except Innascibility or the property of being unbegotten which notifies not a difference of Essence or a different essential Dignity but a personal Property even as Adam being unbegotten for he was immediately formed by God and Seth begotten for he was the Son of Adam and Eve proceeding out of the side of Adam for she was not begotten differ not in Nature for they are all Men or human Persons but in a distinct personal Property These words need no Comment Seth's Birth and Eve's Procession of the Rib of Adam are not their Personalities not their Modes of Subsistence but their personal Properties not that which constituted them Persons but that which distinguished them in our Conception one from another that which constituted them distinct Persons one from another Besides the Phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not of it self capable of any other Interpretation to be unbegotten a negation See Ch. 2. n. 10. can never be the Father's Mode of Subsistence his Personality 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 says the Animadverter is a term not importing in it any positive Relation but only a meer Negation of all Producibility by any superior Principle Anim. c. p. 248. This term therefore cannot signifie causally and consequently not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here stiled contrary to the Animadverter's Observation I acknowledge to the Animadverter that every Person Ibid p. 250 251. and consequently the Divine Persons are formally constituted such by a Mode of Subsistence or what we are obliged to conceive of as a Mode of Subsistence that is each distinct Person has a distinct Mode of Subsistence and the three Divine Persons have in our Conception three distinct Modes of Subsistence Nay I will add further that I believe that no Man who understands the meaning of the term Hypostasis and uses it without Aequivocation will or can deny any part of this The Reverend Dean expresly acknowledges this truth A Beast is a Suppositum Vind. of the Trinity p. 262. that is a distinct living subsisting Being by it self But I do here deny to the Animadverter that the Ancient Fathers did ever assert that the Divine Relations were in this proper formal Sense Modes of Subsistence or that That Phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when applied to the Divine Relations and much more when applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was by them understood in the proper formal Sense of which we are now enquiring Secondly If the Animadverter could get over the first Difficulty Anim. c. p. 120. he would find a second behind how one simple Being which is the Animadverter's Hypothesis of the Trinity can have three Modes of Subsistence The whole School of the Thomists and Scotists assert an absolute essential Subsistence and consequently one Subsistence of the whole Trinity they esteem the three Divine Persons to be unum subsistens unum suppositum aut personam incompletam says Cajetan one of the most famous Commentators upon Aquinas to which Suarez only replies Suarez de incar q 3. Act. 1. disp 11. S. 5. p. 285. Cavendus est hic loquendi modus utpote alienus à modo loquendi conciliorum Patrum Theologorum that is have a care lest Hereticks hear us and take advantage at such a novel Expression otherwise Suarez finds no fault with the Doctrine and indeed to say That Existence or Subsistence by it self is Relative is a contradiction to the very Phrase Subsistence by it self denies all relation to any other So that according to the Thomists and Scotists the three Personalities are not three Modes of Subsistence not three Subsistences but one essential absolute Subsistence with three Relations or three relative Modes or three Modes of Incommunicability But of this I have already spoke Chap. 1. n. 11 12 13. Thirdly To allot three Subsistences to the God-head is to contradict the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 these Properties are not Names of the Essence of the God-head but of the Persons The God head does not properly subsist but the Divine Persons subsist Cajetan may inform the Animadverter what is the consequence of ascribing Subsistence to the God-head even the same with calling it a suppositum or incompleat Person where the term incompleat is only added to avoid the grossness of the Phrase otherwise they ascribe all the Divine Acts to this unum subsistens unum suppositum and call them essential Acts whereas the Notion of Philosophers is that actiones non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attribuuntur that Actions ought not to be attributed to the Nature but to the Person endowed with such Nature The Person is the principium quod Nature only the principium quo the power by which the Person acteth The School-men retain in words the personal Acts of the Divine Persons that Generation is the personal Act of the Father Incarnation the personal Act of the Son Sanctification the personal Act of the Holy Spirit Active Spiration the personal Act of the Father and Son But these are meer words Generation according to the School-men is the reflex Act of the Divine Understanding whereby it knows it self and this singular individual Act they ascribe in common to Father Son and Holy Ghost So every thing that is an Act in Incarnation is according to them the Act of the whole Trinity they pretend indeed that the same singular reflex Act of the Divine Understanding only generates as it proceeds from the Person of the Father and that the Incarnation is only terminated upon the Person of the Son But what Pretence to invent for Sanctification I do not find that they are yet agreed The sacred Scriptures give Sanctification for the distinguishing Character of the third Person he is so called in the very Form of Baptism to deny this distinguishing Character was Sabellianism to the Ancients Yet this the School-men have undeniably done in the Act of Sanctification The Maxim of the Ancients was that Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa They have not only misconstrued indivisa for confusa but in reality left out the Exception ad extra and confounded the Actions ad intra as well as those ad extra So Spiration to the School-men is that Act of the Divine Will whereby it loves it self and this singular individual Act they also ascribe to the Holy Spirit equally with the Father and the Son Only say they The Divine Will 's loving it self is not Spiration in the Person of the Holy Ghost but only in the Person of the Father and Son How much better is it with the Ancient Fathers to confess these to be inscrutable Mysteries than to expose the sacred Article by such bold and abstruse Definitions and yet these are the Gentlemen whom the Animadverter commends for venturing little for preceding upon the surest grounds of Reason and Scripture Again Sanctification which the divinely inspired Writings give us as the peculiar
by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction And if this does not satisfy as it rationally may I must needs profess that my Thoughts and Words can neither rise higher nor reach further This difficulty is not peculiar to the Asserters of a Trinity of Divine Persons They who acknowledge but one Divine Person in the Godhead are equally concerned in this question Whether the Subsistence of one or more Divine Persons added to the Divine Nature infers a Composition in a Divine Person The Animadverter confesses That in all finite Persons Subsistence and Nature infer a Composition he means a modal Composition a Composition of Substance and Mode This manifestly increases the difficulty how a Substance and Mode should not be a modal Composition in a Divine Person He tells you indeed it does not if we please we may take his word if not his thoughts and words can reach no higher But by his leave I shall consider this point more carefully All Composition is Distinctorum Vnio so as to constitute some whole that is in Composition there must be an Union and also the several things united must in some sense be component parts otherwise we could not distinguish Composition from a bare local Union Now according to the Animadverter the Divine Nature or Substance is one thing and the Mode another a Mode is to him a thing added and a Divine Person a whole so that it is manifest according to him that there must be a modal Composition in a Divine Person in God in a pure simple act which is void of all Composition Nay further those Schoolmen who assert these real Modes reduce some of them to Substance some of them to the accidental Predicaments Those Modes which intimately adhere to Substance as Existence Subsistence they reduce to the predicament of Substance those Modes which complete Substance it self cannot be any thing accidental of a different kind and nature from Substance and yet they cannot be perfect Substances for then they would want other Modes to perfect them but they suppose each of these Modes a substantiale quid a substantial thing tho not so perfect as Substance So again those Modes which perfect an Accident are each of them accidentale quid something accidental tho not a perfect Accident Now I freely profess that I have no Notion of this substantiale quid which is not a perfect Substance nor of an accidentale quid which yet is not a perfect Accident However from this Explication of these Philosophers minds it is manifest that a Substance and Mode in finite Persons infer a Composition of a Substance and a distinct substantiale quid To apply this to the Opinion of the Schoolmen concerning the simplicity of a Divine Person The Subsistence as I have already declared they believed to be one absolute Essential the Divine Relations which they call Modes of Subsistence because according to them they constitute the Divine Persons and render each Person incommunicable which a Mode of Subsistence does in finite Persons I say the Divine Relations of Paternity Filiation and Procession they first declared to be no predicamental Relations for then they must have been esteemed proper Modes Modus non potest non esse quid imperfectum cum non