whether it be a sin or not when he hath freedome to forbear it is a contempt of the Lawes and therefore by the 28. Art of the third Chapter a sin against the Law of nature Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into Active and Passive as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees which is a sinne against the Law of nature which is the Law of God or as â—…though they sinned not who sinne at their own perill Integer vitae sceâ—erisque purâ—s Non eget Mauri jaculis nec areâ— Nec venenatis gravida sagittis Fusce pharetra Sive per Syrtes iter aestuosas Sive facturus per inhospitalâ—… Caucasum vel quae loca fabulosus Lambit Hidaspis RELIGION CHAP. XV. Of the Kingdome of God by Nature I. The Proposition of the following contents II. Over whom God is said to rule by nature III. The word of God three-fold Reason Revelation Prophesie IV. The Kingdome of God two-fold Naturall and Prophetique V. The Right whereby God reigns is seated in his omnipotence VI. The same proved from Scripture VII The obligation of yeelding obedience to God proceeds from humane infirmity VIII The Lawes of God in his naturall Kingdome are those which are recited above in the 2. and 3. Chapter IX What Honour and Worship is X. Worship consists either in attributes or in actions XI And there is one sort naturall another arbitrary XII One commanded another voluntary XIII What the end or scope of worship is XIV What the naturall Laws are concerning Gods attributes XV. What the actions are whereby naturally wee doe give worship XVI In Gods naturall Kingdome the City may appoint what worship of God it pleaseth XVII God ruling by nature only the City that is to say that man or Court who under God hath the soveraign authority of the Cioy is the Interpreter of all the Lawes XVIII Certaine doubts removed XIX What Sin is in the naturall Kingdom of God and what Treason against the divine Majesty I. WEE have already in the foregoing Chapters proved both by reason and testimonies of holy Writ that the estate of nature that is to say of absolute liberty such as is theirs who neither govern nor are governed is an Anarchy or hostile state that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state are the Lawes of nature that there can be no civill government without a Soveraigne and that they who have gotten this Soveraigne command must be obey'd simply that is to say in all things which repugne not the Commandments of God There is this one thing only wanting to the complete undestanding of all civill duty that is to know which are the Laws and Commandments of God for else we cannot tell whether that which the civill power commands us be against the Lawes of God or not whence it must necessarily happen that either by too much obedience to the civill authority we become stubborne against the divine Majesty or for feare of sinning against God we runne into disobeditnce against the civill power To avoid both these rocks its necessary to know the Divine Lawes now because the knowledge of the Lawes depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome we must in what followes speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God II. The Lord is King the earth may be glad thereof saith the Psalmist Psal 97. v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist Psal 99. v. 1. The Lord is King be the People never so unpatient he sâ—teth betweene the Cherubins â—e the Earth never so unquiet to wit whether men will or not God is THE King over all the Earth nor is he mov'd from his Throne if there be any who deny either his existence or his providence Now although God governe all men so by his power that none can doe any thing which he would not have done yet this to speake properly and accurately is not to reigne for he is sayed to reigne who rules not by acting but speaking that is to say by precepts and threatnings And therefore we account not inanimate nor irrationall bodies for Subjects in the Kingdome of God although they be subordinate to the Divine power because they understand not the commands and threats of God nor yet the Atheists because they beleeve not that there is a God nor yet those who beleeving there is a God doe not yet beleeeve that he rules these Inferiour things for even these although they be govern'd by the power of God yet doe they not acknowledge any of his Commands nor stand in awe of his threats Those onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome who acknowledge him to be the Governour of all things and that he hath given his Commands to men and appointed punishments for the transgressours The rest we must not call Subjects but Enemies of God III. But none are said to governe by commands but they who openly declare them to those who are govern'd by them for the Commands of the Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd but lawes they are not if not perspicuously publisht in so much as all excuse of Ignorance may be taken away Men indeed publish their Lawes by word or voice neither can they make their will universally knowne any other way But Gods lawes are declar'd after a threefold manner first by the tacit dictates of Right reason next by immediate revelation which is suppos'd to be done either by a supernaturall voice or by a vision or drcame or divine inspiration Thirdly by the voice of one man whom God recommends to the rest as worthy of beliefe by the working of â—rue miracles Now he whole voice God thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others is called a PROPHET These three manners may be term'd the threefold word of God to wit the Rationall word the sensible word and the word of Prophecy To which answer the three nanners whereby we are said to heare God Right reasoning sense and faith Gods sensible word hath come but to few neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except particularly to some and to diverse diversely neither have any Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people IV. And according to the difference which is between the Rationall word and the word of Prophecy we attribute a two-fold Kingdome unto God Naturall in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason and which is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power by reason of that rationall nature which is common to all and Propheticall in which he rules also by the word of Prophecy which is peculiar because he hath not given positive Lawes to all men but to his peculiar people and some certaine men elected by him V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule and to punish those who break his Lawes from his sole irresistable power for all Right over others is either from nature or from Contract How the Right of governing
nature 135 CHAP. XVI Of his government by the old Covenant 261 CHAP XVII Of his government by the new Covenant 287 CHAP. XVIII Of those things which are necessary for our entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven 339 Rex est qui posuit metus Et diri mala poctoris Quom non ambitioâ—…potâ—ns Et nun quam stabilis fauor Vulgi praecipitis mouet Qui tuto positus â—oco Infra se viâ—et omnia Philosophicall Elements OF A true Citizen LIBERTY CHAP. I. Of the state of men without Civill Society I. The Introduction II. That the beginning of Civill Society is from mutuall fear III. That men by nature are all equall IV. Whence the will of Mischieving ariseth V. The Discord arising from comparison of Wills VI. From the Appetite many have to the same thing VII The definition of Right VIII A right to the end gives a right to the means necessary to that end IX By the right of nature every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation X. By Nature all men have equall right to all things XI This right which all men have to all things is unprofitable XII The state of men without civill society is a meere State of Warre The definitions of Peace and Warre XIII War is an adversary to mans preservation XIV It is lawfull for any man by naturall right to compell another whom he hath gotten in his power to give caution of his future obedience XV. Nature dictates the seeking after Peace I. THe faculties of Humane nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds Bodily strength Experience Reason Passion Taking the beginning of this following Doctrine from these we will declare in the first place what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare towards each other and whether and by what faculty they are born apt for Society and so preserve themselves against mutuall violence then proceeding we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this businesse and what are the conditions of Sâ—ciety or of Humane Peace that is to say changing the words onely what are the fundamentall Lawes of Nature II. The greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning Common-wealths either suppose or require us or beg of us to believe That Man is a Creature * born sit for Society The Greek call him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of Civill Society as if for the preservation of Peace and the Government of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary then that Men should agree to make certaine Covenants and Conditions together which themsâ—lves should then call Lawes Which Axiom though received by most is yet certainly False and an Errour proceeding from our too slight contemplation of Humane Nature for they who shall more narrowly look into the Causes for which Men come together and delight in each others company shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise but by Accident For if by nature one Man should Love another that is as Man there could no reason be return'd why every Man should not equally Love every Man as being equally Man or why he should rather frequent those whose Society affords him Honour or Profit We doe not therefore by nature seek Society for its own sake but that we may receive some Honour or Profit from it these we desire Primarily that Secondarily How by what advice Men doe meet will be best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met For if they meet for Traffique it 's plaine every man regards not his Fellow but his Businesse if to discharge some Office a certain Marketfriendship is begotten which hath more of Jealousie in it then True love and whence Factions sometimes may arise but Good will never if for Pleasure and Recreation of mind every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stirre up laughter whence he may according to the nature of that which is Ridiculous by comparison of another mans Defects and Infirmities passe the more currant in his owne opinion and although this be sometimes innocent and without offence yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the Society as their own Vain glory But for the most part in these kind of meetings we wound the absent their whole life sayings actions are examin'd judg'd condemn'd nay it is very rare but some present receive a fling before they part so as his reason was not ill who was wont alwayes at parting to goe out last And these are indeed the true delights of Society unto which we are carryed by nature i. e. by those passions which are incident to all Creatures untill either by sad experience or good precepts it so fall out which in many never happens that the Appetite of present matters be dul'd with the memory of things past without which the discourse of most quick and nimble men on this subject is but cold and hungry But if it so happen that being met they passe their time in relating some Stories and one of them begins to tell one which concernes himselfe instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too if one relate some wonder the rest will tell you miracles if they have them if not they 'l fein them Lastly that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser then others if they meet to talk of Philosophy look how many men so many would be esteem'd Masters or else they not only love not their fâ—llowes but even persecute them with hatred So clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider Humane affaires that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty or from vain glory whence the parties met endeavour to carry with them either some benefit or to leave behind them that same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some esteem and honour with those with whom they have been conversant The same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves of Will Good Honour Profitable For when we voluntarily contract Society in all manner of Society we look after the object of the Will i. e. that which every one of those who gather together propounds to himselfe for good now whatsoever seemes good is pleasant and relates either to the senses or the mind but all the mindes pleasure is either Glory or to have a good opinion of ones selfe or referres to Glory in the end the rest are Sensuall or conducing to sensuality which may be all comprehended under the word Conveniencies All Society therefore is either for Gain or for Glory i. e. not so much for love of our Fellowes as for love of our Selves but no society can be great or lasting which begins from Vain Glory because that Glory is like Honour if all men have it no man hath it for they consist in comparison and
