in the Mind is altogether passive and includes no Action at all I call that Faculty or Capacity the Soul has of receiving all these things the UNDERSTANDING Whence we ought to conclude That 't is the Vnderstanding which perceives since 't is only its business to receive the Idea's of Objects For for the Soul to perceive an Object and to receive the Idea which represents it is one and the same thing 'T is also the Vnderstanding which perceives the Modifications of the Soul since I mean by this word Vnderstanding that passive Faculty of the Soul by means of which it receives all the different Modifications it is capable of For it is the same thing for the Soul to receive a mode of existence which we call pain as to perceive Pain since it has no other way of receiving Pain than by the Perception of it whence it may be inferr'd that 't is the Vnderstanding that imagines the Objects that are absent and is sensible of those that are present and that the Senses and Imagination are nothing but the Vnderstanding perceiving Objâcts by the Organs of the Body as shall be explain'd hereafter But because in the Sensation of Pain or any thing else Men generally perceive it by the mediation of the Organs of Sense they customarily say they are the Senses which perceive it without knowing distinctly what it is they mean by the word Sense They fancy there is some Faculty distinct from the Soul which renders It or the Body capable of Sensation as believing the Organs of Sense do really participate of our Perceptions They imagine the Body is so assistant to the Mind in its Sensations that if the Mind was separate from the Body it could have no Sensation at all But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice and because in the State we are in we are sensible of nothing but through the use of the Instruments of Sense as shall be shewn elsewhere more at large 'T is by way of accommodating my self to the ordinary way of Speaking that I say in the Process of my Discourse the Senses perceive but by the word Sense I mean nothing but that passive Faculty of the Soul before-mention'd that is the Understanding perceiving any thing on occasion of what happens in the Organs of her Body according to the Institutions of Nature as shall be explain'd in another place The other Resemblance between the passive Faculty of the Soul and that of Matter is this That as Matter receives no real alteration by the change which happens in its Figure I mean for instance that as Wax receives no considerable change by becoming Round or Square so the Mind receives no change by the diversity of Idea's it contains I would say the Mind receives no considerable change though it receives the Idea of a Square or a Circle in perceiving a Square or a Circle Again As it may be said that Matter receives considerable Changes when it loses the Configuration peculiar to the parts of Wax to take that which is proper to those of Fire and Smoak when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoak so it may be said that the Soul undergoes very considerable Changes when it alters its Modifications and suffers Pain after it has felt Pleasure Whence we ought to conclude That Idea's are to the Soul in a manner what Figures are to Matter and that Configurations are to Matter almost what Sensations are to the Soul There are still other Corrsepondencies betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter and the Idea's and Modifications of the Mind for Matter seems to be an Image or Representative of the Mind I mean only that there are Properties in Matter which have some mutual Respects between them not unlike those which we find between the Properties belonging to the Mind though the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter as we shall clearly see in that which follows From what I have said I would have it well remember'd That by Vnderstanding I mean that passive Faculty the Soul has of Perceiving that is of receiving not only different Idea's bat also an abundance of different Sensations as Matter has a capacity of receiving all sorts of external Figures and internal Configurations The other Faculty of Matter is that of its being capable of receiving many Motions and the other Faculty of the Soul is that Power it has of receiving many Inclinations Let us make the Comparison between them As the Author of Nature is the Universal Cause of all those Motions which we find in Matter so also he is the general Cause of all those natural Inclinations which are found in the Mind And as all Motions proceed in a right line unless otherwise determin'd by the Rencounter of some foreign and particular Causes which by their Opposition put them into a Circular course so all the Inclinations we receive from God have a direct tendency and could only aim at the possession of Good and Truth were there not some extraneous cause which biass'd that natural Impression towards corrupt and mischievous Ends Now 't is that foreign Cause which is the cause of all our Evils and depraves all our Inclinations To understand this rightly we must know there 's a very considerable difference between the Impression or Motion the Author of Nature produces in Matter and the Impression or Motion towards Good in general wherewith the same Author of Nature continually influences our Soul For Matter is wholly inactive it has no power of retarding or stopping its Motion or determining and turning it one way rather than another It s Motion as I have said proceeds always in a right line and if at any time it is