attingat absolutam rationem entis Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 4. N. 11. p. 410. and the Schoolmen were never so silly as to believe there was any thing so imperfect as a Mode in God they never believed a substantiale quid which was not so perfect as a Substance in God They call the Divine Relations transcendental Relations which in our imperfect way of Conception are but as so many substantial Modes perfecting the one absolute Subsistence of the Divine Essence they believed each distinct Divine Relation to be not a bare substantiale quid but a most perfect infinite Substance with a Relative Form or as they often speak a Relative Substance And here I must again acknowledge that I am as little able to conceive a Relative Substance as a substantiale quid before J am substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit Absurdum est autem ut substantia relativè dicatur omnis res ad scipsam subsistit quanto magis Deus St. Austin lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 5. But will not this Notion of the Schoolmen infer an higher Composition in a Divine Person viz. of two Substances an Absolute Substance the Divine Nature and a Relative Substance the Relation They answer That the Absolute and Relative Substance are not united but identified one with another this being an Axiom to the Schoolmen Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 2. N. 3. p. 407. In Divinis omnia sunt Vnum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio but there cannot be pretended relationis oppositio betwixt an Absolute and Relative Substance and by the same Axiom they endeavour to shew how these three Relative Substances may be one absolute Divine Nature one God But then comes the grand Difficulty of all If each distinct Relative Substance be the same or identified with the one singular absolute Divine Nature are not the three Relations from thence identified one with another Is not this an infallible Axiom in reason Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se This is the Gordian Knot which almost every Schoolman gives a different answer to but at last they are generally obliged to cut it and deny the truth of the Axiom in the Divine Nature I thought it necessary to give this account of the Opinions of the Schoolmen to shew the Animadverter how little reason he had to lay so great a stress upon the Metaphysicks of Modes Nothing was farther from the thoughts of the Schoolmen with whose Names he flourishes so often than to believe that there were true Modes in God The Divine Relations according to them were only Modes in Name or in our imperfect Conception of them As for my own private Opinion with all submission to better Information I conceive That Existence in a finite Person or Being much more in a Divine Person is only the actuality of a Person or Being That Subsistence adds only a Negation of incompleteness to substantial Existence even in finite Persons and consequently infers no sort of Composition in them and therefore much less infers a Composition in a Divine Person Again I do believe that all predicamental Relations amongst the Creatures are no positive Modes but only external Denominations the same which the Schoolmen are obliged to affirm of the Relations of the Divine Persons to the Creatures Nor can I see any Absurdity of extending the same conclusion to the Internal Relations as the Schoolmen call them As for instance The Relation of Paternity may justly as I conceive be stiled an extrinsical Denomination extrinsical I say not to the sacred Triad but to the Person of the Father who is denominated by it and in the same sense Filiation extrinsical
The utmost their Hypothesis will allow them to pretend to is That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD According to the Schoolmen the Humane Nature of Christ subsists and is a Principium quod of all its own Actions equally with the Humane Nature of any other Humane Person they seem to me to strive to disguise the Heresy of Nestorius by saying That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD because it subsists by the Subsistence or Personality of the WORD To explain this a little The Schoolmen who under pain of Heresy assert but one singular absolute Substance in the Trinity found a great and almost insuperable difficulty so to explain the Incarnation that only the Person of the WORD and not the whole Trinity was incarnated or became Man This is an obvious enquiry What it is which was immediately united to the Humane Nature of Christ so as to denominate Christ both God and Man To assert that the singular common Divine Nature was immediately united to the Humane Nature was to assert the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since whatever belongs to the common Divine Nature immediately belongs equally to the whole Trinity it remains therefore according to them that only the Mode of Subsistence of the WORD was immediately united to the Humane Nature This Answer has visibly many difficulties in it which may be considered hereafter Now I am only to enquire how it denies the Humane Nature of Christ to be a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD The Humane and Divine Nature of Christ have say they but one singular Mode of Subsistence Well grant that possible What follows The Schoolmen say that then they are not two distinct Persons I cannot for my life see the Consequence That Maxim of the Law Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona oequum est ac si concurrerent in duobus may be as I conceive applied here If we suppose it possible for one Personality to constitute two distinct Natures each a Person it is a meer wrangle of a term to deny these two Natures to be two distinct Persons they have all the Properties of two distinct Persons they are two distinct Principia quoe equally with two other Persons The Animadverter does not barely alledge these to me unintelligible Subtilties of the Schools as the only defence of the sacred Article of the Incarnation against Nestorianism but in his third and next Argument to prove that Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in finite Persons He unwittingly I charitably presume has endeavoured to overthrow the defence which the most Learned and Orthodox Fathers of the Church have given us of this sacred and mysterious Article P. 73. N. 4. The Soul of man is Self-conscious and yet not a Person therefore c. P. 74. lin 22. If the Soul be a Person then the Body must be joined to it by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the Soul as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the composition and constitution of a man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no Body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an one as makes a compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed has in this spoke the sense of the Catholick Church For as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is one man so God and Man is one Christ that is One not by Confusion of Substance but by Unity of Person I hope no True Son of the Church of England nor indeed Candid Lover of the Article but will pardon my digression if it deserve to be called such to vindicate this Similitude whereby the most Learned Fathers of the Church have endeavoured to illustrate and defend this Article against all its Heretical Opponents The Animadverter first objects That then the Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Vnion Alas Obj. 1. How extremely afraid are some persons of having the Articles of their Faith found agreeable to the common Principles of Reason If by an Hypostatick Union he means that the Soul and Body of Man only subsist by the same singular Mode of Subsistence and that nothing but the Mode of the Subsistence of the Soul is immediately united to the Body I do assure the Animadverter that I believe not a Syllable of this I do not believe that one Mode can modify two Subjects or that a corporeal Body can be terminated perfected by a Mode of an incorporeal nature such as the Soul is Figure is a Mode of quantity and yet to me it seems unconceivable that a Giant should be terminated by the figure of a Dwarf without any alteration of his quantity or that a Dwarf should have the figure of a Giant and yet not altered in quantity Less am I able to conceive that the Humane Nature of Christ should be terminated by a Mode of Subsistence which belongs to a Divine Nature Secondly Obj. 2. If the Constitution of a Man be an Hypostatick Union then an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an One as makes a compound Hypostasis will not be quite different things then the Hypostatick Union in Christ will be also an Hypostatick Composition and then the Person of Christ will be a compound Hypostasis Well and what follows from all this why nothing but a threatning of the Animadverter's That in due time we shall be taught the Falshood of all this But not to await his due time I answer that to say that the Hypostatick Union in Christ is also an Hypostatick Composition or which is the same that Christ is a compound Hypostasis is so far from being a Paradox that it is the received Language not only of the Greek Fathers but of the Councils Syn. 5a. Constantin Can. 4. Sancti Patres docuerunt unitatem Dei verbi ad carnem animatam anima rationali intellectuali secundum compositionem Theodori autem Nestorii sequaces divisione gaudentes affectualem unitatem introducunt Sancta Dei verò Ecclesia utriusque perfidioe impietatem ejiciens unitionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur Vide Can. 7um hujus Concilii Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. Hear Petavius's Confession Christi Domini Hypostasin sive personam à plerisque Patribus dici compositam ex naturis duabus ut ab Cyrillo Damasceno Maximo aliis To which add what the Learned Suarez hath observed Suarez de