it and who is strongest must be decided by the Sword VII Among so many dangers therefore as the naturall lusts of men do daily threaten each other withall to have a care of ones selfe is not a matter so scornfully to be lookt upon as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done otherwise for every man is desirous of what is good for him and shuns what is evill but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills which is Death and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature no lesse then that whereby a Stone moves downward It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his Body and the Members thereof from death and sorrowes but that which is not contrary to right reason that all men account to be done justly and with right Neither by the word Right is any thing else signified then that liberty which every man hath to make use of his naturall faculties according to right reason Therefore the first foundation of naturall Right is this That every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members VIII But because it is in vaine for a man to have a Right to the end if the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him it followes that since every man hath a Right to preserve himself he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means and do all the actions without which he cannot preserve himself IX Now whether the means which he is about to use and the action he is performing be necessary to the preservation of his Life and Members or not he himself by the right nature must be judg for say another man judg that it is contrary to right reason that I should judg of mine own perill why now because he judgeth of what concerns me by the same reason because we are equall by nature will I judge also of things which doe belong to him therefore it agrees with right reason that is it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion i. e. whether it conduce to my preservation or not 10. Nature hath given to every one a right to all That as it was lawfull for every man in the * bare state of nature or before such time as men had engag'd themselves by any Covenants or Bonds to doe what hee would and against whom he thought fit and to possesse use and enjoy all what he would or could get Now because whatsoever a man would it therefore seems good to him because he wills it and either it really doth or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing Article whether it doth or not in so much as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so and by the 7. Article it appeares that by the right of Nature those things may be done and must be had which necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members it followes that in the state of nature To have all and do all is lawfull for all And this is that which is meant by that coÌ„mon saying Nature hath given all to all from whence we understand likewise that in the state of nature Profit is the measure of Right In the meere state of Nature This is thus to be understood What any man does in the bare state of Nature is injurious to no man not that in such a State he cannot offend God or break the Lawes of Nature for Iujustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawes such as in the State of Nature there are none Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindfull Reader in the Articles immediately foregoing but because in certaine cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises I will contract this Argument and make it most evident to a single view every man hath right to protect himself as appears by the seventh Article The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end by the eight Article But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such by the ninth Article He therefore â—ath a right to make use of and to doe all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation wherefore by the judgement of him that doth it the thing done is either right or wrong and therefore right True it is therefore in the â—are State of Nature c but if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so he may offend against the Lawes of Nature as in the third Chapter of this Book is more at large declar'd It hath been objected by some If a Sonne kill his Father doth he him no injury I have answered That a Soâ—ne cannot be understood to be at any time in the State of Nature as being under the power and command of them to whoâ— he ownes his protection as soon as ever he is born namely either his Fathers or his Mothers or his that nourisht him as is demonstrated in the ninth Chapter XI But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common Right to all things for the effects of this Right are the same almost as if there had been no Right at all for although any man might say of every thing This is mine yet could he not enjoy it by reason of his Neighbour who having equall Right and equall power would pretend the same thing thing to be his XII If now to this naturall proclivity of men to hurt each other which they derive from their Passions but chiefly from a vain esteeme of themselves You adde the right of all to all wherewith one by right invades the other by right resists and whence arise perpetuall jealousies and suspicions on all hands and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an intention to oppresse and ruine though he come with a small Number and no great Provision it cannot be deny'd but that the naturall state of men before they entr'd into Society was a meer War and that not simply but a War of all men against all men for what is WAR but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declar'd either by Words or Deeds The time remaining is termed PEACE XIII But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of Man-kind or of each single Man a perpetuall War is But it is perpetuall in its own nature because in regard of the eâ—uality of those that stâ—ive it cannot be ended by Victory for in this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger as it were to be accounted a
Miracle if any even the most strong should close up his life with many years and old age They of America are Examples hereof even in this present Age Other Nations have been in former Ages which now indeed are become Civill and Flourishing but were then few fierce short-lived poor nasty and destroy'd of all that Pleasure and Beauty of life which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them Whosoever therefore holds that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawfull for all men he contradicts himself for every man by naturall necessity desires that which is good for him nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all which necessarily adheres to such a State to be good for him and so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this condition and to get some fellowes that if there needs must be war it may not yet be against all men nor without some helps XIV Fellowes are gotten either by constraint or by consent By Constraint when after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him either through feare of death or by laying fetters on him By consent when men enter into society to helpe each other both parties consenting without any constraint But the Conqueror may by right compell the Conquered or the strongest the weaker as a man in health may one that is sick or he that is of riper yeares a childe unlesse he will choose to die to give caution of his future obedience For since the right of protecting our selves according to our owne wills proceeded from our danger and our danger from our equality it s more consonant to reason and more certaine for our conservation using the present advantage to secure our selves by taking caution then when they shall be full growne and strong and got out of our power to endeavour to recover that power againe by doubtfull fight And on the other side nothing can be thought more absurd then by discharging whom you already have weak in your power to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one From whence we may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men That a sure and irresistible power confers the right of Dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist insomuch as the right of all things that can be done adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature i. e. of War by reason of that equality of power and other humane faculties they are endued withall Wherefore to seek Peace where there is any hopes of obtaining it and where there is none to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War is the dictate of right Reason that is the Law of Nature as shall be shewed in the next Chapter CHAP. II. Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts I. That the Law of Nature is not an Agreement of Men but the Dictate of Reason II. That the fundamentall Law of Nature is to seek Peace where it may be had and where not to defend our selves III. That the first speciall Law of Nature is not to retain our Right to all things IV. What it is to quit our Right what to transfer it V. That in the transferring of our right the will of him that receives it is necessarily required VI. No words but those of the present tense transferre any right VII Words of the future if there be some other tokens to signifie the will are valid in the translation of Right VIII In matters of free gift our Right passeth not from us through any words of the future IX The definition of Contract and Compact X. In Compacts our Right passeth from us through words of the future XI Compacts of mutuall faith in the State of Nature are of no effect and vain but not so in Civill Government XII That no man can make Compacts with Beasts nor yet with God without Revelation XIII Nor yet make a Vow to God XIV That Compacts oblige not beyond our outmost endeavour XV. By what meanes we are freed from our Compacts XVI That promises extorted through feare of death in the State of Nature are valid XVII A latter Compact contradicting the former is invalid XVIII A Compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my Body is invalid XIX A Compact to accuse ones self is invalid XX. The definition of Swearing XXI That Swearing is to be conceived in that forme which he useth that takes the Oath XXII An Oath superaddes nothing to the Obligation which is made by Compact XXIII An Oath ought not to be prest but where the breach of Compacts may be kept private or cannot be punisht but from God himself I. ALL Authors agree not concerning the definition of the Naturall Law who notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their Writings The Method therefore wherein we begin from definitions and exclusion of all equivocation is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes for the rest if any man say that somwhat is done against the Law of Nature one proves it hence because it was done against the generall Agreement of all the most wise and learned Nations But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of all Nations Another hence That it was done against the Generall consent of all Man-kind which definition is by no means to be admitted for then it were impossible for any but Children and Fools to offend against such a Law for sure under the notion of Man-kind they comprehend all men actually endued with Reason These therefore either doe Naught against it or if they doe Ought it is without their joint accord and therefore ought to be excus'd but to receive the Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them who oftner Break then Observe them is in truth unreasonable besides Men condemne the same things in others which they approve in themselves on the other side they publickly commend what they privately condemne and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear-say then any Speculation of their own and they accord more through hatred of some object through fear hope love or some other perturbation of mind then true Reason And therefore it comes to passe that whole Bodyes of people often doe those things by Generall accord or Contention which those Writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the Law of Nature But since all doe grant that is done by RIGHT which is not done against Reason we ought to judg those Actions onely wrong which are repugnant to right Reason i. e. which contradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning from true Principles but that Wrong which is done we say it is done against some Law therefore True Reason is a certaine Law which since it is no lesse a part of Humane nature then any
doe not so much care to destroy it as to conveigh it on others for removing this power they together take away Civill Society and a confusion of all things returnes There is so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief Ruler as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City that is to say so much as that Right of his may not be granted in vaine Now this kind of obedience although for some reasons it may sometimes by Right be deny'd yet because a greater cannot be perform'd we will call it SIMPLE But the obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City but mediately from hence That without obedience the Cities Right would be frustrate and by consequence there would be no City constituted For it is one thing if I say I give you Right to Command what you will another if I say I will doe whatsoever you Command and the Command may be such as I would rather die then doe it forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd much lesse is he tyed to that which to him is worse then death if therefore I be commanded to kill my self I am not bound to doe it for though I deny to doe it yet the Right of dominion is not frustrated since others may be found who being commanded will not refuse to doe it neither doe I refuse to doe that which I have contracted to doe In like manner if the Chief Ruler command any man to kill him he is not tyed to doe it because it cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant nor if he command to execute a Parent whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the Law since there are others who being commanded will doe that and a Son will rather die then live infamous and hated of all the world There are many other cases in which since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some and not by others Obedience may by Right be perform'd by these and refus'd by those and this without breach of that absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler For in no case is the Right taken away from him of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him But they who thus kill men although by Right given them from him that hath it yet if they use that Right otherwise then right Reason requires they sin against the Lawes of Nature that is against God Absolute A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion and the Citizens oppose it not for in the gathering together of many men they acknowledge the face of a City and even the unskilfull understand that matters there are rul'd by Counsell Yet Monarchy is no lesse a City then Democraâ—y and absolute Kings have their Counsellours from whom they will take advice and suffer their power in matters of greater consequence to be guided but not recall'd But it appears not to most men how a City is contain'd in the Person of a King and therefore they object against Absolute Command First that if any man had such a Right the condition of the Citizens would be miserable For thus they think He will take all spoil all kill all and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not already spoil'd and kill'd But why should he doe thus not because he can for unlesse he have a mind to it he will not doe it Will he to please one or some few spoil all the rest First though by Right that is without injury to them he may doe it yet can he not doe it justly that is without breach of the Naturall Lawes and injury against God And therefore there is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which Princes take Next if he could justly doe it or that he made no account of his Oath yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it since he findes no good in it But it cannot be deny'd but a Prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly but grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the injuries of others which if thou wilt be safe is necessary for thee to give are not all the same things to be feared for he that hath strength enough to protect all wants not sufficiency to oppresse all Here is no other difficulty then but that humane affaires cannot be without some inconvenience And this inconvenience it self is in the Citizens not in the Government for if men could rule themselves every man by his own command that 's to say could they live according to the Lawes of Nature there would be no need at all of a City nor of a common coercive power Secondly they object That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute which indeed is not true for all Monarchies and all other States are so for although they who have the chief Command doâ— not all those things they would and what they know profitable to the City the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them but the consideration of their Citizens who busied about their private interest and carelesse of what tends to the publique cannot sometimes be drawn to performe their duties without the hazard of the City Wherefore Princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right and prudently remit somewhat of the act but nothing of their Right XIV Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe for he is already suppos'd to have what he can give himself nor can he be oblig'd to himselfe for the same Party being both the obliged and the Obliger and the Obliger having power to release the obliged it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe because he can release himself at his own pleasure and he that can doe this is already actually free Whence its plaine that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes for the Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City by which if she were engag'd she should be engag'd to her selfe Neither can the City be oblig'd to her Citizen because if he will he can free her from her obligation and he will as oft as she wills for the will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the City the City therefore is free when she pleaseth that is she is now actually free but the will of a Councell or one who hath the Supreme Authority given him is the will of the City he therefore containes the wills of all particular Citizens Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes for this is to be bound to himself nor to any of his Citizens XV. Now because as hath been shewn above before the constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men nor is there that thing which any man can so call his as any other may not by the same
