Ark to which St. Peter allude's 1.3.21 the like figure whereunto that is of the Ark spoken of in the 20. Verse is Baptisme well by no meanes could it any way notify the power of God in this shape but his kindness and meekness now likewise that it is a distinct person from the other is evident because in this very Verse the other persons are not intimated onely but expressed the voice from heaven uttering these words thou art my c. manifesting the Father and the person spoken to declaring the Son Sect. 2. But I find another opinion amongst them which is in the Racovian Catechisme Chapter 6. de Christi prophetico munere pag. 162. in that edition I use now at Racovia 1651. where the question being put Quid verò Spiritus Sanctus What is the holy Ghost he answer 's that first in the New Testament the Gospell of Christ is designed by it the Catechisme produceth two places of Scripture to prove this by the first 1 Cor. 2.10 but God hath revealed them that is the things which he hath prepared for them that love him unto us by his Spirit where say those Divines the holy Spirit is said to reveal the Mysteries of Godlinesse to God's Servants the other is 2 Tim. 1.10 where it is said God hath brought life and immortality to light by the Gospell now say they in this latter place the Gospell is said to do that which the Spirit was said to act in the former therefore they are one A most piteous Argument The Fire a Candle and the Sun make us see the same thing therefore they three are one but more closely the internall light in mine eye or whatsoever it is that fit 's the Organ for discerning and the externall light of the Sun which illuminate's the object both make me perceive the same visible object therefore by their Logick they are one which is absurd so is it with these two the carnall or naturall man of himself cannot behold the things of the Spirit God therefore infuseth into him the holy Ghost by which he is enabled to discern these Mysterâ—es of Godlinesse bue yet thâ— object lie's in the dark the Gospell therefore reveale's it unto them as the Kingly Prophet most punctually phrasâ—th it Psalm 36.9 in thy light we shall see light in the light of the Spirit we shall see the light of the Gospell and yet these two are very distinct nay my Text confute's all for if there be any thing in this Verse which look's like the Gospell it is the words of the voice thou art my beloved Son c. the apparition of the holy Ghost in the likenesse of a dove hath nothing to do with the Gospell therefore the Spirit here cannot be taken for the Gospell but they urge again that it is called the Gospell of the Spirit 2 Cor 3 6. I say therefore it is not the Spirit it is the Gospell of the Spirit because it reveale's the Spirit unto us and Spiritual Mysteries but nothing is the same with that which it reveale's nay if we say any thing is of another we must in that imply that it is not that other Sect. 3. But they goe farther and say that this phrase the holy Spirit signifie's Dei Donum which is given to certain men and is called the earnest of our inheritance no doubt and he cite's 2 Cor. 1.22 as Ephesians 1.14 all this is granted that the holy Spirit is taken sometimes for the Gifts but by a Metonymie the cause for the effect but that it should never be taken for that Divine person we deny and they cannot prove for as St. Paul dispute's the case at large 1 Cor. 12. The gifts of the spirit are divers but the same Spirit that third person of the Trinity is one so that although the Spirit may be called by the name of those Gifts which proceed from it yet he is distinct from them and here it is evident in my Text he was another thing besides them This is all that I find objected and all this is confuted out of this where the holy Spirit is said to descend upon our Saviour in the likeness of a dove to which none of these extravagant expressions can be applyed And now there needs no more from Scripture Their great defiance to us to produce Reason for what we speak may be defyed by us as unnecessary in a Case of Faith where we have Scripture we must believe beyond yea against reason the Scripture hath been abundantly handled by diverse although in these places which I have handled I have endeavoured to contribute something to the clearing of them The rationall laid aside by all almost as an impossible work Sect. 4. I therefore will adore and admire that high Mystery and shall most humbly thank Almighty God that he hath pleased to reveal such a sacred Truth to our Faith but then shall admire likewise his bounty to such men whose Souls and Reason he hath awakened by his Spirit to such a height as that they have made their Reason attend their Faith and follow it although non passibus aequis yet come up to it and discern that it is most rationall for a man to believe it is so What I have observed in this kind and wherein I can enlarge the Conceipt of others and explain any thing by reason I shall set down having this occasion and impart to the world with all humility to more learned men and to adoration of the Divine Excellencies which are not to be fathomed by man quid sunt what they are although quòd sunt that they are believing that they are by faith humane reason may justly strive to prove them and certainly it is a Godly work as impious to labour against it but I am discouraged mightily by the whole body of the School who almost with one voice Thomist and Scotist cry out that it is impossible to be done CHAP. XXXV Concerning God's enlarging the capacity of Nature and admitting Reason to some discovery of the Holy Trinity Of Lullies Demonstration by Aequiparance Whom the Bishop magnifies and vindicate's against Vasques c. The production of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost by the spiritual acts of the divine Understanding and Will Sect. 1. CArthagena is so impudent that he affirme's impossibile est per Dei potentiam fieri creaturam cui sit naturalis cognitio mysterii Trinitatis in Thomam Quaest. 32. art primo conclusione secunda It is impossible that by the power of God a creature should be made to whom the knowledge of the Trinity should be natural which in my conceipt is little lesse then blasphemy for why cannot â—od make a Creature natural doe that which he can enable him to doe for these Termes naturall or supernatural are only such because God hath confined Nature to such bounds as it cannot goe farther and exalted other things to such an height as is ultra Sphaeram
