same reason there being but one God there can be but one divine essence and if more essences more Gods 3dly That when we speak of God the words Essence Nature Substance Divinity are Synonymous terms and signify one and the same thing Thus in the Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are promiscuously used to denote the divine nature or Godhead The Divine Nature Essence Substance being nothing else but the Deity or Divinity and the Divinity vice versa is nothing but the Divine Nature Substance Essence 4thly Therefore if in the Trinity there are three distinct Substances there must be three distinct Essences and Divinities and consequently there must be three Gods For that there is one God or more Gods than one must depend upon the Unity or Multiplication of the divine nature and essence If there be but one divine Nature Substance Divinity there is and for that reason it is impossible there should be any more than one God and if more distinct Substances and Divinities there must be more Gods As the former are numbred and multiplied so are the latter in the same proportion both as to number and kind If there be but three distinct Substances and Divinities there are but three Gods and if those Substances be only numerically distinguished then they constitute only three numerical Gods but if specifically distinguished then there must be three Gods of a different kind that is specifically distinguished from each other 5thly That the Unity of the Godhead is the most perfect and complete sort of Unity that can be imagined No Nature Essence Substance can in any sense be more one than the Divine Nature or Essence is which hath such so perfect and so peculiar a Simplicity and Identity as to exclude all manner of division and all sorts of Multiplication It is true indeed there is one peculiar prerogative of the Divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and holy Ghost But this is done without any division or multiplication so that the same divine nature is a singular but not a solitary nature being whole and entire in the three blessed persons in each of which it doth completely subsist tho with a different manner of subsistence yet so as to retain its most complete Identity excluding all plurality of essences whether equal or unequal like or unlike the Divine nature being but one and the same as was said before in the three divine persons without diversity and without distinction The Persons indeed are distinguished from each other by a true real proper distinction But this is not founded in the diversity or distinction of their natures but is taken from the different ways of subsistence which one and the same nature hath in the three persons whereby they have different properties characters and relations which are absolutely incommunicable to each other and whereby some things may be affirmed of one which cannot possibly be affirmed of either of the others Such as are the generation of the Son the procession and mission of the holy Ghost And in this different manner of subsistence is founded as the distinction so likewise the subordination between the divine Persons the Father being the first and therefore styled by the Fathers the Origine and Fountain of the Divinity with respect to the Son and holy Ghost Not by the production of a new divine nature but by a communication of his own which as the Fathers always speak is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one and the very same in all three without separation difference or distinction This is indeed a great mystery but we speak of the blessed Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity which hath bin always looked upon by the greatest and wisest men in the Church to be above all expressions and description If any man therefore will not be satisfied with this general account but will be putting new and nice questions and desire to be informed with Nicodemus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how can these things be Then I must acquaint him once for all that neither man nor Angel can give a satisfactory answer to such enquiries which are not only impertinent but dangerous proceeding from a wanton and impious curiosity which ought severely to be condemned As for us of this place I hope we shall always endeavor to regulate our apprehensions in the affairs of Religion by the discoveries which God hath made in the holy writings accounting that the truest wisdom when men are wise according to what is written And therefore in spight of all the objections and flouts of Arians Socinians Tritheists Atheists we will resolve to believe what is revealed and to adore what we cannot comprehend Lastly Since the Unity of the divine nature is such and so perfect as is before described therefore we may conclude that all those who attempt to explain it by a specifical sameness and identity are so far from confirming that they plainly undermine this great and fundamental truth For 1st hereby they destroy a true real Unity and in the room of it introduce only a notional Unity which may be consistent with nay indeed as the Dean hath bin told implys a multiplication of the divine nature So that when we say the three persons are one God they are no otherwise one according to this explication than as ten thousand individual men are one man or a myriad of Angels are one Angel Neither is it enough to say that the three divine natures and substances are United in the Trinity but are separated or divided in the persons of Angels and men For this will not alter the case for the three