easily evince For this Victorinus was old before he became a Christian and when upon his becoming so he betook himself to write upon some Articles of the Christian Faith he did it so perplexedly and obscurely and very often so dangerously and unjustifiably as to his way of expressing himself that the Learned Dr. Cave but with a modesty equal to his Learning gives this Character of him in his Historia Literar p. 181. Non videtur ubique Fidei Dogmata satìs accuratè percepisse saltem non satìs feliciter expressisse So that for ought I see this Defender might as well have quoted the Epistolae obscurorum virorum or even himself for the Elegancies of the Latine Tongue as Victorinus Afer for an Authentick Director how we ought to conceive or to express our selves about the Article of the Trinity But to conclude this head what design this Man could have in thus stripping the Divine Nature of it's singularity by making a difference between this and it's Individuality unless he thinks hereby the better to introduce his Tritheism and in time to give another sence even of Individuality too I cannot imagine But I doubt not but his not duly stateing distinguishing the Terms used in disputation will quickly drive him headlong into the grossest Heresies And so I pass to 3. His Third Proposition which runs thus That upon supposal of the singleness or singularity of the Divine Nature the whole Divine Nature cannot be incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son but the whole Trinity must thereby be incarnate too Now this blessed Proposition is borrowed from the Socinians also and is as arrant Socinianism as any part of that whole Heresy But the Answer to it is this That in the Incarnation of the second Person the whole Divine Nature is incarnate but not wholly That is to say non-quoad omnem suum subsistendi modum not in respect of all its Modes or ways of subsisting but only of one Alone viz. that founded in Filiation and proper only to the second Person of the Trinity And therefore since the Godhead is not incarnate under that proper mode of subsisting which it has in the Father nor under that other which it has in the Holy Ghost the Incarnation of the whole Divine Nature in the Son does not infer the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since the said Nature is not hereby Incarnate as to those other Two modes of Subsistence which it has respectively in those other Two Persons And this passage I recommend to the Reader 's Observation as one Notable Instance of those Intolerable Heterodoxies which this Man 's denying all Modes in the Divine Nature will and must inevitably plunge him into 4. As for his Fourth and last Proposition viz. That one single Nature can subsist but once or have but one Subsistence This is so beyond all bounds of shame Scandalous and Heretical and so absolutely destroys Three Personal Subsistences in one single Divine Nature That I shall say nothing in Answer to it having sufficiently overthrown it by what was said before but only set down the Doctrine held by all Catholick Divines and Writers in direct opposition to it Viz. That one and the same Numerical Individual single Divine Nature has Three distinct Persons or Subsistences so belonging to it that it exists in Common in them all and severally in each of them This I affirm to be the Catholick Doctrine and shall say no more to the fore-recited shameful Proposition but leave both it and it's Author to be argued down by that Authority which is much abler and fitter to deal with such Persons and Doctrines than any Disputant can be In the mean time if these Villanous Heterodoxies should as was hinted before in the Animadversions Chap. 12. chance to cross the Water with what Tragical out cryes and clamorous reflexions upon our Church would both Papists and Protestants from all Parts Eccho them back to us again Only our poor Church has this one small happiness amongst her many unhappinesses at present that many of those who receive her Revenues and wear her Honors and in requital of Both invade her Doctrines yet thanks be to God neither do nor can carry her disgrace further than the Reach of their Native Tongue But our Innovator rests not in his former Explications of the Trinity but offers us another and a plainer and that is by a Man and his living Image if any one could tell where to find it However the Notion of it is as the rest were perfectly his own and if possible extreamly more Absurd And to lay it before the Reader it is thus He considers a Man seeing himself represented by Reflexion from a Glass or some such Body for it is an Image by Reflexion only which he here professes to speak of Now says he let us suppose this to be a living Image and that such an one as should exactly answer it's Prototype not only in its external Features Colours and Postures but also in the internal Acts of the Soul such as Knowledge Volition Ioy Grief c. So that as the Man himself Knew or Willed any Thing the Image likewise should exactly Know and Will the same This supposed He tells us further That this Image would be another Person from the Prototype but not another Man forasmuch as he supposes the Prototype and the Image to have the same Numerical Humane Nature in them both and that so as to perform all the Acts of a Man both in the One and in the Other This is the Account he gives us of this living Image in order to his Explication of the Trinity by it And I shall bring it under a particular Examination But before I do so I require this Author to tell me Whether in pag. 6. of this Defence he does not profess to lay the Foundation of his New Hypothesis in giving an Account of the Mysterious Vnion of the Divine Persons by the Unity of a Spirit And whether he does not withal declare himself certainly in the Right in pitching upon that as the best way of explaining the said Union and not the best only but indeed the only fit and proper way of doing it forasmuch as in the strength of it he does with great Contempt reject all the Material sensible Representations which the Fathers were wont to set forth this Mystery by making it his Business to substitute his own Account of this Mysterious Union of the Persons from the Unity of a Spirit as the only thing that could make it Intelligible This is certainly so as appears from the fore-cited place and since it cannot be denied I desire this Author in the next place to inform me how the Explication of this Mysterious Union by a Man and his living Image is explaining it by the Unity of a Spirit and whether the Man or his Image or both be Spirits and the Resemblance between them be this Unity of a Spirit which he spoke of in the place
you no further trouble having with all the Respect and Reverence due to such great and renowned Bodies given you an account of the Occasion of this Address to you as a Thing well deserving your most serious Thoughts and representing the cause of our Venerable Old Religion now at stake as in truth it is I humbly leave the whole matter before you and remain As by Duty and Inclination equally bound Honoured Sirs Your most faithful and devoted Servant A. A. A Collection of several Choice New Theological Terms made use of in Two Books One Entituled A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity c. The other A Defense of Dr. Sherlock 's Notion of the Trinity c. and first Introduced by the said Doctor for giving the Church a better Explication and a clearer Notion of a Trinity in Unity than it has had for above sixteen hundred years before Which Collection is as follows SElf-Consciousness Vind. p. 49. l. 27. Mutual Consciousness Vind. p. 52. l. 4. Natural Self-Consciousness Def. p. 8. l. 7. Natural Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 18. l. 8. Intimate conscious Knowledge Vind. p. 59. l. 4. Conscious life Def. p. 60. l. 20. Self conscious Principle Def. p. 67. l. 16. Natural Principle of mutual Consciousness Def. p. 67. l. 22. Conscious Union Def. p. 9. l. 10. Natural Unity of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 33. l. 2. Communion of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 72. l. 9. Self-Conscious Love and Self-Conscious Complacency Def. p. 68. l. 2 4. Intellectual Sensation Def. p. 77. l. 16. Self-Sensation Def. p. 39. l. 24. Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 4. Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 15. Natural Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 30. Natural Mutual Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 2. Feeling each other's Knowledge Vind. p. 56. l. 24. Self-Consciousness between the Father and the Son Vind. p. 60. l. 14. The Son 's feeling the Father's Will and Wisdom in himself Vind. p. 60. l. 22. The Son the Self Conscious Image of his Father's Will and Knowledge Vind. p. 60. at the end Continuity of Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 12 13. Three distinct Infinite Minds Vind. p. 66. l. 22. One Individual Nature subsisting thrice not by multiplying but only by Repeating it self Def. p. 24. l. 2 3. The Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication Def. p. 37. l. 1. The same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences Def. p. 91. l. 8. The same Individual Nature repeated in its living Image Def. p. 70. l. 4. One Eternal Infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences Def. p. 94. l. 6 c. Which Terms with some others like-them are to be substituted in the room of Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Suppositum Person Hypostasis and Relation All which though constantly used hitherto both by Fathers and Councils yet serving only as this Author affirms to pervert and confound mens Notions and Discourses about the Divine Nature and Persons ought utterly to be exploded and laid aside as meer Gibberish and Gipsie Cant especially by such as account all Greek and Latin so too Several New Heterodox and Extraordinary Propositions partly in Divinity and partly in Philosophy extracted out of the Two forementioned Books 1. THE Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits and not to hold so is both Heresie and Non-sense Vind. p. 66. l. 25. 2. Unless every Person of the Blessed Trinity considered as a distinct Person be allowed to be a distinct Infinite Eternal Mind we shall have nothing left us but a Trinity of meer Modes Names and Postures Defen pag. 8. lin 24. pag. 30. lin 24. 3. That which makes a Spirit whether Finite or Infinite and consequently each of the Divine Persons which according to this Author are Three distinct Infinite Spirits One with it self and distinct from all others is Self-Consciousness and Nothing else Vind. p. 67. lin 11. p. 68. lin 5. 13. 74. lin 15 c. 4. A natural Self-Consciousness makes a Natural Person Def. p. 8. lin 7. 5. If the formal Reason of Personality be that which makes a Mind or Person which with this Author are always Terms convertible one with it self and distinguishes it from all others then Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality Def. p. 37. l. 8 9 10 c. 6. Mutual Consciousness is that which formally unites the Divine Persons in Nature or Essence and makes them all essentially and numerically one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6 7 8. and p. 84 l. 29 and elsewhere frequently 7. There is no other mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father called by the Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceivable or possible but by mutual Consciousness Def. p. 9. l. 15 16 c. 8. The Son and the Holy Ghost are in the Father as in their Cause Vind. p. 69. l. 29. Which Term Divines generally decline the use of using the word Principle instead thereof However this overthrows the foregoing Proposition viz. That the Son can be no otherwise in the Father than by mutual Consciousness 9. