to the Person of the Son and Procession extrinsical to the Person of the blessed Spirit This naturally and easily defends the Simplicity of a Divine Person this frees us of endless and inextricable Questions which fill up every page of the Scholastical Writers This forces us not to hide our selves in a Cloud of Words which signify nothing A Substance and a Mode says the Animadverter infer not Composition in a Divine Person because in him the Substance and Mode coalesce into one by an Vnion and Conjunction that is in other words they infer not Composition because they are compounded Composition and Coalescing into One by an Union and Conjunction differ no more than Definitum and Definition It is truly therefore incomprehensible and ineffable that a coalescing into one by an Union and Conjunction should not be a Composition Mind Wisdom Power Goodness P. 39. lin 6. N. 15. c. are formally distinct from one another and so not affirmable of one another and in speaking of things the formal differences of them must still be attended to Gods Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him But he that says His Justice is his Mercy speaks absurdly for all that c. Whatever differs really differs also formally but here by formal difference the Animadverter understands that difference which is only formal and not real Now in this sense of the term the express contrary Conclusion is true That whatsoever things are only formally different are therefore affirmable of one another The Conclusion the Animadverter ought to have deduced from his Premises is That Mind Wisdom Goodness viz. in God are not formally affirmable of one another But it is Fallacia à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter to put the first Conclusion in place of the second to say That Mind Wisdom Goodness are not simply affirmable of one another because it will be acknowledged that they are not formally affirmable of one another Secondly Whereas the Animadverter tells us That in speaking of Things the formal Differences of them must still be attended to We need no other Confutation of this Proposition than his own immediate following words viz. That God's Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him His Justice and his Mercy are formally or in our way of Conception two distinct nay two opposite Acts it is only in the Reality that we affirm them to be one pure simple Act in him Thirdly If things only formally different are not affirmable of one another there could be no Propositions but identical ones or at most where the Subject and Predicate are synonimous Terms No man could say without absurdity That the Father is God because these two terms Father and God formally differ and therefore according to this wise Rule of our Animadverter are not affirmable of one another Has the Animadverter never heard of the Distinction of Sensus Identicus and Sensus Formalis This Proposition God's Justice is his Mercy is true Sensu Identico tho not Sensu Formali We are cautioned indeed by the Learned that we avoid Conclusions which are only true Sensu Identico when such way of speaking is against common Custom or when the formal Sense carries a formal Opposition as in the Divine Attributes of Justice and Mercy and the reason they give is because in such instances the Propositions lead to a formal Sense in which Sense they are false But if we add Sensu Identico that is in what sense we understand these Propositions then they are true and consequently not absurd unless a Truth can be absurd CHAP. II. I Shall crave leave of the Reader N. 1. to say thus much in general of the Animadverters Third and Fourth Chapter wherein he endeavours to prove That Self-consciousness is not the Formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons nor Mutual-consciousness the Formal Reason of their Vnity of Nature That all this is said as I verily believe without an Adversary The Reverend Dean of St. Paul's does not once in his Vindication of the B. Trinity expresly affirm either the one or the other of these Propositions He asks no more of his Reader if I misunderstand him not save to acknowledge That a distinct Self-Consciousness is a firm proof of the Distinction of Persons in this Sacred Mystery and that a singular Mutual-Consciousness is an equal proof of the Singularity of the Divine Nature I conceive That the Reverend Dean never intended to deny that the Distinction of Persons is in order of Nature before their distinct acts of Self-Consciousness or that their Unity of Nature is in the same degree of Priority before their singular Mutual-Consciousness but only intended that quoad nos or in our way of Knowledge or Conception their distinct Self Consciousness proved or was known to us before their distinct Personality and their singular mutual Consciousness in order of our Knowledge before the Knowledge of their Unity of Nature In the Animadverter's Third Chapter N. 2. he endeavours to prepare the way by denying that Self-Consciousness is the formal reason of personality in finite created Persons A Conclusion none affirms who understands the meaning of the terms It is impossible that a personal Act an Effect should any ways be the proper formal cause of its efficient a Person Animad c. P. 71. lin 10. But when he tells us That Personality is the ground and principle of all Action wheresoever it is he is guilty of a great Paradox in Philosophy and a greater in Divinity Personality is properly the Principle of no Action a Person is the Principium quod the Principle which acteth Nature is the Principium quo the Principle by which the Person acts Personality is but a necessary condition of a Being to enable it to act a causa sine qua non which is equivocally called a Cause or Principle Secondly Not the Personality of the WORD but the Humane Nature of Christ exerts the acts of Self-Consciousness Ibid. P. 72. lin 12. and other Humane Personal Acts the Humane Nature of Christ has all the Principles and Powers of Self-Reflection upon its own Acts otherwise Christ would not be a perfect Man P. 72. lin 21. N. 3. That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person is no less evident Since it is taken into and subsists in and by the Personality of the Second Person of the Trinity and therefore can have no distinct Personality of its own 1. Never was so obscure an Argument brought to prove so acknowledged a Conclusion Self-Consciousness is not the formal reason of Personality in finite Persons because the Humane Nature of Christ in the Hypostatical Union is Self-Conscious and yet not a Person nay this latter no less evident than the former 2. 'T is a received Article of the Church That the Human Nature of Christ is not a Person but how to reconcile this with the Subtilties of the Schools is above my skill The utmost their Hypothesis will allow them to pretend to is That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD According to the Schoolmen the Humane Nature of Christ subsists and
is a Principium quod of all its own Actions equally with the Humane Nature of any other Humane Person they seem to me to strive to disguise the Heresy of Nestorius by saying That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD because it subsists by the Subsistence or Personality of the WORD To explain this a little The Schoolmen who under pain of Heresy assert but one singular absolute Substance in the Trinity found a great and almost insuperable difficulty so to explain the Incarnation that only the Person of the WORD and not the whole Trinity was incarnated or became Man This is an obvious enquiry What it is which was immediately united to the Humane Nature of Christ so as to denominate Christ both God and Man To assert that the singular common Divine Nature was immediately united to the Humane Nature was to assert the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since whatever belongs to the common Divine Nature immediately belongs equally to the whole Trinity it remains therefore according to them that only the Mode of Subsistence of the WORD was immediately united to the Humane Nature This Answer has visibly many difficulties in it which may be considered hereafter Now I am only to enquire how it denies the Humane Nature of Christ to be a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD The Humane and Divine Nature of Christ have say they but one singular Mode of Subsistence Well grant that possible What follows The Schoolmen say that then they are not two distinct Persons I cannot for my life see the Consequence That Maxim of the Law Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona oequum est ac si concurrerent in duobus may be as I conceive applied here If we suppose it possible for one Personality to constitute two distinct Natures each a Person it is a meer wrangle of a term to deny these two Natures to be two distinct Persons they have all the Properties of two distinct Persons they are two distinct Principia quoe equally with two other Persons The Animadverter does not barely alledge these to me unintelligible Subtilties of the Schools as the only defence of the sacred Article of the Incarnation against Nestorianism but in his third and next Argument to prove that Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in finite Persons He unwittingly I charitably presume has endeavoured to overthrow the defence which the most Learned and Orthodox Fathers of the Church have given us of this sacred and mysterious Article P. 73. N. 4. The Soul of man is Self-conscious and yet not a Person therefore c. P. 74. lin 22. If the Soul be a Person then the Body must be joined to it by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the Soul as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the composition and constitution of a man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no Body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an one as makes a compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed has in this spoke the sense of the Catholick Church For as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is one man so God and Man is one Christ that is One not by Confusion of Substance but by Unity of Person I hope no True Son of the Church of England nor indeed Candid Lover of the Article but will pardon my digression if it deserve to be called such to vindicate this Similitude whereby the most Learned Fathers of the Church have endeavoured to illustrate and defend this Article against all its Heretical Opponents The Animadverter first objects That then the Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Vnion Alas Obj. 1. How extremely afraid are some persons of having the Articles of their Faith found agreeable to the common Principles of Reason If by an Hypostatick Union he means that the Soul and Body of Man only subsist by the same singular Mode of Subsistence and that nothing but the Mode of the Subsistence of the Soul is immediately united to the Body I do assure the Animadverter that I believe not a Syllable of this I do not believe that one Mode can modify two Subjects or that a corporeal Body can be terminated perfected by a Mode of an incorporeal nature such as the Soul is Figure is a Mode of quantity and yet to me it seems unconceivable that a Giant should be terminated by the figure of a Dwarf without any alteration of his quantity or that a Dwarf should have the figure of a Giant and yet not altered in quantity Less am I able to conceive that the Humane Nature of Christ should be terminated by a Mode of Subsistence which belongs to a Divine Nature Secondly Obj. 2. If the Constitution of a Man be an Hypostatick Union then an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an One as makes a compound Hypostasis will not be quite different things then the Hypostatick Union in Christ will be also an Hypostatick Composition and then the Person of Christ will be a compound Hypostasis Well and what follows from all this why nothing but a threatning of the Animadverter's That in due time we shall be taught the Falshood of all this But not to await his due time I answer that to say that the Hypostatick Union in Christ is also an Hypostatick Composition or which is the same that Christ is a compound Hypostasis is so far from being a Paradox that it is the received Language not only of the Greek Fathers but of the Councils Syn. 5a. Constantin Can. 4. Sancti Patres docuerunt unitatem Dei verbi ad carnem animatam anima rationali intellectuali secundum compositionem Theodori autem Nestorii sequaces divisione gaudentes affectualem unitatem introducunt Sancta Dei verò Ecclesia utriusque perfidioe impietatem ejiciens unitionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur Vide Can. 7um hujus Concilii Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. Hear Petavius's Confession Christi Domini Hypostasin sive personam à plerisque Patribus dici compositam ex naturis duabus ut ab Cyrillo Damasceno Maximo aliis To which add what the Learned Suarez hath observed Suarez de
