Selected quad for the lemma: nature_n
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A51289
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A brief reply to a late answer to Dr. Henry More his Antidote against idolatry Shewing that there is nothing in the said answer that does any ways weaken his proofs of idolatry against the Church of Rome, and therefore all are bound to take heed how they enter into, or continue in the communion of that church as they tender their own salvation.
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More, Henry, 1614-1687.
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1672
(1672)
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Wing M2645; ESTC R217965
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188,285
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386
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Memory Understanding and will â—his is as near as in this impeâ—scrutable Mystery we can come speaking in a Parable with that ancient Father And we must say so rather than acknowledge any similitude with that of the common humane nature in Pythagoras Plato and Socrates least we run into that dreadfull absurdity of making more Gods than One. But now speaking according to the sense of St. Austin it is plain that that One Divine Nature being not in the three Persons as one general humane nature in three Men but the Union and mutual inexistence being as that of the Soul and her Powers it is plain I say that thaâ— One Divine Nature will be no more divided from it self by being thus inexistent in the three Persons than the Soul will be divided from her self by reason of her three Powers Memory Understanding and will or Mâ—ns Notitia Amor or Sapientia Amor which Peter Lumbard contends to be the proper titles of the Son and Holy Ghost which also is very consonant to the doctrine of the ancient PhÃlosophy of the Jews and Greeks touching their Trinitâ— And lastly as the Soul is sufficiently divisa ab aliis in a Metaphysical sense though she be really identiâ—ed with her three Powers so is the Divine Nature sufficiently divisa ab aliis though it be identified reallâ— with the three Persons So that my Adversarâ— does here nodum in scirpo quâ—rere out of an ill will to the clearness of my Arguments which he would thus obliquely obscure and teach the Infidel to cavil against the solid Mystery of the Trinity because neither himself nor any else can make good that false Opinion of Transubstantiation Which how pious and warrantable an act of him it is let any man judge This is onely to cast dust into the eyes of the Vulgar to dishearten them from endeavouring to see the Truth His Answer to the Argument from Mathematicks in the sixth Paragraph This Argument is meer Cob-web stuff half an eye may look through it For these words of the Doctor That a part of the Division is equal to the whole either refer to the species and then it is false that a part of the Division is equal to the whole or they point at the Body of Christ and then the words are de subjecto non supponente for there is no division of any part of Christs Body from the whole The Reply I will not say That my Adversary looks through too thick a Cob-web to discern the force and scope of my Argument But this I will say that he has plainly missed it For the very absurdity that I drive at is that in dividing suppose an entire consecrated Host into two parts in which one entire consecrated Host there is but one continued Body of Christ veiled as he says but co-extended with the species that in the dividing this Host or species of the Host if you will that one continued Body of Christ there before is discontinued and separated into two as sure as it is in two places at once And what I pray you is this but to be divided into two And being Division here is into two intirely the same with the divided what is it but to be divided into parts of a Division which singly are equal to the whole contrary to that common Notion in Euclid Or if you think this less absurd to be divided into two wholes For they may be called either in such an Hypothesis as brings in the conâ—usion of all things His Answer to the Argument from Logick in this sixth Paragraph This says he is the same in effect with the former and requires no new Answer Because these his trisling expressions if applied to the separated species are false if to Christs Body then they proceed upon a false supposition as hath been declared in my Answer to the third Objection The Reply That this Argument stands upon the same supposition that the former I grant But that the supposition is false I may well deny having proved it true in my Reply to his former Answer Nor is this Argument altogether the same in effect because it illustrates the grand absurdity of the opinion it oppugns from new Maximes So little triâ—ling is the argumentation which I have here produced But it is the Policy of my Antagonist to slight and make himself merry with such things as are too solid to be really Answered For this is succedaneous to a real Confuâ—ation in the eyes of the Vulgar and it may be of more consequence with them that are taught not to examine but believe In which Method he shows himself an egregious Artist in his attaque upon my next Objection where he begins with some few scoptical and undervaluing Reflections as he calls them But a Man of his parts and wit cannot but know that they are insignificant to any but the Vulgar before whom he thinks it very conducing to seem to trample on his Antagonist right loftily acting his part as it were on a Stage His Reflections on some Passages in my Argument from that fundamental Principle in Logick and Metaphysicks in this sixth Paragraph together with my Replies thereunto First saith he a knowing Reader cannot chuse but smile to see Can be or a capacity of Being brought in for a piece of an Argument to prove that a thing is not That individual thing that can be saith the Doctor and is to be made of any thing is not So my Adversary in his first Reflection To which I Reply That some knowing Reader it may be may not onely smile but laugh quite out while he observes to what pretty shifts my Adversary is puâ— to make the Doctor as he calls him seem an old doting fool to the heedless and ignorant For the knowing Reader will easily discern that That that can be is not to be disjoyned from the rest of the sentence but that made is to be referred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be in both places and that the sense is though the sentence is then less succinct and elegant That that individual thing that can be made or is to be made of any thing is not But here he makes another oblique Reflection and observes how fondly the Doctor playes the confident Dogmatizer asserting as evident That that individual thing that can be and is to be made of any thing is not As if forsooth it were evidently demonstrable that that individual thing which is to day in actual being could not possibly be destroyed and made anew again to morrow by a second generation Reply This is a very oblique and distorted Reflection indeed and cast off quite from the mark it should aim at nor does it at all respicere Titulum the Argument in hand which is our ever blessed Saviours Body never to be destroyed So that this Answer is onely an argute Cavil For my Antanist is not so short sighted but he could easily discern that I understand the individual thing I
