every name is conveniently and properly applyed to the thing For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly as if wee should impose the name of horse upon man To speak is a kind of Action Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth And for as much as expression of names is a part of speaking as Noun is a part of Speech to name rightly or not rightly cannot be done by any imposition of names but by a naturall affinity of the name with the thing it self So that he is a right imposer of names who can expresse the Nature of the things in their names for a name is an Instrument of the thing not every inconsiderate name but that which agreeth with its nature By this benefit we communicate things to one another whence it followeth that it is nothing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing as a weavers shuttle to his Webbe It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use names aright for as a Weaver useth a shuttle rightly knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made And as to make a Helm is the effice of a Shipwright but to use it rightly of a Pilot so he who frameth names shall impose them rightly if he do it as if a Dialectick were present who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names Thus much for Dialectick CAAP. VII Of THEORETICK Philosophy WE come next to Theoretick Philosophy whereof one part is Theologick another Physick a third Metaphysick The end of Theologie is the knowledge of primary Causes Of Physick to understand the nature of the Universe what kinde of creature man is what place he holdeth in the world whether there be a divine Providence over all things to which there are other Gods subordinate how men are in respect of them The end of Mathematick is to know the nature of a superficies and a solid and to consider the motion and revolution of celestiall bodies the contemplation whereof must first be proposed in briefe Thus Plato useth to confirm the acutenesse of the minde for it sharpeneth the understanding and rendreth it more ready towards the contemplation of divine things That which considereth Numbers being likewise a part of Mathematicks conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are It frees us from the errour and ignorance which attend sensible things and conduceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things It likewise renders a man expert in military affairs especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of Tacticks Geometry also conferteth much towards the understanding of good it selfe if a man pursue it not only for mechanicall dimension but that he may by the helps thereof ascend to things which are not busying himselfe about those which are in continuall generation and motion Stereometry likewise is exceeding usefull for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation which holdeth the third room Astronomy also is usefull as a fourth discipline whereby we consider the motions of Heaven and the Starres and the author of night and day months and years Thus by a familiar kinde of way finding out him who made all these and by these disciplines as from certain rudiments or elements proceeding to things more sublime Likewise Musick is to be learnt which relateth to hearing for as the eyes are created for Astronomy so are the ears for Harmony and as when we apply our selves to Astronomy we are led from visible things to the divine invisible â—ffence so when we receive the Harmony of voice in at our ears from audible things we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect unlesse we pursue Mathematicall disciplines to this end the contemplation thereof will be imperfect unprofitable and of no value We must therefore presently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears to those which reason only discerneth for Mathematick is only a preface to divine things They who addict themselves to Arithmetick and Geometry desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is which knowledge they obtain no otherwise then as by a dream but really they cannot attain it because they know not the principles themselves nor those things which are compounded of the principles neverthelesse they conduce to those things which we mentioned wherefore Plato will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences Dialectick method proceeds in such manner that by Geometricall Hypotheses it ascendeth to first principles which are not taken upon Hypotheses For this reason he calleth Dialectick a Science but Mathematick neither opinion because it is more perspicuous then sensible things nor a Science because it is more obscure then first Intelligibles But the opinion of Bodies the science of Primaries the contemplation of Mathematicks He likewise asserteth Faith and Imagination Faith of things subject to sense Imagination of Images and Species Because Dialectick is more efficacious then Mathematick as being conversant about divine eternall things therefore it is put before all Mathematicks as a wall and fortification of the rest CHAP. VIII Of first matter VVE must next give a brief account of Principles and those things which belong to Theologie beginning at the first and from thence descending to the creation of the world and contemplation thereof whereby at last we come to the creation and nature of man To begin with matter this he calleth the receptacle nurse mother place and subject of all Images affirming that it is touched without sense and comprehended by an adulterate kinde of reason The property thereof is to undergo the generation of all things and to cherish them like a Nurse and to admit all formes being of her own nature expert of all form quality and specieâ— These things are imprinted and formed in her as in a Table and she admitteth their figures not having of her selfe any figure or qualitie For she could not be fit to receive the impressions of severall forms unlesse she were wholly void of all quality and of those formes which she is about to receive They who make sweet Unguents of Oyle make choice of that oyle which hath the least sent they who would imprint any figures in wax first smooth and polish the matter defacing all former figures It is requisite that matter capable of all things if it must receive all formes must not have the nature of any one of them but must be subjected to all formes without any qualitie or figure and being such it is neither a body nor incorporeall but a body potentially as Brasse is potentially a Statue because then it becomes a Statue when it puts on the form thereof CHAP. IX Of Ideas WHereas matter is a Principle Plato likewise introduceth other principles besides matter One as an exemplar Idaeas another Paternall God the
adversary are Falsitie Paradox Soloecism and Tautologie Sophismes are solved either by distinction or negation Thus much may serve for a slight view of his Logick whereof we have but few Books left in respect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philosophy THE SECOND PART CHAP. I. Of PHYSICK NOt to question the Method of Aristotle's Books of Physick much lesse their titles as some to make them better agree with Laertius's Catalogue have done and least of all their Authority with Patricius we shall take them in that order which is generally received according to which next Logick is placed Physick Physick is a science concerning that substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self The Physicall Books of Aristotle that are extant treat of these nine generall heads Of the principles of naturall things of the Common affections of naturall things of Heaven of Elements of the action and passion of Elements of Exhalation of Plants of Animals of the Soul CHAP. II. Of the Principles of Naturall Bodies THe Principles of naturall Bodies are not one as Parmenides and Melissus held nor Homoiomeria's as Anaxagoras nor Atomes as Leucippus and Democritus nor sensible Elements as Thales Anaximander Anaximenes Empedocles nor numbers or figures as the Pythagoreans nor Idaea's as Plato That the Principles of things are Contrary privately opposite was the joint opinion of the Ancients and is manifest in Reason For Principles are those which neither are mutually of one another nor of others but of them are all things Such are first contraries as being first they are not of any other as contrary not of another Hence it follows that being contrary they must be more then one but not infinite for then naturall things would not be comprensible by Reason yet more then two for of contraries only nothing would be produced but that they would rather destroy one another There are therefore three Principles of naturall bodies two contrary privation and form and one common subject of both Matter The constitutive Principles are matter and form of privation bodies consist not but accidentally as it is competent to Matter Things are made of that which is Ens potentially Materia prima not of that which is Ens actually nor of that which is non-ens potentially which is pure nothing Matter is neither generated nor corrupted It is the first insite subject of every thing whereof it is framed primarily in it self and not by accident and into which it at last resolveth To treat of forme in generall is proper to Metaphysicks CHAP. III. Of Nature and the Causes of Naturall bodies OF Beings some are by Nature as Plants others from other causes those have in themselves the principle of their motion these have not Nature is a Principle and Cause of the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is primarily by it self and not by accident Materiall substances have nature Natural properties are according to Nature Nature is twofold Matter and Form but Form is most Nature because it is in act Of Causes are four kinds the Material of which a thing is made the Formall by which a thing is made or reason of its essence The efficient whence is the first principle of its mutation or rest as a Father the Finall for which end it is made as health is to walking Causes are immediate or remote principall or accidentall actuall or potentiall particular or universall Fortune and Chance are Causes of many effects Fortune is an accidentall Cause in those things which are done by election for some end Chance is larger an accidentall cause in things which are done for some end at least that of Nature They are both efficient Nature acts for some end not temerariously or casually for those things which are done by nature are alwaies or for the most part done in the same manner yet somtimes she is frustrated of her end as in Monsters which she intends not Necessity is twofold absolute which is from Matter conditional which is from the end or form both kinds are in naturall things CHAP. IV. Of the affections of naturall Bodies Motion Place Time MOtion is of a thing which is not such but may be such the way or act by which it becommeth such as curing of a body which is not in health but may be in health is the way and act by which it is brought to health Neither is it absurd that the same thing should be both in act and power as to different respects for the thing moved as water in warming is in act as to the heat which it hath in power as to the greater heat which it is capable of Infinite is that which is pertransible without end such an infinite in act there is not not amongst simple bodies for the elements are confined to certain number and place neither amongst mixt bodies for they consist of the elements which are finite But there are things infinite potentially as in addition Number which may be augmented infinitely in division Magnitude which may be divided infinitely in time and continued succession of generation The properties of place are that it containes the thing placed that it is equall to and separable from the thing placed that the place and thing placed are together that it hath upwards or downwards and the like differences that every Physicall body tends naturally to its proper place and there resteth Place is the immediate immovable superficies of a continent body Those things which are contained by another body are in place but those which have not any other body above or beyond them are not properly in place Bodies rest in their naturall places because they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole Vacuum is place void of body such a vacuum there is not in nature for that would destroy all motion seeing that in vacuum there is neither upwards nor downwards backwards nor forwards Nor would there be any reason why motion should be to one part more then to another Moreover it would follow that it were impossible for one body to make another to recede if the triple dimension which bodies divide were vacuous Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards caused by vacuity for that motion is as naturall to light bodies as to move downwards is to heavy Time is the number of motion by before and after Those two parts of time are conjoyned by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the present as the parts of a line are by a point Time is the measure of rest as well as of motion for the same measure which serves for the privation serves for the habit All motion and mutation is in time for in every motion there is a swiftnesse or slownesse which is defined by time The Heavens Earth Sea and other sensibles are in time for they are movable Time being a numerate number exists not without a numerant which
for the Stoiâ—ks take away intellectuall substances affirming all things that are to be comprehended by sense onely differences are not subsistent A solid body according to Apollodorus is divisible three waies into length breadth and depth A superficies is the terme of a body or that which hath onely length and breadth but no depth thus Possidonius A line is the terme of a Superficies or a length without breadth that which hath length only A point is the terme of a line or thâ— least mark A body is divisible into infinite yet it consisteth not of infinite bodies CHAP. III. Of Principles THe place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees into those which produce and those which are produced the first Principles the second Elements â—Principles and Elements differ Principles are ingenerate incorruptible Elements shall perish by conflagration Moreover Principles are bodies and void of form Elements have forme There are two principles of all things the Agent and the Patient The Patient is a substance void of quality called Matter the Agent is the reason which is 〈◊〉 the Matter God Matter is sluggish a thing ready for all things but will cease if none move it The Causâ— that is the Reason â—formeth mâ—tter and moldeth it which way he pleaseth out of which he produceth various woâ—ks There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made and also by which it â—s made This is the Cause that Matter The Cause or active Reason is God In the Agent there is power in the Patient a certain matter or capacity and in both both for matter it selfe could not 〈◊〉 if it were not kept together by a power nor that power without some matter for there is nothing which is not compelled to be somewhere Both 〈◊〉 God and the World the Artist and his work they compâ—ehend within this terme Nature as if nature were God mixed through the World Sometimes they call that naturâ— which containeth the World sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the earth The Agent is as we said called the Cause A Cause according to Zeno is that by which there is an effect which is not a Cause 30 or as 〈◊〉 the reason of the effect or as Pâ—ssâ—donius the first Author of a thing A Cause is a body a not Cause a Categorem It is impossible that the cause being assigned the effect should not be present which is to be understood thus The Soule is the â—ause through which we live Prudence the Cause by which we are wise It is impossible that he who hath a Soule should not live or he who hath Prudence should not be wise CHAP. IV. Of Matter THe substance of all qualitative beings is first Matter according to Zeno and â—hrysippuâ— in his first of Physicks Matter is that of which every thing is made it hath two names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Matter Substance is of all things in generall Matter of particulars Universall matter is according to Zeno wholly eternall not admitting as Chrysippus saith encâ—â—ase or deâ—rease Particular matter admitteth augmentation and diminution for it remaineth not alwaies the same but is separated and mixed so that according to Chrysippus its parts perish by separation and exist by mutuall mistion But those who call fire aire water and earth Matter assert not a thing void of forme but of a body Matter is a body and finite Possidonius saith that the substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and form in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it selfe but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality But the substantiall nature of the Universe differs from matter intentionally only Matter is passible for if it were immutable things could not be generated of it Hence it followeth that it is divisible into infinite yet it selfe as Chrysippus saith it not infinite for nothing that is divisible is infinite but matter is continuous Through this matter Zeno affirmeth that the reason of the World which some call Fate is diffused as feed CHAP. V. Of the World OF this matter was made the World The World hath severall appellations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the â—ll 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Whole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 World is taken three waies First for God himselfe who is properly qualified with all Essence incorruptible and ingenerate who framed the Universe after a certain period of time who resolved all nature into himselfe and again generated it out of himselfe Secondly for the starry Ornament and thirdly that which consists of both The All 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one way taken as Apollodorus saith for the World and another way for the System of the World and the vacuity beyond it The World is finito the vâ—â—uity infinite Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 includeth also an infinite vacuity in which the world is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the world without that vacuity which neither is increased nor diminished but its parts are sometimes extended sometimes contracted It began from the earth as its center for the center is the beginning of a Circle The world is that which is properly qualited with the essence of all things or as Chrysippus and ` Possidonius define it a System of Heaven and Earth and of the natures therein contained or a System of God and Men and of all things that were made for them The world was made by God for if saith Chrysippus there be any thing which produceth such things as Man though indued with reason cannot produce that doubtlesse is greater and stronger and wiser then man But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things therefore that which made them transcendeth man in Art Counsell Prudence and Power and what can that be but God The World was made for those animate â—ssences which have the use of Reason these are the Gods and men then whom nothing is better All things of which it consisteth and which it produceth within it selfe are accommodated to the use of Man The World was made in this manner God in the beginning being alone by himself converted all substance which according to Zeno was fire first into air then into Water And as in the Plant the seed is contained so God who is the prolisick reason of the World left such a â—eed in the humidity as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced Zeno addeth that one part tending downward was condensed into Earth another part remained partly water and partly being exhal'd air of a particle of which air flashed out fire Cleanthes describeth it in this