Incarn Q. 2. Disp 6. sect 4. p. 194. Ibid. p. 193. Alii Patres licet non apertè utantur nomine compositionis aliis tamen quoe perinde esse videntur utuntur ut adunationis copulationis ex duobus conjunctionis c. Illa vero particula ex planè designat compositionem The phrase of the Hypostatick Union is most opposite to the Heresy of Eutyches who believed that there was not an Union of Two Natures but a Confusion of One of them But the phrase of the Hypostatick Composition is most opposite to the Nestorian Heresy who asserted a kind of Hypostatic Union that is an Union of Two Persons and denied that Christ God and Man was One Person compounded of Two Natures The Animadverter shews his skill in this Controversy to oppose these two phrases and to condemn that phrase of an Hypostatick Composition which the Church has received As great an Opiniator as the Animadverter is I believe he will scarce have the confidence to say that he can teach these great Fathers of the Church how to speak in this Mystery I promise faithfully to attend him when ever he begins The Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person P. 75. lin 4. N. 5. Forasmuch as a Part is an incomplete Being and therefore in the very nature of it being designed for the completion of something else must subsist in and by the subsistence of the Whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a subject of inherence or dependence so that it is a direct Contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul a Part does irrefragably prove it not to be a Person I answer That to be a Part and a Person in a simple Person in a Person consisting of one Nature I confess to be contradictious and impossible 2dly To be the inferior part in a compounded Person to be in any Actions an Instrument a Principium quo as the Body in the mixt Actions of Sense is to the Soul is contradictory to the Notion of a Person A Person as such is the Principium quod of all the Actions which proceed from it but to be the superior Part in such Composition is very compatible with the Personality of such superior Nature For such superior Nature may very well retain its own proper Mode of Subsistence if we explain Personality with the Schools such a superior Nature retains all the Perfections all the natural Perfections of a whole and complete Being is a Principium quod not only of its own natural Actions but of the mixt Actions of the whole compounded Hypostasis Such a superior Nature may be a Person and at the same time in a large acceptation of the term a Part that is a Part as Aristotle defines that term Arist 4. Met. cap. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that into which any thing is divided or of which that consists which we call a Whole in which sense of the term Part the Learned Petavius is not afraid to call the Divine Nature of the WORD a Part laxius sumpto partis vocabulo Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. I must pass over the Animadverter's boldness in determining That a Part subsists by the subsistence of the Whole which is very near asserting an Hypostatical Union of every substantial part Others who embrace these Scholastical Subtleties chuse rather to assert That a Part subsists by a partial subsistence and that the subsistence of the Whole is compounded of the subsistence of the Parts So when the Animadverter tells us that a Person does not subsist in any other as a subject of dependence I must crave his pardon for I thought before that every Creature had subsisted in God as a subject on whom we depended that in him we live and move and have our Being P. 75. lin 16. N. 6. If the Soul in the composition of a man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the constitution of the Man then a Man would be an imperfect accidental and not a perfect natural compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Vnum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce into one Mutatis mutandis this is the Great Socinian Objection against the Incarnation of the Son of God That Infinite and Finite cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One that God and Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the name of the most unnatural compound and mixture The same Answer will satisfy both Objections To confound the two Natures of God and Man or of Soul and Body would confessedly make the most unnatural compound and mixture But we maintain an Union in both Cases and not a Confusion The Divine Nature retains all the Perfections of a Divine Person in the Composition and the Human Nature by the Composition loses none of the natural perfections of the Human Nature It cannot indeed properly be called by the metaphysical name of a suppositum as becoming an Instrument a principium quo to the superior Divine Nature but then thereby it becomes capable of being an Instrument in the noblest Acts of the Mediatorial Office which subsisting by it self it was uncapable of So the Soul in the Constitution of Man retains all the Perfections of a separate intellectual suppositum nor did any Philosoper ever assert that an Human Body was more imperfect than a Stone notwithstanding this latter is a suppositum and the former not The Human Body by the Composition is an Instrument a Principium quo to the Soul an Instrument in the mixt Actions of Sense which of it self it was uncapable of And if a Stone could speak it would never complain if God should miraculously change it into an Human Body notwithstanding the compleatness of a suppositum and the incompleatness of an Inferior Nature in an Hypostatick Composition Secondly The Animadverter mistakes that which Philosophers call Vnum per Accidens for that is when two Beings which differ toto Genere as Substance and Accident are united Such an Union say they is accidental and consequently the Compositum not Vnum per se but Vnum per Accidens Or when two Compleat Beings are united as in all Artificial Works where each part is a distinct suppositum which is more properly called Aggregatum per Accidens But the Divine and Human Nature the Soul and Body differ not toto Genere each are Substances and so are capable of a substantial Union which suffices to denominate the Compositum Vnum per se and not Vnum per Accidens Again The Divine Nature is and remains compleat in the Composition the Humane Nature subsists ad modum partis in the nature of a part of an Instrument in the
by which the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we shall hardly find a fitter than to say that it exists in it as an Adjunct in the Subject For it is certain that it does not exist in it as a Part in the Whole since by this means the Second Person in the Trinity must till his Incarnation have wanted one part of his person But I shall not be positive in the application of this term here This Sacred Article of the Incarnation of the Son of God deserves a particular Treatise by it self However I could not in the Interim forbear to vindicate it from those Misrepresentations the Animadverter has unwittingly I charitably presume put upon it The Animadverter did not understand or not consider the relation of an Adjunct to a Subject or he would never have made this Application in reference to the Hypostatic Union of the Humane Nature of Christ to the Person of the WORD Where a Substance is an Adjunct the Adjunct is predicated of the Subject more Accidentis after the nature of an Accident This the predicament of Habitus might have informed the Animadverter We say not that a man is his Cloaths but that a man is cloath'd so that if the Humane Nature of Christ be barely an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD we could not say that the WORD was or became Man but only that he was externally cloathed with Humanity Secondly The Animadverter confutes himself when he tells us That the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A substantial Adjunct can never exist in its Subject but only an accidental Adjunct as a Quality c. If the Humane Nature exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it must in some sense be a part of the Person of the WORD Thirdly Nor is there any Absurdity in acknowledging the Humane Nature to be a part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay very learned persons have not scrupled to call the Person of the WORD a Part of Christ taking that term Part in a large sense and abstracting from the imperfections which are included in the common acceptation of it The Person of the WORD is not an imperfect Part nor the Humane Nature a Part in such Sense that the Person of the WORD wants such Part to complete it In an Hypostatical Composition the Inferior Nature is in some Analogy a Co-part in other respects an Adjunct and of necessity imperfect but to be the superior Nature in such Composition infers no Imperfection But of this more hereafter One and the same undivided Existence P. 34. lin 28. N. 11. as well as one and the same Essence or Nature belongs to all the Three Persons equally whereas yet every Person has his own distinct Subsistence by himself There is not a more intricate Dispute amongst the Schoolmen than this which the Animadverter argues from as a Principle To assert above one singular Existence in the Trinity thô the Sacred Scriptures expresly multiply this Attribute I and the Father are One these Three are One was to give up the Hypothesis of the Schools of the singularity of the common Divine Nature But the Schoolmen were at a loss Probabilius tamen ac verius existimamus illam substantiam singularem quae communis est tribus personis ut sic subsistentem esse ex se essentialiter habereque unam subsistentiam absolutam essentialem tribus personis communem haec enim sententia communiter recepta est à Theologis utriusque Scholae D. Thomae Scoti ab aliis etiam Suarez Metaph Disp 34. Sect. 1. N. 3. when they came to enquire into the Modus of this singular Existence There are but two Modes of a substantial singular Existence incomplete which belongs to a substantial Part complete which belongs to a Suppositum Complete Existence is but another Phrase for Subsistence and so there will be but One undivided Subsistence of the whole Three Persons and this the whole Party of the Thomists and Scotists affirm and call it an absolute essential Subsistence so little did the Animadverter understand these Disputes The acute Petavius could not here keep pace with the Schoolmen all Antiquity knew nothing of this Essential Subsistence he embraces the former and attributes one singular incomplete Existence to the Divine Nature Now certainly this Learned Person strained very hard to ascribe something incomplete to the Divine Nature I will give the Reader his own words Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 12. Sect. 13. p. 421. Non enim de tali Existentia hîc agimus quoe perfecta completae substantioe propria sit sed quoe formis imperfectis Rebus ex quibus quasi componitur quippiam congruit P. 35. lin 11. N 12. Now whatsoever Being or Nature this Mode of Subsistence does belong to that is properly called a Suppositum And the consequence of this is That as Subsistence makes a Thing or Being a Suppositum so Suppositality makes it incommunicable This is worse Heresy to the Schoolmen than the phrase of three infinite Minds They acknowledge this in finite Beings or Natures but affirm the quite contrary in the Divine Nature Not the Absolute Essential Subsistence renders the Divine Nature a Suppositum but the Divine Relation whether it be Paternity Filiation or Procession according to the Schoolmen constitutes the Divine Nature a Person or Persons Secondly Not the Subsistence with a relation renders the Divine Nature incommunicable but only the Divine Person incommunicable Subsistence in finite Beings renders that particular Nature as well as Person incommunicable but in the Divine Nature only the Person P. 35. lin 30. N. 13. So that as a Suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens so the Ratio intellectiva being added to this makes it a Person which is a farther perfection of Suppositality I only ask the Animadverter Whether he acknowledges three Suppositums in the Trinity And whether the Objection of three Substances is not as strong against that Confession from this Definition of a Suppositum as himself brings against the phrase of three infinite Minds 2dly Ratio intellectiva is a farther perfection of a Suppositum but not of Suppositality A Beast as truly as perfectly subsists by its self as a Man Rationality is a Perfection a Mode taking that term in a large sense of Animality but not a Perfection or Mode of Subsistence If it be here asked P. 36. lin 3. N. 14. Whether Subsistence or Suppositality added to bare Nature does not make a Composition I answer That in created finite Persons it does but not in uncreated and infinite And the reason is because tho all Composition implies Union yet all Union is not therefore Composition but something higher and transcendental So that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity the Divine Nature and Personal Subsistence coalesce into one