hindred from continuing it in that manner it describes the greatest circular Line it can and consequently that which comes nearest to a right because 't is God that impresses its Motion and rules its Determination But 't is not so with the Will which may in one sense be said to be Active and to have a Power in it self of giving a different Determination to the Inclination or Impression it receives from God for though it cannot stop this Impression it may in one sense cause a Deviation to what side it pleases and thereby produce all those Disorders which happen in its Inclinations and all the Miseries which are the certain and necessary Consequents of Sin So that by the Word WILL I would be conceiv'd to design That natural Motion or Impression which carries us towards Good universal and undetermin'd And by that of LIBERTY I mean nothing more than The Power the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects and terminating our natural Inclinations upon some particular Object which before were loose and undetermin'd except towards general or universal Good that is to say towards God who is alone universal Good since 't is he alone who comprehends in himself all Goods Whence it is easie to discover That
is included in the Idea of a necessary Being as the Equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of a Circle And I except the Existence of our Soul because we are inwardly conscious that we Think Will and Feel and have no clear Idea of our Soul as I have sufficiently explained in the seventh Chapter of the second Part of the third Book and elsewhere These are some of the Reasons which we have to add to those already given to prove that all our Light is deriv'd to us from God and that the immediate and direct Object of our clear and evident notices is an immutable and necessary Nature Some Objections are usually made against this Opinion which I shall now endeavour to solve Against what has been said that none but God enlightens us and that we see all things in him OBJECTION I. OUR Soul thinks because it is her Nature God in creating her gave her the faculty of thinking and she needs nothing more But if any thing else is wanting let us stick to what Experience teaches us of our senses which is that they are the manifest causes of our Ideas 'T is an ill way of Philosophizing to argue against Experience ANSWER I cannot but admire that the Cartesian Gentlemen who with so much reason reject and scorn the general Terms of Nature and faculty should so willingly employ them on this occasion They cry out against a Man that shall say the Fire burns by its nature and converts certain Bodies into Glass by a natural Faculty And yet some of them fear not to say that the Humane Mind produces the Ideas of all things in it self by its nature and because it has a thinking faculty But be it spoken without offence these words are no more significative in their Mouths than in the Peripateticks I know very well that the Soul is capable of thinking But I know likewise that extension is capable of Figures The Soul is capable of Will as matter is of Motion But as it is false that matter though capable of figure and motion has in it self a force faculty or nature by which it can move it self and give it self now a round figure and anon a square one so though the Soul be naturally and essentially capable of Knowledge and Will it is false that she has Faculties whereby she can produce in her Ideas or motion towards good There is a great difference between being Moveable and self moving Matter is by its nature moveable and capable of Figures nor can it subsist without a figure But it neither moves it self nor shapes it self nor has it any faculty to do it The Mind is of its nature capable of motion and Ideas I acknowledge But it neither moves nor enlightens its self But 't is God that does all in Minds as well as in Bodies Can we say that God effects the changes that happen in matter and that he causes not those which occur in the Mind Is this to give to God the things that are his to leave these latter sort of Beings to their own management Is he not equally Lord of all things Is he not the Creator Preserver and true mover of Minds as well as Bodies Certainly he makes all both Substances Accidents Beings and Modes of Being For in short he knows all But he knows nothing but what he does We therefore streighten him in his Knowledge if we limit him in his Action But if it must be said that Creatures have such faculties as are commonly conceived and that natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Principle of their Motion and Rest as says Aristotle and his Followers This indeed overthrows all my Ideas but yet I will rather agree to it than say the Mind enlightens it self Men may say that the Soul has the force of moving diversly the Limbs of her Body and of communicating to them Sense and Life They may say if they please that it is she that gives heat to the Blood motion to the Spirits and to the rest of her Body its Bulk Situation and Figure Only let them not say that the Mind gives Light and Motion to it self If God works not all let us allow him at least to do what is Noblest and Perfectest in the World And if Creatures do any thing let them move Bodies and range and posture them as they think fit But let them never act upon Minds We will say if that will serve that Bodies move each other after they have been mov'd themselves or rather will sit down ignorant of the different Dispositions of matter as not concerning us But let not our