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used with reference to the Divine Persons by the Nicene Fathers is not sufficient to prove a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Essence in the said Persons Def. p. 69. l. 1 2 c. 10. The Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Divine Persons is partly specifick partly numerical Def. p. 17. l. 27. 11. It is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate Union in Nature than mutual Consciousness Def. p. 35. l. 22. Whereas an Vnion in one Numerical Essence or Nature is and must be in the very Conception or Notion of it greater and more intimate as being the Ground the Reason and Foundation of the other 12. The very Nature and Subsistence of the Father Son and Holy Ghost is wholly Relative Def. p. 27. l. 21. And for their Subsistence I grant it to be so but if their Nature be wholly Relative too I am sure there is nothing absolute belonging to the Deity 13. The Case of a Man and his living Image though even by this Author 's own confession a meer Fiction or Supposition is a plain Account of the essential Vnity between God the Father and God the Son Def. p. 21. l. 10. That is to say in a Romance we have a clear Explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the first and second Person of the Trinity And in Two who are actually separate and loco-distant from one another we have a plain Account of the Union of Two who both in their Essence and Persons are actually and absolutely inseparable 14. If the Three Divine Persons be considered as Three Infinite Minds distinguished from each other by a Self-Consciousness of their own and essentially united to each other by a mutual Consciousness which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting Minds then a Trinity
inexisting in one Another and lastly Only distinct in their Subsistence but by no means Separate or Divided Let all this I say be supposed on the Part of the Eternal Father and Son And on the other side let us suppose Two other Persons viz. The Prototype and his Living Image and these without any Necessary Coexistence with one Another and the latter not having it 's sole dependance upon the former and both of them such as cannot mutually exist in one Another and withal are not only distinct in their respective Subsistences but also actually separate and locally divided from each other Now I say when we have collated all these Disparities together must not that Comparison think we give us a blessed edifying Representation of the Unity of the Eternal Father and Son in the same Numerical Divine Nature when one side of the Comparison is so far from being an Explication of that it is a direct Irreconcileable contradiction to the other But as we first waved the consideration of those monstrous Absurdities that were involved in this notion of a Man and his living Image with reference to the Eternal Father and Son so let us at present wave the forementioned gross disparities between them also yet still this Notion is utterly unfit to give us any Explication of the Trinity as being every whit as Difficult if not more Difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive than the Trinity it self For the grand Difficulty here is to conceive how one and the same Infinite Nature can be in several distinct though intimately Vnited Persons And the Thing which this Author would explain this by is a Man and his Image where he supposes one and the same Numerically subsisting human Nature to be in Two locally distinct and separately subsisting Persons But now in this Case is it not much more conceivable that an Infinite Nature whose boundless perfection reaches to more ways of subsisting than one should subsist in several persons and those only distinct than that a Particular finite Nature which can have but one Subsistence should subsist in Two Persons and those also locally distant and separate from one Another I appeal I say to any Man of Judgment alive whether this be not the greater and more inexplicable Difficulty of the Two For the mind of Man finds an utter Contradiction in making a Finite Being exist at onâ—e in Two distant Places or Vbi's but in the former though it finds an insuperable Difficulty yet it can allege no Contradiction And therefore I say again that it is in the highest degree senceless and irrational to assign that as an Explication of a Thing which is more difficult perplexed and Inconceivable than the Thing it self which it pretends to explain Which yet is the case here of a Man and his living Image as the Notion of it has been stated and applied to the present subject So that this wonderful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a clearer Idea of the Trinity than ever the World had before has these Three Excellent Qualifications to recommend it 1. That it supposes and builds upon several Things utterly contradictious and impossible 2. That it makes one Thing the Representation of another between which yet as to the very particulars wherein the Resemblance should be there is the highest and utmost Disparity And Thirdly and lastly That it offers to explain a Thing Difficult obscure and by human Reason not Comprehensible by another Thing which is ten times more so So that if this must be the Lot of the Church of England to sit down and see her most Holy Religion practised upon by such wretched Innovations as can tend only to ridicule and expose the chief Articles of it to the Scorn of Arians and Socinians and all this under pretence of explaining them I can but say God deliver our poor Church from such Explainers and our Creed from such Explications And as I heartily commiserate the Vnhappy State of that so I really pity this Bold Man himself that he should be thus suffered to go on venting his Scandalous Heterodoxies without finding either Friends to Counsel or Superiors to Controll him Nevertheless should we with a non obstante to what has been said comply with this Man 's absurd Notion so far as to allow his Prototype and his living Image to bear such a peculiar Resemblance to the Eternal Father and Son as he pretends but can never prove them to do yet how does this any way explain or give us as he calls it any Idea of the Trinity For are the Father and the Son the Trinity without the Holy Ghost And how does this Prototype and living Image set forth to us the Procession of the Holy Ghost from both of them when it makes no mention of any Third Person at all The Son indeed issues from the Father in the way of Knowledge by a Reflex Act thereof expressing his Infinite Nature and Perfections whereupon as it is the Property both of Knowledge and of an Image to represent some thing so if this Prototype and living Image can be of any Use to help our Notions of the Eternal Generation it must be by its Representing Quality But now the Holy Ghost issues from the Father and Son per modum voluntatis by an Eternal Incomprehensible Act of Love streaming from them both and the Property of Love we know is not to represent as Knowledge does but to unite to the Object Known And here I pray what does the living Image do towards the setting forth of this Why our Author indeed makes the Prototype One Person and his living Image Another but do these Two by an Act of Love or any other Act proceeding jointly from both produce a Third Person If not what Idea of a Trinity can be drawn from these Two But if this Author will say as he says things no less Absurd That the Prototype and his living Image do produce some certain Third Person distinct from Both of them and so answering to the Holy Ghost in the Trinity I desire him to tell the World what kind of Thing this Third Person is and by what Name it is to be called and expressed for I never yet heard or read of any such nor am I so much an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man as to fetch it from my own Invention But besides all the foregoing Absurdities It is worth observing what a notable cast of his Ignorance he gives us about Emanation Def. p. 28. l. 10. And in order to it I think fit to shew What an Emanation and a Cause by Emanation is Now a Cause or Principle by 〈◊〉 Emanation is that which produces its Effect or Term without any intervening Action really distinct from either the Agent or Effect And accordingly That is properly called an Emanation or an Effect by Emanation for the word here signifies passively which issues immediately naturally and necessarily unless hinder'd by a supernatural power from the Substance of its productive
Nature of a Spirit proved not to consist in Vital internal Sensation 17 18 19 The Trinity in Vnity not explicable by Sensation and Continuity of Sensation 20 21 No man's feeling himself a distinct Person can be the Reason of his being so 22 23 The Defender's Complement to the Animadverter returned 24 Mutual Consciousness can never make three distinct Spirits essentially one 26 27 Mutual Consciousness according to this Author's Principles must consist of three distinct Acts 27 28 His profane Assertion concerning the Trinity 30 Each of the Divine Persons as a distinct Person is not a distinct Infinite Mind with a Refutation of his Argument brought to prove it so 31 32 33 34 His absurd Assertions concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Divine Persons 35 36 37 His vain endeavour to justifie his Hypothesis of three distinct infinite Minds from the Allusions used by the Fathers about the Trinity 38 39 An extraordinary Discovery made by this Author of Resemblance without Likeness 40 41 His gross Mistakes and precarious Assertions concerning the sence and use of the Term Person from p. 41 to 50 His ridiculous pleading Theological use for the word Minds as importing the same with Persons while none can be proved to use it so but himself and some few Hereticks besides 46 47 The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sufficient proof of a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Essence in the Divine Persons 51 All Specifick Vnity of Nature or any thing analogous to it in the Divine Persons proved absurd and impossible 52 53 The Divine Nature proved against this Author to be a single or singular Nature together with a Refutation of some other of his false and heretical Assertions from p. 54 to 60 The Vnity of the Divine Nature in the three Persons proved not to be as this Defender would have it partly Specifical and partly Numerical 55 56 The Testimony of Victorinus Afer of little or no Authority with Reference to the Doctrine of the Trinity 60 61 Two other of this Defender's scandalous Assertions refuted 61 62 His Romance of a Man and his living Image so absurdly and profanely brought by him as an Explication of the Essential Union of the Divine Persons examined and exploded from p. 63 to 80 His gross Ignorance of the sence and import of the term Emanation 73 The proper and true Sence of it explained ibid. An account both of the Nature of an Image in general and of an Image by Reflexion in particular 65 66 The Animadverter's Objection That Dr. Sherlock has stated a Trinity in Vnity so as utterly to overthrow the Mysteriousness of it enforced and made good 81 82 The Mysteriousness of the same denied also by Le-Clerk in his Theological Epistles under the Name of Liberius de Sancto Amore where the Reader may find the Materials of this Author 's new Hypothesis and where this Author himself may be supposed also to have found them before from p. 82 to 85 The School-Terms defended and the Vse of them asserted against this Illiterate Innovator 86 87 The Term Formal Reason of a Thing further explained and insisted upon 89 90 The true state of the Point in dispute between Dr. Sherlock and the Animadverter fully and particularly represented from p. 91 to 99 His Blunder about