substances so united retain their true and real distinction from each other notwithstanding that Union and are still as much three as if they were not united And therefore this Union of natures will no more constitute one nature than the Union of the three persons in the Trinity who are most intimately and inseparably united to each other will make one person or than the Union of both natures Divine and Humane in our blessed Savior will constitute and make one nature Eutyches of old maintained such a senseless opinion but the Fathers told him that those natures were united it is true but yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without confusion alteration or conversion of either into the other So that each nature retained its own powers faculties and properties entire and distinct from those of the other without any mixture or change The like is to be said of the union of several essences and natures in the Trinity For should such an union be allowed yet still the natures must remain entire and distinct and so must their attributes likewise They must have distinct understandings and wills and distinct operations as flowing from powers and faculties essentially distinguished and
consequently they must be three Gods to all intents and purposes when united as much as if they were separated But 2dly A specifical sameness of the Godhead is by no means to be allowed because it destroys the true and fundamental reason of that unity viz. the infinite perfection of the divine nature which renders it absolutely incapable of any multiplication and places it upon another weak and unstable foundation viz. the operation of the mind and understanding So that the unity of the Godhead according to ths hypothesis doth not result from the nature of God but is owing to and dependent upon the operation of some intellect drawing one common notion from the agreement which it observes in several individuals Which to affirm would certainly be both a monstrous and a Blasphemous assertion ss the Animadverter hath very judiciously observed p. 183. From all these observations I think it is as evident as any truth in nature that to assert three substances in the blessed Trinity is plainly to imply and in other words to affirm that there are three Gods which assertion therefore in the judgment not only of all true Christians but even of Jews and Mahometans and some sober Pagans would be accounted and adjudged false and impious as it is declared to be by the Oxford Censure But against this the Dean will urge in behalf of his three distinct substances the plurality and distinction of persons in the Trinity Are there not three Persons in the Godhead Yes Are not these three Persons three substantial Persons Yes we acknowledge they are Tho by the by this epithet of substantial when added to Person is superfluous and is no better than a plain tautology because the very notion of Person imports the perfection and complement of substance so that it receives no addition to its signification by the word substantial But to pass this by and proceed to his questions Are not three substantial persons three distinct substances I answer no. For these three persons have but one and the same substance or nature that is common to them all which nature hath three different ways of subsisting in the three persons From which different ways of subsisting as I said before do result distinct properties and relations belonging to each of those divine persons and which are incommunicable to the others All these questions so often and so impertinently proposed by the Dean are easily resolved by proposing the like questions in other words but such as are perfectly equipollent Are not the Persons in the Trinity three distinct Divine Persons Yes Is not every divine Person truly and properly God Yes Is it not then as plain that if there be three distinct divine Persons there must consequenty be three Gods I answer no. Because tho each of them distinctly is a divine Person and therefore God yet they have but one and the same Divinity or Godhead in common to them all so that they are distinguished only by their personalities but are united in one divine nature or Godhead And therefore as the Athanasian Creed tells us tho we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord yet we are forbidden by the Catholick Religion to say there are three Gods or three Lords Now of all this I would defire no greater or plainer acknowledgment than what I find in the writings of this examiner and particularly in the papers before us p. 18. he hath these words That there are three Persons and one God is the Catholick Language and therefore three belongs to the Persons and one to the Godhead This is right but in the words immediately succeeding he quite overturns the Catholick Faith and Language by saying That therefore whatever is essential to the notion of each Person may be numbred and distinguished with the Persons From hence he would have it follow as indeed it will if this be allowed that spirit and substance being included in the notion of a Person it must be multiplied with it so that as there are three Persons so there must be three spirits three substances in the Trinity Now this is extremely false for by the same way and for the same reason that there are three substances or three spirits there must be three Godheads He saith no adding that this will not affect the unity of the Godhead for three he saith belongs to the persons which are three not to the Godhead which is but one very right And must it not be said for