tables of the law and calling others unto him to fall upon the massacring of the people yet this testimony is given of him that hee was the meekest man on the earth I doe not dislike your allowance of men to be passionate in the promoting of Gods glory I hope you will give like allowance to men to be passionate in the defence of Gods truth I have no greate edge to make Christians contend in passion with worldly men how wise soever Yet well I wote that David one of the worthyes of the World amongst Martialists his eyes did gushe out with rivers of water because men kept not the law of the Lord holy Lot did vexe his heart with the uncleane conversations of the Sodomites These morall essayes of yours have a foule issue as when you inferre but most inconsequently as arguing from the nature of man to the nature of God that passions are in God nor so only but even such affections as essentially include perturbation you were as good plainly professe that God is not exempt from perturbation Neyther is to be zealous or compassionate to be like God in wisedom but rather in affection Yet zeale and compassion are accidents in man not in God arise in man never without alteration but no alteration as your selfe have made shew to maintayne is incident unto God Yet I doe easily grant you that the vehemency of mans passions doth as significantly represent the want of passion in God as the swift motions of the Heavens doth represent Gods immutability Like unto him that presenting an unsufficient person to his degree and being demaunded what he meant to prostitute himself to such profanesse made answere he might doe it with a safe conscience For he undertooke for him but tam quam tam moribus quam doctrina and he thought him as good one way as the other though indeede good at neyther And now if your selfe be arrived after all this unto a rest I doe not say vigorous least that might proove the embleme of greater motion from your passion I pray consider how these doe agree First to say that Gods wisedom doth not exempt him from passion and then to acknowledge a want of passion in God 2 I see no reason why you should complaine of the barrennesse of your imagination in illustrating the attributes of God to my judgement it hath bin more fruitefull then all that ever went before you who I dare say were never able to discerne that lively resemblance you speake of betweene the swift motion of the Heavens and the immutability or vigorous rest of God as also betweene the vehemency of mens passions and the vacuity of all passion in God Your Mathematickes though I professe my selfe a very sory scholler in that science I doe reasonablely well understand as namely that a circular figure is as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and of all figures of equall circumference the most capacious and that all other figures the nearer they draw to a circle and the more Angles they contayn of equall circumference are the more capacious I expect your mysterious and profound explication 3. The Analogy spoken of betweene sides and Angles as found in circles and other figures doth fitly expresse you say that analogy which Schole divines assign betweene wisedom science love hatred goodnesse desire as they are found in God and man Your theame was how Anger Love Compassion mercy or other affections are in the divine nature of all these there is but one found in this latter enumeration of yours and that is love and wheras you proposed to speake only of the affection and to shew how they are in God Yet here you mention wisedome science goodnesse which never were accoumpted affections No name or title of affection can you say be univocally attributed unto God And this is true and as true of habits and powers of our soules that they cannot univocally be attributed unto God For whatsoever is in God is mere essence and therfore such titles as signifie accidents in us cannot denominate God secundum nomen nominis rationem But as we love by an act of passion so God may love by an act which is his essence Our wills and understandings are accidents yet doth God as truly will and understand as we by his very essence not by any act which is really distinguished from his essence Gods love Gods wrath are merely his will to doe good or to revenge evill as they signifie any thing within God But if they be used as externall denominations so when God punisheth us he is sayd to be angry with us when he doth us good he is sayd to love us And in the like sense may every name of any affection be attributed unto God provided it doth not essentially imply any imperfection as feare doth and desire doth which cannot be attributed unto God but metaphorically The fruits of love compassion proceede from none so freely so plentiously as from God and therfore he may justly be sayd to be most loving most compassionate but to whom he will In like sort the fruits of wrath and a revenging will proceede from none more powerfully and more heavenly then from God Psal. 90. 11. Heb. 10. 13. Who knoweth the power of thy wrath Psalm 90. It is a fearefull thing to fall into the hands of God Therefore may he justly be accoumpted a most severe regenger of iniquity but on whom he will For he can pardon it and cure it in whom he will these being but the fruites of his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will But to say he is wholly love and wholly displeasure is a wild expression in my conceyte For to say that he is wholly love is as much as to say that whatsoever he is is love whence it followeth that seeing he is displeasure also as you say his very displeasure is love and consequently by the same reason his very love is his displeasure The truth is affections in us belong only to the will and so translated unto God they should only denominate his will Now his power his understanding his will are very distinct notions though in God they are not really distinct yet so farre distinct as that it seemes absurd to say that his power is his will or his wisedom or that his wisedom is his will or his power or that his will is eyther his power or wisdom So you speake truth we are content you take what liberty you think good in the illustration of it and to satisfie your selfe with your illustrations though your readers you doe not I finde you are much pleased in the commodious illustration which a circle doth afford you or which you divise in a circle which you call the true embleme of eternity Some I confesse have professed that eternity doth ambire tempus but I never observed that they compared it to a circle but only I conceave theire meaning was that at this present it was
gracious action to be the object of Gods decree For it is manifest that these all are contingent actions Now your opinion is that God decreethe Contingency but not any contingen◠thinge Though on the other side you confesse God cannot decree necessity but withall he must decree things necessary allso Lastly doe you knowe any that maynteyne any such Tenet eyther in opposition to Arminius or otherwise which here you obtrude upon your opposites I assure you I knowe none such But whatsoever our Tenet be I pray remember your promise that if we agree with you in the former namely that God hath a true fredome of doing good Man a true fredome of doing evill then you will not dissent from vs in other points controverted And doe you knowe any of vs to deny eyther of these And yet we may desire explication of that which you passe over smoothly as thoughe it needed none For what doe you meane by libertie of doing good liberty of doing evill is it quoad specisicationem or only quoad exercitium dare you professe that God is free to doe evill as well as good or that Man since his fall in the state of nature is free to doe good as well as evill quoad exercitium we grant that both God is free to doe or not doe whatsoever he dothe soe likewise Man is free to doe or not doe whatsoever he dothe Why doe you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ at least in not distinguishing them Yet this is not all the confusion we complayne of For Gods absolute power is one thinge his ordinate power is another thing for this includs his will God coulde have refused to make the world when he did make it he made it freely but supposing Gods decree to make it to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise as it is impossible that Gods will shoulde be changed In like sort God dothe al this time continne the World he continueth it freely But yet in respect of his decree to continue it certeyne yeares it is impossible upon this supposition that it shoulde ende before the time appoynted Agayne what meane you to feigne any such Tenet on our parts in opposition to Arminius as that God for soothe hath soe decreed all thinges that nothing can fall out otherwise then it hath done For we expressely to the contrary maynteyne that God hathe decreed many things to come to passe in such sort that they could have fallen out otherwise to witt all such thinges as are contingent For we doe not maynteyne that God hathe decreed that all thinges shall come to passe necessarily but some things only necessarily other things contingently And in respect of these modi rerum in generall which are necessitie contingency we say it is impossible that any thing should come to passe otherwise then God hathe decreed they shall come to passe in this sense to witt if God hathe decreed some things to come to passe necessarily they shall come to passe necessarily if he hath decreed some things to come to passe contingently they shall come to passe contingently it is impossible that thinges should come to passe otherwise And I praesume you will not deny this though therby you shall contradict your selfe in respect of that Tenet which here you cast upon your Adversaries disavowe as an errour ignorance I say contradict your selfe unles you distinguishe those thinges which in this your Tenet you deliver without distinction and confound as your manner is But by your leave whatsoever God hath decreed that shal come to passe that in such sort as supposing his decree it shall be impossible to be otherwise neyther will we feare your censures of errour ignorance noe nor your praesumptuous consequences of involvinge enmitie against your sweete disposition of the all-seieng and vnerring providence of God thus with wordes as sweete as butter as soft as oyle you woulde woorke in your Reader an opinion of your devotion to Godward to praevent suspicion of ill affection to his providence when you turne out All decreeing put in Allseeing in the place of it Wheras before you made shewe as if you excepted not against our Tenet of Gods decreeinge all thinges but only against the manner of it his so decreing all thinges But be not deceaved God is not mocked Let vs ever feare to maske profanes with the vizard of devotion doe not you thinke with the smoake of woordes in such sort to dazle the eyes of your intelligent Reader as to disable him to discerne your deedes in their proper colours Neyther have you any colour for this your Tenet in denying God to have decreed all thinges but only in respect of sinne And what reason have you to range sinne amōgst the number of Things without distinction consideringe it is rather a mere privation of some thinge then conteynes any positive thinge therin Yet as I sayde before your opinion were tolerable did you maynteyne all other thinges to be decreed by God besides sinne But your opinion is that God decreeth contingency but not the thinges contingent which is in effect to deny in playne termes that God hathe decreed that any Man shall believe or repent or performe any gracious action God foreseethe these things but decreethe them not this is your fowle opinion in that opposition to the praerogative of Gods grace For if God by his grace holy spirite dothe woorke men vnto faithe repentance in shewing mercy vnto whome he will then vndoubledly he did decree thus to woorke them For God woorketh all thinges according to the caunsayl of his will And his will I hope you will not deny to be aeternall Yet you seeme to strengthen your opinion with a reason of State Therfore be like amongst other reasons yet concealed you decline the acknowledgment of Gods all decreing providence because that Tenet is aforerunner of ruine to most floorishing states where it growes common and comes to full light Heathen States then undoubtedly had never any experience of such ruines proceeding from any such cause I doubt not but you will accommodate this your prophecy or politicall observation unto Christian States And what Ecclesiasticall history I pray hathe affoorded you this oracle Noe ancient history I am persuaded doe you rely upon in this for as much as you will not acknowledge that this opinion which you impugne was receaved amongst any States of ancient times Is it then as it is most likely that the later times experience hath cast you vpon this interpretation of Gods providence wherupon you are bolde to make rules to commend them unto posterity And I pray answere me was the Kingdome of Bohemia one of those florishing States wherin the conceyte of Gods all decreeing providence was a forerunner to the ruine of it And did Prince Palatine the lady Elizabeth or their Asociates bringe in this conceyte amongst them
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
hath his name from that nature wherof it participates as hot is that which participates of heate white is such a nature as participates of whitenes But God cannot be sayde to participate of essence In this I finde some defect First because you doe not shewe howe ens which you call a concrete is divided as concretes are into a part materiall participating and a part formall participated In a word you doe not once offer to resolve ens into the parts of its signification Secondly there is litle congruity betweene ens that which hath beinge hot or white that which hathe heate and whitenes For that which hathe whitenes in it or heate is a substance or subject really existent wherin the qualitie of heate or whitenes is founde But the word ens admittethe no division comparable or congruous herunto For you cannot with sobrietie say that ens signifieth a nature really existent wherin essence is found distinct from the nature signified or comming over and above unto it as heate dothe over and above to the constitution of the subject And therfore it followethe not that because hot dothe signifie a subject participating of heate therfore ens allso signifieth a subject participating of essence A great deale of difference there is betweene concretes of accidentall denomination and concretes of essentiall denomination As Homo Animall which may be accoumpted concretes in respect of such abstract notions as are conceaved under the termes of Humanitas and Animalitas The specificall essence beinge constituted by the abstract notion and not participating of it as bodies participate of heate The truthe is all compounds doe properly admitt a concrete denomination as in whome the suppositum as Homo and Animal differethe from the nature denominatinge it as Humanitas Animalitas But in things not compounde it is not so least of all in God For thoughe Homo be not Humanitas yet Deus est ipsa Deitas Aquin. 1 q. 3. art 3. De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum a quibus cognitionem accipimus ideo de Deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus subsistentiam quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita Et utimur nominibus abstractis ut significemus ejus simplicitatem Quod ergo dicitur Deitas vel vita vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri non ad aliquam diversitatem rei That God is one by whome all thinges are is true but this description is litle congruous to the nature of God in as much as it could have no place before the creation or in case the World had never bene created Yet Gods nature is still the same I cannot admitt that thinges created participate of Gods being They have their beinge from God I grant but I cannot admitt their being to be any part of Gods beinge or Gods beinge to have parts Yet if all thinges are from him howe can you avoyde but that God himselfe shall be from himselfe Vnles the Apostle helpe you in this discoursinge In that he hath put all thinges under him it is manifest that he is excepted who did put all thinges under him But be it so that all other thinges are from him then allso accidents as well as substances are from him and can they participate of Gods being Of accidentall beinge I grant they doe participate and that from God but not of Gods beinge If so howe much more must faithe and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God which I much feare you will be founde to deny if not at first hande yet at least in a second place by maynteyning it in such a manner to be the worke of God as upon condition of mans will which in my judgement is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them The name of God I am openeth a fayre way to the expoundinge of a mystery which you medle not with contenting your selfe with ventinge of phrases in settinge foorthe the nature of God The existence of all creatures may be accoumpted as a mere accident to their essence for as much as all of them have being after not beinge and from being eyther doe or may returne agayne to not beinge It is not so with God who is everlastinge and that formally by necessitie of nature So that wheras the essence of every creature abstract from existence includes a possibilitie formally indifferent to being or not being Gods essence includes a necessitie of beinge an impossibilitie of not beinge Your lines of amplification are eyther very wilde and without sense or my witts are too shallow to comprehend them the rest I cannot construe the close I can when you say the essence of God is the bond of all thinges that can be combined or linkt together I can construe these wordes but not comprehend their meaninge The combination of thinges together you understand it seemes in affirmations negations Nowe that Gods essence shoulde be the copula wherby the subject and predicate in all propositions are linkt together and that whether true or false Holy or profane may well passe I thinke for the tenthe woonder of the world God only is by nature all other thinges by the will of God I am that I am say the the Apostle but by the grace of God God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence we are in such sort as that our existence is not our essence For sometimes we were not and if it pleased God we might cease to be But yet we live and moove and have our beinge all in him I cannot admitt that Angells participate of Gods essence or that God communicates his essence to any but to his Sonne They as all other things have their essence from God but not his Yet are they according to the Image of God Other creatures may have vestigia footestes of God In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God I say the Image of God but not the essence of God 2. Whether Angells are creatures and consequently of a finite nature no Christian makes question But as touching their nature understanding place and motion attributed unto them they are such secrets and mysteries unto me that I have no heart to medle with them The Scriptures tell us that a Legion of divells were in one man and of the good that the Angells of litle children doe allwayes behold the face of God their Father But touching the nature of God to say that his indivisible unitie comprehendeth all multiplicity is an ambiguous speeche both because multiplicitie is found in evill as well as in good and the phrase of includinge to my thinking inclines to signifie comprehension formall rather then vertuall As for Senecaes sentence which you so much magnify as if we coulde not say more of him in fewer words I judge to be
goodnes To be essentiall to the nature of God is more noble I grant then to be accidentall but howe any power can be greater then power infinite or any wisedome greater then wisedome infinite or any goodnes greater then goodnes infinite I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe that whersoever infinite power infinite wisedome infinite goodnes is founde that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerfull and wise good as namely the nature of God thoughe of the evident demonstration therof for ought you have brought to helpe us herein we may be still to seeke As for succession and extension we holde that each is impossible to be infinite And neyther of them any attribute of God as power and wisedome and goodnes is And therfore the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kinde must needes be wonderous wilde Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations but rather wonder that succession and extension shoulde be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections conteyned in God and that all these mentioned attributes layde out in severall should have infinities added unto them Much more should we have wondered if the issue of your discourse had bene answearable to the originall which is to shewe not how power and wisedome goodnes are all one in God which are with us of accidentall denomination but to shewe how every substance is in God of Angell of man of beasts of birds of fishes of woormes and every creeping thinge and that all these are to be accoumpted excellencyes and perfections And surely they had neede to be in God in a more excellent manner then they are in themselves otherwise their advancing so highe woulde be too great a degrading of the nature of God But to adde my mite of discourse touching the being of all thinges in God and the precise unitie of all thinges in God which under a forme of pluralitie according to our conceytes are attributed unto him As touching the first that all perfections are in God is to be acknowledged without all controversy because we understand by God such a nature as nothing can be imagined better and I approove of Aquinas his reason Like as heate if it did exist of it selfe it should comprehende all degrees of heate so the essence of God being all one with his existence that is he beinge essentially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him But as for the perfections of beinge which are founde without God according to their severall rankes and kindes therein â—s namely of being without life of being and life without sense or reason of beinge life sense without reason of bothe beinge life and sense and reason as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species oâ—kind but only analogicall which as Aquinas shewethe is this that God is entitie by essence every other thinge is an entity only by participation So likewise their perfections cannot be sayde to be in God univocally but only analogically as the effect is sayde to be in the Agent in as much as he hathe power to produce it It is true some thinges are attributed unto creatures which cannot be attributed unto God and some thinges are attributed bothe to God and to the creatures As for example God is not a body man is a body God is a spirite an Angell is a spirite God hath beinge so have all thinges God hath life so have many thinges God is wise good powerfull these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angells Yet these denominations in admitting wherof bothe God and creatures doe agree are as different in respect of God and the creatures as those denominations in the communion wherof they doe not agree As for example the Spirituall nature of God is as farre different from the spirituall nature of an Angell as from the bodily nature of maâ— or beast as being infinitely different from eache And therfore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God but rather their remotion a non esse One creature having more perfections of beinge then another consequently so much the more remooved from not beinge But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely remooved from God who is infinite So that like as the bodily nature of man dothe not agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God so neyther dothe the spirituall nature of an Angell agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God But God is equally an equivocall Agent in respect of bothe And no merveyle for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree are commonly such as are of accidentall denomination unto the creatures as when we say God is wise and holy and powerfull a man or Angell is wise and holy and powerfull c. But is there any colour why the nature of God shoulde come nearer unto those thinges that are of accidentall denomination in us then unto those that are substantiall wheras every meane scholer knowes that substances are more noble then accidents and as for substantiall denominations wherein God and the creature doe agree if they be examined it will be founde that in the resolution of the truthe the agreement will appeare to be only in negation As when we say God is a spirite the negation of extension corporall and materiall is the only thinge wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angell Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirite in distinction from a man to consist in this that a spirite hathe not fleshe and bones And as for the generall not on of entitie common to all marke what a vast difference there is herein betweene God and the creature and such as excludes all univocation God is an entity independant and wherof all other entities depend bothe for their production and for their preservation and that out of nothinge as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles Let it suffize then that all perfections are in God and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence But as for created perfections the word created is a terme diminishing perfection but such as they are they are in God only as effects are in their causes and they not univocall but equivocall only or at the best but analogicall Let us come to the consideration of the unitie of Gods attributes especially with Gods essence whence it will followe that an unitie of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves And the question wil come to this whether there be any accident in God Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysicall speculations or that I thinke our language to be fitt for them for want of termes of Art in common use to expresse such notions as here must necessarily occurre But only being provoked herunto by
