like God himself and several other qualities they ascribe to him which caused Plutarch to reproach them in these words The Stoicks have taught some things far more ridiculous than the Poets But Epicurus on the contrary was of a sweeter and more candid Temper and as he acted with sincerity and plain-dealing he could not endure this vanity and ostentation So that when he consider'd besides the weakness of our Human Nature and what it was capable of undergoing and what not he quickly understood that all those great boastings which made such noise in the Schools of the Stoicks were but vain Fictions when the Glory and the Pride of their words were removed therefore he proposed to himself a Vertue that he knew our Human Nature capable of And because he observ'd that Men in all their Proceedings were naturally carried to some Pleasure and after he had well inquired into all the several kinds of Pleasure there was none more Universal more firm more constant and more desirable than that which consists in the Health of the Body and the Tranquility of the Mind he therefore declared that to be the chief End of all Delights and that Vertue alone was the best means to obtain it and consequently that a Wise or a Vertuous Man did by his Sobriety and Chastity that is to say by the Vertue of Temperance preserve the health of his Body as far as his Natural Constitution would permit and that being assisted by Moral Vertues by which he appeaseth the Passions of Lust Gluttony Covetousness and Ambition he endeavours chiefly to preserve likewise as much as he is able the Tranquility of his Thoughts At the same time he also maintain'd that true Pleasure was not to be found in the Act or in the Motion as Aristippus imagin'd but in statu in a state or manner of existing without Pain in the Body and disquiet in the Mind as we have already often declared heretofore And this was his plain and simple manner of acting he cared not to obtain the reputation of the Vulgar by a glossy Rhetorick or by a Majestick Deportment that express'd a great deal of Vanity in Manners as Zenon did nor did he deceive the People as the other did with a vain ostentation of things which takes much with them tho' they neither understand them nor can practise them Now Zenon and the Stoicks understanding this simplicity of Manners and Doctrin and seeing that many Men of Parts were undeceived and made no account of their great and glorious words and promises conceived so great a prejudice against him that they sought always how to defame him taking occasion from the word Pleasure and affirming that he thereby understood sensual and debauch'd Pleasure and Excess We are not therefore too easily to assent to what they say nor too readily give credit to the Report of others who being imposed upon by their Mistakes have exclaim'd against him But if some honest Men have been guilty of this Error it is to be supposed as Seneca observes that they never knew the inside of this Sect but had only some forged Books or believed the Stoicks his Enemies or perhaps tho' they understood his Opinion they believ'd nevertheless that it was not easie to undeceive the People as it was convenient to continue their Clamours against this Philosopher that they might declare thereby their hatred to Vice and Sensual Pleasures by exclaiming against their supposed Protector and Incourager For the Holy Fathers of the Church as they design'd nothing but Piety and good Manners they have furiously declaim'd not only against all filthy and bruitish Pleasures but also against their Patrons and Protectors And because the Report was already spread abroad that Epicurus was the Chief they have treated him according to the common mistake So that it is not their fault that he has been Scandaliz'd for he was so before and what they did was only as we have already hinted to give a greater abhorrence of Vice and of sordid and sensual Pleasures This is so certainly true that some such as Lactantius who being otherwise provok'd against Epicurus have nevertheless retracted their former Opinion And St. Jerom amongst the rest writing against Jovinian places not Epicurus amongst them who commonly say Let us Eat and Drink c. but looks upon him in another manner than the common Report It is wonderful saith this great Saint that Epicurus the great Patron of Pleasure fills his Books with nothing but Herbs and Fruits affirming that the plainest Food is the best because Flesh and other dainty Dishes require a great deal of care and trouble to be fitted for our use and that there is more Pains in seeking them than Pleasure in abusing them that our Bodies have no need but of plain Meats and Drinks that where there is Bread and Water and such like Necessaries we may thereby easily satisfie Nature but what is over and above is needless and tends to gratify our Lust that our Eating and Drinking is not for Delight but to expel Hunger and Thirst that Wisdom is inconsistent with the laborious toil of procuring good Chear that Nature's Desires are soon satisfied and that by moderate Diet and plain Apparel we expel Cold and Hunger There is but one passage more that may seem to create some difficulty It is that which Cicero objects as being taken out of the Book wherein Epicurus's Ends and Designs are described for he makes him say That if we take away Bodily and Sensual Pleasures he knows no other good But why may we not easily suppose that the Stoicks who have been so bold to forge whole Books and make Epicurus their Author have maliciously put this Passage in his Book and it being thus abused and falsified it is come into the hands of Cicero and Atheneus That which makes us suspect this is First That Laertius who hath left us a Catalogue of Epicurus's Books and consequently ought to know what was in them when he relates a passage out of his Book of The End and others of the same saith That they are Fools that impose such things upon Epicurus for they are not to be found in the true Copies And Hesichius assures us that they are gross Lyars that assert any such thing of him Secondly Epicurus himself complains of their making him speak those words which were against his Judgment and his Disciples would never acknowledge that passage but they have rather always complain'd of it and exclaim'd against it Thirdly These words are expresly contrary to those which are known to be of Epicurus Res Venereae nunquam prosunt multum est ni noceant as we have already observ'd Fourthly That Cicero amongst these Objections that he makes cannot but propose this Question as if Truth himself had forced him to it What do you believe that Epicurus was of this Perswasion and that his Opinions were dishonest sensual and lewd For my part I can't believe it for I find that he declares
Practice of Vertue it inquires wherein consists the chief Good and the chief Evil whither all our Actions ought to tend and what is the Rule of Life we ought to steer by Moreover he who shall have consider'd the strong Revolutions of Things since the beginning of the World the Rise Progress Consistency Declension and Over-throw of Kingdoms Common-wealths Religions Opinions Laws Customs Manners and the present Ways and Methods of Living now in Vogue which our Fore-fathers would have rejected such as our Ancestors seriously followed and which we now laugh at and such possibly as will hereafter please our Posterity yet could we but at present see them we should laugh at and deride These Fashions and Customs tho' they change in some particular things may in general be said to be the same and are only a Sign of the Frailty Lightness and Inconstancy of Mankind And thus it always happens that Men by their Lightness live continually miserable being carried away by Ambition or Covetousness or some other Passion They don't see how much it is their Concern to free themselves from such Cares to be content with little to live within themselves and to spend their Life peaceably without so much noise He I say who shall have employ'd his Mind in such Contemplations will doubtless feel extraordinary Delight and will be very happy in his Thoughts especially if he considers all things as from that high and sacred Tower from whence as we said Vertue looks down upon the several Actions and Affairs of Men their Ambition their Pride their Vanity their sordid Covetousness and the rest before hinted Of Freedom from Pain in particular NOw to speak something concerning Freedom from Pain It seems not so much in our Power to free our selves from Pain in our Bodies as to ease our selves of Troubles in our Minds for tho' it is difficult to stop the Passions in their full Career and check their exorbitant Motions yet if we except such as have a Conjunction with Pain such as are particularly Hunger and Thirst which create a desire of Eating and Drinking it seems in respect of the others as they arise in us from Opinion so they may if we keep our selves from the Influence of that Opinion be check'd and curb'd But in relation to the Pains of the Body tho' we may take care not to draw them upon our selves outwardly nor stir them up inwardly yet it often happens that the Temper which we derive from our Mother's Womb is such that upon that very account we are liable to many Pains during the course of our Lives 'T is not without Reason therefore that Esop feigned that when Prometheus was to temper the Clay with which he was to make Man made use of no Water but of Tears for by that he had a design to teach us that the Nature of our Bodies is such that it is partly subject to outward and partly to inward Mischiefs and seeing it is impossible but some will often befal us of necessity we must suffer some Pain I should be endless to enumerate the Particulars of this kind that may befal us either from Tyrants from Fools from all sorts of Animals from Heat from Cold from Fevers Gout Defluctions c. I shall only observe that such who have been sometimes tormented with them may tell with what earnestness they wished to be freed and how much they would have given to be delivered Certainly there is no Person that labours under an acute Distemper and is grievously tormented with Pain but when he considers such as are in Health esteems them very happy and wonders that they don't acknowledge the greatness of the Advantage they enjoy it being so considerable that no worldly Enjoyments can stand in competition with or be accounted a valuable Exchange for Health Wherefore in all Ages Men have highly extoll'd it But as every Book is full of its own Praises I shall only take notice what an antient Poet saith That the greatest Benefit that can befall frail Man is to enjoy Health Fragili viro optima res bene valere And as another says Nothing can be more advantageous to us than to be free from Pain and Diseases Si ventri bene est si lateri est pedibusque tuis nil Divitiae poterunt Regales addere majus Now what I have here observ'd is to prove that it is not without ground what I have asserted That to be free from Sickness or bodily Pain is part of our Happiness Truly tho' light Pains and such as are of a short continuance may be easily supported and tho' we willingly undergo great ones when they are in order either to avoid greater Evils or for the obtaining of greater Pleasures yet there is no Man so fond of Pain for Pain 's sake but would willingly be quit of it if it were not in order to the obtaining something better which could not be acquir'd without it Men commonly extol Zenon and Anaxarcas for the constancy they express'd against the Tyrants in their greatest Tortures And Calanus also and Peregrinus are much celebrated for freely offering themselves to the Flames But supposing it had been in their Power to have purchased as much Glory by any other Means I refer it to your self whether they would have made this Choice Cicero likewise very much extolleth Possidonius for that being grievously tormented with the Gout when Pompey visited him at Rhodes he told him That he was very sorry that he could not hear him to which Possidonius answer'd You may if you please and I will not suffer so great a Person to come to me in vain He tells us that he began to discourse to him excellently viz. That there is nothing Good but that which is honest And when his Pains assaulted him often during the Interview he as often said Thou wilt never prevail upon me O Pain tho' never so grievous to make me confess thee to be an Evil. But tho' Possidonius patiently endured the Pains that he could not avoid yet you can't but imagine that he would rather have been free from 'em and been able to discourse without ' em We may here add That if as we have already said Pain is the chief Evil it necessarily follows that a freedom from Pain should be the chief Good and the rather because Nature seems to have bestowed upon us an inclination for nothing else but for this freedom For when any Pain happens to us whether by Hunger or by any other Desire we are naturally carried to that Action by which we may remove that Pain and if any Pleasure intervenes we have observed that Nature adds it as an Encouragement to the Action needful to obtain that freedom from Pain And probably we may consequently add by what Means we may obtain so great an Advantage But besides the divers Remedies which may be taken from the convenient Precautions and from the Medicinal Art which relate not to Moral Philosophy we may say That
up several Oracles that have faltred and divers of their Temples that have been burned and then argues from thence If these wonderful Utterers of Oracles are not able to protect their own Temples nor defend themselves in time of Danger how can they defend others But the strongest Reason of all is that many of these Diviners Sooth-sayers and Fortune-tellers having been by the Ancients examined and more lately by the Romans have plainly discovered the Truth and declared that the Mistake proceeded from the too easie credulity of Men and that all was nothing but Subtilty and Cheat. We are not here to forget that after Eusebius had made mention of the Disciples of Aristotle and of the Cynicks says as to the Epicureans That he wonder'd at them because being bred from their Cradle after the manner of the Greeks and instructed by their Parents in the Belief and Doctrins of the Gods they nevertheless would not suffer themselves to be cheated by Mistakes but have boldly declared their Sentiments against such Oracles tho' they were then very famous and much frequented from all parts of the World protesting that they were meer Cheats and Impostures and making it appear that they were not only foolish idle and vain but also wicked THE CONTENTS BOOK I. OF Moral Philosophy in General Page 1. CHAP. I. What Happiness is Page 5. Several Opinions concerning the efficient Cause of Happiness Page 8. Some Particulars needful to be examined and considered which will contribute very much to the Repose and Happiness of Mankind Page 14. CHAP. II. What sort of Pleasure it is that Epicurus recommends as the End of a happy Life Page 44. Wherein Epicurus and Aristippus differ Page 58. The Condition and Satisfaction of a wise Man according to Epicurus's Opinion Page 61. That the Pains and Pleasures of the Mind are greater than those of the Body Page 63. Wherein Epicurus differs from the Stoicks Page 67. That Virtue according to Epicurus is essentially related to Pleasure as it tends to the main End and Design of an happy Life Page 69. CHAP. III. Wherein an happy Life doth consist Page 77. Whether all Pleasure be good of it self Page ibid. Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks in respect of Good and Evil be justyfiable Page 82. Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleasure Page 84. Of the first Good that Nature has in its view Page 86. That things profitable and useful are sought after for the sake of Pleasure Page 91. That those good things which we call honest have the nearest relation to Pleasure Page 93. Whether the desire of Honour be blame-worthy Page 97. CHAP. IV. What advantage moral Virtue procures Page 100. Of Self-love Page 111. Of the deceitful Virtue and deceitful Happiness of Regulus Page 114. CHAP. V. That a wise Man is only capable of enjoying moral Virtues Page 122. Of the Tranquility of the Mind in particular Page 128. Of Life and of Active Felicity Page 132. Whether a Contemplative Happiness is to be preferr'd before an Active Page 136. Of freedom from Pain in particular Page 138. CHAP. VI. What Virtue and Advantage accrues by being contented with a little Page 147. A description of the Indian Diogenes Page 171 BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of Virtue in General Page 173. In what sense Virtue is said to consist in a Medium or to be placed in a Mediocrity Page 176. Of the Apathy or Insensibility of the Stoicks Page 180. Of the mutual Connection of moral Virtues Page 185. A general division of Virtue Page 188. CHAP. II. Of Prudence in general Page 191. Of the general Offices or Duties of Prudence Page 193. Of the Dispositions or Qualities needful for the performing the Duties of Prudence Page 195. CHAP. III. Of private Prudence Page 199. Of the Offices of private Prudence Page 201. That 't is dangerous to undertake any thing against our Natural Inclination Page 205. CHAP. IV. Of Oeconomick Prudence Page 210. Of the Nuptial Prudence and its several Duties Page 212. Of Paternal Prudence and its several Duties Page 214. Of Prudence of Superiors and their several Duties Page 217. Of Possessory Prudence and its Offices Page 218. CHAP. V. Of Politick or Civil Prudence Page 224. Of the first Original of Soveraign Power according to the Opinion of the Ancients Page 225. Whether Monarchical Government is the best Page 229. Of the Duties of a Monarch in General Page 230. Of the great concerns of Meum and Tuum or of the Property of the Subject Page 238. Of the Duties of a Sovereign in times of Peace Page 241. Of the Offices of a Sovereign in times of War Page 245. If a wise Man ought to intermeddle with publick Affairs Page 250. CHAP. VI. Of Fortitude Page 254. Of the several kinds of Fortitude Page 260. Whether the Evils foreseen make the least Impression upon us Page 263. How we ought to support External and Publick Evils Page 265. Of External and private Evils and first of Banishment Page 268. Of Imprisonment Page 270. Of Slavery Page 271. Of Shame and Disgrace Page 273. Of the loss of Children and Friends Page 274. Of the loss of an Estate Page 276. Of Pain and of Death Page 278. CHAP. VII Of Temperance Page 280. Of Modesty and Decency Page 281. Of Sobriety and Chastity in general Page 283. Of Sobriety in particular Page 286. Of Chastity in particular Page 289. Of Mildness and Gentleness Page 294. Of Clemency Page 297. Of Mercy Page 299. Of Modesty Page 300. CHAP. VIII Of Justice Equity and the Laws Page 306. Of Retaliation Page 308. Of Justice in general according to Epicurus Page 312. Of Right or Just from whence Justice derives its name Page 314. Of the Origin of Right and of Justice Page 317. Between whom Right or Justice takes Place Page 319. That there is great Reason to live up to Justice Page 328. Whether we may wrong any Man without doing him an Injury Page 334. CHAP. IX Of the Virtues which accompany Justice namely of Religion of Piety of Observance Love Bounty Liberality Gratitude And first of Religion Page 337. Of Piety Page 348. Of Observance or Respect Page 353. Of Friendship Page 355. Of Beneficence and Liberality Page 363. Of Gratitude Page 366. BOOK III. Of Liberty Fortune Destiny and Divination CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is Page 372. CHAP. II. Of Fortune and Destiny Page 392. Of Destiny Page 396. CHAP. III. How Destiny may be reconciled or consist with Fortune and Liberty Page 409. CHAP. IV. Of Divination or the foretelling of future Contingencies Page 424. Of Demons or Spirits according to the Opinion of Antiquity Page 429. Of the Oracles Page 449. FINIS GASSENDI's MORALS