Minds be ignorant whence proceeds the Light that enlightens them Let them know from what hand they receive all that can make them more happy or more perfect let them acknowledge their dependence in its whole extent and know that whatever they actually have God gives them every moment for as says a great Father upon another Subject 'T is a very criminal Pride to use the gifts of God as our own innate Perfections Above all let us take heed of imagining that the Senses instruct Reason that the Body enlightens the Mind that the Soul receive of the Body what it wants it self We had better believe our selves independent than to believe we truly depend on Bodies 'T is much better to be our own Masters than to seek for Masters among inferior Creatures But we had much better submit our selves to Eternal Truth which assures us in the Gospel that none else is our Instructor than to believe the Testimony of our Senses or of some Men who presume to talk to us as our Teachers Experience whatever may be said does not countenance prejudices For our Senses no less than our Teachers after the Flesh are only occasional causes of the Instruction which Eternal Wisdom infuses into our most inward Reason But because this Wisdom enlightens us by an insensible Operation we imagine it is our Eyes or the words of those that verberate the Air against our Ears who produce this Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us And for this Reason as I have said in another place our LORD thought it not enough to instruct us in an intellible manner by his Divinity unless he condescended also to inform us in a sensible way by his Humanity thereby teaching us that he is every way our Master And because we cannot easily retire into our selves to consult him in Quality of eternal Truth immutable Order intelligible Light he has rendred Truth sensible by his Words Order Amiable by his Example Light Visible by a Body which breaks the force of its Lustre and after all we are still so ungrateful unjust stupid and insensible as to respect as our Masters and that against his express prohibition not only other Men but it may be the most insensible and vilest Bodies OBJECTION II. Since the Soul is more perfect than Bodies how comes it that she cannot include
it were only that these Beings having no Relation to us the Knowledge of them would be of little use to us as he has not given us Eyes acute enough to reckon the Teeth of an Hand-worm since 't would be useless to the Preservation of our Body to have so penetrating an Eye-sight But though we do not think it fit to judge hastily and rashly that all Being is divided into Spirit and Body yet we think it inconsistent with Reason for Philosophers in explaining Natural Effects to use other Idea's than those that depend on Thought and Extension these in Effect being the only distinct or particular that we have There is nothing more Unphilosophical and Irrational than to imagine vast numbers of Beings from simple Logical Idea's to bestow on them infinite properties and so to go about explaining things which no body understands by things which not only no body conceives but which indeed are impossible to be conceived This is to take the same course that Blind Men would do when intending to discourse of Colours and maintain the Theses that concern them they should make use of the Definitions they receive from the Philosophers and thence make their Inferences and Conclusions For as these blind Men's Arguings and Disputes about Colours must needs be pleasant and ridiculous enough since they could have no distinct Idea's of the Subjects in Question and would only argue from general and Logical Idea's So the Philosophers can never reason justly and solidly upon the Effects of Nature when they only employ general and Logical Idea's as of Act Power Being Cause Principle Form Quality and others of like Nature It is absolutely necessary for them to ground their Disputes and Reasonings only upon the distinct and particular Idea's of Thought and Extension and those which are contain'd in them as Figure Motion c. For we can never expect to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it and 't is better not to meditate at all than to throw our Meditation away upon Whimsies and Chimera's We ought not however to assert that there is nothing but Spirit and Body Thinking and Extended Beings in Nature since 't is impossible for us to be mistaken For though these are sufficient for the Explication of Nature and consequently we may conclude without danger of erring That all Natural things as far as our Knowledge goes depend upon Extension and Thought yet absolutely speaking it s not impossible but there may be others whereof we have no Idea nor see any Effect Men are therefore too rash and precipitate in judging as an indisputable Principle that all Substance is distinguish'd into Body and Spirit But they thence infer a rash and unadvis'd conclusion when they determine by the sole light of Reason that GOD is a Spirit 't is true that since we are created after His Image and Similitude and we are taught from several places of the Holy Scripture that GOD is a Spirit we ought to believe and call Him so But Reason all alone can never teach us so much It only tells us that GOD is a Being infinitely perfect and that he ought rather to be a Spirit than a Body since our Soul is more perfect than our Body but it cannot assure us there are not still other Beings more perfect than those Spirits within us and rang'd in an higher order above them than our