the same reason that when we affirm that there are three substantial Persons three is to be applied to Persons and not to substance because substance when we speak of God being equipollent to Godhead as was said before is but one and therefore cannot be multiplied But cannot what is essential to the notion of a person be numbred and distinguished with the person No by no means for tho it may and must be so in finite persons it is not so when we speak of the divine infinite persons in the Trinity Because there is something in each of those persons which in common belongs to them all such is the divine nature substance Godhead which is so in each as to be whole and entire in all three and therefore tho residing in and applied to each person yet it may not it cannot be numbred or distinguished with the persons who are distinguished by their properties and relations which arise from three different ways manners of their subsistence but not by their substance and Godhead which is but one and the same in all three without division distinction or multiplication The same orthodox acknowledgment we have p. 21. tho tacked by him according to his usual method to an egregious contradiction There he saith that the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine Person and that infinite and infinite and infinite when applied to the Persons are but one and the same infinite nature Very right but then with the same breath in a manner he puffs all this away by telling us that each of the divine Persons is a distinct infinite mind and yet that these three infinite distinct minds can have but one and the same divine nature Which is a plain contradiction making one to be three and three one in one and the same respect And is no better than if he should say in three Gods there is but one and the same Godhead for infinite mind and spirit is but the same thing in other words with God as he himself elsewhere acknowledges Lastly to mention no more p. 29 30. He repeats the same orthodox expressions The Scripture-notion of the Unity of God is not such an Unity as is only in one Person for then it could not enjoyn the Faith and worship of Father Son and holy Ghost But such an Unity as can be between three when the one same divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the
eternal Son and by the Father and the Son to the eternal Spirit without any division or separation And that which is communicated whole and entire without division or separation makes no number for it is but one still Here he is as sound and orthodox as Athanasius but when he comes to explain himself and therein to give us his true sentiments for all the former expressions are but an artificial disguise of his errors then he uses such a shuffing ambiguous deceitful way of speaking that you would think that Ursacius or Valens or Eusebius of Nicomedia were risen from the dead I confess I have bin beyond measure astonished when I have perused his writings on this subject to find such plain and gross contradictions so often and so boldly uttered by him Sometimes he will make a good and laudable confession of the Faith and by and by he spoils all by a very fraudulent and treacherous explication And indeed hereby he hath laid the foundations of such a sophistical and deceitful way of writing that if it should be countenanced in him and thereupon imitated by others it would render it almost impossible either to vindicate the truth or to confute any Heresy This charge will be made good by considering these following particulars Such as are 1st his manifest and manifold contradictions with which his books written upon the subject which is now before us do every where abound Whereby he affirms and denys the same thing almost in a breath and what he erects in one place he presently kicks down in another To make out this I shall confine my self to one instance of it relating to the Unity of the divine nature p. 21. He saith the Divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person and the three divine persons whom he very falsly and very dangerously there calls three divine minds have the same one divine nature and are but one and the same infinite nature p. 29. There is but one and the same divinity or Godhead in them all speaking of the three persons The same one divinity or Godhead is entirely and indivisibly in three distinct persons p. 30. The same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son c. See p. 45. where you have the like expressions by which he affirms that there is but one and the same nature one Divinity one Godhead in the three Persons And yet in other places he is as confident that there is not only one singular nature and substance in God p. 16. To say that there is one singular substance in the Deity is the fundamental Article of the Sabellian Creed p. 17. If there be but one singular divine nature and substance in the Deity tho men could find a Trinity of Persons in this one divine nature which yet p. 16. he represents as a ridiculous imagination yet from thence he saith it must follow that the whole Trinity must be incarnate p. 23. Now to affirm that there is but one Godhead one and the same divine nature in the three Persons and yet to deny that there is one singular divine nature and substance in those persons I think amounts to a very plain contradiction I know it will be said that he affirms and denies the Unity of the divine nature but it is not in the same respect when he saith it is one he means that the same specifical nature is whole and entire in the three Persons but