or miles distant from A quoad integram suam substantiam as to its intire substance as B is from C. But B is really distant or separate from C suppose twenty yards or miles as to their intire substances Ergo A is distant or separate from A twenty yards or miles as to its intire substance nothing of its substance being between So that it is both present with it self and absent from it self at the same time twenty miles and may be many thousands according to this impossible Hypothesis In so much that it is plain this part of his Answer is weak and insufficient To the other part I say That it manifestly follows from my former Reply that shows plainly that A is distant and separate from A which is a plain and palpable Division of A wholly and intirely from it self That A is not Ens unum but Entia multa or plura because the very definition of Ens unum is that it be indivisum à se. This is perfect demonstration to any one 's whose eyes are not obstructed with prejudâ—ce And now to his Second Answer I deny that I go upon any such supposition That Essential Unity is derived from the unity of local Presence But what I contend for is this Tâ—at unity of local Presence is a necessary consequence of Essential Unity Nor can any finite Essential Unity be in any mâ—re than one place at once as Athanasius and Anastatius also have concluded And there may be as ne essary and indubitable reasonings â—rom the property of a thing as from its intrinsick Principles As a man may as certainly conclude such a Triangle to be a Rectangle Triangle from the equality of the Power of the Hypotenusa to the Powers of the sides including the Angle subtended by the Hypotenusa as from the very definition of a Rectangle Triangle it self And though the ubi of a Being be not essential to it yet we are sure what ever is is some where quod nusquam est nibil est From whence it is apparent how weak my Adversaries Inference is That unless essential Unity be derived from the Unity of local Presence it will not follow that the same Body being in divers places at once is divided from it self any more than it is divided from its intrinsick Principles which it can never be by Plurality of local Presence they being wholly extrinsick to the subject Which is the same as if he should contend that a Man may be and yet be no where because Vbi or Place is extrinsecal to him Or that his Soul may be neither wiser nor less wise nor equally wise with others or his Body neither taller nor less tall nor equally tall with others and yet be these being onely external respects and comparisons and not in the definition or â—ssential constitution of a Man To all which I add That the very intrinsick Principles of any one â—eing supposed to be in two Places are divided from themselves that is are distant or sâ—parate so many Yards or Miles as is plain from my former Arguing As suppose Plato were at the same time at Athens and Thebes the intrinsick â—rinciples of Plato to wit his Soul and Body would be both divided from themselves at this distance and constitute two Plato's These things are so plain that it is a wonder to me that they can be hid from any Mans eyes that does not wilfully wink against them or rather that any Man can wink against them though in humour or for ends best known to himself he may talk against them Now to his third and last I Answer Who does the greater disservice to the Catholick Church he or I I dealing bonâ fide and plainly demonstrating that to be an errour that cannot be hid from the unprejudiced it being in a subject so easily comprehensible to all mens perceptions I mean the nature of a Body and the impossibility of what they pronounce thereof And it being an Opinion unknown or disown'd by the Fathers of the Church I mean this Opinion of Transubstantiation not avowed by any Council till about four or five hundred Years ago when as the Doctrine of the Trinity was repeatedly ratified in the Primitive times by general Councils above 1200 Years ago with what reason is it that my Adversary will allow no greater certainty of the Mystery of the Trinity then of Transubstantiation which has such palpable and easily deprehensible and plainly demonstrable contradictions in it Is not this to put weapons into the hands of Inâ—idels with a witness But I hope I shall easily wrest them out again by a sufficient Reply to this third Answer of my Adversary In the First part therefore I say his supposition is very gross and incompetible to the Divine Nature As if it were in the three Persons as one hand phancyed in three distinct distanced gloves at once or one finger in three distinct fingerâ—stalls filling them out in several with its presence whenas the Divine Nature and the Persons are promiscuously said to be in one another Iohn 17. 21. I in thee and thou in me And Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity Peter Lumbard not unskilfully resembles the Trinity and Divine Nature to the Mind and the three Powers in the Mind Memory and Understanding and Love or Will These three saith he out of St. Austin are not three Lives but one Life not three Minds but one Mind one Essence He descants further on this Similitude but it is enough to hint thus much that from hence also it is manifest That the Divine Nature is not in the three Persons as one finger that fits three distinct distanced finger-stalls but as the Memory Understanding and Will are adequately every-where where the Mind is by a Metaphysical Coincidency and â—ongruity so also is the Presence of the three Persons and Divine Nature every where coincident and adequate Nor is the Divine Nature any more repeated according to the number of Persons then the Essence of the Soul is according to the number of those three Powers Memory Vnderstanding and Will So that nothing more can be concluded then thus That the number of the Persons are triple to the Divine Nature which is but One as the Powers of the Soul or Mind are triple to the Soul or Mind that is but One. And what inconvenience is there in this Do not all Men say that there are three Persons though but One Divine Nature But he would bring a thick Night upon Truth that gross Errour also might find harbâ—ur under that Covert In the second part of his Answer there seems also to be a supposition as Uncatholick and false as the former As if the Divine Nature in the three Divine Persons were as One common general Humane Nature in three Men suppose Pythagoras Plato and Socrates when as according to St. Austin and others The Divine Nature is to the three Divine Persons raâ—her as the Rational Soul or Mind to the three Powers