Selected quad for the lemma: nature_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
nature_n ghost_n holy_a trinity_n 3,214 5 9.7060 5 false
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A04194 A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part; Commentaries upon the Apostles Creed. Book 6 Jackson, Thomas, 1579-1640. 1629 (1629) STC 14318; ESTC S107492 378,415 670

There are 4 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

rule without any purpose of man are to quicken the ingraffed notion of the Deity and to bring forth an acknowledgement of Divine Providence and Iustice 343 32 Of the Geometricall proportion or forme of distributive justice which the supreame Iudge sometimes observes in doing to great Princes as they have done to others 349 33 How the former law of retaliation hath beene executed upon Princes according to Arithmeticall proportion or according to the rule of commutative justice 359 24 The sinnes of parents visited upon their children according to the rule of retaliation 365 35 Grosser sinnes visited upon Gods Saints according to the former rule of Counterpassion 369 36 Of sinnes visited or punished according to the circumstance of time or place wherein they were committed 376 37 What manner of sinnes they bee which usually provoke Gods judgments according to the rule of counterpassion And of the frequency of this kinde of punishment foresignified by Gods Prophets 387 38 The conclusion of this Treatise with the relation of Gods remarkeable judgements manifested in Hungarie 398 A TREATISE OF THE Diuine Essence and Attributes THE SECOND PART Containing the Attribute of Omnipotency of Creation and Providence c. J beleeve in God the Father Almighty SECTION I. Of the Attribute of Omnipotency and creative power CHAP. 1. The Title of Almighty is not personall to the Father but essentiall to the Godhead IN further explication of this Article it is added in the NICENE CREEDE I beleeve in one God the Father Almighty This title of Almighty or Omnipotency is not given to the Sonne or to the Holy Ghost nor are either of them expresly enstyled by the name of God in the Creede The omission of the title of God and of the Attribute Almightie which is proper to the Godhead when the persons of the Sonne and of the Holy Ghost with their severall offices are described may administer this scruple to men not much conversant in these great mysteries Whether the Father onely be God or onely Almightie or the onely God Almightie in such sort as the Sonne and holy Ghost are not To say the Father onely is God or the Father onely is Almightie were to wrong the Sonne and Holy Ghost to both whose Persons these titles are due and our Faith in this point of the Trinitie above all others must be uniforme and unpartiall without respect of Persons And for the better instruction of such as did not fully apprehend the right meaning of the Apostolique Creede this uniformitie of our Faith is expresly taught by Athanasius Such as the Father is such is the Sonne and such is the holy Ghost the Father is God the Sonne is God and the holy Ghost is God the Father is Almightie the Sonne is Almighty and the holy Ghost Almightie yet shall we often reade in Scriptures and in Writers Orthodoxal euen in Athanasius himselfe that the Father is the onely God So saith the Sonne of God Iohn 17. vers 3. This is life eternall that they may know thee the onely true God and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent Doth Christ therefore deny himselfe to be the onely true God or rather is it a part of our beleefe and of our Saviours meaning in that place that wee must know not onely God the Father but Iesus Christ also whom hee hath sent to be the onely true God And though it be not in that place expressed yet it is necessarily implyed in other Scriptures that the holy Ghost is the onely true God No Christian may question this Proposition Pater est solus Deus The Father is the onely God nor this Filius est solus Deus The Sonne is the onely God nor this third Spiritus sanctus est solus Deus The holy Ghost is the onely God The Father likewise is the onely Almightie the Sonne likewise is the onely Almightie and the holy Ghost the onely Almightie on whom our Faith is joyntly and uniformly set This uniformitie of our Faith hath for its object the unitie of nature in the Trinitie But to say Solus Pater est Deus solus Pater est omnipotens The Father onely is God or the Father onely is Almightie The Son onely is God or the Sonne onely is Almightie The holy Ghost onely is Almightie were more then heresie grosse infidelitie For every one of these speeches include a deniall both of the coequalitie of their persons and of the unitie of their nature Of the ground of this distinction or of the difference betweene these severall Propositions Solus Pater est Deus Pater est solus Deus The Father onely is God and the Father is the onely God c. by the assistance of this blessed Trinitie wee shall discusse after wee have proved the Sonne to be truly God and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God in the severall Articles which concerne their persons and offices Now the same Arguments which proves the Sonne to be truly God and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God will likewise prove the Sonne to be the onely God the onely Almightie The point next in view and first to bee handled is the meaning of this Attribute Almighty and how it agrees to the Godhead or divine nature as it is presupposed one and the same in the three Persons CHAP. 2. Of Omnipotencie and of its