of St. John in his Revelation ibid. XV. The words Being with God signifie more then Known to God against Socinus and his followers 340 Eternall life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angels blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers 341 Although not till afterward manifested to others 342 The Philosophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge ibid. XVI Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose 343 XVII The Discourse resumed concerning knowledge of the word before the preaching of St. John Baptist. ibid. XVIII Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said The word was God 345 XIX God with them no proper name but an Appellative c. 346 Contrary to the use of it single throughout the New Testament ibid. XX. How Satan is called the God of this world c. 347 How the Belly God ibid. The Socinians criticisme about the article ibid. Answer'd 348 And Socinus's Instances ibid. How St. Cyrill's rule is to be understood ibid. XXI Socinus answer'd about Tautology 349 As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself 350 Lord and God not both one 351 The Word God with though not of the Father ibid. CHAP. XXXIII I. The Socinians conceit of the Word being with God in the beginning 352 II. Improbable having no Evangelical authority 353 III. That they pretend to prove's it not ibid. The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated ibid. His Ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeall 354 IV. His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed 356 V. How all things we made by him 357 St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation ibid. Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture 358 VI. Christ's interest in the Creation re-inforced against the Socinians gloss 359 Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental cause ibid. Their other slight objection answer'd 360 The use of words ibid. The benefit of Tradition ibid. VII How Life eternal and what else is to be understood ver 4. 361 How both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men ibid. How Christ is called the light according to Socinus 362 How according to the Bishop ibid. VIII What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why render'd was ibid. Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist. 363 IX Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ ibid. Which is evidently affirmative of his Divinity 364 X. Socinus misinterpret's Creation by Recreation or Regeneration 365 And misapplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Eâ—hesians 366 Another violence of his in wresting actuall Regeneration to Regeneration in endeavour 367 XI Smalcius's gloss ibid. His various significations put upon the word World ibid. Whereâ—n he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader 368 The Bishop's Animadversions 369 XII Their sense directly opposite to that evident in the Text. 370 XIII The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object 371 Smalcius's reply to Smiglecius ibid. Little becoming a Socinian 372 The World knew not the Word but by supernaturall grace ibid. What men apprehend of God by naturall abilities ibid. The Objection about St. John's upbraiding the world answer'd 373 The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted 374 XIV The Socinians word could not be made Flesh ibid. Their evasion 375 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell ibid. Their heterodox interpretation of Flesh ibid. Not evident in Scripture cited by Socinus 376 The result of their Comment 177 The summe of ours ibid. XV. The union of the Divinity with the Humanity implyeth no mutation of God into Man 378 Notwithstanding the praedication God is Man ibid. Which is asserted and by a familiar instance illustrated ibid. Their Objection answer'd by the dependance of substances upon God ibid. Another Argument of Smalcius's 379 Answer'd by the manner of existing ibid. Christ a true man though a divine Person 380 Whose Conception and Gestation in the blessed Virgin 's womb conduced nothing to his personality ibid. The Divinity and Humanity united render him neither two Sons nor two Persons ibid. XVI Objection of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost 381 Answer which identity implie's not that they were made flesh with him ibid. As Scotus illustrate's excellently 382 The Bishop's Apology to the Reader ibid. XVII Smalcius's first Quaere c. Rectifyed Answer'd 383 All actions not alwayes necessarily according to the nature of him or that which act's ibid. Smalcius's second Quaere Answered and frustrated 384 His third Quaere Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the Incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost ibid. XVIII Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself 385 Which he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles 386 CHAP. XXXIV I. The Socinians opinion of the holy Ghost 387 Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct Person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity ibid. II. Not the Gospel of Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture 389 III. Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure 390 A defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries 391 CHAP. XXXV I. Carthagena's little lesse then then blasphemous limiting God's power of enlarging the capacity of his Creature 392 II. What of God to be proved by reason and by whom to be attempted 393 III. Aquinas's first Argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity 394 The Bishop's Answer grounded upon Lully's demonstration by aequiparance ibid. IV. Aquinas's second Argument 395 The Bishop's first Answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith ibid. The Bishop's second Answer concerning the after-sight of Reason ibid. His third Argument from scorn and scandal 396 Answered by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture ibid. V. Trigosius and Carthagena passed by ibid. Truth not oppos'd to Truth ibid. The Bishop closeth with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques 397 And Aymericus who make's him an heretick ibid. His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about converting the Saracens 398 His devout enterprize according to it with successe ibid. His like adventure among the Moores ibid. Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance 399 The notable effect of his sufferings ibid. VI. Lully's undertaking according to Vasques ibid. Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's 400 The first prove's a personal plurality by concord ibid. Another from equality distinction ibid. Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposition of a reall effective act in God ibid. The Bishop's reply that Lully not only suppos'd but prov'd iâ— ibid. His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity
see it is not to the purpose for this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his own is not in the Text but if it were yet it might be so used because our body and Spirit are expressed to be his by purchase that is God-Christs and in the Text which I treate of the blood of Christ whom he terme's God is said to be the purchasing price so that then man's body and Spirit are God's but his purchase and that which they were purchased with was the blood of God Christ his own blood in a most peculiar and proper acception That our blessed Saviour was God then appeare's from this place of Scripture This Theâ—me hath been handled by abundance I love nâ—t actum agere my designe shall be to examine those great and chiefe names by which he is called in this relation Sect. 4. The first is the Son of God which Mr. Hobbes allowe's him to be and therefore I might be briefe in it but because that this Terme Son is variously used by Writers I will somewhat insist upon that acceptation which is most common to explaine what is intended by it there is an adopted and there is a natural Son a Son which is indeed and a Son taken into the roome of him that is such a one legally made a Son the one is a Son begot the other is made such the real truely begotten Son is it which we affirme of our Saviour he is such a Son of God we are adopted made Sons To know this we must first apprehend what a Son is A Son is an intellectual substance produced naturally of the same nature with the producer the generall nature is a Substance produced but yet that very generall Terme distinguisheth a Son from a Father for although amongst created things there is no Father which had not a producer yet the notion of a father intimate's no such thing and in the holy and blessed Trinity the Father hath no producer nor origination from any the rest is the difference first an intellectual substance this distinguisheth it from the generation of beasts plants mettalls fire water or the like which properly cannot be called Sons of their producers but if any one will desire that they be called Sons I will not much contend or gainsay it it will no whit hurt my designe The next Terme is produced naturally This put 's a difference betwixt a Son and arte facta such things as are made by art of the same nature with the producer This is the last terme and by this it is distinguished from all equivocal generations and therefore a Worme cannot be said to be the Sonne of the Sunne for although it be produced naturally by the Sunne yet it is of another nature and by that reason is not a Sonne Sect. 5. Thus the nature of a Son explained let us examine how it may be applyed to our blessed Saviour the Son of God first it is evident and no man will deny that our Saviour was an intellectuall substance and that he was produced the chiefe querie will be upon these two last Clauses whether produced naturally and whether of the same nature and first that he was produced naturally that will appeare out of this that being produced by God the Father as all agree he must be either a Creature or else naturally produced indeed taking naturally in a large sense for whatsoever opposeth violâ—nce a man may say that a Creature is produced naturally by God because that no violence can force the omâ—ipotent to doe any thing and the Creatures have imprinted in their very natures a passive obedience to God by which they submit themselves to his sacred will but in this place we understand naturally in a more strict meaning as it opposeth not onely violence but arte facta things made by art for those things which are done by the nature of any thing are done primò et per se not per accidens of the nature bent and disposition of the agent not because of any accidental addition which happen's to it this is principally discerned bâ— the constancy of that action or motion for when things are accidentall they appeare seldome and many times are not such but things or actions that flow naturally from any are so constantly and when opportunities are offered are alwayes such so it is accidental to me that I write at this time I doe not alwaies do so no not when I am provoked by reading or studying an untruth no not this selfe same untruth which I write against but that I should eat meate at dinner is a natural action I alwaies doe it unlesse some accidentall thing intervene to hinder it and then the not eating is accidental but the eating were natural because this last ariseth out of the disposition and temper of my body the former not eating from some accidental distemper Sect. 6. Now then to shew that our Saviour's generation according to his divinity was such I shall handle that one place Mic. 5.2 But thou Bethlehem Ephratah though thou be little amongst the thousands of Judah yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be Ruler in Israel whose goings forth have been from of old from everlasting My observations upon this Text are first that it is spoke of our Saviour this is evident out of that Mat. 2.6 where this Text is applyed to him And thou Bethlehem in the land of Judah art not the least amongst the Princes of Judah for out of thee shall come a Governour that shall rule my People Jsrael So likewise Iohn 7.42 Hath not the scripture saâ—d thaâ— Christ cometh of the sâ—ed of Dâ—vid and out of the Town of Bethlehem where David was This is consented to â—y all here then leâ— us consider that that saying cometh forth is understood of his being borne at Bethlehem this likewise is unquâ—stioned for ought I find then let us meditate upon the last Clause whose going forth have been from of old from everlasting there is no â—eason to think but that as his coming forth in the precedent part of the verse did signify hâ—s birth according to his humanity so this going forth from of old c. should signifie his birth according to his divinity for these cannot be understood of that birth which was at Bethlehem which the Prophet saith shall be which was acted long time after the Prophet's writing but of something that was acted long before which those words inforce from of old and from everlasting Faustus Socinus in his answer to Wicâ—us and Bellarmine Cap. 7. pag. 394. thus answers hujus ipsius rationis vì concludi non solùm de vera nativitaâ—e utrobique agi sâ—d etiam de eadem c. That the foâ—ce of this reason doth not onely evince that this is mâ—ant of a true nativity but the same nativity observe his reason for saith he the latter words by which he means come forth coming from the same