be confined to one place more then to another yea to the Court of Heaven rather then to the basest corner of the earthe is so absurd to my judgement that I professe ingenuously all the reason and witt that I have is not sufficient to make it good of Angells as being Spirits abstract from materiall extension And I will remember how Aquinas makes Angells to be in place only in respect of their operation And places are for the natures of bodies and not of Spirits and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angells and such things as I am willingly content they should continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place then to another And indeede to my judgement to be in place is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God And Durand as allready I have shewed professethe that God secundum se is in no place but only secundum effectus and so every where for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects And as God is sayde to have bene in seipso in himselfe before the World was made is he not so to be accoumpted still according to those verses of course in this argument Dic ubi tunc esset cum praeter eum nihil esses Tunc ubi nunc inse quoniam sibi sufficit ipse And is there not reason for it For Gods essence hathe no respect to outward thinges as his power hathe and his operation hathe And see whether by ascribing place to him you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo which opinion but erst you impugned For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre as some are called Princes of the ayre and so within the hollowe of the moone and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remayninge It will not followe herehence that the Angells supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone shall be annihilated because they being abstract substances and undependant on any matter shall exist still and consequently shall be in Uacuo For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies not of Spirits And who doubts but that God could have created spirituall substances only and not bodily in which case they must be sayde to be in Uacuo or no where without them Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselfes within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated yet God shall not cease to be existent there upon the annihilation of Angells like as Angells did not cease to exist there upon the annihilation of bodies and consequently God himselfe shall exist in Vacuo and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence and from his power Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned but only as conteyninge now to conteyne is the worke of his power and of his will not of his essence save as his essence and power and will are all one realitie in God And so God may be sayde to be every where not only three manner of wayes to witt by his essence by his presence by his power but more manner of wayes to witt by his knowledge by his wisedome by his will by his goodnes Yet all these shall be but one way as all these are but one in God But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where but it may content us to say that God ever was and is in himselfe only so his goodnes is no where but in himselfe his knowledge wisedome and understanding no where but in himselfe his will mercy and justice no where but in himselfe his power to make to preserve to worke no where but in himselfe but the operations of all these united in himselfe are every where and so sayth Durand God fillethe all thinges with his sweete influence and effects of his power wisedome and goodnes all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence Thus we may say his power and wisedome and goodnes reachethe unto the earthe and to every thinge within this canopy eyther by way of influence naturall or by way of influence gracious like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven by way of influence glorious All which are not properly his wisedome and power and goodnes but rather the effects of them of them I say which yet are all one thinge with his essence But Gods essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward thinges as his wisedome power and goodnes doe bothe in the way of mercy and in the way of judgement It implyes contradiction to affirme his power or wisedome to be more infinite then his essence if so be we conceave his power and wisedome to be his essence And yet to be in many places more then another thing is is not to make it infinite because all places put together are but finite much lesse to make it more infinite Not only some great Schoolemen as you speake but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary distinguishe of Gods being in all thinges by his essence by his power by his prosence and so the vulgar verse runnes Enter praesenter Deus est ubique potenter Allthoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them as we may reade in Vasquez Three of which explications he takes upon him to confute to witt that of Alexander Halensis as allso the way of Bonaventure and lastly the way of Durand resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas followed as he saythe by Cajetan Albertus Aegidius Ricardus Capreolus Gabriel the exposition there set downe is this 1. God is in all thinges by his essence because his substance is not distant from things but joyned with them whether in respect of himselfe or in respect of his operation 2. By his presence because he knowes all thinges 3. By his power because his power reachethe unto every thinge Nowe I freely professe I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction And to my judgement presence is only in respect of essence or of that individuall substance whatsoever it be which is sayde to be present whether it hathe knowledge or no what power soever it hath much or litle whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power And God indeede cannot be sayde in proper speeche to be more distant from one place or thinge then from any other But he may be sayde I confesse to be in one place more then in another in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place then in another He is in all places as the Author of nature communicating the gifts of nature in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace communicating the gifts of grace but in most
Whereas to my poore conceyt if a founteyne of life be presupposed to things past it must be presupposed allso to things to come And there is no curiosity in this the inference rather is most vulgar For seing future things are behind things past quod est prius priori must needs be prius posteriori yet that which is before a former thinge must needs be before a latter thinge Hence you proceede whether by following on or falling of lett the Reader judge to censure that common saying Tempus edax rerum as relishing more of poeticall witt then of Metaphysicall truth For which kind of censure delivered by you I find no just reason For what can no truth satisfie you but that which is Metaphysicall And why you should make such an opposition I know not as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysicall truth were no truth but rather of Poeticall witt and whatsoever relished of poeticall witt did not relish of truth You maye as well censure Aristotles Physicks and Ethicks and Politiques and Rhetoricks for surely they doe not relish of Metaphysicall truths no nor Euclides Mathematicks no nor of Poeticall witt neyther belike they are liable to a double censure Yet what think you cannot Poeticall witt have course in conjunction with truth as well as in separation from it Nec fingunt omnia Cretes No nor Poets neyther And as for this saying Tempus edax rerum I never knew any sober man or other except against the truth of it before But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure to shew your witt in refuting it you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather then the Philosopher for some of them have taken a course to shape stories according to the use they had to make of them and not to followe the direct truth and this hath bene sayd to be the difference betweene Sophocles and Euripides And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is sayd Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur And abstracting a line from the matter of it they may adde to it or take from it what they list So you construe this saying Tempus edax rerum as if it were delivered in proper speech and not by a figure whereas the meaning is Synecdochicall that in course of time things doe consume and wast not that time it selfe doth wast them For time being the duration of things how can the duration of a thing consume it selfe Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose as when you say If time did devoure things what could possibly nourish them or continue them from their beginning to theyr end And that in two respects for neyther the saying signifies that time should devoure thē before the time appoynted for the consumption of them And though time did consume them yet some thing els might contnue them For theyr owne natures wherein God hath made them are for a time apt to resist that which laboureth to corrupt them And other meanes also there are for the preservation of thē As man by using meanes for his preservation may hold out longer then he which useth none neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying Tempus edax rerum ever conceit that any thing should desire the destruction of it selfe as you are pleased to rove in impugning it And look in what sense time doth not destroy but things are destroyed in time in the same sense things temporall have not the continuation of their being from time but from somewhat els in time For when things are preserved by the witt and industry of man from putrefaction they doe not receave this preservation of theyrs from time but from the wit and industry of man And ergo as time doth not wast so neither doth time preserve from wasting It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth rather to say that the motions of things themsselfes and theyr endeavours to enjoy or enterteyne time approching is that which doth wast and consume them For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption yet in all other creatures inferior unto man as beasts of all sorts how can you make it good that they out of a desire and endeavour to enterteyne time doe wast themselfes who know not so much as what time is How much lesse will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts as plants and trees and in all sorts of mixt bodies Nay how will you make it good in man Some die by course of nature and that eyther through age or sicknes when a man of 100. yeares old dieth what motion or endeavour is there in him to enterteyne that wasted him and how will you prove that had not this motion or endeavour of his bene as all endeavours are voluntary and free he might have lived longer When God sent apestilence among the Israelites that in the space of 3. dayes swept awaye 70. thousand was it a motion of theirs or an endeavour to enterteyne time that consumed them Nay when any disease proves mortall how can it appeare that when one man died of an Ague another of the Dropsie another of the squinancy another of the plurisie another of the consumption that all of them died of a certeyn disease called theyr motions and endeavours to enjoy and enterteyne time approching A disease that I think was never knowne to Hipocrates or Galin or any Physician before or since I should think the desease of Pastime should wast us more then the desease of enjoying Time Others come to theyr ends by violent deathes some in warre some by course of justice others by private malice In all these I find my selfe in the bryers and cannot possiblie conceive how mens owne motions and endeavours to enjoy time should wast or consume them or in case a man makes a waye with himselfe by hanging drowning or poysoning Not altogeather so wild is that conceyt of yours which followeth in saying we naturally seeke to catch time Yet wild enough for it is untrue that men catch Time they catch opportunity which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not a litle differing from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth ergo I will roundly sett my selfe to the making of Hay while this opportunity is offered wherein I catch not time but opportunity for the Time were the same in case it rayned but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same because the wether in that case were not the same And Hay-making requires fayr wether Who they are who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion I know not I should think no man so blockish as to confound them seing motion it selfe may be of more or lesse continuance in respect of Time as well as any thing els And in the same Time somethings
time consisting of parts which is not to answeare the question but utterly to overthrowe it and withall it openeth a way to a newe difficulty for in this case it may well be demanded what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man and what to the being of a corps and take heede least you ascribe one instant to the last of the first forme and another instant to the beginninge of the succeeding of the second forme For seing two instants cannot be immediate it will followe herhence that materia prima shall some space of time actually exist without any forme As for my selfe I never â—ept upon Plotinus his Parnassus nor was ever acquainted with his muses Nay I have bene so long time departed out of the universitie and while I was there so long remooved from these kinde of studies that I may well be sayde to have forgotten Aristole Nunâ— mihi sunt oblita sophisâ—ata Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripateticke store with your atchievements out of Plotinus I say then the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more generall question And that is concerninge the beginninge and ceasing of forme now the rules therof most receaved as I remember are these The formes we speake of are eyther permanent or successive Formes permanent beginne per primum sui esse by the first instant of theyr beinge desiâ—unt per primum sui non esse they cease to be by the first instant of theyr not beinge In such sort as to say that immediately before such an instant they were not but at such an instant and in the time following they were Agayne touching theyr endinge you may say Immediately before such an instant they were in and after such an instant they were not As for formes successive such as are time and motion they are sayde to beginne per ultimum sui non esse by the last instant of theyr not beinge and to ende per primum sui non esse by the first instant of theyr not beinge That is at such an instant motion speaking of motion properly as it includes succession was not for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was Agayne touching the ending of motion we may say at such an instant motion was not but immediately before it was And accordingly to the question proposed I answeare Corruption or dissolution is taken eyther in a complicate signification comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the forme and then all that while undoubtedly Socrates was a man and not a carcase But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the forme humane I say in that instant wherin he is sayde to desinere or cease it being the first instant of his not being as before hathe bene shewed to be the manner of desinence or ceasinge of all forms permanent he is a corps but immediately before he was a man In the next place you tell us of Plotins conclusion namely That while we seeke to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity the life of it being thus divided by us looseth its indivisible nature First I like not that assertion whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin in sayinge that God alone truly is I well knowe our beinge is of a quite different nature from Gods being but to deny that we creatures have a true beinge is as good as to deny that we have any being at all Secondly I knowe no man that goethe about to fitt Gods nature with any proportion of quantitie Yet we maynteyne he was coexistent with all thinges past is coexistent with all thinges present shall be coexistent with all thinges that are to come in their order that without all divisibility or succession in himselfe his coexistence after the manner forementioned implying only divisibilitie and succession in the creatures Of time you say no part truly is but the present So then the present time at least truly is Yet but a litle before and often hertofore you have professed that nothing but God truly is Now give me leave to maynteyne some paradoxes as well as you I say all time truly is and is present as well as that which you accoumpt to be only present For how dothe this present houre exist but by succession of parts If you accoumpt nothing present but an instant it is well knowne that an instant deserves no more to be accoumpted time then a point deserves to be accoumpted magnitude But if you speake of time properly it must have parts which cannot exist together but only by succession As for example this minute of an houre is present but how only as having a part past and a part to come For this only to exist is to exist by way of succession In like sort this present houre dothe truly exist but how 〈◊〉 as havinge a part past and a part to come So this present yeare dothe truly exist as having a part past and a part to come In like sort the time of the Gospell accoumpting from the day of Pentâ—cost when the H. Ghost came downe upon the Apostles unto the ende of the World may as well be sayde truly to exist namely thus as having a part past and a part to come So dividing the World into two parts The old world from the beginninge of time by creation unto Noahs flood and the newe World computed from Noahs flood to the ende of the World I say the time of this World dothe only exist as havinge a part past and a part to come So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the ende may be sayde truly to exist to witt by way of succession of parts havinge one part past and another to come For not the least part of time dothe exist otherwise to witt by coexistence of parts but only by succession of parts They who made doubt whether navigators were to be accoumpted amongst the living or amongst the dead affected more witt then truthe For if Navigators undoubtedly they are livinge and not dead Indeede after they have sett foorthe we are uncerteyne what is become of them and equally as uncerteyne may we be what is become of our freindes that are travayled unto China by the way of the Continent But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being is a conceyte litle becomming a Philosopher in my judgement thoughe it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of thinges successive and in motion whether by Sea or land I should thinke that sory imagination is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant which if it were true woulde inferre that time were nothing but a succession of instants But were it so yet surely the shortnes of continuance of any thinge nothinge hinders the true beinge therof when it is A childe of a day olde hath as true being as Methusalch had who