he declared God to be the first of Beings But that the Mens of â—naxagoras for the annexing of which to matter he was so much famed was no more then what he borrowed from Thales the words of Cicero make good He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his providence governs the world Thales saith Stobaeus being demanded what was most strong answered Necessity for it rules all the world Necessity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence Hither we must likewise referre what is cited under his name by the same Stobaeus that the first mover is immovable which Aristotle hath borrow'd from him not owning the Author Something imperfectly was before delivered by Orpheus concerning God alledged by Clemens Alexandrinus and others but as Cicero saith Thales was the first among the Grecians who made any search into these things and that he brought it out of Aegypt the Grecians themselves deny not for they acknowledge that they received the names of their Gods from thence and beleeved the Aegyptians to be the first who looking up to the world above them and admiring the nature of the universe reflected upon the Deity Sect. 3. Of Daemons THales saith Plutarch with Pythagoras Plato and the Stoicks hold that Daemons are spirituall substances and the Hero's souls separated from the bodies of which sort there are two good and bad the good Hero's are the good souls the bad the bad The same order Athenagoras attests to be observed by Thales ranking the three degrees thus First that of the immortall Gods next Daemons thirdly Heroes This was followed by Pythagoras that the Gods were to be prefered in reverence before Daemons Hero's before men He affirm'd as Stobaeus saith the world to be full of these Daemons This is thought the meaning of that of Aristotle repeated by Cicero Thales thought that all things were full of Gods The same assertion Laertius ascribes to Pythagoras that all the aire is full of souls which are Hero's and Daemons This opinion was asserted by the Greeks before the time of Thales particularly by Hesiod but whether that be argument enough to deny that Thales had it from the Aegyptians I question that they held it in the same manner we may learn by Iamblichus Besides Pythagoras and Plato whom Plutarch joynes in this Tenet with Thales drew their learning from the same fountain Sect. 4. Of the Soul PLutarch and Stobaeus say that Thales first affirm'd the soul to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a selfe moving nature Aristotle that he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect to the motion it gives to other things in which are included both parts of the definition of the Platonists a substance having within it selfe a power to move it selfe and other things which Plato argues to this effect The first of motions is that whereby a thing moves it selfâ— the second that whereby it moves another every thing that moves it selfe lives every living thing lives because it moves it selfe the resore the power of selfe motion is the essence of that substance which we call the soul which soul is the cause of the first generation and motion of things which are nere and shall be and of all their contraries as of all transmutation the principall of motion and therefore more antient than the body which it moves by a second motion And afterwards declares these to be the names of the souls motion to will to consider to take care to consult to judge rightly and not rightly to joy to grieve to dare to fear to hate to love and the like These which are the first motions and suscipient of the second corporall bring all things into augmention and dâ—creâ—se conversion or condâ—mnation and descretion or rarefaction This opinion first raised by Thales was entertained in the schooles with the assent of Pythagoras Anaxagoras Socrates and Plato till exploded by Aristotle whose chief arguments against it were these 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place nothing in place but what hath quantity which because the soul wants none of the foure kinds of motion viz. Lation Alteration diminution accretion are competible perse to her Secondly that selfe motion is not essentiall to the Soul because she is moved accidentally by externall objects The first if understood of Circumscription not only denies the motion of all things that are definitively in place as spirits but of the highest sphear if compared with Aristotles definition of place yet that some of these species of motion though in a different extraordinary manner are competent to the soul and not accidentally may be argued 1. From the further diffusion of the soul according to the augmentation of the body 2. From intellection which is acknowledg'd a perfection and consequently a kind of alteration which that Thales understood to be one of the soul's motions is clear from that Apothegme ascribed to him by Lâ—ertius the swiftest of things is the mind for it over-runs all things Whence Cicero confessing almost in the very words of Thales that nothing is swifter then the mind that no swiftnesse may compare with the swiftnesse of the mind would interpret the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Aristotle a continued and perpetuall motion The second reason may be questioned by comparing the acts of the memory and reminiscence the first occasion'd by exterior things yet objective only so that the motion is within her selfe but by the other she moves her selfe from a privation to a habit without the help of any exterior It is worth notice that among these and other reasons alledg'd by Aristotle to destroy this assertion one is the possibility of the resurrection of the body but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 From the second part of the difference in the definition viz. from moving other things Thales argued that the Load-stone and Amber had soules the first because it drawes Iron the second Straw He further saith Laertius asserted those things we count inonimate to have souls arguing it from the loadstone and Amber the reason of which latter example Aldobrandinuâ— falsely interprets its change of colour and jarring as it were at poison But Aristotle more plainly for of those whom we mentioned Thales seems to have taken the soul to be something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apt to move since he affirmed a stone to have a soul because it moved Iron He asserted likewise the soul of man to be immortall and according to Cherilus was the first that held so Cicero ascribes the originall of this opinion to Pherecydes but it rather seems to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians that they held so Herodotus attests Sect. 5. Of the World THales held that there was but one world and that made by God which truth was follow'd by all Philosophers as Aristotle confesseth untill he rejected it to defend by the contâ—arie an
the common rule of naturall Philosophers of nothing proceeds nothing it is not possible any thing can be made of that which is not or that which hath a being can be resolved into that which hath none Secondly because contraries are made mutually of each other therefore they were in each other before for if it be necessary that whatsoever is made be made of that which is or is not but that it should be made of that which is not impossible wherein all agree that ever discoursed upon nature it followes necessarily that they be made of things that are and are within these very things though by reason of their smallnesse not discernable by us Hence is it that they say every thing is mixt with every thing because they see any thing made of any thing but things seem different and are called diverse in respect to one another by reason that the multitude of infinites which are within aboundeth in the mistion for the whole is neither quite white nor black flesh nor bone but every thing seemeth to be of the nature of that whereof it hath most of simple nourishment as bread water and the like are bred the hair veines arteries nerves bones and other parts of the body all things are therefore in this food as nerves bones and the like discernable by reason though not by sense Of these Atomes the whole world consisteth as gold of grains these homogeneall parts are the matter of all things his opinion is thus exprest by Lucretius Next Anaxagoras we must pursue And his Homoiomeria review A term that 's no where mention'd but among The Greeks too copious for our naâ—row tongue Yet may the sense be in more words arraid The principle of all things entrailes made Of smallest entrails bone of smallest bone Blood of small sanguine drops reduc'd to one Gold of small graines earth of small sands compacted Small drops to water sparks to fire contracted The like in every thing suppos'd yet he Nature asserted from all vacuum free And held that each corporeall being might Be subdivided into infinite That God is an infinite selfe-moving mind that this divine infinite mind not inclosed in any body is the efficient cause of all things out of the infinite matter consisting of similar parts every thing being made according to its species by the divine minde who when all things were at first confusedly mingled together came and reduced them to order Sect 2. Of the Heavens That the higher parts of the world are full office the power that is there he called aether and that properly saith Aristotle for the body which is continually in quick motion is conceived to be divine by nature for that reason called aether none of those that are here below being of that kind That the ambient aether being of a fiery nature by the swiftnesse of its motion snatcheth up stones from the earth which being set on fire become starres all carried from East to West That the Startes are impelled by the condensation of the aire about the Poles which the Sun makes more strong by compressing That the starres are earthly and that after the first secretion of the Elements the fire separating it selfe drew some parts of the earth to its own nature and made them like fire Whereupon he farther affirmed The Sun is a burning plate or stone many times bigger then Peloponnesus whose conversionn is made by the repulse of the Northern aire which he by compressing makes more strong the Moon is a dark body enlightned by the Sun habitable having plaines hills and waters that the inequality in her face proceeds from a mixture cold and earthly for there is darknesse mixt with her fiery nature whence she is called a star of false light Plato saith that the Moon was occasion of dishonour to him because he assumed the originall of this opinion of her borrowing light to himselfe whereas it was much moreantient That the milky way is the shadow of the earth upon that part of heaven when the Sun being underneath enlightens not all Or as Aristotle that the Milkie way is the light of some starres for the Sun being under the earth looks not upon some starres the light of those on whom he looks is not seen being swallowed up in his the proper light of those which are hindred by the earth from the Suns illumination is the Galaxy Laertius saith he held the Galaxy to be the reflection of the light of the Sun Sect. 3. Of Meteors THat Comets are the coâ—apparition of wandring starres which approach so near each other as that they seem to touch one another Or as Laertius the concourse of Planets emitting flames That falling starres are shot down from the aether as sparkles and therefore soon extinguished That Thunder is the collision of Clouds lightning their mutuall attrition Or as Plutarch the cold falling upon the hot or the aetheriall upon the aeriall the noise which it makes is Thunder of the blacknesse of the cloud is caused lightning of the greatnesse of the light Thunderbolts of the more corporeall fire whirle-winds of the more cloudy Presters That lightning distills from the aether and that from that great heat of Heaven many things fall down which the clouds preserve a long time enclosed That the Rain-bow is a refraction of the Suns light upon a thick dark cloud opposite to him as a looking glasse by the same reason faith he appeared chiefly in Pontus two or more Suns That Earth quakes are caused by the aire or aether which being of its own nature apt to ascend when it gets into the veines and cavernes of the earth finding difficulty in the getting out causeth that shaking for the upper parts of the earth contract themselves by the benefit of rain Nature having made the whole body thereof alike laxe and spungy the parts as in a Ball superiour and inferiour the superiour that which is inhabited by us the inferiour the other This wind getting into the inferiour parts breaks the condensed aire with the same force as we see clouds broken when upon the collision of them and motion of the agitated aire sire breaks forth this aire falls upon that which is next seeking to get out and tears in pieces whatsoever it meets untill through those narrow passages it either finds a way to Heaven or forceth one which Laerâ—ius obscurely expresseth the repulsion of the air upon the earth THat Snow is not white but black nor did it seem white to him because he knew the water whereof it is congealed to be black Sect 4. Of the Earth THat the begining of motion proceeding from the mind the heavie bodies obtained the lowest place as the earth the light the highest as the fire those betwixt both the middle as the aire and water thus the sea subsists upon the superficies of the earth which is flat the
humidity being ratified by the Sun That the primitive humidity being diffused as a pool was burned by the motion of the Sun about it and the unctuous part bring exhaled the remainder became salt That assoon as the world was made and living creatures produced out of the world the world enclined of it selfe towards the south according to divine providence that some parts thereof might be habitable others not habitable by reason of the extremities of heat and cold That the mistion of the Elements is by apposition That the inundation of Nilus is caused by the snow of Aethiopia which is dissolved in summer and congealed in winter Sect 5. Of living Creatures THat Creatures were first generated of humidity calidity and earthly matter afterwards mutually of one another males on the right side females on the left That the soule is that which moveth that it is aeriall and hath a body of the nature of aire That there is a death of the soule likewise which is separation from the body That all Animalls have active reason That sleep is an action of the body not of the soul. That in the hand of man consists all his skill That the voice is made by the wind hitting against firm resisting air returning the counter-blow to our ears which is the manner whereby also the repercussion of the air is formed called Eccho That the Gall is the cause of acute diseases which overflowing is dispersed into the lungs veines and costs CHAP. III. His predictions SUidas saith he foretold many things of those two instances onely have been hitherto preserved The first thus related by Pliny The Grecians celebrate Anaxagoras of the Clozomenian and for foretelling by his learning and Science in the second yeare of the 78. Olympiad on what day a stone would fall from the Sun which happen'd in the day time in a part of Thrace at the river Agos which stone is at this day shewne about the bignesse of a became of an adust colour a Comet also burning in those nights Plutarch adds that it was in his time not onely shewen but reverenced by the Peloponnesians Eusebius reckons the fall of this stone upon the fourth yeare of the 78. Olympiad which is two yeares after Pliny accompts of the prediction Silenus cited by Laertius saith it fell when Dimylus was Archon which if it be to be red Dyphilus for the other name is not to be found neere these times will be the first yeare of the 84 Olympiad But the marble at Arundell House graven about the 129. Olympiad to be preferred before any other chronologicall accompt expressly names the fall upon the 4th yeare upon the 77. Olympiad when Theagenides was Archon two yeares before Pliny saith it was foretold It was beleeved to have portended as Plutarch testifies the great defeat given to the Athenians by Lysander at the river Agos 62. yeares after viz. the fourth yeare of the 39. Olympiad Of the wonder Aristotle gives a very slight accompt affirming It was a stone snatched up by the wind and fell in the day time a Comet happening in those nights which is disproved by Plutarch who hath this large discourse upon it It is said that Anaxagoras did prognosticate that one of the bodies included the Heavens it should be loosed by shaking fall to the ground the Stars are not in place where they were first created they are heavie bodies of the nature of stone shining by