made him Head of the Church and as Head of the Body he rules over all This we do not at all question but how this comes to be creating Dominions and Powers visible and invisible Did God make the Earth and all the living Creatures in it when he made Man Lord over them Or rather was Man said to create them because he was made their Head If this be their interpreting Scripture like wise Men I shall be content with a less measure of Understanding and thank God for it XI Lastly Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise men to leave the form of Baptism doubtful whether it were not inserted into S. Matthew's Gospel or to understand it in another Sense than the Christian Church hath done from the Apostles times I say first Leave it doubtful because they say That Learned Criticks have given very strong Reasons why they believe these Words In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost were not spoke by our Saviour but have been added to the Gospel of S. Matthew from the common Form and Practise of the Church Why are these strong Reasons of learned Criticks mentioned but to raise Doubts in Peoples minds about them But they declare afterwards against them Not too much of that For they say only That they are not without their weight but they have observed several things that make them think that this Text is a genuine part of Scripture Very Wisely and Discreetly spoken The Reasons are strong and weighty but they think otherwise I wish they had told the World who these learned Criticks were lest it should be suspected that they were their own Inventions But I find a certain Nameless Socinian was the Author of them and his Words are produced by Sandius a Person highly commended by them for his Industry and Learning but as much condemned by others for want of Skill or Ingenuity The reason of writing these Reasons Sandius freely Confesses was because this place clearly proved a Trinity of Persons against the Socinians But what are these very strong and weighty Reasons For it is great Pity but they should be known In the first place he observes That S. Matthew's Gospel was written in Hebrew and the Original he saith is lost and he suspects that either S. Jerom was himself the Translator into Greek and Latin who was a Corrupter of Scripture and Origen or some unknow Person from whence it follows that our Gospel of S. Matthew is not of such Authority that an Article of such moment should depend upon it Is not this a very strong and weighty Reason Must not this be a very learned Critick who could mention S. Ierom as Translator of S. Matthews Gospel into Greek But then one would think this Interpreter might have been wise enough to have added this of himself No he dares not say that but that it was added by Transcribers But whence or how To that he saith That they seem to be taken out of the Gospel according to the Egyptians This is great News indeed But comes it from a good hand Yes from Epiphanius And what saith he to this purpose He saith That the Sabellians made use of the counterfeit Egyptian Gospel and there it was declared that Father Son and Holy Ghost were the same And what then Doth he say they borrowed the Form of Baptism from thence Nothing like it But on the contrary Epiphanius urges this very Form in that place against the Sabellians and quotes S. Matthew's Authority for it But this worthy Author produces other Reasons which Sandius himself laughs at and despises and therefore I pass them over The most material seems to be if it hold That the most ancient Writers on S. Matthew take no notice of them and he mentions Origen Hilary and S. Chrysostom but these Negative Arguments Sandius thinks of no force Origen and S. Chrysostom he saith reach not that Chapter the Opus Imperfectum which was none of his doth not but his own Commentaries do and there he not only mentions the Form but takes notice of the Compendious Doctrine delivered by it which can be nothing else but that of the Trinity In the Greek Catena on S. Matthew there is more mentioned viz. That Christ had not then first his Power given him for he was with God before and was himself by Nature God And there Gregory Nazianzen saith The Form of Baptism was in the Name of the Holy Trinity and he there speaks more fully Remember saith he the Faith into which thou wert baptized Into the Father That is well but that is no farther than the Jews go for they own one God and one Person Into the Son That is beyound them but not yet perfect Into the Holy Ghost Yes saith he this is perfect Baptism But what is the common Name of these three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plainly that of God But this learned Critick observes that Hilary in some Copies takes no notice of this Form That is truly observed for the very Conclusion is not Hilary's but taken out of S. Ierom but if he had look'd into Hilary's Works he would have found the Form of Baptism owned and asserted by him For he not only sets it down as the Form of Faith as well as our Baptism appointed by Christ but argues from it against the Sabellians and Ebionites as well as others Thus we see how very strong and weighty the Arguments of this learned Critick were CHAP. IX The General Sense of the Christian Church proved from the Form of Baptism as it was understood in the first Ages BUT our Vnitarians pretend that they are satisfied that the Form of Baptism is found in all Copies and all the ancient Translations and that it was used before the Council of Nice as appears by several places of Tertullian But how then There are two things stick with them 1. That the Ante-Nicene Fathers do not alledge it to prove the Divinity of the Son or Holy Ghost 2. That the Form of Words here used doth not prove the Doctrine of the Trinity Both which must be strictly Examined 1. As to the former It cannot but seem strange to any one conversant in the Writings of those Fathers when S. Cyprian saith expressly That the Form of Baptism is prescribed by Christ that it should be in plenâ adunaâ—â Trinitate i. e. in the full Confession of the Holy Trinity and therefore he denied the Baptism of the Marcionites because the Faith of the Trinity was not sincere among them as appears at large in that Epistle And this as far as I can find was the general Sense of the Ante-Nicene Fathers as well as others And it