Convertibility and Proprium quarto modo 99 100 c. His flying from the Act of Self-Consciousness to the Principle thereof proved a meer shift and an utter change of the Question 101 102 c. The Animadverter's first Argument proving Self-Consciousness neither Act nor Principle to be the formal Reason of Personality in created Beings enforced from p. 101 to 108 The second Argument vindicated and the defects of the Boetian Definition of a Person noted from p. 108 to 112 The third Argument for the same confirmed also 112 113 c. The Dispute concerning the Personality of the Soul both in and out of the Body resumed and carried on against this Author and all his Hâ—terodox Vnphilosophical Assertions concerning it throughly canvased and confuted from p. 114 to 151 Every man constituted such according to this Author 's avowed Principles not by an Essential Composition but by an Hypostatick Union of the Soul with the Body from p. 147 to 150 The Defender's pretended Answer to the fourth Chapter of the Animadversions proving Self-Consciousness not to be the formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons examined and the several Arguments there produced against it made good from p. 152 to 171 He manifestly gives up the Point in dispute between him and his Adversary and that in several places viz. 153 154. item 160 161. and 168. and 204 c. His Blasphemy 170 The Animadverter's Arguments brought to prove That mutual Consciousness cannot be that which makes as this Author affirms the three Divine Persons essentially one God in like manner confirmed and enforced from p. 171 to 183 c. His Shifting Pretence That by Mutual Consciousness he means the Principle not the Act thereof irrefragably overthrown from his own repeated Expressions and Assertions p. 172 to 178 The Thing it self effectually disprov'd by Reason and Argument p. 178 to 182 How the Divine Knowledge is diversify'd 190 191 The Communion of the Divine Persons with one-another asserted and prov'd not to be formally the same with the Union of the said Persons 193 194 A downright shameless unconscionable Lye affirmed by this Defender 195 196 His silly Cavils about Union of Nature and about Personality answer'd 156 157 158 No 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mutual Indwelling of Minds in one another 199 This Author 's great Ignorance in exploding all Priority and Posteriority from our Conceptions and Discourses of God expos'd and laid open and the Necessity of admitting the same unanswerably prov'd against him p. 199 to 203 His Pretence of not disputing about the Essences of Things shewn impertinent to the purpose he alledges it for and withal grosly contradictious to what he himself had positively affirmed elsewhere 204 205 How Knowledge and how all Arts and Sciences are distinguish'd and denominated from their respective Objects which this Author is utterly ignorant of shewn and explained 207 208 Sensation in God as wholly differing according to this Author in kind from the Divine Knowledge disproved and exploded p. 208 to 213 His scandalous Falsification in quite changing the state of the present Question contrary to his own positive frequent and express Assertions throughout the Vindication c. p. 214 to 218 The same made yet more manifest by collating what he says here with what he had affirmed there ibid. The true state of the Question substituted in the room of the preceding false one 219 His vain Endeavour to rescue his Hypothesis of three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits from the Charge of Tritheism 220 His Assertion of the Equipollency of the Terms Infinite Mind and Infinite Intelligent Person proved intolerably false and absurd 223 224 c. The difference
I hinted before though this Writer be confuted never so often he takes no notice of it but still keeps on Writing and for ought I see will never hold his hand till the Bookseller holds his In the next place he seems to fall a pitch Lower than usual and to be upon the complaining strain as that Men are spightful and will not treat Mr. Dean and his Absurdities according to their Dignity nor allow him such fair Quarter as other Writers he says have met with in the same Cause Adding withal That it is not to be expected that in a matter of so high in Nature we should have such a comprehension of it as to leave no difficulties unexplained Which I confess would be a fair Allegation from another Man but not from him For has he not declared That his Notion of a Trinity solves all doubts and difficulties about it See his Vindication p. 66. l. 2. and 85. l. last and where all difficulties are solved can there remain any Vnexplained Now I ask this Man Are the words here quoted by me his or are they not If they are his then let all Mankind judge whether this Man has not eaten shame and drunk after it as the word is who can without the least sence of it so grosly contradict himself in the face of the World But however let us hear what he says And here we have him alledging the Fathers setting forth the Trinity by the Sun and its light and splendor by a Tree and it's Branches a Fountain and it's Streams or a Mathematical Cube and then bringing up the Rear of all with these Questions Are not these Accounts says he much more chargeable with Tritheism or Sabellianism than the Account he gives of them by Three Minds or Spirits For are not the Sun and its light and splendor as much Three but not so much one as Three Conscious Minds p. 9. To which I answer peremptorily That the Sun and its light and splendor not being Three distinct Supposita are much more one than Three distinct Minds or Spirits which are Three Supposita can possibly be and cannot be more Three than Three distinct Minds or Spirits necessarily and essentially are But I would have the Reader here observe what a wretched Sophism he is now Trumping upon him by arguing ab Imparibus tanquam paribus For is an Account of a Thing by way of Allusion and an Account analogous to a Definition all one Is a similitude or bare Resemblance of a Thing and a proper Representation or Description of the Nature of that Thing the same Is there not a wide difference between shewing what a Thing is like and what it really and properly is And to demonstrate that the Fathers applyed the fore-alleged Instances of Resemblance to the Trinity in a quite different way from what this Author here does when he represents the Three Divine Persons as Three Infinite Minds can he shew us That the Fathers ever positively affirmed or predicated any of the said Resemblances used by them of the Three Divine Persons so as to say Father Son and Holy Ghost are Sun Light and Splendor But this Author Categorically affirms That Father Son and Holy Ghost are Three distinct Minds or Spirits and will he call this a bare Resemblance and no more Nay does he not give this as their True and proper Denomination joining them together and affirming one of the other by a strict and logical Predication and must this pass for a meer Resemblance too Wherefore I would have his Ignorance take notice for the future that an Allusion to a thing per modum similitudinis and a proper Account of it quoad rei veritatem and dogmatically representing the Nature of the said Thing do vastly differ and consequently That to argue from one to the other can be fit for none but him whose Known Talent it is only to shift and to shuffle and instead of answering his Adversary to put a Trick upon his Reader But he tells us That he is now for discoursing something in general concerning a Trinity in Vnity and concerning the words whereby to express it And here as a foretast of the rest it is something pleasant to see how he expresses himself page 10. lines 17 18. Where having said that a Trinity in Vnity is such a Distinction and such an Vnion and why not Unity as is peculiar to the Godhead He adds That there are some faint Resemblances of it in Nature yet Nature has nothing like it Now I would have this Acute Author tell me How there can be Resemblances without Likeness or Likeness without Resemblance For I never knew Two Things resemble one Another but they were like one Another too Resemblance being nothing else but the Agreement of Two or more Things in any one Qualification and it is that Agreement which renders and denominates them properly like But if this Man means by Likeness an entire Universal Agreement in all Respects I must take the boldness to tell him that he speaks Nonsence Forasmuch as to be properly like a Thing and to be an Absolute Exact Copy of a Thing wholly differ there being a Rule in Logick which I can assure him is as little a Friend to him as he can be to that That Omne simile est dissimile that is That all Likeness in the very Essence of it imports a Disagreement in some Respects as well as it denotes an Agreement in others After which horrible Thick-piece of Nonsence it might justly be expected that I should sprinkle this Rude Author with some of those Rhetorical Flowers which he had so liberally bestowed upon the Animadverter such as Ingenious Blunderer and one without Sence or Reason c. but I shall only admire him under the Character which he has so modestly assumed to himself pag. 43. of being forsooth an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man since if ever he could pretend to that Title it must be here for surely to find out a Resemblance where there is no Likeness must be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of the greatest and most celebrated Invention Otherwise to give it its due Character it is a confounded shameless Nonsensical contradiction and it is hard to imagine what it is like unless it be this Author's Case of Non-resistance set off with Horse and Armes as a Comment upon the Text or a Gloss upon the Case And now in accounting for the words by which the Trinity is expressed according to his usual way of complementing the Fathers he tells us page 12. line 18 19. That they in their disputes upon this subject wanted words adequately to express their sence Which I for my part can see no Reason to grant him for though their sence and conceptions fell exceedingly short of the sublimity of that subject as when a finite Reason discourses of an Infinite Being it cannot but do yet it is wholly gratìs dictum That the Fathers wanted words fully and adequately to express their