Right claime as his own for where all things are common there can be nothing proper to any man it followes that * propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd theirs and that that onely is proper to each man which he can keep by the Lawes and the power of the whole City that is of him on whom its chief command is conferr'd Whence we understand that each particular Citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-Citizens hath Right because they are tyed to the same Lawes but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler whose CoÌ„mands are the Lawes whose wiâ—l contains the will of each man and who by every single person is constituted the Supreme Judge hath not a Right But although there be many things which the City permits to its Citizens and therefore they may sometimes goe to Law against their Chief yet is not that action belonging to Civill Right but to Naturall Equity neither is it concerning what * by Right he may doâ— who hath the Supreme Power but what he hath been willing should be done and therefore he shall be judge himself as though the equity of the cause being well understood he could not give wrong judgment Propriety receiv'd its beginning c. What 's objected by some That the propriety of goods even before the constitution of Cities was found in Fathers of Families that objection is vaine because I have already declar'd That a Family is a little City For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their Father distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family but not from the propriety of the Father himself but the Fathers of diverse Families who are subject neither to any common Father nor Lord have a common Right in all things What by Right he may doe c. As often as a Citizen is granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme i. e. against the City the question is not in that action whether the City may by Right keep possession of the thing in controversie but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it for the Law is the declared will of the Supreme since then the City may raise money from the Citizens under tow Titles either as Tribute or as Debt in the former case there is no action of Law allowed for there can be no question whether the City have Right to require Tribute in the latter it is allowed because the City will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud or cunning and yet if need require all they have openly and therefore he that condemnes this place saying That by this doctrine it is casie for Princes to free themselves from their Debts he does it impertinently XVI Theft Murther Adultery and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature but what is to be called Theft what Murther what Adultery what injury in a Citizen this is not to be determined by the naturall but by the civill Law for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth but onely another mans goods is theâ—… but what is ours and what anothers is a question belonging to the civill Law In like manner not every killing of a man is Murther but onely that which the civill Law forbids neither is all encounter with women Adultery but onely that which the civill Law prohibits Lastly all breach of promise is an injury where the promise it selfe is lawfull but where there is no Right to make any compact there can be no conveighance of it and therefore there can no injury follow as hath been said in the second Chapter Artic. 17. Now what we may contract for and what not depends wholly upon the civill Lawes The City of Lacedâ—mon therefore rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught should â—oe unpunisht for it was nothing else but to make a Law that what was so acquired should be their own and not another Rightly also is that man every where sâ—ain whom we kill in warre or by the necessity of selfe-defence So also that copulation which in one City is Matrimony in another will be judged Adultery Also those contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen doe not so in another although of the same City because that he who is forbidden by the City that is by that one man or Councell whose the supreme power is to contract ought hath no Right to make any contract and therefore having made any it is not valid and by consequence no Marriage But his contract which received no prohibition was therefore of force and so was Matrimony neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts that they were made by an Oath * or Sacrament for those adde nothing to the strenghning of the contract as hath been said above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft what Murther what Adultery and in generall what injury is must be known by the civill Lawes that is the commands of him who hath the supreme authority That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament c. Whether Matrimony bee a Sacrament in which sense that word is used by some Divines or not it is not my puâ—…pose to dispute Onely I say that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together i. e. granted by the civill Law whether it be a Sacrament or not is surely a legitimate Marriage but that copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage since it is of the essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract There were legitimate marriages in many places aâ— among the Jewes the Grecians the Romans which yet might be dissolved but with those who permit no such contracts but by a Law that they shall never be broke Wedlock cannot be dissolved and the reason is because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble not because Matrimony is a Sacrament Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple to blesse or if I may say so to consecrate the husband and wife will peâ—haps belong only to the office of Clergy-men all the rest namely who when and by what contracts Marriages may be made pertains to the Lawes of the City XVII This same supreme command and absolute power seems so harsh to the greatest part of men as they hate the very naming of them which happens chiefly through want of knowledge what humane nature and the civill Lawes are and partly also through their default who when they are invested with so great authority abuse their power to their own lust That they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority some of them will have a City well enough constituted if they who shall be the Citizens convening doe agree concerning certaine Articles propounded and in that convent agitated and approved and doe command them to be observed and punishments prescribed to be
he was a Tyrant hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eatâ— For why doest thou call him a Tyrant whom God hath made a King except that thou being a private Person usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments but espcially to that which is Monarchieall we may hence discerne namely that by it every King whether good or ill stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement and slain by the hand of every â—…rtherous villain IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society is theirs who hold That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Arâ—ic 14. from this Argument That a City can neither be bound to it self nor to any subject not to it selfe because no man can be obliged except it be to another not to any Subject because the single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City insomuch that if the City will be free from all such obligation the Subjects will so too and by consequence she is so But that which holds true in a City that must be supposed to be true in a man or an assembly of men who have the Supreme Authority for they make a City which hath no being but by their Supreme Power Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government is evident from hence that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill that is to say the definition of what is and what is not against the Lawes would return to each single Person Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes and together with it all coercive jurisdiction which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of Government Yet this Errour hath great props Aristotle and others who by reason of humane infirmity suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of Government who thought that the constrainning Power the interpretation of Lawes and the making of Lawes all which are powers necessarily belonging to Government should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves Now although particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate yet this is onely then when the question is not what the Magistrate may but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe As when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it but his will was he should if he brake the Law else his will was he should not This thetefore that a Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes On the contrary it is evident that he is not tied to his owne Lawes because no man is bound to himself Lawes therefore are set for Titius and Caius not for the Ruler however by the ambition of Lawyers it is so ordered that the Lawes to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate but their Prudence V. In the fifth place That the Supreme Authority may be divided is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales But diverse men divide it diverse wayes For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace and the benefits of this life but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others Now because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation it happens that Subjects measuring justice not as they ought by the Civill Lawes but by the precepts and doctrines of them who in regard of the Magistrate are either private men or strangers through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes through fear falling into that which they most feared Now what can be more pernicious to any state then that men should by the apprehension of everlasting torments be deterred from obeying their Princes that is to say the Lawes or from being just There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War and Peace unto one whom they call a Monarch but the right of raising Monies they give to some others and not to him But because monies are the sinewes of War and Peace they who thus divide the Authority doe either really not divide it at all but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is but give the name of it to another or if they doe really divide it they dissolve the Government for neither upon necessity can War be waged nor can the publique Peace be preserved without Money VI. It is a common doctrine That faith and holinesse are not acquired by study and naturall reason but are alwayes supernaturally infused and inspired into mâ—n which if it were true I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith or why any man who is truly a Christian should not be a Prophet or lastly why every man should not judge what 's fit for him to doe what to avoid rather out of his own inspiration then by the precepts of his Superiours or right Reason A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good and Evil which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian world that the number of Apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite and it sprang from sick-brained men who having gotten good store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scriptures made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching that their Sermons signifying just nothing yet to unlearned men seemed most divine for he whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above VII The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government is this That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods be is in possession of That is to say such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods but also of the Magistrate himself which is not true for they who have a Lord over them have themselves no Lordship as hath been proved Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects by the constitution of Government Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken no man had any proper Right all things were common to all men tell me therefore how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate How got the
