a Conclusion of a Syllogism that is they can be concluded or admit of Proof Wherefore since 't is a contradiction to say that the Prime Verities can admit Proof their Terms must be farthest from having any Middle Term coming between them that is imaginable that is must be of the self-same notion and so they must be Identical Propositions The former of these Discourses was put down by me Letter of Thanks p. 10 11 12. which one would think it became a Logician to speak to But my Adversary is of another metal not the very same but near akin to aes sonans aut cymbalum tinniens He never meddles willingly with Premisses or Proofs but denies the Conclusion stoutly never acknowledging what was said in its behalf and tinkles a little Rhetorick against it which done who would think it immediately as with some Charm the Terms unconnect of themselves and miraculously fly asunder and though before it look'd like good honest Reason yet by his giving it a Disguise instead of a Confute 't is turn'd perfect Nonsence But to return to our Argument § 5. Logick tells us moreover that whatever accidental considerations may enhance Opposition 't is agreed by all that a Contradiction is formally and intrinsecally the greatest or First of Falshoods also that a Contradiction is An affirming and denying the same of the same according to all the same respects wherefore the very First Principles being the First of Truths ought to be diametrically opposite to Those that is an Affirming or denying the same of the same according to all the same respects which is impossible to be exprest but by an Identical Proposition § 6. Add that since Contradiction is Faulty and all Fault is a Privation of the opposite Good which it violates it follows that a Contradiction were innocent did it not violate some opposite Truth Since then the Light of Nature teaches every Reflecter that 't is impossible to assign any Truth Opposite to a Contradiction but an Identical Proposition it follows that First Truths or First Principles must be Identical Propositions § 7. To explain this better we shall find by reflexion that two Contradictory Propositions are comprisable into One equivalent to both whose Subject and Predicate contradict one another as Peter here and now runs Peter here and now runs not are necessarily equivalent to this What here and now runs here and now runs not So likewise Scripture's Letter is a Rule Scripture's Letter is not a Rule is equivalent to this Something which is a Rule is not a Rule and so of the rest By which 't is easie to discern how clear a Truth it is that Identical Propositions are the proper opposites to Contradictions or the Truths they directly and immediately violate and consequently First Principles Since 't is impossible mans wit rack'd to its utmost can invent any Opposite to What runs runs not but What runs runs or to What is a Rule is not a Rule but What is a Rule is a Rule Lastly The nature of Contradiction in common puts a thing to be and not be at once and consequently puts this Proposition What is not is to which the onely opposite Truth is What is is which is therefore the First Standard of all Truth and all other First Principles as A Rule is a Rule A Man a Man c. are but particulars subsuming under it and partaking in the most perfect manner of its clearest Light § 8. Farther 't is observable that the more remote the Terms of a Proposition are from Formal Identity the less evident they are and the more proof they require as also that they still grow nearer and nearer to evidence according to the degree of their approach toward the said Identity Wherefore since all Approach of distant things if pursu'd ends in a conjoyning and centering in the same 't is manifest that all distance in notion amongst Terms ends in their being the same in notion that is in an Identical Proposition as also that such Propositions are for the reason given the most evident that may be and so in both regards the very First Principles § 9. Farther All Propositions which are capable of proof or all Conclusions must have their Terms materially Identical that is what corresponds to both their notions must be found in the same Thing else they could not be True nor capable to be proved wherefore the Terms in First Principles must be formally such nay the most formally that is possible but nothing is or can be more formally Identical than to have the Predicate and Subject every way the same such therefore the very First Principles ought necessarily to be § 10. There is also in Logick a way of arguing by bringing one to an Absurdity or Contradiction And this is performed two manner of ways One by forcing the Defendant to contradict himself The other by obliging him to contradict the nature of the Subject in question The former of these is available as an Argument ad hominem but the latter attempt if brought to effect is a perfect Conquest And why but because it puts the Defendant to violate the nature of the Thing under debate that is to thwart this First Principle The same is the