Minds are above our Bodies But supposing there were such Beings as these as Reason makes it unquestionable that GOD was able to create them 't is evident they would have a nearer resemblance to their Maker than our selves And so the same Reason informs us that GOD would rather have their Perfections than ours which would be reckon'd but imperfections in comparison with them We ought not therefore precipitately to imagine that the word Spirit which we indifferently use to signifie what GOD is and what we are our selves is an univocal Term expressing the same things or very like GOD is farther exalted above Created Spirits than these Spirits are elevated above Bodies and we ought not to term GOD a Spirit so much for a positive Declaration of what He is as to signifie He is not material He is an infinitely perfect Being no Man can doubt of it But as we are not to imagine with the Anthropomorphites that he ought to have an Humane shape because that Figure seems the most perfect though we should suppose Him Corporeal so we ought not to think that the Spirit of GOD has Humane Thoughts and that his mind is like our own because we know nothing perfecter than our own Mind 'T is rather to be believ'd that as he includes in Himself the Perfections of Matter without being material for 't is certain that Matter has a Relation to some Perfection that is in God so He comprehends the Perfections of created Spirits without being a Spirit after our manner of conceiving Spirits that his true Name is HE THAT IS that is being without restriction all Being being Infinite and Universal CHAP. X. Some Instances of Errors in Physicks wherein Men are engag'd by supposing that the things which differ in their Nature their Qualities Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in these things IT has been shewn in the Fore-going Chapter That Men make a rash Judgment in concluding all Beings under two Heads either of Body or Spirit we will make it appear in the succeeding Chapters that they not only make rash Judgments but false too and which are the fruitful Principles of innumerable Errors when they judge that Beings are not different in their Relations and Modes because they have no Idea of these Differences 'T is certain that the Mind of Man searches only after the Relations of things First those which the Objects it considers have to it self and then those which they have with one another For Man's Mind is inquisitive only after its Good and Truth For the finding out its Good it considers carefully by Reason and by Taste or Sensation whether the Objects have any Relation of Agreement with it self For the discovering Truth it considers whether the Objects have any Relation of Equality or Similitude to each other or what precisely is the Quantity that is equal to their Inequality For as Good is not the Good of the Mind any farther than it is agreeable to it so Truth is not Truth but by the Relation of Equality or Resemblance which is found betwixt two things or more whether this Relation be between two or more Objects as between an Ell and a Piece of Cloth For 't is true that this is an Ell of Cloth because of the Equality between the Ell and the Cloth whether it be between two or more Idea's as between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six for 't is true that Three and Three are Six because of the Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three and the
beneath the Grandeur and prostrate it self before the Lustre of Riches But if I consider that the Body is infinitely inferiour to the Mind that it is not its Master nor can instruct it in Truth nor any ways illuminate it and if upon this Scene and Prospect I re-enter into or enquire of my self or rather since I am neither my own Master nor my own Light if I approach unto GOD and in the calm and silence of my Senses and Passions make this Demand Whether Riches or Vertue is preferable I shall hear a clear and distinct Answer concerning what is to be done an Eternal Answer that has been always given and which is and always will be an Answer that 's not necessary to be explain'd since every body know it such as read this and such as do not read it which is neither Greek nor Latin nor French nor German but which all Nations under Heaven understand An Answer lastly that consolates the Just in their Poverty and desolates Sinners in the abundance of their Riches I shall hear this Answer and remain convinc'd and then shall laugh at the Visions of my Imagination and the Delusions of my Senses The Internal Man that is in me shall ridicule the Animal and Terrestrial Man that I carry about me In fine the New Man shall thrive and the Old Man shall be destroy'd provided in the mean time I continually obey the Voice of Him who delivers Himself so clearly in the most secret recess of my Reason and who becoming sensible to accommodate Himself to my Weakness and Disease and to give me Life by that which gave me Death speaks to me anew in a most strong and lively and familiar way by my Senses I mean by the preaching of His Gospel But if I interrogate Him in all Metaphysical Natural and purely Philosophical Questions as well as those which respect the Rule of Manners I shall always have a faithful Master who will never deceive me I shall not only be a Christian but a Philosopher I shall be a sound Thinker and a Lover of what is Good In a word I shall follow the Road that leads me to all Perfection I am capable of either by Nature or by Grace We ought then to conclude from all that has been said that