saith he pertaines to the constituting a person I answer he was thus although these had nothing to doe in the Constitution of his person these were but the common producers of any individual humane nature and so by consequence were accidents of ordinary personality although they were undiscerned to work any thing nay they could work nothing in his personality To the second part of this distinction or else there must be two distinct persons and so two Sons that which hath been delivered is sufficient to answer that there is but one Son and one person as Athanasius in his Creed as the Soul and Body make one man so the Divinity and Humanity make one Christ the Soul and Body have but one subsistence when they are united but two when they are severed so if the humanity had not been taken ken into the Word or should be left by it there would be two distinct subsistences and two distinct persons but being as they are united there is but one Sect. 16. He hath another objection which he esteem's of very great force pag. 102. which is thus framed When the word is the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost it should follow if the Word be made flâ—sh that the Father and the holy Ghost should be made flâ—sh likewise and so it would agree to the Father and the holy Ghost to be conceived born dy arise again as well as to the Son because Omnia opera c. all the outward works of the Trinity are inseparable For answer to this I grant that Axiome to be true and so farre forth as there is any outward action it is most true that the whole Trinity conspired in that Act they all produced this man Christ our Saviour they all preserved him in his being but the humanity of our Saviour was united onely to the Word which was his Divinity and this union was it by which he was made man nor in respect of it can it be said that that was an externall Action but a taking the humanity into unity with its sâ—lf for although the object be an externall thing yet the act being internall a reception not an extramission or working without upon it it need be no more called an externall act then God's knowledge of the Creatures whose object is externall but the act internall for all that can be said of this is that this manhood is united to the Word which union may well be a work of the Trinity although terminated in the Son as when a man tye's a knot by which two points or any other things are united the union is wrought by the man but terminated in these two so though this unity is wrought by the Trinity yet it is terminated in the Word and humanity not in the other persons or if you would have it closer suppose a man should glew a ring to the midle joynt of his little finger the man made this union but it is onely united or terminated in that joynt nor can we imagine what outward work was terminated by that joynt Scotus to this purpose excellently A point terminateâ—s a line yet hath no outward work upon it one relation terminate's another the Son the Father yet hath no outward causation or work upon him this termination which personality give 's to any individuall nature give 's it onely a finition and stint's it in these particular bounds but hath no externall work upon it at all so that the Father and the holy Ghost produce all the outward work with the Son but the Son onely is interested in the union by being made flesh c. Good Reader if my weak expressions have not rendred this high Mystery lively to thy Capacity excuse me I have done mine endeavour and since they labour with Philosophicall tricks and nice ties to â—ustian and amaze this discourse I must crosse them in their own way or else their triumph will be endlesse the truth is these Mysteries are revealed quòd sunt that they are and men ought to belâ—eve that and should go no farther but when witty men with wicked reason shall labour to lay stumbling-blocks of reason in our way to heaven it becom's us to lay them aside which I hope by the assistance of that God whose glory I endeavour I have and shall do Smalcius where before cited adde's great vaunts of this Argument with most opprobrious Terms which I meddle not with as impertinent Sect. 17. But because he make's some Queries which he think 's or seem's to think are able to stumble a Reader being unanswerable I shall putting them down endeavour to answer them although I may justly say in cases of this nature it is as true as in any that a weak and silly man may ask more then a learned man can answer His first is Potest ne fieri can it be that he who is God can do any thing not as God or in the nature of God this last phrase or in the nature of God seem's to me a strange exposition of that as God for quatenus ipsum is not in the nature of the thing which act's but according to the nature or to act out of the Principles of that nature now that may be done even by God in these outward acts of creating and governing the Creature which acts are not in but out of his nature although according to his nature I do not understand quatenus here in the strictest sense of Logicians for that which is reciprocall but in a larger as I expounded it To the Qâ—estion its self I answer to it as it seem's to be proposed as if it were in generall that nothing can act any thing which is not out of the principles of its nature for this consider Socrates is a man yet he can affect sensuall things which he doth not as a man but as a beast or a sensitive Creature he groweth and the like not as a man that is out of the principles of humanity but as a vegetable again Socrates is a Son or a Father or both he doth many things as neither he doth many being a Son and a man as a Son out of the principles of Sonship not as man out of the principles of humanity so that when any thing hath a substantial essence and a relative it may act out of the principles of that relative condition it hath and not out of the essentiall nature it hath if he speak as he doth of the persons of the Trinity no doubt but those personall actions and relations betwixt Father Son and holy Spirit although done and acted in that essence yet are not essentiall but personall and for other acts if any person assume any thing into a personal union with it it may act by and in that united nature that which it act 's not according to his Divine that is out of that principle thus may it eat walk and the like this because he still