denominates him the particular Person of the Father This last Question is what the Fathers were chiefly concerned in The Noetianists the Patri-Passianists rarely disputed the Personality of Father Son and Holy-Ghost None who understand the meaning of the Term can deny that Father Son and Holy Ghost are each of them a proper Person if he acknowledges that each of them is properly God None can imagine that that Being which is God is either an Accident a Part or to please the Animadverter an Adjunct to any other Being Those only deny the Personality who esteem the Son and Holy Spirit that is each of them not properly God but something in God the Personal Word or Wisdom of God the Father or his Personal Power This was the great Controverted Debate Whether the Father Son and Holy Ghost that is whether Each of them was a Distinct Person and consequently whether they were Three Persons Now Paternity say the Ancient Fathers in this sense constituted the Father a distinct Divine Person The Schoolmen change the Question and say That it constituted him a Person In the same sense Filiation according to the Ancients constituted the Son a distinct Person and Procession Sanctification constituted the Holy Spirit a distinct Person from Father and Son This Observation will be of great use to any one who shall read the Ancients concerning the Personality of Father Son and Holy Ghost CHAP. III. P. 93. N. 1. COnsideration 5. When the terms Cause formal Reason constituent or productive Principle and the like are used about the Divine Nature and Persons they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms but only by way of Analogy as really meaning no more than a causal or necessary dependance of one Notion or Conceptus Objectivus upon another so that it is impossible for the Mind to conceive distinctly of the one but as depending upon or proceeding from the other Compare this with his first Consideration P. 92. That the natural Order of Prius and Posterius founded in the universal Reason of things according to which the Conception of one thing presupposes and depends upon the Conception of another makes no Prius or Posterius and yet is by no means to be contradicted or confounded in our discoursing of God This the Animadverter lays down as a Rule to guide our Discourses concerning the Divine Persons To which I answer First That these Considerations contain a direct Heresy the express Heresy of Sabellius Secondly That the Animadverter himself notoriously breaks these Rules even where he ought to have kept them First It is the direct Heresy of Sabellius to assert That there is no Prius and Posterius between the Divine Persons The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed denies a Prius or Posterius in the Trinity in reference to Duration or Time they are all three Co-eternal But to deny a Prius and Posterius in Original is to deny that there is a Father and Son in the Trinity Again it is very pleasant for the Animadverter to tell us That this Prius and Posterius is founded in the Vniversal Reason of things and yet denies it in the Divine Nature As if Universal Reason did not reach infinite as well as finite Nature I suppose he means That there is a natural Order of Prius and Posterius founded in the particular reason of finite Natures which makes no Prius or Posterius in the infinite Divine Nature And it is as pleasant to hear him telling us That this natural Order of Prius and Posterius must not be contradicted in our discoursing of God when in the very immediate preceding words himself had contradicted it and affirmed that there was no Prius and Posterius in the Divine Nature Secondly Himself most shamefully confounds this Natural Order of Prius and Posterius when he asserts p. 98. That the Father is formally constituted a Person by his own personal Act of Generation P. 249. That personal Properties are properly Personalities P. 250. That the Relation and Mode of Subsistence make but one single indivisible Mode of Being Yet says the Animadverter in the next immediate words according to the Natural Order of conceiving things we must conceive of the Subsistence as precedent to the Relation For as much as Human Reason considers things simply as subsisting before it can consider them as related to one another The meaning of all this is That these are Rules when he hopes that he can confute the Dean of St. Paul's Self-Consciousness cannot be Subsistence because according to the natural Order of conceiving things we must conceive of the Subsistence before the Self-Consciousness Self-Consciousness cannot be the formal Reason of Personality for as much as it is a Personal Act one property of the Person already constituted These are Demonstrations against the Dean of St. Paul's What pity was it that the Dean of St. Paul's never asserted this once in all his Book for then it would have been allowed the Animadverter that in one single Article he had been too hard for the Dean But why are not these Rules to himself Is not Generation as much a personal Act as Self-Consciousness Is not the Attribute of being a Father one property of a Person already constituted Is not this Relation founded upon and posterior to a personal Act of Generation Can any thing according to human Reason be related before it is I believe the Animadverter in this point must borrow his own words and tell us That his Thoughts and Words can reach no higher Lastly The Animadverter denies a Prius and Posterius in the Divine Nature to purpose when he tells us That even Productive Principles when used in reference to the Divine Persons that is Father and Son are not applicable to them in the strict and proper Signification of the said term With his leave the Father is strictly and properly the productive Principle of his Son or else he cannot be strictly and properly the Father of his Son or else he did never strictly and properly beget his Son The Arians deny a proper Generation and assert That the Father is an Adoptive Creative and not Generative Father of his Son The Sabellians on the other hand adulterate both the Divine Generation and Mission and expound them in a figurative improper Sense Against both these Heresies the Church has ever professed a true and proper Generation amongst the Divine Persons P. 94. lin 25. N. 2. Self-Consciousness is a personal Act and therefore Self-Consciousness cannot be the formal reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is and to whom it personally belongs The Consequence I allow the Animadverter I only enquire Why it concludes not against Generation which is as confessedly a Personal Act as Self-consciousness Secondly To affirm that Self-consciousness is a Personal Act is the greatest Heresie to the Schoolmen A Personal Act is an Act proper and peculiar to some
the Trinity say the Schoolmen is not therefore a Father because he generates but therefore generates because he is a Father Fifthly Filiation constitutes the Son formally a Son that 's not the question But does Filiation constitute the Son a Person that is the thing in debate and which the Animadverter ought to have proved Sixthly The very Personal Subsistence of these Persons implies and carries in it a formal Relation This is not sufficient to imply a Relation to carry in it a Relation except the Animadverter means that the Personal Subsistence is it self a Relation Again Subsistence in relation to a productive Principle which is all the Relation the Animadverter here mentions is a quite different thing from Personal Subsistence Every Human Person subsists relatively in Relation to God his Creator but what is this to his Personality This does not denominate an Human Person relative in his Personality The Son and Holy Spirit relate to the Father as their productive Principle but how does this prove them Relative Persons It is certain That to be a Father P. 101. lin 3. N. 4. is a Relative Subsistence A Father as understood in this Mystery viz. as implying the property of being unbegotten can have no Relation to a productive Principle A Father has indeed a Relation to a Son but the natural Order of conceiving things obliges us to conceive of a Person as subsisting before we can conceive him capable of the Act of Generation or of the Relation of a Father The Schoolmen therefore call this not a thing certain and evident but a Mystery and confess that unless the Father be so denominated antecedently to his Act of Generation it is impossible that the Father's being a Relative Subsistence or Person should be so much as true And having said thus much from the Animadverter concerning this Subtilty of the Schools viz. the Relativeness of the Divine Persons in their Personalities give me leave to consider it more generally And first it is no small prejudice with me against the Scholastick Subtilties that in this material Article all Antiquity for above a thousand Years have affirmed the quite contrary viz. that to be a Person is an absolute Attribute Petrus Abelardus Peter Lombard Council of Trent examined and disproved c. p. 79. August lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 6. Hugo de St. Victore who first shewed the way to School-Divinity saith the Learned Bishop of Worcester all agreed with St. Augustin That Pater dicitur ad se persona that the Father was absolutely and not relatively called a Person Indeed St. Augustin has given us an unanswerable Argument against this Assertion of the Relativeness of this Attribute of being a Person in this Sacred Mystery August lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 6. If to be a Person be a Relative Attribute as to be a Friend is then according to the nature of all Relatives the Father when denominated a Person must be defined by his Correlate and so of the other Persons that is to say that this Phrase viz. The Person of the Father cannot signify the Father but the Son And this Phrase viz. The Person of the Son cannot signify the Son but the Father for so it is in all other Relatives The Friend of James cannot be James but must be Peter or some other Person This is a just Consequence of this Scholastick Subtilty I need not note the Paradoxicalness of it To which I add as an Argument ad homines to the Animadverter and those who follow the Schools That to be a Person is as common to Father Son and