same with it self for example to make Quantity not to be Quantity a Rule not to be a Rule Faith not to be Faith as shall be shewn hereafter more clearly when we come to see the use of the First Principles in particular Instances § 11. Moreover if it be well examin'd 't will be found that all Efficiency and Passiveness that is all kind of Operation is nothing but the existence of such a Nature exerting or as it were imprinting it self upon the Subject in which it works its Effect For example when a Brass Seal makes an Impression upon soft Wax no account can be given of this Effect abstracting from Motion which is caus'd by a Nature superiour to Body but onely this that the Agent is of such a degree of Density or Hardness as if mov'd or apply'd to that matter is apt to alter the figure of its parts according to its own mould and the Patient of such a yielding nature in comparison of the other as to receive its Impression and yet not to that degree Rare as to lose it again by the Action of the common Causes in Nature till some more particular Agent comes to efface it 'T is manifest then that all Causality essentially depends on and is finally resolv'd into this Truth that Things are such as they are which is their being in part what they are All knowledge then of Cause and Effect and consequently all Demonstration is ultimately refunded that is primarily built on those Propositions which express Things being what they are that is into Identical Ones § 12. Lastly He who is Essential Wisdom and Truth it self has propos'd to us an Identical Proposition in those words I am what I am which is the First Increated Truth as
to viz. to Assent to the Existence of a Deity and other Points of Faith as Certain Truths nay lay down their lâ—ves upon occasion to Attest they are such And what is it to Assent 'T is to say interiourly or judge verily that the thing is so And can a Motive or Reason possible to be False ever induce in true Reason such an Obligation or work rationally such an Effect How should it be Since in that case a man must on the one side judge the thing Impossible to be False because he is to assent to it as a Truth and yet must at the same tâ—me necessarily judge it Possible to be False because he sees the Motives he has offer'd him raise it no higher that is he must hold both sides of the Contradiction which is absolutely impossible Now true Evidence that the thing is so takes away all possibility of Falsehood and so obliges to Assent and if Dr. T. produces such proofs as make the point truly Evident an Atheist is unreasonable and obstinate if he do not Assent to it But if by those words Atheism is unreasonable because it requires more Evidence than the things are capable of he means that the Things afford no true Evidence at all and judges Atheists unreasonable for not assenting without true Evidence because the Things afford none he in effect tells them they must forfeit their Manhood ere they can be Christians than which nothing can more reflect on the Profession of Christianity or be more unworthy a Christian Divine to propose Let us â—ee how far Dr. T. is blameable in this Particular He discourses thus and since he so earnestly presses it we will take his words in order § 8. Aristotle says he hath long since observed how unreasonable 't is to expect the same kind of Proof for every thing which we have for same things Aristotle said very well For speaking of Proofs in common and at large those we have for Success in our Exteriour Actions on the Hopes of which we proceed to Act are for the most Part but Probable but this reaches not our present business about a Deity in order to which this Preamble is fram'd where Exteriour Acting will not serve the turn but an Interiour Act of Assenting to the Existence of such a Soveraign Being is necessarily requir'd The Question then is Whether Aristotle did or could with any reason say that a Rational Creature that is a Creature whose nature 't is to deduce Conclusions by Discourse from Premisses or build the certain Truth of Those upon the certain Truth of These could be oblig'd in true Reason or acting according to Right Nature to assent judge or conclude a Thing True without such Motives or Proofs which did conclude it True or that what concluded a Thing True did not also conclude it impossible to be otherwise or to be False 'T is granted then that in our Exteriour Operations exercised upon Particulars where Contingency rules we must rest contented with Probabilities of the Event and proceed to act upon them the necessity of acting obliging us for should all the world surcease from Action till they were assur'd of the good success of it all Commerce and Negotiation must be left off nay all the means of Living must be laid aside but then we are not bound to assent or judge absolutely that the thing will succeed well because we have no Certain Grounds or Conclusive Reasons for it but onely that 't is best to act though upon Uncertain Grounds of the Success for which assent also we have absolute Evidence