plead those Sacred words of their Law I am the Lord thy God Thou shalt have no other Gods before me That all their Doctors for the space of two thousand Years interpreted those words in their Natural sense viz. as spoke of one Divine Person What shall we say to this Objection Did God suffer the wisest of the Heathen Philosophers the most Pious Persons of the Jewish Religion to believe an Heresie of him for so many Ages Did God speak of himself in the most Sacred part of the Law in such words which Naturally lead to Heresie For I and me Naturally lead to the belief of one Person speaking This is the great Objection with which the Socinians flourish An Answer to which would be of more worth than a thousand such Books of Inadversions as the Socinian Considerer calls these Animadversions Considerations on the Explications c p. 23. For my own part I cannot be so fond of the Subtilties of the Schools as for the sake of them to confess so harsh a Conclusion I do most firmly believe that the Faith of a Trinity of Divine Persons and the Article of the Unity of God as it was believed by the wisest of the Heathens and the Jewish Church are by no means inconsistent The whole Truth was not revealed to the Jewish Church or at least so very obscurely that very few of them understood it But yet I verily believe that what was revealed was a most Sacred truth I believe that the God whom the Heathen Philosophers by the Light of Nature worshipped was one Divine Person I believe that the same one Divine Person spake of Himself in those Sacred words of the Law I am the Lord thy God c. I also believe that this One Divine Person was the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ Nor does this contradict that common Article of the Christian Faith viz. That God is Three Persons as the Socinians vainly pretend and some others unwarily grant them God is not three Persons as he is Just or Good or Holy as if three Persons were Essentially included in the Divine Nature For then no one single Person could by himself be God then there could not be a Son of God or a Spirit of God When God is said to be three Persons the term God is taken in a Logical sense equivalent in Predication to a terminus communis or a Species and signifies that the Divine Nature subsists in three Persons that this term God is truly predicable of three distinct Persons But a further disquisition of this Difficulty belongs to my Second Part. The Animadvertor accuses the Reverend Dean of giving a scurvy stroke at the Trinity p. 135. lin 7. n. 19. p. 89. where he the Reverend Dean affirms that the Expression of the one true God and the only true God cannot properly be attributed to the Son nor Holy Ghost Ibid. l. 19. and consequently if he asserts that these terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to and predicated of the Son and Holy Ghost we have him both Arian and Macedonian together in this Assertion First The Reverend Dean never asserted that the Son or Holy Ghost could not properly be called the one God or only true God only that they could not so properly be stiled so as the Father The Fathers of the Nicene Council indeed of the whole Eastern Church did expresly appropriate the Title of One God to the Father and God of God to the Son by which Opposition it appears that by One God in the first Article of the Creed they meant a God of himself which is a Personal Attribute and peculiar to the Father Our Saviour appropriates this Title of Only true God to the Person of the Father Hilary lib. 3. de Trin. and St. Hilary who was never hitherto esteemed either an Arian or Macedonian expresly asserts this to be Debitum Honorem Patri St. Paul has patronized this Appropriation Ephes 4.6 To us there is one God and Father Now for my part I had rather be esteemed an Heretick Arian and Macedonian with my Saviour St. Paul St. Hilary all the Oriental Fathers than Orthodox with the Animadvertor and Bellarmin I do assure him that I am neither afraid of him nor the Socinians I crave no Favour at either of their Hands for this Profession of my Faith That the Title of one God only true God is a Proper Personal Prerogative of the Father alone p. 138. lin 21. n. 20. And as for the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity I hope he looks upon the Expression only as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense for fear the Consequences of it may engage him too far to be able to make an handsome Retreat which I assure him if he does not take heed they certainly will Oratio contra gregales Sabellii propè initium Athanasius tells us that we might rightly call the Father the only God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he only is unbegotten and he only is the Fountain of the Deity This learned Father has hitherto been esteemed the very Test of Orthodoxy in this Mystery The Reverend Dean's Notion and Phrase is borrowed from him who would not have thought himself safe under so Venerable a Name But alas the World is strangely altered Athanasius himself must come to School to the Animadvertor to learn how to speak I hope he that poor Novice Athanasius looks on the Expression as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense I hope also that I may be allowed to vindicate this Phrase of that great Light of the Church from the Exceptions of a bold Animadvertor May I in the Name of Athanasius enquire of this great Critick which of these two words Fountain or Deity are to be interpreted Metaphorically That of Fountain is plainly Metaphorical Athanasius was never so weak as to believe that the Deity was a River of Waters and the Father the Fountain of it If the Animadvertor means that this term Deity is Metaphorical I must require his Proof and not his Affirmation Again neither Athanasius nor any of the Ancient Fathers ever intended by this Phrase that the Father is the Fountain of the Deity that he was the positive Fountain of the Divinity in his own Person any more than Philosophers and Divines mean that God was the cause of Himself when they say that God is of Himself Athanasius added to avoid the suspicion of such an absurd sense that he was unbegotten as well as the Fountain of the Deity What then is the fault of this Phrase of Athanasius Why alas poor Athanasius was unacquainted with the subtilties of the Schools He said plainly and bluntly that the Father was the Fountain of the Deity whereas he ought to have said Animadv c. p. 191. lin 10. That he was the Fountain of the two other Divine Persons To say
the Animadvertor they are three Infinite Minds in the highest sense The Animadvertor charges the Phrase of three Infinite Minds with the grossest Tritheism it immediately and unavoidably infers three Gods Preface pag. II. The Reverend Dean pleads the Authority of the Nicene Fathers that they had said as much nay more than he they had asserted a Specifick Unity of the Trinity which in the Animadvertor's Judgment implies a multiplication of the Divine Nature that is three Infinite Spiritual Natures whereas three Infinite Spirits in the bare Phrase implies no more than that there are three possessing one Infinite Spiritual Nature Now I presume if the Dean or rather if Petavius and Dr. Cudworth were not mistaken the Animadvertor will abate something of his Confidence he will hardly have brow enough to say That the Notion of the Trinity which the Nicene Fathers advanced was a silly Heretical Notion immediately and unavoidably inferring three Gods The same Request I make to all my Orthodox Readers that they will be pleased to lay aside their Prejudice against the Admission of a Specifick Unity in the Trinity till this Historical Truth be fairly determined The Nicene Fathers Judgment is not indeed the Rule of our Faith but it deservedly demands a Veneration from all Modest and Pious Christians and is infinitely to be preferred before the bare Authority of the Schoolmen or Moderns The Animadvertor Answers n. 3. p. 174. lin 16. I must confess my self very unfit to take such great and truly learned Persons to task and that upon comparing this Author the Reverend Dean and Petavius together I find much more Reason to believe that he mistook the meaning of Petavius than that Petavius could mistake the meaning of the Fathers If the Animadvertor is unfit to take two such learned Persons to task why does he contradict their Judgment Why does he call it a traducing misrepresenting the Fathers Why does he so confidently aver That the Fathers never mark that word never used the Example of three or more individual Men agreeing in the same Nature as a parallel instance of the same sort or degree of Unity He should have added p. 175. lin 5. of Nature with that which is in the three Divine Persons The Fathers never believed indefinitely universally the same Unity betwixt Humane Persons as betwixt the Divine Persons nor is that the Question but whether they believed the same Unity of Nature betwixt the latter as is confessedly betwixt the former A Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature if we for once only suppose such an Unity has quite different Consequences from what a Specifick Unity of a created Humane Nature implies which yet alters not the Unity of each Nature Well but the Animadvertor has compared the Dean and Petavius May I ask him why he did not also consult Dr. Cudworth He gives him a Complement in the foregoing Lines his Piece is not so rare but it might easily have been procured He was a Protestant Divine a Person of great and deserved Repute for Learning and Skill in Antiquity and which is more gives judgment against himself He himself embraces the Platonick Hypothesis which infers a Generical not Specifical Unity of the Trinity He lays a very severe charge to this Notion of a Specifick Unity It seems plain that this Trinity of St. Cyril and such who believe a Specifick Unity is no other than a kind of Tritheism and that of Gods independent and co-ordinate too The Platonick and Nicene Hypothesis of the Trinity both agreed in this that the common Divine Essence was an Universal They differed in this that the Platonists held the Divinity to be a genus and consequently capable of admitting degrees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the distinct Divine Persons The Nicene Fathers held the Divinity to be a Species capable of no degrees of no essential degrees but that Father Son and Holy Ghost are perfectly equal touching the Godhead in the words of the Athanasian Creed The Godhead of the Father Son and Holy Ghost is all one the Glory equal the Majesty co-eternal I say the Testimony of this learned Person is of the more weight as being against his own Judgment We naturally in such cases weigh the words of an Author with more exactness when his Authority makes against us than when it agrees with us Him therefore we have left us as an unanswered Witness What does the Animadvertor say to Petavius Has the Reverend Dean misrepresented Petavius or not Why does not the Animadvertor speak plain Why does he keep a muttering between his Teeth That he finds more reason to believe that the Reverend Dean mistook the meaning of Petavius than that Petavius could mistake the meaning of the Fathers We want a categorical Answer whether Petavius did represent a specifick Unity of the Trinity to be the meaning of the Fathers and if he did so whether in so doing he mistook their meaning and sense This question which was too hard for the Animadvertor I will answer for him but I cannot promise to