his counsayle refused For he went home set his house in order and hanged himselfe it seemes his unsanctified wisedome urged him hereunto For as it is written of Cesar that he alone came sobrius ad perdendam Rempublicam so Achitophell accessiâ— sobrius ad perdendum seipsum As for the acquiring of well being this is an end that all affect but according to theyr severall dispositions For the good which they affect being bonum conveniens agreing to theyr affections so it comes to passe that as men are of different affections so they propose unto themselfes different endes The luxurious person setts his witts on worke for compassing the satisfaction of his lust the covetous person he affecteth to grow rich the ambitious person to grow greate the vertuous person to be good according to natures direction And thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Looke how every man is qualified such is the end he aymes at but still naturall But in compassing there is a great deale of difference for some are wise to doe evill as appeares in Absolons carriage of himselfe aspiring to the Kingdome as allso in Achitophells counsayles which if Absolom had followed it hath gone full ill with David Nay generally they are found even naturall men to be wiser in theyr courses though wicked witnesse the unâ—â—st â—teward then the children of God are in theyres though honest and Christian. The children of this world sayth our Saviour are wiser in theyr generation then the children of light Nay morall Philosophers in theyr instructions unto vertuous courses have advised theyr Disciples to set before their eyes the picture of vice and to perswade them to take but the like course in prosecuting vertue that the wicked doe in prosecuting vice Vt jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones Vt teipsum serves non expergisceris A manifest argument of the great corruption of man whose witt serveth him so well in evill things so ill in good things Tho improvement whereof is in no small degree allso imputable unto Satan who is most forward to impregnate the fancies of men with suggestions unto evill We have known heavy headed and dull persons brought up at schoole amongst us when afterwards they have taken other courses given themselfes to Ruffianisme they have beene acounted amongst the witts of the time But as for the discerning of true good that power transcends the region of nature God must first regenerate us and translate us into a supernaturall state before we can discerne the thinges of God or these thinges that belong unto our owne peace which when God hath graunted us then our end is no longer the preservation of our temporall being but the salvation of our soules in the world to come and to this purpose to cleave unto God by faith and love usque ad contemptum nostri even to the contempt of our selfes as touching this temporall life of ours And to attaine to this end we neede no consultatious with flesh and blood God in his word hath chalked out unto us a direct way unto this end and therfore it is sayd to be a lanterne unto our feete and a light unto our pathes But whatsoever the end be you tell us that if it bee much affected the lesse choyse of meanes is left the more eagerly we apply our selfes unto their use and strive as it were to straine out successe by close embracing them And for this reason ignorance or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes for bringing about our much desired ends is the mother of selfe will and impatience For what is selfe will if a man should define it but a stiffe adherence to some one or few particular means neyther onely nor cheifly necessary to the maine point It seemes you are in a streight and therfore fetch about for matter though aliene and here we have mett with a good phrase of straininge out successe by close embracing the meanes Yet even in these unnecessary straines your discourse is but loose in my judgement For whether we discerne many meanes or few meanes all is one as touching the close pursuing of that which we much affect For if many we will make choice of the fittest in our judgement and as close embrace them as others doe that doe not discerne so greate variety And as for successe that is not in our power to be strayned out as you speake by close embracing the meanes Man is a resistible agent and easily crossed in his courses and the ends we ayme at in reference to our best meanes are but of a conjecturall nature and so of uncertayne issue Neyther doe I seè any reason to the contrary but that a man may be as selfe willed in the midst of variety of meanes discerned by him as of few meanes and if he be crâ—st in them all much more impatient For surely the greater variety of meanes is represented the more the way is open to take hold of that which is neyther onely nor cheifly necessary like as where many wayes offer themselfes a travailer is in most danger to mistake the most direct way Selfe will I confesse is excercised in adherence to meanes unfitt as may be seene in the rude Irish that will not be brought off from theyr rude courses they will tye their ploughes or harrowes to theyr horse tayles say what the English will to persuade them to another course But it is as well seene in following different endes Many will not be takeÌ„ off from theyr uncleane conversation from their riotous and intemperate courses they count it pleasure as S. Peeter speakes to live deliciously these fruites of selfe-will are not in adhering to meanes so much as in adhering to evill ends But you proceede and tell us in the next place that Witts conscious of theyr owne weakenes for conqueing what they eagerly desire presently call in power wrath or violence as partiall or mercenary seconds to assist them Whereas he that out of fertility of invention can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose cannot much esteeme the losse or miscarriage of some one or two These may seeme prety contemplations and as pretily expressed But I had little thought that selfe will and impatience joyned with want of witt had allso beene joyned with consciousnes of selfe weakenes For the sluggard though but a foole as Solomon sayth is as wise in his owne conceit as seven men that can give a reason And certainly selfe will and selfe conceyts are companions inseparable And therfore such commonly make little question of accomplishing or as you call it of conquering theyr desires by theyr owne courses And yet if they faile hereof t is nothing strange since the best meanes are but likely as your self stile them I can as hardly beleeve that fertility of invention is of power to keepe men from impatience In my opinion patience as all other morall vertues depends rather upon
judgement then invention though formally it is a quality of the will as all morall vertues are and not any habitt of the understanding But suppose he miscarry in all then a mans patience must needes bidd farewell to invention to support it and it is high time to relye upon judgement Yet I trust patience which must have her perfect worke Iam. 〈◊〉 may have course in this case allso though it be an hard matter you say to keepe from fowle play if the game whereat a man shootes be fayre and good and most of his stringes allready be broken It is good they say to have two stringes to a mans bowe A vertuous man hath more then two you suppose as much for you suppose many to be broken yet not all And surely vertue is not vertue if it keepe not from foule play The Stoickes mainteyned that a vertuous man might descend into Phalaris bull without the interrupâ—ion of his happines We Christians are taught and disciplined to rejoyce even in tribulation and marke well our bow stringes because tribulation worketh patience and patience experience and experience hope and hope maketh not ashamed because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sayth S. Paule I am able to endure all thinges by the power of Christ that enables me and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospell to witt by the power of God The power of Christ and the power of God are two such stringes to our blowe of patience as can never be broke We know his grace to be sufficient for us and when his power is made perfect in our weakenes we shall have cause to rejoyce in our infirmities For when we are weake then are we strong In a mans owne strength no man shall be strong But blessed art thou o people who art the saved of the Lord who is the sheild of thy strength and the sword of our glory He can make us to be as a Gyants sword and he is a wall of fire round about Ierusalem All that sight against it theyr fleshe shall consume away though they stand on theyr feete and theyr eyes shall consume in theyr holes and theyr tongues shall consume in their mouthes But to returne The contingency of the issue is within the horizon of our fore sight As for horizons of contrivances let such as fancy them make themselfes merry with them All this while the matter of your discourse being of Gods infinite wisedome and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisedom of man I have wondred what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience unlesse it were to prepare your reader therby with a more willing entertaynment of your discourse But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience which that it might seeme the more congruous you pretend that the infinitenes of his wisedome carries him herunto And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say every minute of theyr life 's violently thwart and crosse some particular meanes ordeyned for his glory and theyr good Gods patience in forbearing us and our sinnes in provoking him are greate enough in theyr proper colours they neede no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them by saying that every minute of life we violently crosse them For surely eyther you must suppose man every minute of his life to be waking or els you delivered this as it were slumbering But to touch upon something more materiall I pray remember that you treate of the wisedome of God as exercised in intending a right end and prosecuting a right choyse of meanes for the effecting of it Now would you be so good as to consider what is the end that God aymes at in this and particularly whether it be all one in bearing thus with all and that of an ambiguous nature thus that in case they doe at length repent and turne unto God he may magnify his mercy in theyr salvation if still they stand out and dye in impenitency he may magnify himselfe in theyr just condemnation And withall I pray consider whether this be the course of any wisedom finite or infinite in God or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner I mention no other end of Gods patience and long suffering because I know no other end agreable to your opinion That which followeth tendes rather to the commendation of the goodnes of Gods will then the wisedome of his understanding therfore so much the more heterogeneall and extravagant as when you say out of the Apostle that He is light and in him is no darknes and that He distingvisheth the fruites of light from fruits of darknes before they are even before he gave them possibility of being An amplification partly idle partly unsound For God must eyther distinguish them before they are or not at all For there is no change in his understanding unsound in saying God gives them possibility of being The being of things is from the gift of God but not the possibility of being But you proceede in the same stringe As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he disernes truly good as for his infinite essence to shrinke in being God indeede cannot shrinke for he is indivisible and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God from which you say his will cannot decline I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular What I pray is more truly good then the setting forth of Gods glory eyther in his patience and long suffering or in ought else whatsoever And is it impossible thinke you for Gods will to decline this If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World Is not this a faite way to Atheisme Many thinges you say may and every thing that is evill doth fall out against Gods will but nothing without his knowledge or besides his expectation In Scripture phrase we find that many thinges fall out not onely besides but contrary to Gods expectation as Esa. 5. where God complayneth of the house of Israel that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wilde grapes And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speeche By the proposition in this place it must be sayde that God expects sowre grapes as well as sweete for otherwise they shoulde fall out besides his expectation which you here deny So then God did expect that Shimei should rayle on David that Absolon should defloure his Fathers Concubines that Iudas should betray his Master that David should defile his neighbours wife and cause hir husband to be slayne by the sword of children of Ammon and that the Iewes should crucify the Holy Sonne
to imprison his infinite wisedome in his selfe-fettered power to restraine the Aeternall Majestie from using such libertie in his everlasting decrees as some earthly Monarches usurpe in causes temporall or civill For the Pope never tyes his hand by any grant which is a fault in him But in that Holy One the reservation of such libertie is a point of high perfection A little before you told us very gravely that weedes grow apace and the former errour which you minced as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly touching Gods decreeing all things was soone delivered of a second to wit the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will You rather thinke that God foreknowes things to come before and without the determination of his will Whether this opinion of yours bee a tare or good corne let the Reader judge And of what nature not a second is but seconds are whereof it seemes you are soone delivered which now we come to examine To say that God foreknowes all things because he decreeth them is you say to imprison his infinite wisedome in his power Why it is nothing so for Gods decree is Gods will not his power yet how is Gods wisedome imprisoned in his will more then his power For as God knoweth more things possible to be done and fit to be done then he doeth so hee can doe more then he doeth and therefore his wisedome is no more imprisoned thereby then his power But besides this you take your aime quite amisse For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to passe is no part of wisedome For for a man to be privie to his owne purposes is no part of wisedome for it is incident even to silly creatures Againe to know what I meane to doe what a senselesse thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge and as like senselesse a thing it is to say that Gods knowledge or wisedome is imprisoned by being privie to his owne purposes Againe how is Gods power fettered by his will Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it you signifie that his liberty is hereby restrained wherein in his everlasting decrees A most senselesse speech Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree Gods libertie of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained Perhaps you may say by making it he cannot alter it I answer if he should alter it after he hath made it this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting but you suppose the contrary namely that Gods decrees are everlasting Or if God should for a while suspend his decrees and not make them with the first how is it possible they could be everlasting This savoureth strongly of an affection to maintayne that Gods decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius though you are ashamed to professe it and therfore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention For you would have God still indâ—fferent to decree this or that as the Pope is who by no graunt bindes his hands And why so is it that upon emergent occasions God might decree a newe as he thinkes fitt why but consider all these emergent occasions were from everlasting knowne to God So that if God at thâ—s time were indifferent to decree he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting For from everlasting he knewe all that now he doth and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was For with him is no variablenesse nor shaddow of change The wildernes of your inventions I well perceave is not at an end I wonder whither the wantonnes of our witts would bring us in the end Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to beleive lyes and that for not embracing his truth with love And who can looke for better from them who shamefully oppose the gâ—ace of God Is it marvaâ—le if God infatuate them As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of Gods decree this is your language not ours in the last period of your former Section We say looke what God hath decreed that of necessitie must come to passe but how not alwayes necessarily but sometimes contingently Only the workes of nature doe by the decree of God come to passe necessarily but as for the actions of men they come to passe by the decree of God contingently and freely But whether workes of nature or actions of men they of necessitie must come to passe if God hath decreed them and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to passe that is necessary things necessarily contingent things contingenâ—ly 6. As a man or Angell having free power to doe this or that by producing any thing subject to the freedome of his will doth therewithall produce contingency without decreeing it for in as much as he workes freely the worke must needes be freely wrought that is contingently In like soâ—t God being free to produce any worke without him upon the producing of such a worke doth produce contingency without decreeing it For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently To produce this or that is the object of Gods decree because he can choose whether he will produce this or thaâ— but to worke contingently is no object of Gods decree â—for it is not in Gods power to choose whether he will worke contingently or necessarily If he doth worke at all ad extra he must needs worke freely that is contingently For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature to bee necessarily so it is the perfection of divine nature to worke not necessarily in the producing of ought without him but freely contingently But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angelicall and humane that he not only worketh freely but also is able to create creatures herein like himselfe that can worke freely as namely Angells and men like as he can and hath produced other creatures that worke in all things necessarily Agayne considering that necessitie and contingency are but modi rerum certaine manners of bringing things to passe therfore cannot exist without the things themselves whâ—ch are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular except he decree the thing it selfe So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe or such a particular shall contingently come to passe Neyther is it reasonable to affirme that God doth
decree necessitie or contingency in generall but not the necessitie of this particular or the contingency of this particular For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars Now there is a contingency taken in another sense which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it and denominates it before it doth exist as when we say raine to morrow is contingent it is as much as to say it is possible to raine it is possible not to raine So touching the actions of men of any action we may say it is contingent for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing for it may continue or no. So before the World was made it was possible to be and not to be and so the making of it contingent but not by the decree of God For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered for Gods decree is a free act But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World or not to make it according to his will Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God as all necessary truthes are derived therefrom Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree it might be otherwise For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth so that if he decree them to be possible he might have decreed them not to be possible Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this as when you say God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discerne your meaning But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God your confirmation thereof we must expect when you come to treat of mans fall This thus by fetching compasse expressed by you I doubt will prove no more then this that God decreed to make man a free agent yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require and promise some exquisite perfourmance And I am verily perswaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome as to make it good will surpasse the perfourmance of any Schoole divine that ever was from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live But of the nature of your perfourmances we have had reasonable experience You may remember what he sayd while he was shearing his hogges Here is a great deale of cry and a little wooll In the next place you dictate your parallells wherein it seemes you take great pleasure That Gods wisedome is infinite we nothing doubt but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to doe we take to be a very hungry description of it For is either man or Angell any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to doe Gods immensitie consists in filling all places which are but finite neythâ—r is it possible they should be infinite yet beyond things that are this immensitie is not extended And you have already denyed precisely that God is in vacuo But as for Gods eternity that doth not only coexist with all time but had existenâ—e before it actually and that without all beginning In a word Gods immensitie is not in respect of any quantitas molis quantitie of extension but only in respect of quantitas virtutis And what is this different from his infinite power And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing but only after the way of containing and supporting all things And looke by what quantitie he made all things by the same quantity he supports all things and that is the quantitie of his power A very weake amplification it is in my judgement of Gods incircumscriptible presence which yet is nothing els but his immensitie to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it as well as that which circumscribes it coexists with that which is circumscribed by it As for your Mathemâ—ticall conceyts of center and circumscrence I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them To say that eternity is more then commensurable to time is to graunt that it is commensurable thereunto which is very absurde And how is it possible that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end You say it is in all durations not as contained in them I hope if as containing them this also is untrue For like as it is not Gods eternity whereby he made the World but by his power so it is not by his eternity that he maintayneth the duration of it but by his power What noone tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing but as for fluent instants we knowe none For fluent is as much as succedent and succession is not but in respect of parts and an instant hath no parts Yet if we give way to such imaginations like as sluxus puncti in Longitudinem is not contayned in the line but is the line so sluxus instantis is not contayned in a set time but is the very set time it selfe Nor is it a part of it as noone-tide is of the day And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of Gods eternitie to resenâ—ble the proportion that is betweene the part of time and the whole time you may say as well the World is contained in Gods immensitie like as halfe the yard is contayned in the whole yard Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest the proportion of the least beame of light to the light of the World may be expressed the proportion of things that are to the things that God is able to produce cannot the first is finite this is infinite Yet by your leave there is no greater disproportion betweene Gods wisedome manifested and manifestable then betweene his power manifested and manifestable In a word God hath
It is manifestly untrue first in generall that to produce a reward and punishment no cause is required but the producing of the fact which is to bee rewarded or punished Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall but it is not so with consequents morall such as are rewards and punishments And in particular the case is cleare that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines then Davids defilâ—ng of Bethsheba For both the counsell of Achitophel and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto and the pâ—nishing hand of God herein were found in this and none of all these was found in Davids sinne Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act Now this I confesse is a truth but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein For t is as much as to say that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them for this is to reduce possibility granted as you say by Gods decree into act and that is enough But by your leave it is not enough to salve your credit to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to every cogitation but a proportionate end and correspondent consequent And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon was a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions then by your doctrine this deiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne was everlastingly decreed by God and not the possibility of it And how absurd a thing it is to say that God decreed the possibility of any thing whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God as the whole world was possible and that not by the decree of God But it seemes you have reference to the possibility not of the punishment but of the time for which correspondent punishment is decreed as appeares by that which followes as when you say Did we that which we doe not but might doe many things would immediately follow which now doe not which though it be granted you yet herehence it would not follow that No other cause should be required to the producing of them then our producing of the antecedent But by this you justifie that upon Davids adultery Absolon his defiling Davids concubines and upon Sennacheribs blasphemy against the God of Israel Adâ—amelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god did inevitably follow For these things did befall them and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe as you professe in the next place though not as absolutely decreed by God and in the first place yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God knâ—w would be done Now let us examine this a little further You speake indifferently of good and evill that doth befall men And these indifferently you prosesse to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God and in the first place but upon the fore sight of some good in the person saved or to be saved which good must be eyther faith or good workes or both or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill as suppose naturall humilitie in the state of nature Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also God foreseeing some evill in man say you doth purpose to condemne him Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission so God could not foâ—see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it it followeth that the decree to permit sinne is before the decree of God to damne for sinne therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation and consequently it must be after it in execution as much as to say God doth first damne men for sinne and afterwards permit them to sinne Hereupon you will reflâ—ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne and secondly to permit them to sinne I answere If I did maintayne this I should looke to be confuted by reason and not to be cried downe without reason or contrarie to all reason Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason Secondly I answere by negation For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention but rather coordinate because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice according to that of Aquinas who professeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne and of inferring damnation for sinne Now let us proceed to that which followes It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not For possibilitie is of a passive signification not active And abilitie to obey God I confesse we had in Adam and in Adam we have lost it That which you call the absolute necessitie of Gods decres is not in respect of Gods act in 〈◊〉 For his decrees are most free but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree So then thinges freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike you say from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power but of his wisedome that you might not seeme beside the text you tell us in the close that herein is seene Gods incomprehensible wisedome that nothing falls out without the circumference of it whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed it is rather the fruit of his power