Holy Ghost Animadv p. 113. as to be God is common to the Three If therefore this be a sure Rule that whatever Attribute is communicable is absolute to be a Person will be an absolute Attribute Si enim tres personae commune est eis id quod persona est St. August lib. 7 de Trin. cap. 4. as certainly communicable And they strain very hard to maintain this Scholastick Subtilty who deny that this Attribute of being a Person is common to Father Son and Holy Ghost save only in Name or aequivocally and yet this is a just consequence of asserting the Relativeness of this Attribute That which drove the Schoolmen to this novel and unintelligible Subtilty shall be considered hereafter P. 101. N. 5. Argument III. If Self-Consciousness be the formal reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing it self but that there might be Three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three P. 102. lin 1. c. Because this repugnancy if there be any must be either from the nature of Self-Consciousness or from the Nature of the Godhead But it is from neither of them For first there is nothing in the Nature of Self-Consciousness to hinder its Multiplication c. Nor in the next place is there any repugnancy on the part of the Godhead that Three thousand Self-Conscious Spirits should subsist in it any more than that Three should For the Godhead considered precisely and abstractedly in it self and not as actually included in any Person is as able to communicate it self to the greatest number as to the smallest This is an old Socinian Objection and were it of any force it would conclude universally against the Faith of Three Divine Persons viz. that if we once acknowledg a plurality of Divine Persons we can give no reason why we stop at the number Three we might equally assert Three thousand as well as Three For to suppose a Socinian retorting the Animadverter's own Argument against himself If Three distinct Modalities or Modes be sufficient to constitute Three Divine Persons then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing but that there might be Three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three Because this repugnancy if there be any must be either from the Nature of a Mode or from the Nature of the Godhead But it is from neither of them for first there is nothing in the Nature of a Mode to hinder its Multiplication into never so great a number of particulars but that there may be Three thousand or Three millions of Modes as well as Three Nor in the next place is there any repugnancy on the part of the Godhead that Three thousand Modes subsist in it or be sustained by it any more than that Three should For the Godhead considered precisely and abstractedly and not as actually included in any Person is as able to communicate it self to the greatest number of Modes as to the smallest Now there is not a surer sign that an Author does not understand the Subject he writes upon than his bringing an Objection which is so plainly and easily retorted upon his own Hypothesis The Animadverter cannot answer this Objection in the mouth of a Socinian but in the same words he will answer himself The Faith of
more properly a term equipollent and convertible with a Divine Person than with the term God As it is true that one and the same God or Godhead is common to p. 120. l. 6. n. 6. and subsists in all and every one of the three Persons so it is true that one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is common to and subsists in the said three Persons This Fallacy is easily answered One Godhead and one Infinite Spiritual Nature in abstracto is common to the three Persons The Animadvertor must prove that this Rule holds of one Infinite Spirit in concreto God the Father is not God the Son God the Father and God the Son are not the same God in Person or Personality in the words of the learned Petavius Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 9. S. 3. p. 282. Non est igitur Filius idem ille unus Deus qui Pater Can the Animadvertor believe that Petavius would have scrupled to say Non est igitur Filius idem ille unus Spiritus qui Pater The same one Godhead by being common to three Persons becomes Deus trinus in Personis in which Phrase Trinus agrees with Deus and not with Personis nor is it capable of that common but groundless Interpretation of Tri-une God is three and not tri-une in Persons Had Trinus ever signified tri-une which yet it never did to the Ancients nor by any Rules of Grammar ought it to signifie so now If it be here objected p. 120. n. 7. that we allow of three distinct Persons in the Godhead of which every one is Infinite without admitting them to be three distinct Gods and therefore why may we not as well allow of three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits in the same Godhead without any necessity of inferring from thence that they are three distinct Gods This Objection is every way to the purpose this is the Plea of the Reverend Dean To say they are three Divine Persons and not three Infinite Minds was what the Reverend Dean could not understand Secondly This is the great Objection of the Socinians three Humane Persons are three Men three Angelical Persons three Angels therefore three Divine Persons three Gods They esteem God and a Divine Person terms equipollent and convertible they esteem the Consequence from three Divine Persons to three Gods necessary immediate and unavoidable Not one Socinian who understands himself but will confess that he can as soon believe three Infinite Minds as three Divine Persons reconcileable with the Article of the Unity of God If the Animadvertor can give an Answer to this Socinian Objection from the Phrase of three Divine Persons which is not equally applicable to his own Objection against the Phrase of three Infinite Spirits I will yield him the Point he contends for One thing I must note which to me betrays the Animadvertor's fear I mean his not representing the Objection fair The Dean's Phrase is put down three distinct Infinite Minds why did he not equally say three distinct Infinite Persons Why must this last be expressed by a Circumlocution three Persons of which every one is Infinite How often has the Animadvertor used the Phrase of three Divine Persons which is the same with three Infinite Persons Is not this to make a distinction without a difference p. 120. n. 8. I Answer that the case is very different and the reason of the difference is this because three Infinite Minds or Spirits are three absolute simple Beings or Essences and so stand distinguished from one another by their whole Beings or Natures But the Divine Persons are three Relatives or one simple Being or Essence under three distinct Relations and consequently differ from one another not wholly and by all that is in them but only by some certain Mode or Respect peculiar to each and upon that account causing their distinction This Answer puts me in mind of a certain Respondent who being at a great loss cryed Nego id not determining whether it was the Major Minor or Conclusion which he denyed And I believe most Readers will be equally at a loss whether the Animadvertor applies this Answer to the Premises or Conclusion The Animadvertor's Argument against the Reverend Dean's Assertion of three Infinite Minds is this One Infinite Mind is one God therefore three Infinite Minds are three Gods The Socinians Objection mutatis mutandis the same One Divine Person is one God therefore three Divine Persons are three Gods The Consequence of each Argument the same viz. That three Infinite Minds three Divine Persons must be thrice what one Infinite Mind or one Divine Person is The Consequence is a Mathematical Conclusion that three of any kind must be thrice what one of the same kind is Will the Animadvertor deny the Antecedent that one Divine Person is one God Or will he deny that Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Persons This Objection depends not immediately upon the Relativeness or Absoluteness of a Divine Person If one Mode one Accident one Relation be one God how shall we avoid the Conclusion that three Modes three Accidents or three Relations are three Gods The force of this Answer if it has any must lye in this that there are not properly three Divine Persons the Divine Persons are not three as three Infinite Minds are three to speak the truth the ternary number belongs not to the Persons but to the Personalities to the Modes to the Relations We use the Phrase of three Relatives but we mean only three relations of one simple Being and with equal Justice the Animadvertor might have said that we use the Phrase of three Persons but we mean only three Personalities of one absolute Person The Animadvertor entirely begs the Question if he takes three Relatives and one simple Being under three Relations to be equipollent Adam had three relations of a Creature an Husband and a Father yet he is but one Relative A Relative is not the Relation but that which has the Relation the Subject of the Relation The Person of the Father is one simple Being God under two Relations of Generation and Spiration is therefore the Person of the Father two Relatives two Persons Again the Divine Persons are three Relatives Why did not the Animadvertor speak out Are they three Relative Substances three Relative Accidents or three Relative Modes Further Genebrard and the same I believe of the Reverend Dean would have told him that three Infinite Minds or Spirits have but one singular individual Spiritual Nature or Essence and therefore according to Genebrard three Infinite Minds differ no more than three Divine Persons Lastly the difference of the Divine Persons is not the difference of one simple Being under three Relations For one simple Being under one Relation cannot be simply denyed of it self under another Relation Adam the Father is Adam the Husband Adam the Creature the Person of the Father is the Spirator of the Holy Ghost though as he