which we observe in men and since the perfection of Generation in them is for a Father to produce his like shall men generate others of the same nature with themselves and shall God generate one of quite another Nature from his own as a Finite Nature must necessarily be This was the force of their Argument and it was directed against the Arians but never were these Explications alledged as adequate Representations of the same Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons that was in Men. But as it was intimated before in the Animadversions no doubt this Author has been all along pursuing this Tritheistical Whimsey of a Specifick Vnity only in order to the providing an Unity of Nature for his Three Infinite Minds or Spirits which by all the Wit of Men and Angels can never be proved capable of any greater Vnity than Specifick But this Point about a Specifick Vnity of the Godhead has been so throughly debated and the Impossibility of it so clearly demonstrated by the Animadverter Chap. 7. from the 178 to the 188 page That this Man should have done well to have answer'd what was to be found there before he troubled the Reader with the same old baffled story again I conclude therefore against this Author that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applyed to the Divine Persons does fully and sufficiently express the Numerical Vnity and Identity of the Divine Nature belonging to them without importing any Thing of Specifick Vnity in the same or any thing so much as Analogous to it After he has done with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he excepts against the Terms Single and Singular as applied to the Divine Nature But he first draws them off from their proper and received Signification according to which all Divines whether Schoolmen or others have in treating of the Divine Nature generally used them expressing the said Nature by no word more commonly than by Singularis essentia singularis Natura And does this Man now think to take this word by a wrong exotick signification of which more presently and in the strength of that to run down and casheir the True and Genuine sence of it Which besides the confusion it must needs bring upon all Discourses about the Godhead and the Divine Persons will not fail also to give mighty scandal to all sober and learned Men both Papists and Protestants who are concerned to have these weighty Points not only truly stated but also warily treated of For my own part I must declare That I never met with stranger and more untheological Assertions than what this Author has concerning the Application of the Terms single and singular to the Divine Nature and yet the true sence of them lies pain and obvious almost in all Scholastick Writers So that whatsoever is signified by Hoc unum Individuum and numericè unum the same also is signified by singulare they being all but Synonymous words to express that greatest and perfectest Vnity which we call Numerical and it will be hard to assign where we may properly apply any one of them and not as properly apply the other So that if this Author would but have understood these and the like Terms in the same sence in which both Philosophers and Divines use them he could never have abused the Subject he wrote upon nor exposed himself with such false and scandalous Assertions as these that follow 1. That the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Vnity as is both Specifick and Numerical 2. That the Divine Nature is not a Single or Singular Nature p. 18. lin 13. 3. That upon supposal of the Singleness or Singularity of the Divine Nature the whole Divine Nature cannot be Incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son without the Incarnation of the whole Trinity thereby p. 18. lin 18. 4. That one Single Nature can subsist but once or have but one Subsistence p. 19. lin 23. All which Four Propositions I find in the compass of less than three whole Pages viz. 17 18 19. And they are of that vile Import that I defie either Arian or Socinian to speak more against the Vnity of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Infinite Divine Nature than this Man in some of the forementioned Propositions has done But I shall consider them particularly though they are much fitter for the Publick Censure of the Church than for any Private Man's Confutation And first for the 1. First Proposition viz That the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Vnity as is both Specifical and Numerical This is fully and plainly asserted by this Author though not in these very Words as the Reader will find in the 17 th page and 19 th line of this Defence Where speaking of the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son he affirms That there must be that in it that perfectly answers that Specifick Sameness of Nature that is between Father and Son in Humane Persons of which but four or five Lines before he had given an Instance in Abraham and Isaac and withal that it must not only perfectly answer but much out do it too But now on the one hand Nothing can perfectly answer one Instance of Specifick Unity or Sameness but another Instance of the same Kind forasmuch as Two Kinds or Sorts of Unity can never perfectly answer one another nor on the other hand can any Sort of Unity out do a Specifick Vnity but a Numerical For no one Specifick Vnity can do more towards the Uniting the Things it belongs to than another there being but one and the same formal Effect common to all Specifick Vnities which is to render and denominate their respective Subjects Specifically one and no more This I say is all that a Specifick Vnity can do and if more be done it must be by a Numerical But again in the 27 th Line of the same Page He tells us to the same purpose That the Vnity or Sameness of Nature between the Father Son and Holy Ghost is not a meer Specifick Sameness which Words must imply and inferr That it is a Specifick Sameness though he affirms it to be also something more To which Passages we may add Two more altogether as full for this Complex Sort of Vnity viz. One in page 114. line 26. and the Other p. 121. l. 22. of his Vindication From all which it is manifest That this Author holds such an Vnity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons as is both Specifick and Numerical which I affirm to be as gross an Absurdity as the Reason of Man can well imagine For a Specifick and a Numerical Unity are not Two degrees of one Kind but Two several Kinds of Unities Two Unities differing toto genere and consequently such as cannot possibly coincide into any one Unity which shall comprehend and partake of both For a Numerical Vnity is the Unity of One Individual Nature or Being and no
its Prototype it follows That it can never be a True and Proper Representation of the Eternal Image of the Father as being upon all Accounts wholly of another Kind and therefore unspeakably dishonourable in its Application to the Son of God The Fathers indeed sometimes set forth the substantial likeness between the Eternal Father and the Son by a Man's seeing himself in a Glass But never did they intend this for a true and proper Representation of but only for a Popular Allusion to the Mystery they were treating of nor as sufficient to afford Arguments to prove any Thing strictly and logically conceâ—ning it whereas this Author frequently argues and that in the strictest way he can from this Case of a Man and his living Image but only as Instances fit enough to found Similitudes Resemblances and Illustrations upon further than which they would never go And this I think most worthy of our Particular Observation concerning those great Men as to the Case before us viz. That in all their Attempts to give the World some small dim Resemblance of the Trinity they still drew their Allusions from Things that had a real Existence in Nature and were obvious to sence as unequal as they well knew them to the great subject they applied them to But never did they venture to express or describe it by impossible Suppositions and Schemes of Things that never were nor could be nor by bold Fictions and Chimera's formed wholly in their own Brain No this Province was wholly reserved for this Author the great Corrector and Chastiser of all that ever wrote before him and especially as in Duty bound of the Fathers For as to his Notion of a Man and his living Image it is manifest that he does not offer it as a bare Resemblance of the Trinity and no more but rather as a Parallel Instance or at least very near one and such as gives us a True and Proper Representation of this Mystery which I must tell him is much more than a faint Resemblance of it or a meer Allusion to it For in several places of this Book of his he cites it and refers to it as a Rule whereby to speak and conceive rightly of the Trinity and not only so but also as a medium whereby to argue concerning it particularly p. 63. l. 20. p. 70. l. 4. p. 87. l. 16 25. And to shew us yet further of what use and vertue this extraordinary Notion is he tells us That this gives us â—n Account also of the modi subsistendi viz. of the Real Subsistence of the same Individual Nature in Three after a different manner Def. p. 35. l. 15. And a more useful piece of Instruction for our better understanding of the Trinity no doubt there cannot be But then are not these modi subsistenti Modes and has not this Man several times both in his Vindication and in this his Defence utterly denied all modes in God putting them in the same Rank with Accidents and equally exploding both with Reference to the Deity Let him deny this if he can and if he cannot let the Reader take notice what a kind of Disputant this is who having first denied That there are any Modes in God is now for offering us an Account or Explication what these Modes are But this being only an Absurdity and a Contradiction is in this Author not much to be regarded But that which is infinitely more unjustifiable is his audacious obstruding the same Romance of a Man and his living Image as the best Key for the Interpretation of Scripture and that in the most important points of Religion with great Prophaneness calling this figment of his own making The plain Account of the Essential Vnity between God the Father and God the Son p. 21. l. 10. Which words are so derogatory to the Sacred and Mysterious Vnity here spoken of that I darâ— say no Church in Christendom would have endured them but this For they manifestly contain in them these Two Scandalous Propositions First That a Plain Account may be given by us of the most Mysterious Incomprehensible and Unaccountable Thing that God ever proposed to the Belief of Men as the Numerical Essential Vnity which is the Unity here spoken of between the Eternal Father and the Son confessedly is Secondly That a meer Figment a Romance and an impossible supossition of what never was nor is not can be viz. A Man and his living Image is a most proper if not absolutely the best way to give this plain Account of the said Vnity by These Propositions I say which are evidently contained in his forecited Assertion are Intolerable And I do here aver that they are these daring offers to give the World Plain Accounts clear Ideas new Representations and further Explications of the Trinity unknown to the Church heretofore which have not only driven this unhappy Man upon an Hypothesis which is downright Tritheism but have also terribly shaken the whole Belief of this Article in some Mens Minds and quite extinguish'd and cast it out of others But such effects must be expected from Heresy when it can walk about and face the World with a Licence in the Front of it But after all these high pretences does any one by this new piece of Imagery and this Man's Discourse upon it find the Trinity more explained to him than before or rather does not the whole Discourse seem wrote in the Sâ—raphick way and style of Iacob Behmen or George Fox it being nothing from first to last but a meer Iargon of Unaccountable Incoherent Obscure dark stuff and nothing so fit as a Dark Room to speak it in How it may pass the World I know not but I fancy not so currently as some imagined And therefore if I might advise the profound Author of it since he has the Gazette so much at his service he should upon Publication of the next Auction for Pictures take care to get his Living Image into the Collection And now in his Conclusion of the Account given by him of his Hypothesis he endeavours to remove a great Objection against it For both the Antapologist and the Animadverter had charged him for stating the Notion of a Trinity in Unity so as utterly to take away the Mysteriousness of it which Charge he would here ward off and he attempts to do it by taking shelter in the Ambiguity of the Term Intelligible which may be either taken at large for that which may in any degree be understood And so none doubts but God or the Divine Nature may be in some Respects Intelligible and yet for all that remain upon many other Accounts Vnconceivable Or Secondly Intelligible may be taken for that which may be fully and perfectly understood and whatsoever is so I am sure can have nothing Vnconceivable in it unless conceiving be one thing and understanding another Now I affirm that where we may form a Notion of a Thing not only True but also Plain and