his good liking The Reverend Dean did not mistake the meaning of Petavius as might be proved from innumerable places of Petavius I shall content my self with two only Petav. l. 4. de Trin. cap. 7. S. 2. In hoc uno Graecorum proesertim omnium judicium opinionesque concordant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id est essentiam sive substantiam sive naturam quam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant generale esse aliquid commune ac minimè definitum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verò proprium singulare circumscriptum Ibid. c. 9. S. 1. Again Antiquorum plerosque dicentes audivimus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive naturam commune quiddam esse multis quod universale vocant Hypostasim verò idem atque individuum sive singulare These words are capable of no Evasion Petavius in express terms declares that according to the Judgment of all the Greek Fathers the common Divine Essence is Generale quippiam as opposed to singulare is commune quiddam multis quod Vniversale vocant Thus Petavius as well as the Reverend Dean takes in the subject before us Common Nature and Specifick Nature to be all one Had the Animadvertor consulted the seventh and ninth Chapters of this fourth Book of Petavius concerning the Trinity he could neither have doubted of Petavius's Judgment nor well of that of the Ancient Fathers Well the Animadvertor has a Refuge for himself if Petavius has given his Judgment against him in the immediate following words n. 4. But however I shall lay down this as a Conclusion which I take to be undoubtedly true p. 174. ib. viz. That the Ancient Fathers as well the Nicene as those after them held only a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature That is in other words They held and acknowledged one Numerical God and no more This Conclusion I hold and have good reason to believe that neither Petavius nor Dr. Cudworth shall be able to
wrest it from me I must put this into form and then the weakness of it will evidently appear The Argument of the Animadvertor is to this purpose If the Nicene Fathers held and acknowledged one Numerical God and no more then they held only a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature and if they held only a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity then they could not hold a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity But the Nicene Fathers and those after them held and acknowledged one Numerical God and no more c. that is A Numerical Unity of God infers a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons and a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons is inconsistent with a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons Now grant this last to be true in the Animadvertor's Sense what follows That the Nicene Fathers who held the Antecedent must also hold the Consequent By no means This indeed follows that they ought to have held the Consequent if they embraced the Antecedent not that they actually did It is a very weak Argument that such Persons embrace such a Conclusion because they hold such Premises from whence another believes that such a Conclusion does necessarily follow Secondly I must examine his Antecedent The Nicene Fathers held and acknowledged one Numerical God and no more This is ambiguously expressed The Nicene Fathers the whole Catholick Church holds and acknowledges one God and in what Sense God is one it is impossible he should be more For one and more than one are contradictorily opposed and therefore impossible to be verified of the same Subject in the same Sense But neither the Nicene Fathers nor the Catholick Church do so hold God to be one but they also hold God to be Three that is In a different Sense of the term God viz. God is Three in Persons that is When this term God is taken as equipollent with a Divine Person for undoubtedly the Catholick Faith is that there are Three Divine Persons The Jews Socinians Mahometans do indeed hold that there is but one Numerical God but one in Person that there is but one Divine Person but the Christian Faith is that Deus est unus Trinus Again The Numerical Unity of God does not determine the Modus of the Unity of the Trinity does not determine that there is a Trinity of Divine Persons and much less of what kind their Unity is Lastly It is a mistake though a common one that a Numerical Unity of the common Divine Essence and a Specifick Unity of the same Essence are inconsistent A common Essence must of necessity be Numerically One even in Three Humane Persons the Common Humanity the Species of Humanity is numerically One there is as strictly one Species of Adam Eve and Seth as there is one Person of Adam The Moderns indeed say that there are three singular Humane Natures of Adam Eve and Seth but it is a Contradiction to say that the singular Nature of Adam is common to Eve It is the Objection of the Animadvertor that a Specifick Unity in the Trinity would imply three singular Divine Natures in the three Persons of which afterwards But be that so still the common Divine Essence would be numerically One that is the Species of the Divinity would be but one or which is the same the common Divine Nature would be an Universal Petav. l. 4. de Trin. c. 13 14. This Observation alone will answer the greatest part of two Chapters wherein Petavius has endeavoured to impose upon his Reader as if the Nicene Fathers had believed a Singularity of the common Divine Essence whereas his proofs are only concerning a Numerical Unity of the common Divine Essence But there was a very good reason for the thing he was a Jesuit and those of his own Order and of his own Church would never have suffered his elaborate Work of the Trinity to have been published if he had not made a seeming Defence for the Faith of the Schools the Singularity of the common Divine Essence and that was impossible upon his Principles viz. The Authority of the Ancient Fathers he therefore shamm'd this of the Numerical Unity in the room of it St. Ambrose St. Augustin St. Hilary and others even of the Latin Fathers in express terms reject the Singularity of the Divinity There is one single passage of Maxentius which ascribes Singularity to the Divine Nature and another I have seen quoted from Anselm tending to the same purpose and these two are all I have ever met with which would have made a poor shew had they stood alone whereas for the Numerical Unity of the common Divine Essence Petavius might have transcribed half the Fathers but this I shall have occasion to mention again The Animadvertor's next refuge is n. 5. p. 175. lin 5. only his own positive ipse dixit that the Fathers always mark that word always alledged the Example of three or more individual Men agreeing in the same Nature either by way of Allusion or Illustration as it is the nearest resemblance of and approach to this Divine Unity of any that could be found in created Beings or else à minore ad majus To which I reply First that these two ways are really but one way what is only a near resemblance must in this debate be à minore ad majus Secondly The Animadvertor's Phrase is universal they always alledged it thus which supposes that not one single Father in any one single passage ever alledged it otherways and that the Animadvertor has examined every single passage and upon his own Experience finds it so Thirdly The Unity of three Humane Persons of three distinct proper Beings of three Substances of three Natures can never be the nearest resemblance of and approach to the Unity of one simple Substance or Being under three Relations An Unity that is barely Notional can never be the nearest resemblance of an Unity that is properly Real There are a thousand Instances in Nature of one simple Being under these Relations the single Person of Adam has three Relations The Animadvertor p. 167. calls it a jocular Argument an Argument fit to be answered by Laughter only to argue from three Humane Persons from Peter James and John to Father Son and Holy Ghost to the three Divine Persons yet here to serve a turn he acknowledges it to be the nearest resemblance of and approach to the Divine Unity that can be found in created Beings I am sure upon the Animadvertor's Principles I may well borrow the Poets words Risum teneatis amici since 't is in Sense as if he had said that three Substances is the nearest resemblance of and approach to one Substance that can be found in created Beings Fourthly This is so far from being an Argument à minore ad majus upon the Animadvertor's Principles that it
is justly esteemed by all the Moderns who follow the Schools one of the difficultest Objections against the Faith of the Trinity viz. that if three Humane Persons have three singular Humane Natures and consequently are so many Men why three Divine Persons should not also infer three singular Divine Natures and consequently be three Gods And the Answer that the School men and Moderns give is that the case is vastly different that the Unity of three Humane Persons is only Notional the Unity of the Divine Persons strictly real The Animadvertor himself p. 300. can tell you of a better Allusion and Similitude to the Union of the three Divine Persons The Vnion of Vnderstanding Memory and Will as one and the same Soul One simple Being with three Faculties is a nearer resemblance of one simple Being under three Relations than three simple Beings n. 6. But let us hear the Animadvertor himself explain this Argument p. 175. à minore ad majus If several individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature much less could this be said of the three Divine Persons To which I answer First Does the Animadvertor really believe that three Men cannot properly be said to have more than one Nature or not If he believes it What will become of his Objection that a Specifick Unity implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals What becomes of that famous Passage of his P. 270. that Substantiis Consubstantialibus will neither be Truth nor Sense I suppose he will not deny that several individual Men are Substantioe Substances in the plural Number nor yet that Consubstantialibus signifies of one Substance of one Nature I intreat him to answer this Question Are several Men Consubstantial or not Is Christ according to his Humanity Consubstantial with us Men or not Will he dare to say that the whole Catholick Church has neither spoke Truth nor Sense For the whole Church has ever professed a Belief of Christ's Consubstantiality with us Men. If the Animadvertor shall plead that it was the Sense of the Fathers that three Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature even that is sufficient for my purpose who am now enquiring only into the Judgment of the Fathers This is sufficient ad Hominem to the Animadvertor but for my Reader 's fuller Satisfaction I answer to the Point that so far as this Allegation is true 't is Impertinent and that so far as 't is pertinent 't is false 'T is an acknowledged Truth that the strictest Union that can be betwixt Humane Persons is but a resemblance an Allusion to that inseparable incomprehensible Union betwixt the Divine Persons But this is not the question concerning the Union of the Divine Persons indefinitely but concerning the Unity of their Nature The Fathers maintained that the Unity of the common Divine Nature was of the same kind and degree with the Unity of the common Humane Nature There is certainly a greater Union betwixt two Humane Persons who are dear and intimate Friends than betwixt two who are mortal Enemies There is a greater Union betwixt two Saints in Heaven than betwixt the best Friends on Earth And yet two mortal Enemies have the same Unity of Nature with the Saints in Heaven The Union of the Saints in Heaven is by our Saviour himself resembled to the Union of the Father and the Son John 17.22 That they may be one as we are one But these words no more denote an illimited equality than those other words of our Lord Matt. 5.48 Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect denote an equality in Perfection If we suppose three unbegotten unproduced Divine Persons three Fathers I cannot see how we can deny such to be Consubstantial since we acknowledge three Angelical Persons to be of one Nature and Substance yet three unbegotten Divine Persons three Fathers are to all the Ancient Fathers three Gods They did not therefore believe that a Specifick Unity was the only Unity of the Divine Persons that they were one upon no