expounded by the Schools page 205. Christ had a plenarity of power in his mission from the Father chapter 33. s. 18. page 385. Moral Philosophy hath a subject of a greater extent then Mr. Hobbes seem's to allow it chapter 29. s. 8. page 261. How Moses was instead of God to Aaron chapter 30. s. 12. page 286. How made a God to Pharaoh ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and his people s. 15. page 290. Motion aim's at quiet chapter 1. s. 3. page 5. All things produced by it p. 6. Things without us are not motions causing apparitions chapter 6. s. 9. page 48. The six kinds of motion page 49. No eternity of motion in things moved unto which no stop or impediment occurre's chapter 7. s. 2. page 55 How standing water recover's its rest after motion chapter 9. s. 1. p. 63. A bladder's sudain stopping its motion of ascent on the top of the water s. 2. page 64. The first mover immoveable chapter 14. s. 8. page 101. How naturall bodies move themselves without being moved by that which is moved page 102. N Naboth destroyed not by Ahab's but Jezabell's malice chapter 19. s. 4. page 145. The being and nature of things consist's not in their second but their first act c. chapter 5. section 1. page 32 The right of nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life chapter 22. section 1. page 164. Necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life section 3. page 166. He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment chapter 23. section 2. page 177. To which he is oblig'd by Reason ib. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispens'd with page 178. What is the Law what the Right of Nature chapter 24. section 1. page 181. Not such as Mr. Hobbes define's it chapter 25. section 1. page 190. External impediments may hinder but not take away naturall power section 2. p. 191. Nature's aiming at the benefit onely of particulars an errour which run's through Mr. Hobbes's whole discourse section 3. p. 193. How far naturall abilities conduce to the knowledge of God chapter 33. section 13. page 372. Actions not alwayes answerable to the principles of his or its nature which act's section 17. page 383. Severall acceptions of necessity and the different effects of it accordingly chapter 22. section 2. page 165. Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law ibid. No new Patent made to Noah but that to Adam re-enforced chapter 24. section 4. p. 185. Noah's sonne 's like co-heires or enter-commoners in their right page 186. O Obedience due in submission to any punishment by a lawful Magistrate chapter 25. section 7. p. 199. God to be obeyed before man chapter 30. section 9. p. 282. an instance in the Hebrew midwives ibid. The title of Occupancy sacred chapter 19. section 4. page 145. Before Occupancy Reason or Armâ— decide the title p. 147. Of all titles to Interest Occupancy most evident section 11. page 163. How far in case of necessity to be remitted chapter 36. section 13. p. 437 Discovery give 's not an equall right with Occupancy p. 438. Little peace to be expected if the right of Occupancy be not allowed p. 440. Ochinus pervert's the sense of Acts 20.17 28. to detract from the divinity of Christ chapter 31. section 2. page 293. Refuted by Smiglecius ib. To whom Smalcius replie's p. 294. Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ib. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishâ—p chapter 31. section 10. p. 315. One in essence may be plurally expressed when the effects are divers section 7. p. 309. The heathen Gods not believed for their Oracles but the Oracles for their Gods chapter 13. section 5. page 90. P The right of Parents over their Children chapter 24. section 2. page 182. What make's passions sinful chapter 21. section 2. p. 154. The various constitutions of the objects to our passions ibid. The passions to be moderated by prudence and right reason the ancient Ethnick Philosophy and Saint Paul's chap. 29. section 12. p. 269. ch 36. s. 3. p. 421. The barbarous Persecutions endured by the Primitive Christians chapter 25. section 6. p. 197. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantiall chapter 30. section 1. p. 272. No lesse applicable to a feigned then a true Person section 2. p. 273. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum anciently used to denote what we term Person section 3. p. 274. Person differently used in severall Arts and Faculties ibid. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes section 4. p. 275. No man Personates hiâ—self ibid. That of Cicero interpreted Vâ—us sustineo tres personas Mei Adversarii Judicis ibid. Perâ—on how taken by Criticks page 276. Boethius's definition of a Person section 5. ibid. objected against by Ri. de Sancto Victore ibid. By Scotus p. 277. Boethius's other definition of a person more difficult ibid. The former definition explain'd and vindicated by the Bishop section 6. page 278. The Etymology and common acception of Persona p. 280. Not the Actor but the acted is the person ib. The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated chapter 30. section 11. p. 284. Moses though instead of God did not personate him p. 285. s. 12. p. 287. Nor do Kings Nor Priests ibid. Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God section 14. p. 289. Uncomly to say our Saviour personated God who was really God himself chapter 31. section 1. p. 291. Personality what chapter 33. section 15. page 379. What that of Christ in the flesh ib. Diversity of persons imply's not diversity of things section 17. page 384. The whole Divine nature not necessarily engaged in the acts of any single person in the Trinity ibid. The eternal plurality of Persons by production in the holy Trinity syllogistically proved chapter 35. section 7. p. 404. Why no more persons then three in the holy Trinity section 11. p. 410. How the product of two Divine Agents may be one and the same Person section 12. p. 411. How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and holy Ghost section 13. page 412. St. Augustine's argument for their being called three Persons which is no Scripture-language section 14. p. 414. How great is the Personal distinction in the holy Trinity a mystery yet unrevealed chapter 35. section 14. p. 415. Personal and relative perfection taught by Philosophers chapter 29. section 10. p. 263. How man's knowledge is from Phantasms chap. 14. s. 4. p. 95. The foundation of Ethick Oeconomick and Politick Philosophy chapter 29. section 9. p. 262. Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus section 10. p. 263. With that of Lucretius page 265. The Philosophers language used by the Primitive Fathers and St. Paul chapter 32. section 14. p. 337. That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John p. 338.