reflection of the aether being drawn up by force kept there by the violence of that circular motion as at the beginning in the first separation of things cold heavie they were restrained There is another opinion more probable which saith those which we call falling starres are not fluxions of the aether extinguisht in the aire almost as soon as lighted nor inflammations or combustions of any part of the aire which by it spreadeth upwards but they are coelestiall bodies failing of their retention by the ordinary course of heaven throwne downe not upon the habitable earth but into the Sea which is the cause we doe not see them yet the assertion of Anaxagoras is confirmed by Damachus who writeth in his book of Religion that 75. daies together before this stone fell they saw a great body of fire in the Air like a cloud enflamed which tarried not in one place but went and came uncertainly removing from the driving whereof issued flashes of fire that fell in many places like falling starrs when this great body of fire fell in that part of the Earth the Inhabitants emboldned came to the place to see what it was and found no appearance of fire but a great stone on the ground nothing in comparison of that body of fire Herein Damachus had need of favourable hearers But if what he saith be true he confuseth those Arguments who maintain it was a piece of a Rock by the force of a boistrous wind torn from the top of a Mountain and carried in the air so long as this whirlwind continued but so soon as that was laid the stone fell immediately unlesse this lightning body which appeared so many daies was fire indeed which coming to dissolve and to be put out did beget this violent storm of force to tear off the stone and cast it down This it is likely Charimander meant who in his book of Comets saith Anaxagoras observed in the Heavens a great unaccustomed light of the greatnesse of a huge pillar and that it shined for many daies The other memorable prediction of Anaxagoras was of a storm which hee signified by going to the Olympick games when the weather was fair in a shaggy gown the rain powring down all the Graecians saith Aelian saw and gloried that hee knew more divinely then according to humane Nature CHAP. IV. His Scholers and Auditors THese are remembred as his Scholars and Auditors Pericles Son of Xantippas being instructed by Anaxagoras could easily reduce the exercise of his mind from secret obstrusive things to publick popular causes Pericles much esteemed him was by him instructed in natural Philosophy and besides other virtues fre'd from superstitious fears arising from ignorance of physicall causes whereof there is this instance the head of a Ram with but one horn being brought to Pericles was by the South sayers interpreted prodigious Anaxagoras opening it showed that the brain filled not its naturall place but contracted by degrees in an ovall form toward that part where the horn grew Afterwards Anaxagoras neglected and decrepit with age in a melancholy resentment thereof lay down and cover'd his face resolving to starve himself which Pericles hearing came immediately to him bewailing not Anaxagoras but himself who should lose so excellent a Counsellor Anaxagoras uncovering his face said They Pericles who would use a Lamp must apply it with oil Archelaâ—s Son of Apollodorus was Disciple to Anaxagoras and as Laertius affirms called the
or silently desired That God takes care of all creatures is demonstrable from the benefits he gives them of light water and fire seasonable production of fruits of the earth that he hath particular care of man from the nourishment of all plants and creatures for mans service from their subjection to man though they excused him never so much in strength from the variety of mans sense accommodated to the variety of objects for necessity use and pleasure from reason whereby he discoursed through reminiscence from sensible objects from speech whereby he communicates all that he knows gives lawes governs states that God notwithstanding he is invisible hath a being from the instances of his Ministers invisible also as thunder and wind from the soule of man which hath something with the divine nature in governing those that cannot see it This is the effect of his discourse with Eâ—thidâ—mus The Soule is immortall for what is alwaies moveable is immortall but that which moveth another or is moved by an other hath a cessation of motion and life The soule is praeexistent to the body endued with knowledge of eternall Ideas which in her union to the body she loseth as stupisied untill awakened by discourse from sensible objects Thus is all her learning only reminiscence a recovery of her first knowledge The body being compounded is dissolved by death the soule being simple passeth into another life incapable of corruption The soules of men are divine to whom when they go out of the body the way of their return to heaven is open which to the best and most just is the most expedite The soules of the good after death are in a happy estate united to God in a blessed inaccessible place the bad in convenient places suffer condign punishment but to define what those places are is hominis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence being demanded what things were in the other world he answered neither was I ever there nor ever did I speak with any that came from thence Sect. 2. Ethicks HIs moralls consider a man either as a single person or as the father of a family or as a member of the common-wealth In the first respect are his Ethicks wherein such sentences as have been preserved by Xenophon Diogenes Laertius Stobaeus and others are thus collected Of vertue and vice HE exhorted his friends to Endeavour to be the most wise and beneficiall because what wants reason wants respect as the bodies of dead friends and hair nailes and the like which are cut off and cast away To be employed is good and beneficiall to be idle hurtfull and evill they that do good are imployed they that spend their time in vain recreations are idle He that hath most advantage by gifts of nature as well as he that hath least must learn and meditate on those things wherein he would be excellent He only is idle who might be better imployed To do good is the best course of life therein fortune hath share They are best and best pleasing to God who do any thing with any art or calling who followeth none is uselesse to the publick and hated of God He taught every where that a just man and a happy were all one and used to curse him who first by opinion divided honesty and profit which are coherent by Nature as having done an impious act for they are truly wicked who separate profitable and just which depends on law The Stoicks have followed him so far that whatsoever is honest the same they esteem profitable He asked Memnon a Thessalian who thought himselfe very learned and that he had reached as Empedocles saith the top of wisdome what is vertue He answered readily and boldly that there is one vertue of a child another of an old Man one of a Man another of a Woman one of a Magistrate another of a private Person one of a Master another of a Servant Very good replies Socraâ—es I ask for one vertue and you give us a whole swarm truly conceiving that he knew not one vertue who named so many Being demanded by Gorgias If he accounted not the great King of Persia happy I know not answered he how he is furnished with learning and vertue as conceiving that true happinesse consisteth in these two not in the frail gifts of fortune Euripides in his Auge saying of vertue It is best carelessely to part with these he rose up and went away saying It was ridiculous to seek a lost servant or to suffer vertue so to go away He said he wondered at those who carve Images of stone that they take such care to make stones resemble men whilst they neglect and suffer themselves to resemble stones He advised young men to behold themselves every day in a glass that if they were beautifull they might study to deserve it if deformed to supply or hide it by learning He said to begin well is not a small thing but depending on a small moment He said vertue was the beautie vice the deformity of the soul. He said outward beauty was a sign of inward beauty and therefore chose such Auditors In that life of man as in an Image every part ought be beautifull Incense to God praise is due to good men Who are undeservedly accused ought to be defended who excell others in any good quality to be praised A Horse is not known to be good by his furniture but qualities a man by his mind not wealth It is not possible to cover fire with a garment sinne with time Being demanded who live without peâ—turbation hee answered thâ—y who are conscious to themselves of no ill To one who demanded what Nobility is he answered a good temper of soul and body Of affections Love Envy Grief Hope c. THat two brothers God meant should be more helpfull to each other then two hands feet eyes or whatsoever nature hath formed doubtlesse because if they love they may great distance mutually help one another is the scope of his discourse with Chaeracrates That all things are good and fair to those things where with they agree but ill and deformed in respect of those things with which they agree not is the conclusion of his second discourse with Aristippus Envy is a grief not at the adversity of friends nor the prosperity of Enemies but at the prosperity of friends for many are so foolishly enclined as to maligne those in good fortune whom in misfortune they pittied A ship ought not to trust to one Anchor nor life to one hope To ground hopes on an ill opinion is to trust a ship to a slight anchor The beauty of fame is blasted by envy as by a sicknesse Many adorn the tombes of tâ—ose whom living they persecuted with envy Envy is the saw of the soul. Nothing is
then he if by himself it must be either to better or to worse both which are absurd From all these it followeth that God is incorporeal which may likewise be proved thus If God were a body he should consist of matter and form for every body consisteth of matter and its form joynes to that matter which is made like unto the Idaea's aâ—d in an ineffable manner participant of them But that should consist of matter and form is absurd for then he could not bee either simple or a Principle therefore he is incorporeall Again if he be a body he consisteth of matter and consequently is either fire or air or earth or water or somthing made out of these but none of these is principle by it selfe besides he must then bee later then matter as consisting of it which being absurd it is necessary that God be incorporeall Moreover if he were a body it would follow that he must be generable corruptible mutable which to affirm of God were intollerable CHAP. XI Of Qualities THat Qualities are incorporeall may be proved thus every body is a Subject quality is not a Subject but an accident therefore quality is not a body Again no body is in a subject every quality is in a Subject therefore quality is not a body Again quality is contrary to quality but no body as no body is contrary to a body therefore qualities are not bodies To omit that it is most agreeable to reason that as matter is void of quality so quality should be void of matter aud if quality be void of matter it must likewise be void of corporeity for if qualities were bodies two or three bodies might be together in the same place which is absurd Qualities being incorporeal the maker of them must be incorporeall also moreover there can be no efficients but in corporeals for bodies naturally suffer and are in mutation not continuing alwaies in manner nor persevering in the same state For whensoever they seem to effect any thing we shall find that they suffer it long before Whence as there is something which wholly suffereth so must there bee somthing which wholly acteth but such only is incorporeall Thus much concerning principles as far they relate to Theology we proceed next to Physicall contemplations CHAP XII Of the Causes Generation Elements and Order of the World FOrasmuch as of sensible and singular things there must of necessity be some examplars viz. Idea's of which are Sciences and Definitions for besides all particular men we conceive a man in our mind and besides all particular horses a horse and likewise besides all living creatures a living creature immortall and unbegotten as from one seale are made many prints and of one man there may be many Pictures of all which the Idaea it self is cause that they are such as it self is it is necessary that this Universe the fairest Fabrick of Gods making be so made by God that in the making thereof he look'd upon an Idaea as its exemplar whilst by a wonderfull providence and most excellent design God applyed himselfe to the building of this frame because he was good God therefore made it of all matter which being before the generation of Heaven disorderly scattered he from a deformed confusion reduced to beautifull order and adorned every way the parts thereof with sit numbers and figures untill at last he so distinguish'd them as now they are Fire and Earth to Air and Water of which there were then only the footsteps and a certain aptitude to admit the power of Elements and so without any reason or order they justled matter and were justled again by matter Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements of whole Fire and Earth Water and Air omitting no power or part of any of them For he saith it must be corporeall and generated and subject to touch and sight but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or seen Wherefore justly he framed it of Fire and Earth and because it was requisite there should be some chain to unite these there is a Divine chain which according to the proportion of reason maketh one of it self and those things which are united to it and the World could not be plain for then one medium would have served but sphaericall therefore there was need of two mediums to the constitution thereof Betwixt Fire and Earth by the prescription of this reason is interposed Air and Water that as Fire is to Air so is Air to Water and as Air is to Water so is Water to Earth and again as Earth is to Water so is Water to Air and as Water is to Air so is Air to Fire There being nothing remaining beyond the World God made the World one conformable to this Idaea which is one He likewise made it such as that is uncapable of sicknesse or age For besides that nothing can befall it whereby it may be corrupted it is so sufficient to it self that it hath not need of any exteriour thing He bestowed upon it a Sphaericall figure as being the fairest the most capacious and aptest to motion and because it needeth not hearing or sight or the rest of the senses he gave it not any Organs of sense He denied all kinds of motion to be competible to it except the circular which is proper to the mind and to Wisdom CHAP XIII Of the convenience of figures with the Elements and World THe world thus consisteth of two parts a Soul and a Body this visible and corruptible that neither subject to sight nor touch The power and constitution of each is different the body consisteth of Fire Earth Water and Aire which foure the maker of the Universe there being untill then nothing more confused then the Elements formed in a Pyramid a Cube an Octaedron and an Icosaedron but chiefly in a Dodecaedron Matter as far as it put on the figure of a Pyramid became Fire and mounted upward For that figure is the most apt to cut and to divide as consisting of fewest triangles and therefore is the rarest of all figures As far as it is an Octaedron it took the qualitie of Aire VVhere it took that of an Icosaedron it became Water The figure of a Cube Earth as being the most solid and staple of all the Elements The figure of a Dodecaedron he used in the fabrick of the Universe Superficies come nigher the nature of Principles then all these for they are before solids Of its nature the two Parents as it were are two Triangles most fair and rectangular one a Scalenum the other an Isosceles a Scalenum is a triangle having one right angle the other of two thirds the last of one third A Scalenum therefore is the element of a Pyramid and an Octaedron and an Icosaedron A Pyramid consisteth of foure triangles having all sides equall to one another each whereof is divided as we said into six scalenous triangles The Octaedors consist of eight like sides whereof each is