words 1. They say That there is a Note of distinction and Superiority For Christ owns that his Power was given to him by the Father There is no question but that the Person who suffer'd on the Cross had Power given to him after his Resurrection but the true Question is whether his Sonship were then given to him He was then declared to be the Son of God with Power and had a Name or Authority given him above every Name being exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour to give Repentance and Remission of Sins in order to which he now appointed his Apostles to teach all Nations baptizing them in the Name of the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost He doth not say in the name of Iesus who suffer'd on the Cross nor in the name of Iesus the Christ now exalted but in the name of Father Son and Holy Ghost and although there were a double Gift with respect to the Son and Holy Ghost the one as to his Royal Authority over the Church the other as to his extraordinary Effusion on the Apostles yet neither of these are so much as intimated but the Office of Baptism is required to be performed in the Name of these three as distinct and yet equal without any Relation to any Gift either as to the Son or Holy Ghost But if the ancient Iews were in the Right as we think they were then we have a plain account how these came to be thus mention'd in the Form of Baptism viz. that these three distinct Subsistences in the Divine Essence were not now to be kept up as a secret Mystery from the World but that the Christian Church was to be formed upon the Belief of it 2. They bring several places of Scripture where God and his Creatures are joyned without any Note of distinction or Superiority as The people feared the Lord and Samuel 1 Sam. 12.18 They worshipped the Lord and the King 1 Chron. 29.20 I charge thee before God the Lord Iesus Christ and his elect Angels 1 Tim. 5.21 The Spirit and the Bride say come Revel 22.17 But can any Man of Sense imagine these places contain a Parallel with a Form of Words wherein men are entred into the Profession of a new Religion and by which they were to be distinguished from all other Religions in the former places the Circumstances were so notorious as to God and the Civil Magistrate that it shews no more than that the same external Acts may be used to both but with such a different Intention as all men understood it What if S. Paul name the elect Angels in a solemn Obtestation to Timothy together with God and the Lord Iesus Christ What can this prove but that we may call God and his Creatures to be Witnesses together of the same thing And so Heaven and Earth are called to bear Witness against obstinate Sinners May men therefore be baptized in the name of God and his Creatures The Spirit and Bride may say come without any Incongruity but it would have been strange indeed if they had said Come be baptized in the Name of the Spirit and the Bride So that these Instances are very remote from the purpose But they say farther That the ancients of the first Four hundred years do not insist on this place to prove the Divinity or Personality of the Son or Spirit As to the first Three hundred years I have given an account already and as to the Fourth Century I could not have thought that they would have mention'd it since there is scarce a Father of the Church in that time who had occasion to do it but makes use of the Argument from this place to prove the Divinity and Personality of the Son and Spirit Athanasius saith That Christ founded his Church on the Doctrine of the Trinity contained in these Words and if the Holy Ghost had been of a different Nature from the Father and Son he would never have been joyned with them in a Form of Baptism no more than an Angel or any other Creature For the Trinity must be Eternal and Indivisible which it could not be if any created Being were in it and therefore he disputes against the Arian Baptism although performed with the same Words because they joyned God and a Creature together in Baptism To the same purpose argue Didymus Gregory Nazianzen S. Basil and others within the Compass of four hundred years whose Testimonies are produced by Petavius to whom I refer the Reader if he hath a mind to be satisfied in so clear a Point that I cannot but think our Vnitarians never intended to take in the Fathers after the Council of Nice who are so expressly against them and therefore I pass it over as a slip 4. They object That the Form of Baptism implies no more than being admitted into that Religion which proceeds from God the Father and deliver'd by his Son and confirmed by the Testimony of the Holy Ghost So much we grant is implied but the Question still remains whether the Son and Holy Ghost are here to be consider'd only in order to their Operations or whether the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost from whom those Effects came are not here chiefly intended For if no more had been meant but these Effects then the right Form of Admission had not been into the Name of Father Son and Holy