object of possibilitie and of impossibilitie ὈΥκ αδυνατήσει παρα τῷ Θεῶ παν ῥὴμα Nothing shall be unpossible unto God saith the Angell to the blessed Virgin doubting or moving this question How shall I instantly conceive and beare a sonne seeing I know not a man That the accomplishing of that which the Angell had said was possible to God the event did prove But that nothing should be impossible unto God can neyther be proved by any event nor will it necessarily follow at least the necessity of its consequence is not so cleare from the words uttered by the Angel which admit of some restriction For to be God or to be equall with God is something more then meere nothing Is it then possible for God to make a God euery way equall unto himselfe The Sonne of God who was conceived by the holy Ghost and borne of the blessed Virgin was equall with God yet not so made but so begotten from all eternitie Hee is more then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and is not comprehended under the former Proposition For being God from all eternitie it was impossible hee should be made Must then the Angels speech or the Article of Omnipotencie bee restrained to things possible or is God said to be omnipotent onely in this respect that hee is able to doe all things that are possible to be done In respect of whom then shall they be counted possible In respect of God himselfe or in respect of Men or Angells Or with reference to Angelicall or humane knowledge onely or in respect of knowledge divine To be able onely to doe all things that man or Angels can doe or can
make a conscience as well of their words as of their wayes herein perhaps especially faulty that they are too zealously sollicitous not to speake amisse make no scruple of entertaining these and the like inferences following as naturally descending from the former Maxime It is impossible ought should fall out otherwise than it doth all things in respect of God and his Omnipotent Decree are necessary Contingencie is but a solecisme of secular language or if any thing may without offence be termed contingent it must be reputed such onely with reference to second causes 2 Howbeit such good men as doe thus write and speake will give us leave I know to take it in the first place as granted that God is wiser than we are and knowes the nature of all things and their differences better than they or we doe This being granted we will in the second place suppose that Contingency is not a meere fictitious name of that which is not as Tragelaphus nor altogether Synonymall to Necessity The question about Contingency and of its difference from necessity is not such as one in merriment once proposed in schools An chimera calcitrans in vacuo terat calceos The very names of Contingency and Necessity to ordinary Latinists differ more than Ensis and Gladius than Vestis and Indumentum betwixt which perhaps the ancient Latine Artificers or Nomenclators knew some difference Yet was it impossible for them to know any thing which God knew not who out of all controversie knowes the true difference betweene Contingency and Necessity much better then we can doe For both of them are Entities of his making and serve as different Lawes to the diversity of his creatures or their different actions All the reasons that can be drawne from the immutability of Gods Decree to the contrary may with greater facility and strength of the same Decree be retorted than brought against us For God immutably decrees mutability Now who will say that things mutable are in respect of Gods decree or knowledge immutable The Heavens and other bodies moveable according to locall motion are truly moveable in themselves absolutely moveable not immoveable in respect of Gods decree or knowledge for he knowes them to bee moveable because he decreed them so to be hee doth not know them to be immoveable because he decreed them not to be such unlesse for a time by interposition of miracle It implies lesse contradiction to say Deus immutabiliter decernit mutabilia than to say which hath beene accounted an ancient orthodoxall Maxime Stabilis dat cuncta movere For Mobility is a branch of Mutability 3 Every thing in respect of Gods decree or knowledge is altogether such as God hath decreed it should be If then God hath decreed there should be contingency as well as necessity it is altogether as necessary that some events should be contingent as others necessary and as truly contingent as the other is necessary in respect of Gods decree Albeit to speake properly the natures of contingency and necessity consist not in meere relation or respect For in as much as both are immediate and reall effects of Divine Omnipotency both must have absolute being the being of neither is meerly relative Now if Contingency have a true and absolute being it is neither constituted in the nature of contingency by any respect or relation to second causes nor can any respect or relation to the first cause deprive it of that absolute nature which the Omnipotent efficacy of the cause of causes hath irrevocably bestowed upon it Briefly if Contingency be any thing it is that which it is by the Omnipotent Decree and being such it is altogether as impossible that some effects should not be absolutely contingent as that such effects as the Divine Decree hath appointed to bee necessary should not be at all Or if we would make impartiall inquiry into the originall of all things nothing without the precincts of the most glorious and ever blessed Trinity is absolutely necessary 4 By Contingency lest haply we might be mistaken