put into an iron Cage and so carried up and down in a miserable fordid condition and at last as Laertius relates though others otherwise thrown to Lyons and devoured CHAP. VI. His School and manner of Teaching THus Aristotle having lived eight years with Alexander returned to Athens as Apollodorus and Dionysius Halicarnassaeus affirm in the second year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad Pythodorus being Archon where he found Xenocrates teaching in the Academy which place was resigned unto him by Speusippus in the fourth year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad Hence it appeareth that Hermippus erreth in affirming that Xenocrates took upon him the School of Plato at what time Aristotle was sent by the Athenians on an Embassy to Philip. For as Patricius hath observed it can no way agree in time it being certain as Laertius attests that Speusippus succeeded Plato in the School in the first year of the hundred and eight Olympiad immediately upon Plato's death and continued therein eight years that is to the end of the hundred and ninth Olympiad in the second year of which Olympiad Aristotle as we said went to Philip not on an Embassy but upon his invitation to educate Alexander Neither is the Author of Aristotles life lesse mistaken who saith that upon the death of Speusippus the Athenians sent to Aristotle and that both of them Aristotle and Xenocrates took upon them Plato's School Xenocrates in the Academy Aristotle in the Lyceum But this errour is easily detected by the same computation for at the time of Speâ—sippus's death Aristotle was with Alexander nor did he leave him untill six years after all which time Xenocrates profess'd Philosophy in the Academy The Academy being prepossess'd by Xenocrates Aristotle made choice of the Lyceum a place in the suburbs of Athens built by Pericles for the exercising of Souldiers Here he taught and discoursed of Philosophy to such as came to him walking constantly every day till the houre of anointing which the Greeks usually did before meals whence he and his followers are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from walking Peripateticks Others say he was called Perâ—paâ—etâ—ck from walking with Alexander newly recovered of a sicknesse in which manner he used to discourse of Philosophy with him The number of his auditors encreasing very much he gave over walking and taught sitting saying Now to be silent most disgracefull were And see Xenocrates possesse the chair Though Cicero and Quintilian affirm he used this verse against Isocrates in emulation of whom he taught Rhetorick to his Disciples every morning So many Disciples resorted to him that he made Lawes in his School as Xenocrates did in the Aâ—ademy creating Archons that ruled ten daies The discourse and doctrine which he delivered to his Disciples was of two kinds One he called Exoterick the other Acroatick Exoterick were those which conduced to Rhetorick meditation nice disputes and the knowledge of civill things Acroatick those in which more remote and subtile Philosophy was handled and such things as pertain to the contemplation of nature and Dialectick disceptations Acroatick Discipline he taught in the Lyceum in the morning not admitting every one to come and hear them but those only of whose wit and principles of Learning and diligence in study he had before made tryall His Exoterick Lectures were in the afternoon and evenings these he communicated to all young men without any distinction calling the latter his evening walk the former his morning walk CHAP. VII His Philosophy IN Philosophy saith Ammonius he seemeth to have done more then Man for there is not any part of Philosophy whereof he treated but he doth it most accurately and many things he himselfe such was his sagacity and acutenesse finding out compleated and finished In Logick it was his invention that he separated the precepts of Disputation from the things themselves of which we dispute and taught the manner and reason of disputation For they who went before though they could demonstrate yet they knew not how to make a demonstration as they who cannot make shooes but only wear them Alexander Aphrodisaeus affirmes that he first reduced Syllogismes to Mood and Figure Philoponus that he invented all Dialectick Method whence Theodorus calls him both inventer and perfecter of Logick which he indeed in a manner challengeth but modestly to himselfe in the last Chapter of his Elenchs affirming nothing had been done in that kinde before but what the Eristicks and Sophists taught As for the Categories the invention whereof some ascribe to the Pythagoreans it is much more probable that they were wholly his own for those books entituled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 under the name of Archytas from which some conceive Aristotle to have borrowed much the particulars whereof are instanced by Patricius Theâ—istius affirmes to have been written not by the Pythagorean neither hath Laertius made mention of any writings of his for the Pythagoreans at that time wrote but little the first that wrote any thing being Philolaus but by some Peâ—ipatetick who thought his work might passe with greater credit if published in the name of so antient a Philosopher In Physick the â—ift essence whereof celestiall bodies consist distinct from the foure Elements is generally ascribed to his invention only Simplicius citeth the authority of Xenocrates in his book of the life of Plato that Plato constituted five simple bodies Heaven and the foure Elements asserting they differ no lesse in nature then in figure for which reason he assigned the figure of a Dodecaedron to Heaven differing from the figure of the foure Elements But these as the learned Nunnesius observes seem to be rather Symbolicall and Pythagoricall then the true meaning of Plato For Plato in his Timaeus expressely averrs that the Heavens are of their own nature dissolute but by the divine Will are kept together as it were by a Tye from being dissolved Xenarchus a Philosopher wrote against the fift Essence introduced by Aristotle whom Alexander Aphrodisaeus exactly answereth Theodorus calleth Aristotle the Perfecter of Physick adding â—that only his writings upon that subject were approved by following ages who rejected whatsoever others had written in the same kinde as appeareth by their losse What Epicure and others have objected against him as a fault that he enquired with such diligence into the minute and meanest things of nature is a sufficient testimony of his excellence and exactnesse in this study In Ethick whereas Polyaenus placed Felicity in externall goods Plato in those of the soule only Aristotle placed it chiefly in the soul but affirmed it to be deâ—â—led and straighâ—ned if it want exteriour goods properly using these terms For those things which are deâ—iled have the same beauty within but their superficies only is hidden and those which are straightned have the same reall magnitude In Metaphysick which he calleth First-Philosophy and Wisdome and as the more antient Philosophers before him
to have written upon the Categories being often cited by Simplicius upon that subject Taurus the Berâ—â—â—an a Platonick Philosopher living under Antonius wrote first concerning the difference between the Doctrines of Plato and Aristotle Adrastus the Aphrodisaean wrote a Comment on Aristotle's Cagories and of his Physicks and a Book concerning the Method of his Philosophy Aspasius wrote a Comment on all Aristotle's Works taking particular care to restore the Text to which end he is often quoted by Simplicius and Boetius There is a Comment upon some books of the Ethicks extant under his name Herminus somwhat later seems to have written upon all or the greatest part of Aristotle's works cited by all the Greek Commentatours that are extant and by Boetius Alexander the Aphrodisaean who lived under Antonius and Severus wrote upon the Analyticks Topicks and Elenchs whence stiled by the latter Interpreters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Expositor Galen who lived at the same time wrote three Books upon Aristotle of Interpretation four Books upon the first of the first Analytick four upon the second of the first six upon the first of the second Analytick five upon the second Atticus a Platonick Philosopher besides seven Books wherein he proved Plato and Aristotle to be of the same Sect contrary to the assertion of Taurus he wrote also a Dialogue upon the Categories extant seven Books upon the Categories cited by Simplicius a Comment upon the Book of Interpretation cited by Boetius Not to mention what he wrote upon Aristotle de Anima since it appears from Suidas that it was rather by way of opposition then exposition which Theodoret likewise confirmes Iamblicus of Chalcis in Coelosyria Master to Iulian the Emperour wrote in an abstruse way upon the Book of Categories Dexippus by some thought to be sonne of Iamblicus wrote a Dialogue on the Categories extant Maximus a Byzantine Disciple of Iamblicus wrote Commentaries on the Categories and other Books of Aristotle as Simplicus and Suidas affirm Plutarch the younger Son of Nestorius flourishing under Valentinian the first Gratian and Theodosius the first according to Suidas and Philoponus wrote Commentaries upon some Books of Aristotle Syrianus surnamed the great of Alexandria a Philosopher who flourished under Arcadius Honorius Theodosius the second and Valentiniâ—n the second wrote Commentaries upon Aristotle's Books of Nature of Motion of Heaven and upon the Categories cited by Simplicius and Philoponus Likewise upon the 2d. 5. and 6. Book of Metaphysicks which are extant Olympiodorus an Alexandrian who derived himself from Ammonâ—us Saccus and was contemporary to Plutarch and Syrianus wrote upon Aristotle's Meteors extant He was later then that Olympiodorus who writ upon Plato Themistius living according to Suidas under Iulian and Iovinian wrote a Paraphrase upon Aristotle's Physick 8. Books a Paraphrase on the Analyticks 2. Books upon his Books of the Soul 7. Books Of the scope and title of the Book of Categories one Book Proclus Disciple of Syrianus wrote two Books concerning Motions wherein he made an abstract of Aristotle's second Book of Motion That he wrote also upon his book of Heaven and the Elements may be conjectured from the frequent citations of Simplicius Marinus who succeeded Proclus in the School seemeth to have written somthing upon Aristotles Book of the Soul being often cited upon that subject by Philoponus Ammonius Hermaeus wrote upon Aristotle's Categories and upon his Book of Interpretation both which are extant as likewise upon his Books of the Soul cited by Philoponus Damascius a Platonick Philosopher Disciple to Ammonius besides what he wrote in confutation of Aristotle concerning Time epitomiz'd the four first and the eight Book of his Physick and the first Book of Heaven To these adde Phâ—loponus and Simplicius and Asclepius Disciples to Ammonius Iohannes Damascenus whose compendium of Aristotles Logick and Pâ—ysick are extant he lived about the year 770. Eustathius wrote upon some of the Nicomachian Ethicks and Eustratius upon his book concerning Demonstration Michael Psellus about the year 800. and Michael Ephesius upon the parva naturalia Magentinus upon the Categories and the book of Interpretation Nicephorus Blemmydes under Iohannes duca upon the Logick and Physick Georgius Plachymerius and Theodorus Metochita lived about the year 1080. and wrote Epitoms extant Of Arabick Commentatours were Avicenna and Averroes about the year 1216. The later writers it wil be unnecessary to mention there being a Catalogue of them annexed to Aristotles works of the Paris Edition ARISTOTLES EPISTLES To Philip 1 THey who undertake a Command for the good of their Subjects not preferred there unto either by Fortune or Nature trust not in their own power which they know subject to chance but grow great in Vertue whereby they order the Commonwealth wisely For there is nothing amongst men so firm and solid but the rapid motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening Nature if we enquire into the truth varieth all lives interweaving them like the Action of a Tragedy with misfortunes Men like flowers have a set time wherein they flourish and excell others Wherefore behave not your self towards Greece tyrannically or loosely for one argues petulance the other temerity Wise Princes ought not to be admired for their Government but Governance so that though Fortune change they shall have the same praise As for the rest do all things well preferring the health of your Soul by Philosophy that of your body by exercise To Philip 2. MOst Philosophers assert beneficence to be somthing equall to God To speak the truth the whole life of Mankind is comprised in conferring and returning Benefits So as some bestow others receive others return Hence is it just to commiserate all that are in adversity for pitty is the signe of a mild Soul sternness of a rude it being dishonest impious to neglect vertue in misfortunes For this I commend our disciple Theophrastus who saith we never repent of doing good it brings forth good fruit the prayers and praises of the obliged Wise men therefore must study to oblige many thinking that beside the praise there may some advantage accrew from hence in the change of Affaires and if not all at least some one of those to whom he hath done good may be in a capacity to requite him For this reason endeavour to be ready in doing good but give not way to your passions for that is kingly and civill this barbarous and odious As you see occasion practise and neglect not this usefull advise To Philip. 3. THE most excellent Princes whose honour toucheth the Starrs have conferred most benefits and not accommodating their sway only to the present but considering the instability of Fortune have treasured up good deeds as usefull in either condition In prosperity it procures them Honour for Honour is proper to Vertue in adversâ—ty Relief for friends are much better try'd in bad fortune then in good The sight of benevolent persons is like to that of Land to men
Blood and the like what they are and to what end their matter and reason but especially whence they have their motion next to proceed to dissimilar parts and lastly to speak of those which consist therof as men Plants and the like Hence Patricius conjectures that his Books of the parts of living Creatures did immediately succeed those of the Meteors wherein he treateth as he proposeth of Similar parts unto the tenth Chapter of the second Book and from thence of the dissimilar But to reduce his Books of living Creatures to this method is the lesse certain for as much as many of these besides those which treated particularly of Anatomy have been lost of which perhaps were some which might better have cleared the series for in the Books themselves concerning Animals there is nothing to ground it upon For the same reason it is uncertain where his Books of Plants ought to have been placed which are lost Perhaps they might precede those of Animals for he asserts that Plants have souls contrary to the Stoicks endued with vegetative power that they live even though cut asunder as insects whereby two or more are made of one that the substance they receive by aliment and the ambient air is sufficient for the preservation of their naturall heat As concerning Animals we have Of their Going one Book Of their History ten Books Of their parts four Books Of their Generation five Books So exquisitely hath he treated upon this subject as cannot well be expressed by an abridgement and therefore we shall omit it the rather because little or nothing was done herein by the Academicks or Stoicks a collation with whom is the principall design of this summary CHAP. XIV Of the Soul THe knowledge of the Soul conduceth much to all Truth and especially to Physick for the Soul is as it were the principle of animate things Animate things differ from inanimate chiefly by motion and sense Whence the antient Philosophers defined the Soul by these Democritus the Pythagoreans Anaxagoras by motion Empedocles and Plato by knowledge others by both others by incorporeity or a rare body Thales something that moveth Diogenes air Heraclitus exhalation an immortall substance Hippo water Critias blood The soule doth not move it selfe as Democritus held for whatsoever is moved is moved by another Again if the soul were moved perse it would be in place and it were capable of being moved violently and it would be of the same nature with the body and might return into the body after the separation Neither is the soul moved by it selfe but from its objects for if it were moved essentially it might recede from its essence The soul therefore is not moved perse but by accident only according to the motion of the body The soul is not Harmony a proportionate mixture of contraries for then there must be more souls in the same body according to the different constitution of its parts But though we commonly say the soul grieveth hopeth feareth c. we are not to understand that the soul is moved but only that these are from the soul in the body that is moved some by locall motion of the Organs others by alteration of them To say the soul is angry is no more proper then to say she builds for it is the man that is angry by the soul otherwise the soul were liable to age decay and infirmity as well as the organs of the body Neither is the soul a rare body consisting of elements for then it would understand nothing more then the elements themselves neither is there a soul diffused through all things as Thales held for we see there are many things inanimate Some from the different functions of the soul argue that there are more souls then one in man or that the soul is divisible the supream intellectuall part placed in the head the irascible in the heart concupiscible in the liver But this is false for the Intellect is not confined to any part of the body as not being corporeall nor organicall but immateriall and immortall The soul is the first intelechie of a naturall organicall body having life potentially First Entelechie Entelechie is two-fold the first is the principle of operation as Science the second the Act it selfe Of a Naturall not of an artificiall body as a Tower or Ship Organicall body that is endued with instruments for operation as the eye for seeing the ear for hearing even plants have simple Organs Having life potentially as it were in it selfe for potentially is lesse then actually actually as in him that wakes potentially as in him that is asleep The soul is otherwise defined that by which we first live feel and understand whence appeareth there are three faculties of the soul nutritive sensitive intellective the inferiour comprehended by the superiour potentially as a triangle by a quadrangle CHAP. XV. Of the Nutritive faculty THe first and most common faculty of the Soul is the Nutritive by which life is in all things the acts and operation thereof are to be generated and to take nourishment Nutriment is received either towards Nutrition or augmentation Nutrition is the operation of the Nutritive faculty conducing to the substance it self of the animate being Augmentation is the operation of the Nutritive faculty whereby the animate body encreaseth to perfect Magnitude In nutrition are considered the Soul nourishing the body nourished and the food by which the nourishment is made hereto is required a Naturall heat which is in all living creatures The aliment is both contrary or unlike and like to the body nourished as it is undigested we say nourishment is by the contrary as altered by digestion like is nourished by its like CHAP. XVI Of the Sensitive Faculty THE Sensitive faculty of the Soul is that by which sence is primarily in Animals Sense is a mutation in the Organ caused by some sensible Object It is not sensible of it self nor of its Organ not of any interiour thing To reduce it to act is requisite some externall sensible object for sense cannot move it self being a passive power as that which is combustible cannot burn it self Of sensible Objects there are three kinds proper which is perceived by one sense without errour as colour in respect of sight Common which is not proper to any one but perceived by all Accidentall which as such doth not affect the sense Sense is either Externall or Internall the externall are five Seeing Hearing Smelling Touching Tasting The object of Seeing is Colour and some thing without a name that glisters in the dark as the scales of fish glow-worms and the like Colour is the motive of that which is actually perspicuous nothing therefore is visible without light Perspicuous is that which is visible not by it self but by some other colour or light as Air Water Glasse Light is the act of a perspicuous thing as it is perspicuous It is not fire not