it to be a cleare thing that not only contingent thinges but even necessary thâ—nges also as we call them doe come to passe all contingently in respect of the will of God They that ground Gods foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God doe usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves as upon the causes producing them which though they worke contingently and not necessarily yet this they thâ—nke nothing hindreth the infallibility of God knowledge because hee is able to comprehend all failings possible and to discerne in what case they take place and in what not which in effect is to rest upon the condition of Gods knowledge in it selfe as you here doe and because it is infinite therehence to conclude that it is infallible An invention of late yeares and brought in by the Iesuits together with their doctrine concerning scientia media For whereas before there was onely a double knowledge found in God the one antecedent to his will which they called scientia simplicis intelligentiae whereby hee understood his owne essence and therewithall all necessary truths and all things possible the other subsequent to the will of God which they called scientia visionis and hereby he knoweth all things past present and to come all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God the Iesuits have of late yeares devised a middle knowledge betweene thâ—se two and it consists in knowâ—ng not things necessary nor thâ—ngs contingent that have beene are or shall be but in knowing what would be in such or such a case as for example what a man in such a case thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evill would doe or not doe And the ground hereof they make the infinitie of Gods knowledge as I remember Vasquius expresly professeth so much and so as well they may make this infinitie of Gods knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palatius who as he hath maintained that God knowes future contingents by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge yet judge I pray whether himselfe differ from him when he come to prove his owne opinion which is this In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis cum in virtute efficacitate intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite So Vasquez Deus quae sua est infinitas efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrat and againe Quia divinus intellectus infinitae virtutis est quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti intelligere Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi à quo alio posset And indeed were future contingents intelligâ—ble there were no further question to be made but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come more thâ—n as a thing not to come in its owne nature and consequently God can no more know that it is to come then that it is not to come unlesse that which in its owne nature is onely possible be determined this way or that way and consequently made future or not future This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth Sicut divina potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine infallibilitate quia requirit adaequationem And to this purpose he alledgeth Thomas saying Scientiam non posse esse necessariam nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur necessitatem habeat Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam id est talem modum veritatis quae apta sit ut certum infallibile judicium feratur quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer then in the whole distinction following if he be able to make good what he saith For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge But I would know of him or you how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist whereas in his owne nature it is onely possible to exist and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist As for example how is it true that to morrow it shall rayne rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other If the one were true and the other false then there were no question but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez why the one should be true rather then the other there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth but shewes not how they come to have their truthe nor how thinges merely possible in themselvs come to be future which as it is appareÌ„t could not possibly be without a cause But had he gone about this worke which indeede was most necessary the truth would soone have appeared in his colours For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus and of Scotus and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintaynes it to have bene the opinâ—on of Aquinas also To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasqu us writes in 1. disp 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the saâ—e disputation cap. 2. Durands words are playne Not only Gods prescience of a thing to come is joyned with his will to have tâ— come in 1. dist 35. q 3. num 25. Deum prescire A fore coexigit Deum velle A fore But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist 39. q. 1. num 10. in these words Repraesentatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens sed ut est volens rem possibilem sore quia libere vult rem fore And Vasquius himselfe not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be
may attribute it unto God But we like plaine fellowes love to speake plainlie and to call a spade a spade And in the like language we deny that God is after time to come and prove it thus To be in duration after any thing is to be while that other thing is past or at least the first exâ—stence of it but God in this sence cannot be sayd to be after time to come because time to come is neither yet past nor yet existent Yet at length when divinations will not serve your turne you thinke to have gotten a text of Scripture for it Gods duration you say is Yesterday to day to morrowe and the same for ever It is well you did not quote Scripture least so your penne might have bene censured as Corruptor stilus for putting into the text to morrowe and that in small letters suitable with the former Perhaps you may say why may he not be as well sayd to be to morrowe as to be Yesterday I grant the proportion of truth in both but where doe you find it to be sayd of God that He is yesterday Take heed of adulter sensus which may be as bad as Corruptor stilus Not in the Hebrewes where it is onely sayd that Christ is the same yesterday and to day and for ever Not that he is Yesterday nor that he is To morrow but rather to the contrary thus He was he is and he is to come But still the same in opposition to alteration more wayes then you have expressed nor to alteration onely but to all possibilitie of alteration For he is of necessary being T is false to say that In his duration all thinges are It beeing neither true formally as it is manifest for time is no part of eternity nor eminently For it is nor Gods eternity that produceth things or maintayneth the duration of things but the will of God armed with power and wisedom to doe every thing At first sight I thought to have made no exception against the last sentence but upon second thoughts two members of the three seeme to be as faultie as any For things future have no being at all in esse reali as touching reall being they are in esse cognito and esse volito knowne by God and decreed to come to passe in due time So likewise things past have no being at all only they are knowne of and were decreed by God to be in such a time as now is past And how can they be sayd to be in God Not formally as is manifest nor eminently for he cannot produce things past For that were to make them not to be past Yet you end in a truth that Thinges present cannot subsist without him I would you had both begun and continued so Yet this you corrupt with a needlsse amplification That presence cannot subsist without him which being but a relation requires no distinct operation to susteyne it distinct from that which susteyneth the foundation In the end of the fifth Section you promised to intimate a certaine point of high perfection in God consisting in the reservation of his libertie but since that time we never heard of it more CHAP. IX Of Divine Immutability IN the first place you tell us that some Schoolemen mould immutability in the same conceit with eternity and that others make that the off-spring of this but you conceale your Authors I see no reason for either but manifest reason I have against the first For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability then no man could conceive a thing to bee eternall but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable But this is most untrue For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternall both waies without beginning and without end yet did not conceive them to be immutable for as much as hee acknowledged them to be all under motion and the elements also as touching their parts subject to corruption Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning yet hee acknowledged it to be eternall one way that is without end yet did not conceive it to be immutable The first matter was generally held to be eternall both wayes yet none maintained it to be immutable And no marvell For mutation comprehends all kinde of motion and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion but eternity signifieth only continuance for ever Now like as continuance for seven yeares or an hundred yeares c. doth not require that the same thing should bee without all change for seven yeares or an hundred yeares c. much lesse doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of yeares in the conceit thereof so neither doth continuance for ever include the notion of being without all change for ever in the conceit thereof Adam was made immortall and so had continued if he had not sinned yet should he not have been free from all change The Angels are eternall that is such as shall continue for ever and so were made yet neither are they now nor were they made immutable Indeed there are divers kindes of motions some are in qualitie called alterations some in quantitie called augmentation and diminution some in place called locall motion some in substance as generation and corruption Immutability in this last kinde commeth nearest to the conceit of eternity yet there is a difference For eternity signifieth onely an everlasting continuance which may be joyned with a possibility of not-continuance as in Angels and the soules of men and our bodies also in the world to come but immutability cannot bee joyned with such a possibility therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutabilitie are much different And for the same reason immutability cannot be the off-spring of eternity rather eternity is the off-spring of immutability I thinke both immediately flow from the manner of his being which is necessarie The like judgement may be made of that you avouch in the next place to wit That the true explication of the former containes the truth of this If by the former you meane eternity as I thinke you doe though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of Gods infinite wisedome which you chiefly place in foreknowing all things which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will In my judgement immutability rather confirmes eternity then eternity confirmes immutabilitie and the knowledge of Gods eternity is the off-spring of the knowledge of his immutability rather then on the contrary and that for the reasons before given to wit because immutability inferres eternity eternity doth not inferre immutability 2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt but in my judgement you doe not well to prove it from the infinitenesse of his essence First because this consequent carryeth no evidence with it That nothing can bee added to that which is infinite carryeth some evidence but that nothing can be diminished from it
so much Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free continue immutable and that from everlasting as indeed being from everlasting And wee say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting In that which followeth we agree with you that immutabilitie is a perfection mutability an imperfection likewise that to worke freely is a perfection to worke necessarily is an imperfection and where both immutability and freedome of operation meet the perfection of that nature is so much the greater But this I finde not so scholastically expressed when you say That if man were as immortall as the heavens are hee would be more perfect then they can be This I say wants much of accuratenesse For the heavens are not immortall Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible but not immortall For like as in case they were corruptible yet could they not bee counted mortall because they have no life to lose so though they be granted to be incorruptible yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortall and that for the same reason because they have not life which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortall and for want of life the meanest of creatures having life doe in excellency surpasse the heavens And if Aristotle had lived in our dayes to bee acquainted with such Astronomicall observations as we are of so many Comets and blazing Starres in the celestiall Region not only above the Moone but even in the firmament it selfe and that of long continuance and at length wasted and consumed it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have beene changed considering his apologies and excuses in his bookes De Caelo that the bodie of the heavens being so farre remote and little certaine experience whereupon all natuall reason is grounded to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to bee taken in the better part and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a naturall Philosopher And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens he professeth that all experience did justifie his opinion in that point for as much as there was never knowne any alteration there So then had he knowne of any alterations there this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle and that no alteration was then knowne was to be attributed to the weake nature of Astronomicall observations in those dayes whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions being no Astronomer himselfe In the next place you tell us that Though freedome in it selfe be a great perfection yet to be free to doe evill is a branch of imperfection which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome This deserves well the scanning Adam in his innocency was free to doe evill was he not Yet was he made very good and after the image of God and no sinne had yet estranged him from the life of God and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any of all creatures The perfection of Angells is above the perfection of man The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection rather then of perfection And for ought I see freedom unto evill is no more favouring of imperfection then freedome unto good considering that they both make but one morall freedome For to be morally free to doe good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will doe good or no and quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe good or evill So to be morally free to evill quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or no quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or good This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your owne phrase that speaks of freedom unto evill but to speak in mine owne phrase I should not hastily speake of any freedome of the will of man to evill You may say as well that the will of man in thâ— use of the eye is free to behold either colours or sounds which he will or in the use of the eare is free to judge of sounds or colours as he will There is a Common sence within I confesse whereby the will is able to judge of these but by the eye or eare she cannot The reason is no facultie extends beyond his object Within the compasse of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular but it reacheth not beyond his object Now the object of the eye is onely colour and the object of the eare is onely sound And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many that are presented unto him so by the eare take notice of any sounds that are but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured nor the eare apprâ—heÌ„d ought that is not of the nature of sound In like soâ— the will within the compasse of her owne object may settle upon what she will but beyond her object she cannot extend Now the object of the will is good not evill and therefore she is of free choyce to settle upon what good she will but not upon evill But here some may say how then can any evill be committed I answere two wayes First by errour of judgment For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding therefore it is called a reasonable appetite Secondly by preferring a lesse good before a greater as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable or pleasureable or some way or other advantageous for the present notwithstanding that it is dishonest and such as will bring a farre greater dammage unto us for the time to come Or thus because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superiour authority hath forbidden it both because an evill inclination maks us preferre things presently pleasing and profitable and withall prowd that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawfull authority such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God Hence it comes to passe that we are sayd also to be free to good or evill which we may call a morall liberty in distinction from the former which is liberty naturall and consisteth in being indifferent to doe ought that lyes in our power to be done provided that it may seeme convenient to be done As for that morall liberty it scarce ever was to bee found in the world For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination
justice thaâ— doth oblige the will of God If you would deale plainly in setting downe your opinion and Scholastically in taking paynes to dispute for it and not in some sory manner to begge the question I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also And at this time had you named any thing that God cannot doe in the way of justice which otherwise he hath power to doe I would have taken the paines not to consider it only but to confute it For I hold that tenent not farre from blasphemy And I doe well observe that in expressing this your opinion you doe not signify that Gods freedome must be wedded to his goodnesse but that freedome must be wedded to goodnesse And indeed the freedome of men and Angells is to be limited by the lawes of God who is their Creator and may and doth give lawes unto them But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto I know none no not to his owne goodnesse as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it but by necessity of nature he loves it that is himselfe and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth he must doe for himselfe and for the setting foorth of his owne glory as he shall thinke good and not to any other end He that is the supreame efficient must necessarily be the supreame end of all things So from him and by him and for him are all thinges Much lesse is he bound to the rules of any goodnesse or justice without him But it may be of this we shall heare more from you hereafter In the next place you returne to shew how immutability and freedome may stand together and in stead of proving it you tell us that we may easily conceive it provided that they be rightly joyned or sorted And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so yet that serves for matter of your discourse but as touching the right sorting of them I doubt we shall never heare of in such a manner as you promise to wit that our conceits shall easily comprehend it no more then wee have heard of that reservation of libertie which you promised to intimate as a point of very high perfection in God Well the ill sorting of them seemes to bee the conceiving of God to be freely immutable and that you say implieth contradiction if not unto the nature of immutability yet unto the nature of absolute perfection or to our true conceit of infinite being I know no congruity of this discourse of yours For freedome is onely in respâ—ct of operation not in respect of being For freedome supposeth being according to the kinde and nature of the thing which is said to bee free It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man or that he were not freely reasonable And no lesse absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable You might as well tell us that God is not freely God And yet if we list to walke along with you in the like vanity of discourse we might maintaine that God is freely immutable freely of absolute perfection freely of infinite perfection if you take freedome in opposition to coaction For God is not immutable by coaction nor of absolute perfection by coaction nor of infinite being by coaction And to be that which a man is freely is better then to be that which he is by coaction To be freely immutable in your sense is not a branch of imperfection but rather of impossibility For it is neither possible to the Creator nor possible to the creature But imperfections imply a possibility rather then include any impossibility But suppose there were any such freedome in God yet it followeth not that it should put all those perfections which are contained in his nature upon the hazard For how improbable were it that God by his will should choose to be imperfect rather then perfect Possible indeed it were upon this supposition but yet in respect of his wisedome and goodnesse â—t were as good as impossible hee should will any such thing though he were free to will it But God by necessitie of nature is immutable and impossible it is he should be otherwise in this nature of his the will of God delghteth And accordâ—ngly we may judg of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions yet by your leave mutability is not alwaies charged with possibility of doing amisse but onely in creatures reasonable yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable yea and without sense and life also as in creatures reasonable But to proceed as it is impossible God should be freely immutable so is it impossible he should be mutably free But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason more then to be immutably wise immutably powerfull immutably good Neither doe I like your inference herehence namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedome as in power wisedome or goodnesse like as because God is immutably wise and powerfull and good it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisedome power and goodnesse as he is in freedome The consequents that is the propositions themselves I approve but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other Now because God is immutably free therefore hee was and is and shall be eternally free to exercise his power and to communicate his goodnesse All this we grant and by all which you seeme to goe a birding and if your tackling hold you are like to catch something ere long and if I mistake not the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long Free it is you say for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipotenâ—ly to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them I finde more then at first blush I dreamed of For that which you hunt after as now I perceive is a soryconceit and such as being granted you will yeeld your cause as much support as a bulrush what need you thus travell to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinkes worth the asking Onely you carrie it in such a phrase of obscurity as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery whereas if â—t were plainly delivered and that in a sober sense it is no more then this God hath decreed that some things shall worke contingently and freely as namely men and Angels like as hee hath decreed that other things to wit naturall agents shall worke necessarily And can you tell who is ignorant of this or can you shew that ever any