for the first I grant that the three Persons in the Blessed Trinity differ as really as Peter James and John But Secondly if by real distinction be meant as great a distinction so we utterly deny that the three Divine Persons differ as much as Peter James and John I Answer that this Phrase as really signifies in the same degree of real distinction as this Phrase as Wisely imports the same degree of Wisdom Again it is an idle Enquiry to dispute by what Name we must call the distinction of the Divine Persons If they were three Infinite Minds they can but be simply denyed one of the other we could then only say that the Father is not the Son nor the Son the Father nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son and this I shall hereafter shew is not a Modal but a strictly real distinction CHAP. VI. n. 1. THERE ought to be a double care in treating of Mysterious Articles of Faith on the one hand not to debase them to avoid the difficulties which attend the Article in its Native sense and on the other hand not studiously to seek out for Mysteries which possibly God never intended nor to refuse such Illustrations of the Article from Natural Examples which readily offer themselves especially if they have the Suffrage of the most Pious and Learned Fathers of the Church The Sabellian Hereticks have adulterated the Divine Generation because they could not explain how God an Immortal Spirit can generate On the other Hand the Schoolmen are not satisfied that the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation in the general contain great Mysteries in them but they will have every Conclusion throughout both the Articles to be so These two Articles are delivered with so much plainness and simplicity in the Sacred Scriptures and with so much subtilty in the Writings of the Schoolmen that a stranger to the Christian Faith upon the comparing of them both together could hardly be perswaded that the latter were pretended to be an explication of the former The Sacred Writings contented themselves to teach us that the Father and Son are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that these three are one The Fathers of the Church justly explained this Unity that they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one in Nature one in Godhead the Unity of a Father and a begotten Son is an Unity of Nature The Shoolmen advance one step higher it is not sufficient with them for any one to acknowledge the Divine Persons to be one in Nature Essence Divinity unless he adds in one singular Essence in one singular Nature in one singular Divinity and that under pain of being guilty of the worst of Heresies Tritheism it self The Animadvertor keeps pace with the warmest not only contends against the admission of a Specifick Unity in the Trinity but calls it a Traducing of the Fathers to assert that they held this Specifick Unity As to the Question it self I wish from the bottom of my Heart that we might learn to distinguish betwixt the Primary Conclusions of our Faith and disputed Articles that they who contend for the singularity of the common Divine Nature with the Schools would not overthrow the received Faith of three Divine Persons and that the Article of the Unity of God be esteemed infinitely more Sacred than any seeming Advantages that the Assertion of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity might afford us in the maintaining the Faith of three Divine Persons The Christian Faith professes an Unity in Trinity and a Trinity in Unity He therefore who asserts an Unity to destroy the Trinity or a Trinity in derogation of the Unity offends against the Christian Religion I shall much rather choose my self and recommend to my Orthodox Reader the Belief that the Divine Nature is above these terms of Art above these distinctions of Logick of Singular and Universal that it is transcendental to those Rules by which we judge of created inferiour Natures than any ways weaken either of those Fundamental Articles before mentioned either of the Unity of God or of the Trinity of Divine Persons The learned Petavius seems to me to incline to this Opinion where speaking of the Unity of the Divine Nature Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 1583. he has these words Speciei unitate constituta etiam individua singularis sequitur And in that Famous Objection of the Greeks against the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son viz. that then Father and Son are one Principle of the Holy Spirit either specie sola or numero Lib. 7. de Trin. c. 16. n. 1. p. 156. To which Petavius Answers That they are Vnum reverà numero specie Principium quatenus in Deum convenire ambo ista possunt Where he expresly asserts that a Specifick Unity and an Unity of Singularity are consistent in the Divine Nature nay that the latter follows from the former as also that the vis spiratrix which to Petavius and the Schools has the same Unity with the common Divine Essence is one both in specie and in number Suarez Metaph. Disp 5. S. 1. n. 6. Non desunt Theologi qui dicant Divinam essentiam nec singularem nec universalem esse And in the Margin Vide Durandum alios in 1. D. 35. To the same purpose I understand those Divines who assert that the common Divine Essence is neither a first nor second Substance that is neither strictly Singular nor Universal but in some measure partaking of both transcendental to both However it must not be dissembled that since every created Nature is either strictly Singular or Universal we want a medium to prove that the Divine Nature can be transcendental to both these and therefore how Modest and Peaceable and otherwise Eligible such an Assertion seems to be yet when we contend with an obstinate Adversary with a subtile Socinian it will be hazardous to found the Defence of so Sacred an Article upon what he will be apt to stile a Precarious Hypothesis The common Opinion of Philosophers is that Singulare and Vniversale are contradictorily opposed in Finite Creatures and consequently that there can be no medium betwixt them and it is not easie to give a Reason why the same Rule should not hold in the Divine Nature especially since we cannot in this Conclusion plead the Authority of express Revelation as we can in that Mysterious Article of a Divine Generation and Procession There is no need of this Precaution in reference to the Animadvertor my Debate with him is rather Historical and Problematical than Dogmatical Historical as whether the Ancient Fathers held this Opinion of the Universality of the common Divine Essence Problematical whether those Reasons which he has brought against the admission of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity prove such Notion to be unphilosophical Nay I do here disclaim all Dogmaticalness in this Conclusion I shall not in the least contend with any Orthodox Divine who
Ancient Fathers denied them to have one simple subject Vt visum est Sabellio sed diversitatem illam multiplicitatem in subjecto esse reverà To assent to the ternary number to be only in the Modes or Properties is the Sabellian Heresy the Catholick Faith is that there are three Persons as well as three Personalities three Subjects of the Divine Relations It is no contradiction that the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same Subject should be Father and Son the contradiction is that the same Subject should be Father and Son to it self These Properties cannot have relation to the same Subject Otherwise they are consistent in the same Subject in the same Person in the same finite Person the same Man is both Father and Son The Divine Person of the Son according to the Western Church is produced himself and doth produce the Holy Spirit which are opposite Relations as well as Paternity and Filiation But the contradiction vanishes since those opposite relations respect distinct Subjects He is produced by the Father he doth produce the Holy Spirit This therefore is the principal enquiry in this sacred Article what is the Subject of Paternity not what is Paternity that is but a secondary Article of less moment what is the Subject of Filiation not what Filiation is What is the Subject of Procession not what Procession is in other words what is the Father what is the Son what is the Holy Ghost The Subject of Paternity is not the Subject of Filiation for then the Father would be the Son Nor is the Subject of Procession the Subject either of Paternity or Filiation for then the Holy Ghost would either be Father or Son or both To say that the Divine Nature is the Subject of Paternity Filiation and Procession is not only contrary to the Ancients who assert these Properties not to be the Names of the Essence but renders the Sabellian Heresy impossible to be confuted since an infinite Person is as capable of sustaining these three distinct relations as an infinite nature and makes one and the same Subject Father and Son to it self lastly contradicts our formal conception of these sacred Articles The Divine Nature is according to our conception the essential Form of the Divine Persons is predicated of the Divine Persons in obliquo Father Son and Holy Ghost have each of them the full whole and entire Divine Nature in them We are enquiring what it is which may be predicated in recto of them and which may be multiplied with them what is the Subject to which the essential form in our imperfect conception of these things is joyned and which we conceive as the proper subject of the Divine Relations And after the strictest enquiry I can make no better Answer than the Church has done before me Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Hypostases three Substances when that term is not understood as equipollent with Essence three infinite Substances so say the Schoolmen only they add Relative three infinite spiritual Beings which is all the Reverend Dean understood by three infinite Spirits That is that they are not three Faculties or Affections of one Being but three proper Beings Both Accidents and Modes are affections of Being And moreover P. 242. l. 5. n. 7. as every Mode essentially includes in it the Thing or Being of which it is the Mode so every Person of the Blessed Trinity by vertue of its proper Mode of Subsistence