when it is present only excited by the phantasy The object of the Theoretick Intellect is true or false of the practick good or ill The rationall soul in some manner is every thing for that which actually knoweth is in some maner the same with the thing known CHAP. XXIII Of the Motive faculty BEsides the nutritive sensitive and intellective faculties there is also a motive faculty in animate creatures That it is not the same with the nutritive is manifest in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension which plants have not neither have they organs fit for motion which nature would have given them if they had this power That it is not the same with the sensitive appears in that some animals which have sense have not the power as Zoophytes which have not the organs fit for this motion Neither is it the same with the Theoretick Intellect for that judgeth not as to action but progressive motion is the action of an animal flying ill or pursuing good The principles of locall motion in animals are the practick Intellect under which is comprehended phantasy and appetite These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action intellect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned what to be embraced appetite by shunning or embracing it Appetite is the chief principle thereof for that may move without intellect as in beasts and many times in men who desert their reason to follow their pleasure But intellect never moveth without appetite that is will for appetite is the principle of all motion honest and dishonest intellect only of honest motion In man appetite is two-fold Will which followeth the judgment of reason and sensuall appetite irascible or concupiscible which followeth sense and phantasy In the motion of animals three things are considered First that which moveth and that is two-fold the appetible object which moveth the appetite as a finall cause not as an efficient and the appetite it selfe which being moved by the appetible object moveth the animall Secondly by what it moves which is the heart of the animal by which instrument the appetible object moveth it Thirdly that which is moved the animall it selfe perfect Insects are moved locally as perfect animals are and consequently by the same principles appetite and phantasy but this phantasy is imperfect diffused through the whole body as appeareth by their uncertain motion only towards present occurrent objects That they have appetite is manifest in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure Beasts have sensitive phantasie only rationall creatures deliberative which compareth many things conducing to some foreknown end and chooseth the most expedient Yet somtimes the sensitive appetite in man overswayeth the rationall but by the order of nature the will which is the rationall ought as being the superiour to it to oversway the sensitive Thus there are three motions one of the will commanding another of the sensitive appetite resisting and a third of the body obeying But when the sensitive overruleth there are only two motions for the will resists not but is deceived CHAP. XIV Of Life and Death GEneration and dissolution are common to all living Creatures though all are not produced and dissolved in the same manner The generation of a living Creature is the first conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat Life is the permanence of that Soul with the said heat Youth is the encrease of the first refrigerative part age the decrease thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the constant and perfect life which is betwixt both As long as an animate Creature liveth it hath naturall heat within it self and as soon as that faileth dieth The principle of this heat is in the heart If it be extinguish'd in any other part the Animal may live but if in the heart it cannot This heat is extinguish'd two waies first by consumption when it faileth of it self secondly by extinction from some contrary as in violent death the cause is the same in both defect of aliment which in the living Creature is its vital moisture as fire wanting refrigeration groweth more violent and soone consumeth the humidity which being gone it self must of necessity go out Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the conservation of the naturall heat Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air and by aliment their naturall heat is extinguish'd by excessive cold and dry'd up by excessive heat Animals which live in the air or in the water are refrigerated by the air or water some by breathing others without Death according to the extinction of naturall heat is two-fold violent or naturall violent when the cause is extrinsecall naturall when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature For that part wheron life dependeth the Lungs is so ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever Death therefore cometh from defect of heat when through want of refrigeration the radicall humidity is consumed and dry'd up Refrigeration faileth naturally when by progresse of time the lungs in Creatâ—res that have breath the gils in fishes grow so hard that they are unapt for motion Old men die easily as having but little naturall heat and without pain because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection The lives of living Creatures as well of the same as of divers species differ in length the longest life most commonly is that of some Plants as the Palm and Cypresse that of Creatures which have blood rather then the bloodlesse that of terrestriall creatures rather then the aquatile that of those which have great bodies as of Elephants rather then those of little The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture if it be much and fat not easily dry'd up nor congealed Secondly natural hear which suffereth not that humour to be congealed Thirdly a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture Fourthly fewnesse of excrements for excrements are contrary to Nature and somtimes corrupt nature it self somtimes a part Salacious creatures or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then women but more active In hot Countries animate creatures are larger and live longer then in cold Those animals which have little or no blood either are not at all produced in the Northern parts or soon dye Both Plants and Animals â—f they take not aliment die for the naturall heat when the aliment faileth consumeth the matter it self wherein it is the vitall moisture Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall and the bloodlesse then those that have blood because their humidity is more waterish and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted Plants live long as having lesse of waterish moisture which therefore is not so apt to be congealed The largenesse of the upper parts as well in Plants as Animals is a signe of long life because it argues much naturall
yeeld to things that are perspicuous Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause it hath not according to Chrysippus this principall reason not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation for it is necessary that assent be moved by phantasie but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone which move not by impulsion then of their owne nature the Cylinder seemes to rowle and the Cone to turne round As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion but did not give it volubility so the objected phantasy imprinteth and as it were sealeth in the soule its species yet the assent is in our power and that as we said in a Cylinder extrinsecally impelled the motion is continued by its own power and nature Phantasies wherewith the mind of man is presently affected are not voluntary or in our own power but inferre themselves by a kind of violence approbations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which these phantasies are knowne and judged are voluntary and made according to our arbitrement So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven or by the fall of any thing or sudden newes of some danger or the like it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved and contracted and appalled not through opnion perceived of any ill but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions which praevert the office of the mind and reason But presently the same wise man approveth not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those dreadfull phantasies that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rejects and refuses them nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men The unwise when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind thinke them to be truly such as they appeare and receiving them as if they were justly to be feared approve them by their assent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion But a wise man suddenly changing colour and countenance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assents not but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment which he alwaies had of these phantasies as nothing dreadfull but terrifying only with a false shew and vain fear CHAP. VIII Of Notions FRom Sense the rule of Science Notions are imprinted in the Soul by which not only principles but larger waies to reason are found out A man when he is born hath the supream part of his Soul like unto clean paper upon which every notion is inscribed The first manner of inscription is by the Senses as for example They who perceive a thing that is white after it is taken away retain the memory thereof but when they have conceived many remembrances of one species then they say they have experience for experience is a multitude of similitudes Of Notions some are naturall which are in such manner as we we have said and without Art Others gained by learning and industry These are properly called Notions the other Anticipations The reason for which we are called rationall is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature for phantasm when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul is then called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligence a word taken from the Intellect For to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes to the Gods only and to us these are incident Those which belong to us are Phantasmes as to their genus Notions as to their species as denaries and staters when paid for transportation are called Naula Common notions are planted in all men in which they all agree together one is not repugnant to another for who holds not that good is profitable and ought to be chosen with utmost endeavours Who holds not that what is just is fair and well-beseeming Whence then proceed contentions and differences to wit from the application of first notions to singular things These Notions and whatsoever is of this kinde which right reason conformeth in us being long examined are true and suitable to the natures of things CHAP. IX Of Science and Opinion THat which is comprehended by Sense Zeno call'd Sense and if so comprehended as not to be plucked away by reason Science otherwise Ignorance from which proceedeth Opinion which is weak and common to the false and unknown These three are joyned together Science Opinion and Comprehension which borders upon the other two Science is a firme stable immutable comprehension with reason Opinion an infirm weak assent Comprehension which commeth between both is an assent to comprehensive phantasy Comprehensive phantasy is true in such manner that it cannot be false Therefore Science is in wise men only Opinion in fooles Comprehension is common to both as being that by which truth is judged and is for this reason reckon'd by Zeno neither amongst the right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor amongst the bad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but betwixt science and ignorance affirming that this only is to be credited CHAP. X. Of Voice Speech and Words These three are joyned to one another that which is signified that which signifieth and the contingent That which signifieth is the voice as Dion That which is signified is the thing it selfe declared by the voice it is that which we apprehend and is present in our cogitation The contingent is the outward subject as Dion himselfe Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth and that which is signified is divided into two places one of Significats the other of Voice The place of significats is divided into phantasies and subsistents on phantasie dicibles axioms c. In the other place concerning Voice is declared literall Voice the parts of speech the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms Poems Ambiguities Song Musick and according to some definitions and divisions The phantasies of the minde precede speech Of these therefore we have already treated then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie For this reason the consideration of Dialectick by the joynt consent of all seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice Voice is aire percussed the proper sensible object of hearing as Diogenes the Babylonian in his Art of Voyce The voice of a living sensitive creature is aire percussed with appetite the voice of man is articulate proceeding from the minde at his four teenth year it is perfected Speech as Diogenes saith is a literate voice as It is day Word is a significative voice proceeding from the minde Language is a speech according to the variety of Nations whereof each useth its peculiar dialect as the Attick saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ionick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Voice and Speech differ in that voice is a sound but speech
wisdome by the first naturall appetite afterwards more esteem that wisdome then those things whereby we arrived at it And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reason of living so the appetition of the soul is given not for every kinde of life but for one certain form of living so likewise reason and perfect reason For as action is proper to a Player motion to a Dancer yet not any but one certain kinde so the life that is to be acted is in one certain kinde not in any which kinde we call convenient and consentaneous Wisdome is not like the art of a Pilot or a Physician but rather to that Action we mentioned and to Dancing that the extream that is the effection of the Art be in the Art it selfe and not extrinsecall There is another similitude betwixt Wisdome and these Arts for in them are those things which are done rightly yet are not all the parts whereof they consist contained therein Things done rightly or Rectitudes contain all numbers of vertue for only wisdome is wholly converted into it selfe which is not in other Arts. But improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician compared with the ultimate of Wisdome For wisdome includeth Fortitude and Justice and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it which happenâ—th not in other Arts but none can hold these vertues which we last mentioned unlesse he affirm there is nothing that is different but honest and dishonest CHAP. V. Of Good and III. HItherto of Appetites we come next to their Objects Things according to Zeno are whatsoever participate of Essence Of things some are good some ill some indifferent Good is severall waies defined by the Stoicks but their definitions tend all to one end Good is profit or that which differeth not from profit Profit is vertue and vertuous action not different from profit is â— vertuous man and a friend For vertue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick and vertuous action being an operation according to vertue is plainly profit A vertuous man and a friend is not different from profit for profit is a part of Vertuous as being the Hegemoniack thereof Now the wholes are neither the same with their parts for a man is not a hand nor different from their parts for they subsist not without parts wherefore the whole is not different from its parts and consequently a vertuous man being the whole in respect of his Hegemoniack which is profit is not different from profit Good is by some defined that which is expetible in it selfe by others that which assisteth to felicity or compleateth it by Diogenes that which is absolute by nature or that which is perfect according to the nature of a rationall creature The consequent thereof is a beneficient motion or state absolute in nature Whereas things are known either by use or conjunction or similitude or collation by this fourth kinde is the knowledge of good for when from those things which are according to nature the minde ascendeth by collation of reason then it attaineth the notion of good Good is known and named not by accession increase or comparison with other things but by its proper power For as Hony though it be most sweet yet in its proper kinde of tast not comparative to any other we perceive it to be sweet So this good of which we speak is that which is most to be esteemed but that estimation consisteth in the kinde not the magnitude For estimation being neither amongst the good nor ill whatsoever you apply it to it will remain in its kinde Different therefore is the proper estimation of vertue which consisteth in the kinde not in increase To Good belongeth all vertue as Prudence Justice Temperance Fortitude and whatsoever participates of those as vertuous actions and persons Accessions hereto are joy cheerfulnesse and the like Ills are the contrary vices as Imprudence Injustice Intemperance Pusillanimity and whatsoever participates of vice as vicious actions and persons The accessions hereunto are discontent affliction and the like Of Goods some as we have said are Vertues others not-vertues as Joy Hope and the like In like manner of Ills some are Vices as those already mentioned others not-vices as Griefe and Fear Again of Goods some are continuall in all the vertuous and at all times such is all vertue sounde sence wise appetition and the like Others are intermissive as joy hope and prudent counsell which are not in all the wise nor at all times In like manner of Ills some are continuall in all and alwaies in the imprudent as all vice and imprudent sence and imprudent appetite Others intermissive as griefe fear and imprudent answer which are not alwaies in the wicked nor at all times Again of Good there are three kinds The first from which profit commeth as from its first cause such is vertue The second by which profit commeth as vertue and vertuous action The third that which may profit as vertue and vertuous actions and a vertuous man and a friend and the Gods and good Demons Thus the second signification includeth the first and the third both the first and second In like manner of Ills there are three kinds First that from which hurt originally proceedeth as vice Secondly that by which hurt commeth as vicious actions Lastly and most largely whatsoever is able â—o hurt Again of Goods some are in the Soul as vertue and vertuous actions some without the Soul as a true friend a good Country and the like some neither within nor without the soul as good and vertuous men In like manner of Ills some are within the Soul as vices and vicious actions some without the Soul as imprudent friends enemies and the like some neither within nor without the Soul as wicked men and all that participate of vice Of goods within the Soul some are habits some affections some neither habits nor affections The vertues themselves are affections their studies habits nor affections their acts neither habits nor affections In like manner of Ills some are affections as vices some habits only as infirmities of minde and the like some neither habits nor affections as vicious actions Again of Goods some are finall some efficient some both finall and efficient A friend and the benefits arising from him are efficient goods Fortitude magnanimity liberty delectation joy tranquillity and all vertuous actions are finall goods Both efficient and finall as all vertues as they perfect felicity they are efficient as they constitute it as parts thereof finall In like manner of Ills some are finall some efficient some both A friend and the dammages incurred by him are efficient Fear basenesse servitude stupidity frowardnesse griefe and all vicious actions are finall participant of are vices as they procure misfortune they are efficient as they constitute it as parts thereof finall Again of goods some are