when he denies it to be one he means that there is not one only singular or numerical divine nature for this were by so saying to revive the Heresy of Sabellius I Answer this will not save him from a contradiction For let him make choice of which of these terms he pleases to express the Unity and sameness of the divine nature by it is certain that what he affirms in one place he denies in another When he saith it is one one and the same doth he mean one singular numerical nature if he means so then this he doth at other times in plain downright terms deny not only as a thing that is false but as Heretical impossible contradictory as was seen before Well when he asserts the Unity of the Godhead and saith that one and the same divine nature is in the three Persons wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son as he expressed himself p. 30. doth he mean a specifical Identity I suppose he doth for p. 10. he tells us that to assert three substances in the Arian notion that is three distinct minds and species of substance or three natures and essences specifically different this is false impious and Heretical Therefore to affirm three natures of the same kind must be a true religious orthodox acknowledgment This he must mean if he means any thing Otherwise if he shall say that when he affirms there are three natures or substances he means that there are three but yet which are neither of the same kind nor of a different kind that is neither numerically nor specifically different Then I say that he advances an absurd and an inexplicable position which neither he nor any man else can possibly understand But on the other hand if he affirms or means a specifical Unity in the Godhead then I am sure he doth as plainly as words can make it in other places contradict his meaning For p. 19. He hath these words Tho the Ancient Fathers frequenty make mention of a specifick Unity of nature in the Godhead yet they did not confine the Unity of the divine nature to this And p. 33. This specifick sameness doth not answer the complete notion of the divine Unity Nay he doth not only say this but gives a very good reason for it p. 19. The divine nature is no species for it is but one If there be any force in this consequence it must be this viz. That the divine nature is but one singular individual nature which is incapable of plurality or multiplication and therefore it cannot be a species because a species can be multiplied and therefore is capable of being affirmed and predicated de pluribus of more things of the same kind He proceeds The Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible unity Very right Therefore say I it is not a specifical Unity the former assertion being a clear an unanswerable proof that it is not so For 1st The Unity of the Godhead is a real Unity but a specifick Unity is only a Logical and Notional one 2dly The unity of the Godhead is an essential unity the unity of one nature and essence the specifick is only an unity of several natures which are really and essentially à parte rei distinct from each other and are only united in the understanding Lastly The unity of the Godhead is the most real and therefore the most perfect unity but a specifick unity is not the most real but of a lesser sort
and much inferior to a singular and numerical Identity It is this latter then that is to be found in the Godhead which being uncapable of division or multiplication is for the same reason as he himself acknowledges uncapable of numeration For when we say three persons Three belongs to the persons who are three but not to the Godhead which is but one p. 18. And now is it not plain to any man that the Dean by thus going forward and backward saying and unsaying very evidently contradicts himself I think he doth But if this wants any farther confirmation let the Reader look into his Vindication and there he will find these contradictions yet in more plain and express terms if it be possible which the Reader may find exemplified in the Animadversions p. 178. c. and thither I refer him to save the trouble of transcribing But the Dean for all this will not allow that he is guilty of a contradiction and therefore to save himself from that imputation he hath contrived two Answers but they are the most bold and arbitrary that ever were invented But when men are hard pressed it is no wonder that they should make use of any the most desperate shift to make their escape 1st then Doth not he who asserts the unity of the Godhead and yet tells the world that this is neither a specifick nor a numerical unity for of a Generical one there is no question in this case I say doth not such an one contradict himself Surely he doth For if God be one he must be so in either of these two senses And therefore if the Godhead be one and yet is neither numerically nor specifically such it must be one and not one which is a contradiction He answers no because there is an unity that is a medium between both The unity of the Godhead is not such as is to be found in a singular nature that is saith he Sabellianism neither is it a specifick unity for that is only a Logical and notional unity and therefore the unity of the divine nature is not to be confined to this p. 19. In opposition to the Arians the Father 's taught not one singular substance in God which is Sabellianism But such an oneness of substance as we know not how otherwise to express than by a specifick sameness and unity tho that doth not answer the complete notion of the Divine unity p. 33. In short the Divine nature is one