other account but if we can know their meaning by their words they did certainly believe a Specifick Unity And this I perswade my self the Animadvertor's Heart misgave him n. 7. He therefore comes in with a third Salvo p. 176. That he does not in the least deny but several Expressions may have dropped from the Fathers which if we looked no further might be drawn to a very inconvenient Sense That is in plain English several Expressions have dropped from them which assert if we look no further a Specifick Unity What from those Fathers who never alledged this Example as a parallel Instance but always used it by way of Allusion or à minore ad majus It seems the Animadvertor's always and never will bear an exception What Salvoe has he for this He gives it us in the following words But then also it is as little to be deny'd that the same Fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same Points here declared themselves in such terms as are very hardly if at all reconcileable to those occasional and accidental Expressions And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both it ought much rather to be taken from what was asserted by them designedly than what was asserted only occasionally Now it is well contrived to take the conclusion for granted he is to prove It seems that the Animadvertor would have things come to that pass that we must take his bare affirmation of a thing for a proof of it Petavius Dr. Cudworth the Reverend Dean of St. Paul's have asserted the quite contrary they have already equivalently denied it and the Animadvertor gives us his own ipse dixit that it is little to be denied Again the Animadvertor pretends no more than a difficulty or a doubt whether these designed expressions may not be reconciled to the occasional expressions The Animadvertor makes an if of it to him these latter are hardly if at all reconcileable with the former which is no great wonder since he believes tribus substantiis consubstantialibus to be neither truth nor sense since he believes a numerical Unity absolutely inconsistent with a Specifick Unity Lastly Why is the conclusion stronger than the premises Why does he make the conclusion positive Their meaning cannot be taken from both is the conclusion whereas the premises mentioned only a difficulty or a doubt They are hardly if at all reconcileable The Animadvertor was I believe n. 8. in some measure sensible of the weakness of these answers and therefore He provides a fourth Salvoe Ib. p. 176. viz. that the Orthodox Writers of the fourth and part of the fifth Century were chiefly exercised with the Arian Controversie And the Arians would not allow so much as a specifick Unity of Nature between the Father and the Son but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or sameness held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
in the proper and genuine Sense of the Phrase the Modes of Subsistence the Divine Relations are capable of an easie and fair Solution as I have formerly hinted chap. 1. n. 14. Upon the whole Matter in discoursing of the Trinity P. 245. l. 19. n. 9. Two things are absolutely necessary to be held and insisted upon One that each and every Person of the Blessed Trinity entirely contains and includes in himself the whole Divine Nature The other That each Person is incommunicably different and distinct from the other This one Sentence is a truly Golden one contains the fundamental Truth of this Article of the Trinity But to speak the truth it stands like a Parenthesis or like a forged Passage in an Author it has no connexion with what goes before it and the latter part is confuted by what follows These are the Animadverter's following Words And here if it should be asked How they differ P. 245. n. 10. and whether it be by any real distinction between the Persons What need of this Question which the preceding Words had so positively and orthodoxly determined each Person is incommunicably different and distinct from the other What ever is incommunicably different is certainly really different by a true real and not modal Difference The Animadverter answers P. 246. That the Divine Persons really differ and are distinguished from one another viz. by a Modal or lesser sort of Real difference according to which the Divine Nature subsisting under and being determined by such a certain Mode personally differs from it self as subsisting under and determined by another What is this but to tell us that he did not understand those former Words that each Person is incommunicably different from the other Can any thing be incommunicably different from it self He tells us that two Persons are the same self how is it possible that they can be more communicably the same The Person of the Father is Modally different from the Person of the Spirator but not incommunicably different The Person of the Father is the Divine Nature subsisting under the Mode of Paternity which Modally differs from it self under the Mode of Spiration But all this arises from a mistake of the Nature of Real and Modal Difference In a real Difference we say simply that the one is not the other according to the Animadverter p. 77. That wheresoever there are two distinct Persons we do and must by all the Rules of Logick and Grammar say that the one is not the other And the Rule is as true è converso that where we can say one is simply not the other there we must count two we must acknowledge a strictly real Difference Thus we say that the Father is not the Son that is the Subject of Paternity is not the Subject of Filiation In a Modal Difference the Negation is Modal secundum quid in some Mode or Respect The Person of the Father as a Father is not the Spirator But there needs no proof in so allowed a conclusion Not one Schoolman whom I have met with but is a better Divine and soberer Reasoner I will add and a sounder Philosopher than to affirm that the Divine Persons differ Modally or that a simple Negation can arise from a Modal Difference The first Rudiments in Logicks teach us That Negative Propositions are of a malignant Nature and universally remove the Predicate from the Subject and not under a certain Mode only The exactly learned and solid Forbesius as the Animadverter stiles him p. 251. in the same Chapter which he there quotes S. 19. declares that the Divine Persons differ really as that is distinguished from the greatest Modal Distinction Inter personas in Divinis est realis distinctio Forbesii Instr hist Theol. lib. 1. cap 35. S. 19. non tamen essentialis aut absoluta sed tantum Hypostatica seu personalis relativa secundum oppositionem personarum inter se internam relativam realem To whom I will add the words of the learned Suarez Lib. 3 de Trin. cap. 1. n. 3. p. 385. Vnaquaeque divina Persona in se spectata est vera res per se subsistens una non est alia Ergo est distinctio realis inter ipsas nam realiter distingui nihil aliud est quam esse veras res quarum una non est alia Again Distinctio modalis nunquam invenitur Ibid. n. 4. nisi intra eandem rem quae componitur vel aliquo modo coalescit ex illis rebus quae ita distingui dicuntur Vnde quod ita ab aliqua re semper est tanquam modus vel affectio ejus ut inductione facile constet ideò in Deo non habet locum hic modus distinctionis quae vere actualiter fit in re ipsa quia in eo non habet locum compositio nec modificatio vel affectio per aliquid a seipso actualiter in re distinctum à substantia Dei ergo sola superest distinctio realis quae inter divinas personas esse possit These words are very full and deny not only a modal Distinction betwixt the Divine Persons but any Modes in God for that Modes would inferr a Composition in God In the former abstracted Sense they are properly Personalities or personal Properties P. 249. lin 9. n. 11. By the Animadverter's Favour Personality and a personal Property are distinct Things Differentia and Proprium are different Species of predicables Where the difference is unknown to us as in all Individuals in all singular Persons we use the Properties or a Collection of Accidents in the Definition instead of the Difference but this alters not the Nature of the Properties or Accidents Thus the Ancient Fathers described the Divine Persons by their Personal Properties These are the Animadverter's own words Anim. p. 88. Self-consciousness is one property of a rational or intelligent Being suppose of an Angel then it will be a Property of a Person or Personal Property Will the Animadverter grant that therefore it is properly in an Angel a Personality no the Argument holds the other way therefore it cannot be properly a Personality P. 249. lin 20. n. 12. For neither would the Latins at first admit of three Hypostases in God as taking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same thing for that they had no other Latin word to translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by but substantia by which also they translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 First The Animadverter falls into his old mistake that the Faith of this Article is That there are three Hypostases in God there are three Hypostases in the Trinity in the Unity of the Divine Nature but not in God Secondly St. Augustin scrupled nay condemned the phrase of three Persons as well as of three Hypostases Thirdly The Distinction of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requires us to distinguish betwixt first and
one Divine Person as Generation is a Personal Act proper and peculiar to the Person of the Father and distinguishes the Father from the Son and Holy Spirit Now Self-consciousness is an Absolute Attribute and upon that account cannot be esteemed Personal by the Schoolmen Self-consciousness is but one conception of Omniscience and will the Animadverter say That the Father has a distinct Personal Omniscience If he does he multiplies Omniscience with the Persons that is he multiplies the Divine Nature in such Person Self-consciousness as well as Mutual Consciousness to the Schoolmen is an Essential Act Father Son and Holy Ghost according to the Schoolmen as they have but one singular Divine Nature so they have but one singular Omniscience but one singular Self-consciousness and one singular Mutual Consciousness Every Act proceeds not only from some Agent but by vertue of some power to produce that Act Therefore a Personal Act must have a Personal Power a Personal principium quo The Personal Act of Generation by the Father supposes a Personal Power to generate peculiar to the Father A Personal Act of Self-consciousness therefore will imply a Personal Power to exert such Act that is a Personal Omniscience or a Personal Divine Nature Not therefore the Phrase of Three Infinite Minds but the asserting that Self-consciousness is a Personal Act does in the Judgment of the Schoolmen unavoidably infer Three Gods The Personality of every One of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative P. 98. lin 12. N. 3. and therefore nothing Absolute as Self-consciousness is can be the Formal constituent reason of their Personality The Conclusion and Consequence are granted to the Animadverter The Antecedent viz. That the Personality of every one of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative is also the General Assertion of the Schoolmen as Petavius observes Lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 10. sect 6. Paucissimi quidem è Schola Theologi vel opinati sunt vel probabile judicant personales proprietatès absolutum non-nihil habere à quibus meritò dissentiunt coeteri How universally soever this Conclusion is embraced by the Schoolmen and from them by the Animadverter I can scarce persuade my self that the Animadverter understood the meaning of the very Conclusion this I am sure of That his pretended Arguments to prove this Conclusion are the greatest Objections against the truth of it and that he all along betrays the grossest Ignorance of the Schoolmens meaning I will give the Reader his own words and then examine them And that the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative to one another and consequently that their Personalities are so many Relations is no less evident from this that two of them relate to one another as Father and Son and the third to both as proceeding from both and it is impossible for one thing to proceed from another especially by a continual act of Procession without importing a relation to that from which it so proceeds so that the very Personal Subsistence implies and carries in it a formal Relation For