may even be observed in those Praeter-office is an action which reason requireth that we do not as to neglect our Parents to contemn our Brethren to disagree with our Friends to despise our Country and the like Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth as the taking up of a straw Of Offices some are perfect called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rectitudes actions done according to vertue as to do wisely to do justly Others not-rectitudes actions which have not a perfect office but a mediate as to marry to go an Embassy to discourse and the like Of rectitudes some are in things requisite others not Of the first kinde are to be wise temperate and the like of the second those which are not requisite to the being such In like manner are praeter-offices divided Again of Offices some are ordinary as to have a care of our selves of our limbs and the like Some extraordinary as to maim our selves throw away our goods Accordingly is it of praeter-offices Again of Oâ—fices some are continuall as to live vertuously some intermassiâ—e as to question answer walk and the like Accordingly it is of praeter-oâ—fices Office is a mean thing placed neither amongst the good nor their contraries for there is something in this approvable so as a right reason may be given for it as done approvably That which is so done is office And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices there is somthing which may be of use it is not to be taken away Again it is manifest that a wise man doth something in these mean things he therefore when he doth it judgeth that it is his office so to do but a wiseman is never deceived in judgment therefore there is an office in mean things Again we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done or a Rectitude but that is a perfect office therefore there is an inchoat office as if it be a Rectitude justly to restore a depositum to restore a depositum must be a simple restitution without the additionall terme is an office And since it is not to be doubted but that in mean things some are to be performed others rejected whatsoever is done in that manner is comprehended in common office whence it is manifest that all men by nature lovâ—ng themselves as well the foolish as the wise will take those things which are according to nature and reject the contrary This is therefore one common office of the wise and unwise conversant in mean things All offices proceeding from these it is justly said that to these are referred all our thoughts even the forsaking of life or continuing in it In whom most things are according to nature the office of that person is to remain in life in whom there are or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature his office is to forsake life although he be happy and of a fool to conâ—tinue in life although he be miserable for that good and that â—ll as we have often said are things that follow afterwards The first principles of naturall appetite fall under the judgement and election of a wise man and is as it were the matter subjected to wisdome Thus the reason of continuing in life or forsaking it is to be measured by all those things we mentioned For neither are they who enjoy vertue obliged to continue in life nor they who live without vertue to die and it is often the office of a wise man to part with his life even when he is most happy if it may be done opportunely which is to live conveniently to nature This they hold that to live happily depends on opportunity for wisdome commandeth that a wise man if it be required should part with his life Wherefore vice not having power to bring a cause of voluntary death it is manifest that the office even of fooles who are likewise wretched is to continue in life if they are in the greater part of those things which we hold to be according to nature And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided We say not therefore without cause that they who enjoy most naturalls should continue in life Hitherto it appertaines to know that the love of Parents towards their Children is the effect of nature from which beginning we may track all mankinde as proceeding from thence First by the figure and parts of the body which declare that nature carefully provided for procreation Neither can these two agree that nature orders procreation and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young me thinks we hear the very voice of nature her selfe Wherefore as it is manifest that we abhor pain by nature so it is likewise apparent that we aâ—e drâ—ven by nature to love those we have begotten Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men amongst men that it behooveth a man not to seem alienate from man for this very reason because he is man For as among the parts of the body some are made only for themselves as the eyes and ears others assist towards the use of the other parts as the thighes and hands so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves yet that â—hell fish which is called patula prima and the pinnoteres so named from keeping its shell which shutteth it selfe up so close as if it taught others to look to themselves as also Ants Bees Storks do something for the sake of others Much neerer is the conjunction of mankinde so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions Counsells Cities Whatsoever is produced upon the earth is created for the use of man but men are generated for men that they may profit one another In this we ought to follow nature our leader and to bring forth common benefit to the publick by mutuall offices by giving by receiving by arts by endeavours and by faculties to unite the society of man with man The world is governed by the power of God it is as it were a common City of men and Gods and each of us is a part of the world whence it followeth by nature that we should prefer the common benefit before our own For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular so a good and wise man conformable to Law not ignorant of civill office taketh more care for the benefit of the generall then of any particular or of his own Nor is he who betraies his Country more to be condemned then he who deserts the common benefit or safety Whence it followeth that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common-wealth and teacheth us that our Country is dearer to us then our selves And because that speech is esteemed
manner The Univâ—rse being set on fire the midle part thereof first setled downwards then the next parts by little and little were quenched Thus the Universe being wet the extream fire the midle part opposing it sprang upward and began the costitution of the World and the revolution of this constitution shall never end For as the parts of every thing are at certain times produced of Seed so the parts of the Universe amongst which are living Creatures and Plants are produced in their seasons and as some reasons of the parts are mixed together in the seed which being composed are again dissolved so of one are all things made and again of one is all compounded by an equall and perpâ—tuall revolution The World is One of the same corporeall substance and of a Sphaericall figure for this is of all figures most apt for motion Thus Zeno Chrysippus Pâ—ssidonius and others The World is feared in an infinite incorporeall vacuity which is beyond it circumfused about it into which the world shall be dissolved by conflagration The World is finite the vacuity infinite yet Pâ—ssidonius saith it is no more then will suffice for the resolution of the World when it shall pâ—rish By this argument they consute the motion of Atomes downward introduced by Epicure for in that which is infinite there are no locall differences of high or low The world is not heavy because the whole fabrick thereof consisteth of heavy and light Elements and being placed in the midst whither such bodies tend it keepeth its place In the World there is no vacuity but it is compleatly one for that necessitates a conspiration and harmony betwixt Celestialls and Terrestrialls The World only is self-sufficient because it alone hath all in it self whereof it standeth in no need Of it self it is nourished and augmented whereas the parts are transmuted and converted into one another The World is a perfect body the parts of the World are not perfect because they are respective to the whole and not of themselves The Universe is by Nature apt to move it self in all parts to contain preserve and not break dissolve and burn it self the Universe sending and moving the same point and the parts thereof having the same motion from the Nature of the body Like it is that this first motion is naturally proper to all Bodies namely to encline towards the midst of the World considering the World moveth so in regard of it self and the parts likewise in that they are parts of the whole The World is a living Creature rationall animate and intellectuall so Chrysippus Apollodorus and Pâ—ssidonius and hath an animate sensible essence For a living Creature is more excellent then that which is not a living Creature but nothing is more excellent then the World therefore the World is a living Creature That it is animate is manifest from our Soul which is a piece therof taken out of it but Boethius denies that the world is a living Creature The mind or Providence passeth through every part thereof as the Soul doth in us but in some parts more in others lesse through some permeating as a habit as in the bones and Nerves through some as a mind as through the principall Hegemonick part In like manner the whole World is an animate rationall Creature the Hegemonicall part thereof is the Aether as Antipater the Tyrian in his eighth Book of the World But Chrysippus in his first of Providence and Pâ—ssidonius of the Gods affirm that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World Cleanthes the Sunne But Chrysippus in the same Book differing from what he said before affirmeth it to be the purest part of the Aether which they call the first God sensibly because it passeth through all in the air and through all living Creatures and Plants but through the Earth as a habit The World according to the greater part of Stâ—iâ—ks is corrupâ—ible for it is generated in the same manner as things comprehensible by sense Again if the parts thereof be corruptible the whole is also corruptible but the parts of the World are corruptible for they are dayly changed into one another therefore the whole it selfe is corruptible And again if any thing admit any change into the worse it is corruptible but the World doth for it admitteth exâ—iccation and inundation therefore c. The World shall perish by fire caused by the power of fire which is in all things which after a long time consuming all the moisture shall resolve all things into it self The Moon Stars and Sun saith Cleanthes shall perish but God shall assimilate all things to himself and resolve all into himself This opinion of the generall conflagration of the World was held by the first and most antient of this Sect Zeno Cleanthes and Chrysippus This fire is the Seed of the World after the conflagration it diffuseth it self even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World Afterwards by order of the same reason which made the World it shall withdraw and contract itself towards the generation of a new World yet not be quite extinguished but so as that some portion thereof remain for as much as it is the cause of motion But Boethius Pâ—ssidonius and Panaetius deny this conflagration of the World conceiving rather that the VVorld is eternall to whom likewise Diogenes the Babylonian assents CHAP. VI. Of Elements GOd having converted as we said all matter into moisture and prepared it for the generation of future things in the next place produced the foure Elements Fire VVater Air and Earth Of these discourseth Zeno in his Book of the Universe and Chrysippus in his first of Physicks and Archedemus of Elements Element is that of which generated things are first made and into which they are resolved The foure Elements are matter or substance endued with quality Fire is hot water moist Aire cold Earth dry yet not so but that in Aire tâ—ere is part of the same quality for in the highest it is fire which is called Aether in which is generated the first sphear of Planets next Air then Water the basis of all Earth being placed in the midst of all c Of the four Elements two are light Fire and Air the other two Earth and water heavy which properly tend to the centre but the centre it self is no way heavy CHAP. VII Of Fire THE first Element is that of Fire which as all bodies tend to the middle enclineth as much as the lightnesse of its Nature permits to the centre of the world by a circular motion round about it There are according to Zeno two kinds of fire one artificiall requisite to the use of life which converteth nutriment into it self the other inartificiall so Cicero renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which all things grow and are preserved for whatsoever is nourished and groweth compriseth within it self the