to enjoy perfect Health and a sound Constitution of Body Riches purchased without Fraud and in short to spend his Life amongst his Friends Fragili viro optima res bene valere Atque indolem bonam esse sortitum Tum possidere opes dolo haud partas Tandem cum amicis exigere vitam Another Description we find in Martial who among many other things desires to enjoy a Paternal Estate acquir'd without Labour to be free from the vexation of Law-Suits c. Since Dearest Friend 't is your desire to see A true Receipt of Happiness from me These are the Chief Ingredients if not all Take an Estate neither too great nor small Which Quantum sufficit the Doctors call Let this Estate from Parents Care descend The getting it too much of Life does spend Take such a Ground whose gratitude may be A fair Encouragement for Industry Let constant Fires the Winter's Fury tame And let thy Kitchins be a Vestal Flame Thee to the Town let never Suits at Law And rarely very rarely Business draw Thy active Mind in equal Temper keep In undisturbed Peace yet not in sleep Let Exercise a vigorous Health maintain Without which all the Composition's vain In the same weight Prudence and Innocence take Ana of each does the just Mixture make But a few Friendships wear and let them be By Nature and by Fortune fit for thee Instead of Art and Luxury in Food Let Mirth and Freedom make thy Table good If any Cares into the Day-time creep At Night without Wine 's Opium let them sleep Let Rest which Nature does to Darkness wed And not Lust recommend to thee thy Bed Be satisfied and pleas'd with what thou art Act chearfully and well th' allotted Part Enjoy the present hour be thankful for the past And neither fear nor wish th' approaches of the last Here we may first observe as Horace according to Aristotle tells us that many are often disappointed in their search after Happiness imagining that it consiks chiefly in such things as they want and which they admire in others as the Ignorant suppose it in Knowledge the Poor in Riches the Sick in Health which Horace very well expresseth speaking of the Merchant of the Soldier and of the Husbandman the one envies and admires the other's Condition O happy Seamen cries th' Old Son of War With batter'd Limbs and half his Face a Scar. The restless Seaman when insulting Gales Toss the light Bark and Conquer all his Sails If fear allows one distant thought or word Trembling applauds the Brother of the Sword The Man of Law when pondring at the Door His wakeful Client knocks him up at four Wou'd leave the Bar to lie securely warm And part with all his Practice for a Farm The clumsy Peasant if when Harvest 's done A kind Subpoena call's him up to Town 'T is odds but ravish'd with the gaudy Scene He sells his Team sets up for Citizen Secondly To admire nothing as Horace again says is almost the only thing capable of rendring a Man happy and continuing him so Not to admire as most are wont to do It is the only Method that I know To make Men happy and to keep them so And this does not only shew the Tranquility of mind unto which he hath attained who perceiving the Vanity of all Human things does not admire nor any way seek after but rather despises the Glory of Power Honours and Riches which generally dazle Mens Eyes but it also shews that other sort of Tranquility which he hath attained who hath arrived to the knowledge of Natural Causes so that he neither wonders nor fears nor is any way disquieted as the Vulgar usually are Happy the Man who studying Nature's Laws Thro' known Effects can trace the secret Cause His Mind possessing in a quiet State Fearless of Fortune and resign'd to Fate Thirdly That the sweet Repose and Quiet which we meet with in a retired state void of the Incumbrances of the World contributes not a little to our Happiness for he that aspires to the true Felicity of Life which consists chiefly in the Tranquility of Mind must not as Democritus tells us incumber himself in much Business either Private or Publick And it is generally known that the Oracle esteem'd not the Great King Gyges so Happy as the Old Father Aglaus Psophidius who in a little Corner of Arcadia Husbanded a small Estate from which he reapt plentifully the Necessaries of Life and never departing thence spent his time comfortably free from Ambition and without the least sense of the Evils which torment the greatest part of Mankind 'T is this sweet Retirement that Horace hath so much commended in his Praise of a Country Life Happy the Man whom bounteous Gods allow With his own hands Paternal Grounds to Plough Like the first Golden Mortal happy he From Business and the Cares of Mony free No Human Storms break off at Land his Sleep No loud Alarms of Nature on the Deep From all the Cheats of Law he lives secure Nor do's th' Affronts of Palaces endure The same state Virgil describes in his 2d Georgic O Happy if his Happiness he knows The Country Swain on whom kind Heav'n bestows At home all Riches that wise Nature needs Whom the just Earth with Ease and Plenty feeds 'T is true no Morning Tide of Clients comes And fills the Painted Channels of his Rooms Adoring the rich Figures as they pass In Tapestry wrought or cut in living Brass Nor is his Wool superfluously dy'd With the dear Poison of Assyrian Pride Nor do Arabian Perfumes vainly spoil The native Vse and Sweetness of his Oyl Instead of these his calm and harmless Life Free from th' Alarms of Fear and Storm of Strife Do's with substantial Blessedness abound And the soft Wings of Peace cover him round Through Artless Grates the murmuring Waters glide Thick Trees both against Heat and Cold provide From whence the Birds salute him and his Ground With lowing Herds and bleating Sheep do's sound And all the Rivers and the Forests nigh Do Food and Game and Exercise supply As to Epicurus we shall speak more at large that he makes Happiness to consist in the Ease of the Body and the Tranquility of the Mind teaching at the same time and maintaining That the efficient Causes of this Felicity are neither the delicious Wines nor the delicate Meats nor any such thing but a sound just and enlightned Reason assisted by Vertue from which it is not to be separated and which duly weighs and examines the Causes and Motives that induce us either to embrace or shun any thing Therefore designing to treat afterwards of Happiness he earnestly exhorts to consider throughly of the things that conduce to it and because amongst those things the chief is That the Mind may be disengaged from certain Mistakes which cause continual Disturbances and vain Fears he mentions several Particulars which he believes to be of that Importance that when
well examin'd will settle the Mind and procure to it a real and solid Happiness Some Particulars needful to be examin'd and consider'd which will contribute very much to the Repose and Happiness of the Mind THE First Particular is the Knowledge and Fear of God And certainly this Philosopher had good Reason to recommend to us in the first place the right Ideas that we are to entertain of this Sovereign Being because he that hath a right Notion of him is so much inflamed with Love and Affection for God that he constantly endeavours to please him by an honest and a vertuous Life always trusting in his infinite Goodness and expecting all things from him who is the Fountain of all good By this means he spends his Life sweetly peaceably and pleasantly We shall not concern our selves here to shew the Existence of this Being seeing we have already done it elsewhere But shall only take notice that tho' Epicurus delivers some Notions that are very just and reasonable yet he hath others that are not to be entertained by pious Men tho' he interprets 'em after his own Fashion such are to be look'd upon as impious for he believes That God hath a Being as Lucretius makes him acknowledge in his first Book For whatsoe'er's Divine must live in Peace In undisturb'd and everlasting Ease Not care for us from Fears and Dangers free Sufficient to it 's own Felicity Nought here below nought in our Power it needs Ne'er smiles at good ne'er frowns at wicked deeds Now I say to believe such a supreme Being that exists to all Eternity is immortal and infinitely happy in it's own Nature enjoying all things within it self and stands in no need of us nor hath any Cause to fear that is not subject to Pain Anger nor other Passions are undeniable Truths and an Opinion that is Praise-worthy especially in a Heathen Philosopher but when he denies Providence as these Verses do intimate and when he thinks that it is not consisting with the highest Felicity as if God had no particular Care of Men That the Just are to expect nothing from his Goodness nor the Wicked are not to dread his Justice are such Opinions that our Reason and Religion will not permit us to entertain The second Particular relates to Death For as Aristotle observes Death is look'd upon as the most dreadful Evil because none is exempted being unavoidable Therefore Epicurus judges That we ought to accustom our selves to think upon it that we might learn by that means as much as is possible to free our selves from such Fears of Death as might disturb our Tranquility and consequently the Happiness of our Life and for that Reason he endeavours to perswade us that it is so far from being the most dreadful of all Evils that in it self it is no Evil at all And thus he argues Death saith he don't affect us and by consequence in respect of us is not to be judged an Evil for what affects us is attended by some but now Death is the privation of Sense He tells us also with Anaxagoras That as before we were capable of Sense it was not grievous to us to have no Sense so likewise when we shall have lost it we shall not be troubled at the want of it As when we are asleep we are not concerned because we are not awake So when we shall be dead it will not trouble us that we are not living He concludes with Archesilas That Death which is said to be an Evil hath this belonging to it that when it hath been present it hath never troubled any body And that it is through the Weakness of the Mind and the dismal Apprehensions that we have of Death that makes it seem so terrible to us when absent insomuch that some are struck dead with the very Fear of dying We may very well acknowledge That Death is the Privation of our External Sense or of Sense properly so called And Epicurus hath very good Reason to say That in Death there is nothing to be feared that may injure the Sight the Hearing the Smell the Tast or the Sense of Feeling for all these Senses cannot be without the Body and then the Body ceases to be or is dissolved But that which we are not to allow is what he affirms elsewhere That Death is also the Privation or Extinction of the Spirit or Understanding which is an internal Sense a Sense according to his Notion Therefore that we may not be hindred by this Impiety which has been sufficiently refuted in treating of the Immortality of the Soul let us proceed to give a Check to the extraordinary Apprehensions of Death and to those Fears that frequently disturb all the Peace and Quiet of our Life and with a sullen Blackness infect and poison all our most innocent Pleasures as Lucretius saith Those idle Fears That spoil our Lives with Jealousies and Cares Disturb our Joys with dread of Pains beneath And sully them with the black Fears of Death Let us therefore in the first place remember to give a Check to that fond Desire of prolonging our days without bounds Let us I say so remember this frail and infirm Condition of our Nature as not to desire any thing above it's Reach and Capacity Let us calmly and quietly without repining enjoy this Gift of Life whether it be bestowed upon us for a longer or a shorter time It is certain that our Maker may deprive us of it without doing us any wrong Let us thankfully acknowledge his Liberality from whom we have received it and add this to the number of those Benefits which we daily draw from his Bounty Nature favours us for a while with the use of the Prospect of those Enjoyments Be not angry that we must withdraw when the time is expired for we were admitted upon no other Terms but to yield our places to others as our Ancestors have done to us Our Bodies are naturally inclinable to Corruption and the manner of our Nativity renders our Death unavoidable If to be Born is pleasant let not our Dissolution be grievous to us to make use of Seneca's Words If the striving against this Fatality could any ways advantage us we should then perhaps approve of the Endeavours that are made but all our Strugglings are to no purpose we do but add to our pain The number of our Days is so appointed that the time of our Life slides away and is not to be recovered and we run our Race in such a manner that whether we will or not we are brought at last to the end As many Days as we pass over so many are cut off from that Life that Nature hath alotted to us So that Death being the Privation of Life we are dying continually as long as we live and that by a Death that carries not all at once but by degrees one step after another tho' the last is that unto which the Name of Death is assigned So true
shall hear what he saith next When we say that Pleasure is the main End we mean neither the Pleasures of Debauchery nor the other sensual Delights which terminate in the very moment of enjoyment and by which the Senses are only gratified and pleased as some ignorant Persons and who are not of our Opinion or who being enviously bent against us do thus Interpret But we only understand this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To feel no pain in the Body and to have no trouble in the Soul for 't is not the Pleasure of continual Eating and Drinking nor the Pleasure of Love nor that of Rare Dainties and delicious Bits of large and well-furnish'd Tables that make a Pleasant Life but a sound Judgment assisted by Sobriety and consequently by a serenity and tranquility of Mind which throughly enquires into the Causes why we ought to embrace or avoid any thing and that drives away all mistaken Opinions or false Notions of things which might raise much perplexity in the Soul I might add another Passage which I shall only mention Venereorum usus nunquam prodest praeclareque agitur nisi etiam noceat That the Delights of Venus are not only unprofitable but it is very rare if they be not mischievous But this ingenuous and plain Declaration of his meaning is sufficient to justifie him from the slanderous Accusations of his Enemies Let us nevertheless take notice of the difference and contrariety that Laertius puts between Epicurus and Aristippus for this difference or antithesis shews clearly that Epicurus believed no other Pleasure to be the End but that which consists in a constant Repose namely a freedom from pain of Body and trouble of Mind But Aristippus would have it consist in that Pleasure of the Body which is chiefly Communicated to us by action or by which our Senses are actually pleased and gratified This contrariety I say discovers Epicurus's Opinion to have been misrepresented and taken in a wrong sense such as Aristippus's deserved So that all the Reproaches that were due to Aristippus have been cast by this mistake upon Epicurus and the other hath escap'd unblemish'd The Famous Dispute of Torquatus in Cicero plainly discovers this Truth Hear his words I will explain saith Torquatus what that Pleasure is that I may prevent all cause of mistake in them who understand not the matter and that I may make them apprehend that this Doctrin which they fancy to be loose and debauch'd is Grave Chast and Regular We do not pursue that Pleasure which gratifies Nature with a little seeming sweetness and that is relish'd by the Senses with a haut-gust But we esteem that to be the chief Pleasure that is taken without any sense of Pain for as Thirst and Hunger are allayed by Eating and Drinking this deliverance freedom or privation from that which is troublesom and uneasie causeth Pleasure so in all other things a deliverance from Pain begets Pleasure Epicurus therefore admits of no Medium between Pain and Pleasure for he maintained that what appear'd to some to be a Medium namely the privation from all Pain was not only a Pleasure but the chief Pleasure In truth he that rightly understands himself and knows what ails him or what Condition he is in he must needs be either in Pleasure or in Pain Now Epicurus was of Opinion that the chief Pleasure consisted in a privation from all Pain and by Consequence that Pleasure may be diversified and distinguished but not augmented and encreas'd We might here produce some Witnesses of this matter Certainly Seneca may be heard and credited before all others as being without doubt a Person of great worth unspotted Reputation of an Exemplary Life and Manners and addicted to a Sect which had chiefly drawn upon Epicurus all the shame and disgrace that is commonly cast upon him instead of Aristippus being thereunto encouraged by the evil sense and meaning that they have given to his words According to Epicurus saith Seneca there are two Advantages required to the compleating the Sovereign Good or Chief Happiness of Man The First is That the Body may be without Pain The Second That the Mind may be calm and sedate These advantages don't increase if they be compleat for how can that which is full increase When the Body is free from Pain what can be added to that Freedom when the Mind enjoys it self and is quiet what may be added to this Tranquility Like as the Serenity of the Heavens is perfect and can't admit of any other new degrees of Light when it is absolutely clear and without the least shadow or mist Thus the Condition of Man is perfect when he hath taken care of his Body and Soul making his chief Happiness to consist in the advantages of both together in a Freedom from all trouble of Mind and from all pain of Body for we may then say that such a Man is arrived to the full accomplishment of all his Desires And if beside all this there happens to him an additional Repose it don't increase his chief Good but it only seasons it for this compleat Happiness the perfection of the Human Nature is comprehended in the quiet of the Body and the Mind In which words we may take notice that Seneca expresseth clearly and plainly Epicurus's Opinion as it is related by Laertius Moreover because that Epicurus gave the Name of Chief Good or Compleat Happiness to a freedom from Bodily Pain and a perfect Tranquility of Mind the loose and Debauched Persons of his time took incouragement from thence mistaking the word Pleasure and boasting that they had a Philosopher to countenance their Debaucheries For this Reason Seneca argues with them in this manner in his Book of a Happy-Life 'T is not Epicurus that forces or perswades them to Luxury and Debauchery but being accustomed to these Vices they endeavour to conceal their Vices under the Covert of Philosophy and they flock together when they hear Pleasure mentioned with Praise Non ab Epicuro impulsi luxuriantur sed vitiis dediti luxuriam suam in Philosophiae sinu abscondunt eo concurrunt ubi audiunt laudari Voluptatem Without doubt it is not the Pleasure of Epicurus which is esteem'd and sought after I know how sober and innocent that Pleasure is But they skip at the Name of Pleasure seeking some protection and veil from their Lasciviousness and filthy Delights Nec aestimatur Voluptas illa Epicuri ita enim me Hercules sentio quam sobria ac sicca sit sed ad nomen ipsum advolant quaerentes libidinibus suis patrocinium aliquod ac velamentum My Opinion saith he again is for I will speak it in despight of the Vulgar The things that Epicurus teacheth are fair and just and have something of solid and serious if we consider them exactly for his Pleasure is reduc'd to very few things He prescribes to it the very same Rules that we do to Vertue and appoints it to be Obedient to Nature