includes in it the God-head it self and is properly and formally p. 293. the God-head it self as subsisting with and under such a certain Mode or Relation This is a very fruitfull Period of Paradoxes A Mode according to the Animadverter is an Abstract not concrete Term to be understood as a simple Form as the Affection of a Being as Himself defines it p. 31. and not a Being affected The Concrete of a Mode includes the Being as well as the Mode Album includes the Thing that is white as well as whiteness but Album is not formally the Mode not Whiteness but that which has Whiteness the subject of Whiteness Whiteness the Affection the Mode is an Abstract and by the Term abstracts from the Subject Secondly The Father is Essentially God by his Nature this all confess but who ever said that the Father is Essentially God by his Personality by his Paternity Thirdly There can be no such Heresy as that of Sabellius if every Mode of the Deity essentially includes the Deity the Rankest Sabellianist never denied that Father Son and Holy Ghost signified three Modes of the Deity Fourthly I cannot but ask this great Master of Language why he uses those Terms its and it speaking of a Divine Person He was pleased to condemn this Language as improper and absurd when used of Human Persons Anim. c. p. 341. is there more respect due to Human Persons than to Divine Persons Had it been any fault to have expressed it thus So every Person of the Blessed Trinity by vertue of his not its proper Mode of Subsistence includes in Him not it the God-head it self Far be it from me to pretend to be a Critick in Words or Phrases I rather crave the Reader 's even the Animadverter's pardon for much greater slips than this However 't is some comfort that I find Homer Himself may nod sometimes P. 242. l. 17. n. 8. And accordingly as these Relations are three and and but three so the Persons of the God-head to whom they belong are so too viz. Father Son and Holy Ghost Some Persons take a priviledge to speak and write what they please The Animadverter might almost as well have said that the Persons of the God-head are but two as that the Relations are but three Nothing is more notorious than that there are four Relations in the Trinity if the Relation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father inferr two Relations there can be no shadow of pretence why the Relation of the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit and of the Holy Spirit to the Father and Son should not make two more P. 243. There are says the Animadverter four internal Acts Generation Filiation Spiration Procession though by the By two of these are not Acts but Passions viz. Filiation and Procession upon which the Divine Relations are founded and from which they flow And in the same Page puts the Objection That four Relations inferr four Persons which he endeavours to solve in the following Words That is one Difficulty and unanswerable upon the Animadverter's Principles that one singular Divine Nature is the Subject of these four Relations The Second is What this Relation of it self is whether a Mode or not an infinite relative Substance or not The Schoolmen are obliged to confess this a Property of a Person already constituted and not a Mode of Subsistence Whereas if with the Ancients we assert the Divine Persons to be three substantial Beings three Hypostases
in the proper and genuine Sense of the Phrase the Modes of Subsistence the Divine Relations are capable of an easie and fair Solution as I have formerly hinted chap. 1. n. 14. Upon the whole Matter in discoursing of the Trinity P. 245. l. 19. n. 9. Two things are absolutely necessary to be held and insisted upon One that each and every Person of the Blessed Trinity entirely contains and includes in himself the whole Divine Nature The other That each Person is incommunicably different and distinct from the other This one Sentence is a truly Golden one contains the fundamental Truth of this Article of the Trinity But to speak the truth it stands like a Parenthesis or like a forged Passage in an Author it has no connexion with what goes before it and the latter part is confuted by what follows These are the Animadverter's following Words And here if it should be asked How they differ P. 245. n. 10. and whether it be by any real distinction between the Persons What need of this Question which the preceding Words had so positively and orthodoxly determined each Person is incommunicably different and distinct from the other What ever is incommunicably different is certainly really different by a true real and not modal Difference The Animadverter answers P. 246. That the Divine Persons really differ and are distinguished from one another viz. by a Modal or lesser sort of Real difference according to which the Divine Nature subsisting under and being determined by such a certain Mode personally differs from it self as subsisting under and determined by another What is this but to tell us that he did not understand those former Words that each Person is incommunicably different from the other Can any thing be incommunicably different from it self He tells us that two Persons are the same self how is it possible that they can be more communicably the same The Person of the Father is Modally different from the Person of the Spirator but not incommunicably different The Person of the Father is the Divine Nature subsisting under the Mode of Paternity which Modally differs from it self under the Mode of Spiration But all this arises from a mistake of the Nature of Real and Modal Difference In a real Difference we say simply that the one is not the other according to the Animadverter p. 77. That wheresoever there are two distinct Persons we do and must by all the Rules of Logick and Grammar say that the one is not the other And the Rule is as true è converso that where we can say one is simply not the other there we must count two we must acknowledge a strictly real Difference Thus we say that the Father is not the Son that is the Subject of Paternity is not the Subject of Filiation In a Modal Difference the Negation is Modal secundum quid in some Mode or Respect The Person of the Father as a Father is not the Spirator But there needs no proof in so allowed a conclusion Not one Schoolman whom I have met with but is a better Divine and soberer Reasoner I will add and a sounder Philosopher than to affirm that the Divine Persons differ Modally or that a simple Negation can arise from a Modal Difference The first Rudiments in Logicks teach us That Negative Propositions are of a malignant Nature and universally remove the Predicate from the Subject and not under a certain Mode only The exactly learned and solid Forbesius as the Animadverter stiles him p. 251. in the same Chapter which he there quotes S. 19. declares that the Divine Persons differ really as that is distinguished from the greatest Modal Distinction Inter personas in Divinis est realis distinctio Forbesii Instr hist Theol. lib. 1. cap 35. S. 19. non tamen essentialis aut absoluta sed tantum Hypostatica seu personalis relativa secundum oppositionem personarum inter se internam relativam realem To whom I will add the words of the learned Suarez Lib. 3 de Trin. cap. 1. n. 3. p. 385. Vnaquaeque divina Persona in se spectata est vera res per se subsistens una non est alia Ergo est distinctio realis inter ipsas nam realiter distingui nihil aliud est quam esse veras res quarum una non est alia Again Distinctio modalis nunquam invenitur Ibid. n. 4. nisi intra eandem rem quae componitur vel aliquo modo coalescit ex illis rebus quae ita distingui dicuntur Vnde quod ita ab aliqua re semper est tanquam modus vel affectio ejus ut inductione facile constet ideò in Deo non habet locum hic modus distinctionis quae vere actualiter fit in re ipsa quia in eo non habet locum compositio nec modificatio vel affectio per aliquid a seipso actualiter in re distinctum à substantia Dei ergo sola superest distinctio realis quae inter divinas personas esse possit These words are very full and deny not only a modal Distinction betwixt the Divine Persons but any Modes in God for that Modes would inferr a Composition in God In the former abstracted Sense they are properly Personalities or personal Properties P. 249. lin 9. n. 11. By the Animadverter's Favour Personality and a personal Property are distinct Things Differentia and Proprium are different Species of predicables Where the difference is unknown to us as in all Individuals in all singular Persons we use the Properties or a Collection of Accidents in the Definition instead of the Difference but this alters not the Nature of the Properties or Accidents Thus the Ancient Fathers described the Divine Persons by their Personal Properties These are the Animadverter's own words Anim. p. 88. Self-consciousness is one property of a rational or intelligent Being suppose of an Angel then it will be a Property of a Person or Personal Property Will the Animadverter grant that therefore it is properly in an Angel a Personality no the Argument holds the other way therefore it cannot be properly a Personality P. 249. lin 20. n. 12. For neither would the Latins at first admit of three Hypostases in God as taking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same thing for that they had no other Latin word to translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by but substantia by which also they translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 First The Animadverter falls into his old mistake that the Faith of this Article is That there are three Hypostases in God there are three Hypostases in the Trinity in the Unity of the Divine Nature but not in God Secondly St. Augustin scrupled nay condemned the phrase of three Persons as well as of three Hypostases Thirdly The Distinction of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requires us to distinguish betwixt first and