the Father subsists Personally as a Father by that Eternal Communication of his Nature to his Son which Act as proceeding from him is called Generation and renders him formally a Father and as terminated in the Son is called Filiation and constitutes him formally a Son and in like manner the Holy Ghost subsists personally by that Act of Procession by which he proceeds from and relates to both the Father and the Son So that that proper Mode of Subsistence by which in conjunction with the Divine Essence always included in it each of them is rendred a Person is wholly Relative and so belongs to one of them that it also bears a necessary reference to another From all which it undeniably follows that the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are in the formal Constitution of them Relative to one another and consequently that the Three Personalities by which they become formally Three Persons and are so denominated are Three Eternal Relations The Ancient Fathers confess That the Divine Relations constitute each of them a distinct Person that they enable us to conceive them distinct this therefore is not the question The question is Whether the Relations constitute each of them a Person indefinitely Spiration is a Relative Attribute in the Father relates the Father to the Holy Spirit but yet Spiration is not properly a Personality not properly the subsistential Form but a subsistential or personal Property A little to examine the Animadverter's proofs First The Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative This is too much more than ever any asserted before him A Person in the Blessed Trinity is God an infinite Mind but to be God to be an infinite Mind are confessedly absolute Attributes The Schoolmen say That the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative in their Personalities that is purely Relative secundum quid or in one Respect The Animadverter turns the Proposition into a simple Affirmation that they are in all Respects purely Relative Secondly The Divine Persons are purely Relative because two of them relate to one another as Father and Son and the third to both The Animadverter knows not the difference betwixt a Relative Person and a Person who sustains a Relation Adam is related to God to Eve to Seth yet none ever stiled Adam a Relative Person The Personality of Adam is not a Relation but a proper Mode of Subsistence which can never be conceived otherwise than Absolute Thirdly The Father subsists personally as a Father This is the question it self and by the Rules of Logick ought to have been proved and not supposed The sole Enquiry is Whether to be a Father and to be a Person or subsist personally be formally the same Paternitas sc Divina rationem fundandi non postulat ut in rerum natura sit nam si aliquam talem fundandi rationem haberet maximè generationem activam Illam autem non respicit ut rationem sui esse sed potius est in suo genere ratio cur ipsa sit In quo etiam Paternitas illa aeterna antecellit omnem aliam Paternitatem quae in coelo in terra nominatur Omnis enim alius Pater ideo est Pater quia generat Pater autem aeternus ideo generat quia per Paternitatem est constitutus in suo esse Personali Suarez lib. 5. de Trin. cap. 8. N. 8. p. 437. Fourthly The Father subsists Personally by an Act of Generation How can a Personal Act which supposes the Person already constituted be the formal Cause of Personality in the same Person The Schoolmen were wiser in their Generation they confess that if the Father is denominated a Father from his Act of Generation it is impossible that the Father's Paternity should be his Mode of Subsistence since it is impossible not to suppose a Person subsisting before we can conceive of him acting The first Person of
the Trinity say the Schoolmen is not therefore a Father because he generates but therefore generates because he is a Father Fifthly Filiation constitutes the Son formally a Son that 's not the question But does Filiation constitute the Son a Person that is the thing in debate and which the Animadverter ought to have proved Sixthly The very Personal Subsistence of these Persons implies and carries in it a formal Relation This is not sufficient to imply a Relation to carry in it a Relation except the Animadverter means that the Personal Subsistence is it self a Relation Again Subsistence in relation to a productive Principle which is all the Relation the Animadverter here mentions is a quite different thing from Personal Subsistence Every Human Person subsists relatively in Relation to God his Creator but what is this to his Personality This does not denominate an Human Person relative in his Personality The Son and Holy Spirit relate to the Father as their productive Principle but how does this prove them Relative Persons It is certain That to be a Father P. 101. lin 3. N. 4. is a Relative Subsistence A Father as understood in this Mystery viz. as implying the property of being unbegotten can have no Relation to a productive Principle A Father has indeed a Relation to a Son but the natural Order of conceiving things obliges us to conceive of a Person as subsisting before we can conceive him capable of the Act of Generation or of the Relation of a Father The Schoolmen therefore call this not a thing certain and evident but a Mystery and confess that unless the Father be so denominated antecedently to his Act of Generation it is impossible that the Father's being a Relative Subsistence or Person should be so much as true And having said thus much from the Animadverter concerning this Subtilty of the Schools viz. the Relativeness of the Divine Persons in their Personalities give me leave to consider it more generally And first it is no small prejudice with me against the Scholastick Subtilties that in this material Article all Antiquity for above a thousand Years have affirmed the quite contrary viz. that to be a Person is an absolute Attribute Petrus Abelardus Peter Lombard Council of Trent examined and disproved c. p. 79. August lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 6. Hugo de St. Victore who first shewed the way to School-Divinity saith the Learned Bishop of Worcester all agreed with St. Augustin That Pater dicitur ad se persona that the Father was absolutely and not relatively called a Person Indeed St. Augustin has given us an unanswerable Argument against this Assertion of the Relativeness of this Attribute of being a Person in this Sacred Mystery August lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 6. If to be a Person be a Relative Attribute as to be a Friend is then according to the nature of all Relatives the Father when denominated a Person must be defined by his Correlate and so of the other Persons that is to say that this Phrase viz. The Person of the Father cannot signify the Father but the Son And this Phrase viz. The Person of the Son cannot signify the Son but the Father for so it is in all other Relatives The Friend of James cannot be James but must be Peter or some other Person This is a just Consequence of this Scholastick Subtilty I need not note the Paradoxicalness of it To which I add as an Argument ad homines to the Animadverter and those who follow the Schools That to be a Person is as common to Father Son and Holy Ghost Animadv p. 113. as to be God is common to the Three If therefore this be a sure Rule that whatever Attribute is communicable is absolute to be a Person will be an absolute Attribute Si enim tres personae commune est eis id quod persona est St. August lib. 7 de Trin. cap. 4. as certainly communicable And they strain very hard to maintain this Scholastick Subtilty who deny that this Attribute of being a Person is common to Father Son and Holy Ghost save only in Name or aequivocally and yet this is a just consequence of asserting the Relativeness of this Attribute That which drove the Schoolmen to this novel and unintelligible Subtilty shall be considered hereafter P. 101. N. 5. Argument III. If Self-Consciousness be the formal reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing it self but that there might be Three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three P. 102. lin 1. c. Because this repugnancy if there be any must be either from the nature of Self-Consciousness or from the Nature of the Godhead But it is from neither of them For first there is nothing in the Nature of Self-Consciousness to hinder its Multiplication c. Nor in the next place is there any repugnancy on the part of the Godhead that Three thousand Self-Conscious Spirits should subsist in it any more than that Three should For the Godhead considered precisely and abstractedly in it self and not as actually included in any Person is as able to communicate it self to the greatest number as to the smallest This is an old Socinian Objection and were it of any force it would conclude universally against the Faith of Three Divine Persons viz. that if we once acknowledg a plurality of Divine Persons we can give no reason why we stop at the number Three we might equally assert Three thousand as well as Three For to suppose a Socinian retorting the Animadverter's own Argument against himself If Three distinct Modalities or Modes be sufficient to constitute Three Divine Persons then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing but that there might be Three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three Because this repugnancy if there be any must be either from the Nature of a Mode or from the Nature of the Godhead But it is from neither of them for first there is nothing in the Nature of a Mode to hinder its Multiplication into never so great a number of particulars but that there may be Three thousand or Three millions of Modes as well as Three Nor in the next place is there any repugnancy on the part of the Godhead that Three thousand Modes subsist in it or be sustained by it any more than that Three should For the Godhead considered precisely and abstractedly and not as actually included in any Person is as able to communicate it self to the greatest number of Modes as to the smallest Now there is not a surer sign that an Author does not understand the Subject he writes upon than his bringing an Objection which is so plainly and easily retorted upon his own Hypothesis The Animadverter cannot answer this Objection in the mouth of a Socinian but in the same words he will answer himself The Faith of
dicamus tres substantioe incommunicabiles seu relativoe Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 6. The Learned Suarez acknowledges the Divine Persons to be tres res tria entia but he thinks it better to add tria entia relativa to be tria aliquid No Protestant Writer can deny them to be tres per se subsistentes and in that sense tres substantias Indeed there never had been any scruple of this Phrase had not this term Substantia been ambiguous and sometimes signified the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence Whence the warm St. Jerom Quis ore sacrilego tres substantias proedicabit Whence himself says that there was Poyson in the term Hypostasis whereas there is neither Poyson in the one or the other term if rightly Interpreted P. 123. l. 13. n. 13. And Bellarmin a Writer Orthodox enough in these Points and of unquestionable Learning otherwise in his second Tome p. 348. about the end says that to assert that the Father and Son differ in Substance is Arianism And yet if they were two distinct Substances for them not to differ in Substance would be impossible Authority is very low with the Animadvertor when he takes shelter in Orthodox Bellarmin and lays hold on a dubious Expression in a plain case Every one knows that the Arians asserted that the Substance of the Son was not barely different in number but different in kind specifically different from the Substance of the Father and how impossible soever the Animadvertor judges it for two Substances not to differ in Substance the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon did expresly assert That Christ in his Humane Nature and we Men who are confessedly two Substances in number were consubstantial 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And I am perswaded that the unquestionably Learned and Orthodox Bellarmin if he were now alive nor the Animadvertor for him will have the Boldness to say that this term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to differ in Substance Again the Orthodox Bellarmin justified Calvin who ventured to Condemn that Expression of