power of heat This fire is diffused through all the parts of the World and they are all sustained by it That it is in the Earth appeareth by Seeds and Roots which spring up and grow by the temperament of this heat That it is in Water appeareth forasmuch as Water is susceptible of greater cold as by freezing It is consequently in air also that being a vapour extracted from Water and supply'd by motion of the heat which is in the Water But primarily and originally it is in the Element of fire a Nature absolutely hot which dispenseth salutary vitall heat to all other things This is Nature saith Zeno and the Soul Of fire consist the Sun Moon and Starrs CHAP. VIII Of the Starres IN the aether are generated the Starrs of the noblest and purest part thereof without admixtion of any other Nature wholly hot and pellucid animate creatures indued with sense and Intellect Possidonius defineth a Star a divine body consisting of sethericall fire splendid and fiery never resting but alwaies moving circularly That the Starrs are wholly fiery Cleanthes proveth by the testimony of two senses touch and sight For the Lustre of the Sun is brighter then of any fire seeing that it shines so far and wide to so vast a world and such is its touch that it not onely warmeth but oftentimes burneth neither of which it would do if it were not fiery Now saith he the Sun being fiery is either like that fire which is requisite to the use of life or unto that which is contained in the bodies of living creatures but this our fire which the use of life requireth is a consumer of all things disturbeth and dispatcheth all things On the contrary the other is corporeall vitall and salutary it conserveth all things it nourisheth enâ—reaseth sustaineth and affecteth with sense therefore saith he there 's no question to which of these fires the Sun is like for he causeth all things to flourish and sprout up according to their severall kinds Wherefore the fire of the Sun being like those fires which are in the bodies of living creatures the Sun must be a living creature also and so must be likewise the rest of the Starres in the celestiall fire which is called Aether or Heaven For seeing that of living creatures one kinde is generated in the earth other kinds in the water others in the aire it were absurd to think that in that part which is most apt for generation of living creatures no living creature is generated The Starrs possesse the Aether which being most rare and in perpetuall agitation and vigour it is necessary the living creature that is generated in it be endued with most acute sense quickest mobility The starrs therefore have sense and intelligence whence it followeth that they are to be reputed Gods For we say that they who live in the purest aire are much more acute and understanding then those who live in a thick climate The diet likewise is thought to conduce not a little to the sharpening of the understanding Whence it is probable the starrs are endued with most excellent understanding forasmuch as they dwell in the aetheriall part of the world and are nourished with exhalations from the Sea and Earth extenuated by a long distance The sense and intellect of the Starrs is chiefly manifest from their order and constancy for nothing can be moved by proportion and number without providence in which nothing is temerarious nothing various nothing casuall But the order of Starrs and constancy throughout all eternity cometh neither from Nature for that is void of Reason nor from Fortune which affecteth variety and disalloweth constancy Again all things are moved either naturally or violently or voluntarily Those which move naturally are carried either by their weight downward or by their lightnesse upwards neither of which is proper to the Starres for their motion is circular Neither can it be said that they are moved violently against their own nature for what power can be greater it remaineth therefore that their motion be voluntary No fire can subsist without some aliment the starres therefore are nourished by the vapours of the earth Of Starrs according to Câ—rysippus there are two sorts both which are by nature divine animate and providentiall the fixed and the Erratick The multitude of the fixed is incomprehensible the Erratick are lower then the fixed The fixed are all ranked in one superficies as is manifest to the sight the erratick in severall The sphear of fixed starrs includeth that of the erratick The highest of the erratick and next to the fixed starres is the sphear of Saâ—urn next that of Iupiter after which that of Mars then that of Mercury then that of Venus then that of the Sun and lastly that of the Moon which being neerest the air seemeth therefore aeriall and hath greatest influence upon terrestriall bodies Saturn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 finisheth his course in almost thirty years Iupiter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in twelve Mars 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in twenty foure Months wanting six daies Mercury 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a year Venus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lowest of the five Planets in a year The Sun and the Moon are properly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Starrs but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differ for every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the contrary The rising of a star Chrysippus defineth its advancement above the earth and the setting thereof its occultation under the earth The same starrs at the same time rise to some and set to others The apparition of a star 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is its rising together with the Sun and the setting thereof is its setting with the Sun for setting is taken two waies in opposition to rising and in opposition to apparition As the apparition of the Dogâ— star is its rising together with the Sun and its setting is its occultation under the earth together with the Sun The same is said of the Pleiades CHAP. IX Of the Sun NExt Venus the lowest Planet is the Sun the chiefe of all that consist of this aetheriall fire The Sun is defined by Cleanthes and Chrysippus an intellectuall Taper gather'd and kindled from the vapours of the Sea Possidonius defineth the Sun a most pure fire greater then the earth of a sphaericall figure as Cleanthes also affirmes answerable to that of the world That the Sun is fiery is manifest in that it hath all the operations of fire and forasmuch as he is fire it followeth that hee must be nourished The Sun is nourished by exhalations from the great Ocean According to the expansion of this subjected aliment saith Cleanthes in his motion from Tropick to Tropick He moveth in a spirall line from the Aequinoctiall towards the North and towards the South Zeno saith he hath two
motions one with the World from East to VVest the other contrary through the Signes That the Sun is greater then the Earth appeareth in that it enlightneth not only all the Earth but Heaven also Again the shadow of the Earth being conicall argues the Sun to be greater then the Earth Again it is visible every where by reason of its magnitude The Sun is Eclipsed by interposition of the Moon betwixt us and that part of the Sun which is toward us as Zeno in his book of the Universe For meeting the Sun and coming under him she seemeth to darken his light and afterwards to disclose it again as will appear in a basin of water CHAP. X. of the Moon IN the lowest part of the aether is the Moon The Moon according to Zeno is an intellectuall wise igneous Star consisting of artificiall fire Cleanthes saith she is of a fiery substance and 〈◊〉 a dirty figure Lipsius for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dirty substitutes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is if of the same figure as a nat or cap. But perhaps there needs no alteration for they affirmed as she is nearer to the Earth then the Sun so is she of a more terrene Nature Possidonius and most of the Stoicks affirm she is mixt of fire and air by reason of which diversity of substance she is not subject to corruption To this mixtion of air in her composition they impute likewise those spots which are seen in her face She is greater then the Earth as well as the Sun is and Spnaericall as the Sun yet apeareth in various figures the full-Moon first quarter New-Moon last quarter Chrysippus saith she is a fire collected after the Sun from the exhalation of fresh Waters for which cause she is likewise nourished by them as Possidonius also asserteth Her motion is spiral Zeno saith she hath two motions as the one with the World from East to West the other contrary through the signes The period of her course is called a Mont◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is likewise that part of the Moon which appeareth to us for one halfe of her is alwaies turned towards us The Moon is Eclipsed when she falleth into the shadow of the earth For although every month she is opposite to the Sun yet she is then only eclipsed when she is fullest by reason of the obliquity of her course whereby her latitude is varied towards the north and south When therefore she happens to be neer the Ecliptick and opposite to the Sun she is eclipsed which happens as Possidonius saith in Libra and Scorpio and in Aries and Taurus Thus Laertius but Possidonius seemes to have been ignorant of or not to have considered the motion of the Nodes of the Moon commonly called Caput Cauda draconis whereby the restitution or period of Eclipses is made in ninteen yeeres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which was the ground of Meton's period and of the Cycle of the Moon in the Julian Calender CHAP. XI Of Aire NExt the sphear of the Moon saith Chrysippus is the element of Aires interposed betwixt the Sea and Heaven sphericall in figure consecrated by the name of Iuno Sister and Wife of Iupiter who is the Aether betwixt these there is a neer conjunction The Aire is divided into three regions the highest the middle and the lowest The highest region is the hottest and dryest and rarest by reason of the vicinity of the eternall fires The lowest and neerest to the earth is thick and caliginous because it receiveth terrene exhalations The middle region is more temperate then the higher and lower as to siccity and rarity but colder then both This wherein the clouds and winds are generated is according to Possidonius forty furlongs above the earth Next to it is the pure and liquid aire of untroubled light From the turbulent part to the Moon is twenty hundred thousand furlongs To the aire is attributed the primitive cold As concerning things in the Aire Winter is the rigour of the aire next above the earth occasion'd by the remotenesse of the Sun and is the coldest of the seasons of the year Spring is the season succeeding Winter preceding Summer and is a good temperature of the air occasion'd by approach of the Sun Summer is that season of the year when the aire above the earth is warmed by the Suns accesse towards the north Autumne that season of the year which followeth Summer and precedeth Winter is made by the return of the Sun from us Winter commeth when the aire is predominant in thicknesse and is forced upward Summer when the fire is predominant and driven downward Winde is a fluxion of the aire having severall names from the variety of places as for example That which bloweth from the darknesse of the night and Sun-setting is called Zephyrus from the East and Sun-rising Apeliotes from the North Boreas from the South Lybs It is occasion'd by the Sun's extenuation of the vapours The Rainbow is a reflection of the Sun's beams from a humid cloude or as Possidonius an apparition of part of the Sun or Moon in a cloud dewy concave and continuous to the phantasy as in a looking-glasse the representation of a Circle Comets are fires subsisting of thick air carried up to the aetheriall place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an accension of suddain fire swiftly carried through the air appearing length-waies Rain is a conversion of clouds into water when either from the Earth or from the Sea by the power of the Sun the humour is drawn upwards ineffectually Frost is congealed rain Hail is a concrete cloud dispersed by the winde Snow is humidity from a concrete cloud according to Possidonius Lightning is an accension of clouds which are driven by the winds upon one another and broken according to Zeno. Thunder is a noise occasion'd by the collision of clouds Thunderbolt is a strong inflammation rushing upon the earth with great violence when the clouds by impulsion of the winds are broken against one another Some define it a conversion of fiery inflamed aire violently rushing down Typho is a violent Thunder thrust down with a great force of winde or a smoaking winde which rusheth down upon the breaking of the cloud Prester is a cloud inclosed with fire by winde in the concavities of the earth There are many kinds thereof Earthquakes Câ—asma's and the like CHAP. XII Of Water and Earth THat part of the world saith Chrysippus which is the most solid support of nature as bones are in a living creature is called the earth About this the water is evenly diffused The earth hath some uneven parts arising out of the water called Islands or if of large extent Continents from the ignorance of man who knowes not that even those are Islands in respect of
sicknesse For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature and Parent of all good things but he having generated many great things most apt and usefull other things also incommodious to those which he made were aggenerated together with them coherent to them made not by Nature but certain necessary consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As saith he when Nature framed the bodies of Men more subtle reason the benefit of the World would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence that the head would be too weakly defended and broken with the least blow Sicknesses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred In like manner saith he whilst Vertue is begotten in Man by the counsell of Nature vices like wise are begotten by contrary affinity CHAP. XVIII Of Nature NExt Iupiter Possidonius placeth Nature By Nature they somtimes understand that which containeth the World somtimes that which produceth things upon Earth both which as we said is to be understood of God For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World hath perfect sence and reason which power is the Soul of the World the mind and divine Wisdom Thus under the terme of Nature they comprehend both God and the World affirming that the one cannot be without the other as if Nature were God permeating through the World God the mind of the World the World the body of God This Chrysippus calleth common-Common-Nature in distinction from particular Nature Nature is defined by Zeno an artificial fire proceeding in the way of generation which is the fiery spirit the Artist of formes by others a habit receiving motion from it self according to prolifick reason and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it in certain definite times producing all things from which it self is distinct by Nature proposing to it self these two ends Utility and Pleasure as is manifest from the porduction of man CHAP. XIX Of Fate THe third from Iupiter according to Possidonius is Fate for Iupiter is first next Nature then Fate They call Fate a concatenation of Causes that is an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed Fate is a cause depending on Laws and ordering by Laws or a reason by which the World is ordered Fate is according to Zeno the motive power of matter disposing so and so not much diftering from Nature and Providence Panaetius assirmeth Fate to be God Chrysippus desineth Fate a spirituall power governing the World orderly or a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things it self rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence of which it is adapted and connected or as Chrysippus again in his Book of Definitions hath it The reason of the World or Law of all things in the World governed by Providence or the reason why things past have been the present are the future shall be For Reason he useth Truth Cause Nature Necessity and other termes as attributed to the same thing in different respects Fate from the severall distributions thereof is called Clotho Lachesis and Atropos Lachesis as it dispenseth to every one as it were by lot Atropos as it is an immutable dispensation from all eternity Clotho in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads Necessity is a cause invincible most violent and inforcing all things Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane reason For some things come by Necessity others by Fate some by deliberate Counsel others by Fortune some by Casualty But Fate being a connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us That all things are done by Fate is asserted by Zeno in his Book of Fate and Possidonius in his second Book of Fate and Boethus in his 11th of Fate Which Chrysippus proves thus If there is any motion without a cause then every axiom is not either true or false for that which hath not efficient causes will be neither true nor false but every axiom is either true or false therefore there is no motion without a cause And if so then all things that are done are done by precedent causes and if so all things are done by Fate That all axioms are either true or false Cicero saith he labour'd much to prove whereby he takes away Possibles indeterminates and other distinctions of the Academicks of which see Alcinous Chap. 26. In answer to the sluggish reason if it be your fate to die of this sicknesse you shall die whether you have a Physician or no and if it be your fate to recover you shall recover whether you have a Physitian or not Chrysippus saith that in things some are simple some conjunct Simple is thus Socrates shall die on such a day for whether he do any thing or not it is appointed he should die on such a day But if it be destin'd thus Laius shall have a son Oedipus it cannot be said whether he accompany with a woman or not for it is a conjunct thing and confatall as he termes it because it is destin'd that Laius shall lie with his wife and that he shall get Oedipus of her As if we should say Milo shall wrastle at the Olympick Games and another should infer then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no he were mistaken for that he shall wrastle is a conjunct thing because there is no wrastling without an adversary Thus are refelled all sophismes of this kinde you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician than that you shall recover They are confatall Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers one that all things are so done by Fate that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie as Democritus Heraclitus Empedocles and Aristotle held the other that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate Chrysippus as an honourable Arbitratour took the middle way betwixt these but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie The Antients who held all things to be done by Fate said it was by a violence and necessitie those who were of the contrary opinion denyed that Fate had any thing to do with our assent and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents They argued thus If all things are done by Fate all things are done by an antecedent cause and if appetite then likewise those things which follow appetite therefore assents also But if the cause of appetite is not in us neither is the appetite it selfe in our power and if so neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power whence it followeth that neither praise can be