to make the best use possible of the Faculties of our Soul of our Senses Imagination and Vnderstanding we must apply them only to those things for which they were given us We ought carefully to distinguish our Sensations and Imaginations from our Pure Idea's and judge by the former of the Relations our Body has with those about us but never make use of them in discovering Truths which they always confound Whereas Pure Idea's must be us'd in the finding out of Truths but omitted when we judge of the Correspondencies between Exteriour Bodies and our own because their Idea's have never reach and extent enough to give a thorough Representation of them 'T is impossible for Men to have sufficient Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the little parts of their Body and Blood and of those of a particular Fruit at a certain Season of their Sickness to know whether there is a Relation of Agreement between that Fruit and their Body and that if they eat of it they shall recover Thus our Senses alone are more useful for the Conversation of our Body than the Rules of Experimental Medicine and Experimental Medicine than Theoretical But Theoretical Medicine that deferrs much to Experience and more to the Senses is the best of all Because all these should be caball'd together Reason then is of universal use and this is the Privilege it obtains over the Senses and Imagination which are limited and conâin'd to Sensible things yet this is to be regularly employ'd for though it be the principal part of Our selves it often happens to deceive us by our letting it act too much because it cannot act enough without tiring I mean it cannot know enough to make a right Judgment and yet it will still be judging F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH BOOK IV. Concerning the Inclinations or Natural Motions of the Mind CHAP. I. I. Inclinations are as necessary to Spirits as Motions to Bodies II. GOD gives no Motion to Spirits but what tends towards Himself III. The Tendency Spirits have to particular Goods proceeds but from their Motion towards Good in general IV. The Original of our chiefest Natural Inclinations Which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book THERE had been no occasion of Treating on the Natural Inclinations which are to be the Subject of this Fourth Book nor on the Passions which I am to speak to in the Fifth to discover the Causes of our Errours did not the Understanding depend on the Will in the Perception of Objects But because the Understanding receives its Direction from the Will and is determin'd and fix'd by it rather to some Objects than others in order to penetrate into the Causes of the Errours whereunto we are subject it will be absolutely necessary to be well acquainted with the Nature of our Inclinations Had God in the Creation of the World produc'd a Matter infinitely Extended without imprinting on it any Motion there had been no diversity in Bodies The whole Visible World at this day would have been nothing but an unweildy Mass of Matter or Extension which might perhaps have serv'd to shew the Greatness and Power of its Author but wanting that Succession of Forms and Variety of Bodies wherein the Beauty of the Universe consists would have little to invite Spiritual Beings to admire and adore the Infinite Wisdom of its Governour Now the Inclinations of Spirits seem to be in the Spiritual World what the Motions of Bodies are in the Material and that if Spirits had no Inclinations or Volitions that Variety would be wanting to the Order of Spiritual things which not only excites to the Admiration of the profound Wisdom of God as does the diversity observ'd in Material things but also of his Mercy Justice and Goodness and all his other Attributes in general The difference then of Inclinations has an Effect in Spirits much like that which the diversity of Motions produces in Bodies and the Inclinations of Spirits together with the Motions of Bodies make up all the Beauty of Created Beings So that 't is requisite for the former to have several Inclinations as for the latter to have different Motions But let us try to discover what Inclinations these ought to be Were not our Nature corrupted we should not need to seek by Reason as we are now to do what should be the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits We need but have descended into our own Breast to have discover'd by an inward Feeling or Self-consciousness of what passes within us all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to have But since we are taught by Faith that Sin has inverted the Order of Nature and even by
as long as we see and feel it 'T is certain that if the Mind could easily keep up to clear and distinct Ideas without being as it were supported by some Sensation and without having its Attention perpetually disturb'd by the Restlesness of the Will we should find no great difficulties in infinite Natural Questions but in a short time should get rid of our Ignorance and Errours about them which we now look upon as inexplicable For instance 't is an indisputable Truth to every Man that makes use of his Reason that Creation and Annihilation exceed the ordinary force of Nature Should we now stick to the consideration of that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason we should not so readily admit the Creation and Annihilation of such innumerable multitudes of New Beings as of Substantial Forms Real Qualities and Faculties and the like We should look for the reason of Natural Effects in the