like as a small Weed which grows and flourisheth amongst Wheat This seems Popular and Taking And we may truly compare Vertue to the Wheat but as we seek and covet the Wheat not simply for the sake of Wheat nor for that small Weed that grows amongst it but for the uses of Life that we expect from it So Vertue is not sought after simply for it self or for its own sake or for any slight thing that may intervene but chiefly in order to Happiness or which amounts to the same for this kind of Pleasure that we now treat of Therefore when he adds Thou art mistaken when thou askest what that thing is which moveth us to seek after Vertue for it is to ask for something above that which is the highest of all I seek and desire Vertue it self I desire it for it self there is nothing better it carries with it a sufficient Reward It is manifest that this Question is full and to the Purpose and we may say That when we desire something beyond Vertue we don't desire a trivial thing but something that is above the highest and Supream It is true that in order to all the means which are used to render Life happy it is impossible to find any more conducive thereunto than Vertue Nevertheless we are to esteem an happy Life above Vertue for Vertue only relates to Happiness or an happy Life as to its proper End And therefore Aristotle seems to be very exact in this point when he speaks of that Happiness which Vertue above all things can procure Is is saith he evident That the recompence or reward of Vertue is something very Excellent something Divine and Happy And elsewhere That Felicity is not a thing that happens to us by a Divine appointment alone but is to be obtain'd by Vertue or by Learning or by our Endeavours there is nothing can be more Excellent nothing more Happy Besides he makes this distinction with Plato and Architas There are some things saith he That are desirable for themselves and not for any thing else as Felicity and others are desired for something else and not for themselves as Riches and other things are desired for themselves and for others as Vertue This I instance on purpose that one may see what sort of Men may be opposed to Seneca when he is so confident that Vertue cannot nor ought not to be desired for any thing else but it self By this Opinion we offer no wrong to Vertue for just as much as we value Pleasure Felicity and the chief Good so much do we praise and esteem Vertue which leads us to and is the proper means of obtaining them But not to busy our selves any longer about this matter it sufficeth to relate here what Cicero makes Torquatus speak according to the Sentiments of Epicurus The Text is long but excellent and it explains and decides as I may say the whole Matter When therefore after a long Dispute it was concluded That whatsoever is Right Just and Praise-worthy tends to live Pleasantly and with Delight Torquatus continues thus to speak In regard therefore that this is the chief and supream Good which the Greeks have called by the name of End because it tends to no other thing and that all things center in it We ought to confess that to live with delight and Pleasure is the chief Good or Happiness They who place it in Vertue alone and whose Understandings are dazled with the glory of the Name not rightly comprehending what Nature requires may be freed from a gross Mistake if they please to hearken to Epicurus for to instance in all your laudable and excellent Vertues and First of Wisdom Who can believe them to be Praise-worthy or desirable if they procured no Pleasure Truly as we don't esteem the Art of a Physician for the Art sake but for the Preservation of Health so we should never desire Wisdom which is the Art of Living if it were Insignificant and Useless But as it drives us in the search and helps us in the obtaining true and real Pleasure we earnestly desire and pursue after it You understand now what Pleasure I speak of and lest the ambiguous acceptation of words should render our Discourse untelligible or doubtful I must explain my self That it is Wisdom alone that banisheth Sorrow and all uneasiness of Mind that supports us under our anxious Fears that curbs the fury of our Lusts and Appetites and causeth us to live Peaceably and Easy These are the unsatiable Appetites that ruin not only every particular Person but also Families and oft-times the whole Common-wealth From these Appetites proceed Hatred Quarrels Discords Seditions Wars And these Passions break not only outwardly upon other Persons with a blind Fury but struggle inwardly and War within themselves in our Minds It is this that must needs cause our anxious and uneasy Life So that the Wise Man alone having banish'd all boundless and irregular Desires confines himself and is satisfied within the limits of Nature and by that means may spend his time without Grief Sorrow or Fear If therefore we see all our Life disturb'd by Error and Ignorance and that it is Wisdom only which delivers from the Affronts of our vain Desires and groundless Fears and that adviseth us to bear with Patience the injuries of Fortune and teaches the ways that lead to Rest and Tranquility ought we not to say that Wisdom is desirable because of Pleasure and that we are to shun Folly because of the Mischief which attends it by bringing Trouble and Disturbance to our Minds By the same Reason we will say that Temperance is not desirable for it self but because it brings Peace into our Minds it sweetens and preserves them in quiet Because 't is Temperance that directs us to follow Reason either in things that we ought to desire and follow or things that we are to shun and avoid for it is not sufficient to judge what ought to be and what ought not to be but we must likewise continue constant and resolved in what we have so judged Now there are many who cannot remain firm in what they have resolved but being overcome by a seeming and mistaken Pleasure give themselves over to the slavery of their Lusts without foreseeing what will from thence ensue and from hence it happens that for a small and trivial Pleasure which might be otherwise obtain'd and which we might easily want without Pain they fall into great Sicknesses into Loss into Shame and incur many times the penalty of the Laws and Courts of Judicature But such as will so enjoy their Pleasures that no inconveniency nor trouble may thereby ensue and who continue constant in their well-grounded Resolutions for fear of being overcome by false Pleasures and lest they should be perswaded to do what they understand ought not to be done such I say find a great pleasure in denying themselves these seeming Delights They oftentimes easily undergo small Pains and Troubles
lest by shunning of these they might fall into greater From hence we may learn that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones We shall find the same Arguments for Fortitude for it is neither Labour nor Pain nor Patience nor Constancy nor Industry nor Courage nor Watchfulness that draw us of themselves but we are perswaded by these actions that we may live without Trouble or Fear and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is disturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage insomuch that by this weakness of Spirit many have lost their Parents many their Friends and many their Native Country nay have altogether lost themselves But a generous stout and couragious Spirit is free from such Cares and Troubles because it despiseth Death and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death and the least have divers intervals of Rest and that as for moderate Griefs we are Masters of them Besides a noble Spirit considers that if the Pains be not extraordinary they are easily suffered but if they be very grievous we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life which in such a case becomes unpleasant to us so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre From hence we may conclude that Fear and Cowardise are not in themselves blame-worthy neither do Courage and Patience of themselves merit Praise But the first are slighted because they increase Pain and Sorrow and the other are desired because they procure real Pleasure There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice of which we may almost say the same For as I have already demonstrated that Wisdom Temperance and Fortitude are so joyned with Pleasure that they cannot be separated from it we ought to say the same of Justice which is not only inoffensive to all Men but does also constantly bring with it such advantages as by the strength of its own nature does quiet and settle the Thoughts by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire And as Timerousness Covetousness and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul it begets much Trouble and Vexation and if it hath committed any evil action tho' never so secretly yet it can never be assured that it shall always remain undiscover'd Jealousy and fear of being found out do commonly attend evil Actions and we suppose every one to be our Accuser and ready to Inform against us Nay some out of fear of being Discovered have been their own Accusers If some think their Riches a sufficient shelter and capable of quieting their Conscience yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes that upon a due resentment of this their Thoughts labour under a perpetual Agony and Disturbance Now their wicked Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience or the Laws of the Country and the hatred of their Acquaintance have to increase it Nevertheless such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches Luxury Honour Dominion c. that in the obtaining of them they will stick at no indirect Means so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws is able to stop their Career True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice Equity and Fidelity which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others and which is absolutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Sedate And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill because that the desires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person and as for other vain Desires we are not to regard them for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us by the seeming good things it brings along with it Therefore we cannot say That Justice is of it self desirable but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest where it hath once taken possession I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion but they relate to nothing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures which Epicurus abhors in express words I will only take notice that the Pleasure that is here understood is such true real and natural Pleasure in which our Happiness consists We therefore say That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it being the real and genuine cause of it for where that is supposed Happiness immediately attends and when that is removed Pleasure it self must needs decay In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day because it alone is the true and necessary cause thereof for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon the Day must needs be and when it withdraws the Day dis-appears Now the reason why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness is because he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues for all the rest proceed from this and have in a great measure a dependence upon her CHAP. III. Wherein an Happy Life doth consist WHat we have already discours'd of tends to little else than to make a plain discovery of Epicurus's Opinion But now we must come closer to the Matter and strictly examin whether he had sufficient ground to say That Pleasure is the main End Here we must weigh two of his chief Maxims First That all Pleasure is of it self and of its own nature a real Good and on the contrary That all Grief and Pain is an Evil. The Second is That notwithstanding sometimes we must prefer some sort of Pains before some sort of Pleasures Whether all Pleasure be good of it self IN respect of the first Maxim It is not without ground that Epicurus asserts That all Pleasure is of it self good tho' by accident it happens sometimes otherwise for all Creatures are of themselves so inclinable to Pleasure and Delight that it is the first and chief thing that they naturally covet nor
do they willingly reject any Pleasure that is offered them unless it chance to be accompanied by some Evil that may after procure a Pain and so cause us to repent of its first acceptance And truly as it is the nature of Good to invite and perswade the Appetite to love and embrace it so we can give no Reason why all Pleasure should not be of it self Lovely and to be desired seeing there is none but in it self is pleasing and desirable and which does of it self incline our Appetites So that if we refuse any we refuse them not as Pleasures but because of some inconveniences that are annexed and will infallibly attend them Now to illustrate this more plainly by an Example There is no Person but will allow Hony to be naturally sweet yet if Poyson happens to mixed with it whereby the Poyson it self doth also become sweet we shall then have a real aversion for the sweetness of the Hony but this is by accident for the Hony of it self is naturally sweet and pleasing to our Taste So that if we have any dislike we may say it is not really for the sweetness of the Hony but for the Poison that is mixt with it and for the Mischief that Poyson will bring for if it were separated from the Hony we should then willingly taste of it Now adjust any Pleasure whatsoever to this Example and you will easily perceive it to be never otherwise for we shall always eschew the Evil but not the Pleasure it self when distinct and separated from the Evil For either it is the thing from whence it is taken or the action that is joined to it or the damage that ensue either from the thing or from the action or the pain and grief that will attend it which proceed from the Thing from the Action or from the Damage And to make the matter still appear more obvious and intelligible Suppose that the same Pleasure is to be drawn from a Thing or Action that neither Law nor Custom nor Honesty prohibit suppose that from this Action or thing no damage or prejudice will happen either to our Health Reputation or Estate Suppose in a word that no Punishment will attend it nor Grief nor Repentance neither in this Life nor the next And you will plainly understand that nothing can hinder it to be esteem'd a real Good and real Advantage and if at present it is not so reputed this proceeds not from the nature of the Thing but from the Circumstances that I have mentioned Aristotle also proves the thing by an Argument taken from Pain which is opposite to Pleasure All the World saith he are agreed that Pain is an Evil and to be avoided Now that which is contrary to a thing that is to be avoided and a real Evil is good therefore Pleasure is a real Good Now to inlarge upon this Reason of Aristotle Is it not manifest That all Pain in general is of it self Evil and Hurtful and by consequence every Animal hath naturally an aversion against it So that if at any time it is called Good it is only by accident in regard it hath some good thing that is joined to it which obliges us to love and desire it But if you remove from Pain all hopes or expectation of obtaining any good thing either Honest Profitable or Pleasant there is no Man so foolish as to wish for it or seek after it As this is undeniable so it is apparent that if all Pain be of it self Evil and not good but by accident all Pleasure being contrary to Pain is of it self good and an evil by Accident Some object That a Temperate Man flies from Pleasures and that he that is Wise seeks rather a freedom from Pain That there are some Pleasures which are impediments to Wisdom and the rather because they are Violent and Furious as all Venereal Pleasures generally are That there are others which are not only hurtful because they dull the Understanding beget Diseases and cause Poverty but are also filthy and infamous But First The Temperate and Prudent Man flies not from all Pleasures for it is plain That he seeks after such as are pure and honest and if he avoids some it is not because they are only Pleasures but because inseparable from actions which are certainly attended with Destruction which a Prudent Temperate Man ought not to be guilty of for the enjoyment of a present Pleasure In the same manner as we fly from Poison sweetned not because it is sweet but because it is deadly and brings a Mischief with it which undoubtedly ought not to be bought at so dear a rate Besides it is plain That Pleasures alone are no impediments of Wisdom or Prudence but rather the Actions that accompany them such actions I mean by which the Spirits are too much spent whereby the strength of the Mind is weakned and the Judgment blinded So that when these Mischiefs are charged upon Pleasure it is a Paralogism or deceitful way of Arguing called by Aristotle Non causae ut causae when that which is not the Cause is taken for the Cause as if the Evil which ought to be ascrib'd to the Poison be attributed to the Hony or to the Sweetness Thus by consequence that which may be said in respect of Diseases and Poverty and other inconveniences which commonly succeed is that Pleasure simply consider'd as it is Pleasure is not the cause of these Evils but rather Gluttony or the excess of Wine and Meats prepared with Sawces which tempt us to exceed the Bounds of Moderation whence proceed Fevers and other grievous Distempers So also from the excess of Venery proceed the Disease of the Gout and other shameful Maladies accompanied with a numerous Train of other Mischiefs Thus the same may be said in respect of the Infamy which we commonly ascribe to Pleasures for it rather regards the actions that accompany them which are of themselves contrary to good Manners and therefore are reputed Vicious and Dishonest for this reason for Instance The Laws prohibit not the pleasure in Adultery but the action of Adultery it self which being forbidden and infamous in it self causeth the pleasure that it procures to be esteem'd also filthy and infamous But suppose in this case there were no prohibition as in the Estate of pure Nature Or suppose that it happen'd that the Wife of this Man had been the Wife of the present Adulterer here he had enjoyed the same Pleasure which in that case had not been reckoned of ill Repute because that action which accompanies it had not been then forbidden nor dishonest From whence we may conclude That Pleasure is not blame-worthy in it self but for the Circumstances that accompany it Some answer That tho' Pleasure be no Evil yet it is necessary to place it in the number of the Evils because of the Common People who being inclin'd to Pleasure ought like crooked Trees to be bent a contrary way and by that