to Zeno and Philomathes suspected to be spurious 1. The third order Of coincident reasons to Athenades 1. spurious Coincident reasons as to the medium 3. spurious Of Aminius's disjunctions 1. The fourth Order Of Hypotheses to Meleager 3. Hypothetick reasons in Law to Meleager 1. Hypothetick Reasons for introduction 2. Hypothetick reasons of Theorems 2. Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2. Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. Spurious Of expositions to Leodamas 1. The fift order Of introduction to the lying reason to Aristocreon 1. Lying reasons to the Introduction 1. Of the lying reason to Aristocreon 6. The sixt order Against those who think true and false are one 1. Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by distinction 2 Demonstration that infinites are not to be divided 1. Upon that which hath been said against the division of infinites to Pasylus 3. Solutions according to the Antients to Dioscorides 1. Of the solution of the lying reason to Aristocreon 3. Solution of Hedyllus ' s Hypotheticks to Aristocreon and Apollas The seventh Order Against those who say the lying reason hath false sumptions 1. Of the negative to Aristocreon 2. Negative Reasons to Gymnasias 1. Of the diminutive reason to Stesagoras 2. Of opinionative and quiescent reasons to Onetor 2. Of the veiled reason to Aristobulus 2. Of the occult reason to Athenades 1. The eighth Order Of the Nullity to Menecrates 8. Of reasons consisting of indefinite and definite to Pasylus 2. Of the Nullity to Epicrates 1. The ninth Order Of Sophismes to Heraclides and Pollis 2. Of insoluble dialectick reasons to Dioscorides 5. Against Arcesilaus's method to Sphaerus 1. The tenth order Against Custom to Metrodorus 6. Of the Logicall place besides these four differences there are dispersed not containing in the body of Logical Questions 39. Of the Ethick Place for direction of morall notions the First Order Description of speech to Theoporus 1. Morall Theses 1. Probable sumptions for Doctrines to Philomathes 3. Definitions of civill person to Metrodorus 2. Definitions of wicked persons to Metrodorus 2. Definitions of mean persons to Metrodorus 2. Generall Definitions to Metrodorus 7. Definitions of other arts to Metrodorus 2. The second Order Of things like to Aristocles 3. Of Definitions to Metrodorus 7. The third Order Of things not rightly objected against Definitions to Laodamas 7. Probables for Definitions to Dioscorides Of Species and Genus to Gorgippides 2. Of Divisions 1. Of Contraries to Dionysius 2. Probables for Divisions genus's and species Of Contraries 1. The fourth Order Of Etymologicks to Diocles 6 Etymologicks to Diocles 4. The fift Order Of Proverbs to Zenodotus 2. Of Poems to Philomathes 1. How Poems must be heard 2. Against Criticks to Diodorus 1. Of the morall place of common speeches according to Arts and Vertue The first Order Against Rescriptions to Timonax 1. How we think and speak singulars 1. Of notions to Laodamas 2. Of Suspition to Pythonax 2. Demonstrations that a wise man doth not opinionate 1. Of Comprehension and Science and ignorance 4. Of Speech 2. Of the use of Speech to Leptines The second Order That the Antients approved Dialectick with Demonstration to Zeno 2. Of Dialectick to Aristocreon 4. Upon the objections against Dialectick 3. Of Rhetorick to Dioscorides 4. The third Order Of habitude to Cleon 3. Of art and sloth to Aristocreon 4. Of the difference of Vertues to Diodorus What vertues are 1. Of vertues to Pollis Of the morall place concerning Good and Ill the first Order Of Honesty and pleasure to Aristocreon 10. Demonstration that Pleasure is not the chief end 4. Demonstration that pleasure is not good 4 Of those which are said******** Thus concludes the seventh Book of Laertius and who seeth not that the last of these titles is defective and moreover that the rest of the Orders concerning this place of Good and Ill whereof this is but the first are wanting Doubtlesse the end of this book is imperfect and wanteth if not the lives of any Stoicall Philosophers who succeeded Chrysippus whereof he mentions Zeno and others else where yet at least a considerable part of his Catalogue containing the rest of his Ethick writings and all his Physick many of which are elsewhere cited even by Laertius himself which as the learned Casauâ—on had observed he would not have ascribed to Laertius's neglect that Chrysippus's book of Lawes is not mentioned Of his Ethick writings besides those here named were these Of Laws Introduction to the consideration of things good or ill Of Honest. Of Consent Of things expetible in themselves Of things not expetible in themselves Of Politick Of ends Of Passions Of Ethick questions Of lives whereof Plutarch cites the 4th book That Zeno used names properly Of Iustice the first book cited by Laâ—rtius Of Life and Transaction Of Offices Demonstration of Iustice. Protrepticks Of the End Of a Common-wealth Of the office of a Iudge Of Good Of Habits To Physick belong these Physicks Of the Soul the 12th book cited by Laertius Of Providence the first book cited Of the Gods Of Fate Of Divination Of the Philosophy of the Antients In calumniation of the Senses Of Jupiter Of Nature Physicall Theses Of Substance Of Motion Physicall questions the third book cited Of Vacuity Epistles The number of all his writings according to Laertius was 705. He wrote so much that he had often occasion to treat upon the same subject and setting down whatsoever came into his minde he often corrected and enlarged it by the testimonies of others whence having in one book inserted all Euripides's Medea one having the book in his hand answer'd another that asked him what book it was It is Chrysippus's Medea And Apollodorus the Athenian in his collection of Doctrines asserting that Epicurus had written many books upon his own strength without using the testimonies of others and that he therein far exceeded Chrysippus addes these words For if a man should take out of Chrysippus's writings all that belongs to other men he would leave the paper blank Seneca gives this censure of him He is most subtle and acute penetrating into the depth of truth He speaks to the thing that is to be done and useth no more words then are necessary to the understanding thereof but addes that his acutenesse being too fine is many times blunted and retorted upon it selfe even when he seemes to have done something he only pricks not pierceth Some there are who inveigh against him as one that wrote many obscene things not sit to be spoken as in his Commentary of the antient Physiologists what he writes concerning Iupiter and Iuno is obscenely feigned delivering that in 600 Paragraphs which the most impudent person would not have committed to writing for say they he hath related the story most unhandsomly
he is To things that are that which is not is not opposed as contrary for it neither existeth nor is participant of any essence nor can be understood So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words or comprehend it by thought he is deceived because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant Yet that which is not as far as it is spoken is not a pure negation of that which is but implyeth a relation to another which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not it cannot be distinguished from other things but thus as many kinds as they are of Ens so many are there of Non-Ens because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philosophy Some things perhaps are said orderly others dispersedly or confusedly yet is all so laid down that by those which we have delivered the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated After so serious a Discourse it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI The first PART Sect. I. IT is a principle of the Platonists That every created thing hath a threefold being Causal Formal Participated In the Sun there is no heat that being but an elementary quality not of Celestiall nature yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear Fire is hot by nature and its proper form Wood is not hot of its self yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun its Formall in the Fire it s Participated in the Fuel The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal and therefore Platonists assert That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being That in God is nothing but from him all things That Intellect is not in him but that he is the original spring of every Intellect Such is Plotinus's meaning when he affirms God neither understands nor knows that is to say after a formall way As Dionysius Areopagita God is neither an Intellectuall nor Intelligent nature but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge Sect. II. PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees The first comprehends the corporeall and visible as Heaven Elements and all compounded of them The last the invisible incorporeal absolutely free from bodies which properly are called Intellectual by Divines Angelicall Natures Betwixt these is a middle nature which though incorporeall invisible immortall yet moveth bodies as being obliged to that Office called the rationall Soul inferiour to Angells superiour to Bodies subject to those regent of these Above which is God himselfe author and principle of every Creature in whom Divinity hath a casuall being from whom proceeding to Angells it hath a formall being and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre below which no nature can assume the Title of Divine Sect. III. THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed who is but one the principle and cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists Peripateticks and our Divines About the second viz. The Angelick and Intellectuall Platonists disagree Some as Proclus Hermias Syrianus and many others betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures part of these they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligible part intellectuall which termes Plato sometimes confoundeth as in his Phaedo Plotinus Porphyrius and generally the most refined Platonists betwixt God and the Soul of the World assigne only one Creature which they call the Son of God because immediately produced by him The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita and Christian Divines who assert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite The second is the more Philosophick best suiting with Aristotle and Plato whose sense we only purpose to expresse and therefore will decline the first path though that only be the right to pursue the latter Sect. IV. VVE therefore according to the opinion of Plotinus confirmed not only by the best Platonists but even by Aristotle and all the Arabians especially Avicenna affirm That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature as perfect as is possible for a created being beyond which he produced nothing for of the most perfect cause the effect must be most perfect and the most perfect can be but one for of two or more it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest otherwise they would not be two but the same This reason for our opinion I rather choose then that which Avicen alledges founded upon this principle That from one cause as one can proceed but one effect We conclude therefore that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God for of all other effects issuing from this minde and all other second causes God is only the mediate efficient This by Plato Hermes and Zoroaster is called the Daughter of God the Minde Wisdome Divine Reason by some interpreted the Word not meaning with our Divines the Son of God he not being a creature but one essence coequall with the Creator Sect. V. ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar believing it more perfect then that which is made after it and this manner of Being Ideal or Intelligible the other Materiall and Sensible So that when a Man builds a house they affirm there are two one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind the other sensible which he makes in Stone Wood or the like expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd to this Dante alludes â—None any work can frame Unless himself become the same Hereupon they say though God produced only one creature yet he produced all because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all and that in their most perfect being that is the Ideal for which reason they call this Mind the Intelligible World Sect. VI. AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate and of those the rational then the irrationall we must grant this World hath a Soul perfect above all others This is the first rationall Soul which though incorporeall and immateriall is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd as was the mind from
God Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall its soul being such and not capable of being without a body that also must be from eternity as likewise the motion of the Heavens because the Soul cannot be without moving Sect. VII THe antient Ethnick Theologians who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries expresse these three natures by other names Coelum they call God himself he produc'd the first Mind Saturn Saturn the Soul of the World Iupiter Coelum imples Priority and excellence as in the Firmament the first Heaven Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature wholly imploy'd in contemplation Iupiter active life consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets Saturn makes Men Contemplative Iupiter Imperious The Speculative busied about things above them the Practick beneath them Sect. VIII WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds In God we understand first his Excellence which as Cause he hath above all his effects for this he is called Coelus Secondly the production of those effects which denotes conversion towards inferiours in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter but with an addition Optimus Maximus The first Angelick nature hath more names as more diversity Every creature consists of Power and Act the first Plato in Philebo calls Infinite the second Finite all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first all perfections from the latter Her operations are threefold About Superiours the contemplation of God about the knowledge of herself about inferiours the production and care of this sensible World these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things but in either respect is firm within her self In the two first because contemplative she is called Saturn in the third Iupiter a name principally applyed to her power as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things For the same reason is the soul of the World as she contemplates her self or superiours termed Saturn as she is imployed in ordering worldly things Iupiter and since the government of the World belongs properly to her the contemplation to the Mind therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter the other Saturn Sect. IX THis World therefore as all other creatures consisteth of a Soul and Body the Body is all that we behold compounded of the four Elements These have their casuall being in the Heavens which consist not of them as sublunary things for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall the Elements in themselves being simple by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth Their participate and imperfect under the Earth evident in the Fire Air and Water experience daily finds there evinc'd by naturall Philosophers to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers Acheron Cocytus Styx and Phlegeton We may divide the body of the World into three parts Celestiall Mundane Infernall The ground why the Poets â—eign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons Iupiter Neptune and Pluto implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World which as long as it remains under Saturn that is in its Ideal Intellectual being is one and undivided and so more firm and potent but falling into the hands of his Sons that is chang'd to this material Being and by them divided into three parts according to the triple existence of bodies is more infirm and lesse potent degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate The first part the heavenly they attribute to Iupiter the last and lowest to Pluto the middle to Neptune And because in this principality is all generation and corruption the Theologians express it by the Ocean ebbing or flowing continually by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls distinctly informing these three parts the World her self being one can have but one Soul which as it animates the subterraneall parts is called Pluto the sublunary Neptune the celestiall Iupiter Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other This opinion though only my owâ—â— I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians Sect. X. NExt that of the World Platonists assign many other rational souls The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres which according to their opinion exceeded not that number consisting of the seven Planets and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets Calliope the universall soul of the World is first the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres Sect. XI PLato asserts That the Author of the World made the mundane and all other rationall souls in one Cup and of the same Elements the universall soul being most perfect ours least whose parts we may observe by this division Man the chain that ties the World together is placed in the midst and as all mediums participate of their extreams his parts correspond with the whole World thence called Microcosmus In the World is first Corporeall Nature eternall in the Heavens corruptible in the Elements and their compounds as Stones Mettals c. Then Plants The third degree is of Beasts The fourth rationall souls The fifth Angelicall minds Above these is God their origine In man are likewise two bodies one eternall the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste immediately inform'd by the rational soul The other corruptible subject to sight consisting of the Elements Then the vegetative faculty by which generated and nourished The third part is Sensitive and motive The fourth Rational by the Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul yet above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick the most excellent part whereof we call the Souls Union immediately joyning it to God in a manner resembling him as in the other Angels Beasts and Plants About thâ—se Platonists differ Proâ—lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also Numenius and Plotinus the whole Soul Sect. XII IDeas have their casuall being in God their formall in the first Minde their participated in the rationall Soul In God they are not but produced by him in the Angelick nature through this communicated to the Soul by whom illuminated when she reflects on her intellectuall parts she receives the true formes of things Ideas Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall at once contemplating and governing Bodies ascend to them they descend not Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation borrowing science from sence to this wholly enclin'd full of errors Their only means of release from this bondage is the amatory life which by sensible beauties exciting in the soul a remembrance