so of the Ignorance of him who thinks that it can prove any Thing else but the Weakness of Him who uses it For I appeal to the whole World to judge what a Consequence this is viz. That because every Person feels himself by Self-Consciousness to be himself and not to be another therefore this Self-Consciousness is that which distinguishes him from all others For can a Person 's perceiving his own Distinction properly make or give him this Distinction Upon the whole matter I must declare that I cannot think any one who looks upon this as serious Arguing worth arguing against And whereas he says that this first Argument of the Animadverter has been sufficiently exposed already I shall securely venture it upon the Bottom upon which it stands without any fear of its being exposed any more than answered especially by one who never yet exposed any Thing or Person but himself And so I pass to the Animadverter's Second Argument Which proceeds thus Nothing in the Nature of it absolute and irrelative can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity But Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative and therefore it cannot be the Reason of Personality in any of the said Persons In reply to which Argument thus fairly formally and Syllogistically proposed why does not this Author as in all Regular Disputations it ought and uses to be done apply an answer either by denying one of the Two Propositions or by distinguishing one or more of the Terms but this not being to be done without Logick our Author must be so far excused And therefore he very prudently wraps himself up in such a Cloud of Insignificant words as may enable him to escape his Adversary without encountring him For one of these two things he must of Necessity disprove viz. Either first That the Divine Persons and Personalities are perfectly and wholly Relative Or Secondly That Self-Consciousness is a Thing wholly absolute and Irrelative As to the first of which he himself elsewhere acknowledges and affirms That the Three Divine Persons are Three Relative Subsistences And let me tell him further That they are so entirely Relative that their very Subsistere is Referri and their Referri not only consequent upon and supervenient to their Subsistence as it is in Created Persons but one and the same with it so that by vertue thereof they are indifferently termed by all Schoolmen and Divines either Relative Subsistences or Subsisting Relations The Concrete and the Abstract Terms in the Divine Persons being by reason of the peculiar condition of their Personality as well as the Absolute Transcendent Simplicity of the Divine Nature only different ways of expressing the same Thing And therefore whereas this Author says p. 63. l. 8. Does that which makes John a Person make him a Father I answer No but affirm also That that which makes the first Person in the Trinity a Person makes him a Father and convertibly that that which makes him a Father and that only makes him also a Person And the Reason of the Difference here is not as this Ignorant Man alleges because every humane Person has an Absolute Nature belonging to him as the subject of the Relation for each of the Divine Persons has an Absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him though not a distinct Absolute Nature But the Difference lies in this That an humane Person has not only an Absolute Nature to be the Remote subject of the Relation but also an Absolute Personality as the Immediate subject of the same by vertue whereof the Person of Iohn continues after the Relation of a Father ceases But in the Trinity every Person and Personality is wholly Relative forasmuch as the very Subsistence of each of them is so So that the Eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son and not by knowing himself to be a Father and by Communicating his Essence to Another not by an Act passed upon and wholly Terminated in his own Person No this is postnate to the former as all other Personal Acts whatsoever are and must be And therefore the Godhead or Divine Nature which is absolute is not as this Man precariously pretends originally distinguished by Three Self-Consciousnesses p. 63. l. 24. But by Three original Relative properties viz. the Innascibility and Paternity of the first Person which make one Personal Property and the Two distinct Originations of the other Two Persons whereby they are both mutually distinguished from and opposed to one Another as all Relatives are But this Man's offering here at an Explication of these Divine Relations by that exploded Figment of a Man and his living Image p. 63. l. 21. is an unsufferable Profaneness as well as an arrant Petitio Principii For will he pretend to explain a Thing in it self obscure by another that is more obscure and which is worse impossible besides Let him for the future learn that no Man who understands what arguing is ought to bring that as a medium either of Explication or Probation which he knows to be doubtful or has just cause to suspect that his Adversary may reject as Absurd and Unreasonable But in the next place to shew whether Self-Consciousness be a Thing in the Nature of it perfectly Absolute and Irrelative and consequently unable to give such a Subsistence and Personality to the Three Divine Persons as shall be wholly Relative There needs only a Repetition of what is said to this purpose in the Animadversions and which this Author has very discreetly said not so much as one word to viz. That Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative as being that Act by which each Person intimately knows and is conscious to himself of his own Being Acts Motions and every Thing personally belonging to him so that as such it terminates within and looks no further than that one Person whom it is an entire survey and comprehension of And as it is an Absolute and Irrelative Term so it may be conceived distinctly and fully without conceiving or implying the conception of any Thing or Person besides And now what Relation does or can such an Act of Self-Consciousness imply in it It is indeed on the contrary a direct contradiction to all that is Relative For it encloses the Person wholly within himself neither pointing nor looking further nor referring to any one else Anim. p. 99. All which is so very plain and full that I defy this Author or any Man alive to prove either that this is not a True account of Self-Consciousness as to the Absolute and Irrelative Nature of it or if it be that it can give a Subsistence purely Relative to the Person which it shall belong to But to make short work with this Man of words without Sence There are in every Relation these Things to be considered The subject of the Relation both Remote and Immediate the foundation of
the Relation the Correlate or Term of the Relation and lastly the Relation it self Accordingly to give an Instance of this in the Paternal Relation of the First Person of the Blessed Trinity The Remote subject of it is the Divine Nature the Immediate subject is the Person of the Father the foundation of it is that Eternal Act by which the Father communicates his Nature to the Son and the correlate or Term of the Relation is the Son and lastly the Relation it self is that mutual respect resulting from the forementioned Act which the Father and the Son reciprocally hear to one Another And here I confess that in the Divine Relations there is a real Identity between the subject the foundation and the relation it self contrary to what it is in Created Persons in whom they are really distinguished Upon the whole matter then let this Man in the present Instance of the Eternal Person of the Father shew that Self-Consciousness is either the subject the foundation the correlate or Term of the Relation or lastly the Relation it self And then let him make it the formal Reason of a Relative Personality in that or in any other Person of the Trinity if he can And if he cannot I think a little less Confidence with a little more Knowledge would do well But in the last place quitting all that he had so peremptorily contended for before He tells us in plain Terms p. 64. l. 5. That if each of the Divine Persons have a Self-Consciousness of its own this distinguishes the Divine Persons and proves them to be really Distinct which is all that the Dean desires Now what Mr. Dean desires more than what Deans generally do I cannot tell but what he has declared is this viz. That Self-Consciousness makes each of the Divine Persons to be one in himself and distinct from all others and is that wherein the said Vnity and Distinction properly and formally does consist And now for Self-Consciousness to be the Cause and Reason of all this and for it only to prove this I must tell him in the Name of Sence and Logick are quite different things And the first of them as appears from the fore-alleaged passages he has asserted hitherto and the latter he fallaciously sneaks into now But to the same repeated assertion I must still give the same Answer viz. That Self-Consciousness can distinguish the Divine Persons only by a Secondary Distinction not by a Primary and Original since nothing can originally distinguish as I have shewn but that which also Constitutes For still Philosophy will have one and the same Principle both Constitutive and Distinctive too So that this is manifestly and fairly another delivering up and quitting of the Point which he had all along in his Vindication asserted and disputed for For there he had asserted that Self-Consciousness gave Original Self-Vnity and Distinction to each of the Divine Persons and here he declares himself content if we allow Self-Consciousness but to prove the same Though we have told him that this is wholly another Case and it has been inculcated over and over But it seems there is no forcing it into his Pate any more than pouring a Pottle into a Pint. And so I proceed to examine what he says to the Animadverter's Third Argument which proceeds thus If Self-Consciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons then there is no Repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the Thing it self but that there might be three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three Which consequence appears from this That neither is there any Repugnancy that there might be so many Self-Consciousnesses or Self-Conscious Minds or Spirits for the Deity to be communicated to nor any repugnancy proved in the Nature of the Deity it self that it should be so communicated This is the sum of the Argument and what is this Defender's Reply to it Why he first tells us That had the Dean said That Self-Consciousness made the Trinity this had been a Notable Argument p. 64. l. 14. And will he grant This Then I shall prove That he did say it and that as fully as words could express it in his Vindication p. 68. l. 4. Where he has this Passage As the Self-Consciousness of every Person to it self makes them Three distinct Persons so the mutual Consciousness of all the Three Divine Persons makes them all but one Infinite God Now I ask this Self-Contradictor first whether any words can be more plain and expressive than these And in the next place whether they are not his own If he doubts it let him turn to the place alleged And if they are his own then I hope That that which makes the Divine Persons Three distinct Persons makes the Trinity also Unless the Three distinct Persons are one Thing and the Trinity Another So that this Argument effectually concludes against this Shameless Man even by his own Concession But he adds in the next place of the same page That he hopes however that Self-Consciousness may distinguish the Three Persons p. 64. l. 16. To which it has been answered again and