means to be made strait But Aristotle answers That it is not convenient to entertain them with these kind of Discourses because when it concerns us as in the case of the Passions and Actions we give not so much credit to the Words as to the Thing it self From whence it happens that when the Words agree not with what the Senses apprehend they are despised and tho' they comprehend something that is good yet they are thereby baffled Therefore Aristotle seems to intimate That it is more reasonable not to place the Pleasures amongst the Evils seeing the Senses are of a contrary persuasion and when they are barely look'd upon as Pleasures they approve of them and judge them good but it is more reasonable to discover and lay open the Evils that frequently accompany such Pleasures which cause a prudent and considering Man to abstain from them lest he being tempted thereby should be drawn into so great Mischiefs If these Answers of Aristotle will not satisfie nothing can hinder us from exclaiming against Pleasure it self supposing those to be Pleasures which cause much more Evil than they procure Good For when it concerns us to persuade it is the same thing to say That Pleasure or the Action that accompanies the Pleasure is Wicked to conclude that we are therefore to shun it by reason of the Evils which infallibly attend and proceed from both Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks in respect of Good and Evil be Justifiable WE might here enter into a large Field of Dispute with the Stoicks who pretend That there is nothing Good but that which is Honest and nothing Evil but that which is Dishonest But hereby we should only trifle away our time in unnecessary Disputes for in short it is manifest that they have rais'd a Dispute about the bare Name when at the same time they have limited and confined the thing it self viz. the Notion of Good according to their own Fancy which all Mankind besides take in a large Sense For whereas other Men place several things besides Vertues in the number of good things as Health Pleasure Glory Riches Friends c. And besides Vices they reckon several other things amongst Evils as Sickness Pain Shame Poverty Enemies c. The Stoicks have rather named these things Indifferent or neither Good nor Evil. But this seems very absurd and contradictory to take Health and Sickness Pleasure and Pain for the same things c. They have endeavoured to feign new Words and call Health Pleasure Glory and other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Promota Assistants As if they should say that they were not really Good but such things as did approach the nearest to Vertue and lead us to that which is the chief and only Good The same Fancy they have had of Diseases and Pain they have named them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abducta remota As if they should say that they were things less Noble and separated from Vertue for when it concerns us to make a Choice those are preferred and these are forsaken This is their way of Discourse which I think not worth Answering any otherwise than as Cicero doth when he cries out O the great strength of Mind and the brave Subject to raise a new Doctrin O magnam vim ingenii causamque justam cur nova existeret disciplina The Stoicks argue and with their weak Reasonings would maintain That Pain is no Evil Concludunt ratiunculis Stoici cur dolor non sit malum c. As if Men were only troubled about the Word and not the Thing Wherefore must you Zeno deceive me with your subtil Niceties and new coin'd Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when you tell me that what looks grievous is no Evil you put me at a stand I would desire to know how that which seems to me most prejudicial and hurtful is no Evil in it self Nothing is Evil as you pretend but that which is Dishonest and Vicious These are but Words neither can you hereby remove the difficulty I understand very well that Pain and Grief are not criminal Evils You need not trouble your self to tell me that but shew me whether it be an indifferent thing to suffer Pain or to be free from it You say That it is indifferent as to the Happiness of Life seeing that consists in Vertue alone But in the mean while what you call Pain is to be reckoned amongst those things that you are to avoid and by consequence is an Evil. When you pretend that Pain is no real Evil but only something uneasie to be suffered c. It is to speak at large what all the World besides name in one word Evil. And when you say That there is nothing Good but what is Honest and nothing Evil but what is Dishonest it is to vanquish in Words but not in Sense it is to express Desires and prove Nothing Doubtless this is an undeniable Truth All that Nature hates ought to be esteem'd in the number of Evils and all that is grateful to it is to be reckoned on the contrary Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleasure THE Second thing to be Examin'd before we conclude about Epicurus's Opinion is Whether we should sometimes avoid Pleasure to embrace Pain This Question depends very much upon the former for if any Pleasure offers it self of that sort which Plato calls Pure and disengaged from any mixture of Grief and Trouble that is to say such as is never to be succeeded by any future Pain neither in this Life nor in that which is to come or if any Pain offers it self such as may be stiled Pure and free from any Pleasure that is such as can never be supposed to yield any Satisfaction No Man can give any reason why such a Pleasure ought not to be accepted and such a Pain avoided But if any Pleasure offer it self which might hinder us from obtaining a greater or which will be attended by a Pain that may cause us to repent the suffering our selves to be drawn away to it or if a Pain offers it self which may turn away a greater or which may be followed by a Pleasure very great there is no Reason can persuade us the shunning such a Pleasure and embracing such a Pain Therefore Aristotle observes That Pleasure and Pain are the Criteria or distinguishing Marks by which we ought to judge whether any thing is to be accepted or avoided Now any Wise Man will decline Pleasure and embrace Pain if he sees that Repentance will follow or that by admitting a little Pain he may avoid a greater But Torquatus plainly clears the Doubt And to the end we may easily see from whence the Mistake arises among those who accuse Pleasure and approve of Pain I will briefly tell you how it is and expound unto you what that Author of Truth and Encourager of an happy Life hath said No Man despises hates or shuns Pleasure because it is
Pleasure but because that such as know not how to pursue Pleasure and keep it within its due bounds fall into great Mischiefs Nay there is none that loves and seeks after Pain because it is Pain but because it happens sometimes that by Labour and Pain we procure to our selves some great Pleasure As to instance in some Particulars Does ever any Man undertake any laborious Exercise or Task of the Body unless he expects to reap some Advantage by it Now can any body reasonably blame him who embraces a Pleasure that is not accompanied with any Inconveniency or him that flees from a Pain that can procure no Advantage But we justly blame and condemn those who being enticed by the allurements of present Pleasures blinded by their Passions foresee not the Mischiefs and Inconveniences that will from thence arise And those are in the like Error who are governed by a weakness of Mind that is to say for fear of Labour and Pain abandon their Duty and Station But it is no difficult matter herein to distinguish aright for in a time of liberty when it is in our power to chuse and that nothing hinders us from acting what pleaseth us best all Pleasure is to be embrac'd and all Pain to be avoided But it happens that at some times and upon certain junctures of Affairs that we ought to decline Pleasure and accept of things that are Vneasie The Wise-Man therefore makes a prudent and discreet Determination in this Affair viz. To reject such Pleasures by the absence of which we may enjoy greater and to suffer those Ills by undergoing of which we may avoid more Mischievous Let us add to this the general Consent of Plato Socrates and Aristotle who make use of the same Rule to distinguish by Let us not forget the Opinion of Cicero who would have us proceed as if all the Pleasures and all the Delights present and to come were set before us and poised in a Balance for saith he If you weigh the present Pleasures with the future we are always to chuse the greatest and the most numerous but if we weigh Evils with Evils we are to chuse the least and the fewest But if you weigh the present Pleasures with the future Evils or the present Evils with the future Pleasures in such a case you must chuse the Pleasures if they out ballance but on the contrary if they be Evils Of the first Good that Nature has in it's View THat we may come at last to Epicurus's Opinion That Pleasure is our main End we must consider that the Reason that induc'd him to this Opinion was That he consider'd Pleasure generally and simply in its own Nature or else as it is manag'd and directed by Prudence and Wisdom for it is in this manner also that Alexander observes That we are to distinguish the Matter when he saith That Pleasure according to the Judgment of Epicurus is the first Good that Nature pursues or the first Good unto which we are Naturally bent and inclin'd but afterwards this Pleasure is regulated and directed by Wisdom and Prudence Esse quidem Voluptatem ex mente Epicuri primum familiare primum congenitum bonum primum aptum accomodatumque Naturae verum deinceps quasi in ordinem redigi talem Voluptatem Wherefore as we shall speak hereafter of this last which with Epicurus is nothing else but a freedom from Pain and a Tranquility of Mind let us at present say something of the First and let us examin if this Pleasure understood in a general sense be really this Primum Naturae familiare or the first and chief Good that Nature goes in quest of for it remains a great Question among the Philosophers And it seems as in the order of good things that are desirable there is one thing that is the ultimate and chief so ought there to be one thing first which may be the beginning of all our Desires Some saith Cicero Conceive Pleasure or Delight to be the first Good others an exemption or a freedom from Pain for as soon as any Creature is born it naturally desires and labours after an indolence or freedom from Pain Others place the first good things of Nature amongst those which they call our Being Life Perfection the preservation of all our Members intire and in Health our Senses Strength Beauty and such like Now among these Opinions the first and second is included in that of Epicurus for he places our exemption from Pain among those things we call Pleasure The third Opinion being that of the Stoicks is less probable for tho' we may say that every Creature desires to have its Being Life Health Perfection and Preservation of its several Parts c. Nevertheless we must observe that all these things are desired because it is pleasant to enjoy them And therefore if these things are desirable for being Pleasant doubtless Pleasure is the first good thing or holds the chief place among those things that are desired And this is probably what Aristotle meant when he said That Pleasure is common to all living Creatures and the inseparable Companion of our free and voluntary Actions for we perceive that what is Honest is Pleasurable as well as what is Vseful Besides Pleasure is born and bred up with us from our very Cradle Therefore it is to no purpose to endeavour to wean our selves from this Inclination with which our Natures are naturally tinctured This plainly discovers to us two things First That tho' we commonly reckon three sorts of good things viz. The Honest the Profitable and the Pleasant The Pleasant or Pleasurable which is nothing else but Pleasure it self is so intermixt with the rest that it don't seem to be a distinct Species of it self but part of the common Stock which renders the others Good and Desirable as if that which is Honest and Useful were only to be desired because it is Pleasing and agreeable Secondly That Pleasure being common unto all sensible Creatures and so fixt and setled in our very first Desires that we have not a liberty of refusing it seems verily that this should be the first Good that we wish for or desire Primum expetibile primum familiare for these are the ordinary Terms Primum expetitum accomodatumque Naturae Epicurus therefore seems to have dealt more candidly and sincerely than all the rest when he declared That Pleasure Est primum Naturae accomomodatum and that it is that In quam tandem definimus quatenus Animalia omnia simul ac nata sunt sponte ipsa Natura citra ullum ratiocinium ipsam complectantur dolorem refugiant Let us but hearken to Torquatus in Cicero Epicurus saith he teacheth That every Animal as soon as it is born desires Pleasure as its chief Good and delights in the enjoyment of it but hates Pain as its great Evil shuns it and flees from it as much as it is able this it practiseth while it is not corrupted then Nature
judgeth aright and without mistake There is no need of Reasoning and Disputing in these Cases or to seek for Causes why Pleasure is desirable and Pain to be avoided we our selves can as easily judge of this matter as of the Fire that it is Hot the Snow White and the Hony Sweet Maximus of Tyre teacheth the same Doctrin Pleasure says he more ancient than Reason or Art goes before Experience and stays not for Time But that violent desire we have for it and which is coaeval with our Bodies is as the foundation of the Creature 's well-being so that if we renounce it all that shall be born must immediately Perish Man after he comes to years may by Experience and Industry arrive to a competent degree of Knowledge Reason and Vnderstanding which is so much Extoll'd naturally and of his own accord but from his Infancy he loves Pleasure and avoids Pain without any help or Instruction for it is Pleasure that delighst him and Pain that annoys him If Pleasure were a thing of no value we should not bring it so early into the World with us nor would it be the first thing necessary for our Preservation But it is not necessary from what we have here said that you should conclude That Pleasure is Man's chief Good or Happiness for as Eudoxius says in Aristotle As in all things that which is desired is Good so that which is chiefly desired ought to be the chief Good or that which every thing desires is chiefly desirable therefore what every thing desires must be the chief Good but that is Pleasure therefore Pleasure is that chief Good Let us here now admire the Wisdom and Fore-sight of the Great Creator and Author of Nature That in regard all our Actions and Operations are of themselves painful and troublesom and these also as Aristotle terms them being Natural as Seeing Hearing c. He hath caused them all to be sweetned with Pleasure and the more necessary these Operations are for the preservation of our Species the greater Pleasure Nature hath allotted them otherwise all Creatures would neglect or forget not only the act of Generation but even Eating and Drinking it self if there were not certain natural Instigations that stir and move us and by causing some kind of Pain and Uneasiness minds us of the Action which the Pleasure that ought to appease this Pain and Uneasiness doth promote and encourage which is a manifest Proof that these sorts of Pleasures are not of themselves Evil tho' Men abuse them afterwards by Intemperance contrary to other Animals Neither is it requisite here to hint again that by the name of Pleasure we don't mean those gross sensual Pleasures of Luxury Effeminacy delicious Meats Revellings and the Debauchery of Women In short such as the Sages as Maximus observes exclaimed against styling them Sardanapali scilicet Luxus Medica mollities Ionicae deliciae Siculae mensae Sybariticae saltationes Corinthiae meretrices c. but generally all that we can call and is generally stiled by the name of Joy Pleasure Contentment Satisfaction Delight Sweetness Pleasantness a peacable State Quietude of Thought secure Tranquility c. which are nothing else but synonymous Names for Pleasure We must only here remember That what we have already observed is one of Aristotle's Principles That whatsoever we make choice of is always accompanied whith Pleasure And seeing there are three sorts of things named Good according to Vulgar Distinction the Honest the Useful and the Pleasant The latter is common to the rest for the Honest and the Useful seem to be also Pleasant and Grateful From hence therefore we may infer that Good and Pleasant are but different Names for the same thing and that Good is Good and described to be what all Creatures desire only because it is grateful and pleasing and by consequence that that Good which is pleasing is desired for the Pleasure it affords It remains that we next prove That the good things which are Honest and Useful are also desired for the Pleasure they yield That things Profitable and Vseful are sought after for the sake of Pleasure NOw there is no difficulty to prove that things Profitable and Useful relate to what is grateful or to the Pleasure which we receive from them For it is manifest That things Useful are not desired meerly because they are Useful but for something else which is either Pleasure it self or which relates to Pleasure As first in respect to Eating or Drinking soft Musick or sweet Perfumes and the like it is plain that we value them in respect of the Pleasure that attends them which may likewise be understood of divers Arts and Sciences as of Cookery Hunting Painting Physick Chirurgery c. which tend to free us from several Distempers from which to be delivered is very pleasing The same thing may be said of Navigation of Merchandise of War all which center in the getting of Mony or something like whereby we may attain to some Pleasure that we promise to our selves So when any one by hard Labour has acquired sufficient to purchase an Habitation Cloaths Medicines Books and the like Conveniences does not he promise to himself the Pleasure he shall enjoy when he shall have obtain'd these things and shall be able to subsist in Ease and Quiet for the future without any further Pains or Trouble to eat when he shall be an Hungred and drink when he is Thirsty or warm himself when Cold to be at leisure and satisfie his Curiosity when he shall desire it in short when he shall be in a condition to spend his days Comfortably Securely Honestly Honourably This is generally the aim of all the World of the Husband-man of the cheating Tradesman as Horace stiles him of the Soldier Merchant and Seaman The Soldier Fights the busy Tradesman Cheats And finds a thousand Tricks and choice Deceits The heavy Plough contents the labouring Hind The Merchant strives with ev'ry Tide and Wind And all this Toil to get vast heaps of Gold That they may live at Ease when they are Old This is the design of the Courtiers and of such as busy themselves in obtaining great Employments and high Offices they undergo many Labours make great Courtships suffer many Hardships and all for no other purpose but that they might at last as they pretend retreat in Peace and spend the remainder of their Lives to their own Content quietly and peaceably The most sordid and most covetous Misers propose to themselves the pleasure to look upon their Coffers full of Gold and Silver A sordid Churl the Jest of all the Place Thus comforted himself for his Disgrace The Lowsy Rabble Hiss me at the Play And Grin and make the greatest Farce of me But what care I when I can hug at home My strutting Bags and give my self an Humm Not to mention those who not understanding That Nature is satisfied with a little delight in Debauchery and Excess who by Rapine and