Now where the Right and exercise are severed there the government of the Common-weale is like the ordinary government of the world in which God the mover of all things produceth naturall effects by the means of secondary causes but where he to whom the Right of ruling doth belong is himselfe present in all judicatures consultations and publique actions there the administration is such as if God beyond the ordinary course of nature should immediately apply himself unto all matters we will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties who exercise authority whether by their own or others Right Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things which being divers from others some Princes may doe for this is to be left to the Politicall Practices of each Common-weale II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence The safety of the people is the supreme Law for although they who among men obtain the chiefest Dominion cannot be subject to Lawes properly so called that is to say to the will of men because to be chief and subject are contradictories yet is it their duty in all things as much as possibly they can to yeeld obedience unto right reason which is the naturall morall and divine Law But because dominions were constituted for Peaces sake and Peace was sought after for safeties sake he who being placed in authority shall use his power otherwise then to the safety of the people will act against the reasons of Peace that is to say against the Lawes of nature Now as the safety of the People dictates a Law by which Princes know their duty so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit for the power of the Citizens is the power of the City that is to say his that bears the chief Rule in any state III. By the people in this place we understand not one civill Person namely the City it selfe which governs but the multitude of subjects which are governed for the City was not instituted for its own but for the subjects fake and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man for the Ruler as such provides no otherwise for the safety of his people then by his Lawes which are universall and therefore he hath fully discharged himselfe if he have throughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part and made it as lasting as may be and that no man suffer ill but by his own default or by some chance which could not be prevented but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part that wicked men doe suffer IV. But by safety must be understood not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever but in order to its happines For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government that they might as much as their humane condition would afford live delightfully They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kinde of government would sinne against the Law of nature because against their trust who had committed that power unto them if they should not study as much as by good Laws could be effected to furnish their subjects abundantly not only with the good things belonging to life but also with those which advance to delectation They who have acquired Dominion by arms doe all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind that they may serve them the better wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them not only with such things whereby they may live but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty they would act against their own scope and end V. And first of all Princes doe beleeve that it mainly concerns eternall salvation what opinions are held of the Deity and what manner of worship he is to be adored with which being supposed it may be demanded whether chief Rulers and whosoever they be whether one or more who exercise supreme authority sin not against the Law of nature if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised or permit a contrary to be taught and practised as they beleeve necessarily conduceth to the eternall salvation of their subjects It is manifest that they act against their conscience and that they will as much as in them lies the eternall perdition of their subjects for if they willed it not I see no reason why they should suffer when being supreme they cannot be compelled such things to be taught and done for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state But we will leave this difficulty in suspence VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only may be distributed into foure kindes 1. That they be defended against forraign enemies 2. That Peace be preserved at home 3. That they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique security 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse liberty For supreme Commanders can conferre no more to their civill happinesse then that being preserved from forraign and civill warres they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own iâ—dustry VII There are two things necessary for the Peoples defence To be warned and to be forearmed for the state of Common-wealths considered in themselves is natural that is to say hostile neither if they cease from fighting is it therefore to be called Peace but rather a breathing time in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other values his security nâ—t according to the Pacts but the forces and counsels of his adversary And this by naturall Right as hath been shewed in the second Chapter 10. Artic. from this that contracts are invalid in the state of nature as oft as any just fear doth intervene It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City First that there be some who may as near as may be search into and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it for discoverers to Ministers of State are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule and we may more truly say in vision politicall then naturall that the sensible and intelligible Species of outward things not well considered by others are by the ayre transported to the soule that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man or if they be compared to Spiders webs which extended on all sides by the finest threds doe warn them keeping in their small holds of all outward motions They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their Subjects without Spies then those Spiders can when they shall goe forth and whether they shall repair without the motion of those threds VIII Farthermore
takes its current so subjects if they might doe nothing without the commands of the Law would grow dull and unwildly if all they would be disperst and the more is left undetermined by the Lawes the more liberty they enjoy Both extremes are faulty for Lawes were not invented to take away but to direct mens actions even as nature ordained the banks not to stay but to guide the course of the streame The measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects and the Cities good wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of those who command and have the authority of making lawes that there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the Magistrate and his Subjects for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do by naturall reason rather then any knowledge of the Lawes where there are more Lawes then can easily be remembred and whereby such things are forbidden as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity they must through ignorance without the least evill iâ—tention fall within the compasse of Lawes as gins laid to entrap their harmelesse liberty which supreme Commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the Lawes of nature XVI It is a great part of that liberty which is harmlesse to civill government and necessary for each subject to live happily that there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and look for and this is done where there are either no punishments at all defined by the Lawes or greater not required then are defined where there are none defined there he that hath first broken the Law expects an in definite or arbitrary punishment and his feare is supposed boundlesse because it relates to an unbounded evill now the Law of nature commands them who are nâ—t subject to any civill Lawes by what we have said in the third Chapter Artic. 11. and therefore supreme Commanders that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evill as the future good and they sin if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment then the publique benefit but where the punishment is defined either by a Law prescribed as when it is set down in plain words that he thâ—t shall doe thus or thus shall suffer so and so or by practice as when the penalty not by any Law prescribed but arbitrary from the beginning is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent for naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by the Law is against the Law of nature For the end of punishment is not to compell the will of man but to fashion it make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty And deliberation is nothing else but a weiging as it were in scales the conveniencies and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting where that which is more weighty doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us If therefore the Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime then will make our feare more considerable with us then our lust that excesse of lust above the feare of punishment whereby sinne is committed is to be attributed to the Legislator that is to say to the supreme and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment then himselfe hath determined in his Lawes he punisheth that in another which he sinned himselfe XVII It pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary liberty of subjects that every man may without feare enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the Lawes for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht by the Lawes from anothers if by wrong judgement robbery theft they may bee again confounded but it falls out so that these doe happen where Judges are corrupted for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evill ariseth not from hence namely because penalties are set but because they are executed for we esteeme the future by what is past seldome expecting what seldome happens If therefore Judges corrupted either by Gifts Favour or even by pitty it self do often forbear the execution of the Penalties due by the Law and by that meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht honest Subjects encompast with murtherers theeves and knaves will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other nor scarce to stirre abroad without hazard nay the City it self is dissolved and every mans right of protecting himself at his own will returnes to him The Law of Nature therefore gives this precept to Supreme Commanders that they not onely doe righteousnesse themselves but that they also by penalties cause the Judges by them appointed to doe the same that is to say that they hearken to the complaints of their Subjects and as oft as need requires make choice of some extraordinary Judges who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones CHAP. XIV Of Lawes and Trespasses I. How Law differs from Counsell II. How from Covenant III. How from Right IV. Division of Lawes into Divine and Humane the Divine into Naturall and Positive and the Naturall into the Lawes of single-men and of Nations V. The Division of humane that is to say of Civil Lawes into Sacred and Secular VI. Into Distributive and Vindicative VII That Distributive and Vindicative are not species but parts of the Lawes VIII All Law is supposed to have a penalty annexâ— to it IX The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring Parents of murther adultery theft falsewitnesse are Civill Lawes X. It s impossible to command ought by the Civil Law contrary to the Law of Nature XI It s essential to a Law both that it self and also the Lawgiver be known XII Whence the Law-giver comes to be known XIII Publishing and Interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a Law XIV The Division of the Civill Law into written and unwritten XV. The Naturall Lawes are not written Lawes neither are the wiâ—e Sentences of Lawyers nor Custome Lawes of themselves but by the consent of the Supreme Power XVI What the word Sinne most largely taken signisies XVII The definition of Sin XVIII The difference between a Sin of Infirmity and Malice XIX Vnder what kind of sinne Atheisme is contained XX. What Treason is XXI That by Treason not the Civill but the Naturall Lawes are broken XXII And that therefore it is to be punisht not by the right of Dominion but by the right of War XXIII That obedience is not rightly distinguisht into active and passive I. THey who lesse seriously consider the force of words doe sometimes confound Law with Counsell sometimes with Covenant sometimes with Right They confound Law with Counsel who think that it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their Counsellours but also to obey them as though it were in vaine to take Counsell unlesse it were also followed We must fetch the
insomuch as the interpretation we speak of is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred Scriptures Now we must shew that that power belongs to each Church and depends on his or their authority who have the Supreme command provided that they be Christians for if it depend not on the civill authority it must either depend on the opinion of each private Subject or some forraigne authority but among otheâ— reasons the inconveniencies that must follow private opinions cannot suffer its dependance on them of which this is the chiefe that not onely all civill obedience would be taken away contrary to Christ his praecept but all humane society and peace would be dissolved contrary to the Lawes of nature for seeing every man is his owne interpretet of Scripture that is to say since every man makes himselfe judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto God they cannot obey their Princes before that they have judg'd whether their commands be conformable to the Word of God or not And thus either they obey not or they obey for their owne opinions sake that is to say they obey themselves not their Soveraigne civill obedience therefore is lost Againe when every man followes his owne opinion it 's necessary that the controversies which rise among them will become innumerable and indeterminable whence there will breed among men who by their own naturall inclinations doe account all dissention an affront first hatred then brawles and warres and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish We have farthermore for an example that which God under the old Law required to be observed concerning the book of the Law namely that it should be transcribed and publiquely us'd and he would have it to be the Canon of Divine doctrine but the controversies about it not to be determined by private Persons but onely by the Priests Lastly it is our Saviours Precâ—pt that if there be any matter of offence between private Persons they should heaâ—… the Church Wherefore it is the Churches duty to define controversies it therefore belongs not to private men but to the Church to interpret Scriptures But that we may know that the authority of interpreting Gods Word that is to say of determining all questions concerning God and Religion belongs not to any forraign Person whatsoever we must consider first what esteem such a power carries in the mindes of the subjects and their civill actions for no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men by a naturall necessiâ—y doe follow those opinions which they have concerning good and evill Reward and Punishment whence it happens that necessarily they would chuse rather to obey those by whose judgement they beleeve that they shall be eternally happy or miserable Now by whose judgement it is appointed what Doctrines are necessary to salvation by their judgement doe men expect their eternall blisse or perditidition they will therefore yeeld them obedience in all things Which being thus most manifest it is that those subjects who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a forraign authority in those Doctrines which are necessary to salvation doe not per se constitute a City but are the subjects of that forraign power Nor therefore although some Soveraign Prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other yet so as he would be understood to have retained the civill power in his own hands shall such a Writing be valid or transferre ought necessary for the retaining oâ— good administration of his command for by the 2. Chap. 4. artâ—â— no man is said to transferre his Right unlesse be give some proper sign declaring his Will to transferre it