we understand the possible meane betweene necessity of being and necessity of not being or of being such or of not being such or betweene necessity of doing and necessity of not doing or necessity of being done or necessity of being left undone This meane betweene necessity of doing and necessity of not doing is that which in agents intellectuall as in men and Angells wee call freedome of will or choice Vnto which freedome necessity is as contradictory as irrationability is to the nature of man and contingency as necessarily presupposed as life and sense are to reason Adde reason to contingency and we have the compleat definition of Free-will In those cases wherein the Creator hath exempted man from restraint of necessity his will is free The divine will it selfe is not free in those operations which are essentiall though most delectable God the Father is more delighted in the eternall generation of his Sonne so is God the Father and the Sonne in the eternall procession of the Holy Ghost than in the creation production or preservation of all the creatures Yet are not these or other internall operations of the blessed Trinity so free in respect of the divine nature as is the production of the world Whatsoever God decrees he decrees it freely that is so as he might not decree it Whatsoever he makes he makes it freely that is he so makes it as that it was not necessary for him to make it CHAP. 13. Contingency is absolutely possible and part of the object of Omnipotency as formall a part as necessity is 1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts that propositions for their forme not incompatible may from the necessity of their matter or subject become equivalent to propositions directly contradictory whose indispensable law or rule it is that if the one be true the other must needs be false they admit of no meane betwixt them Now there is no matter or subject in the world which is so absolutely necessary as the existence of the Divine Nature or the internall operations of the Trinity Whence it is that betweene these two propositions The generation of the Sonne is necessary the not generation of the Son is necessary there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth The first is so absolutely necessary and so necessarily true that the latter is eternally false But such is not the case or condition of these two propositions following The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessarie These are not contradictories for their form nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject and therefore may admit a meane betweene them To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary hath no truth in it for it had a beginning of existence and being and may have an end and the other extreame or contrary The not
creation or non existence of the world is absolutely necessary hath lesse appearance of truth in it It remaines then that the two contradictorie propositions to these false ones must be true The contradictory to the former is this The creation or existence of the world is not absolutely necessarie The contradictory to the latter is this The not creation or non existence of the World is not absolutely necessary Now seeing the world is created and yet it was not necessary that it should be created both these propositions following seeing either of them is a true meane betweene the two former extreames or false ones are most true 1 The creation of the world was possible 2 The not creation of the world was possible And if as well the not creation as the creation of the world was possible wee may not deny that God did freely create it seeing freedome properly taken includes or is a possibility of doing or not doing It was likewise free for the Almighty to create or not to create Man or Angell But his free purpose to create them after his owne Image being supposed it was not meerly possible but altogether necessary that they should bee created good In as much as he is goodnesse it selfe it is not possible that evill should bee created by him that he should be the Author of it As is his being so is his goodnesse perpetually absolute eternally necessary But though Men and Angels were necessarily created good yet their goodnesse in the beginning was mutable not perpetually necessarie The question is whether continuance in that goodnesse wherein God created them were truly possible in respect of Gods decree unto such as have not so continued or their non continuance necessary Or whether neither their continuance or non continuance were necessary or both alike possible To say that Adams continuance in goodnesse was in respect of Gods decree necessary is ●vidently convinced of falshood by his fall So that the other part onely remaines questionable whether Adams non continuance in the state of goodnesse were so absolutely decreed by God that it was not possible for him to continue For resolution of this point we are to inquire First whether in respect of Gods power it were possible Secondly whether in respect of his goodnesse it were necessary or most congruent to ordaine or decree neither a necessitie of continuance nor a necessitie of non continuance in goodnesse but the meane betweene them that is an absolute possibilitie of continuance and an absolute possibilitie of non continuance That it was possible to decree such a mutuall possibilitie may thus be proved 2. Whatsoever implies no contradiction is absolutely possible and fals within the object of omnipotencie But this mixt possibilitie of continuing or not continuing being a meane