Ghost but in the Name of the Father alone as Revealing himself by his Son and Confirming it by the miraculous Works of the Holy Ghost For these are only subservient Acts to the design of God the Father as the only subsisting Person 5. They tell us That it is in vain not to say ridiculously pretended that a Person or Thing is God because we are baptized into it for some were baptized into Moses and others into John's Baptism and so Moses and John Baptist would be Gods and to be baptized into a Person or Persons and in the name of such a Person is the same thing Grant this yet there is a great difference between being baptized in the name of a Minister of Baptism and of the Author of a Religion into which they are baptized The Israelites were baptized unto Moses but how The Syriac and Arabic Versions render it per Mosen and so S. Augustin reads it And this seems to be the most natural sense of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is Act. 7.53 compared with Gal. 3.19 And the force of the Apostle's Argument doth not lie in the Parallel between being baptized into Moses and into Christ but in the Privileges they had under the Ministery of Moses with those which Christians enjoyed The other place implies no more than being enter'd into that Profession which John baptized his Disciples into But doth any one imagine that because Iohn Baptist did enter his Disciples by Baptism therefore they must believe him to be God
we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material Being thinks or not it being impossible for us by the Contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency hath not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive or think If this be true then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking Matter may have a Power of Thinking and if this hold then it is impossible to prove a Spiritual Substance in us from the Idea of Thinking For how can we be assured by our Ideas that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are Especially since it is said That in respect of our Notions it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should super-add to it another Substance with a Faculty of Thinking Whoever asserts this can never prove a Spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking that Matter so disposed cannot Think And he cannot be certain that God hath not framed the matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it It is said indeed elsewhere That it is repugnant to the Idea of Sensless Matter that it should put into it self Sense Perception and Knowledge But this doth not reach the present Case which is not what Matter can do of it self but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it We can have none from the Ideas for those are given up in this Case and consequently we can have no certainty upon these Principles whether we have any Spiritual Substance within us or not But we are told That from the Operations of our Minds we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit How can that be when we cannot from those Ideas be assured but that those Operations may come from a material Substance If we frame an Idea on such Grounds it is at most but a possible Idea for it may be otherwise and we can have no Assurance from our Ideas that it is not So that the most men may come to in this way of Idea's is That it is possible it may be so and it is possible it may not but that it is impossible for us from our Ideas to determine either way And is not this an admirable Way to bring us to a certainty of Reason I am very glad to find the Idea of a Spiritual Substance made as consistent and intelligible as that of a Corporeal for as the one consists of a Cohesion of solid Parts and the Power of communicating Motion by impulse so the other consists in a Power of Thinking and Willing and moving the Body and that the Cohesion of solid Parts is as hard to be conceived as Thinking and we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by impulse as in the Power of exciting Motion by thought We have by daily experience clear Evidence of Motion produced both by Impulse and by Thought but the manner how hardly comes within our Comprehension we are equally at a loss in both From whence if follows That we may be certain of the Being of a Spiritual Substance although we have no clear and distinct Idea of it nor are able to comprehend the manner of its Operations And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas and that they have Reason to reject any Doctrine which relates to Spiritual Substances because they cannot comprehend the manner of it For the same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive Men about the manner of Operation both in material and immaterial Substances It is affirmed That the very Notion of Body implies something very hard if not impossible to be explained or understood by us and that the natural Consequence of it viz. Divisibility involves us in Difficulties impossible to be explicated or made consistent That we have but some few Superficial Ideas of things that we are destitute of Faculties to attain to the true Nature of them and that when we do that we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity and can discover nothing farther but our own Blindness and Ignorance These are very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of humane Understanding with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things which we are most certain of the Being of by constant and undoubted Experience I appeal now to the Reason of mankind whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine proposed to us as of Divine Revelation because we cannot