from the Necessity of actâ—ng now spoken of Whereas on the other side where the whole business of our Christian Life which as such is spiritual is to worship God in Spirit and Truth or approach to him by ascending from Virtue to Virtue that is from Faith to Hope from Hope to Charity the Top of all Perfection the whole interiour Fabrick is built on a Firm Assent to the Truth of the Points which ground our Profession Wherefore if the Foundation for this Assent be not well laid all the Superstructures of Religion are ruinous Now Nature having fram'd things so and the Maxims of our Understanding giving it that those who guide themselves by perfect Reason that is the strongest and wisest Souls are unapt to assent but upon Evidence whereas the weaker sort as experience teaches us are apt to assent upon any silly Probability hence unless such men see Proofs absolutely concluding those points True they are unapt to be drawn to yield to them and embrace them as Certain Truths especially there being no necessity at all to assent as there was to act outwardly in regard Nature has furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending which nothing can subdue rationally in such men at least but True Evidence had from the Object working this clear sight in them either by it self or else by Effects or Causes necessarily connected with It. Other Evidences I know none It may be Dr. T. does Let us see § 8. Mathematical things says he being of an abstracted nature are onely capable of clear Demonstration But Conclusions in Natural Philosophy are to be proved by a sufficient Induction of Experiments Things of a Moral Nature by Moral Arguments and matters of Fact by Credible Testimony And though none of these be strict Demonstration yet have we an Vndoubted Assurance of them when they are proved by the best Arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear This Discourse deserves deep Consideration And first it would be askâ— why Metaphysicks are omitted here which of all others ought to have been mentioned and that in the first place since its proper Subject is those Notions which concern Being and to give Being or Create is the Proper Effect of Him who is Essential Being whence it seems the Properest Science that is to demonstrate a Deity in case Metaphysical things be demonstrable and that they are such Dr. T. himself cannot deny for if as he says here things are therefore demonstrable because they are of an abstracted nature the Object of Metaphysicks which is Being is far more abstracted from matter and so from Motion and its necessary Concomitant Vncertainty or Contingency than is Quantity the subject of Mathematicks for this primary Affection of Body is the Ground and Proper Cause of of all Variation and Unsteadiness since all natural Motion or Mutation arises from Divisibility Yet because all Science is taken from the Things as standing under our notion or Conception and not according as they exist in themselves where thousands of Considerabilities are confusedly jumbled into one Common Stock of Existence or one Thing also because we can abstract by our Consideration the notion or nature of Quantity nay consider the same Quantity meerly as affecting Body as it were steadily or extending it without considering the same Quantity as the Proper Cause or Source of Motion hence the Mathematicks have Title to be truly and
properly a Science for this Abstraction or manner of being in our mind frees the notion or nature thus abstracted that is the thing as thus conceiv'd by us from Vncertainty nay indeed fixes it in a kind of Immutability whereas were it consider'd as found in the World there would be no firm Ground at all for any Discourse For example perhaps by reason of the perpetual turmoil of things in Nature there is not to be found in the World any one Body either mathematically Straight Circular or Triangular yet because the nature of Body conceiv'd as in Rest bears it we can abstract from Motion and so consider quantitative Things according to what they can bear in themselves taken as not moving or in Rest therefore we can make such steady notions and when we have done discourse them and ground a long train of new Conclusions which we call a particular Science upon such a Nature thus conceiv'd § 9. And for that reason I would gladly know why Ethicks or Morality is not equally demonstrable as Mathematicks For we can equally abstract those Moral Notions of Virtues and Vices and consider them apart as we can do those Mathematical ones of Lines and Numbers I know 't is grown a common humour in the World taken up I know not how by course and continu'd none knows why to think otherwise But I must confess I never could discern any reason for it and shall be thankful to that man who can show me any that convinces In the mean time I give mine for the Affirmative which is this That the same reason holds for Ethicks as for Mathematicks since all the perquisits for Demonstration are found in the one as in the other To put it to the Test let 's consider