any Grief either present or to come What State in short can we say is better and more desirable than that Is it not certain that a Man in that condition is in an unshaken Tranquility of Mind That he will not foolishly and childishly fret at the sight of Death but will consider that it is unavoidable On the contrary Suppose another Man tormented with the most exquisite Tortures both of Body and of Mind that a Human Nature is capable of without any hopes of Relief or ease or of any Pleasure either present or to come How can we represent any more Vnhappy than such a one Now if a Life full of Pain is chiefly to be avoided and consequently to live in Pain is without any question the chief of Evils it follows by the Rule of Contraries That to live in Pleasure is the chief Good for there is nothing beyond it where our Mind stops and rests satisfied as there is nothing beyond the pain either of the Body or of the Mind which can shake our Nature or undermine her Settlement I dare not declare saith Cicero whom I should prefer to your pretended Happy Man Vertue shall decide the Controversy and will no doubt prefer Marcus Regulus before him who of his own accord without any Constraint and contrary to the Faith that he had given to the Enemy returned back to his own Country to Carthage Vertue I say shall prefer this famous Man and when he shall be tired and tormented with Watchings and Hunger it will declare that he is happier than Thorius who was drinking deliciously and stretching himself upon a Bed of Roses Regulus had wag'd great War he had been twice Consul and carried in Triumph Yet he looked not upon all this so Great and Glorious As this last Enterprise to which his Faith and Constancy oblig'd him This condition when we hear it describ'd seems to be Miserable to us but to him it was a State of Pleasure and Happiness for it is not always Pleasure Delight Laughter and Sports that cause Happiness but oft times Resolution and Constancy render those Persons Happy who are in the midst of Sufferings and Sorrow Of the deceitful Vertue and deceitful Happiness of Regulus BUt to speak a word of the Examples instanc'd by way of Comparison before we yield to the Eloquence of Cicero Tho we ought not in all respects to approve of Thorius and of his too delicious manner of Living which Epicurus himself would never have allowed Nevertheless it is not easy to conceive how Regulus was really happier than Thorius In truth I perceive a specious Shew and a fine sound of Words by which it is usual to extol this so famous Vertue of Regulus yet if we will seriously examin his Story and weigh sincerely the several Circumstances we shall not find it so Plausible Polybius informs us That Regulus having fortunately Commanded in the War against the Carthaginians and fearing lest another Consul being sent from Rome in his stead should bear away the honour of his brave Exploits he advised the Carthaginians to a Peace But the Conditions that he proposed to their Deputies were so hard that they resolved rather to hazard all They therefore chusing for their General Xantippus the Lacedemonian Encounter'd with Regulus in a Battel got the Victory and took him Prisoner with Five Hundred more with whom he was Flying An undoubted Sign saith the same Polybius of Fortune's Inconstancy and of the little trust we are to put in her flattering Smiles seeing that he who but a little before could not be moved to Pity and had no Compassion of the Afflicted was soon after oblig'd to cast himself at their Feet and to beg his Life Polyaenus adds further That Regulus Swore to the Carthaginians That if they would suffer him to depart he would persuade the Romans to make Peace with them and if he could not he would return back to Carthage But that he advis'd the Senate to the Contrary discovering the Weakness of the Enemy the Means whereby they might Destroy them and that the Prisoners of the Carthaginians were Young and stout Captains whereas he was Decrepid and Old This he Whisper'd saith Appian to the Chief of the Romans His Opinion saith Cicero so much prevailed that they kept back the Prisoners there was no Peace made and he returned to Carthage 'T is true that his Departure was attended with Mournful Circumstances for Horace tells us That at his Return he fix'd his Eyes upon the Ground like a Criminal with a dejected Countenance rudely putting aside his Wife and Children as they were approaching to embrace him with Tears His Wife 's chast Kiss his prattling Boys The former Partners of his Joys Now grown a Slave thrown down by Fate And lessen'd from his former State He shunn'd with manly Modesty And on the Earth he cast his stubborn Eye Whilst thus by strange Advice he sought And fix'd the wavering Senate's Vote Then through his Weeping Friends he ran In haste a glorious Banish'd Man What Cords and Wheels what Racks and Chains What lingring Tortures for his Pains The barbarous Hang-men made he knew And hightning Fame told more than true Yet he his Wife and Boys remov'd His hindring Friends and all he Lov'd And through the Crowd he made his way That wept and begg'd a longer stay As free as if when Term was done And Suit 's at end he left the Town And did from Business and Cares retreat To the cool Pleasures of a Country Seat Nevertheless we must observe what Tuditanus Relates That when he advis'd 'em to make no Exchange of the Prisoners he inform'd 'em That the Carthaginians had given him such a slow Poison that he could only live until the Exchange was made afterwards he was to pine away and Die. We may also take notice of that which is to be found among the Fragments of Diodorus Siculus Now Who will not disapprove the Pride and Vain-glory of Attilius Regulus who not being able to support himself under so great Prosperity which seem'd to him as an heavy Burthen deprived himself of the advantage of a general Applause and brought his own Country into eminent Danger For when he might have concluded an Honourable and Advantageous Peace to the People of Rome and obtain'd the Glory of a remarkable Clemency and Renown he proudly insulted over the Afflicted and required such harsh and unreasonable Terms of Peace that he not only drew upon himself God's Displeasure but mov'd the Conquered to such an implacable Hatred whereby to renew their Courage and venture to fight afresh By his fault the Affairs were chang'd in such a manner that he and his whole Army were Routed Thirty Thousand of 'em being slain in the Field and Fifteen Thousand taken Prisoners with him c. From whence we may surmise That when Regulus considered he could never make sufficient amends for the Fault he had committed and that he would be always look'd upon in Rome as a
Rash and Proud Man he chose rather to return to Carthage and prefer'd an apparent Danger tho' he thought it not to be so great because of the Carthaginian Prisoners in the hands of the Romans to an undoubted Infamy and to a Life which he saw was Languishing and very short because of the Poison which the Carthaginians had given him However when Regulus had done nothing at Rome but having return'd back to Carthage that he kept his Word doubtless he cannot be too much esteem'd and applauded But when he dissuaded the Senate from what he had promised to persuade them to How can that be judg'd as a commendable thing seeing it was a manifest Perjury If he had contented himself with the plain delivery of his Message without persuading or dissuading any thing his proceeding might then admit of some colourable Excuse But thus openly to violate the Sacred Laws of Oaths how can this be Palliated And when he did it in Secret for fear saith Appian lest the Ambassadors that came along with him might come to understand it that also increaseth the Suspicion and aggravates the Crime Pretend not the Welfare and Glory of his Country to excuse him Truly our Country is to be secured by good Advice by Strength and Courage but not by wicked Artifices and by perfidious Dealing And we ought not to approve our selves Citizens whereby to become good Men. You may perhaps alledge what we find in Euripides That he swore with the Tongue but not with the Heart Illum jurasse Lingua Mentem gessisse injuratam But this is only to seek a Cloak for Perjury for as Cicero saith 'T is not Perjury to Swear falsly but not to perform what the Oath signifies according to the common intention of the Words Truly if it were lawful without wounding the Conscience to mean one thing and speak another it were to permit Lying in reality and to deceive him who hears us speak and with whom we converse This would cause the Faith of every one to be suspected and consequently would introduce a great Confusion in the Transactions and Affairs of Mankind You may also say that this was lawful because the Carthaginians themselves had broke the Faith they had given him But if you be a Wicked Person I ought not therefore to be less Honest otherwise What difference would there be between you and me We ought to deal with perfidious Persons either with a great deal of Precaution or with open Force but it is not lawful upon any account whatever to violate our Faith It is an old Maxim That either we ought not to Promise at all or else to keep it But it seems the Carthaginians put him to grievous Tortures for no other end but because contrary to the Faith he had given them he had dissuaded the Romans from concluding a Peace and the Exchange of the Prisoners It is true as Tubero saith That the Noblest Prisoners were delivered into the hands of Regulus 's Children who put 'em to Death with the same Torments that Regulus suffered But pray consider whether Regulus had any reason to prefer the Destruction of those Prisoners to the Lives of five Hundred Roman Soldiers who had been taken with him and who for the sake of his Vertue cruelly perished in the same manner with him at Carthage But to return to our present purpose in relation to Happiness I would fain be resolved how the Happiness of Regulus was greater than that of Thorius when he was Tortured in the manner that the forementioned Tubero relates They kept him a long time says he in dismal dark Dungeons then they cut off his Eye-lids and when the Sun shone brightest they brought him forth and exposed him to the Sun-beams forcing him to hold his Eyes that way knowing it was not possible for him to shut them Cicero informs us that he was bound in an Engin and that after they had cut off his Eye-lids they destroyed him by Watching Seneca terms this Engin a Tub stuck through with Nails in which he was Inclosed Sylvius presents us with this Description With desp'rate Rows they arm'd the sloping Wood And tor'tring Nails at equal distance stood Thus robb'd of Sleep by never sleeping pain He grows his own Tormentor and in vain Attempts his Limbs by turning to relieve While only varied Wounds the varied Postures give But possibly you 'll say That Thorius embrac'd Pleasure in an Effminate manner whereas Regulus for the good of his Country prefer'd these Tortures and suffer'd them Courageously First Thorius was not so soft and Effeminate but that when the Well-fare of his Country required he did not decline the Wars but at last died fighting in defence of it as Cicero himself testifies And tho' it be a great support in the midst of our Sufferings to preserve our Conscience Pure and Unstained considering that we suffer in an honest Cause and for the Well-fare of many yet it don't thereby appear that we are therefore more Happy than we should be by living Vertuously Wronging no body but endeavouring to do all the good we can and every way discharging the Duty of a good Man and an honest Subject spending our lives in this manner in a great deal of Pleasure and little Pain In short suppose a Man of the greatest Resolution and Courage who would not upon a good account be daunted at the greatest Difficulties or Dangers I say if it were offered to such a one without any prejudice either to his Duty or Reputation to take his choice of the two kinds of Life mentioned by Torquatus Where is the Man I beseech you among all those that thus exclaim against Pleasure and extol Vertue and Sufferings that would give the preference to the latter and willingly embrace it But to confirm what hath been said before That Pain is the greatest Evil for that hath been as the Antecedent from whence we may conclude by the Rule of Contraries That Pleasure is the chief Good By the same Reason by which we have proved That Pleasure is the sovereign Good which Naturally we seek Primum familiare seu accommodatum And consequently the chief Good By the same Reason it hath been proved That Pain is the chief Evil which Naturally we avoid Primum alienum se incommodans And consequently the chief Evil. For Nature hath not only given to all Creatures a natural love for Pleasure but hath also fix'd in 'em a natural hatred of Pain Let us now take notice of two or three Particulars First By the word Pain we are not to understand only those that we call the Pains of the Body but also those which we term the Pains or Inquietudes of the Mind and which are far more anxious and insupportable than those of the Body as we have already said Secondly That as we have before observ'd Vertue and Goodness have something within them which naturally afford Pleasure and Delight so likewise we may now affirm that Vice or that which is
the most general and easie Means to procure this freedom from Pain is Temperance and an exquisite Sobriety For by this Means we may if not altogether remove at least very much correct the hereditary Diseases avoid such as we contract by our own Miscarriages and free our selves from such as are already contracted Let us observe only That he who enjoys a freedom from Pain may without any bitterness possess the different kinds of Pleasures as well those of the Body as of the Mind and Health As Plutarch very well compares Health to the Tranquility of the Sea in regard the Sea gives an Opportunity to its Inhabitants to breed and conveniently to bring up their young so Health affords to all Men a Means to perform all the Functions of Life conveniently and without Pain Therefore saith he tho' Prodicus maintains and hath elegantly describ'd That Fire is the greatest Seasoning of our Life Nevertheless some may correct his Fancy and inlarge upon it by saying That Health gives a supernatural Relish seeing that neither boiled nor rost nor any other Meat whatever Haut Goust they have can give any Relish to such as are sick or to such whom some distemper hath put out of order whereas in a healthful Constitution every Morsel is pleasant and grateful to the Appetite Now the same may be said of the Pleasures that relate to the other Senses for to a sick Body the Delights which otherwise are lawful and honest displease the Smelling is not refresh'd with Sweet Odours the Ear cares not for Musick nor does the Sight rejoyce in beautiful Objects Nay our Entertainments Publick Shews our Recreations in Walking Hunting and other such like Divertisements cannot please and are of no service for want of this Seasoning and without which Pleasure it self as we have said is no Pleasure As all this is most certain in regard of these Pleasures of the Body it is doubtless much more in respect of that of the Mind for it is apparent that neither in Sickness or under any grievous Pain no Man can study read or meditate for while the Soul is united to this crasy and mortal Body there is such a Union between these two Parties that the Body cannot suffer but the Soul must feel it and be drawn tho' against its will from its most pleasing Objects for the afflicting Pain employs all the Thoughts and Attention of the Mind Happy therefore are they who by their natural Constitution enjoy a sound Health free from Pain and consequently more capable in taking Pleasure in the study of Wisdom Happy are likewise such who tho they have an infirm Body yet govern it with so much Prudence and correct it with that Temperance that if they dont altogether avoid all Pain yet they make it so light and easy to be born that it proves a small Impediment to the full enjoyment of the Pleasures of the Mind Therefore the First ought to take heed how they disturb or by their Intemperance weaken the sound Constitution of their Bodies and the other ought to amend theirs and to bring it as much as is possible to this State of Indolency And both of 'em should take care of their Bodies if it were only for the sake of the Soul which cannot be well while the Body is sick Here we must truly acknowledg that tho the chief part of Happiness consists in the Tranquility of the Mind yet we must not despise the other part which consists in the freedom from bodily Pain I confess there be some who believe that it is a crime when it concerns the chief good or the business of Man to joyn the advantages of the Body to them of the Mind and consequently believe That it is an unworthy Deed to joyn that freedom from bodily Pain with the Tranquility of the Mind But as these are Stoicks or such as affect to follow them I cannot but mention here what Cicero himself says against them when addressing himself to Cato he begins with this Principle of the Stoicks That we are recommended to our selves and that the first Inclination that Nature hath bestowed on us is Self-preservation that we may preserve our selves such as we ought to be that we are Men made up of Soul and Body and therefore according to our original and natural Inclination we must love these Things and make them the end of that chief Happiness which consists in the acquisition of such Things as are according to Nature Now saith he seeing these are our Opinions and that you assign that to be the End to live according to Nature shew us now how you can maintain That to live honestly is barely and absolutely the chief Good How have you so soon forsaken the Body and all those Things that are according to Nature If we sought for the chief Happiness not of Man but of some other Creature which were all Spirit that End that you speak of would not be the only End of that Spirit for it would desire Health and to be free from Pain it would desire also its own Preservation and whatsoever might tend to it and it would propose to it self to live according to Nature which is as we have said to possess all things agreable with Nature at least in some measure if not in the most considerable part Vertue alone say they is sufficient to render us happy and the Goods of the Body are but as it were small Appendages which are not capable of rendring Life more happy But truly a Man in grievous Pain would be very much obliged to him who would free him from it And if a wise Man were condemned by some Tyrant to encounter with Pain his mortal Foe he would muster up all his rational Faculties to assist and support him in so difficult and dangerous a Combat And then goes on Every Creature of whatsoever Nature loves it self for where is that Creature which forsakes it self or any part of it self or the use of that part or any of the things which are according to Nature and its state and frame Certainly no Person hath forgotten his first Constitution but retains his first Faculty from the beginning to the end How can it therefore be that only Man's Nature should suffer Man to forget his Body and should place his chief Happiness not in the whole but in one part of himself Wisdom hath not begot Man but hath found him begun by Nature If there were nothing to be perfected in Man but some Motions of the Soul that is to say of Reason Wisdom ought to have no other aim but Vertue which is the perfection of Reason So also if there were nothing to be perfected but the Body its chief end would be Health a freedom from Pain Beauty c. But here is a Question concerning the chief good of Man who is composed of Soul and Body Why dont we therefore seek his chief good in relation to his whole Nature They who place it in one or t'other