again that it can distinguish them only secondarily and consequentially not primarily and originally But I am weary of these Repetitions though he is not ashamed to outdo Battus himself in Tautology And therefore whereas he says further That Self-Consciousness proves the Distinction though it does not limit the Number of the Persons p. 64. l. 23. I deny that it can originally distinguish them without limiting the Number of them also For as I have proved nothing can originally distinguish the Persons but that which makes them Persons And that which makes them Persons by the very same makes them Three Persons it being as essential to them to be Three as to be Persons And therefore to that Question of his Does the formal Reason of Personality make or limit the Number of Persons l. 33. ibid. I answer That in Persons wholly Relative as the Divine Persons are it does and must do so For the further clearing of which it must be observed That the Animadverter in the Present Argument considered the Divine Nature as wholly abstracted from all Personality belonging to it and so in it self as upon such an Abstraction it must needs be only communicable and Determinable and consequently such as cannot be supposed to communicate or determine it self but to receive this Communication and Determination from the Personalities considered as actually joined with it The number of which Personalities must be taken from such a Peculiarity of their condition as shall make one certain Number of them necessary and no other And that wherein this peculiarity of condition does consist is the Relative opposition of the said Persons to one another by vertue whereof they are necessarily Three and no more For as there are Two and but Two such Oppositions in this Divine Oeconomy viz. one between Generation and Filiation and the other between
Thing Forasmuch as the first and Original Principle of all Acts is the Nature and Essence of the Thing to which the said Acts belong But then the bare Essence or Nature of a thing whether Create or Vncreate can never of it self make or constitute that Thing a Person but the Determination of the said Nature by its proper and complete Subsistence must do that Accordingly in the Subject here before us The Principle of Self-Consciousness is no other than the Divine Nature as it is an Infinite Omniscient Mind which absolutely considered both as to its Being and Actings being the same in all the Three Divine Persons can never constitute them Persons nor originally distinguish them And if there be any Distinction in this Infinite Omniscient Mind either as to the Manner of its Subsisting or Acting for in that must lie all the Distinction that it is capable of it must be from the Personal Properties determining and distinguishing both and consequently since this Omniscient Principle and its Actings receive all their Distinction antecedently from the said Personal Properties or Personalities it is impossible that these Properties or Personalities should receive their Distinction from them In short the bare Principle of Self-Consciousness is the Divine Intellect or the Divine Nature as Omniscient which of it self neither is the Person nor constitutes the Person and the Actual Exercise of this Principle belongs to the Person himself who alone can be properly said to Act and therefore must be a Person antecedently to his Acting all Personal Acts proceeding from a Suppositum from both which it follows That Self-Consciousness neither in the Actual Exercise nor yet in the Principle thereof does or can constitute the Divine Persons or be the proper Formal Reason of their Personal Being Vnity and Distinction And whereas he tells us again That every Act of Self-Consciousness proves a distinct Person pag. 66. lin 6 7. This is an old Story and so often repeated that it is almost come to the Cuckow 's Note but he has been frequently told in Answer to it and must be so told again That the Question is not What proves a Person distinct but what makes it so and that not by any sort of Distinction but only by a primary and Original And this is that which I shall abide by and am resolved to hold him to notwithstanding all his Wrigglings and Turnings to get rid of it But it is now high time to remark upon some more of his Absurd Untheological and indeed Scandalous Assertions Which are these Three as we find them p. 67. l. 10. viz. That there are no Modes in the Divine Nature nor secondly any Affections in it nor thirdly that it admits of any Priority so much as in our conceptions of it To which I answer 1. That if there are no Modes in the Divine Nature there are no Persons in it neither For a Person is nothing else but the Godhead determined by a peculiar Incommunicable Mode of Subsistence To the Second I answer That these prime and transcendental Affections of Being viz. Unity Verity and Bonity do and must of necessity belong to the Divine Nature if we own it for a Real Being as I hope this Man does though I am not sure of it And then Thirdly If no Priority of conception is to be allowed in our Discourses about the Divine Nature as being uncapable of any we can never discourse of it as of a Being which has Attributes belonging to it or Immanent Acts flowing from it and resting in it For there is no conceiving of the former but per modum Subjecti Adjuncti nor of the latter but per modum Principii Actionis in both of which there is necessarily implyed a Priority and Posteriority of conception And I shall say no more of this Man here but that in these Assertions he opposes himself to all the Orthodox Divines in Christendom But that is the less to be wondered at if we consider also the Profaneness of some of his expressions here For the Animadverter having urged That Self-Complacency might be as well alleged for the Reason of the Divine Personalities as Self-Consciousness This Man Blasphemously subjoins p. 65. l. 29. Yes and he might as well have added Self-displeasure and Self-condemnation and as many more such Selfs as he could think of Now had the discourse here been of Men that is of weak sinful Mortals he might well enough have mentioned such kind of Selfs as Self-displeasure and Self-Condemnation and the like provided that the omitted not the Prime Self of all and most peculiarly his own which is Self-contradiction But when the discourse here is wholly of the Three Sacred Persons of the Trinity each and every one of which is God blessed for ever for him to affirm Self-Condemnation every whit as applicable to them as Self-Complacency when Self-Condemnation on the one hand must suppose Sin or Folly as the ground of it and Self-Complacency on the other is as essential to and inseparable from all and each of the Divine Persons as any other Divine Perfection can be this let me tell him is downright Blasphemy And therefore in requital of that scurrilous Character of an Ingenious Blunderer which he has so insolently reproached the Animadverter with I must and do here return upon him the just Charge of an Impious Blasphemer and that upon more accounts than this one telling him withal that had he lived in the former Times of our Church his Gown would have been stripped off his back for his detestable Blasphemies and Heresies and some other place found out for him to perch in than the top of St. Paul's where at present he is placed like a Church Weather-Cock as he is notable for nothing so much as standing high and turning round And now if he likes not this kind of Treatment let him thank his own Virulence for it in passing such base Reflections upon one among many more who he might be sure would repay him and certainly will though he has not yet cleared the Debt And thus having shewn that the Animadverter's Arguments against Self-Consciousness are not to be shook by any of this Author 's Pittiful Cavils we will now pass to the Examination of what he opposes to the Arguments brought by the Animadverter against his Muâ—â—â—l Consciousness also Of which the First is this No Act of knowledge can be the formal Reason of an Vnity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity But an Act of mutual Consciousness is but an Act of Knowledge c. And what answer does he give to this Why the old one viz. That he no where asserts That mutual Consciousness is the formal Reason of this Vnity but only that the Three Persons who are thus mutually conscious â—o each other must be essentially One p. 68. l. 5. To this he has been still answered That though he uses not the Term yet he asserts the Thing And whether he does not so
Nature but to the Vnity in Trinity p. 69. l. 29. And will this Man say That any Thing can be essential to the Vnity of the one which is not as essential to the Vnity of the other For though we frequently use the word Vnion of Persons yet strictly speaking it is improper since it is not an Vnion which is but another word for Vnition but an Vnity of Persons in Nature or an Vnity of Nature in the Persons which is the proper expression and therefore we neither say an Vnion in Trinity nor a Trinity in Vnion but always apply the word Vnity to both But our Author closes this Paragraph with these words p. 69. at the end That if mutual Consciousness be essential to this Vnity of Nature so that the Three Persons are thus united and cannot be one without it he will contend no further And so far I think he does discreetly but too late For whether he will contend further or no his Adversary both does and will for as much as this Author has asserted a great deal more than what this Concession amounts to and if he does not prove all that he has asserted he is a baffled Person For he has positively asserted as we have shewn from his own words that mutual Consciousness makes the Three Divine Persons to be Naturally one p. 66. Def. 26. and to be essentially one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6. And this by his favour is quite another thing from only asserting that mutual Consciousness is essential to that Vnity of Nature which is in the Three Persons For that it may be as it is an essential consequent of the said Unity of Nature and no more As also from asserting as he here does p. 69. l. the last That the three Divine Persons cannot be one without it For surely that which is only a Conditio sine quâ non and without which the said Divine Persons cannot be one in Nature and that which formally makes them so or wherein their Vnity does consist are wholly different Things And therefore since it is manifest that this Man has no Logick I heartily wish that he had some shame In the mean time he is for shewing as well as he can how the Animadverter mistakes the whole matter in these words quoted from him Anim. p. 108. l. 14. The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons there is upon this account one and the same knowledge in them also And they are not one in Nature by vertue of their mutual Consciousness but they are therefore mutually conscious because the Perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so Thus the Animadverter and where is now the mistake why our Author tells us That Three Persons who have the same Nature may know the same Things without feeling one another's thoughts and knowledge in themselves p. 70. l. 22. To which I answer first That the foundation of this reply is That there is such a thing as Feeling in God distinct from knowledge which is the height of nonsence and Absurdity as shall be declared before we pass from this head of mutual Consciousness Secondly I utterly deny That Persons who have the same Divine Nature can know the same Things I mean all the same Things for that only here can be insisted upon without knowing each other's thoughts and knowledge in themselves For as much as whatsoever each of these Divine Persons knows he does and must know by an