that of St. John in his Revelation The words Being with God signifie more thâ—n Known to God against Socinus and hâ—s â—ollowers Eternal life before Christ's Iâ—carnation knowne to the Angelâ— blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers Although not till afterward manifested to others The Phâ—losophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose The Discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said the Word was God God with them no proper name but an Appellative â— Contrary to the use of it single thâ—oughout the New Testament How Satan is called the God of this World c. How the belly God The Socinian's Criticisme about the Article Answered And Sociâ—uâ—'s Instances How St. Cyrâ—ll's rule is to be understood Smalcius answered about Tautology As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself Loâ—d and God not both one The Word God with though not of the Father The Sociniaâ—s conceit of tâ—e Word being with God in the bâ—ginning Improbable having no Evangelical authority That they pretend to prove's it not The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated His ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeal His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed How all things were made by him St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture Christ's interest in the Câ—eatiâ—n reinforced against the Socinians glosse Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental Cause Their other slight objection answered The use of words The benefit of Tradition How life eternall and what else is to be understood ver 4. Hâ—w both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men How Christ is called the lâ—ght according to Socinus How according to the Bishop What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ. Which is evidently affirmatâ—ve of his Divinity Socinus misinterprets creation by recreation or regeneration And in supplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Ephesians Another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour Smalcius's gâ—oâ—â—e His various significations put upon the word World Wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader The Bishop's Animadversions 〈◊〉 sense â—irectly opposite to that evident in the Text. The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object Smalcius's reply to Smeglecius Little bâ—câ—ming a Socinian The World knew not the Woâ—d but by supernaturall grace What men appâ—ehend of God by naturall abilities The objection about Saint Johâ—'s upbraiding the world answered The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted The Socinians Word couâ—d not be made Flâ—sh Their evasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell Their heterodox interpretation of flesh Not evident in Scripture Cited by Socinus The result of their Comment The summe of ours The union of the Divinâ—ty with the humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man Notwithstanding the predâ—cation God is Man Whâ—ch is asserted â—nd by a familliar instance illustrated Their Objection Answer'd by the dependaâ—â—â— of substances up on God Another Argument of Smalcius's Answer'd by the manner of existing Christ a true man though a divine persâ—n Whose conception and gestation in the blessed Virgin 's wâ—mb conduced nothing to his personality The Divinity an humanity uniâ—ed render him neither two Sons nor two persons Object Of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost Answer Which identity implies not that they were made flâ—sh with him As Scotus illustâ—ate's excellently The Bishop's apology to the Reader Smâ—lcius's fiâ—st Qâ—erie c. Rectifyed Answered All actions not alwayes necessariâ—y according to the nature of him or that which act 's Smalius's second Querie Answeâ—ed and frustrated His third Querie Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authoriâ—y and plenitude of power in himself Whâ—ch he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles The Socinian's opinion of the holy Ghost Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity Noâ— the Gospel oâ— Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure A defiance to them that call for Reason in these mysteries Which notwithstanding may be subservienr to Faith Câ—rthagâ—na's lâ—tle lesse then blasphemous intimating God's power of enlarging the capacâ—ty of his Creature What of God to be proved by Reason and by whom to be attempted Aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity The Bishop's answer grounded upon Lulli's demonstratâ—on by aequiparance Aquinas's second Argum. The Bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith The Bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of Reason His third argument from scorn and scâ—ndal Answer'd by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture Trigosius and Carthagena passed by Truth not oppos'd to Truth The Bishop closeâ—h with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques And Aymericus who make's him an haeretick His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about convertâ—ng the Saracens Hiâ— devout enterprize according to it wâ—th successe His like adventure among the 〈◊〉 Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance The notable effâ—ct of his sufferings Lully's undertaking according to Vâ—sques Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's The first prove's a personal plurality by concord Another from equality distinction Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposiâ—ion of a reall effective act in God The Bishop's Râ—ply that Lulâ—y not only suppâ—sâ—d but proved it His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle which could nâ—t be Vasques chargeth Lully with a mâ—stake of a formal cause for an efficient Who is mâ—staken by him And the cause proved no less efficient then formal The discourse drawn into perfect syllogisme provâ—ng the eternall plurality of persons by production The Objection urging the Angel cannot produce the like effect answer'd Vasquâ—s's satisfactâ—â—y answerâ— to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion The Bâ—shop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity God's infinite Simpliciâ—y and Uniâ—y His spiritual faculties Understandâ—ng and Will Himself the infinite objâ—ct of his Understanding Which is eternally productive of his internal Word And that word substâ—â—tiâ—â— the same with himself The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wise-men by a Sâ—ar God's Will as fruitful by love as hiâ— Understanding by knowledge And so productive of a third person which is likewise God These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answered The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered accordâ—ng to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and Holy Spirit Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and â—ow long ago debated by St. Augustâ—ne The extent or limits of this personal distiâ—ction the Bishâ—p â—eveâ—ently forbear's to determâ—ne And dislâ—ke's the rash curiosity of the School-men His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason And seldom quoting the Fathers A digression