according to that Expression of the Poet Aestuat vitae disconvenit ordine toto So that we ought not to change except for some very weighty Causes for if we alter upon every light Occasion the same mischief will attend us in all our succeeding Conditions As for the last Office of private Prudence as it is not distinct from the Offices of other Virtues we shall not trouble our selves to treat of it particularly in this Place and the rather because this Matter would be too tedious and it is as differing as there are differing Affairs and Actions of Life which are to be directed by Prudence Therefore it seems there remains for us nothing else to do but to mention this General Rule To undertake nothing rashly or as Cicero expresses it of which we cannot render a probable Reason Now this Rule hath divers excellent Particulars belonging to it First That we ought to understand the Nature and Qualities of the Business that we undertake Because if we have not a clear insight into that it will be impossible to discover all the convenient Expedients and consequently all our Care and Diligence will be vain and useless and therefore here we must chiefly take heed that our Mind be not blinded with Passion and so mistake Error for Truth but that we may give to every thing its due estimate Secondly It is requisite that the Nature and Condition of those with whom we are concerned be not concealed from us for if we don't understand whether they be honest Men or deceitful wary or rash powerful or weak c. we can undertake nothing with any assurance neither can we reasonably expect it And here it is that we must keep to a certain Medium between Confidence and a too great distrust because as it is often hurtful to have too great Confidence so it is no less and as often to be too distrustful The Third Is to consider our own Strength because if we know not what we can do of our selves or by our Friends or by our Riches we cannot promise to our selves to compass any thing I confess we must yield something to Chance and Destiny but in the mean while we must be enabled with Industry and Strength to drive on to a Performance or to divert the Casualties that oppose us Fourthly We must have the Means and Instruments ready at hand for there is nothing more ridiculous than to undertake a Business and not know where to begin it And here the Circumstances in relation to the Thing or in relation to the Agent which may either further or hinder the execution are chiefly to be inquired into Fifthly That we take care to make use of a fit Time and Occasion for fear if we be too hasty we over-throw all or by too long delay all our Counsels become useless Sixthly That when the Business hath been begun after a serious Deliberation we ought to proceed vigorously for fear that if the Mind stops in the execution or wavers in considering and meditating upon the Resolution it will effect nothing This hath given occasion for that famous Sentence of Bias Aggredere tarde agenda sed aggressus age constanter Undertake deliberately but when you have begun proceed with Vigour and Resolution Lastly That we keep our selves steady and fixt in the Resolution we have taken never to deviate out of the Paths of Virtue and Honesty Whatever Temptation may be offer'd we must never prefer Profit before Honesty nor Injustice before Justice but we are to observe constantly this general and excellent Rule of Morality That it is better never to succeed in any Business by keeping our Conscience blameless and undefiled than to succeed by polluting it for he that cannot tax himself with any Guilt is not to be deemed miserable and he that is conscious of any Evil cannot be counted happy That it is dangerous to undertake any thing against our natural Inclination WE ought here upon the occasion of the first Particular to examine if Lactantius had any Cause to upbraid Epicurus with this supposed Crime That he adviseth in general to follow Nature and the rather because if this Saying be rightly understood and taken in a good sense it seems very reasonable for seeing that Nature and Inclination differ in several Persons what Rule more general and more secure could be given than to advise with our selves and to provide our selves a settlement in a certain condition and state of Life according as we find our selves either fit or otherwise Should any Man in a Business of so great Moment forget himself I mean not remember his own Temper and Abilities and by that means cast himself into a necessity to be always labouring in vain as Sisyphus or as the Gyants contend with the Gods to no purpose This Cicero calls striving against Nature It is without doubt a very dangerous Ambition to pretend to excel in any thing out of a meer Fancy that by the same means others have been made Famous tho' we are often destitute of the same advantages of Mind and Fortune which others had 'T is by this means that Parents make their Children Miserable by putting them upon Employments without considering their Nature Temper and fit Qualifications but out of a foolish Ambition to raise them in the World higher than their Circumstances will permit Wee need but hearken to Seneca upon this occasion Before all other Things we ought to make a right Judgment of our selves and put a just and true value upon our Abilities for commonly we fancy to have more Strength and Merit than really we have Some lose themselves by trusting too much upon their Eloquence Others spend more than their Estates will allow and some who have but infirm Bodies have lain oppressed under too weighty Employments The Modesty of some will not suit with publick Functions that require a bold and daring Countenance and others have too much Pride or too little Complacency to obtain any Suit at Court Some can never be moved and others at the least distast are provoked to a high degree Some cannot behave themselves with any Decency and Civility nor refrain themselves from offering sharp Jests whatever danger they incur To all these kind of People it is more convenient for them to live a private Life than to be admitted to the management of publick Affairs for a proud and hasty Temper ought to avoid all occasions that might interrupt or obstruct its own Freedom Cicero speaks almost to the same purpose when he saith We must behave our selves in such a manner that we may not act against our Nature in general but follow our own Disposition for we must not oppose nor force Nature or proceed in any thing as we say Invita Minerva that is against the Grain If there be any thing Commendable it is doubtless the equality and evenness of our Life and Actions which you can't possibly observe if you imitate the Tempers of others and neglect your own
Let every one therefore consult his own Genius and judge exactly of himself of his Vices and of his good Disposition that the Stage-Players may not seem to excel us in Prudence For they chuse to represent not always the most excellent Persons but such as best becomes them Now let us hear what Lactantius objects The Doctrin of Epicurus saith he hath always been more famous than the rest not because it is more agreable with Truth but because he speaks more agreable with the Inclinations of every one and by that means he hath drawn the common People to his side To him who is Slothful he forbids Study to the Covetous he admonishes to forbear Grieving to the Effeminate and Slothful to enter into the managment of publick Affairs the Coward he advises not to go to the Wars to him who hates Company he praiseth a solitary Life If any delights not in Marriage or hath unruly Children his directions to him is to keep to a single Life He who is Stout and Courageous shall be told that the wise Man is Happy even under Pain If any Fancies Honour and Preferments he will counsel him to be acquainted with Kings but another who cant bear a repulse he 'le admonish to depart from the Court These are the Objections of Lactantius In the mean while if we may take the Words of Epicurus in a plain Sense without any such Gloss in my Judgment they will not seem so unreasonable For first for the advice he offers to a lazy Fellow not to ingage himself in Study he don't hereby blame Study absolutely but rather he esteems and values it highly for he exhorts both Young and Old to the Study of Philosophy and for the sake of those who would apply themselves to it he took the Pains to make Abridgments of his own Works But because Arts and Sciences are not to be obtain'd without a resolute and continued Labour if there be any that either cannot or will not endure the Fatigue of this Labour what harm is there to forbid him to ingage himself in it seeing thereby he would do himself no good We have before cited this Sentence of Epicharmus Labor nobis cuncta Dij vendunt bona But if this be true in respect of other Things how much more in relation to the Sciences which as they cannot be bought with all the Gold of the World they cannot be obtained but by a vast Labour and Industry And if in another place he advises the Covetous to be sparing in his Bounty he don't thereby condemn Liberality or those Expences which are made for good and lawful Uses but he means plainly that if any fears to fall into Want that he should not be too lavish of his Estate and cast it away in such Liberalness as belongs only to Princes and such as abound in Wealth If he forbids them that are naturally Slow and Lazy to engage themselves in publick Affairs it was not without great Reason as we shall see hereafter He forwarns a timerous Man to go to the Wars But why should we not approve of his Advice As if we ought not to make choise of Men for the Wars or as if we should desire such to go thither who tremble and are affraid of the least Noise and whose Sword falls to the Ground at the sight of Danger Are we not sensible that in an Ingagement one Coward does more mischief with his idle Fears than a great many brave Men may do good with their Courage And don't pretend that we should rather encourage a fearful Spirit and make him Courageous for if he be so of his own Nature we know the common Saying It is not an easy matter to turn an Hare into a Lion Or of a slender Reed to make a Lance. He advises a wise Man to do all for himself But we have already discovered how that is to be understood and that the wise Man acts for himself tho he puts himself upon Inconveniences or even Dies for the sake of his Friend and yet what is there more dear and precious than Life He praiseth Solitariness to him who naturally cares not for Company How can we blame this without blaming the Retreat of many great Men and the Rules of Living of several Societies or Fraternities of ancient Philosophers and religious Persons who purposely shun the throngs of Men for the better improving of their Minds If he praiseth the single Life to such as decline Women and the Happiness of having no Children to such as are troubled with Disobedient ones He means not that he who hath a wicked Wife or perverse Children should shake them off but he would have him who thinks of Marriage consider how he would endure his uneasiness if he had a troublesome Wife or Children of corrupt Manners so that by apprehending the Mischiefs that may proceed from thence he may the better understand that it is not convenient to have either CHAP IV. Of Oeconomick Prudence AS to Oeconomick Prudence which consist in the due ordering of a Family and wha belongs to it I shall not insist on it for let us bâ—â— suppose private Prudence and it is easy from thenâ—â— to learn what belongs to Oeconomick if we wâ—â—â— but mind such as do generally exercise themselvâ—â— in it or prescribe Rules for it Nevertheless thâ—â— we may not seem totally to neglect this Matter it is necessary to observe First what we meet with in Aristotle That the Oeconomick Dominion is a kind of Monarchy or Principality because every House is governed by the command of one single Person Secondly That he who governs in a Family is called Father or Father of a Family in respect of the Children Husband in respect of the Wife Master in respect of the Slaves and Servants Owner in respect of the Goods and Estate Thirdly That the Houshold or Family in respect of the Relation between Husband and Wife Parents and Children is called Natural and first instituted by Nature for there can be none more agreeable with Nature Fourthly That for the Government between Master and Servant it is also agreeable with Nature for among Men some seem to be born to Command and others to Obey so that besides that Slavery that the Laws or Rights of Nations have introduced in respect of those who have been taken Prisoners in War or have been Sold there is another certain natural Slavery by which as the Soul commands the Body and Men Brutes so he who excells in the Abilities of the Mind commands over him who excels only in Strength of Body and the rather because it is needful for the latter to be ruled by another as it is useful for Brutes to be tamed by Men. Fifthly in respect to the Right that we have over certain Things which we possess to our selves for tho according to the primitive Right of Nature one thing is no more mine than thine nor thine more than mine nevertheless it seems agreeable with Nature That
that which provokes Appetite and makes it become greater than it would be naturally Therefore wise Men have fancied that it makes for our Health to give a check to our Appetite and stop betime And because some might object that other Animals that follow Nature and consequently never do ought in prejudice of their Health Eat and Drink till they be fully satisfied They answer That the Animals live upon Food purely natural and which never stirs up Hunger nor Thirst as that doth which Men make use of This is plain in Drink the most natural which is Water and that we drink with great Pleasure but as soon as the Thirst is allayed we have no more Inclination to it However 't is certain that no Person repents to have risen from Table without being fully satisfied but we have often been sorry to have filled our Stomachs so full that we were able to eat no more And doubtless it is not without Cause that Diogenes wonders that Men will eat for Pleasure and that they will not forbear Eating for the same Reason seeing there is so much Pleasure in being Healthy and free from Diseases and by this means will be ready the sooner to repeat the same Pleasure with the more delight and Satisfaction In relation to the Quality it seems also that then we have a regard to our Health when we shall nourish our selves with plain Food easy to be digested and which we know to be proper and convenient For this reason we see some Country-people who live upon nothing but Bread Fruits and Water and yet enjoy a perfect Health without any need of a Physitian Whereas those who feed at plentiful Tables have but a weak Body and are often forced to seek the assistance of the Physitian Therefore there have always been some Sects of wise Men such as Pythagoras who abstained from Eating the Flesh of living Creatures and contented themselves with the plain Products of Nature and have spent their Life in Health and Pleasure I shall not here repeat what we have said elsewhere that Flesh seems to be no natural Food for Mankind but as Custom hath made it so we should consider at least that the use of Flesh is so much the more Healthy the more plainly 't is prepared And that the Arts of Cooks of Confectioners and others who by their different Mixtures and Sauces do as it were change our very Food seem to have been intended for the destruction of the Health of Mankind Therefore we cannot but wonder why we should with so much earnestness prosecute such as Poison and yet hire and entertain the Contrivers of our dainty Dishes who by a deceitful Art destroy no less their Life and Health But how few are there that are not carried away by the deceitful Charms of a liquorish Tast and being bewitched with the present Pleasure never take heed nor apprehend the Mischiefs that follow What great Reason had Democritus to Laugh at those who make Vows to the Gods for their Health and yet by their debaucht and disorderly living undertake to ruin it daily 'T is a wonderful thing saith Diogenes That Men have so much care to cause their Bodies to be Embalmed after their Death and yet all their endeavours during Life is to become rotten Of Chastity in particular FInally in relation to Chastity I will only observe that whereas this Virtue is to struggle with the most violent of all the Passions unto which there is scarce any Body but submits I shall here mention Two or Three principal means that may serve as Bulworks to defend us from danger The First is a great Sobriety for it will be in vain to attempt to give a check to this unruly and imperious Appetite unless you carefully cherish this Virtue which tho encourged it you will still have great difficulty to overcome this Lust Long before Terence was heard of it hath been said That without Wine and good Cheer Love grows Cold. Which is easily to be made out for that which encourages Love and stirs up Lust is the increase of natural Seed which swells and moves in the Vessels excites Nature and obliges it to free it self from that which is troublesome to it Now as this increase proceeds from the quantity or quality of the Food if any Person be very temperate in his living and if he takes care to use no Meats that are too hot or fit to augment the Seed he will take away the Fewel and the Oil as I may so say which serves to increase and add Flame to this Fire Therefore those who profess a chast and continent Life ought not fully to satisfy themselves but as we have said before retain always a Stomach for more Citra satietatem vesci Their Virtue will not want a sufficient Reward for they will become stronger and more lusty because the ejection of the Seed diminishes the Strength and Spirits which is the cause why other Animals and even the very Trees the more fruitful they are the sooner they grow Old The Second Means is some honest Employ which may entertain and spend some of the Spirits that make the Seed to boil up and so give a diversion to the Thoughts For the Imagination which fixes upon the beloved Object and is not otherwise diverted is easily heated and from a little Spark kindles and becomes a great Flame Therefore we ought to take a strong Resolution to resist all base and dishonest Thoughts to avoid all occasions which might cause them to rise whether by the Sight or too intimate and private Discourses or by Reading or Touching or otherwise and if casually any doth arise not to give it time to take any deep root but to banish it at first and in so doing we discover our Manhood for the more you give way the greater will be the difficulty to stop your self in so slippery a Path So that there is nothing can be a greater Truth than what is commonly said That it is a kind of Combat where the Victory is not to be obtained but by flying away The Third is the custom of resisting and overcoming for as we become so much the more inclinable to Love the more easy and the more often we yield and submit to it so we become so much the more Continent the more courageously we resist and the less we are overcome by it I confess the violence of this Passion is great but it often happens that the weakness of our Spirit is such that at the first Assault we suffer our selves to be overcome You yield upon the first Assault without making any effort or exercising your Resolution in trying whether you might not have Strength enough to withstand the Temptation and so no wonder that the Passion triumphs and gets the Victory over your Reason But perhaps you will say I have already contracted an Habit. Well Why don't you endeavour by forbearance to destroy this Habit and to bring in a contrary For the thing