distinct Ideas of Extension Figure and Motion and this is not so difficult as is imagin'd For all Nature hangs in a continued chain and the parts of it mutually prove each other The Effects of Fire as those of Cannons and Mines are very wonderful and their Cause as secret and conceal'd Nevertheless if Men instead of adhering to the Impressions of their Senses and false and delusive Experiments should insist on that sole Notion of Pure Intellect That 't is impossible for a Body gently mov'd to produce a Violent Motion in another since it cannot communicate more moving Force than it has it self it would be easie from that single Notion to conclude there is some subtile and invisible Matter that it is violently agitated and universally diffus'd among all Bodies and several things of like kind which might serve to explain the Nature of Fire and to discover other yet more intricate and hidden Truths For seeing so great Motions produc'd in a Cannon or a Mine and all the visible surrounding Bodies in too little Commotion to effect them we are infallibly assur'd there are other invisible and insensible Bodies which have at least so much Motion as the Cannon Bullet but being extremely fine and subtile may when alone pass freely and without bursting any thing through the Pores of the Cannon before it is fir'd that is as may be seen explain'd at large in Mr. des Cartes before they have surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Saltpeter which the Powder is compos'd of But when the Fire is kindled that is when these most subtile and agitated particles have encompassed the gross and solid parts of the Saltpeter and so have communicated their most forcible and violent Motion to them all must necessarily burst because the the Pores of the Cannon which gave a free passage on all sides to the subtile parts we speak of when alone are not large enough to receive the gross parts of the Saltpeter and others that make the Powder when agitated by the subtile particles that environ them For as the Water of a River shakes not the Bridge it runs under because of the minuteness of its parts So this most fine and subtile Matter continually passes through the pores of all Bodies without causing any sensible alteration But as again that River is able to overturn a Bridge when bearing down its Stream huge massy pieces of Ice or other more solid Bodies it dashes them against it with the same Force that it self is mov'd by so the subtile Matter is capable of those astonishing Effects observable in Cannons and Mines when having communicated to the parts of the Powder swimming in the midst of it an infinitely more violent and rapid Motion than that of Rivers and Torrents these same parts of the Gunpowder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the including Bodies because of their too great bulk and therefore open themselves a way by violently breaking what withstands them But 't is not very easie to imagine these so subtile and refin'd Bodies and they are look'd upon as Chimeras because they cannot be seen Contemplatio fere desinit cum aspectu says My Lord Bacon And indeed the greatest part of Philosophers had rather invent some New Entity than be silent about things they do not understand If it be objected to their false and inconceivable Suppositions that Fire must necessarily be compos'd of parts rapidly mov'd because of those violent Motions it produces whilst nothing can communicate what it has not which surely is a most clear and solid Objection they will be sure to confound all by some childish and imaginary Distinction such as Causes univocal and equivocal that they may seem to say something when indeed they say nothing at all For in fine 't is a receiv'd Maxim with all considering Men That there can be no equivocal Cause in Nature and Ignorance has only invented them Those then who are desirous of knowing Nature should take care to fix more to clear and distinct Notions They should a little check and resist that Levity and Inconstancy of their Will if they would penetrate to the bottom of things for their Minds will ever be feeble superficial and desultory whilst their Wills remain roving fickle and inconstant It must be confess'd that 't is a painful and tiresome thing and full of constraint to become attentive and go to the bottom of the things we have a mind to know But nothing can be had without pains Mean time 't is a reproach to Men of Sense and Philosophers who are oblig'd by all manner of reasons to the Search and Defence of Truth to talk they know not what and to be satisfied with what they do not understand CHAP. III. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate it III. An Explication of the first of these Rules AS long as Men shall have an Inclination for a Good that exceeds their Strength and they shall not enjoy it they will ever have a secret Inclination for whatever carries the Character of New and Extraordinary They will constantly be persuing after things which they have not yet consider'd with hopes of finding what they seek for and whereas their Minds can never be fully satisfied without the Intuition of him for whom they are created so they will always be restless and tossing about till He appears to them in His Glory This Disposition of Minds is doubtless very consonant to their Condition it being infinitely better restlesly to search after Truth and Happiness which they do not possess than to fix on a false and ill-grounded security by taking up with Falshood and Seeming Goods the ordinary Desserts they feed on Men ought not to be insensible to Truth and Hapiness and what is New and Extraordinary ought to quicken them For there is a Curiosity which we may permit them or rather which we ought to recommend to them So then common and ordinary things containing not the true Good and the Ancient Opinions of Philosophers being most uncertain it is reasonable we should