comprehend the manner of it especially when it relates to the Divine Essence For as the same Author observes Our Idea of God is framed from the Complex Ideas of those Perfections we find in our selves but inlarging them so as to make them suitable to an infinite Being as Knowledge Power Duration c. And the Degrees or Extent of these which we ascribe to the Soveraign Being are all boundless and infinite For it is infinity which joyned to our Ideas of Existence Power Knowledge c. makes that Complex Idea whereby we represent to our selves the best we can the Supreme Being Now when our Knowledge of gross material Substances is so dark when the Notion of Spiritual Substances is above all Ideas of Sensation when the higher any Substance is the more remote from our Knowledge but especially when the very Idea of a Supreme Being implies its being Infinite and Incomprehensible I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence because they cannot comprehend the manner of it But of this more afterwards I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reason from clear and distinct Ideas and if we can attain to Certainty without them and where it is confessed we cannot have them as about Substances then these cannot be the sole Matter and Foundation of our Reasoning which is so peremptorily asserted by this late Author But I go yet farther and as I have already shew'd we can have no certainty of an Immaterial Substance within us from these simple Ideas so I shall now shew that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from them by their own Confession concerning the Existence of the most Spiritual and infinite Substance even God himself We are told That the Evidence of it is equal to Mathematical Certainty and very good Arguments are brought to prove it in a Chapter on purpose but that which I take notice of is that the Argument from the clear and distinct Idea of God is passed over How can this be consistent
of the thing be that it cannot be comprehended then you rightly understand the Nature of the thing and so it is not above your Reason Let the Case be now put as to the Trinity do you believe the Doctrine of it as of Divine Revelation No God hath given me the Nature and Faculties of a Man and I can believe nothing which I cannot have a distinct and clear Idea of otherwise I must have new Faculties Will you hold to this Principle Then you must believe nothing which you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of Very true But can you have a clear and distinct Idea of what you cannot comprehend A clear Idea is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident Perception A distinct Idea is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others Is this right Yes But can you have a full and evident Perception of a thing so as to difference it from all others when you grant it to be Incomprehensible If you have a full Perception of it you comprehend its Nature and especially if you can difference it from all other things but when you say its Nature is Incomprehensible and yet believe it you must deny it to be necessary to Faith to have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing proposed And if it be repugnant to your Faculties to reject the Trinity because you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of it for the same Reason you must unavoidably reject his Eternity and all other Attributes which have Infinity joyned with them But we must stop here because this admirable Undertaker hath said That he despairs not of rendring Eternity and Infinity as little Mysterious as that three and two make five And till then I take my leave of him And so I return to our professed Vnitarians who in answer to my Sermon fell upon the same Subject and it is necessary that I consider so much as tends to the clearing of it In my Sermon I had urged this Argument to prove that we may be bound to believe some things that are Incomprehensible to us because the Divine Nature and Attributes are acknowledged to be so and I had said 1. That there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the Trinity and Incarnation than there is of Eternity Not but that there is great Reason to believe it but from hence it appears that our Reason may oblige us to believe some things which it is not possible for us to comprehend And what say our Vnitarians to this They Charge my Notion of Eternity as they call it with a Contradiction The best way of proceeding will be to set down my own Words which are these We know that either God must have been for ever or it is impossible he ever should be for if he should come into being when he was not he must have some Cause of his Being and that which was the first Cause would be God But if he was for ever he must be from himself and what Notion or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it To this say they To say a Person or Thing is from it self is a Contradiction it implies this Contradiction it was before it was And they are sorry an Eternal God must be a Contradiction What a false and spiteful Inference is this But it had look'd like very deep Reasoning if I had said That God was the cause of himself For that would have implied the Contradiction he had charged it with but I had expressly excluded his being from any Cause and the thing I urged was only the Impossibility of our having a clear and distinct Conception of Eternity For if he could have no Cause what could we think of his being Eternal If to be from himself as a Cause be unconceivable as I grant it is then it proves what I designed that we cannot have any distinct Idea of Eternity But to be from himself in the Sense generally understood is a meer Negative