but by what kind of unity no man can divine It is neither a specifical nor a numerical oneness but an unity either made up of both or made up of neither however it is a medium between them I fancy such another medium as he found who desired the people to join with him in singing the Psalm that was between the three and twentieth and the twenty fourth Psalms But if this Answer will not bring him off he hath contrived a second viz. that these three numerical substances are united into one by a mutual self-consciousness But for this notion of his the Animadverter hath sufficiently-accounted with him and therefore there remains nothing more by me to be said upon that Head Thus it is plain that the Dean in his writings is guilty of many gross and palpable contradictions which way of writing is very scandalous and ought therefore by every one to be condemned But this is not all there are several other things in his way manner of writing which ought to be discountenanced I can but just name them Any man that peruses his late writings will besides his contradictions find in the 2d place that he frequently but very fraudulently endeavors to impose upon his Readers by makeing two words to be equipollent which yet have a different signification Thus in order to amuse unwary Readers when he speaks of the divine nature he joins the words singular and solitary together as if they were synonymous terms and then insidiously asks p. 17. Is it not Sabellianism to affirm that there is but one singular and solitary nature in the Trinity Answer To affirm that there is but one solitary nature is to revive the Heresy of Sabellius because it were as much as to say that the divine nature or substance is to be found only in and therefore confined to one Person But to say there is but one singular nature imports no such thing For the same singular numerical nature is to be found in each of the divine Persons being common to them all but yet without multiplication as he hath often bin told by his Adversary and which thing he hath often affirmed himself how sincerely let others judge So again in order to establish a plurality of substances he makes three substantial persons to be the same with three personal substances But he hath bin often told that tho the persons are different each of which is a substance yet that the substance or nature is not distinct but common to all three And therefore three substantial Persons are no more three substances than three divine Almighty Persons have three distinct Divinities or Almightinesses which he himself sometimes will not allow 3dly When hard pressed by his Adversary to defend himself he invents several arbitrary and incomprehensible distinctions for which he hath neither reason nor example Thus when told that three substances must infer a multiplication of the divine nature in the Trinity that again must infer three Gods to avoid the force of this Argument he tells us that the same Individual nature subsists thrice not by multiplying but by repeating its self and that the divine nature is repeated in its Image but without multiplication And this senseless distinction he often repeats in his defence by which it is certain that he multiplies words tho perhaps he may think that he doth not multiply distinctions Again having denied a Numerical Unity of the Godhead and yet being aware that a Specifical Unity would lay him open to many unanswerable difficulties he hath in a most presumtuous unprecedented manner formed a distinction as to Identity and sameness of nature by which he makes a middle sort of Unity between the two former partly specifick and partly numerical Which distinction is perfectly an Original and for which he hath neither copy nor precedent from any writer either living or dead Lastly In the same insidious manner to avoid the force of those Arguments which are brought against him when he cannot maintain his words he flies to his meaning where he entrenches himself and then he is as safe as if he were in an enchanted Castle And there let him continue for me unmolested and undisturb'd provided that he will no longer disturb the world with so unjustifiable a practice for if men may be allowed by a mental reservation to harbor a meaning different from the plain obvious and natural signification of words then there is an end of all truth and sincerity and consequently of all mutual confidence
between man and man which by this means or such meaning if you please is entirely destroyed By all that hath bin said upon this Head I think it will appear plain to every unprejudiced person that there was great reason to condemn the Propositions mentioned in the Decree which plainly overthrow the Unity of the Godhead and therefore are justly styled false and impious Of them it is farther affirmed in the Decree that they are contrary to the Doctrine of the Catholick Church and particularly to that received here in the Church of England And so they are as opposite to it as truth is to falshood and faith to infidelity It hath bin the belief and profession of all good Christians since the first planting of Christianity in the world that as there is but one God so there is but one nature and essence in the three persons of the Trinity of which they are all partakers This was upon a particular occasion Decreed in the Council of Nice confirmed afterwards by all the other General Councils and they who have opposed this determination have in all times heretofore bin adjudged and declared Hereticks For some time indeed the words Substance Person and Hypostasis