Nyssen the Reader may more easily consult it and there from his own Eyes be satisfied that this was the judgment of that most learned Father St. Basil This Epistle is the first Authority Petavius quotes in the aforementioned seventh Chapter of his fourth Book of the Trinity I do not desire of the Animadvertor to traverse and examine all Petavius's Allegations much less all the Greek Fathers I am content to stand or fall by this single Epistle if this does not assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity I am content that it pass for a Traducing mis-representing of the Fathers to say That any one of them ever held such a Notion And now I hope with the leave of the Reader I may add that Petavius as well as Dr. Cudworth stands as an unanswered witness and that in the Mouth of these two Witnesses till better Testimony appear the Historical Truth of this disquisition stands at present unshaken n. 10. I in the second place descend to the Problematical part whether the Reasons of the Animadvertor are so cogent as to forbid the Admission of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature The Animadvertor gives us five Reasons p. 181. c. the three first of which are dispatched in a word His first That if a Numerical Unity the Animadvertor means a Singularity in the same Divine Nature be sufficent to make the three Persons one God then a Specifick Unity of the same is not necessary I answer those who admit of a Specifick Unity in the Trinity strictly so called do it upon this account That they are afraid that a Singularity a Numerical Unity in the Animadvertors sense will make Father Son and Holy Ghost one Person as well as one God They conceive that three truly three distinct three can have no other Unity of Nature save a Specifick Unity and those who admit of both mean it only in our imperfect conception of things otherwise they believe that the Unity of the Divine Nature is above both these terms of Art that in our imperfect conception it partakes of some properties of both these Unities but strictly and really it is neither Singular nor Universal The same answer solves the Animadvertor's second Reason n. 11. that a greater and less degree of Unity are not to be admitted in the Divine Nature They who admit of a Specifick Unity deny a Singularity They who in words admit of both do not in reality believe two Unities in the Divine Nature but only one Transcendental Unity in our imperfect Conception partaking of the properties of both these Unities His third has been already answered See cap. 3. n. 5. that a Specifick Unity may agree to ten thousand Individuals as well as to three so may one simple Being have ten thousand Relations or Modes as well as three this Article is wholly owing to Revelation His fourth is that a Specifick Unity is principally n. 12. p. 182. if not absolutely notional and therefore cannot any ways properly belong to the Divine Persons nor is by any means necessary to make the three Persons one God First The Animadvertor brings in his Conclusion with an if if not absolutely notional and yet argues from that Conclusion as if it were the most allowed Maxim Secondly The Distinction of the Divine Attributes of Justice and Mercy is confessedly notional and yet the Animadvertor formerly pronounces it to be Absurd to contradict that Distinction Thirdly The Unity of Nature betwixt Christ and his Mother is certainly a Specifick Unity according to the Animadvertor a notional Unity and yet it is Heresie to deny That Christ and his Mother are of one Nature or Consubstantial Fourthly The Relations of likeness equality which are betwixt the Divine Persons though founded on the express words of Scripture Christ thought it no robbery to be equal with God the Image of the Invisible God the express Image of his Fathers Apostasis are by all the School-men confess'd to be relationes rationis that is Notional and yet I hope the Animadvertor will not hence deny that they ought not properly to belong to the Divine Persons nor necessary to make them one God Fifthly The Unity of the Divine Nature is also a Relation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Consubstantial unius substantioe of one Substance implies a relation in Substance We cannot say That the Father and the Spirator of the Holy Ghost are Consubstantial 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unius substantioe This term is as contrary to the Sabellian Heresie as it is to the Arian and therefore according to the School-mens own Principles this Relation of Unity of Substance must be relatio rationis that is notional Sixthly those Fathers who assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity do not believe that the Divine Persons are said to be one upon no other account save a Specifick Unity or that they are deny'd to be three Gods from a Specifick Unity alone this Unity they conceive necessary but not of it self sufficient Seventhly Even a Specifick Unity hath a sufficient fundamentum in re A Specifick Unity is indeed a Logical Notion but the Foundation of it is something real viz. a real agreement of the distinct Persons or individuals in the same reason of Nature The Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God as really as Peter is a Man and James is a Man and John is a Man Peter James and John are not notionally each of them a Man nor Father Son and Holy Ghost notionally each of them God From this real agreement in Human Persons we Form in Logicks the notion of a Specifick Unity and the Ancient Fathers applied the same notion to the agreement of the Divine Persons The Animadvertor's fifth and last Argument is n. 13. That a Specifick Unity of Nature implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in every one of the particulars to which it belongs therefore such an Unity cannot be admitted in the Divine Nature The Argument put into due Form is to this purpose If a Specifick Unity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings implies a Multiplication of the said Nature then a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons implies a Multiplication of the Divine Nature But a Specifick Unity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings implies a Multiplication of the said Nature therefore a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons implies a Multiplication of the Divine Nature But the Conclusion is Absurd the Divine Nature being uncapable of Multiplication therefore a Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature is not to be allowed from whence such Conclusion follows Now in this Argument as it stands betwixt the Animadvertor and my self I deny the consequence of the Major because I am satisfied the Animadvertor would do the same if I should retort the same Argument mutatis mutandis against his own Hypothesis as for Instance if I should thus urge If a Singularity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings forbids a Plurality
from believing three Gods that they did not as Eulogius there tells us believe that either Father Son or Holy Ghost were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly God and in the next words gives us their positive Faith that they esteemed the Personal properties to be the Persons themselves There may be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Personal property of what we conceive in the Nature of an Accident 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by Aristotle appropriated to Substance Again a Personal property an Accident or Mode can never be properly God So that these Hereticks as the Church then judged them believed one Essence with three properties they believed these properties to subsist or to be Hypostases How near the Animadvertor comes to them when he tells us Animadv c. p. 121. Ibid. p. 275. that the ternary Number belongs only to the Personalities that a Person here or in this Mystery imports a Mode or Relation c. that the Relations subsist I leave to Himself upon cooler consideration Pholii Biblio Cod. ccxxx p. 866. If he desires to see these Notions confuted He may please to consult Eulogius in the same place where He will find that Eulogius thought them scarce in their Senses that could imagine a Relation or Personal property could subsist or be a Person I was the more willing to explain this obscure Heresie since this is the eternal Harangue of the Socinians that the Faith of three proper Persons was condemned by the Ancients in the Person of Philoponus when yet at the same time they confess that the belief of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity was the Faith of the Nicene Fathers which two Opinions are inconsistent that they should condemn that for Heresie the worst of Heresies in Philoponus which they esteemed Orthodox in themselves and their own Party n. 18. Fourthly and lastly Though I see no necessity of Multiplying the Divine Nature if we assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity and less if we assert it in the Sense I only contend for that is for such a transcendental Unity which in our imperfect Conception of things must either be called a Specifick Unity or confessed to want a Name in our present Philosophy yet ex abundanti I am not afraid to declare to the Sociniuns that I would sooner acknowledge three Singular Divine Natures in the Trinity than deny the Faith of three Divine Persons A Singular Nature or Essence if we admit such a Notion in Philosophy is also a Personal Nature or Essence and whatever is Personal in the Divinity it self may be Multiplied nor have the Ancients sometimes scrupled the Phrase of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor Petavius that of Trina Deitas no more than Trinus Deus and genita and ingenita sapientia c. is of the same Import All I will say at present of these and the like Phrases is that they are fairly reconcileable with the true Notion of the Unity of God and no ways contradictions to Reason that I know of Both which I hope to evince in my Second Part where I shall also endeavour to explain the sense in which the Ancients used these different Expressions of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is evident that He the Reverend Dean makes Specifick sameness of Nature p. 186. lin 