Infinite Act of Knowledge comprehending both himself and the other Two Persons and all that is Knowable in the World besides and how each of the Divine Persons can know all this without mutually knowing one another I desire this Man to shew But he argues further That if by one and the same knowledge the Animadverter means that the knowledge of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is but one Individual Act as the knowledge of one single Person is this destroys the Distinction of Persons which cannot be distinct without distinct personal Acts as mutual knowledge is and destroys mutual Consciousness for there is no place for mutual Consciousness or mutual Knowledge where there is but one single Act of Knowledge p. 70. l. 24. In answer to which I observe these Two Notable Instances of his Great Ignorance First His supposing and taking for granted the very Thing in dispute between him and his Adversary viz. That the Distinction of the Divine Persons depends upon certain Distinct Acts of Knowledge as the cause or antecedent Reason of that Distinction whereas his Adversary on the contrary affirms all Distinction of Divine Knowledge as well as all Diversification of the Divine Nature it self to be from the Distinction or distinct Subsistence of the Divine Persons as the Prime and original Reason of it And whereas this Author says again That the Divine Persons cannot be distinct without Distinct Personal Acts as mutual knowledge is it is true That they cannot be without them as Inseparably consequent upon their Personal Distinction but not as constituent of it Secondly The other Instance of his Ignorance here is his affirming that there can be no place for mutual Consciousness or Knowledge where there is but one single or Individual Act of Knowledge Which I utterly deny as false and in order to the proving it so I do here observe That there is but one single Act of Knowledge in all the Three Divine Persons that is to say single as to the Substance of the Act though diversified by the several modifications which it receives from the Persons whom it proceeds from and from the several respects it bears to the several objects it terminates upon Which different modifications and respects do by no means infer diverse or distinct Acts of Knowledge but only variously modify determine and distinguish one and the same Act. Accordingly in the present Case I do here affirm to this Author That mutual Consciousness is nothing else but one and the same Act of Divine Knowledge differently modified as it proceeds severally and after a different manner from Father Son and Holy Ghost as the Persons knowing and jointly terminated in them all as the objects known as on the other side Self-Consciousness is no more than this one and the same Act of Knowledge as it issues only from one of the Persons and terminates upon the same too Though I confess if the Three Divine Persons were Three distinct Minds or Spirits mutual Consciousness could not be one Act only but must be Three This I hold concerning the Divine Knowledge and the respective distinctions of it and I leave this Author to try his best skill in Divinity and Philosophy to confute it In the mean time he gives us one Absurdity more out of his inexhaustible stock viz. That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed by the Fathers to the Three Divine Persons is that very mutual Consciousness which the Dean means For these are his words p. 7.
down in that Preface nor has he in the Defence of that wretched Book answered any one of them saving that at the latter end of it viz. p. 529. l. 14. of his Defence of the Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Iesus Christ he seems to knock under Board and to own that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 due to the discoursing of Things Sacred be the Case what it will Which Apology declares that even by his own Confession he had treated of these Things in a most scandalous unbecoming manner as in truth he did and not only so but whosoever set him upon it in a most Profane and Devillish way too So that whereas he here says That he had by that answer silenced his Adversaries so that he heard from them no more Def. p. 94. l. 24. I must tell him that some silence their Adversaries because they cannot be answered by them and some because they are not thought worth the answering which was this Author's Case here For his Adversaries as inconsiderable as they were having effectually baffled and overthrown his whole Book and broken the strength and sinews of it if it had any little concerned themselves at any Insignificant Replies he did or could afterwards make though never so many but were willing to let him have the last word considering that as Rector of Billingsgate at that time he might claim it by his place But the following Instruction to his Friend is certainly very diverting Def. p. 98. at the end in these words Where the Animadverter says he charges the Dean with Absurdities and Contradictions turn to the place and read it with it 's context and tell me what you cannot answer and I will to which he should have done well to have added If I can But the whole Passage is just as if he had said Sir If you find not Absurdities and Contradictions enough in my Book to satisfy your Curiosity that way pray come to the Fountain Head and consult me and you shall be sure of a more plentiful supply But he goes on If you or any Body else says he can be perswaded by the Animadverter that the Dean understands neither English Latin or Greek Logicks Metaphysicks c. I need wish you no other punishment than when ever you write to fall into the hands of such an Adversary p. 99. l. 1. In answer to which I am bid only to tell him that touching his Qualifications as to the forementioned respects the Animadverter is perfectly of the same mind which he was of when he wrote the ninth and tenth Chapters of the Animadversions but thinks it not worth his while to use many Arguments to perswade the Reader to be of the same opinion but only refers him to two Irrefragable ones viz. his own two Eyes to convince him In the mean time it may be some diversion to him to observe how that because most Parts of Philosophy viz. Physicks Metaphysicks Mathematicks Ethicks Politicks c. are always expressed plurally therefore this Author very wisely expresses Logick so too calling it Logicks Def. p. 99. l. 3. which I dare say no Scholar ever called so before and in my poor Judgment he might have forborn to speak of Logicks in the Plural till he had better understood one But 't is evident that he knew no better and we must not expect that any one should speak better than he knows But since he is such a grand Exemplar of Pride and Disdain towards all whom he ever wrote against that he may not however lie too open to them when they turn upon him again as in all likelyhood the way being now opened to them they will I would advise him in time though I confess it is something with the latest to procure himself some good honest Systems in all the forementioned sorts of Learning adding to use his own Dialect Grammaticks withal since I would not direct him to Books too much above his reach at first And when he has once got them about him I would have him ply them hard assuring himself which all know though scarce any one is so much his Friend as to tell him so that he has a great deal more need of studying than the World has or can have of his Writing Nevertheless if Writing be so absolutely Necessary to him that his health requires it and that Nature cannot be at ease nor enjoy it self unless the Scripturient humour has sometimes vent by throwing it self off into Paper let him at least make choice of proper Subjects and forbearing all Controversial Discourses about Christ's Satisfaction God's punitive Iustice and the Trinity which he was never cut out for let him rather jog on in the old beaten Track of Church Communion and of Death and Iudgment and upon these and such like heads the Two last especially he may continue on Writing and Printing and Printing and Writing and the World never the wiser for either even till his Subject overtakes him I have now gone through his whole Defence and having done so cannot but think it very proper and equally for the Reader 's Satisfaction to lay before him a Brief Scheme or Analysis of it together with those pittiful mean ways and methods by which with much ado it has been patched up and put together that so he may see what a kind of Antagonist the Animadverter has had to deal with and that in these following Particulars As First That for the better salving of his Credit he imposes his Book upon the World under the specious but false Title of an Answer to the Animadversions whereas it is but a very small Part of that Discourse which he attempts to answer passing over the main body of it without answering examining or so much as medling with it at all Secondly That he boldly and positively denies several Things in this Book which he had as positively affirmed before For which compare what he had said of the Term Substance in his Vindication with what he says of it in this his Defense In the former he explodes it from all our Discourses of God for that as he affirms the Mind of Man cannot form any conception of Substance either without matter or without a Beginning upon which score I am sure it cannot be applicable to God Vind. p. 69. l. 1. and 70. l. 7. and yet here in this Book he allows of it in our Discourses of God as a Term not only very Good but Vseful and Necessary Def. p. 3. l. 27. which two let the Reason of all Mankind reconcile if it can Likewise for Subsistence compare what he says for the utter rejection of this Term from all discourses about the Trinity Vind. p. 138. line the last and 139. line the first with what he says in behalf of it in this Defense p. 25. l. 13. affirming that there could not be a more proper word used to express an Vnity in Trinity by But all Instances of this kind falling under the Head of
Self-Contradiction I pretend not to Arithmetick enough to number them Thirdly That when he finds himself overborn by an Argument he flyes off and quite alters the state of the Question and in the Room of that Term which he finds indefensible he presently substitutes another As instead of the Act of Self-Consciousness which he had so frequently and so expressly made use of and insisted upon he puts the principle of the said Act Def. p. 39. l. 15. Fourthly That he takes shelter in several fallacious expressions which being once stripped of their Ambiguity by distinctions duly applyed leave the Thing they would prove in the lurch and vanish into Nothing such as for instance amongst many others is his insisting upon a substantial Trinity in opposition to such a one as admits of no greater than a Modal distinction between the Divine Persons by which if he means That the said Three Persons are Three distinct Substances it is false but if he means that they are Three Substantial Persons so called from one and the same Infinite Substance common to them all and subsisting differently in each of them it is True and every one grants such a Substantial Trinity but this makes nothing at all for his Hypothesis the Argument resting wholly upon the Ambiguity of the Term Substantial Fifthly That finding some of the chief Notions which he built his whole Hypothesis upon quite baffl'd and by none of his palliating Tricks to be justified he fairly quits and gives them up and thereby whether he will or no absolutely yields the Point in debate to his Adversary See this grosly exemplified in his Notion of Mutual Consciousness which frequently comes in my way made by him at first the Reason of the Essential Vnity of the Divine Persons and afterwards allow'd by him to be no more than the Result and Consequent of the said Unity Defence p. 75. l. 20. Sixthly That when he is nonplus'd in any Proposition taken and understood according to the universally receiv'd sense of the Words of it he presently strikes off from thence to his Meaning and tells the Reader That he for his part means quite another thing by it See his Def. p. 81. l. 28. These I say are some of those Arts and Shifts with which he all-along encounters the Animadverter but Shifts by his Favour will neither pass for Arguments nor yet for Answers to them any more than Shuffling the Cards can be reckon'd Winning the Game But because his chief Engine of all and which he makes most use of is his frequent allegation of his Meaning in opposition to his plain express Assertions I think it not amiss to illustrate it by some Examples Thus for instance 1. When he says That we know the Nature of a Body Vind. p. 4. l. 25. his Meaning is that we know the Nature of Nothing in the World Vindic. p. 7. l. 19. 