were of ambiguous signification but that was afterwards settled and the Language of the Church ever since hath bin Three persons and but one Substance Nature Essence Divinity In this all the Fathers agree both Greek and Latin even St. Hilary who styles the Father Son and Holy Ghost three substances yet in the very same place where he is cited by the Examiner he explains himself and vindicates the Synod of Antioch and tells us p. 37. Tres substantias esse dixerunt subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes by three substances they meant three persons But as to the substance it self when placed in opposition to person he acknowledges that to be but one and that the Father and son unius recte ambo creduntur esse essentiae Again Credamus dicamus esse unum substantiam p. 39. and p. 40. Deus unus ob indiscretae in utroque naturae indissimilem substantiam praedicetur Which the Examiner thus renders into English The Father who begets and the Son who is born are to be acknowledged one God upon the account of the same nature in both without the least difference or variation and therefore say I without the least distinction except the Dean can find out a distinction without a difference which I confess he hath done in some other cases before mentioned But this is his peculiar talent to find out that which no body before him ever dreamed of The like observation is to be made with relation to the Alexandrian Synod under Athanasius which one would think he would never have mentioned if he had not in a manner bin forsaken by his reason at the same time that he abandoned his Religion For nothing could have bin produced which is more apposite and pertinent to overthrow his new notion of three minds and substances For there happened a dispute between the Catholicks concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which was meerly a contention about words when they all agreed in the same thing those who asserted three Hypostases thereby meaning three Persons but yet but one Godhead and one substance in the Trinity those who denied there were three Hypostases thought that by Hypostasis was meant substance and they dreaded nothing more than to affirm there were three substances in the Godhead Take it in the words of the Examiner p. 43. They owned but one Hypostasis or substance for they believed but one ' Divinity or Divine nature by reason of the Identity of nature between Father and Son And they having given their several Explications were all found to agree in the Catholick Faith and then afterwards three Hypostases and one nature was the Catholick Language Can any thing be more directly opposite to his notion than this Determination of the Synod One cannot but think he was Infatuated when he produced it But still he hath a shift in reserve to save himself and his three substances For in that same place he renders Hypostasis by substance and saith that when they said three Hypostases they meant it still in the notion of three substances A very false and perfidious suggestion making the Catholick Language as he himself acknowledges it wherein Catholicks expressed their consent in the same Faith to consist in a ridiculous contradiction For according to him when they said three Hypostases and one nature they meant three substances and one nature that is three substances and one substance three natures and one nature these being two words that signify but one and the same thing But the true Language of the Church was that there are three Persons truly and really distinct and yet but one nature essence substance And this doctrine hath bin constantly uniformly and without any alteration conveyed thro all the Ages of the Church to our days this being the Faith and these the words of all Christian Churches Greek and Latin Eastern and Western that are at this day in the World And particularly of our own Church who in the first Article of our Religion teaches us to profess that there is but one God and that in the Unity of this Godhead there are three Persons of one power substance and eternity And in our most solemn addresses to Heaven she directs us to make the same acknowledgment viz. upon Trinity Sunday and to give glory to God in these words Who art one God one Lord not one only Person but three Persons in one substance For that which we believe of the glory of the Father the same we believe of the Son and holy Ghost without any difference or inequality And if there be not any difference in the substance there can be no distinction as was said before And now at length being quite tired with following this Examiner thro that maze and Labyrinth into which he commonly leads his Readers it is high time I should take leave of him after I have committed him to the mercy of God and his writings to the censure of the Church The former I hope he will partake of the latter perhaps he and they may escape tho he stands in great need of it especially since he so obstinately and pertinaciously persists in his errors after so plain a discovery and so clear a confutation of them But I cannot fairly part with him without enquiring into the reasons which induced him to publish this Paper wherein he treats the Governors of the University in so rude and insolent a manner falling foul upon persons whose Character Profession and Station he ought to have considered and from whom he never received the least personal injury or provocation that ever I could yet hear of Among other Reasons he hath suggested one in the last page of this Book which I shall only take notice of viz. That it was