the Nicene Council that the Son was God of God and affirmed that the Son was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God of himself Dr. Bull. def fidei Nicaenae S. 4. cap. 1. n. 7. p. 439. Bellarmin thought this only a Dispute of a Phrase Verbi solum locutionis Such an Orthodox Person who can thus easily part with the Nicene Faith may easily find out a new sort of Arianism For to believe Father Son and Holy Ghost three co-equal co-eternal Substances Hypostases was not the Arianism which the Nicene Fathers opposed Since for one and the same Substance to be common to all three Persons p. 124. lin 4. n. 14 and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the three and thereby to distinguish them from one another is contradictious and impossible This is the Faith of the Schools that one and the same Substance one and the same singular Nature is common to all three Persons and withal belongs incommunicably to the Father quatenus ingenita incommunicably to the Son quatenus genita incommunicably to the Holy Spirit quatenus spirita See Animadv c. p. 160. This Faith the Animadvertor declares to be contradictious and impossible which is in his own words not to be able to forbear Writing and yet not know when one writes for and when against an Opinion p. 124. lin 8. n. 15. On the other side to assert two distinct Substances in each Person is altogether as absurd and that as upon many other Accounts so particularly upon this that it must infer such a composition in the Divine Persons as is utterly incompatible with the Absolute Simplicity and Infinite Perfection of the Divine Nature The Schoolmen who assert an Absolute Substance and a Relative Substance in each Divine Person deny a composition from hence for that the Absolute and Relative Substance are not united but identified one with another The Ancient Fathers asserted that the common Divine Nature and each single Hypostasis differed not really but only ratione from each other as Homo and Petrus Angelus and Michael in which cases there is no composition and therefore à majori there is no composition in a Divine Person p. 124. n. 16. Argument III. One Infinite Mind cannot be three Infinite Minds Nor three Infinite Minds one Infinite Mind Therefore the Divine Persons who are one Infinite Mind as they are one God cannot be three Infinite Minds This is the sum in short of his Third Argument which to swell up his Book and make a shew of he repeats backwards and forwards This Argument is a meer Fallacy equivocating in the term Mind or Spirit which is to be interpreted in a concrete or in an abstract sense When the Schoolmen say That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are one God they do not take this term God in a concrete sense but in an abstract sense Father Son and Holy Ghost are not habens Deitatem which is the concrete sense of this term God but either habentes Deitatem in the Plural Number or Deitas the Godhead it self in the Singular Number So the learned Genebrard Lib. 2. de Trin. p. 154 Nota Dei nomen aliter accipi in his enuntiationibus Pater est Deus Filius est Deus Spiritus Sanctus est Deus aliter in hac Pater Filius Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus Nam in primis Deus idem quod habens Deitatem quod quidem Personae congruit in postrema non simpliciter habentem Deitatem sonat sed ipsam potiùs Deitatem Now the Animadvertor himself will not say that tres habentes Deitatem cannot be one Essence nor that tres habentes infinitam spiritualem naturam cannot be one Infinite Spiritual Nature one Infinite Mind or Spirit in the abstract sense of the term in which only the Divine Persons are said to be one Infinite Mind or Spirit It is in a different sense of this term Infinite Mind or Spirit viz. in the concrete sense that we multiply it and say that three Divine Persons are three Infinite Minds And this Answers the Animadvertor's Fourth Argument drawn from the Athanasian Form p. 128. n. 17. which is grounded upon a false Supposition viz. That this term Infinite Mind is necessarily a Predicate perfectly Essential whereas p. 130. lin 17. when it is taken concretely it must be understood as a Personal Attribute viz. for habens infinitam spiritualem naturam which in the words of Genebrard personoe congruit The Animadvertor's Overplus p. 131. lin 2. n. 18. That the Heathens believed God to be one Infinite Mind cuts deeper than he is aware of For these same Heathens did as certainly believe that God was one single Person as well as one Infinite Mind Nay which is a far greater Objection the Jews God's own People not only did but to this day do most firmly believe that God is one Divine Person and
bare Phrase of it self therefore is not inconsistent with a Specifick Unity even according to the Moderns and much less with the Ancients according to whose Philosophy a Specifick Unity implied a strictly Numerical Unity of Nature in all the several Individuals It is an easie thing to say That the Ancients were mistaken in their Philosophy but not so easie to overthrow the learned Damascen's Reason viz. That then properly two Human Hypostases would not be Consubstantial Vrsin Expli Cate. Quest 33 n. 4. p. 196. This Conclusion the learned Vrsinus embraces Duo homines sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 qui tamen non sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But this is contrary to the Language of all Philosophers contrary to himself who a little before Determins that Christ Ib. Quest 33. p. 183. secundum humanam naturam habet multos fratres ejusdem naturae according to his Human Nature had many Brothers of the same Nature or Consubstantial Again the Definition is justly supposed to contain the Essence of any thing but a true and proper Definition contains only the Genus and Difference that is only the Species If we ask what is James or Peter We answer by the Difinition or Species that each of them is a Man or animal rationale but if according to the proper Rules of Philosophy the Essence of Peter and James is Singular We ought to add Singulare to animal rationale that is We must confound what is Personal in Peter and James with what is Essential the Notes of Singularity with the Genus and Difference A Second Corollary I shall deduce from the Philosophy of the Ancients in this Point is n. 15. That their denying Peter James and John to be properly called three Men is not so great a Paradox as some of the Moderns represent or rather mistake it They never doubted whether Peter James and John had three Souls and three Bodies they never denied them to be three distinct Substantial Beings three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is three Subjects in which the common Humanity did subsist they believed them properly three Hypostases which is all the vulgar mean by three Men The Debate is solely about a Phrase whether Peter James and John are more properly called three Hypostases in one Human Nature or three Men. The Former Phrase even the Moderns allow as also they confess that all Concrete terms such as Man is do Primarily signifie the Form and Secondarily assignifie the Subject in which such form subsists Thirdly the School-men themselves give this Rule concerning Deus Creator Dominus c. that because the Form signified by those Concrete terms cannot be Multiplied neither Deitas vis creatrix nor potentia Dominatrix are according to the School-men capable of Multiplication therefore neither are the Concrete terms Deus Creator Dominus capable of a Plural Predication Now by the same Rule this term Man ought not to be Plurally Predicated since according to the Philosophy of the Ancients Humanity the Form was not Multiplied in the several Human Hypostases Nor see I what a School-man can reply upon his own Principles save his own ipse dixit that the Ancients were mistaken when they asserted that Humanity was not Multiplied in the several Human Individuals For my own Part I esteem this one Reason why thase terms Deus Creator Dominus c. are not Multiplied but neither the sole nor chief Reason of the Singularity of their Predication nay further That the chief Reason why the Fathers of the Church from before the Nicene Council have Religiously observed a singular Predication of those Attributes is by no means applicable to the term Man in respect of several Human Hypostases so that I can very well comply with common Custom which calls Peter James and John three Men and yet believe that Father Son and Holy Ghost ought not to be called three Gods three Creators three Lords but this belongs to my Second Part of the true Notion of the Unity of God n. 16. A Second thing I shall crave leave to observe is that the School-men themselves that is the chief Leaders of them Thomas and Scotus were not averse to this Philosophy of the Ancients in immaterial Beings they determining that the Angelical Nature was not capable of Multiplication in the several Angelical Persons and consequently that the several Angels differed Specifically and that there could not according to some even by the Omnipotence of God be created two Angels in the same Species This several of the School-men thought more Eligible than to Parallel the Unity of the Divine Persons with Angelical Persons Common Custom Authorising the Phrase of different Angels as well as of different Men. The Foundation of this Assertion of the Schoolmen concerning the impossibility of different Angels within the same Species arose from their belief that Matter was the sole Principle of Individuation which is now generally disapproved However from Hence a fair Reason appears why none of the School-men embraced this notion of the Ancients of the Specifick Unity of the Trinity Si ergo Angeli non sint compositi ex Materia forma sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos Angelos unius Speciei Aquin. sum Quest 50. they thought such Unity impossible between immaterial Persons and it was down-right Arianism to assert a Specifick Essential difference betwixt Father Son and Holy Ghost and a worse Heresie to assert that Father Son and Holy Ghost had Bodies A Third thing I shall crave leave to observe is That Philoponus the famous Ring-leader of the Tritheit Hereticks was the first of the Ancients who asserted that a Specifick Unity implied a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals of the same Species n. 17. and that consequently not only three Human Persons had three distinct Human Natures which according to the Antients was an Error in Philosophy But also the three Divine Persons had three distinct Natures For which uncouth Phrase of three Natures in the Trinity and not for holding a Specifick Unity of the Trinity were Philoponus and his followers Stiled Tritheit Hereticks Philoponus himself as I believe His followers more certainly if we may Credit Eulogius were nearer Sabellius than the Faith of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eulogius Photii Biblioth Cod. ccxxx p. 879. to me has cleared this obscure Part of the Ecclesiastical History These Monophysitae Hereticks these Tritheist Hereticks for both these Heresies are charged upon Philoponus distinguished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 betwixt Nature and Essence and none but some of the Maddest asserted three Essences in the Trinity but only three Natures But the Othodox esteeming 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as equivalent gave the Name of Tritheit Hereticks to both Otherwise those who distinguished betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were so far