Expression for no Men were such Fools to imagine any thing could be before it self and in this Sense only Learned Men have told us that it is to be understood by those ancient and modern Writers who have used that Expression As when S. Ierom saith That God is self Originated and S. Augustin that God is the Cause of his own Wisdom and Lactantius that God made himself all these and such like Expressions are only to be Negatively understood But I confess I aimed at shewing that it was impossible for us to have any clear and distinct Idea of Eternity and therefore I took in all possible ways of conceiing it either by Gods being from himself or his Co-existing with all differences of Time without any Succession in his own Being or his having a successive Duration From all which I argued the Impossibility of a clear Notion of Eternity And now what do these Men do They dispute against one of these Notions and very triumphantly expose as they think the Absurdities of it And what then Why then this Notion will not do But I say none will do I prove there can be no successive Duration in a Being of necessary Existence and that it is not to be conceived how without Succession God should be present with the Being and not Being the Promise and Performance of the same thing and yet one of these ways we must make use of From whence I concluded That all we can attain to is a full Satisfaction of our Reason concerning God's Eternity although we can form no distinct Conception of it in our Minds But when these Men instead of answering the Argument from all the Notions of Eternity only dispute against one Notion of it they apparently shew the weakness of their Cause if it will bear no other Defences but such as this For I take it that the main Debate in point of Reason depends upon this whether we can be certain of the Being of a Thing of which we can have no clear and distinct Idea If we may then it can be no Objection in point of Revelation that we can have no clear and distinct Idea of the Matter revealed since there can be no Reason to tie us up stricter in Point of Revelation than we are without it If we can be certain in Reason of many things we can have no such Ideas of what imaginable Reason can there be that a Point of Faith should be rejected on that account 2. I urged another Attribute of God viz. his Spirituality for the same Reason viz. that we are satisfied in point of Reason that God must be a Spirit and yet we cannot have a clear distinct positive Notion of a Spirit And what answer do they give to this As wise as the former Why truly I had no cause to object this against them because they own the Spirituality of God's Nature and none since Biddle have denied it Very well but doth my argument proceed
so many ages with embracing Errors and Nonsense and Contradictions for Mysteries of Faith I desire to know supposing it possible for the Christian Church to be so early so generally and so miserably deceived in a matter of such moment by what light they have discovered this great Error Have they any new Books of Scripture to judge by Truly they had need for they seem to be very weary of the old ones because they find they will not serve their turn Therefore they muster up the old Objections against them and give no answer to them they find fault with Copies and say they are corrupted and falsified to speak the Language of the Church they let fall suspicious words as to the Form of Baptism as though it were inserted from the Churches Practice they charge us with following corrupt Copies and making false Translations without any manner of ground for it And doth not all this discover no good will to the Scriptures at least as they are received among us And I despair of meeting with better Copies or seeing a more faithfull Translation than ours is So that it is plain that they have no mind to be tried by the Scriptures For these exceptions are such as a Malefactor would make to a Jury he is afraid to be condemned by But what then is the peculiar light which these happy men have found in a corner the want whereof hath made the Christian Church to fall into such monstrous Errors and Contradictions Nothing they pretend but the mere light of common sense and reason which they call after a more refined way of speaking clear Ideas and distinct Perceptions of things But least I should be thought to misrepresent them I will produce some of their own Expressions In one place they say We deny the Articles of the new Christianity or the Athanasian religion not because they are Mysteries or because we do not comprehend them we deny them because we do comprehend them we have a clear and distinct Perception that they are not Mysteries but Contradictions Impossibilities and pure Nonsense We have our reason in vain and all science and certainty would be destroy'd if we could not distinguish between Mysteries and Contradictions And soon after we are not to give the venerable name of Mystery to Doctrines that are contrary to nature's and reason's Light or which destroy or contradict our natural Ideas These things I have particular reason to take notice of here because they are published as an Answer to the foregoing Sermon about the Mysteries of the Christian Faith and this shews the general grounds they go upon and therefore more fit to be consider'd here To which I shall add one passage more wherein they insinuate that the Doctrine of the Trinity hath been supported only by interest and force Their words are after they have called the Doctrine of the Trinity a monstrous Paradox and Contradiction This is that say they which because all other arguments failed them in their disputations with the Photinians and Arians they at last