of that assertion which you interprete For if God doth not new beginne to decree those things that befall us doth it not manifestly follow here hence that he hath already decreed them rather then that he hath not decreed them already We willingly grant that Gods decrees have no end but continue the same still but you would have us thinke that they are still in making As God himselfe was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlastinge in like sort Gods decree or will was from everlasting and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadowe of change But albeit Gods will continueth the same without change and end yet I finde no example to justify this phrase of yours in saying God now decreeth the thinges that befall us and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that doe befall us and that by the same reason for his decree hath no end And is it a sober speech thinke you to affirme that God doth now decree the creation of the World or the fall of Angells or the turning of Adam out of Paradise or Noahs flood or the burning of Sodome and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone You say it is much safer to thinke on Gods decree as present to the whole course of our life then as it was before the World for so we shall thinke of them as of acts past and finished more irrevocable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World if this be as much as to be now past and finished then also it is true that they are acts past and finished which you denye If to be before the world be not to be past and finished then to thinke of them as they were before the World is not to thinke of them as acts past finished which yet you say it is but without al reason in this case And I pray what think you are Gods decrees which you dare not to deny to have had their existēce before the world of a revocable nature Certainely they are no more alterable then that which is past irrevocable But like as God cannot be sayd to be past though he was before the World Because he still continueth and shall continue for ever So the decrees of God cannot be sayd to be past though they were before the World because the same will whereby he decreed all things doth continue without all change and shall continue for ever though the thinges decreed and willed by him doe change from thinges to come to things present from thinges present to things past But the lawes of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making which they utterly take from them being enacted Very well observed and therefore let us think it fit to mainteyne that Gods decrees are still in making and none of them made no not the decree of creation nor of redemption nor of sanctification of al the holy Patriarchs Prophets that ever were lest otherwise we should spoile God of his liberty By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing stil but never doth any thing lest after he hath done it he have no longer any libertie to doe it or leave it undone These conceites have as much wisedome as sobriety in them being equally removed from both For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as greate liberty of will the last yeare of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. yeares old notwithstanding many thinges had beene done by him in the space of 900. yeares which to doe or not to doe in the last yeare of his age was not a thinge indifferent unto him And were it not a madde thing to affirme that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty or that the more idlely a man liveth the more liberty he keepes in store and the more painfull hee is the more his liberty perisheth 2. Gods decrees are infinitely more unalterable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians For God cannot change man can change Gods will cannot bee resisted the will of man may be resisted even the will of the greatest Princes by God himselfe by his Angels by men by forreine enemies by their owne subjects The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable are either evils of sinne or evills of punishment you will not say evils of sinne For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of Gods decrees If evils of punishment it is false to say that Gods decrees doe not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men For no decrees of men doe make evils of men inevitable but upon supposition of transgression Now it is of an undoubted truth that punishment designed by the decrees of God is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men For many malefactors escape the hands of men but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of Gods judgements to overtake them it is said that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travaile upon a woman with childe and they shall not escape You are besides the truth when you say that wisedome hath just warrant to make decrees for men this belongs to power and authority not to wisedome The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince to make lawes to binde him but rather the Prince though inferiour in wisedome hath power over him But the wiser men are the fitter they are to governe and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them supposing the wisedome of the governour to be bound to aime at the good of the subject But no such obligation is found in God who as he is the Creator of all so he made all things for himselfe And good reason that seeing all things are from him therefore all things should be for him Qui dedit esse quo sine essent habuit potestatem When you say that too strict obligement unto lawes positive or decrees unalterable deprives both law-givers and others of their native libertie and opportunity of doing good I finde nothing sound in all this For you confound the libertie of nature which is equally common to all with liberty of condition which is greater by farre in one then in another Secondly you range God the supreme Law-giver with other law-givers which have onely power deputed unto them no obligement unto lawes doth deprive any man of liberty naturall For whatsoever is forbidden any man yet is hee never a whit the lesse naturally free to the doing of it then before though in case he transgresse he is subject to censure and punishment And of this naturall libertie you speake of hitherunto as being most proper for the nature of decrees that is liberty from
or take away all possibility of doing otherwise Now to prevent this suspition we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours as in conceiving Gods decree or fore-knowledge rather as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves We say that by vertue and efficacy of Gods decree not onely some things come to passe necessarily as the workes of naturall agents but other things also come to passe contingently that is with all possibility of being otherwise as the free actions of men onely upon supposition of Gods decree we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever shall come to passe but how not necessarily but contingently In like sort supposing Gods foreknowledge of things to come which foreknowledge of God not onely is to day but was before the world was made though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are and afterward also with the notion of knowledge it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to passe but how not necessarily but contingently Here followes a list of what you will prove when time serves 1. That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts I pray tell me had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world and before that also If it had what meane you to say he doth decree it as if this decree of God which yet you call eternall had not existence till now why doe you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world the turning of man out of Paradise the drowning of the world in the dayes of Noah the destruction of Sodome and the like for you have no colour of reason to justifie your phrasiologie herein but onely this that though Gods decrees bee eternall yet they still continue Now this is as true of the decree of creation and the rest above mentioned as of any other decree Secondly what meane you to qualifie your assertion by saying In most humane acts as if you durst not avouch it of all Are not all humane acts of a contingent nature and consequently have a contingencie in them and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others It may be that herein you have reference to the Iesuits distinction of future contingents absolutely that shall be and future contingents conditionall that should be if and in case some condition were put in esse But how then will you prove that the acts of men that shall be are of a greater number then those that might or should be in some case For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed is in most humane acts I have a manifest reason to the contrary For the number of things that might be upon supposition is farre greater then the number of things that are have beene and shall be for in case the world had beene made twice bigger then it is and twice as many men as there are and should last twice as long the number of humane acts would be farre greater then these are wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency Againe the Iesuits maintaine that God hath not onely decreed contingencie in humane acts but the humane acts themselves which you doe not we maintaine that God decreeth the actions of men themselves that they shall come to passe contingently and consequently decreeth the contingency of them but not that onely but the actions themselves As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel God decreed not onely the contingency of it but the act it selfe that it should come to passe in a contingent manner Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar God decreed not onely the contingencie of this act but the act it selfe to wit to come to passe in a contingent manner So Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes out of captivitie to their countrie was an humane contingent act and God decreed not onely the contingencie hereof but the act it selfe to come to passe in a contingent manner 2. The second Aphorisme is that Gods eternall decree doth coexist to each humane action throughout the whole succession of time This we doe not deny no more then wee denie Gods coexistence with every action but heretofore you have professed that God doth at this present coexist with all things not onely with all things present but with all things that are to come and this we denie because God cannot coexist with that which doth not coexist with him and therefore seeing things past and things to come doe not at all exist at this present and consequently doe not coexist with God therefore we professe that God at this present doth not coexist with them In the next place you say that Gods decree doth inspire them with contingency in their choice It was wont to bee said that praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth then his decree for his decree was from all eternitie yet nothing was inspired into man till the creation nor into us men untill we are brought forth and grow capable of inspirations When you talke of contingency in our choice you might have spoken plainly and called it libertie in our choice But doth God continually inspire this It is too absurd to inspire is to bring forth something anew as when God doth inspire good motions into us You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us as libertie of choice more congruous it had beene to say that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a libertie of choice in all that we doe and he moves us so as that we may move our selves more waies then one But when doth he move us thus in the very time of doing ought or before and so doth he move us by perswasion onely or by mediate operation on the will For all this whereabouts alone there is question now adaies amongst Divines we have nothing but blankes here you are yet onely upon the promise of performance and not upon any performance it selfe Yet whilst it moves them it withall inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents which were foreordained to the choices which we make whether they be good or evill That is God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved they that die in impenitencie shall be damned Wherin you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God to wit of an indefinitive nature thus Whosoever beleeves shall be saved whosoever beleeves not shall be damned But that these men in particular shall beleeve and repent and so be saved others shall neither beleeve nor repent nor bee saved you will be wise and wary enough to keepe your selfe from the acknowledgement of any such decree unlesse it be provided that God be not charged with any such impotent immutabilitie as not to be able to revoke his decrees For
though the Pope wants wisedome and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himselfe as namely of making grants and againe revoking them yet God doth not CHAP. XI Of transcendentall goodnesse and of the infinitie of it in the divine nature I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this or in the Chapter following yet having begunne this worke of examination it is fit to consider these also if it be but to take notice of what you deliver and rightly to understand the meaning thereof They which fetch light beyond the Sunne must bee content with Starre-light and they which cannot satisfie themselves with day light but seeke for starre-light they are well enough served if they goe to bed darkling Wee commonly say Life is sweet and it is a truth not because it is a principall stemme of being in my judgment for reason is a more principall stemme of being then it and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable as to creatures reasonable And you confesse that the appetite of preservation of it selfe is naturall unto all yet it cannot be denyed but that life is subject to soure things as well as sweet whereupon some have said Non est vivere sed valere vita And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Better eye out then alwais akeing and better once dead then alwaies dying Nay the hope of a better state without all others consideration may make this life of ours distastefull unto us I desire to be dissolved sayth S. Paule and to be with Christ I am not of your opinion in your construction of the Maxime Omne ens qua ens est bonum as if the meaning were that it is good it selfe for that which is good and that whereunto a thing is good should be rather different then the same for the termes of relation must be distinct Your instances are very incongruous you should say that poyson is good to it selfe not to the aspe for the aspe is a different thing from his owne poyson and so is the Adders stinge from the Adder And as sure I am that even of poyson good use may be made for the service of man And the Scorpion cures the wound that is made by his owne sting And even of the Adders sting God the Creator of it hath a good use evē in stinging and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he sayth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If naturall qualities of contrary nature doe fight for the maintenance of their owne being it seemes being to them is as sweete as life is to us though life be a principall stemme of being How transcendentall goodnes should be equally communicated by God to all and not equally participated by all I understand not the contrary seemes true to my opinion for as much as like as there can be no communication where there is no participation so there can be no equall communication where there is no equall participation And though a lesse vessell may be as full as a greater yet there is no equall communication of water unto them both and the comparison is no way congruous for as much as it is an easy thing to distinguish betweene the water and the vessell filled with it but not so easy to distinguish betweene the thing and the being of it Rather thus God doth sitt every thing with qualities or parts according to the being thereof or as it shall require like as every vessell small and great are filled with water The being of a fly of a man of every thing is good in it selfe and as it may be and is referred to the glory of God for God made all things for himselfe But in the things that God hath created there are degrees of perfection some creatures have onely being some being and life also some adde sense unto them both some have reason over and above them all The degree of entitative goodnesse cannot arise from the specificall nature of it for so it should arise from it selfe for the degree of entitative goodnesse in any thing and the specificall nature thereof is all one Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodnesse is as bad or worse as when you derive it from the degree of their specificall nature As if the specificall nature of a thing had degrees which is untrue as I remember Aristotle compares specificall natures or formes of substances to numbers that admit no intention or remission three flyes are as truly three as three Elephants The difference of individualls under the same species is merely accidentall not essentiall Thus that one is not so happy as another is an accidentall difference not entitative or essentiall It is true sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds upon his five senses It is not the fruition of goodnesse incident to one sense that defeates another for the time of that it most desires but rather want fruition thereof by your instances For if the belly be satisfied it is free to delight in musick also if pinshed with hunger not so yet too much feeding I confesse may bring a man asleepe and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise either of body or minde On the other side deepe contemplation as you say pines the body and is occasion of farre worse accidents also sometimes as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematicall operations made him neglect the Souldiour that came upon him and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies to the great greife of Marcellus the Generall who had given chardge to the contrary The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hāds though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him had been more worth to an ingenuous Conquerour then the taking of Syracusa I have great cause to be sensible of that of Solomons of making many books there is no end for I think if I should live Methusalehs yeares yet I should not make an end Much study is a wearinesse unto the fleshe but by the goodnesse of God I find this wearinesse with a litle refreshing quickly to vanish and I returne unto it with as great vivacity of minde and Spirit as ever I did before I desire to doe the taske which God hath appointed for me And if death prevent me yet it is good to dy doeing something I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied yet it is true I confesse the more we encrease in knowledge the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement enabled to proceed in knowledge And this capacity of ours will never be throughly satisfied till the enjoying of God himselfe yet I see
attributes are The other That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others so farre as they are capable of it As for the first of these what Heathen Philosopher that acknowledged the making of the world that acknowledged a God did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse and that as infinite as any other of his attributes As touching the other doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much when he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God and did this make them as happy as they might be It is true indeed their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves Det vitam det opes animum mihi ipse parabo And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this even in this place For although you carry it in generall termes when you say he is the cause of all goodnesse yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse as when you say God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse It is true God cannot be the author of evil of sin but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evill as withall to deny him to be the author of good Speake plainly doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith that God it is who gives repentance that workes in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure if you beleeve this then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed who professe that God doth decree contingency but not things contingent And who doubts but the faith of Peter and his repentance the faith of Paul and his repentance were contingents and if God did never decree them surely he was not the author of them for God doth nothing in time but what he decreed to doe before all time And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse we would not quarrell with you about the terme essentiall which with what learning you deliver I professe I know not but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phrases we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes can you tell us which of them is called by any essentiall unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall because they constitute the essence of that whose matter and forme they are But I hope you will not say that God in this sense is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse CHAP. XII Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I doe not like this Title the disjunctive argueth that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature I know no patterne of morall goodnesse which we must imitate but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World and us Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate As touching his providence whereby he governs the World we are called by our Saviour to imitate him in some particulars as when he suffereth his rayne to fall and Sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good But in most particulars we can not in many we may not imitate him He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha we must not imitate God in the like we must still blesse them that curse us and pray for them that persecute us The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves even in this corrupt state of man doth only provoke us the more to shewe pitty unto others in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. Dâ—do Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco But it doth not breede it for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse or not at all may shewe more mercy then such as have beene in great misery themselves Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselvs will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery 2. And this is true not onely in the corrupt state of man but even in the state of integrity for is it not sayd of our Saviour that being tempted himselfe he knew how to succour them that are tempted It is now a dayes without question among divines that mercy and pitty as they signify passions are not in God but attributed unto him per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are the members of our body also But the will of succouring creatures in their necessity may with propriety enough be attributed unto God for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly Father how much more is his love enlarged towards man who when they were sinners sent his Sonne to dy for them and when they lay weltring in their blood sayd unto them live And washed them with water yea washed away their blood from them and anoynted them with oyle Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery and this will and grace and favour of God is in Scripture phrase called mercy But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth I wonder you should applaud that saying Nemo sponte malus which hath no colour of truth Save in respect of originall sinne traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant And you in another sense treading the authors stepps seeme to mainteyne it not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowred our natures but in respect rather of the perfection of our soules and their native inclination unto good for externall things you say doe so captivate the humane soule that she cannot doe as she would but these strings being cut she followeth her native sway And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this Nemo sponte malus manifesting thereby that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion convictable of untruth by the very light of nature as when you say that externall things doe captivate the soule as if the object had power to the will which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity And nothing indeed but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evill For let