is not impossible if you will strive with all your Courage Learn by degrees to be Continent and if you cannot abstain one Day of two at least abstain one in a Week for by this means it will happen that in a little while you will attain three Days of Abstinence afterwards Six and after that you will be Conqueror during whole Weeks and Months But above all things remember that as it is almost impossible but that many things must intervene which may divert you from your Design so you ought to keep steady and fixt to your Resolution You must break through all Obstacles You must proceed still on and be continually going forward You must consider with your self that it is a great weakness to express so early a Repentance and being a Man as you are to shew nothing less than your Manhood Consider what a satisfaction you will have when the Fatigue will be over and that you shall find that you have got the Victory whereas if you suffer your self to be meanly overcome a troublesome and uneasy Repentance will attend you but otherwise you will applaud and approve of your Happiness when you shall have bravely obtained the Conquest You will also from thence receive new Strength to help you to overcome again in a like Temptation and if you continue you will find that by degrees you will alter the evil Habit that you will draw your self out of a cruel Bondage deliver your self from a base Tyranny and instead of a dark and clouded Spirit it will become clear and Serene instead of a feeble and diseased Body it will become strong and vigorous and instead of a languishing and short Life it will become healthy and long Not to mention here the loss of Reputation and Goods neither shall I instance in those other odious Mischiefs which are known to all the World I shall not here trouble my self to inform you That it is usual to subdivide these two kinds of Temperance each into two Parts so that they assign four parts commonly subject to Temperance whereof Two of them relate to the Tast namely Abstinence and Sobriety the First concerns our Eating the Second our Drinking and the other Two relate to Venery namely Chastity and Modesty The First concerns the Act it self and the Latter some Circumstances such as are Kisses Approaches Embraces Looks and Discourses c. I shall not insist here to prove that Modesty is either Chastity it self and principally that of Virginity which being once lost as the Poet saith can never be retrieved Nulla reparabilis arte Laesa Pudicitia est deperit illa semel Or if it be understood for that Virtue that gives a check to the Circumstances that we have named it ought not to be esteemed so much a part subject to Prudence as a potential part of Chastity I will only observe in relation to Modesty which is so called from the word Modest being a kind of a Guard to Chastity that tho Nature produces nothing whereof we ought to be ashamed as an obscene Thing and therefore among Nations who own no Obscenity neither in the Members of the Body nor in the Language or Names that are given to them for as to this we are to refer our selves to common Usage nevertheless among those People who do own any such thing we are to refrain from them and we are not to banish Modesty which obligeth us to forbear them for let it be either Nature or Law or Custom which makes things to be esteemed Brave Good or Honest 't is always Nature that commands them to be observed which is to be obeyed for the common Good in which the Happiness and Welfare of every private Person as due to him of common right is comprised Therefore Cicero discourses excellently well upon this Point We are not to hearken to the Cynicks who Laugh at us because we esteem things to be filthy and undecent in Words which are not really so indeed and on the contrary Things that are really Wicked and Dishonest we don't stick to mention by their proper Names As to Steal to Cheat to commit Whoredom which indeed is Vnjust and Dishonest and yet is spoken without any Obscenity To beget Children is an honest Act but yet to use the proper Term is Obscene and Immodest For our part let us follow the dictates of Nature and let us abstain from all that our Eyes or Ears cannot honestly endure let our Carriage our Gate our Sitting our Lying down our Countenance our Eyes and our Hands observe the Rules of Modesty And hear what he says in another Place After he had shewn that there is nothing more indecent and unbecoming than in serious and weighty Matters to mix loose and light Expressions Says he Thus Pericles treated the Poet Sophocles very wisely who while sitting upon the Bench with him in open Court espied a beautiful young Damsel pass by and not being able to contain himself cried out What a Beauty is there before us Pericles answered O Sophocles 't is becoming a Judge upon the Bench to be Modest and Grave not only in respect to his Hands but in respect to his Eyes also Of Mildness and Gentleness WE shall now speak something as to the other parts of Temperance which some name Subject Parts others Potential But Mildness seems truly to belong rather to Fortitude than to Temperance in that it relates to Truth which ariseth because of Pain and because it resides in that part of the Appetite which derives its name from Wrath namely in the irascible part therefore it seems to deserve to be plac'd under Fortitude Nevertheless as it is the property of Fortitude to raise and encourage and of Temperance to check and depress and that in respect of Wrath the Mind hath not so much need to be incited and stir'd up as to be curb'd and kept in for this reason it is commonly placed under Temperance However Aristotle teacheth That Mildness or Gentleness ought to be reckoned among the Virtues because 't is a Mediocrity or a Medium between two Extremes the one a Temper inclinable to Wrath as when a Man is either sooner or in a higher degree enraged than he ought against one who deserves it not or for some frivolous Causes The other a simple Meekness or want of Anger as when a Man is not angry when and against whom and for such Reasons as he ought to be angry for he declares that under certain Circumstances 't is not only lawful but also requisite and needful to be so and that because Nature it seems hath not only given Man an Inclination to Anger but also because that this Passion is as a Spur that stirs us up and encourages us to repel not only private Injuries but likewise puts us upon securing our selves against such publick Dangers and Calamities as may affect our Country Parents Relations c. and all good Men. By this means our private and publick Welfare is secured and maintained and
c. 'T is also from hence that the Law by a Metaphor is called Right because it declares and prescribes what belongs to every one as his Right what Authority Power and Command every one hath over any thing And this by a like Metaphor That we call Right the Court or Tribunal where Right is done that is to say where the Party injured hath his Right restor'd or Justice done him Nay we may go yet farther and say That Right seems by consequence to be originally more ancient than Justice for as Justice is the same thing with that Affection or habitual Desire or Inclination which we have to wrong no body and that every one may enjoy their Right as we enjoy ours 't is certain that this Justice supposeth that there is in other Men a Right not depending upon it and which nevertheless would be tho' it self were not in Being Therefore it seems in the first place we ought to acknowledge the Right that every one hath tho' it be different from what Nature gives or tho' it be by Contract or by Law Secondly That the Injury is nothing else but a Violation of this Right it self Thirdly Justice or the Will to render unto every one his own which repairs the Wrong restores Right and gives the Title of Just to him who possesseth it Fourthly The Proceedings or Work of Justice or the Right restored which is also called Just or that which is Just Justice giving it that Denomination But because Epicurus whom both many of the ancient and modern Authors have followed hath derived the very beginning of Right and whatever is agreeable with Equity from Utility or Profit let us listen to what he says in the four following Paragraphs 'T is in this manner that he discourses of Justice in general Terms Of Justice in General according to Epicurus AS Justice is a Virtue by which we render unto every one that which is his due and by which we take heed not to wrong any body 't is certain that in this respect it relates to and respects other Men and that it is convenient for Man as he is a Member and lives in Society it being the common Tie without which 't is impossible a Society should subsist It hath this also in common with other Virtues viz. Prudence Temperance and Fortitude that 't is not to be separated from Pleasure not only because it injures no body but also because it settles the Mind at Rest either by its own natural Influence or by the Assurance that nothing shall be wanting to us which our Nature not corrupted can desire And as Rashness Luxury and Cowardise disturb and trouble the Mind so from that very instant that Injustice hath taken Possession of the Soul of a Man he cannot be otherwise but troubled and uneasie Insomuch that if he hath undertaken any evil Action tho' he hath done it never so secretly yet he can never be assured that it will always remain so And if there be any who by reason of their great Riches fancy themselves sufficiently secur'd from the Inquisition and Justice of Men yet they are always afraid of a divine Vengeance and they believe that this Uneasiness which Torments them Day and Night is a Punishment that proceeds from the Appointment of the immortal Gods who are offended and displeased with them And afterwards says he As to the Advantage which we receive from evil Actions how inconsiderable are they to lessen our Griefs or to support us under the Troubles of our Life Do they not rather increase 'em by the remorse of Conscience by the fear of the Laws and by the hatred of our Neighbours Nevertheless some are unsatiable as to Mony Honour Authority and prescribe no limits to their Luxury Debauchery and other Extravagancies which the ill-gotten Goods do augment and increase more and more rather than lessen and appease Therefore it seems that all Rules and Precepts are useless to such Men and that there is nothing but Severity and Punishment that can restrain them Reason therefore invites them who are of sound Sense and Understanding to the observation of Justice Equity and Fidelity Wicked Deeds are useful to no body and Riches are convenient for none but for honest Men and such as have a Mind tending to Liberality for they know thereby how to gain Mens Affections and to make themselves beloved which tends very much to the security and quiet of our Lives besides there is nothing that ought to oblige us to unjust Actions The Desires that proceed from Nature are easily to be satisfied and for such as are vain foolish and needless we should not obey ' em These Desires procure nothing worthy of our Affections and the Wrong done to others causes more Mischief than we obtain Advantage by doing that Injury Therefore if Justice of it self and by it self is not desirable 't is at least desirable for the sake of the great Pleasure and Satisfaction that it procures for there is nothing more Pleasant than to be beloved because that makes up the Society and consequently the Delights of Life So that Wickedness is not only to be avoided because of the Punishments and the Mischiefs that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly also because it never suffers our Minds to be at ease but Poisons all our Delights and renders our Life miserable What I have here said may seem to be sufficient but I think I shall not do amiss to add something concerning that which we call Right or Just from whence Justice derives its Name that we may the better discover what the Origin of Right is among what Nations it hath been received and what are the Advantages that proceed from thence Of Right or Just from whence Justice derives its Name AS Justice hath been contrived and appointed for the Publick Good it must needs follow that the Right and Equity which it chiefly respects is Good for each individual Person that constitutes a Society And because every one desires naturally that which is Good for himself it must needs be that what is Right or Just is according to Nature and by consequence must be stiled Natural Now 't is not without Reason that I mention this because it sometimes happens that in the Government of Societies some things are order'd as Right and Just which nevertheless are not Good nor the true Interest of a Society and consequently being not natural but against Nature ought not to be reputed Just but only nominally so or by mistake that which is truly Right and naturally Just being such as 't is ordained that is to say effectively Useful and Good Therefore to speak properly Right or natural Equity is nothing else but what is mark'd out by Utility or Profit or that Utility which by common Agreement hath been appointed that Men might not injure one another nor receive any wrong but live in security which is a real Good and therefore naturally desired of every one I suppose therefore that which
and Love and for the same Ends. 'T is Nature hath established what is right just and equitable to its Law 'T is a greater Evil to be the cause of Wrong than to suffer it Nature commands that our Hands should be always ready to afford assistance Let this be always in our Heart and at our Lips Homo sum humani nihil à me alienum puto I am a Man and think my self obliged to all the Duties of Humanity THE Third BOOK OF Liberty Fortune Destiny and Divination CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is AFter we have examined the moral Virtues we must speak something of Destiny Fortune and of Free-will which some esteem to be Causes others to be Modes or manner how certain Causes act and others to be nothing but empty Names vain and imaginary Notions we must I say speak something and the rather because according as they are received or rejected Virtues and Vices will be allowed or not allowed and consequently our Actions may deserve praise or blame rewards or punishments for 't is most certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy but what is done freely and with deliberation and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Necessity is neither to be commended nor condemned This being unquestionable the first thing that we have to do is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will consists what is Fortune and Destiny that so we may the better understand how Fortune and Liberty either contradict or may agree with Destiny To begin therefore with Liberty And here 't is to be understood that we mean not precisely such a Liberty as is taken in opposition to Slavery that which relates properly to the Body and is described a power of living as we please but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id quod in nobis seu penes nos nostrove in arbitrio potestateque situm est that which is in us within our Power or Free-will namely something which is in the Soul and is not under Bondage to any external Master or if I may make use of the words of Epictetus That which cannot by any means be hindered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if we should say A full and entire Power or Liberty to do any thing The Latins and chiefly the Divines call it commonly liberum aribitrium Free-will and sometimes liberale arbitrium Upon which we must observe First That this is given to Reason or which is the same thing to the Understanding because Reason is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties or as a Judge to examin to consult and deliberate and at last to decide as the Judgment is sway'd upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Case Secondly That as soon as the Consultation and Deliberation are concluded Reason hath indeed elected and chosen one thing preferrable before another which she hath conceived or believed to be the best the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite will immediatly follow Thirdly That by this word Appetite I understand the reasonable Appetite and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone as Reason is because we shall hereafter indifferently make use of these Terms Will and Appetite meaning the reasonable Appetite Fourthly That because the Action of the moving Faculty which is properly the pursuit of that which is good follows the Appetite or as we commonly speak the Will the Faculty being taken for the Action that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reason termed Voluntary as if one should say willingly undertaken that is with Deliberation and Consultation Fifthly That Reason or Free-will is supposed in Man to be so free that of the several things which come under his Deliberation there is nothing he chuseth but he hath at the same time an equal liberty of refusing it and making choice of something else Truly we usually ascribe this Liberty to the Will or to the reasonable Appetite which signifies the same thing for we all agree that the Original of Liberty is in Reason which we commonly call Understanding that is to say in the intellective Power for we usually hold that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it self blind which cannot incline to any thing till the Understanding goes before and holds forth if I may so say a Light before it So that 't is the Property of the Understanding to precede and enlighten and of the Will to follow So that it cannot easily be turned out of the Path it hath taken until the Understanding first turns the Light which directs it that way Liberty therefore seems by consequence to be first and primarily in the Understanding and secundarily or dependantly in the Will To open the Matter a little more clearly The Nature of Liberty seems first to consist in an indifferency by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing and this is called Liberty of Contradiction or incline in such a manner to any thing as it may equally incline it self to the contrary and this is called Liberty of Contrariety And in truth as we cannot imagin any Liberty without a Faculty free to chuse 't is certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency because where there is but one thing proposed or where the Faculty is resolved and determinated to act or to pursue any certain thing there can be no Choice nor Election which supposeth at least two things whereof the one is to be preferr'd before the other I know some are of Opinion that the Will is then principally and altogether free when it is so fixed and resolved on any certain thing suppose for Example the sovereign or chief Good and Happiness that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing that is to say to Evil because say they the actual love the pursuance the enjoyment of this Good or Happiness is altogether Voluntary and by consequence altogether Free But I know not whether they take notice enough that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action for a willing or spontaneous Action is nothing else but a certain propensity or impulse of Nature which impulse may be effected without any Reasoning whereas the free Action supposeth and depends upon some Reasoning Examination Judgment or Choice preceding And to prove that a spontaneous Action is a certain impulse or propensity of Nature they instance in Children and Brutes unto whom they never attribute the use of Reason or Liberty yet they perform many things sponte and this is said also of things inanimate as of a Stone that it falls down sponte of its own accord or of Fire that it ascends sponte so that fiery sponte and fieri natura seem to be the same thing Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good 't is no wonder that we should say that 't is carried sponte of