effectually proved by the Imperial Edicts by Confiscations and Banishments by Seizing and Burning all Books written against it or them by capital Punishments and when the Papacy of which this is the chief Article prevailed by Fire and Faggot This is a new discovery indeed that the Doctrine of the Trinity as it is generally receiv'd in the Christian Church is the chief Article of Popery although it were embraced and defended long before Popery was known and I hope would be so if there were no such thing as Popery left in the world But if every thing which displeases some men must pass for Popery I am afraid Christianity it self will not escape at last for there are some who are building apace on such foundations as these and are endeavouring what they can to remove out of their way all revealed Religion by the help of those two powerfull Machines viz. Priest-craft and Mysteries But because I intend a clear and distinct Discourse concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity as it hath been generally received among us I shall proceed in these four Enquiries 1. Whether it was accounted a monstrous Paradox and Contradiction where Persons were not sway'd by Force and Interest 2. Whether there be any ground of common reason on which it can be justly charged with Nonsense Impossibilities and Contradiction 3. Whether their Doctrine about the Trinity or ours be more agreeable to the sense of Scripture and Antiquity 4. Whether our Doctrine being admitted it doth overthrow all certainty of reason and makes way for believing the greatest Absurdities under the pretence of being Mysteries of Faith CHAP. II. The Doctrine of the Trinity not received in the Christian Church by Force or Interest AS to the first it will lead me into an enquiry into the sense of the Christian Church as to this Doctrine long before Popery was hatched and at a time when the main force of Imperial Edicts was against Christianity it self at which time this Doctrine was owned by the Christian Church but disowned and disputed against by some particular Parties and Sects And the question then will be whether these had engrossed Sense and Reason and Knowledge among themselves and all the body of the Christian Church with their heads and governors were bereft of common Sense and given up to believe Nonsense and Contradictions for Mysteries of Faith But in order to the clearing this matter I take it for granted That Sense and Reason are no late inventions only to be found among our Vnitarians but that all Mankind have such a competent share of them as to be able to judge what is agreeable to them and what not if they apply themselves to it That no men have so little sense as to be fond of Nonsense when sense will do them equal service That if there be no Biass of Interest to sway them men will generally judge according to the evidence of reason That if they be very much concerned for a Doctrine opposed by others and against their interest they are perswaded of the truth of it by other means than by force and fear That it is possible for men of sense and reason to believe a Doctrine to be true on the account of divine Revelation although they cannot comprehend the manner of it That we have reason to believe those to be men of sense above others who have shew'd their abilities above them in other matters of Knowledge and Speculation That there can be no reason to suspect the integrity of such men in delivering their own Sense who at the same time might far better secure their interest by renouncing their Faith lastly That the more Persons are concerned to establish and defend a Doctrine which is opposed and contemned the greater evidence they give that they are perswaded of the truth of it These are Postulata so agreeable to sense and common reason that I think if an affront to human Nature
to go about to prove them But to shew what use we are to make of them we must consider that it cannot be denied that the Doctrine of the Trinity did meet with opposition very early in the Christian Church especially among the Iewish Christians I mean those who strictly adhered to the Law of Moses after the Apostles had declared the freedom of Christians from the obligation of it These as I shall shew by and by soon after the dispersion of the Church of Ierusalem gathered into a body by themselves distinct from that which consisted of Iews and Gentiles and was therefore called the Catholick Christian Church And this separate body whether called Ebionites Nazarens or Mineans did not only differ from the Catholick Christian Church as to the necessity of observing the Law of Moses but likewise as to the Divinity of our Saviour which they denied although they professed to believe him as the Christ or promised Messias Theodoret hath with very good judgment placed the Heresies of the first ages of the Châ—istian Church under two distinct heads which others reckon up confusedly and those are such as relate to the Humanity of Christ as Simon Magus and all the Sets of those who are called Gnosticks which are recited in his first Book In his second he begins with those which relate to the Divinity of Christ and these are of two kinds 1. The Iewish Christians who denied it Of these he reckons up the Ebionites Cerinthians the Nazarens and Elcesaitae whom he distinguished from the other Ebionites because of a Book of Revelation which one Elxai brought among them but Epiphanius saith he joyned with the Ebionites and Nazarens 2. Those of the Gentile Christians who were look'd on as broaching a new Doctriâ—e among them of these he reckons Artemon as the first then Theodotus whom others make the first Publisher of it as Tertullian and the old Writer in