communication of them also Am. 9. 7. I have withheld the raine from you when there were yet three weekes to the harvest and caused it to raine upon one Citie and caused it not to raine upon another Citie one piece was rained upon and the piece whereon it rained not withered Some dye in their mothers wombe some hanging at their mothers breasts some after a long time are consumed with a lingring death neither is Gods love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect Thus Iacob was loved but Esau hated Againe what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature Both Vasquez and Suarez concurre in this that the justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise But Gods will you say is not the rule of goodnesse because the designes thereof are backt with infinite power Your theame was to prove that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse when you come to prove it you prove nothing lesse but onely that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse is not for that his designes are backt with infinite power This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse but rather to confirme it for in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse you doe imply that you maintaine that his will is the rule of goodnesse though not for this cause Perhaps you may say They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this to wit Because his designes are backt with infinite power But had it beene so you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse whereas you mean nothing lesse and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine Secondly I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse for this cause because his designes are backt with infinite power as much as to say because God can doe what hee will This reason carieth no colour of truth with it for there is no reason why amongst men they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men should therefore bee honester men then other But because God hath infinite lawfull power that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction hence it followeth that whatsoever God doth is good and whatsoever God can doe if it were done by him it should justly be done otherwise hee should have power to be unjust which power in this case should either be in vain because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated or if actuated God should be unjust Holinesse you say doth so rule his power and moderate his will that the one cannot enjoyne or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patterns of equitie You take great liberty of discourse throughout What I pray according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holinesse is it not his will And how can his holinesse worke upon his will Doth the heat of fire worke upon the fire or the cold of water worke upon the water Againe here wee have power and will distinguished and the act of injoyning attributed to the one and exacting to the other Both are acts of command now I pray consider doth Gods power command I had thought imperium had beene the proper prerogative of the will yet both these by your discourse are in subjection to the eternall patterns of equity and equity before you confounded with justice Now I know no such justice in God different from his wisedome And herein I am of the same minde with Aquinas Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei Art 6. where hee disputeth this question Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat And there hee professeth that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione ad se invicem ad suam causam Now let any man name any thing that God can doe and then let him answer me whether God bee not as well able by the infinitie of his wisedome to doe it wisely as by the infinity of his power to doe it at all And marke what in the same place where he seems most to favour your present Tenet Aquinas professeth Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus voluntas secundum rem pro hoc nec idem est voluntas rectitudo voluntatis Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus voluntas propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis ipsa voluntas Although in us the understanding is one thing and the will really another thing whence it is that our will and the rectitude of our will is not the same yet seeing that in God the understanding and the will are really the same hence it is that in God his will and the rectitude of his will are all one But be it that his will is consonant to the eternall or abstract paternes of equitie I pray what more eternall and abstract paterne of equity then this that it is lawfull for God to make the world if he will and not to make it if he will yea and to doe what he will and leave undone what he will I hope the will of God revealed doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions if things are therefore good because God wils them as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them Now the former of these is true without all question in most things for whether the world had beene made sooner or later bigger or lesser more Angels or lesse more spheres or lesse whether they had moved this way they doe or the contrary way whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall all had been received as the good course of Gods providence equally as now it is But here you passe to a point of a farre different nature for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world is therefore good because God hath done it and a farre different thing to demand whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense that whatsoever God commands us in his word for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will it is therefore good because God commandeth it And I give a manifest reason of this difference for before the revelation of Gods word and without that all men naturally are able to discerne between good and evill they knew impiety idolatry profane swearing perjury
irreligiousnesse contempt of government murder uncleannesse gluttony drunkennesse theft oppression extortion lying to be evill and the contrary to these to be good by the light of nature and suggestion of conscience there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all their conscience bearing witnesse and their thoughts accusing or excusing Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say that wee know this or that to be good because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly in most points of morality wee know this to be good and that to bee evill without the revealed will of God and by the very light of nature Neither doth it follow that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of his will first because wee have heard out of Aquinas that Gods wisedome is his justice secondly it is absurd to say that justice goodnesse or wisedome are the objects of his will Againe if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just to wit in things that are to be done by man then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without and shall not bee essentiall unto him like as the rectitude of mans will which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged Whereas you say unlesse this or that had beene good God had not willed it this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne for the wisedome of God may represent this or that to bee good that is such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity so that if it be done it shall be done congruously yet not to bee good so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity Nay marke what Bradwardine professeth suppose the wisedome of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that yet is not God hereby bound to preferre the doing of that before this Ratio praeponderans est qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud vel quod melius est hoc facere quam dimittere talis ratio non movet nec concludit voluntati divinae nec eam determinat ad agendum Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit multa bona quae non facit And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem nisi faceret omnia possibilia horum quod libet infinitum quod contradictionem includit Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione voluntas vel saltem ratio congruens concomitans praelaxata Yet the will of God is alwaies reasonable but marke what is the ground of this denomination according to Aquinas in 1. Quest. 19. Art 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud Yet you would make the world beleeve that you fetch your divinitie from the fountaine they that thinke otherwise never taste it but in trenches yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountaine from whence you take it 3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions but alas you propose but one exception and that a poore one Seeing no thing can be without Gods will what can be good before God wills it And your answer is by concession That goodnesse actually existent in the creature cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will as much as to say this exception is nothing to the purpose and so you undertake to free your Tenet onely from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe doth that depend meerly upon the will of God or at all upon the will of God The manifestation of it or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God for as much as this is performed onely by outward workes and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world or any part of it yea or no. But as for Gods goodnesse we that tast of divinity but in trenches acknowledge that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will There is you say a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will What I pray Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing take heed what you say lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world whence it followeth that the world was everlasting Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water for it is brought by you as that which sheweth Gods will what is to be done But every novice knowes it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction but to wisedome rather and therefore Aquinas as I shewed before makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisedome of Gods understanding And I grant willingly that the direction of wisedome in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere qaam rationabiliter velle Yet neither the wisedome of God shall determine his will unlesse it doth so direct as to shew that this or that ought to be done For if it doth onely direct by shewing what is fit to be done and of many courses which Gods wisedome can devise sit to be taken if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what hee list it is apparent that though before God choose it was fit to be done like as many other courses were also yet no necessity why God should preferre this before an other sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto neither out of the fountaine nor out of the trenches Intellectus divinus saith one singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat Henrie quodlib 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth that whatsoever God is able to doe that also hee can wisely doe in 1. Quest. 25. Art 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit And again professeth that the order of things in the government of this world doth not adequate the wisedome of God as much as to say hee could have brought forth a world and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as hee hath shewed in this his words are these Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio justitiae consistit
second causes in the way of Gods glorious qualification of our natures And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certaine manner to wit by way of reward of our obedience therefore he could not make us immutable at first For thus to discourse is to professe that God could make them so upon supposition to wit upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable but to prove that God could not make them impeccable onely upon a certaine supposition Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse If to decline to evill implyes no contradiction but only to omnipotent being then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have nor the Saints of God for the time to come shal have any omnipotent being it followes that to decline from evil is neither contradictorie to the present state of the elect Angels nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God God is impeccabilâ—s per naturam the creatures some are others shal be impeccabilis per gratiam to decline to evill implyeth contradiction to them both To say that to decline to evill is possible to all creatures is true onely in men in the confirmed Angels t is not true It was once of them also I confesse but now it is not It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven it ever was false of the manhood of Christ which yet was and is a creature yet iâ— Christ as man more like to his Creator then either Angell or any other Saint of God If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evill doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned or else he was never truly and inherently good Further if the elect Angels from within few dayes after their creation have continued truly and inherently good notwithstanding their impeccability from that time forward why they should not have beene altogether as truly and inherently good if their impeccability had begunne a few daies sooner even with their creation I see no reason For did not God make them good yea truly and inherently good Surely he did therefore if immediately they had beene impeccable by grace they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truely and inherently good Gods goodnesse is his happinesse this happinesse of his being increate cannot be communicated unto us subjectively but objectively onely Yet there is a goodnesse created called Gods goodnesse because it proceeds from God which is our happinesse of grace shall be our happinesse of glory not the foundation of it but it save that the happinesse of grace is the foundation of our happinesse of glory but to this manner of foundation you seeme to have no reference Neither is there any colour of reason to inferre as you do that therefore Gods justice and loving kindnesse did remove all necessity from mans will because that had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in creation And you may as well say that Christ also might have sinned for necessity to keepe him from sinne would have utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for his manhood being a creature to expresse his Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Sonne of God Nay the truth is if from the beginning wee had beene necessarily enclined unto good wee had more lively expressed Gods goodnesse then now wee doe being freely good For God himselfe is good necessarily not freely It is a senslesse speech to say that mans goodnesse expresseth Gods goodnesse communicative for mans goodnesse is the very goodnesse communicative of God For Gods goodnesse communicative is no goodnesse formally in God but Gods formall goodnesse is uncreate and therefore incommunicable unto creatures Therefore it must be goodnesse create which is Gods goodnesse communicative and that is the verie goodnesse of man it selfe For God is the author of it in genere causae efficientis Create in mee a new heart and renew a right spirit within me And therefore the distinction of the goodnesse of God communicative and communicated is very absurd like as your similitude resembling it to a seale and the stampe thereof Onely the Sonne is the image and character of his Father we are made after the image of God His goodnesse increate is that which doth communicate goodnesse unto us in genere causae efficientis And our goodnesse is the worke of Gods goodnesse But no more proportion betweene them then is betweene nature increate and nature create But it is your usuall course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety Yet you have found out a proportion betweene Gods goodnesse and ours but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented For you compare Gods working freely with mans being freely most incongruously God communicates his goodnesse freely that which duly answereth unto this is mans communicating his goodnesse freely But seeing Gods being good is as a being necessarily if God had made us to bee good necessarily that is impeccable by his grace herein had wee better exprest the manner of his goodnesse And if otherwise we could not be like unto God it followes that the Angels now for many thousand yeares have not been good like God because they have beene good by necessity and not freely So neither Gods Saints in heaven are good like God because they are good by necessity and not freely T is untrue which you adde that man could not be confirmed in such goodnesse as hee had or translated unto everlasting happinesse but by continuing freely good for some space For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception yet this never hindred his confirmation in his goodnesse or translation to everlasting happinesse And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodness which man had from the beginning even from the creation For if God made him good and withall impeccable how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein hee was created And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely For I hope your selfe will not deny but that Christ was impeccable and that what good soever he did he did it freely For like as the wicked in state of nature cannot but sinne in generall that is one way or other yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sinne therefore there is no particular evill that they doe but they doe it freely In like sort though Christ could not but doe good in generall so that whatsoever he did should be good yet seeing he was not necessitated to
any particular good therefore what good in particular soever he did did it freely So doe the Angels so shall we in the kingdome of heaven Hitherto under colour of consequence which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand to wit of Gods obligement in justice to make men taste of the fruits of his mercy after their wilfull contemning of it into an aliene matter farre removed touching impeccability Now you seeme to returne to your former discourse but in such a manner as if you meant utterly to overthrow it for here you give us to understand that so long as man doth lesse evill then he might doe he may be confirmed in goodnesse and translated unto happinesse Now I pray as bad as the Sodomites were yet were they not lesse evill then they might be For if God had suffered them longer and left them destitute of his grace had they not profited in pejus growing worse and worse And yet I confesse hereupon to bee confirmed in no better goodnesse then they had had not beene much seeing this their goodnesse had beene never a whit but you say not onely this that they that doe lesse evill then they might may hereupon not onely bee confirmed in that goodnesse which they have which may be very farre off from any goodnesse at all but also translated to everlasting happinesse Since mans fall you say wee are not capable of mercy but by free abstinence from some evills Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evills be of grace or no If of grace whether this grace be not a fruite of mercie If so then it appeares that before we abstaine from any evill wee are capable of mercy thereby to obtaine grace to abstaine from evill I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life but onely the state of sinning against the holy Ghost I doe not like your distinction of doing good and doing it naughtily for whatsoever we doe naughtily therein we cannot be said to doe good but evill rather for therein we sinne and in sinning wee doe not any good but evill rather Yet I confesse wee may be said to doe good imperfectly but not naughtily in my judgement Though we doe both lesse evill and the good that we doe lesse naughtily then possibly we might doe God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us I professe at first sight I tooke this to bee a notorious untruth but when I considered a claw of your sentence which is this lesse evill then possibly we might doe I reverse my judgement and finde it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit though in the way of truth For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible For how is it possible that a man can doe at once all the evill that he can doe Now if he doth not doe all the evill that possibly hee can doe there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations and hee neede not feare lest God proceede to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst for certainly they had not done all the evill that possibly they might doe Now it was well worth the having to heare you explaine unto us what you understand by the influence of Gods gracious providence which you say God restraines and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickednesse to another suffering the reines of our unruly appetites to bee given into our uâ—ieldie hands Here be good phrases which if you would bee pleased to interpret unto us in plaine termes I doubt not but wee should finde good matter to worke upon But to the comfort of all profane persons bee it spoken God doth never deal thus with any by your computation but such as have done as much evill as possibly they can doe To be capable of well doing is to be capable of Gods mercy and you have already told us to our comfort that to do lesse evill then possibly wee can doe doth make us capable of Gods mercy yet here you say this cannot bee done without Gods love and favour Now to my judgement no person is so profane or impious but that hee doth lesse evill then possibly he might doe whence it followeth that to this state of impiety considered as lesse then possibly might be he is arived through the love and favour of God Yet what you meane by the love and favour of God I know not and throughout I finde cause to doubt that you meane nothing lesse then to advance the honour of Gods grace but onely your scope to advance the power of mans free will And I wonder you consider not how you enterfare and crosse your owne shinnes in your discourse when you conceive the love and favour of God as a meanes to make us capable of the mercy of God you might as well say that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy for love and favour shewed unto him that is in misery is in the way of mercy So when you make a great difference betweene withdrawing a mans selfe from the extremities of mischiefe and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing you contradict your selfe for to do lesse evill then possibly might bee what is it other then to withdraw from extremities of mischiefe yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing as you have signified in this very page more then once as namely both in the first sentence and in the third yet this is wilde enough to say A man must doe good to make himselfe capable of well doing By the sentence following it seemes that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing is to repent and this you say cannot be done without the attractions of infinite love yet usually you make a worke of nature to bee a preparation to grace and sometimes you call that worke of nature humility sometimes the doing of lesse euill then wee might doe And what you meane by the attractions of infinite love I know not for you make it incident to men without the Church who are not so much as drawne hereunto by the word so that as it seemes it can be no other then Gods patience in sparing them and so leading them to repentance that you meane in this place Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast your selfe while you make shew to honour the grace of God as namely when you say since Adams fall our love to sinfull pleasures is so strong that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love implying thereby that before Adams fall wee could repent without infinite attractions of love But I pray consider what need was there of repentance before Adams fall Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and undâ—filed nature could he performe without speciall grace Yes you