but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his Soveraignty cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it This kinde of Writing therefore will not be a sign of Will but of Ignorance in the contractors We must consider neâ—t how absurd it is for a City or Soveraign to commit the ruling of his Subjects consciences to an enemy for they are as hath been shewed above in the 5. Chap. 6. artic in an hostile state whosoever have not joyn'd themselves into the unity of one Person Nor contradicts it this truth that they doe not alwayes fight for trâ—ces are made between enemies It is sufficient for an hostile minde that there is suspition that the Frontiers of Cities Kingdomes Empires strengthned with Garisons doe with a fighting posture and countenance though they strike not yet as enemies mutually he hold each other Lastly how unequall is it to demand that which by the very reason of your demand you confesse belongs to anothers Right I am the Interpreter of Scriptures to you who are the Subject of anothers Realme Why By what Covenants past between you and me By Divine authority Whence knowne Out of holy Scripture Behold the Book read iâ—… in vain unlesse I may also interpret the same for my self That interpretation therefore doth by Right belong to me and the rest of my private fellow-subjects which we both deny It remains therefore that in all christian Churches that is to say in all christian Cities the interpretation of sacred Scripture depend on and derive from the authority of that man or Councell which hath the Soveraign power of the City XXVIII Now because there are two kindes of controversies the one about spirituall matters that is to say questions of faith the truth whereof cannot be searcht into by naturall reason such are the questions concerning the nature and office of Christ of rewards and punishments to come of the Sacraments of outward worship and the like the other about questions of humane science whose truth is sought out by naturall reason and Syllogismes drawne from the Covenants of men and definitions that is to say significations received by use and common consent of words such as are all questions of Right and Philosophy for example when in matter of Right it s questioned whether there be a Promise and Covenant or not that is nothing else but to demand whether such words spoken in such a manner be by common use and consent of the Subjects a Promise or Covenant which if they be so called then it is true that a Contract is made if not then it is false that truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men In like manner when it is demanded in Philosophy whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men about the signification of the word entire for if men when they say a thing is entirelyâ—…somewhere doe signifie by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once that truth therefore depends on the consents of men and by the same reason in all other
by the Lawes Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt Judges How Law differs from Counsell How it differs from a Covenant Annotation How it differs from Right The division of lawes into divine and humane and of the divine into naturall and positive and of the naturall into those lawes of single men and those of Nations The division of humane that is to say civill lawes into secular and sacred Into distributive and vindicative Distributive and vindicative are not two Species of the Lawes All Law is supposed to have a Penalty annext to it The Precepts of the Decalogue of honouring Parents of murther adultcry these false witnesse are the civill Lawes It is not possible to command ought by the civill Law contrary to oâ—e Lawes of nature It is essentiall to a Law that both it and the Legislator be knowne Whence the Legislator is knowne Promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a Law The civill Law divided into written and unwritten That the naturall laws are not written laws neither are the sentences of lawyers or custome laws of themselves but by the consent of the supreme power What the word Sin taken in its largest sense signifies The definition of Sin The difference betweene a sinne of infirmitie and malice Under what kind of sin Aâ—hâ—isme is contained Annotation What the sinne of Treason is Treason breaks not the civill but the naturall Law And therefore is punisht not by the Right of Soveraignty but by the Right of Warre Obedience not rightly distinguisht into Active and Passive The Proposition of the following contents Over whom God is said to raign The word of God three fold Reason Revelation Prophesy The Kingdome of God two-fold Naturall and Prophetique The Rigbt whereby God governs is seated in his omn pâ—teâ—â—e The same proved from Scripture The obligation of yeelding obedience unto God proceeds from humane infirmity Annotation The Lawes of God in his naturall Kingdome are those which are above set down in the second and third Chapters What honour and worship are Worship consists either in attributes or in actions And there is one sort naturall and another arbitrary One commanded another voluntary 〈…〉 What the end or aim of worship iâ— What the naturall Lawes are concerning Gods attributes 〈◊〉 What those actions are whereby naturally we do give worship In the naturall kingdom of God the City may appoint what worship it pleaseth God ruling by nature onely the City that is say that man or Court which under God hath the Soveraignty is the Interpreter of all the Lawes Certain doubts removed Annotation What is sin in the naturall Kingdom of God and what Treason against the divine Majesty Superstition possessing forraign Nations God â—nstituted the true Religion by the means of Abraham By thâ— Covenant between God and Adam all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors The manner of the Covenant between God and Abraham In that Covenant is contained an acknowledgement of God not simply but of him who appeared unto Abraham The Lawes to which Abraham was tyed were no other but those of nature and that of Circumcision Abraham among his own was the Interpreter of the word of God and of all Lawes Abrahams subjects could not sin in obeying him Annotation Gods Covenant with the Hebrewes at Mount Sinai From thence Gods government was called a Kingdom What lawes were by God given to the Jewes What the word of God is and how to be knowne What was held for the written word of God among the Jewes The power of interpreting the word of God and â—he supreme civil power were united in Moyses while he lived They were also united in the High Priest during the life of Joshuah They were also united in the High Priest untill King Sauls time They were united in the Kings untill the Captivity The same were united in the Priests after the Captivity Among the Jewes the deniall of the Divine providence and Idolatry were the onely Treasons against the Divine Majesty in all other things they ought to obey their Princes The Prophesies of Christs dignity The Prophesies of Christs Humility and Passion That Jesus was the Christ That the Kingdom of God by the new Covenant was not the Kingdome of Christ as Christ but as God That the Kingdome of God by the 〈◊〉 Covenant is heavenly and begins from the day of Iudgement The government of Christ in this world was not a Soveraignty but Counsell or a government by way of doctrine and perswasion What the Promises of the new Covenant are on both parts There are no Lawes added by Christ beside the institution of the Sacraments That these and the like forms Repent be baptized keep the Commandements are not Lawes It belongs to the civill authority to define what the sinne of injustice is It belongs to civill authority to define what conduces to the Peace and safety of the City It belongs to the civill authority to judge when need requires what definitions and what inferences are true It belongs to the Office of Christ to teach morality not as a speculation but as a Law to forgive sins and to teach all things whereof there is no science properly so call'd A distinction of things temporall from spirituall The word of God many wayes taken All things contained in Scripture belong not to the Canon of christian faith The word of a lawfull Interpreter of Scriptures is the word of God The authority of interpreting Scriptures is the same with that of determining controversies of faith Divers significations of a Church What a Church is to whom we attribute Rights actions and the like appellations proper to a Person A Christâ—… City is the same with a Christian Church Many Cities doâ— not constitute one church Who are Clergy-men The Election of Church-men belongs to the Church their consecration to the Pastors The power of remitting sinnes to the penitent and retaining those of the impenitent belongs to the Pastors but judgement of the repentance to the Church What excommunication is and on whom it cannot passe The interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the Ciâ—y A christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergy-men The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnaney of obeying God and men is to be remov'd by the distinction betweene the points necessary and not necessary to Salvation All things necessary to Salvation are contain'd in Faith and Obedience What kind of Obedience that is which is requir'd of us What Faith is and how distinguisht from profession from science and from opinion What it is to beleeve in Christ That that article alone that Iesus is the Christ is necessary to Salvation is prov'd out of the scope of the Evangelists Annotation By the Apostles Sermons By the easinesse of christian Religion By this that it is the foundation of Faith By the plaiâ— words of Christ and his Apostles In this Article is contained the Faith of the old Testament How Faith and Obedience doe conâ—ur to Salvation In a Christian City there is no contrariety be weene the Command of God and of the City The Doctrines which this day are controverted about Religion doe for the most part belong to the Right of Dominion
Philosophicall Rudiments concerning GOVERMENT and Civill SOCIETY 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury Ro Vaughan sculp Philosophicall Rudiments CONCERNING Government and Society OR A DISSERTATION Concerning MAN in his severall habitudes and respects as the Member of a Society first Secular and then Sacred Containing The Elements of Civill Politie in the Agreement which it hath both with Naturall and Divine Lawes In which is demonstrated Both what the Origine of Justice is and wherein the Essence of Christian Religion doth consist Together with The Nature Limits and Qualifications both of Regiment and Subjection By THO HOBBES LONDON Printed by J. G. for R. ROYSTON at the Angel in Ivie-lane 1651. TO THE Right Honourable WILLIAM Earle of Devonshire My most honoured Lord. May it please your Lordship IT was the speech of the Roman people to whom the name of King had been render'd odious as well by the tyrannie of the Tarquins as by the Genius and Decretals of that City 'T was the speech I say of the Publick however pronounced from a private mouth if yet Cato the Censor were no more then such That all Kings are to be reckon'd amongst ravenous Feasts But what a Beast of Prey was the Roman people whilst with its conquering Eagles it erected its proud Tropheeâ— so far and wide over the world bringing the Africans the Asiaticks the Macedomans and the Achaeans with many other despoyled Nations into a specious bondage with the pretence of preferring them to be Deâ—…zons of Rome So that if Cato's saying were a wise one 't was every whit as wise that of Pontiue Telesinus who flying about with open mouth through all the Companies of his Army in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla cryed out That Rome her selfe as well as Sylla was to be raz'd for that there would alwayes be Wolves and Depraedatours of their Liberty unlesse the Forrest that lodg'd them were grubb'd up by the roots To speak impartially both sayings are very true That Man to Man is a kind of God and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe The first is true if we compare Citizens amongst themselves and the second if we compare Cities In the one there 's some analogie of similitude with the Deity to wit Justice and Charity the twin-sisters of peace But in the other Good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a Sanctuary the two daughters of War Deceipt and Violence that is in plaine termes a meer brutall Rapacity which aâ—…ongâ— men object to one another as a reproach by an inbred custome which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of other men wherein as in a Mirroir all things on the left side appeare to be on the right all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left yet the naturall right of Preservation which we all receive from the uncontroulable Dictates of Necessity will not admit it to be a Vice though it confesse it to be an Unhappinesse Now that with Cato himselfe a Person of so great a renowne for wisdome Animosity should so prevaile instead of Judgement and Partiality instead of Reason that the very same thing which he thought equall in his Popular State he should censure as unjust in a Monarchical other men perhaps may have leisure to admire But I have been long since of this opinion That there was never yet any more-then-vulgar-prudence that had the luck of being acceptable to the Giddy People but either it hath not been understood or else having been so hath been levell'd and cryed downe The more eminent Actions and Apothegms both of the Greeks and Romans have been indebted for their Eulogies not so much to the Reason as to the Greatnesse of them and very many times to that prosperous usurpation with which our Histories doe so mutually upbraid each other which as a conquering Torrent carryes all before it as well publick Agents as publick Actions in the streame of Time Wisdome properly so call'd is nothing else but this The perfect knowledge of the Truth in all matters whatsoever Which being derived from the Registers and Records of Things and that as 't were through the Conduit of certain definite Appellations cannot possibly be the work of a suddaine Acutenesse but of a well-ballanc'd Reason which by the Compendium of a word we call Philosophy For by this it is that a way is open'd to us in which we travell from the contemplation of particular things to the Inference or result of universall Actions Now look how many sorts of things there are which properly fall within the cognizance of humane reason into so many branches does the tree of Philosophy divide it selfe And from the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant there hath been given to those branches a diversity of Names too For treating of Figures t is call'd Geometry of motion Physick of naturall right Moralls put all together and they make up Philosophy Just as the British the Atlantick and the Indian Seas being diversly christen'd from the diversity of their shoares doe notwithstanding all together make up The Ocean And truly the Geometricians have very admirably perform'd their part For whatsoever assistance doth accrew to the life of man whether from the observation of the Heavens or from the description of the Earth from the notation of Times or from the remotest Experiments of Navigation Finally whatsoever things they are in which this present Age doth differ from the rude simplenesse of Antiquity we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe meerly to Geometry If the Morall Philosophers had as happily discharg'd their duty I know not what could have been added by humane Industry to the completion of that happinesse which is consistent with humane life For were the nature of humane Actions as distinctly knowne as the nature of Quantity in Geometricall Figures the strength of Avarice and Ambition which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgar as touching the nature of Right and Wrong would presently faint and languish And Mankinde should enjoy such an Immortall Peace that unlesse it were for habitation on supposition that the Earth should grow too narrow for her Inhabitants there would hardly be left any preteÌ„ce for war But now on the contrary that neither the Sword nor the Pen should be allowed any Cessation That the knowledge of the Law of Nature should lose its growth not advancing a whit beyond its antient stature that there should still be such siding with the severall factions of Philosophers that the very same Action should bee decryed by some and as much elevated by others that the very same man should at severall times embrace his severall opinions and esteem his own Actions farre otherwise in himselfe then he does in others These I say are so many signes so many manifest Arguments that what hath hitherto been written by Morall Philosophers hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the Truth