Eusebius supposed to be Caius who lived near the time and of whom a considerable Fragment is preserved in Eusebius which gives light to these matters The next is another Theodotus who framed a new Sect of such as set up Melâ—hisedeck above Christ. Then follow Paulus Samosatenus and Sabellius who made but one Person as well as one God and so overthrew the Trinity with whom Marcellus agreed in substance and last of all Photinus But Theodoret concludes that Book with this passage viz. That all these Heresies against our Saviour's Divinity were then wholly extinct so that there were not so much as any small Remainders of them What would he have said if he had lived in our age wherein they are not only revived but are pretended to have been the true Doctrine of the Apostolical Churches Had all men lost their Senses in Theodoret's time And yet there were as many learned and able Men in the Christian Church then as ever were in any time CHAP. III. The Socinian Plea for the Antiquity of their Doctrine examined BUT this is not the age our Vnitarians will stand or fall by They are for going backward and they speak with great comfort about the old Ebionites and Nazarens as entirely theirs And that they had considerable men among them as Theodotion and Symmachus two Translators of the Hebrew Bible And among the Gentile Christians they value themselves upon three Men Paulus Samosatenus Lucianus the most learned Person they say of his age and Photinus Bishop of Sirmium As to the Vnitarians at Rome whom they improperly call Nazarens they pretended that their Doctrine was Apostolical and the general Doctrine of the Church till the times of Victor and Zepherin This is the substance of their Plea which must now be examin'd I begin with those Primitive Vnitarians the Ebionites concerning whom I observe these things 1. That they were a distinct separate body of men from the Christian Church For all the ancient Writers who speak of them do mention them as Hereticks and wholly divided from it as appears by Irenaeus Tertullian Epiphanius Theodoret S. Augustin and others Eusebius saith of them That although the Devil could not make them renounce Christianity yet finding their weakness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he made them his own He would never have said this of any whom he look'd on as Members of the Christian Church But wherein is it that Eusebius blames them He tells it in the very next words that it was for the mean opinion they entertained of Christ for they look'd on him as a meer Man but very just And although there were two sorts of them some owning the miraculous Conception and others not yet saith he They at last agreed in the same Impiety which was That they would not own Christ to have had any Pre-existence before his Birth nor that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God the Word It 's true he finds fault with them afterwards for keeping to the Law of Moses but the first Impiety he charges them with is the other That which I inferr from hence is that Eusebius himself to whom they profess to shew greater respect than to most of the ancient Writers for his exactness and diligence in Church-History doth affirm the Doctrine which overthrows the Pre-existence and Divinity of Christ to be an Impiety And therefore when he affirms the first fifteen Bishops of the Church of Ierusalem who were of the Circumcision viz. to the Siege of it by Hadrian did hold the genuine Doctrine of Christ it must be understood of his Pre-existence and Divinity for the other we see he accounted an Impiety And he tells us the Church of Ierusalem then consisted of believing Iews and so it had done from the Apostles times to that of Hadrian 's Banishment of the Iews Which is a considerable Testimony to two purposes 1. To shew that the Primitive Church of Ierusalem did hold the Doctrine of Christ's Pre-existence and Divinity But say our Vnitarians this doth not follow For what reason When it is plain that Eusebius accounted that the only genuine Doctrine No say they he meant only the miraculous Conception and that they held that in opposition to those Ebionites who said that he was born as other men are This is very strange when Eusebius had distinguished the two sorts of Ebionites about this matter and had blamed both of them even those that held him born of a Virgin for falling into the same Impiety What can satisfie such men who are content with such an answer But say they Eusebius only spake his own sense Not so neither For he saith in that place that he had searched the most ancient Records of the Church of Ierusalem Yes say they for the Succession of the first Bishops but as to their Doctrine he had it from Hegesippus and he was an Ebionite himself Then Eusebius must not be the man they take him for For if Hegesippus were himself an Ebionite and told Eusebius in his Commentaries that the Primitive