teach when we make the work of faith a worke of power 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power and is not the worke of grace such a worke Eph. 2. 2 But you doe ill under colour of magnifying the love of God to dishonour both his love and his power his love in confining it onely to promises and threatnings as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance his power in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe and that ardently And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme as wel'l as we doe In the next place you tell us We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him but constraines no mans will to love him But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint why did you not expresse your minde on this point you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse the author and finisher of our faith of our repentance of our obedience Did you acknowledge this there should bee no difference betweene us For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us by way of constraint And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes that which was pleasing in his sight you shall never finde in any of our Divines that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God I know no power in God but infinite and seeing what worke soever he workes is by the exercise of his power it cannot be denied but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite Againe is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts It is not as I presume you will confesse why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts and making us to love him be accounted a worke of power infinite And Austin divers times professeth that God doth convert our hearts omnipotenti facilitate by an almighty facility and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite as when Bernard confesseth of God saying Bernâ—n circumcis Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God it is no article of our Creed but a tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts whereby wee are brought to love him Neither doe we say that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us according to that of Iohn 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him because he loved us first and to that of S. Paul The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature and not to a seed of grace though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly as it were fit you should And no marvell For they which doe evill hate the light As for constraint we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained As for the will that non potest cogi cannot be constrained And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity whereof others doe not should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite as if they maintained that the will of man may be constrained yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him would this breed in God a loathing of him Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you Yet I have read My soule loathed them and their soule abhorred mee but I never heard the contrary My soule loathed them and their soule loved mee for while we abhorre God as enemies unto him yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love will he continue to love us and not turne his love into loathing as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes as being satisfied and disdaining to be scorned by them whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts yet could not winne their loues But God never makes us unwillingly to love him it is a thing impossible but as Austine saith Ex nolentibus volentes facit T is true God loves a cheerefull giver but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne Like as it is said of him that Corâ—nat non merit a nostra sed donasua he crownes not our works but his owne And where there is a willing minde there it is accepted not according to that which a man hath not but to that which he hath but whose worke is this willing minde Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us but makes us willing and ready and cheerefull in the performing of it not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth but in suffering what hee inflicteth or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse though with much a doe yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse will hee love his childe or his obedience or dutifulnesse the worse for this yet God more effectually and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts even omnipotente facilitate as Austine speaketh and shall hee love our obedience our thankfulnesse our repentance the lesse for this 5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme to wit In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard All
hands and keepe us from falling into the hands of men yet if God calleth us thereunto to commit our selves unto God when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him certainly They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence but the revealed will of God For whatsoever Gods nature is hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us but hee hath revealed that he will never faile them that put their trust in him And this is that loving kindenesse of God as much as to say his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature why God should give them a being neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature as you superficially use to discourse but meerely the love of himselfe For he made all things for himselfe And the creature before God made him was just nothing neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus It is a strange conceit to say that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being who is the Creator For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut between an horne and a bagpipe an harp and an harrow Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator and the creature Certainly all do not love God whom he loves for he loved us when we were his enemies Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him as all shall either sooner or later it will not follow that all should bee saved For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase and such as Esau are hated rather And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine as denying Gods omnipotency then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it The apprehension of Gods love to us is the cause morall of our love to him though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love how dare you professe God loves the reprobate and that ardently and with excessive and infinite love Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption and not rather unlovelinesse throughout Neither will it serve your turne to say that he loves them as his creatures For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads yea and the Devills and damned Spirits 3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill as brethren in evill do love one another and our Saviour hath taught us as much Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have doe not the Publicanes even the same I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable The doing of things otherwise unlawfull in some cases may be dispensed with but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with it may be remitted but that is not to dispense with it I take your meaning and leave your words you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation I no way like such extravagant assertions though frequent in your writings as if you would innovate all both naturall reason and divinity I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost and finall impenitency which God will not pardon in his elect Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe as you doe of your selfe Be God never so louely yet if a man know him not how can hee love him And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God Suppose we doe know him to be most wise most powerfull yet if he be our enemie how should this move us to love him or put our trust in him If we know him to love us and to be our friend yet are not the best backward enough from loving him when we are easily drawne to sinne against him And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable what an uncomfortable doctrine is this and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements Ioh. 14. 5. Againe what is the love of God Is it not to love him above all things even above our selves as Gerson expresseth it Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui Is this naturall long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake is this sinne unpardonable You are a valliant Champion I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ. But alas what should become of poore Peter that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ denied that he knew him and that with oath and imprecation Yet Christ looked back upon him â—s before he had praied for him that his faith might not faile and Peter looked back upon himselfe and went forth and wept bitterly and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order that Peter by name should be acquainted with the first with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead that as he died for his sinnes so hee rose again for his justification The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate who take notice of it chiefly as touching blessings spirituall As for temporall blessings Gods love therein to man how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud comming to passe onely by course of nature But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life which hee never meanes to performe is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes To the children of God there is
no such obligation for t is not the blessings but the sanctified use of them that is a pledge and assurance to them of the favour of God unto salvation and so the sanctified use of Gods temporall curses are no lesse evident a pledge and assurance to them of the same favour of God For by chastising divers and sundry waies with crosses and afflictions hee manifests unto them that God receives them for his sonnes and so esteemes of them and not as bastards Heb. 12. 8. I am glad to heare you acknowledge that Of all the motions of our hearts and soules God is the sole author and guide For such acknowledgements are most rare with you and which you cannot embrace without manifest contradiction to your selfe and overthrowing all your discourse touching Gods decree which as you say decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves But the motions of the soule and heart are contingent things and these must needes he decreed by God if they be produced by God And if God be the author of them hee must needs produce them So that the whole tower of your discourse touching Gods decree is suddenly overthrowne by your selfe and that with the blast of this one sentence Besides when you acknowledge God to be the authour of all the motions of our hearts and soules you therewithall acknowledge him to be the author of evill motions as well as good For you doe nor say hee is the author of all good motions but of all whose motions in reference to our hearts our soules our strength God is the sole Authour and guide yet we dare not avouch that God is the Author much lesse the sole Author of all our motions without manifold distinctions And to my thinking it became you to be very cautulous of such assertions who are so apt to charge your opposites with making God the Author of sinne Of every action of man that is free wee maintaine man to be the author as well as God but man wee make in operation subordinate unto God the second cause unto the first This is true as touching actions naturally considered and as touching good actions but with a difference man in working any naturall action we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence generall in working good actions wee make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence speciall But as touching evill actions there wee make man alone to be the author of them as they are evill without any subordination unto God in respect of any influence generall or speciall And cannot sufficiently wonder what improvidence hath overtaken you to out-lash in so strange a manner But even in this we acknowledge a providence of God confounding the wittes and longues of them that build up Babell I remember what the Prophet saith of the Aegyptians The Lord hath mingled among them the spirit of errours and they have caused Aegypt to erre in every worke thereof as a drunken man erreth in his vomit and how is that but in defiling himselfe and that which is before him oâ— his owne favourites that sit next unto him Christs yoake is easie and his burthen light to the regenerate but is it so unto naturall men doe they not account it coards and bands Psal. 2. Doth not the Apostle tell us The affections of the flesh are not subject to the law of God nor can be It seemes you are a very morrall man you do so willingly fall upon this theame of advancing the power of mans naturall morallity But I remember withall what Austine sometimes said Malo humilem peccatorem quam superbum innocentem And arrogancie is a speciall fruit of pride And you discourse in such sort of the nature of man as if it had never beene corrupt in Adam 4 If our love of God be raised from the beliefe of his loving kindenesse to us then our love to God is not the first conception or plantation of true happinesse but rather our faith as the Apostle plainely testifieth 1 Tim. 1. 5. saying The end of the law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained And neither the one nor the other is the worke of nature but of Grace nor the worke of God neither by influence generall and naturall but by influence speciall and spirituall As for the conclusion you deduce herehence it is well known that life and sense and reason we obtaine by course of nature and naturall generation of naturall and reasonable parents And to know that God gives all this and maintaines naturall generation by the counsell of his will that he it is that fashioneth us in the wombe is not knowne by light of nature for the greatest Philosophers knew not this but by light of grace and so the moanest christian comes acquainted with this mysterie But herehence to inferre that God hath a purpose to give me with them whatsoever good things my heart my sense or reason can desire is a verie loose inference God hath no purpose to give his own children whatsoever good thing they doe desire much lesse what they can desire Paul desired and prayed thrise to be delivered from the buffetings of Satan but God granted it not unto him Moses desired to go over Iordan to see the goodly mountain and Lebanon but it was denied him Abraham desired that the blessing might be conferred on Ishmael but could not obtaine it And no marveyle For God knows what is better for us then our selves the childe prayeth for his Fathers health sayth Austine but it is Gods pleasure to take him away by death God hath not promised to give us all that we desire much lesse that sense desireth but hath promised that all things shall worke together for our good even povertie as well as riches sikenesse as well as health and adversitie as well as prosperitie For every creature of God is sanctified unto them that beleive and know the truth This is the faith only of a childe of God who is the heyre of the World by faith in Christ. But to say of all and every one hand over head that God hath a purpose to give them all eternall life is your common errour that now is like an hereditary sicknesse unto you driving you to maintayne two foule tenets the one that God is not omnipotent as purposing to give that which he never performes a manifest signe that he is not able to performe it as Austine many hundred yeares agoe disputed Enchirid 95. Deus noster in caelo sursum in caelo in terra omnia quaecunque voluit fecit Quod utique non est verum si aliqua voluit non fecit quod est indignius ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret quod volebat omnipotens voluntas hominis impedivit And Enchirid. 96. Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere Hoc
nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens nisi quia quicquid vult potest nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus The other tenet as foule as the former is this that God changeth For undoubtedly at this time he hath no purpose to save the Divells and damned soules of men therfore if ever he had any such purpose it is now changed and consequently God is changed himselfe You have no way to avoyde this but by saying that Gods purpose you speake of is not absolute but conditionall as before you upbraided your opposites for maintaining Gods decree of electtion to be absolute Yet the Arminians at the conference of Hage utterly declined the maintenance of Gods decree of election to be conditionall Yet the shifre will not serve your turne being too narrow a leafe to cover the shamefull nakednesse of your assertion For to purpose conditionally is no more a purpose of salvation then of condemnation which is no way an evidence of Gods love to any man in particular the issue wherof is indifferent to be condemnation as well as salvation But you hitherto in this respect have insisted upon the maintenance of Gods love to all and every one The beginning which God found out for mankind was a being indifferent to stand or fall which indifferency fitted him no more for salvation in case he stood then for damnation in case he fell save that God was withall resolved to provide him of a Saviour upon his fall that should be as tabula post naufragium but to whome only to these whome he loved as he loved Iacob not unto those whome he hated as he hated Esau. For as he made all thinges for himselfe so also he made the wicked against the day of evill and ever that for himselfe also Why Gods love in respect of creation should be accoumpted his infinite love I know no reason considering that the meanest creature was partaker of that love as well as man And as he gave being unto all things so he maintaynes being to Divells and damned men and ever will doe We are knit unto God by faith as well as by love and of the two faith is the more noble as being the Fountaine and cause of love If God out of love be sayd to make us what we are it may as well be sayd that out of love he made all other creatures what they are If you reply that they were made out of his love to us for as much as they were made for our use and service In like sort I answeare that it was out of love to himselfe that he made us for as much as he made us for his owne use and service yea and all things else that were made For he made all things for himselfe In like sort if God made us what we are because he was lovinge to us he made also all creatures what they are because he was loving to them Yet by your leave He made all things for himselfe And this is the foure and twenty Elders acknowledgment Revela 4. 11. Thou art worthy o Lord to receive glory and honour and power For thou hast created all thinges and for thy wills sake they are and have bin created You say true where faith and love is found there is assurance of Gods favour towards us to set both his wisdome power on worke to make all things worke together for our good and so to preserve us to his heavenly Kingdome But the question is whether this faith and love be the workes of nature and wherof all are capable by power of nature or whether they are the meere fruites of Gods grace afforded to some denyed to others according to the good pleasure of his owne will as who hath mercie on whome hee will and whom he will he hardneth CHAP. XIX How God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge NOw because you cannot but perceave how this pincheth sore upon the unchangeable nature of God Therfore you spend two chapters in the clearinge of this difficulty wherin if you satisfie your selfe it is well As for my part I am so farre from receaving satisfaction that I am utterly to seeke in understandinge the course you take to give satisfaction Whether anger hate or jealosie have any seate in the omnipotent Majestie is litle to the purpose But to shew how God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge without any change this alone is to the purpose For the very māner of proposing it doth imply the ceasing to be a loving Father which he was but becomes a severe inexorable judge which he was not For to bee a loving Father and a severe judge all at once is not of a lovinge Father to become a severe judge And though this were granted you yet it is not congruous to your tenet to maintayne that God was an inxorable judge to any before the measure of his iniquity be full And as then he first begines to become an inexorable judge so it is requisite that then he ceaseth to be a loving Father And albeit you are loath to acknowledge this because it doth so manifestly imply a change in the nature of God yet you must be driven hitherto whether you will or no unlesse you maintayne that still God continueth a most loving Father unto the Divells and ever shall be both unto them and to all damned persons notwithstandinge the wrath of God continue upon them to everlastinge damnation And it is a very strange dialect to acknowledge that God is a most loving Father unto damned persons especially considering that in Scripture phrase we are sayd to be the Sonnes of God by faith in Christ Jesus Gala. 3. 26. And indeede if you can make good that to inflict everlastinge damnation doth consort with infinite mercy then you shall obteyne not that God of a most loving Father doth become an inexorable judge but that at once he is both a most loving father and a most inexorable judge also As for anger whether it be in God or no or whether Lactantius hath carryed himselfe well or no in this Argument it is nothing at all to this present businesse The question is whether God ardently desiring the salvation of any man doth at length cease to desire it or whether still he continueth to will and ardently desire a mans salvation notwithstandinge that he purposeth to inflict or actually doth inflict upon him condemnation For this seemes to be the intended issue of your discourse as when you undertake to illustrate how extreame severitie may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love As much as to say that God loves the Devills and loves the damned and continueth the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love towards them notwithstanding that he doth inflict everlasting condemnation