20. n. 19. and the Agreement of Things Numerically different in one and the same common Nature to signifie convertibly the same thing Well and what follows In this says the Animadvertor Ibid. He is guilty of a very great mistake by making those things the same which are not the same With the Animadvertor's leave the mistake lies wholly at his own door The Agreement of Modes Numerically different in one and the same common Nature and a Specifick sameness of Nature are vastly different But the Reverend Dean's words are the Agreement of Things Numerically different and it is the sense of all Philosophers that Things Numerically differing can only agree in one Specifick Nature The term Deus indeed is neither a Genus nor a Species p. 186. lin ult n. 20. Nevertheless all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis This great Dictator in Philosophy I find is yet to learn the first Rudiments in Logick A terminus communis in Logick is the same with a terminus Vniversalis with a terminus predicabilis and all Logicians I have had the Fortune to consult speak but of five Predicables Genus Species Differentia Proprium Accidens It is too great an absurdity for the Animadvertor to be guilty of to affirm that the term Deus is either Differentia Proprium or Accidens Besides that all the Arguments himself has brought against the Admission of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature are equally levelled against the Admission of the Universality of the common Divine Nature that is against this Assertion that Deus is a terminus communis Animadv p. 154. Essentia habet se per modum termini communis quia licet singularis sit tamen vere est in pluribus suppositis quare in praedicationibus fungitur munere vocis Vniversalis Bellarminus de Christo l. 2. c. 18. Well but do not all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis Shall I borrow his own words and answer that by this expression it would more than seem that He has read them all But by the conclusion that he has read none of them For not one single School-man or Modern who follow them do I verily believe allow this term Deus to be a terminus communis That famous Objection against the Faith of the Trinity which the Schoolmen and Moderns are so much concerned to answer viz. That if the Father is God and the Son is God the Father must be the Son grounded upon this Axiom Quoe sunt eadem unitertio sunt eadem inter se shews the judgment of the Schoolmen and Moderns that they take this term Deus to be a terminus singularis for that Axiom holds not in a terminus communis This indeed the School men and Moderns do hold that this term Deus is a terminus singularis communicabilis communicable by Praedication as a terminus communis but in it self a terminus singularis p 217. lin 2. n. 21. In God besides Essence or Substance we assert that there is that which we call Mode Habitude or Relation We cannot contemplate God as he is in himself a pure simple Act but to assert the existence of Modes in God from our imperfect Conception of things is peculiar to the Animadvertor but this falls in naturally in the next Chapter where we are to enquire whether the Personalities are proper Modes One thing I cannot omit the Animadverter tells us Ibid. That by one or either of these in Conjunction with Essence or Substance we give account of all the Acts Attributes and Personalities belonging to the Divine Nature What do we give
account of the Divine Attributes by Essence and a Mode is this in his own Words Ibid. The constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysitians in their Discourses upon God Can a Reader unacquainted with these Debates believe that by the constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysitians we are to understand the single Aninmadverter alone and yet that is the truth So p. 51. l. 3. he with the same confidence and something else tells us That all Divines hitherto have looked upon and professedly treated of the Divine Nature and Attributes as different and distinct from one another still considering the first as the Subject and the other as the Adjuncts of it What must we say when a Person shall set up for a Critick in the most mysterious Article of our Religion and himself understands not the first Elements of Divinity Did any Divine before himself compound God of Subject and Adjunct Did any Divine before himself assert that Holiness Goodness Truth Knowledge Eternity c. were Adjuncts in God Does he know what an Adjunct is Quod alicui preter essentiam adjungitur something added conjoyned to the Essence of a Being Do not all Divines teach That the Divine Attributes may be predicated in abstracto of God God is his Wisdom his Power his Goodness but a Subject cannot be so predicated of its Adjunct But I am ashamed of confuting so weak a Notion yet our Animadverter has the Face to say That without this Notion it is impossible to discourse intelligibly of the Divine Attributes Ibid. p. 217. P. 223 Qu. 3. n. 27. What is the Substance or Nature of God I answer It is a Being existing of and by it self Incorporeal Infinite Eternal Omniscient Omnipotent c. The Animadverter triumphs over this and some other questions the Reverend Dean had made as easie and trifling for that is the natural Sense of calling them not so very formidable c. But I conceive that he mistook the Reverend Dean's Mind in asking this question which probably was What Notion we can frame in our Minds of the Substance of God of an infinite immaterial Substance However I shall wave that and tell him That he has extremely failed in the answer of this easie Question First When he tells us that the Nature of God is a Being God is properly called a Being but his Nature ought to be stiled an Essence and not a Being when we speak properly and according to the formal Conception of things Secondly To be a Being existing of it self is not of the Nature or Essence of God otherwise the Son and Holy Spirit are not each of them God for certainly neither the Son nor Holy Spirit exist of themselves to be a Being existing of it self is a personal property of the Father alone Thirdly Existing by it self is but an explication of being an Hypostasis or Suppositum which indeed agrees to Father Son and Holy Ghost but yet by the Consent of sober Divines is not esteemed an essential Predication and consequently ought not to be put into the Definition of God Fourthly Incorporeal Infinite c. are Attributes that is according to the Animadverter Adjuncts to the Essence or Nature of God how come they therefore to make up part of the Definition of the Nature of God But I am tired and have reason to believe my Reader so with the observation of the Animadverter's Mistakes and therefore I have omitted very many I did observe and doubtless a more attentive Reader would find many which escaped my notice The Animadverter in this Book has concern'd himself chiefly with three Articles Christ's Satisfaction His Incarnation and the Doctrine of the Trinity and I do not find upon the strictest Search that he understands any one of them Concerning the last of these Articles the Reader cannot have a clearer Proof than by Examination of the Animadverter's eighth Chapter wherein he professedly endeavours to lay down the positive Faith of the Church concerning this Article CHAP. VII I judge it neither improper nor unusefull to represent what the Church has hitherto held and taught concerning this important Article of the Trinity p. 240. l. 2. n. 1. as I find it in Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern Make room for this mighty Man keep silence and learn what Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern have taught in this important Article Goliath himself was not more compleatly armed Cap-a-pee but Goliath wanted little David's Sling he came not in the name of the Lord. And it seems this great Opiniator has forgot his Bible behind him quite forgot Christ and his twelve Apostles in the Crowd of Fathers and School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern Shall I need to remind this great Critick that if Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern have determined I will not say against but without a sufficient Foundation of Scripture their determination is no rule of a Protestant's Faith Article 8. Our Church receives the Creeds themselves because they may be proved by most certain Warrants of Holy Scripture I acknowledge it a great Confirmation of my Faith as to this Article that Councils and Fathers have explained the Scriptures in the same Sense in which I believe them The Ecclesiastical Phrases and Forms of Speech are very usefull to detect aequivocating Hereticks or as they speak in short what the Scriptures deliver in several places or as they are Arguments ad homines to those who acknowledge their Authority p. 240. l. 14. n. 2. Now the commonly received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning the Blessed Trinity so far as I can judge but still with the humblest Submission to the Judgment of the Church of England in the Case is this That the Christian Religion having laid this sure Foundation that there is but one God and that there is nothing i. e. no positive real Being strictly and properly so called in God but what is God and lastly That there can be no Composition in the Deity with any such positive real Being distinct from the Deity it self and yet the Church finding in Scripture mention of three to whom distinctly the God-head does belong it has by warrant of the same Scripture Heb. 1.3 expressed these three by the Name of Persons and stated their Personalities upon three distinct Modes of Subsistence allotted to one and the same God-head and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct Relations First The Complement is very high to the Church of England that he will submit the Faith which he finds in Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern to the Judgment of the Church of England but whom does the Animadverter mean by the Church of England this is his Character of the Churchmen the Clergy of the Church of England in