it may be observed that the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so the Mysteries related to those who were initiated and not made Epoptoe i. e. to those who did not throughly understand them although they had more knowledge of them than such as were not initiated Olympiodorus in reckoning up the Degrees of Admissions mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that they were properly Mysteries to such who knew something though there were other things farther to be discover'd but they did not yet know what they were as the Epoptoe did From hence the ancient Christian Writers did not only call the Sacraments but more abstruse Points of Faith by the name of Mysteries so S. Chrysostom calls the Resurrection a great and ineffable Mystery And Isidore Pelusiota in his Epistle to Lampetius saith That S. Paul when he speaks of the great Mystery of Godliness doth not mean that it is wholly unknown to us but that it is impossible to Comprehend it Theophylact saith it is therefore called the great Mystery of Godliness because although it be now revealed to all yet the manner of it is hidden from us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for this Reason it is called a Mystery But this is in the way of Reading let us now come to deep Reasoning and see how strongly he argues against this Sense of the Word Mysteries his Words are these They trifle then exceedingly and discover a mighty Scarcity of better Arguments who defend their Mysteries by this pitiful shift of drawing Inferences from what is unknown to what is known or of insisting upon adequate Ideas except they will agree as some do to call every Spire of Grass sitting and standing fish and flesh to be Mysteries And if out of a pertinacious or worse humour they will be still fooling and call these things Mysteries I 'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others as these are to me It is easie to guess whom these kind Words were intended for And are not these very modest and civil Expressions Trifling Fooling out of a pertinacious or worse Humour but why Fooling about Mysteries to call such things by that Name which are in some measure known but in a greater measure unknown to us and if these are real Mysteries in Nature why may not the same term be used for Matters of Faith And I think in so plain a Case no great store of Arguments need to be used But in these natural things he saith we have distinct Ideas of the Properties which make the Nominal Essence but we are absolutely ignorant of the Real Essence or intrinsick Constitution of a thing which is the ground or support of all its Properties Are not then without Trifling and Fooling these Real Essences Mysteries to them They know there are such by the Ideas of their Properties but know nothing of their Real Essence and yet they will not allow them to be Mysteries If they do understand them why do they say They do not nor cannot And if this be true let them call them what they please they must be inexplicable Mysteries to them So that all this is mere quarrelling about a Word which they would fain be rid of if they knew how but they involve and perplex themselves more by their own deep Reasonings against the Trifling and Fooling of others But he saith That some would have the most palpable Absurdities and gross Contradictions to go down or words that signifie nothing because men cannot comprehend the Essence of their own Souls nor the Essence of God and other Spiritual Substances We utterly deny that any Article of our Faith contains in it any palpable Absurdities or gross Contradictions as I hope hath been proved already as to the Doctrine of the Trinity which is chiefly struck at but surely your deep Reasoners may find a difference between gross Contradictions to our Reason and barely being above it or not having any distinct Conception of the Nature of it And that is all that we assert and which they grant as to all Substances If this be their Way of arguing they may even return to Transubstantiation again without any great lessening of their Understandings But none are so bold in attacking the Mysteries of the Christian Faith as the Smatterers in Ideas and new Terms of Philosophy without any true Understanding of them For these Ideas are become but another sort of Canting with such men and they would reason as well upon Genus and Species or upon Occult Qualities and Substantial Forms but only that they are Terms out of Fashion But we find that the change of Terms doth neither improve nor alter mens Understandings but only their Ways of speaking and ill Gamesters will not manage their Game one jot the better for having new Cards in their hands However we must see what Work they make of it Although we do not know the Nature of the Soul yet we know as much of it as we do of any thing else if not more i. e. we really know nothing by any adequate Idea of it but we must believe nothing but what we have a clear distinct Idea of Is not this a rare way of fixing the Boundaries of Faith and Reason As to God and his Attributes it is said That they are not Mysteries to us for want of an adequate Idea no not Eternity And in another place As to God we comprehend nothing better than his Attributes Let us try this by the Attribute pitched on by himself viz. Eternity We see he pretends to comprehend nothing better than the Divine Attributes and Eternity as well as any which I am very apt to believe but how doth he Comprehend Eternity Even by finding That it cannot be Comprehended Is not this Subtle and deep Reasoning But Reason he saith performs its part in finding out the true Nature of Things and if such be the Nature of the thing that it cannot be Comprehended then Reason can do no more and so it is not above Reason Was there ever such Trifling that pretended to Reason and that about the highest Matters and twith Scorn and Contempt of others whom he calls Mysterious Wits The Question is whether any thing ought to be rejected as an Article of Faith because we cannot comprehend it or have a clear and distinct Perception of it He concludes it must be so or else we overthrow Religion and the Nature of Man and the Wisdom and Goodness of God Here is an Essential Attribute of God viz. his Eternity Am I bound to believe it or not Yes doubtless But how can I comprehend this Attribute of Eternity Very easily How so Do not you comprehend that it is incomprehensible What then Doth this reach the Nature of the thing or only the manner of our Conception If the Nature