betwixt the necessitie of Adams continuance and the necessitie of not continuance in the state of integritie implies no contradiction Ergo it was possible for God to decree it That it implies no contradiction in respect of the forme is a point so cleare from the first principles of argumentation that hee which vnderstands not this is neither fit to dispute nor to be disputed with But the same forme notwithstanding of contrarietie applied to the divine nature the persons in Trinitie or their internall operations admits no meane What is the reason The nature and attributes of the Deitie are absolutely necessary and precedent to all divine decrees or effects of Gods power And it implies a contradiction that any thing which is absolutely necessarie should admit any mixture of contingency or of possibilitie of the contrary But the nature state condition or existence of man are not proper obiects of the divine decree yet proper effects of his power and being such they are not absolutely necessary and not being necessary in themselves they cannot incomber or involve propositions for their forme not necessarie with absolute necessitie Whatsoever had a true possibilitie of beeing before it was may bee actually such as it was absolutely possible for it to be or such as it might please the Almightie Creator who is free in all his actions ad extra to make it It was possible for him to make mans goodnesse or his continuance in it not to be necessary but contingent He that made man of nothing had nothing to resist or hinder him from squaring or framing his nature to that abstract forme of truth which was in its selfe or as we say objectively possible For absolute Omnipotencie includes an abilitie to ingrosse or fill meere logicall possibilities with true and Physicall substances or qualities as truely answerable unto them as naturall bodies are to bodies mathematicall But concerning Gods power to decree an absolute contingencie in the state Condition or Actions of men there can bee no question amongst such as grant his Omnipotencie to be out of question What could necessitate his will to lay a necessitie of sinning upon Adam whose fall or first sinne if it were necessary in respect of Gods decree the necessitie must needs proceed from Gods Omnipotent decree without which nothing can haue any reall possibilitie or true title of beeing much lesse a necessitie of beeing For Divine Omnipotencie is the first and sole Foundation of all Beeing otherwise then by it and from it nothing can come to passe either necessarily or contingently 3. Whatsoeuer is and hath not beene must of necessitie have some cause of now beeing And as is the event or effect such must the causalty bee If the one be necessarie or inevitable it is impossible the other should bee contingent or meerely possible Both or neither must bee necessarie Man we suppose did once stand upright his first sinne or fall That action what soever it were which brought him downe the evils which thence ensued are not meere nothing Evill it selfe got some kinde of beeing by his negligence which from the beginning it had not Of all or any of these the question still revolves whether they were necessary or not necessarie but Contingent If Contingent we have no more to say but Gods peace be on them which so speake and thinke If any reply that they were necessarie he must assigne a necessary cause of their beeing For without some cause they could not be and without a necessitating cause there was no necessitie that they should bee Was this supposed necessitie then from man or from God from any second cause or from the first cause of all things if from man onely or from other second causes then were they necessary not in respect of the first cause but in respect of the second that is some second cause did make them necessarie when as the first cause had left them free or meerely possible which to affirme is contrary to their positions with whom we dispute and in it selfe unconceiveable For who can make that necessarie which God hath made contingent or subject to change What can be said then that God did make mans fall
contingency or al possibility of being recalled or avoyded were by the Heathens ascribed Fato majori to greater Fates The symptomes or characters of events becomming thus irresistibly absolutely necessary come elsewhere by Gods assistance to be deciphered Here it sufficeth to advertise the Reader that as divers things besides so necessitie may be enstyled absolute many waies but two especially Some things are said to be absolutely necessarie that is altogether inevitable albeit this necessitie or inevitablenesse did accrue from some occasions or set points of time lately past As many diseases in their nature curable and easie to have beene cured by ordinarie medicines if they had beene administred in time do by some few daies ill diet by carelesse attendance or casuall relapse become altogether incurable by any after-care or helpe of physick Other events there be which were absolutely necessarie in respect of all times their exhibition or production could not by any policie of man have beene prevented So our Saviours death was absolutely necessary from the beginning of the World but whether absolutely necessary from eternity or absolutely necessary without supposall of Adams fall which was not necessary shall not here be disputed Certaine it is that nothing decreed by God can be so absolutely necessary as the Divine Nature or blessed Trinity is Many errors have found opportunity to mingle themselves with divine truth for want of a