2. When he says That a Person and an Intelligent Substance are reciprocal Terms Vind. p. 69. l. 18. his Meaning is That a Beast or Brute which is not an Intelligent Being is and may be called a Person Vindic. p. 262. l. 18. 3. When he says That Susistence and the like Terms reckon'd up by him serve only to perplex and confound Mens Notions about the Trinity Vindic. p. 138. l the last 139. l. 1. his Shameless Meaning as we have shewn p. 25. l. 13. of his Def. is That there could not have been a more proper Word thought on to represent the Trinity by than Three Subsistences in One Individual Nature 4. When he says A Trinity in Vnity is a Venerable Mystery and that there may be a great deal more in it than we can Fathom Vind. p. 86. l. 1 2. his Meaning is That it is a plain easie and intelligible Notion as explain'd by him and such as gives a plain solution of all the Difficulties and seeming Contradictions in the Doctrine of the said Article Vind. p. 66. l. 2 3. 5. When he professes to explain the Mysterious Vnion between the Eternal Father and the Son by the Vnity of a Spirit as the best way of explaining it Def. p. 6. l. 22. his Meaning in the same Def. from p. 19. to p. 35. is That the said Mysterious Vnion is best explain'd by a Man and his Living Image though neither of them is a Spirit And I suppose that that which is not a Spirit can neither have the Vnity of a Spirit belonging to it 6. When he makes Self-Consciousness the Reason of Personality Personal Vnity and Distinction in each of the Divine Persons and Mutual Consciousness the Reason of their Essential Vnity as we have shewn he does his Meaning is That Self-Consciousness and Mutual Consciousness do only suppose result from Prove and inferr the said Distinction upon the former account and the said Vnity upon the latter That is to say When he speaks of a Cause or Antecedent he always means an Effect or Consequent And I need not quote Page and Line for this having quoted them so often before 7. When he speaks of an Infinite Mind and of Three Infinite Minds as he does very often he tells us That by Mind he means a Person Def. p. 81. l. 32. though Mind and Person are Terms quite differing from one-another both in Signification and Definition and accordingly are and ever have been so used 8. When he says That not to allow the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is Heresie and Nonsense as he affirms in words equally express and impudent he tells us his Meaning is That it is Heresie and Nonsence to assert Three Persons who are not Three distinct Intelligent Persons Def. p. 81. l. 21. which I dare say no Man alive ever asserted or any Man of Sence ever imagin'd any more than any one ever asserted Peter and Iames and Iohn to be Three Men and yet deny'd them to be Three Rational Creatures But an impudent Copy-monger will venture to say something though in defiance of Sence and in spight of Nonsence too 9. When he calls a Man a Person as he often does in his Writings his Meaning is Not that the Man but that the Soul is the Person and the Body the Vital Instrument of the Soul and that neither Soul nor Body are Parts of the Person Nor is this soveraign thing of use only in Matters of Argument and Dispute but also in Matters of a very different nature As for example 1 st When a known Writer publish'd some Queries against the Commission and Commissioners for making Alterations in our Liturgy severely reflecting upon both his Meaning was only to inform the World what Excellent Persons as he styles them they were who so zealously design'd and promoted the said Alterations See An Apology c. p. 5. l. 20. 2 dly When a certain Divine told an Irish Bishop as was hinted before in the Animadversions p. 358. l. 2. Edit 2. That he would be Crucified before he would take
closes his wretched trifling dodging answer to the Animadverter's Argument with Thus says he All his Arguments vanish like smoak rise in a dark Cloud but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such vapours use to do in Thunder and lightning or some Threatning storm p. 87. at the end But was there ever such a Rhodomontade in words so Big with Nothing and without one grain of sense at the Bottom of them For is this the way to expose an Adversarie's Argument to contempt first to represent it as vanishing into smoak and vapour and afterwards returning in storm and thunder But it shews that his Rhetorick keeps pace with his Logick and that whether he would describe or prove a Thing it is much at the same rate In the mean time the Reader may take this for an Observation that will never fail him viz. That this Author is never so high upon the Huff and Rant as when he is lowest nay and knows himself lowest in Point of Reason And so I pass to the Vindication of the Second Argument Which is this If Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of mutual Consciousness in the said Persons then their mutual Consciousness is not the cause or principle of the Vnity of their Nature but the former is true and therefore the latter is so too This is the Argument and a plainer and clearer there cannot well be To which our Author answers thus That the Divine Persons may be thus essentially one by mutual Consciousness or mutual Consciousness may be essential to this Vnity though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other unless they were thus united as to have and to feel each other in themselves Def. p. 68. l. 22. Which Enigmatical obscure and confused stuff if the Reader understands it is well for I profess that I do not But so far as the Term Essential made use of here may seem to make any Thing for his Purpose I answer That mutual Consciousness is Essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons not as that wherein this Unity does consist but as that which is essentially consequent upon it and inseparable from it So that there is an Homonymy in the Term Essential as either importing that Essential Principle wherein the Nature or Essence of a Thing is placed or some thing necessarily resulting from it in which latter sense alone mutual Consciousness is essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature And whereas he says That if by Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons the Animadverter means the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That he says is indeed a Necessary foundation of this mutual Consciousness but not the immediate Cause of it For that the Fathers he pretends were sensible that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not of it self make this Essential Vnity and therefore added the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he affirms to be that very mutual Consciousness here maintained by him to perfect it p. 68. l. 27. In which words there are several very vile Heterodoxyes For first I affirm That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 adequately perfectly and sufficiently makes the Vnity and Identity of the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons and that as I have already shewn not meerly from the force of the word it self but from the peculiar condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it was applyed to which being Infinite could not possibly be otherwise than numerically one and the same and consequently that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or agreement of the Divine Persons in such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could be no other than a Numerical Vnity and Identity of Nature belonging to them upon that account And therefore I deny That the Fathers ever reckoned the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insufficient of it self to make this Unity and challenge him to prove they did And I deny further that they ever alleged the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an addition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to perfect this Unity but as an Explication and Illustration of it and I add moreover That the Fathers never accounted this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either to be mutual Consciousness or to consist in it but to be the mutual Inexistence or Indwelling of the Divine Persons in each other founded upon and resulting from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mutual Inexistence being no more mutual Consciousness than bare Existence can be said to be Knowledge and lastly I affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed to the Three Divine Persons to which this Author may add his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too if he pleases is not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self but a consequent or effect of it for as much as they are not therefore in one another because they mutually know one another but they thus know one another because by the essential Identity of their Nature they mutually are and exist in one Another All which having been so fully proved in the seventh Chapter of Animadv p. 201 202 203 204 205 206. and the ninth Chapter p. 295. 6 7 8 9. and 300 301. to allege it again is in effect but dictum dicere which though it is the constant practice or rather Trade of this Author is the scorn of the Animadverter But to go on the Animadverter having said as is here alleged That Vnity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of mutual Consciousness which being an Essential Property equally belonging to all Three Persons must issue and result from the Divine Nature and so can have no Antecedent Causal Influx upon the same Nature Our Author in answer to this tells us That mutual Consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons p. 69. l. 20. And I dare say he tells us the best he knows But in reply to it I must tell him again That it belongs immediately to both but upon a different account viz. to Nature as the immediately producing Principle of the Act and to the Person as to the immediate proper subject of Denomination from the Act. But he adds That he for his part will not Philosophies upon Antecedent causal Influxes in the Divine Nature p. 69. l. 24. Nor does any one else in the strict proper and Philosophical sense of these Terms pretend to do so but only by accommodating them to help us with the better Method and Distinction to conceive and discourse of so high a Subject as the Divine Nature is And therefore it was not for nothing That he passed over the Nine preliminary Considerations at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of the Animadversions without so much as touching upon them For they would have corrected his Ignorance and taught him how these words are to be understood and used about the Divine Nature and Persons But his Modesty adds That it contents him to know what is Essential not Absolutely to the Vnity of the Divine