its own accord For as a Stone because it falls sponte or of its own Nature downward cannot of it self rise upwards So because the Appetite is carried of its own Nature to Good it cannot of it self incline nor lean to Evil Besides as the Stone because 't is settled to a Motion downwards hath not an indifferency for such a Motion or for a Motion upwards So the Appetite because 't is fixed on Good is not indifferent to what is Good nor indifferent to what is Evil. Lastly as the Stone for want of that indifferency to either of the Motions is truly said to move sponte of its own accord but not freely or with liberty downward So the Appetite for want of this indifferency to Good or Evil is truly said to move sponte of its own accord but not with liberty to what is Good in General Therefore if you suppose that the Will is in such a manner fixed for Example on the Sovereign Good or Happiness that it cannot by forsaking it be turned aside to follow another Object it will be truly reputed to be inclined to it sponte but not freely because 't is not indifferent to that Good or to another and that 't is not in its Power to incline to another and forsake that 'T is certain that it inclines willingly volens and without Reluctancy and Opposition but this kind of Will which we might name Volentia if it were lawful to make use of this word bespeaks not Liberty but Propensity Complacency libentiam collubescentiam and consequently an exclusion of all Constraint Violence Repugnancy or Opposition So that if the Pursuit or actual Love and Affection for this Good is said to be altogether Voluntary we must not therefore infer that it is altogether free but only that 't is summè libitus if I may be permitted to make use of this Term or libens altogether willing because libentia may be without any indifferency but not libertas Now it behoves us to consider that what is usually spoken among the Divines That 't is impossible that the Will such as is that of the glorified Saints which enjoys fully and knowingly the Sovereign Happiness should forsake that Good to embrace another it concerns us I say to make this Observation because it seems this may discover to us what that indifferency is in which the Nature of the Liberty or Free-will of this mortal Life consists We took notice before that the Understanding bears the Light before the Will and it is certain that this Torch or Light is nothing else but the Judgment that the Understanding makes upon things that are Good or Evil declaring that this is Good and that Evil that of these two Good or Evil things this is the greater that the less So that when the Will is said to be diverted from the one and inclined to the other this happens because the Judgment is sometimes for one and sometimes for th' other and that the Flection of the Will is conformable to that of the Understanding Thus because the Understanding is often unconstant in its Judgment the Will is often unsetled and wavers in its Inclination or Appetite so that as the Understanding judges to day that one thing is Good and to morrow Evil the Will to day loves this thing and to morrow hates it And as it judges to day that we ought to embrace a certain thing because it is Good and to morrow it esteems that we ought rather to embrace another because that other appears to it better thus the Will is inclined to day to one thing and to morrow to another In a word it seems that according to the Notions that the Understanding hath of things or according to the Judgment that it makes of them so the Will either pursues or avoids the same In the same manner because among the Good things as among the Evil some are true and real others seeming or apparent Good is sometimes disguis'd with the Appearance of Evil and Evil with that of Good By this means the Understanding often makes a wrong Judgment for being moved with the Appearance of Good it judges Evil to be Good or being moved with the Appearance of Evil it judges Good to be Evil. In the same manner the Will often mistakes its End because in aiming at Good and pursuing after it it happens upon Evil and in flying from Evil it is disappointed of some Good Thus also the Understanding mistakes the lesser Good for the greater and the greater for the lesser the Will by following after the greatest Good gets the less and in flying from the lesser Evil falls into the greater Seeing then the Will is thus bound to follow the Understanding or its Judgment there is no question but that the indifferency which appears in the Will proceeds meerly and absolutely in the same manner as the indifferency of the Understanding Now the indifferency of the Understanding seems to consist in this That it is not so much tied up to any Judgment that it has made of a thing which hath appeared to it true but that it may leave it and incline to make another Judgment of the same thing if there appears in it a greater likelihood of Truth For the Understanding is not of the number of those Faculties that are fixed to a thing as weight in things without Life the Faculty of Generation in the living Creatures and so of the rest but is naturally so flexible that having nothing else for its Object but Truth it may judge of things now in this manner anon in another and according to the Judgment it makes may sometimes take this sometimes that for Truth Therefore the Understanding may be look'd upon as a Balance for as a Balance is indifferent to incline either of the Scales and bends towards that which is most loaden so that where there is the greater Addition of weight it still inclines that way thus the Understanding is indifferently inclined to one or other of these contrary Opinions but is still overpoised according to the greater or less apparency of Truth This Comparison is borrowed from Cicero where he says That in the same manner as the Scale of a Balance is weighed down by the weight that is put into it thus the Mind yields to things that are plain we cannot approve of a thing that is not plain nor manifest This is designed to make us comprehend that the Understanding being indifferent to follow one Judgment or another it is not nevertheless indifferent to leave a plain manifest Truth to follow after another less manifest or to leave the Judgment that seems the truest to embrace that which hath the less likelihood of Truth because as a Scale weighed down by a greater weight can never be raised by a less weight put into the other Scale but only by a heavier which weighing down this shall cause the other to be lifted up Thus 't is not possible that when some evident and experienc'd
Understanding yet I say it is certain that in this Supposition we may still save our Liberty in that when we are ready to act and prepared 't is always in our Power to stop and desist from acting and to consider seriously of things so that if we distinguish the real advantages from those that are counterfeit we should cause the false Reasonings in the Understanding to be rectified and by that means cause this Propensity that is in the Will to be inlightned and so consequently not to seek after an apparent good instead of what is real Vice instead of Virtue CHAP. II. Of Fortune and Destiny THO' according to the Opinion of Cicero Folly Mistake Error Blindness and Ignorance of Things seem to have introduced and brought in fashion the Names of Nature and Fortune and that therefore Fortune cannot be without Ignorance Nevertheless 't is not generally agreed upon that this is only a foolish vain and imaginary Name seeing there are many that hold that 't is not only a Cause but a Divine Cause which occasioned these Verses of Juvenal Fortune was never Worship'd by the Wise But set aloft by Fools usurp'd the Skies That it is not really so Plutarch according to Plato holds That it is a Cause by accident which unexpectedly follows things acted according to Counsel And agreeable with this is Aristotle's Opinion That it is a Cause by accident in things done for a certain End and that this Cause is uncertain and changable For this example is alledged as a common Instance he who digging in the Ground with an intent to Plant a Tree found a Treasure which he never thought of now the Discovery of the Treasure is an Effect by accident that is to say that it happen'd beyond the Expectation and Intention of him that acted So that he who digged being the cause of the Pit made in the Earth is also the cause by accident of the Discovery of the Treasure 'T is in this manner that the Notion of Fortune is commonly explained Nevertheless it may seem by this Name that something else I know not what is understood and that they call not proprerly Fortune either him who digs or his action Therefore often we call a casual thing by the name of Fortune or that which happens unexpectedly And it seems by this Name of Fortune we are to understand The concurrence of several Causes that happen without any mutual dependence or advice so that from them proceeds an event or an effect called Casual which all the Causes or some of them or at least he to whom it happens had never in his Mind and Intention So as by the casual Discovery of the Treasure 't is not only requisite that some should dig in the Earth but that some other body should first hide the Mony 'T is manifest that Fortune or the cause of the Discovery is the concurrence of the hiding of the Mony and of the diging in the Earth in that place I say without any mutual dependence or advice and beyond or besides the Intention of all or some of the Causes Because tho' one or many of the Causes may have designed it and intended it 't is no less Fortune in respect of that Cause that never was thought upon As if one hides a Treasure with a design that he whom he foresees will dig in the Earth should find it In this Case the Event is not truly Casual in regard of him who hid the Treasure but it will be nevertheless in regard of him who was ignorant that any thing had been there concealed Thus that which happened at the opening of the Sepulcher of Nitocris was not absolutely a Hazard or Casual in respect to Nitocris for he imagined that some King would come to open it being induced by this Inscription If any of the Kings of Babylon that shall come after me be in want of Mony let him open this Sepulcher and let him take as much as he please but let him not open it unless he hath need for in such a Case it will avail him nothing But the Event was a Hazard or Casual in relation to Darius because instead of Mony he found this written within If thou wert not unsatiable of Mony thou would'st not have opened the Sepulchers of the Dead We must nevertheless acknowledge that we call that properly Fortune that of all the Causes which concur together not one of them foresees what will happen from thence An eminent Example of this is instanced in delaying the death of Socrates after Sentence had been pronounced For the cause of this delay hapned thus The day before the Sentence was given it hapned according to the yearly Custom a Ship was Crowned in order to be sent to Delos and in the mean while till its return it was not lawful to execute any Person But here neither the Priest in Crowning of the Ship nor the Judge in Pronouncing the Sentence ever thought by this accident to delay the death of Socrates Now 't is not without cause that Epicurus persuades us so much that we should not acknowledge Fortune as a Goddess for the weakness of Men is such that they don't only admire that which they understand not but they fancy it also as some divine Thing and above Nature So that when they had perceived that sometimes Fortune was favourable and sometimes adverse and contrary they adored it under several Shapes and erected Temples to it under these several Titles Fortunae Bonae Malae Blandae Averruncae Calvae Equestri c. This hath given occasion to the Complaints of Pliny That all over the World and at all times Men address themselves to Fortune so that she alone is called upon she alone accused and condemned she alone is praised and blamed that she alone is worshiped with Scoffs Many fancy her uncertain unconstant blind favouring those who deserve it not c. From hence is that common Expression The May-game or Sport of Fortune And this hath caused the life of Man to be likened to playing at Dice or Cards which is equally hazardous to the Gamester whether he understand the Game or not 'T is true that as the Play and the Life of Man are managed by Industry a skilful Gamester and a a wise Man commonly succeed best but this happens not always for often the ignorant Gamester is more fortunate than the skilful and the weak Man more successful than the wise and very frequently Fortune hath as much or more a hand in things than Wisdom This caused Plutarch to say That Fortune and Wisdom tho' very much differing often bring forth very unlike Effects And as there are but few Men who make Profession of Wisdom that know well how to manage and govern the Proceedings of Fortune Theophrastus hath been so bold as to say That 't is Fortune and not Wisdom that governs our Life Vitam regit Fortuna non Sapienta And Lucretius speaking according to the Vulgar saith That Fortune often
attends those who do not greatly seek it and as often flies from those who eagerly pursue and hunt after it So true is it saith he further That there is some secret hidden Power that over-rules human Affairs and seems to delight and sport it self with over-turning Crowns and Dignities and trampling 'em under Feet Vsque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam Obterit pulchros fasces saevasque secures Proculcare ludibrio sibi habere videtur Of Destiny AS to what concerns Destiny Homer speaks more plainly of it than of Fortune for he makes Hector say That if the Destinies don't appoint nor order it nothing is able to take away his Life beside but no Man can avoid his Destiny Nam nisi Fata vocent nemo me mittat ad Orcum At Fatum vitat nemo mihi crede virorum Now tho' Cicero fancies that Fate and Destiny is but a foolish idle and superstitious Name Anilis plenum superstitionis fati nomen and Epicurus That 't is only a fantastical Name and that nothing is done by Destiny Nevertheless as there have always been Maintainers of Destiny some taking it in one sense others in another we must here endeavour to understand the several Opinions into which they have been divided Among these Opinions there are two Principal for some will have Destiny to be Divine others a meer Natural thing The First were the Disciples of Plato and the Stoicks according to whose Opinion Plutarch Chalcidius and some others look upon Destiny or Fate in two manners First As a Substance which they took for God himself or for that eternal Reason which from all Eternity hath ordered all things and hath so joined all Causes both Superior and Inferior together that all that happens either Good or Evil happens persuant to these Causes They bestowed several Names upon this Divine Substance or Reason for sometimes they termed it as Plato The Soul of the World The Reason and the eternal Law of the Nature of the Vniverse And sometimes as Zeno and Chrysippus The moving Virtue of Matter a spiritual Virtue and the Reason of the Order that Governs and Rules all Things Sometimes God Jupiter Understanding or Intellect as Aristotle and Seneca And sometimes with Heraclitus The Reason that penetrates into all Things And sometimes as Pythagoras The governing and ruling Cause of all Things both Vniversal and Particular Secondly As an Act namely in part for the Decree it self or for the Command by which God hath established and ordained all things and partly for the Order it self that Consequence and Concatenation of Causes at first appointed in which it pursues its course without varying in the least from the Rules and Methods at first prescribed For thus they spoke of it when they called Destiny The Law of Nature The Companion of the Whole The Daughter of Necessity The Order that includes and comprehends all other Orders Or as Chrysippus saith A certain eternal and immutable sequel of Things c. Sempiterna quaedam indeclinabilis series rerum catena volvens semetipsa sese implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines in quibus apta connexaque est To which Lucan seems to allude in these two Verses At simul à prima descendit origine Mundi Causarum series atque omnia Fata laborant And Hesiod when he speaks distinctly of the three Parcae which Spin the Life of Man the first is named Atropos because the Time past is irrecoverable which is as the Thread spun and wound in the Spindle The second is called Clotho because of the Time present that runs which is as the Thread in the hand of her who Spins The third is Lachesis because of the Time to come or the hazard which is as the Wool or Flax that is not yet twisted Lachesis in Plato is said to govern the Time past Clotho the present Atropos the future That which is added of Lachesis that she receives the celestial Actions of the two other Sisters that she joyns them together and that she distributes them here below upon the Earth shews the Opinion of the Astrologers who bind the Fate of Mankind to the Stars and make it to depend upon them and come from them according to Manilius Fata quoque vitas hominum suspendit ab Astris An Opinion among the Astrologers more certain than that of the Sybils and the Oracles which were said to utter forth the Destinies For to hear them speak they seem to be no less acquainted with the Designs and Decrees of Heaven than the Oaks which Plato tells us came forth from Voices of the Enchantresses as Virgil observes Quam comitabantur fatalia carmina quercus Moreover as the Disciples of Plato the Stoicks and the other Patrons of Destiny seem consequently to defend Necessity which Seneca stiles a Necessity of all Things and of every Action which no Violence can break or alter For the Destinies saith he exercise their Right and their absolute and uncontrolable Power without favouring any and without being moved either with Prayers or Compassion they observe their fatal course appointed and irrevocable like as the swift and furious downfal of the Waters from some steep Places which neither go back nor stop for those Waters which follow but continually thrust down the first thus the constant sequel of Destiny makes the order of Things under this first and eternal Law to submit to the irrevocable Decree As therefore they seem to maintain I say a Necessity which altogether destroys the Liberty of human Actions and leaves nothing in our Free-will for that reason these Objections are opposed proceeding from the Inconveniences that will ensue The Chief of these Inconveniences is That if our Souls as they are placed and ranked in the sequel of Things be governed by the Destinies and being deprived of all Libery they act always out of an immutable and unavoidable Necessity the Liberty and ordinary Conduct of the Affairs of human Life fails and all Consultations are useless for whatever you resolve upon there shall nothing happen but what hath been decreed by the Destinies Thus Prudence will become idle and needless the study of Wisdom frivolous Legislators and Tyrants will be equally ridiculous because they command things that we must unavoidably do or what we can by no means perform So that there will be neither Vice nor Virtue nor any thing that will deserve either Praise or Blame seeing that they alone are reputed worthy of Praise who might do ill but behave themselves well and those worthy of Blame who might do well but behave themselves ill In this case no body will deserve Reward for any good Deeds as no body will deserve Punishment for any bad because the first cannot but act well and the latter hath not the Power to forbear and abstain from what is ill Finally if all things proceeded from an unavoidable Necessity in vain should we offer up our Prayers our Vows and Sacrifices c. 'T is