but yet have took with the world not so much by giving any light to the understanding as entertainment to the Affections whilest by the successefull Rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions So that this part of Philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the publick Wayes which lye open to all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lot with high wayes and open streets Some for divertisement and some for businesse so that what with the Impertinencies of some and the Altercations of others those wayes have never a seeds time and therefore yield never a harvest The onely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this That amongst all the writers of that part of Philosophy there is not one that hath used an idoneous Principle of Tractation For we may not as in a Circle begin the handling of a Science from what point we please There is a certain Clue of Reason whose beginning is in the dark but by the benefit of whose Conduct wee are led as 't were by the hand into the clearest light so that the Principle of Tractation is to be taken from that Darknesse and then the light to be carried thither for the irradiating its doubts As often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake that Clue or wilfully cut it asunder he describes the Footsteps not of his progresse in Science but of his wandring from it And upon this it was that when I applyed my Thoughts to the Investigation of Naturall Justice I was presently advertised from the very word Justice wich signifies a steady Will of giving every one his Owne that my first enquiry was to be from whence it proceeded that any man should call any thing rather his Owne then another mans And when I found that this proceeded not from Nature but Consent for what Nature at first laid forth in common men did afterwards distribute into severall Impropriations I was conducted from thence to another Inquiry namely to what end and upon what Impulsives when all was equally every mans in common men did rather think it fitting that every man should have his Inclosure And I found the reason was that from a Community of Goods there must needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest and from that Contention all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensue which by the instinct of Nature every man is taught to shun Having therefore thus arrived at two maximes of humane Nature the one arising from the concupiscible part which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest the other proceeding from the rationall which teaches every man to fly a contre-naturall Dissolution as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to Nature Which Principles being laid down I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion in this little work of mine first the absolute necessity of Leagues and Contracts and thence the rudiments both of morall and of civill Prudence That Appendage which is added concerning the Regiment of God hath been done with this intent that the Dictates of God Almighty in the Law of nature might not seem repugnant to the written Law revealed to us in his word I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse not to meddle with the civill Lawes of any particular nation whatsoever That is to say I have avoyded coming a shore which those Times have so infosted both with shelves and Tempests At what expence of time and industry I have beene in this scrutiny after Truth I am not ignorant but to what purpose I know not For being partiall Judges of our selves we lay a partiall estimate upon our own productions I therefore offer up this Book to your Lordships not â—avour but censine first as having found by many experiments that it is not the credit of the Author â—…or the newnesse of the work nor yet the ornament of the style but only the weight of Reason which recommends any Opinion to your Lordships Favour and Approbation If it fortune to please that is to say if it be sound if it be usefull if it be vulgar I humbly offer it to your Lordship as both my Glory and my Protection But if in any thing I have erred your Lordship will yet accept it as a Testimony of my Gratitude for that the means of study which I enjoyed by your Lordships Goodnesse I have employed to the procurement of your Lordships Favour The God of Heaven crown your Lordship with length of Dayes in this earthly Station and in the heavenly Jerusalem with a crown of Glory Your Honours most humble and most devoted Servant THO. HOBBS THE AUTHORS PREFACE TO THE READER READER I promise thee here such things which ordinarily promised doe seeme to challenge the greatest attention and I lay them here before thine eyes whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated of or the right method of handling it or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it or lastly the moderation of the Authour In this Book thou shalt finde briefly described the duties of men First as Men then as Subjects Lastly as Christians under which duties are contained not only the elements of the Lawes of Nature and of Nations together with the true originall and power of Justice but also the very essence of Christian Religion it selfe â— so farre forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it Which kinde of doctrine excepting what relates to Christian Religion the most antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity either curiously adorned with Verse or clouded with Allegories as a most beautifull and hallowed mystery of Royall 〈◊〉 hâ—â—ity left by the disputations of pâ—…e men it might be de filed Other Philosophers in the mean time to the advantage of mankinde did contemplate the faces and motions of things others without disadvantage their natures and causes But in after times Socrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civill Soience although hitherto not throughly understood yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the Common weale and that he set so great a value on this that utterly abandoning and despising all other parts of Philosopy he wholly embraced this as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde After him comes Plato Aristotle Cicero and other Philosophers as well Greeke as Latine and now at length all men of all Nations not only Philosophers but even the vnlgar have and doe still deale with this as a matter of ease exposed and prostitute to every Mother-wit and to be attained without any great care or study and which makes mainly for its dignity those who suppose themselves to have it or are in such employment as they ought to have it doe so wonderfully please themselves in its Idaea as they easily brooke the followers of other arts to be esteemed and
styled ingenuous learned skilfull what you will except prudent for this Name in regard of civill knowledge they presume to be due to themselves onely Whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of the Persons who entertain them or by the number of those who have written of them or by the judgement of the wisest certainly this must carry it which so neerly relates to Princes and others engaged in the government of mankinde in whose adulterate Species also the most part of me◅ doe delight themselves and in which the most excellent wits of Philosophers have been conversant The benefit of it when rightly delivered that is when derived from true Principles by evident connexion we shall then best discerne when we shall but well have considered the mischiefes that have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit and babling form for in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits if any errour escape us it is without hurt neither is there any losse but of time onely but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life it necessarily happens that not onely from errours but even from ignorance it selfe there arise offences contentions nay even slaughter it selfe Look now how great a prejudice these are such and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality truly declared How many Kings and those good men too hath this one errour That a Tyrant King might lawfully be put to death been the slaughter of How many throats hath this false position cut That a Prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed And what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused That Kings are not superiours to but administrators for the multitude Lastly how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of Kings be just or unjust belongs to private men and that before they yeeld obedience they not only may but ought to dispute them Besides in the morall Philosophy now commonly received there are many things no lesse dangerous then those which it matters not now to recite I suppose those antients foresaw this who rather chose to have the Science of Justice wrapt up in fables then openly exposed to disputations for before such questions begā to be moved Princes did not sue for but already exercised the supreme power They kept their Empire entire not by arguments but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good likewise Subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men but by the Lawes of the Realme nor were they kept in peace by disputations but by power and authority yea they reverenced the supreme power whether residing in one man or in a councell as a certain visible divinity therefore they little used as in our dayes to joyn themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits to the utter ruine of their State for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved in truth the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly Wherefore it was peace and a golden age which ended not before that Saturn being expelled it was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings This I say the Antients not only themselves saw but in one of their fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us for they say that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet he fell in love and began to court Juno her selfe offering to embrace her he clasp't a clowd from whence the Centaures proceeded by nature halfe men halfe horses a fierce a fighting and unquiet generation which changing the names only is as much as if they should have said that private men being called to Counsels of State desired to prostitute justice the onely sister and wife of the supreme to their own judgements and apprehensions but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it they have begotten those hermophrodite opinions of morall Philosophers partly right and comely partly brutall and wilde the causes of all contentions and blood-sheds Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise if any man now shall dispell those clowds and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authenticall doctrines conccening right and wrong good and evill besides the constituted Lawes in each Realme and government and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust good or ill is to be demanded of none but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his Lawes surely he will not only shew us the high way to peace but will also teach us how to avoyd the close darke and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition then which I know not what can be thought more profitable Concerning my Method I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what I had to deliver except I took my begining from the very matter of civill goverment and thence proceeded to its generation and form and the first beginning of justice for every thing is best understood by its constitutive causes for as in a watch or some such small engine the matter figure and motion of the wheeles cannot well be known except it be taken in sunder and viewed in parts so to make a more curious search into the rights of States and duties of Subjects it is necessary I say not to take them in sunder but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved i. e. that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature is in what matters it is in what not fit to make up a civill government and how men must be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded State Having therefore followed this kind of Method In the first place I set down for a Principle by experience known to all men and denied by none to wit that the dispositions of men are naturally such that except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power every man will distrust and dread each other and as by naturall right he may so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength hee hath toward the preservatiō of himself You will object perhaps that there are some who deny this truly so it happens that very many do deny it But shall I therefore seem to fight against my self because I affirm that the same men confesse and deny the same thing In truth I do not but they do whose actions disavow what their discourses approve of We see all countries though they be at peace with their neighbours yet guarding their Frontiers with armed men their Townes with Walls and Ports and keeping constant watches To what purpose is all this if there be no feare of the neighbouring power Wee see even in well-governed States where there are