what Euclid does when he demonstrates and by virtue of what We see he puts his Definitions and some common Maxims peculiar to that Subject and then by his Reason connecting the first Deductions with his Principles and the following Deductions with the foregoing onâ—â— weaves them into a Science And is it not evident that we can as well know what 's meant by those words which express Virtues and Vices and so as well define them as we can those other Also that the Common Maxims of Morality are as self-evident to Humane Nature as any First Principles in the World I admire then what should hinder Ethicks to be as perfect a Science as the clearest piece of Mathematicks since we can equally abstract the several notions handled in it from matter equally define them and consequently assisted by Common Maxims equally-evident with equal clearness discourse them which is all that is requir'd § 10. If it be said that particular Moral Actions are liable to Contingency 't is answer'd that this hinders not but the Speculative part of Morality is a true Science Even Mathematical Demonstrations when reduc'd to practice and put in matter are subject also to Contingency as we experience daily in Mechanicks and yet the Speculative part which abstracts from matter is never the less Scientifical § 11. The greatest difficulty is in that Cardinal Virtue call'd Prudence and I confess that because the exercise of this Virtue is surrounded with an incomprehensible number of Accidents and way-laid as it were with all the Ambushes and Stratagems of Fortune and consequently to make its Success Certain we must be put to fathom the natures of many several things nay more their Combinations or Joynt-actings with their several circumstances and especially of those things which are the Common Causes of the World as the influences of the Sun Moon and other Stars if they have any that is considerable and lastly of the Elements which 't is impossible for our short-sighted Knowledge to reach hence Prudence in its Execution or put in matter is liable to more Contingency by far than any piece of the Mathematicks where we have but one or two single notions or natures to grapple with and weild Yet notwithstanding all these difficulties I must still contest that the Maxims of Prudence upon which its Dictamens are chiefly grounded are self-evident practically and to the Learned Demonstrable viz. That we ought to sow and plant in their proper seasons that 't is best for Merchants to hazard though they be insecure of the Event and a thousand such-like § 12. I expect Dr. T. will object the fickle nature of the Will which renders all Contingent where this perpetually-changing Planet has any Influence But yet there 's a way for all that to fix this volatil Mercurial Power and make it act with a constancy as great as any other thing in Nature To conceive how this may be effected we are to consider that the Will too has a peculiar nature of its own which it can no more forgo than the most constant Piece found in Nature can do Its that is The Will can no more leave off being a Will than a Rule can not-be a Rule Faith not-be Faith or any other of those ridiculous Identical Propositions as Dr. T. calls them not be true Now the Will being a Power and Powers taking their several Natures from their Objects or as the Schools express it being specify'd by them and the Object of the Will as distinguish'd from the Understanding being Good and this propos'd to It by that Knowing Power that is Good at least appearing such if it can be made evident that such a thing can never appear a Good to the Subject thus circumstanc'd 't is demonstrable the Will cannot will it nay as evident as 't is that A Will is a Will § 13. To apply this to particulars In case there be a Trade or Profession of Merchants and it be evident to all the Followers of that sole Employment that Themselves Wives and Children must starve unless they venture to Sea the notventuring can never appear to them thus circumstanc'd that is addicted to that onely way of Livelihood as is suppos'd a Good and so 't is demonstrable that abstracting from Madness or Exorbitant Passion which is not our Case they can never will not-to-venture Or if a great multitude of men have embrac'd no Profession but that of the Law and as we 'll suppose have no other Livelihood but That so that it becomes evident it can never appear a Good to them not to take Fees 't is as Certain they will not refuse them as 't is that a Thing is it Self or that a Will is a Will because a Will is a Power whose Essence 't is to have such an Object as is appearingly Good § 14. To come closer to our purpose Suppose Innumerable multitudes of Fathers or Immediate Predecessors in any Age had an inclination to deceive their Children or immediate Successors in the World and consequently that the Immediate End they propos'd to themselves were to make them believe such Points of Faith were received by them from Forefathers which were indeed newly invented these men I say in case they must see