from believing three Gods that they did not as Eulogius there tells us believe that either Father Son or Holy Ghost were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly God and in the next words gives us their positive Faith that they esteemed the Personal properties to be the Persons themselves There may be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Personal property of what we conceive in the Nature of an Accident 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by Aristotle appropriated to Substance Again a Personal property an Accident or Mode can never be properly God So that these Hereticks as the Church then judged them believed one Essence with three properties they believed these properties to subsist or to be Hypostases How near the Animadvertor comes to them when he tells us Animadv c. p. 121. Ibid. p. 275. that the ternary Number belongs only to the Personalities that a Person here or in this Mystery imports a Mode or Relation c. that the Relations subsist I leave to Himself upon cooler consideration Pholii Biblio Cod. ccxxx p. 866. If he desires to see these Notions confuted He may please to consult Eulogius in the same place where He will find that Eulogius thought them scarce in their Senses that could imagine a Relation or Personal property could subsist or be a Person I was the more willing to explain this obscure Heresie since this is the eternal Harangue of the Socinians that the Faith of three proper Persons was condemned by the Ancients in the Person of Philoponus when yet at the same time they confess that the belief of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity was the Faith of the Nicene Fathers which two Opinions are inconsistent that they should condemn that for Heresie the worst of Heresies in Philoponus which they esteemed Orthodox in themselves and their own Party n. 18. Fourthly and lastly Though I see no necessity of Multiplying the Divine Nature if we assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity and less if we assert it in the Sense I only contend for that is for such a transcendental Unity which in our imperfect Conception of things must either be called a Specifick Unity or confessed to want a Name in our present Philosophy yet ex abundanti I am not afraid to declare to the Sociniuns that I would sooner acknowledge three Singular Divine Natures in the Trinity than deny the Faith of three Divine Persons A Singular Nature or Essence if we admit such a Notion in Philosophy is also a Personal Nature or Essence and whatever is Personal in the Divinity it self may be Multiplied nor have the Ancients sometimes scrupled the Phrase of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor Petavius that of Trina Deitas no more than Trinus Deus and genita and ingenita sapientia c. is of the same Import All I will say at present of these and the like Phrases is that they are fairly reconcileable with the true Notion of the Unity of God and no ways contradictions to Reason that I know of Both which I hope to evince in my Second Part where I shall also endeavour to explain the sense in which the Ancients used these different Expressions of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is evident that He the Reverend Dean makes Specifick sameness of Nature p. 186. lin 20. n. 19. and the Agreement of Things Numerically different in one and the same common Nature to signifie convertibly the same thing Well and what follows In this says the Animadvertor Ibid. He is guilty of a very great mistake by making those things the same which are not the same With the Animadvertor's leave the mistake lies wholly at his own door The Agreement of Modes Numerically different in one and the same common Nature and a Specifick sameness of Nature are vastly different But the Reverend Dean's words are the Agreement of Things Numerically different and it is the sense of all Philosophers that Things Numerically differing can only agree in one Specifick Nature The term Deus indeed is neither a Genus nor a Species p. 186. lin ult n. 20. Nevertheless all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis This great Dictator in Philosophy I find is yet to learn the first Rudiments in Logick A terminus communis in Logick is the same with a terminus Vniversalis with a terminus predicabilis and all Logicians I have had the Fortune to consult speak but of five Predicables Genus Species Differentia Proprium Accidens It is too great an absurdity for the Animadvertor to be guilty of to affirm that the term Deus is either Differentia Proprium or Accidens Besides that all the Arguments himself has brought against the Admission of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature are equally levelled against the Admission of the Universality of the common Divine Nature that is against this Assertion that Deus is a terminus communis Animadv p. 154. Essentia habet se per modum termini communis quia licet singularis sit tamen vere est in pluribus suppositis quare in praedicationibus fungitur munere vocis Vniversalis Bellarminus de Christo l. 2. c. 18. Well but do not all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis Shall I borrow his own words and answer that by this expression it would more than seem that He has read them all But by the conclusion that he has read none of them For not one single School-man or Modern who follow them do I verily believe allow this term Deus to be a terminus communis That famous Objection against the Faith of the Trinity which the Schoolmen and Moderns are so much concerned to answer viz. That if the Father is God and the Son is God the Father must be the Son grounded upon this Axiom Quoe sunt eadem unitertio sunt eadem inter se shews the judgment of the Schoolmen and Moderns that they take this term Deus to be a terminus singularis for that Axiom holds not in a terminus communis This indeed the School men and Moderns do hold that this term Deus is a terminus singularis communicabilis communicable by Praedication as a terminus communis but in it self a terminus singularis p 217. lin 2. n. 21. In God besides Essence or Substance we assert that there is that which we call Mode Habitude or Relation We cannot contemplate God as he is in himself a pure simple Act but to assert the existence of Modes in God from our imperfect Conception of things is peculiar to the Animadvertor but this falls in naturally in the next Chapter where we are to enquire whether the Personalities are proper Modes One thing I cannot omit the Animadverter tells us Ibid. That by one or either of these in Conjunction with Essence or Substance we give account of all the Acts Attributes and Personalities belonging to the Divine Nature What do we give
themselves differ that is by a strictly real difference The personalities of different persons always differ by the same difference by which the persons themselves differ that is by a strictly real difference The second of a Being differing from its own Mode is acknowledged to him The third viz. the difference of several things modified or affected is peculiar to the Animadverter never any Philosopher dreamed that several things differ by a modal difference they always differ by a strictly real difference However the Animadverter has here spoke a very great truth That the Divine Persons differ as several things but this utterly overthrows the Animadverter's Hypothesis According to him the Divine Persons differ not as several things but as one and the same Being under one Mode differs from it self under another Mode this is the only modal difference the Animadverter's Hypothesis requires and this with great profoundness of judgment he here omits The other three are nothing to the purpose had they been all never so true in Philosophy P. 33. lin 4. N. 8. Essence may be truly and properly defined That by which a thing is what it is that is to say by which it is constituted in such a kind or order of Being By Essence in this place the Animadverter understands what Metaphysicians call the Ratio Formalis of a thing that is he takes this term Essence in a transcendental sense in so large a sense that not only Substance Accident a mode of Being but even an Ens Rationis may be said to have an Essence for there is a ratio formalis of every one of these by which each of them is constituted respectively a Substance Accident Mode or Ens rationis Now to talk of truly and properly defining a Transcendental is the same blunder in Logicks as he would be guilty of in History who should enquire for the Father or Grandfather of Adam Every Novice in Logicks knows that a true and proper definition consists of a Genus and Difference and consequently that nothing but a Species is capable of a true and proper definition The supremum Genus in each predicamental scale is not capable of a strict Logical definition much less a transcendental Term that is transcendental to all the predicaments But this is the least part of the mistake according to this description of Essence there are at least Four Essences in the Trinity The Divine Relations of Paternity Filiation Procession have each their proper distinct ratio formalis by which each of them is constituted a relation of such a kind nay these Essences of the Divine Relations would differ Specifically for so Paternity differs from Filiation and all Divines acknowledge That the Absolute Divine Nature is a true proper Essence Aristotle appropriates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence to Substance First or Second So did the Fathers of the Church so do all the Moderns Translating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by consubstantial of one Substance Of which more hereafter As for Existence it self it may be defined P. 33. lin 27. N. 9. that Mode or Affection of Being by which a thing stands actually produced out of the Power of its Causes or at least not actually included in any cause in which sense God himself does exist Some few Schoolmen who have supposed that the Human Nature of Christ wanted a Proper or Created Existence have asserted That Existence is a Mode in Created Beings that is something added to the Thing or Being and consequently capable of being Substracted But these are very few and the Animadverter is of a contrary Opinion p. 35. The generality believe that Existence is only the Actuality of the Thing or Being and that all it adds to the Being is only a Negation in the Animadverter's words that the Being is not actually included in any Cause But not one single Divine I firmly believe before his own dear self ever affirmed that Existence was a proper Mode in God His very next words confute this assertion p. 34. that Existence is necessarily included in his very Essence but a Mode a thing added to the Essence cannot be included in the Essence Again in the same page he ascribes one single undivided Existence to the Three Divine Persons which if Existence were a proper Mode would be very difficult to be conceived How Three distinct Persons can be modified or affected with one single undivided Mode P. 34. lin 6. N. 10. The next Term is Subsistence which is a Mode of Being by which a thing exists by it self without existing in another either as a part in the whole or an Adjunct in the Subject I say an Adjunct not an Accident for a Substance may be an Adjunct Subsistence is strictly a Mode of Existence that is it modifies the Existence of a Substance and distinguishes the Existence of a complete Substance from the Existence of an incomplete Substance or Part. Two things are therefore implied in this term Subsistence 1. That the Being which is said to subsist is a Substance and not an Accident not a Quality c. 2. That it is a whole and complete Substance and not a part of some whole This is plain and easy and that which Subsistence adds to Existence may be only a negation of Incompleatness The Animadverter is not satisfied with the common definition of Subsistence but to shew us his profound skill in Philosophy and Divinity at one time has added to the vulgar description of Subsistence those remarkable words or an Adjunct to the Subject and lest we should not sufficiently take notice of it he repeats it with an Emphasis I say an Adjunct not an Accident for a Substance may be an Adjunct Now I must profess that I have always a prejudice against new Definitions both in Philosophy and Divinity commonly they only proclaim the mistake of the Inventer of them First He needed not have cautioned us against an Accident the former part of the Definition had secured sufficiently against such a mistake a Thing existing by it self can never be an Accident except our Animadverter believes Transubstantiation Secondly What a mighty Secret has he instructed the World in viz. That a Substance may be an Adjunct I would fain know one person that understood the meaning of the terms who ever doubted of it However I will endeavour to requite his kindness and inform him That a Suppositum may be an Adjunct nay which is more every substantial Adjunct unless Hypostatically united is a Suppositum or subsisting Being If the Animadverter ever saw a Woman with Child or a Nurse carrying a Child in her Arms he might have been convinced of the truth of this Assertion That a Suppositum may be an Adjunct Nay further Had this Paradox in Philosophy been never so true it is of no use in reference to the subsistence of the Three Divine Persons Well but it would explain the mysterious Incarnation of the Second And I think if we would assign a way Ibid.