precellence neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in my selfe for every man must account himself such as he can make himselfe without the help of others But though the benefits of this life may be much farthered by mutuall help since yet those may be better attain'd to by Dominion then by the society of others I hope no body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by Nature if all fear were removed to obtain Dominion then to gaine Society We must therefore resolve that the Originall of all great and lasting Societies consisted not in the mutuall good will men had towards each other but in the * mutuall fear they had of each other Born sit Since we now see actually a constituted Society among men and none living out of it since we discern all desirous of congresse and mutuall correspondence it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity to lay in the very threshold of this Doctrine such a stumbling block before the Readers as to deny Man to be born sit for Society Therefore I must more plainly say That it is true indeed that to Man by nature or as Man that is as soone as he is born Solitude is an enemy for Infants have need of others to help them to live and those of riper years to help them to live well wherefore I deny not that men even nature compelling desire to come together But civill Societies are not meer Meetings but Bonds to the making whereof Faith and Compacts are necessary the Vertue whereof to Children and Fooles and the Profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects is altogether unknown whence it happens that those because they know not what Society is cannot enter into it these because ignorant of the benefit it brings care not for it Manifest therefore it is that all men because they are born in Infancy are born unapt for Society Many also perhaps most men either through defect of minde or want of education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives yet have they Infants as well as those of riper years an humane nature wherefore Man is made sit for Society not by Nature but by Education furthermore although Man were born in such a condition as to desire it it followes not that he therefore were Born sit to enter into it for it is one thing to desire another to be in capacity â—it for what we desire for even they who through their pride will not stoop to equall conditions without which there can be no Society do yet desire it The mutuall fear It is objected It is so improbable that men should grow into civill Societies out of fear that if they had been afraid they would not have endur'd each others looks They presume I believe that to fear is nothing else then to be affrighted I comprehend in this word Fear a certain foresight of future evill neither doe I conceive flight the sole property of fear but to distrust suspect take heed provide so that they may not fear is also incident to the fearfull They who go to Sleep shut their Dores they who Travell carry their Swords with them because they fear Theives Kingdomes guard their Coasts and Frontiers with Forts and Castles Cities are compast with Walls and all for fear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes even the strongest Armies and most accomplishâ—â— for Fight yet sometimes Parly for peace as fearing each others power and lest they might be overcome It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed and in corners if they think they cannot escape otherwise but for the most part by Armes and Defensive Weapons whence it happens that daring to come forth they know each others Spirits but then if they fight Civill Society ariseth from the Victory if they agree from their Agreement III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men partly in their mutuall will of hurting whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others nor promise to our selves the least security For if we look on men full-grown and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is which perishing all its strength vigour and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it and how easie a matter it is even for the weakest man to kill the strongest there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other but they who can do the greatest things namely kill can doe equall things All men therefore among themselves are by nature equall the inequality we now discern hath its spring from the Civill Law IV. All men in the State of nature have a desire and will to hurt but not proceeding from the same cause neither equally to be condemn'd for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us permits as much to others as he assumes to himself which is an argument of a temperate man and one that rightly values his power another supposing himselfe above others will have a License to doe what he lists and challenges Respect and Honour as due to him before others which is an Argument of a fiery spirit This mans will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength the others from the necessity of defending himselfe his liberty and his goods against this mans violence V. Furthermore since the combate of Wits is the fiercest the greatest discords which are must necessarily arise from this Contention for in this case it is not only odious to contend against but also not to consent for not to approve of what a man saiâ—h is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speaketh as in very many things to dissent is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from which may appear hence that there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Religion and Factions of the same Common-weale where the Contestation is Either concerning Doctrines or Politique Prudence And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this even to get some with whom comparing it may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph and Vaunt it self its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughter or by Words or by Gesture or some signe or other then which there is no greater vexation of mind and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt VI. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other ariseth hence that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common nor yet divide it whence it followes that the strongest must have
other faculty or affection of the mind is also termed naturall Therefore the Law of Nature that I may define it is the Dictate of right * Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of Life and Members as much as in us lyes Right Reason By Right Reason in the naturall state of men I understand not as many doe an infallible faculty but the act of reasoning that is the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may â—…r redound to the dammage or benefit of his neighbours I call it Peculiar because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme i. e. the Civill Law is to be received by each single subject for the right yet being without this Civill Government in which state no man can know right reason from false but by comparing it with his owne every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of his owne actions which are done at his owne perill but also for the measure of another mans reason in such things as doe concerne him I call it True that is concluding from true principles rightly fram'd because that the whole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2 3 4 5 6 and 7. Articles of the first Chapter II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found and where not there to provide our selves for helps of War For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter that this precept is the dictate of right reason but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes that hath been newly prov'd above But this is the first because the rest are deriv'd from this and they direct the wayes either to Peace or self-defence III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this That the right of all men to all things ought not to be retain'd but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd or relinquisht for if every one should retain his right to all things it must necessarily follow that some by right might invade and others by the same right might defend themselves against them for every man by naturall necessity endeavours to defend his Body and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body therefore War would follow He therefore acts against the reason of Peace i. e. against the Law of Nature whosoever he be that doth not part with his Right to all things IV. But he is said to part with his right who either absolutely renounceth it or conveys it to another He absolutely renounceth it who by some sufficient Signe or meet Tokens declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again which before by Right he might have done but he conveys it to another who by some sufficient Signe or meet Tokens declares to that other that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before with Right have resisted him but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting is understood by this that before it was convey'd he to whom he convey'd it had even then also a right to all whence he could not give any new Right But the resisting Right he had before he gave it by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rights is utterly abolisht Whosoever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of men he onely procures himself security and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primitive Right As for example if any man shall sell or give away a Farme he utterly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme but he does not so from others also V. But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onely of him that conveys but of him also that accepts it If either be wanting the Right remaines for if I would have given what was mine to one who refus'd to accept of it I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Right or convey'd it to any man for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this Man was in him onely not in others too VI. But if there be no other Token extant of our will either to quit or convey our Right but onely Words those words must either relate to the present or time past for if they be of the future onely they convey nothing for example he that speaks thus of the time to come I will give to morrow declares openly that yâ—t he hath not given it so that all this day his right remains and abides to morrow too unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it for what is mine remains mine till I have parted with it But if I shall speak of the time present suppose thus I doe give or have given you this to be received to morrow by these words is signified that I have already given it and that his Right to receive it to morrow is conveyed to him by me to day VII Neverthelesse although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signes be added they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present If therefore as by reason of those other signes it appear that he that speaks of the future intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his Right they ought to be valid for the conveyance of right depends not on words but as hath been instanc'd in the 4. Article on the declaration of the Will VIII If any man conveigh some part of his right to another and doth not this for some certain benefit received or for some compact a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift or free Donation Bâ—t in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the pâ—esent or the time past for if they respect the future they oblige not as words for the reason given in the fore-going Article It must needs therefore be that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will But because whatsover is voluntarily done is done for some good to him that wils it there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give it except some benefit either already receiv'd or to be acquir'd but is suppos'd that no such benefit is acquired nor any compact in being for if so it would cease to be a free gift It remains therefore that a mutuall good turne without agreement be
Subject to another that other shall not onely be Lord of him but also of his Servants Supreme Lord over these immediate Lord over him Now because not the Servant only but also all he hath are his Lords therefore his Servants now belong to this man neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good to the Supreme And therefore if sometime in civill Governments the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants that 's suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature and not constituted but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law IX A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude that a Subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection First if his Lord enfranchize him for the Right which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe the same may the Lord restore to the servant again And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City Secondly if the Lord cast off his servant from him which in a City is banishment neither differs it from Manumission in effect but in manner onely for there liberty is granted as a favour here as a punishment In both the Dominion is renounced Thirdly if the servant be taken prisoner the old servitude is abolished by the new for as all other things so servants also are acquired by warre whom in equity the Lord must protect if he will have them to be his Fourthly the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successour the Lord dying suppose without any Testament or Heire for no man is understood to be obliged unlesse â—e know to whom he is to perform the obligation Lastly she servant that is put in bonds or by any other means deprived of his corporall liberty is freed from that other obligation of contract for there can be no contract where there is no trust nor can that faith be broken which is not given but the Lord who himselfe serves another cannot so free his servants but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme for as hath been shewed before such servants are not his but the supreme Lords X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same manner that we doe over the Persons of men to wit by force and naturall strength for if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one by reason of that warre which is of all against all to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good much more will the same be lawfull against â—rutes namely at their own disâ—retion to reduce those to servitude which by aâ—t may be tamed and â—â—tted for use and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpeâ—uall warre as daâ—gerous and noâ—ious Our Dâ—miâ—ioâ— therefore over beasts hath its originall from the right of nature not from divine positive Right for if such a Right had not been before the publishing of the sacred Scriptures no man by right might have killed a beast for his food but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ a most hard condition for men indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury and yet they might not destroy them Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature that a beast may kill a man it is also by the same Right that a man may slay a beast CHAP. IX Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary Government I. Paternall Dominion ariseth not from generation II. Dominion over Infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power III. Dominion over infants is originally the Mothers IV. The exposed infant is his from whom he receives his preservation V. The child that hath one Parent a Subject and the other a Soveraign belongs to him or her in authority VI. In such a conjunction of man and woman as neither hath command over the other the children are the Mothers unlesse by compact or civill Law it bee otherwise determined VII