commodious distinction or explication of this indistinct and confused terme Absolute the anatomy of it were worth the paines of the Learned Evident it is that some things which are not to day may to morrow be in their kind absolute 3 We truly say that the summe of mony wherin one man stands bound unto another is absolutely due from the time of the forfaiture or non-performance of the condition that is there is no plea left in Law no course or meanes of Iustice to avoyd the payment of it Yet was not the same sum absolutely due from the first date of the bond the performance of the Condition in due time had prevented the losse which negligence or breach of promise hath now made necessary and irrecoverable Moneys lent upon no other consideration but upon meere good will to be repayd whensoever the party lending shall demand them are absolutely due from the date of the recognizance and for that which is absolutely due there is a necessitie of payment or satisfaction 4. Some disasterous events become by divine providence irresistibly necessarie long before they be actually accomplished or inflicted such was the destruction of Pharaoh of Senacherib the desolation of Iudah and Ierusalem by Titus Others become fatally irresistible within some few dayes or houres before they happen other not till the very moment wherein they are awarded either for some grievous sinne then committed or for some remarkable document of Gods justice Some againe are for a long time totally irresistible and unpreventable others resistible quoad tantum though not quoad totum that is part of the evils might be prevented though not the whole All that we have said concerning the alteration of possibilities or contingencies or change of events contingent into necessary may easily be conceived without any surmise of alteration in the Omnipotent or in his everlasting decree The least degree of possibility or contingency is as necessarily derived from his absolute irresistible will as necessity it selfe in the highest degree It is impossible for possibility to have any right to actuall being without his speciall appointment To think that Fate Chance or Fortune should nestle in some certaine periods of time or be brought forth by revolutiōs of the heavens is altogether heathenish But neither doth Scripture insinuate nor can reason justly suspect any danger in avouching that the Almighty suffers that contingency or multiplicity of possibilities betweene good and evill or the severall degrees of evill wherewith hee hath endued the reasonable creature to explicate or contract it selfe in every moment of time And according to the nature of the free motions of man the irresistible decree brings 〈◊〉 such events or issues as were truly possible from eternity but become necessary by revolutions not of the heavens but of mans hart and thoughts publike plague or calamities become necessary or inevitable by these meanes onely We must ever remember that God hath not so decreed all things before they come or the manner how they shall come as that he doth not yet decree them For he continually decrees as well necessity as contingency and brings forth effects as well contingent as necessary from this present houre both being sometimes meerly possible The truth of this our last assertion may be demonstrated from our former principle If one part of a disjunctive proposition be denied or faile the other may be necessarily inferred though neither bee absolutely and determinately necessary but become such by consequence or upon supposition of the others failing Many things which in respect of our present purpose or resolution are free or contingent may within a short while after become altogether necessary and unavoydable without any alteration or change in us Suppose a Iudge should be tied by oath to execute justice upon a malefactor within eight dayes there is no necessity that he should performe his vow the first second third or fourth day The execution or not execution of Iustice is during the first seven daies free and contingent without any breach or violation of oath but omitting the opportunities which the first seven dayes have offered the execution of Iustice upon the eighth day is as necessarie as his honesty or fidelity as necessary as if hee had beene tied by oath to execute it upon that day alone The parts of indefinite time or of the matter promised or threatned by man may be farre more than this instance implies So that the performance of those duties or promises which for a long time was free and arbitrarie and might have beene performed in different measure becomes at length absolutely necessary and necessary to such a determinate degree The parts of Gods disjunctive decree and the degrees as well of every matter decreed by him as of the time allotted for the execution of it may be numberlesse in respect of us And man by not entertaining the opportunities which by severall times have beene allotted him for reducing his possibilities of doing Gods antecedent will into act may forfeit the very possibilities themselves for ever or for a long time And by continuance of such neglect of many parts or kindes of successe all truly possible in respect of the eternal decree that only shall in the end become necessary which he least desires which his soule shall most de●est In respect of some future events not as yet become necessary the eternall decree leaves fewer branches of contrary contingencies or possibilities in respect of others more Their multitude may expire or revive every moment according to the diversity of mens waies