to the Reader Select Aphorâ—smes out of which the Author draw's his Discourse A good foundation of his to build upon His noble Quaeâ—e Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life His study of it as to his own particular All men may not have like reason to be so intent The parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private What right a man hath to the mâ—aâ—s of preserviâ—g life and how he is to use them Each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world Nor to things conducing onely to mediate and particular ends The danger of pretending a right to all and so having a right judgment of it Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time All cannot be usefull to one particular perperson Nor every thing to evâ—ry one Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful Oâ—her ruleâ— by which to institâ—te a right judgment beside reason How all creatures are granted to man's usâ— limited Hiâ— impossible supâ—osition His falâ—acy à bâ—ne divisiâ— c. The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all The case of necessity imply's no such universal right Nor dissolution of any Common-wealth An Objection fram'd by the Author A second of his not so strong The first but weakly answer'd by him without regard to God's end His first Argument for universal right returning extreme necessity The Bishop's severall answers to it His second Argument for ancient right in a lawfull defense How the force oâ— invalidity of this argument mâ—y be understood and how the practice moderated His Objection And answer The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion staâ—ing the râ—ght of possâ—ssion Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself Propriety withouâ— Covenant The râ—ght to goodâ— gotten by conquest what His third Argument The Bishâ—p's answer from the fallibiliâ—y of judgmâ—nt His argument against the right of Occupancy Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant What is the râ—ght in necessity Discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with Occupancy The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society and Trade The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed
a husbanding of these seeds and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are exprest that these are the seeds of all Religion I will consider them apart and fiâ—st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion Sect. 2. All the Opinion of Ghosts which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter he makes to be an Error now for Errour to be a sâ—ed of Truth was never heard of before an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit nor ill seed a good tree Errour the greater growth it hath the greater is the Errour but it never growes into Truth Again in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance as indeed it is although his description of it is weak in that place but the assurance that there is a God is the greatest that may be and therefore not to grow out of such a seed Thirdly consider that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit because God is exprest in Scripture to be a Spirit yet the beliefe and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it which prevailed with many Philosophers to perswade them that there were such things yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince there is a God and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts but the opinion of Ghosts which is lesse certain and lesse evident cannot introduce it He brings no manner of proof for what he speakes and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce Pag 55. He nameth Chaos Ocean Planets Men Women and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits although his Daemons and some others have Now although the opinion of Spirits may perswade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits yet it could never invite but would crosse and oppose those Religions which were paid to corporeall things for by all men who have writ of Spirits both Christian and others Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other Sect. 3. His second seed is ignorance of second Causes a most unhappy and unreasonable speech Ignorance the Mother of Religion Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first Rom. 1.20 S. Paul saith The Invisible things of Him that is of God from the Creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his eternal Power and Godhead This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion and this was visible although not in its self yet in the things that are made the second Causes so that not the ignorance but the knowledge of the second Causes like Iacobs ladder leads us from one to another step by step until we ascend to the highest and first Cause This he himself acknowledgeth before but as he often doth so he now forgot what he had said Ignorance of second Causes that they are second and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods and so turne a Religion to them but as may appear at the bottome of the preceding Page 53. he understands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes which without doubt is so farre from bringing in Religion that it is apt to produce Atheism and an opinion that the world is governed by chance not by Providence So that as for his first I deny it to be a Seed of Religion that is the opinion of Ghosts so for this Second the Ignorance of second Causes I affirm that is an enemy to Religion stopping the Soul from ascending up to Heaven by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth Sect. 4. His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear That feare Timor Reverentialis may be a seed the fomenter and cherisher of Religion yea an act of Religion I do not doubt but that that ugly sordid feare which he speaks of as appeares in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined for the first feare ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God but this second feare he speaks of out of Ignorance of Causes Because men know there are Causes saith he of every thing but know not those causes therefore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible Agent This ignorance oâ— Causes must needs be understood of second Causes for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first nor impute the production of things to him It is true the ignorance of some Attributes as his goodness may make a Maniche think there is an ill God and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others that God is the Author of the evil of sin the one not apprehending his internal goodness conceives God evil in himself the other not apprehending his Goodness in operation his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill but the ignorance of him as a first Cause can never introduce a Religion to him But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Causes we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent as he terms it unless it be that god Fortune which the Poet derideth Te facimus Fortuna Deum coeloque locamus And worthily for there can be nothing more contradictory then the Providence of God and the Blindness of Fortune Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes which produce the effects they discerned and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause as they cannot who discern not the second they must needs have that doubt or fear that they are acted by Fortune and all things fall alike to all without either being rewards or punishments Rods or Scourges c. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion as it leads to Atheisme But it is not said that this fear but the Devotion to what we feare is the Seed of Religion I could have wished that among other his expositions of words he had put down what he means by Devotion but he hath not Consider then the sense of it is Voto decernere to decree a thing to another by a vow so that when one devotes a thing to another he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his Now then Devotion to what we feare is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow Devotion then to what we feare if that we feare be God is not a seed but a fruit and act of Religion for Religion is not only as he not vainly onely but wickedly and prophanely defines Chap. 6. page 26. Feare of
Objections of Scotus and his followers which I would answer immediately in their order but that I think the bare explication of Boethius his Definition will doe it without more business which thus I doe Sect. 6. First a person is a substance by that Term it is opposed to all accidents and things onely imaginary it is an individual substance by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances the general or spâ—cial natures of substances which are dividual into many of the same nature as a Man a Lyon there are many of the same kind under each of these notions but there are no more the same as one person yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business which is it is incommunicable he may use it and by that may be denyed that the Soul of man separated is a person because although it is incommunicable ut quod as the Scotists speak yet it is not absolutely for it is communicable ut quo which distinction may be thus explained that thing is communicable ut quod which communicate's its self wholly and in recto as they speak so that it communicate's in such a manner as a man can say another is this so doe general or special any universal natures as we can say Socrates is a man a sensitive thing and the like but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature yet not such as that we may say another thing is this but that it hath this or is made such or such by it so whiteness heat coldness or any form the Soul of man the form of any thing these communicate themselves ut quo by which that thing to which they are communicated may be say'd to be white or have whiteness to be hot or have heat not to be whiteness or heat to be animated or have a Soul but not to be that soul and the like thus they say that the Soul of man separated is communicable ut quo though incommunicable ut quod it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again though it be now separated but a person is absolutely incommunicable The last Term in this Definition is that it is rationalis of a reasonable nature this word reasonable must be understood of any intellectual nature whether by discourse or else and so it comprehend's all Divine Angelical or whatsoever and if I am not deceived this mere exposition will satisfie all the Objections which have been made that of Richardus who saith this agree's to the Divine Nature which is the Trinity No saith my Definition that Divine Nature is Dividual communicable to three persons Scotus his first Argument that it agree's with a Soul separated No say I that is communicable ut quo His second which saith that individuum must be of that is divisible I think I might deny that Proposition howsoever to that which followe's that God cannot be divided I say not into Beings or Natures but he is into Persons and that without all Composition His third that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God is true in a gross sense as no words we use can yet reason may be affirmed of God in a superexcellent manner which excell's our knowledge or Discourse and Angels although they discourse not as most think yet they have an Angelical reason which discern's in a finer manner those things without Discourse which we doe by Discourse nor is it necessary that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge beyond beasts Thus you may discern what a person is esteemed to be amongst such as know how to define and Mr. Hobbes if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books might easily have discovered this amongst them and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage onely for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players rather than Philosophers in words we are not alwayes to consider their Etymologie but how they are used yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word the most commonly received amongst the Schools is significant of the true use which is per se una a person because it is by its self one nor are we to consider onely how words have been used but how they are now in our English formerly a Knave signified a servant now a dishonest man Bawdery signified onely bravery now obscenity with hundreds of the same nature So that since the Exposition which I have given of this word Person is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers when he give 's another sense of it he ought to have shewed more reason for it then he hath But he hath a Design in it I will therefore consider that Sest 7. Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent and then the Person is the Actor and he that owneth his words or actions is the Author I am of another mind not the Actor but the acted is the person as will appear manifestly A Constable hath his actions and his words legally spoke in the King's name owned as the King 's yet he is not the person of the King but the King in his own person act 's by him he beare's the person represent's the person of the King but the King is the person he the Actor or Representer the Author according to his phrase is the person not the actor I commend his observations upon Authority and what followe's in that page onely I can by no meanes approve what he saith in the middle of that page Sect. 8. When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him not he but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature This is very erroneous or else it make's an impossible supposition for this supposition if he be obliged by a former Covenant must either be understood that some former Covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the Law of Nature and that is impossible for no Authority but that of the God of nature can have right to crosse the Law of Nature and then it is most consonant to the Law of Nature to obey him contrary to all Covenants made to any other by any authority yea even of God himself and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his onely Son which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be was most honourable or else must be understood that some Covenant of one man to