Children are no lesse subject to their Parents then Servants to their Lords and Subjects to their Princes VIII Of the honour of Parents and Lords IX Wherein Liberty consists and the difference of Subjects and Servants X. There is the same Right over Subjects in an hereditary Government which there is an institutive Government XI The question concerning the right of Succession belongs only to Monarchy XII A Monarch may by his Will and Testament dispose of his supreme authority XIII Or give it or sell it XIV A Monarch dying without Testament is â—ver supposed to will that a Monarch should succeed him XV. And some one of his children XVI And a male rather then female XVII And the eldest rather then the yonger XVIII And his Brother if he want issue before all others XIX In the same manner that men succeed to the power doe they also succeed to the right of succession I. SOcrateâ— is a man and therefore a living creature is a right seasoning and that most evident because there is nothing needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence but that the word Man be understod because a living creature is in the definition it selfe of a Man and every one makes up the proportion which was desired namely this Man is a living Creature And this Sopâ—roniscus is Socrates his Father and therefore his Lord is perhaps a true inference but not evident because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident that the connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent over his children have brought no other argument then that of generation as if it were of it selfe evident that what is begotten by me is mine just as if a man should think that because there is a triangle it appeares presently without any farther discourse that its angles are equall to two Rights Besides since Dominion that is supreme power is indivisible insomuch as no man can serve two Masters but two Persons male and female must concâ—rre in the act of generation its impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation onely Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place enquire into the original of paternal Government II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature in which by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be accounted equall There by right of nature the Conqueror is Lord of the conquered by the Right therefore of nature the Dominion over the Inâ—ant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power but it 's manifest that 〈◊〉 who is newly born is in the Mothers power before any others insomuch as she may rightly and at
he lists on any Transgressions but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent Subjects and those who never offended against the Lawes And truly this is a very great grievance in any forme of Government wheresoever it happens for it is therefore a grievance because it is not because it may be done but it is the fault of the Ruler not of the Government For all the acts of Nero are not essentiall to Monarchie yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd under one Ruler then under the People For Kings are onely severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent Counsells or oppose them with reproachfull words or controule their Wills but they are the cause that that excesse of power which one Subject might have above another becomes harmlesse wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him namely Courtiers and such as are remarkable for some eminent Charge and not all neither but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy for they that are offensive and contumelious are deservedly punisht whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired life let him be what he will that Reignes he is out of danger for the ambitious onely suffer the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent but in a popular Dominion there may be as mane Nero's as there are Oratours who sooth the People for each one of them can doe as much as the People and they mutually give way to each others appetite as it were by this secret pact Spare me to day and I le spare thee to morrow while they exempt those from punishment who to satisfie their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects Furthermore there is a certain limit in private power which if it exceed it may prove pernicious to the Realme and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to have a care that the common-weale do thence receive no prejudice When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of Riches they lessened it by diminishing their heaps but if it were in popular applause the powerfull party without any other crime laid to his charge was taken from among them The same was usually practised in Democraties for the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull meerly because of their powers without the guilt of any other crime and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the common people were put to death at Rome as men ambitious of a Kingdome In this Democraty and Monarchy were eaven yet differ'd they much in same because fame derives from the People and what is done by many is commended by many and therefore what the Monarch does is said to be done out of envie to their vertues which if it were done by the People would be accounted Politie VIII There are some who therefore imagine Monarchy to bee more grievous then Democraty because there is lesse liberty in that then in this If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the Lawes i e. the commands of the People neither in Democraty nor in any other state of government whatsoever is there any such kind of liberty If they suppose liberty to consist in this that there be few lawes few prohibitions and those too such that except they were forbidden there could be no Peace then I deny that there is more liberty in Democraty then Monarchy for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty as the other for although the word liberty may in large and ample letters be written over the gates of any City whatsoever yet is it not meant the Subjects but the Cities liberty neither can that word with better Right be inscribed on a City which is governed by the people then that which is ruled by a Monarch but when private men or subjects demand liberty under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty but dominion which yet for want of understanding they little consider for if every man would grant the same liberty to another which he desires for himselfe as is commanded by the law of nature that same naturall state would return again in which all men may by Right doe all things which if they knew they would abhor as being worse then all kind of civill subjection whatsoever but if any man desire to have his single freedome the rest being bound what does he else demand but to have the Dominion for who so is freed from all bonds is Lord over all those that still continue bound Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a Popular then in a Monarchicall State That which deceives them is the equall participation of command and publique places for where the Authority is in the People single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are parts of the People ruling and they equally partake in publique Offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing Magistrates and publique Ministers And this is that which Aristotle aim'd at himself also through the custome of that time mis-calling Dominion liberty in his sixth Book and second Chapter of Poli. In a popular State there is liberty by supposition which is a speâ—ch of the vulgar as if no man were free out of this State From whence by the way we may collect That those Subjects who in a Monarchy deplore their lost liberty doe onely stomack this that they are not receiv'd to the steerage of the Common-weal IX But perhaps for this very reason some will say That a Popular State is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall because that where all men have a hand in publique businesses there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome knowledge and eloquence in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in humane nature is to them who excell in such like faculties and seeme to themselves to exceed others the most delightfull of all things but in a Monarchy this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of Subjects and what is a grievance if this be none I le tell you To see his opinion whom we scorne preferr'd before ours to have our wisedome undervalued before our own faces by an uncertain tryall of a little vaine glory to undergoe most certaine enmities for this cannot be avoided whether we have the better or the worse to hate and to be hated by reason of the disagreement of opinions to lay open our secret Counsells and advises to all to no purpose and without any benefit to neglect the affaires of our own Family These I say are grievances But to be absent from a triall of wits although those trialls are pleasant to the Eloquent is not therefore a grievance to them unlesse we will say that it is a
constitute a Law but for the Will of the Supreme Commander which appeares in this that he hath suffer'd his Sentence whether equall or unequall to passe into custome XVI Sinne in its largest signification comprehends every deed word and thought against right reason for every man by reasoning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe If therefore he reason right that is to say beginning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary he will proceede in a most direct way otherwise hee 'l goe astray that is to say he will either doe say or endeavour somewhat against his proper end which when he hath done he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred but in action and will to have sinned for sin followes errour just as the Will doth the understanding And this is the most generall acception of the word under which is contain'd every imprudent action whether against the Law as to overthrow another mans house or not against the Law as to build his owne upon the Sand. XVII But when we speak of the Lawes the word Sinne is taken in a more strict sense and signifies not every thing done against right reason but that onely which is blameable and therefore is call'd malum culpae the evill of fault but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne or fault but onely if it be blameable with reason We must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason what against reason Such is the nature of man that every one calls that good which he desires and evill which he eschewes and therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens that one counts that good which another counts evill and the same man what now he esteem'd for good he immediately looks on as evill and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe he tearmes evill in another for we all measure good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present or expect hereafter Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies because they increase their honours goods and power and of equalls by reason of that strife of honours which is among them both seeme and are irkesome and therefore evill to all and men use to repute those evill that is to say to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive evill its impossible to be determined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe not please and displease what actions are and what not to be blam'd They may agree indeed in some certaine generall things as that theft adultery and the like are sinnes as if they should say that all men account those things evill to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense but we demand not whether theft be a Sinne but what is to be term'd theft and so concerning other in like manner For as much therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers what is by reason blameable is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man more then another because of the equality of humane nature and there are no other reasons in being but onely those of particular men and that of the City it followes that the City is to determine what with reason is culpable so as a fault that is to say a SINNE is that which a man do's omits sayes or wills against the reason of the City that is contrary to the Lawes XVIII But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through humane infirmity although he desire to fulfill them and yet his action as being against the Lawes iâ— rightly blam'd and call'd a Sinne But there are some who neglect the Lawes and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation Not only the deeds but even the mindes of these men are against the Lawes They who sinne onely through infirmity are good men even when they sinne but these even when they doe not sin are wicked for though both the action and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes yet those repugnancies are distinguisht by different appellations for the irregularity of the action is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unjust deed that of the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice and malice that is the infirmity of a disturbed soule this the pravity of a sober mind XIX But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent in what manner will he be said to sinne who either denies that there is a God or that he governs the world or casts any other reproach upon him for he will say that he never submitted his will to Gods will not conceiving him so much as to have any being And granting that his opinion were erroneous and therefore also a sin yet were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or ignorance which by right cannot be punished This speech seems so farre forth to be admitted that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful yet is it to be refer'd * to sins of imprudence but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance is absurd For the Atheist is punisht either immediately by God himselfe or by Kings constituted under God not as a Subject is punished by a King because he keeps not the Lawes but as one enemy by another because he would not accept of the Lawes that is to say by the Right of warre as the Giants warring against God For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord or one to another are enemies among themselves Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence Many find fault that I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence and not to injustice yea by some it is taken so as if I had not declared my selfe an enemy bitter enough against Atheists They object farther that since I had elsewhere said that it might be knowne there is a God by naturall reason I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the Law of nature and therefore not only guilty of imprudence but injustice too but I am so much an enemy to Atheists that I have both diligently sought for and vehemently desired to find so â—e Law whereby I might condemne them of injustice but when I found none I enquired next what name God himselfe did give to men so detested by him Now God speaks thus of the Atheist The fool hath said in his heart there is no God Wherefore I placed their sinne in that rank which God himselfe referres to next I shew them to be enemies of God But I conceive the name of an