judge there is no chang or alteration at all in God but only in men and in theire actions Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration your selfe proposed in the former chapter but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence that is the fruitfull Mother of all things and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation And yet that which you say here I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power But you have not discovered unto us if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children especially consideringe that will is found in the Father as well as in the Mother yea and love also if not in greater measure But I deny not but that God made the world out of love but out of love to whome to the creature Nothing lesse I should thinke as before I have shewed but rather out of love to himselfe as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe And greate reason God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things should be the supreame end of all things But let this passe Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous but very preposterous and unsound First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it and then a qualification or limitation thereof by way of exception unto a certayne time The proposition is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory but our temporall being also and the preservation therof For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any For they are merely gratuita dona and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne in bestowing it on whome he will and denyinge it to whome he will And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will and whome he will he hardneth But more then this as God was not bound to create any so neyther can any thing save his owne will binde him to preserve any thing in being But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men even take theire temporall being from them without any purpose ever to restore it and not only the being of theire bodyes but of theire soules also turning both into nothing Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent never so holy as Arminius confesseth But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this Now these are two the one because God hath created our natures Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this that God hath created other things as well as man Yet who will conclude herehence that God must needes preserve them and not exclude them from this fruite of his love Your other reason is because God cannot change and this is as weake as the former For like as God though at one time he gives us life another time takes life from us yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe like as in course of nature though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether in the heavens in the earth in the Sea in the states and Kingdoms of the World and in the bodyes of all creatures yet without any change at all in himselfe yea though he set an end to this visible World this can inferre no variablenesse in God so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells and so exclude them from all fruits of his love Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God Yet you have a third reason which is this Love is the nature of God as Creator You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good and what other sense you imply when you say Love is Gods nature as a Creator I discerne not You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love it is very incongruous to say that this love of God wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition and that is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill come to that hight as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour First touching your meaning in this then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning your meaning in briefe is this No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity Of this your opinion I have spoken often I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it And that is
intimations You seeme to mee to imply that this will of God is accomplished in Iudas his damnation Because looke in what measure of love God would have saved him in such a measure of wrath he doth damne him and so accordingly looke in what measure Gods delight would have bin in Iudas his salvation had he bin saved in the same measure God doth delight in his damnation he being damned Vous avez thus have you the interpretation of this riddle And by the same reason you may proceede to make other riddles and aske how is the will of God as touching Peters damnation and Gods delight and pleasure therin accomplished to every dramme and scruple and answere that this is accomplished in his salvation For looke in what measure God would have delighted in his damnation had he bin damned in the same measure God now delights in his salvation he being saved And thus the delight and pleasure that any man takes in his childes salvation may be sayd to be accomplished in the delight and pleasure which he shall take in his childes condemnation For the Saints shall judge the World even the Godly Father joyne with Christ in pronouncing the sentence of condemnation upon his ungodly Sonne c. God delights in our obedience and in our repentance when it is but where there is no repentance or obedience how is it probable he or any should delight in that which is not 1 Sam. 15. 22. Hath the Lord as greate pleasure in burnt-offrings and sacrifices as when the voyce ef the Lord is obeyed Perhapps you will say yet his will is that all should repent I answere his will commanding is so to all that heare it but his will decreeing is not that all shall repent that are commaunded to repent For then all should repent To say that God will have any thing come to passe which yet never comes to passe Austine hath long agoe professed to be as good as to deny Gods omnipotency And whereas repentance is the gift of God as the Scripture plainly testifieth it is apparent that God doth not give repentance unto all and therefore neyther did he will or determine to give repentance unto all God is sayd to love persons in as much as he willeth good things unto them God may be sayd to love things morall as repentance and obedience in as much as he will reward persons for theire repentance and obedience Neyther of these loves is accommodable to punishment no more then unto reward Yet looke in what respect God may be sayd to love the one so may he be sayd to love the other And the Apostle professeth of himselfe and his fellows that they were the good savour of the Lord even in them that perish And every man knoweth reward to be a fruite of justice remunerative as well as punishment is of justice vindicative and each presupposeth the will of God as well one as the other For God is not bound to punish sinne he may pardon it Nay how is he not bound to pardon all sinne of all men if so be Christ hath made satisfaction for the sinnes of all And with these Tenets of yours you are growne so farre in love that because some schoole poynts doe not beare such faire wether towards them as might be wished you woulde put the maintayners of them upon some better explication of such Tenets The Tenet is that God doth punish sinners in the life to come citra condignum The Moderne divines as it seemes by your margent are Calvin Zanchy that maintayne this against whom you oppose Coppenius a Lutheran I guesse I doe not thinke he is a Papist Sure I am Bradwardine and Gerson maintayne the same and as I remenber it is most generally receaved amongst the Schoolemen And as for Coppenius his reasons when he demaunds whether God doth remit ought for Christs satisfaction or no I answere it is not for Christs satisfaction but merely according to the good pleasure of his owne will And when he urgeth that of Iames Iudgement mercylesse shall be to him that sheweth no mercy I answere that like as when the Apostle prayeth for Onesiphorus that he may find mercy at that day his meaning can be no other then this that his sinnes might be pardoned and his soule saved so likewise in just proportion they may be sayd to tast of judgement mercylesse whose sinners are not pardoned and whose soules are not saved As for your reason it is grounded merely upon a fiction of your owne that subjecteth the delight of God unto degrees whereas his simplicitie freeth him as well from composition of degrees as from any other kind of composition as also unto change even there where you undertake to cleere God from change If Iudas had bin saved and Peter damned God had still bin the same and no other then now he is as touching will and delight and every thinge that is in God But by the way let me tell you you corrupt the state of the question in supposing that by this Tenet which you dislike the punishment of reprobation is lesse then divine justice exacts For they maintayne no such thing but rather the contrary that no degree of punishment is exacted by any justice in God but left indifferent to the determination of Gods will And therefore Bradwardine distinguisseth betweene meritum actuale and meritum potentiale Meritum actuale is in reference to such a degree of punishment or reward which the will of God hath determined But meritum potentiale is in reference to any degree of reward or punishment which God might have determined And Gerson professeth that when a sinne is committed it is merely in the good pleasure of God to inflict what kinde or degree of punishment he will 2. Your text is to proove that Gods nature admitteth no change albeit of a loveing Father he becomes a severe judge albeit his tender love be turned into wrath And for proofe of this you thinke it enough to say that the change is in man and that Gods wrath kindles not but out of the ashes of his love despised To this you take on an other poynt nothing at all to the purpose that Gods wrath is in proportion to mens sinnes neyther lesse nor more and this you prosequuâ—e a whole leafe and more that what you want of solid answere you may supply by silling mens eyes with an idle discourse Well we have considered what your discourse hath bin on the by touching this that mens punishments are not lesse then theire deserts Now let us consider your following extravagancy in shewing that mens punishments are not more then theire deserts And here you tell us that to thinke God should punish sinne unlesse it were truly against his will or any sinne more deeply then it is against his will and pleasure is one of those 3. grosse transformations of the divine nature which Saint Austine refutes For thus to doe is
an unwoorthy speeche to denote the nature of God as indeede more false then true or rather false throughout and voyde of all truthe And why shoulde we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man and from a Stoicke as Seneca was So Lucan Deus est quodcunque vides quocunque mover◠out of the mouthe of Cato Vticensis a man of Stoicall profession as Seneca was And such sayings as these Deus est totum quod vides totum quod non vides savour hotly of an Atheifticall opinion of such as being ignorant of the nature of the true God deified the nature And commonly their severall Gods denoted only severall parts of the World as Vesta the Earth Iupiter the ayre Baal or Bel and as some say Hercules Tyrius the Sunne Yet severall Nations like enough had their severall opinions but all concurring in this namely in adoring the creature and specially all the host of heaven in steede of the Creator And then withall they had an universall Deitie whome they called Pan representing the whole Vniverse And according to Platonicall opinion God was accoumpted Anima Mundi And thus with them God was Totum quod vides totum quod non vides Yet I may well grant that more coulde not be sayde in fewer wordes but this is in the way of falshood and not in the way of truthe The best construction that can be made of it is to say that God is the Author of all that we see and of all that we doe not see Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoicks of whose profession Seneca was For thoughe he did believe the World was made as Aristotle professethe in his bookes de Caelo it was the opinion of all that went before him Yet did he not believe that it was made out of nothing but that the matter wherof the World was made was eternall Therfore they did not believe that God was the Author of all both of that we see and of that we doe not see Your selfe confesse they conceaved the matter to have bene coeternall with him and not so only but able allso to overmatch the benignitie of his active power by its passive untowardlines Agayne I doe not finde that any of them maynteyned that immateriall substances were made by God for then they shoulde all be made out of nothinge For Angells consist not of materiall extensions And it was their generall voyce that nothing coulde be made out of nothing 3. The analogy you speake of is without all proportion For the picture of a man thoughe it be no true man yet it may be a true picture and whether a true picture or no yet undoubtedly it hathe a true beinge thoughe imperfect in comparison to the beinge of a man And therfore herehence to conclude that no creature truly is is without all proportion Man indeede is but the Image of God as some things are the Images of men Whence it followethe as the Images of men are not men so man the Image of God is not God But to inferre that therfore man is not in truthe or hathe no true beinge hathe no ground no foundation If the beinge of a creature is but the shadowe of true beinge then humanitie which is the being of a man is but a shadowe of true humanitie brutality which is the beinge of a beast is but the shadowe of true brutalitie And is it proper thinke you to say that the truthe of all these are founde in God to witt true humanitie c. David and Solomon were types of Christ but I never read nor heard that the creatures are types of the Creator Effects they are and the workes of God and as the cause dothe shine in the effect so Gods eternall power Godhead are made manifest by his workes Yet the types of Christ were not types according to their essence but according to their course of life and actions And yet the very actions wherby they represented Christ were true actions in themselves separate from typicall signification thoughe the actions of Christ or office of Christ were of farre greater dignitie and price then were the actions of men which represented him Before the World was made this proposition was true God alone is and he could agayne make it true if it pleased him by turninge all thinges into nothing from whence they came But nowe other things allso are Otherwise there could be no place eyther for the name of creatures or for the representation of God in them And howe can that be sayde not to be or not truly to be which as you say participates of Gods beinge It is true God alone is in such sort as whose essence and existence are all one For as much as possibilitie in him is mere necessitie not so in any creature as who all were not before they were and agayne may returne to nothinge if so it please him that made them to dispose of them What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speake of and howe well it accordes with this I knowe not As touching the nature of God I knowe no such discourses superior if equall to the discourse of Aristotle in a certeyne chapter of his Metaphysicks Your text I am God and there is none besides is faire short of congruitie with your present discourse For will it followe that because there is no God besides him therfore there is nothing that hathe any true beinge besides him 4. It is incredible that the Stoickes or any other helde nothing woorthy the name of essence which was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any facultie of witt But what thinke you is God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Have you forgotten the diversitie of errours which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin the last wherof was to conceave that God could beget himselfe Yet if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall be the propertie of God as your selfe confesse by Plotins Philosophy you might as well have sayde by the Philosophy of Heathens that denyed creation out of nothinge there shall be many Gods even as many as there be immateriall substances which they called mindes or Intelligences from their narure but from their office we call Angells But this error you say was easy to be checkt If the favourers of it had bene put in minde that these their demy Gods by necessary consequence of this opinion must have bene acknowledged insinite in beinge So that had you lived in their dayes you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle allso all others from this point of heathenisme For necessary consequences all must yeilde unto especially if the consequence be perspicuous allso as you seeme to suppose by the litle or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument For oportet ut lancem ponderibus ita animum veris perspicuis cedere And seinge Intelligences if made
from temptations And indeede lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes Yet the Poet tells us also of one Qui nunquam visae slagrabat amore pâ—ellae So then it had beene a mercy of God that their eies had beene pulled out of their heads in your divinity I doe not deny but the greatest temporall blessings may bee cursed unto a man by the power of God and the greatest temporall â—nrses blessed unto him But I never heard or read before that blindenesse should bee considered onely as a mercy and such a mercy as whereby wee are guarded from temptation But were a man never so lustfull yet I thinke in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eies then to lose them that so hee might be partaker of Gods word by private reading which hath more power to his salvation then the sight of any Cocatrices to his destruction And if Democritus had beene acquainted with this word of God I doe not believe hee would have pulled out his eyes in pretence as if they hindred his meditations Alas what had the Sodomites beene the better for the blindenesse of their eyes if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknowne object For a man can fancie him as hee lusteth Say rather God could not in justice change their hearts seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodnesse and abused his long suffering and loving kindenesse Yet this saying of yours should bee farre enough off from truth and sobriety Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodnesse and abused his long suffering All out of the state of grace doe so for Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia Yea and too often wee doe so in the state of grace also Then againe a yeare before this sinne of the Sodomites was not so obstinate lesse a yeare before that and so the farther we descend to times passed they were lesse and lesse obfirmate Why did noâ— God then change their hearts or if you wil have this to be a fruit of mercy why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keepe them from these temptations But you put it out of question that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindnesse did imply contradiction to his goodnesse and eternall equity A most unreasonable assertion For I demand Hath God prevented your wilfull contempt of his goodnesse yea or not your abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse yea or not If he hath not prevented it then either your selfe have prevented it without his grace or you are guilty or have beene guilty of wilfull contempt of his goodnesse and abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse which if it be so what would become of you if God should deale with you according to these immutable and eternall rules according whereto you professe he deales with all I perswade my selfe you have a good opinion of your owne sufficiency to prevent these foule symptomes of humane corruption otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning The reason you give to enforce this assertion is in part nothing for you in part against you For though all his wayes are truth yet this is nothing for you unlesse you can prove that in such a state of sinne as the Sodomites God hath determined to use no effectuall meanes to the curing of them But how will you prove this for hitherto you have not You might as well say God could not cure â—he sin of those Iewes to whom our Saviour said It shall be easier for Sodome and Gomorrah in the day of judgement then for you If this were granted you yet herehence it followes onely that God cannot cure them because he will not for hee hath determined the contrary But you undertake to prove that God cannot doe it in point of justice although hee would doe it out of his love to mankinde But when you say that all Gods waies are mercie that is directly rather against you then for you For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sinne then not to pardon it and withall we are given to understand that as touching the execution hereof God will have mercy on whom hee will and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he wll You talke after your fashion of an eternall rule of goodnesse appointing his justice to debarre the fruits of his mercy But you are a meere talker and prove nothing Who is not wilfull in the state of nature in contemning Gods goodnesse Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit ex nolentibus volentes facere Doth not Austin professe that God hath converted not onely aversos à vera fide but adversus verae fidei voluntates also and bindes it with a Novimus we know it to have beene so Was it not so in Saul Doth not God professe of his wilfull and stubborne people that he will rule them with a mightie hand and make them passe under the rod and bring them under the bond of his covenant Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first some not till the last houre of the day Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason that because a creature cannot be impeccabilis from his creation therefore God cannot cure mens wilfulnesse in the way of his mercy towards them as you most incoherently discourse as if you were in potting verses rather then upon meditating a coherent and methodicall course of argumentation yet the maxime here mentioned though brought in with some state of selfe conceit is very preposterously contrived by you We commonly say a reasonable creature cannot be impeccabilis per naturam uncapable of sinne by nature he may be impeccabilis per gratiam uncapable of sinne by grace as the elect Angels are elect men shall be in the state of glory but of being so some while after the creation and not immediately from the creation of being so absolutely and of being so not absolutely I know no sobriety in these conceits neither doe I thinke you have any authority to countenance them The Sonne of God I doubt not but you will confesse that hee was impeccabilis from the first So might Angels have beene so might men have beene by grace had it so pleased God to make them I see no reason to the contrary yet had not this beene absolutely impeccable but meerly upon the supposition of the will of God Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present such shall bee ours in the world to come God indeed without supposition out of his own absolutenesse is no way obnoxious unto sinne If Angels are or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition it is and shall be by the meere will and good pleasure of God whereby yet I meane not to exclude all