desire to know whether a Thing has such or such Properties or if we know it has we desire only to discover what is the Cause of them To solve the Questions of the first sort we must consider Things in their Birth and Original and conceive that they are always produc'd by the most simple and natural Ways But the Solution of the others requires a very different Method for they must be resolv'd by Suppositions and then we must examine whether those Suppositions induce into any Absurdity or whether they lead to any Truth plainly and clearly known For instance We desire to discover the Properties of the Roulet or some one of the Conick Sections We must consider those Lines in their Generation and form them by the most simple and least perplexing Ways for that is the best and shortest Means to discover their Nature and Properties We easily see that the Subâendent of the Roulet is equal to the Circle whence it is form'd And if we discover not many of its Properties that way 't is because the Circular Line that produces it is not sufficiently known But as to Lines merely Mathematical the Relations of which may be more clearly known such as are Conick Sections 't is sufficient for the discovering a vast Number of their Properties to consider them in their Generation Only we must observe that as they may be produc'd by a Regular Motion several Ways so all sorts of Generation are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind that the most simple are the best and that it often happens notwithstanding that some particular Methods are fitter than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But when it is not requir'd to discover in general the Properties of a Thing but to know whether such a Thing has such a Property then we must suppose that it actually enjoys it and carefully examine the Consequences of that Supposition whether it induces into a manifest Absurdity or leads to an undeniable Truth that may serve as a Means to find out what is sought for That is the Method which Geometricians use to solve their Problems They suppose what they seek and examine what will follow of it they attentively consider the Relations that result from the Supposition they represent all those Relations that contain the Conditions of the Problem by Equations and then reduce those Equations according to the usual Rules so that what is unknown is found equal to one or several Things perfectly known I say therefore that when 't is requir'd to discover in general the Nature of Fire and of the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of natural Effects the shortest and surest Way is to examine them in their Principle We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Bodies the Motion of which is diffus'd into those that ferment We must by clear Ideas and by the most simple Ways examine what Motion may produce in Matter And because Fire and the various Fermentations are very general Things and consequently depending upon few Causes there will be no need of considering very long what Matter is able to perform when animated by Motion to find out the Nature of Fermentation in its very Principle and we shall learn withall several other Things altogether requisite to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas he that would in such a Question argue from Suppositions so as to ascend to the first Causes even to the Laws of Nature by which all things are form'd would make a great many of them that should prove false and unprofitable He might perhaps discover that the Cause of the Fermentation is the Motion of an invisible Matter communicated to the agitated Parts of Matter For 't is sufficiently known that Fire and the various Fermentations of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies receive their immediate Motion only from their meeting with others that are more agitated So that he might discover that there is an invisible Matter the Motion of which is communicated to visible Bodies by Fermentation But 't is morally impossible that he should ever by his Suppositions find out how all that is perform'd which however is not so hard to do when we examine the Formation of Elements or of Bodies of which there is a greater Number of the same Nature as is to be seen in Monsieur des Cartes's System The Third Part of the Question concerning Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to solve if we suppose that there are in our Bodies Animal Spirits susceptible of Fermentation and withall Humours so piercing as to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves through which the Spirits are diââus'd into the Muscles provided always that we pretend not to determine the true Texture and Disposition of those invisible Parts that contribute to these Convulsions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the two Ends we sensibly perceive that it endeavours to contract it self when prick'd in the Middle 'T is likely that this depends on the Construction of the imperceptible Parts of which it is made which are as so many Springs determin'd to some certain Motions by that of Compunction But who can be sure he has found out the true Disposition of the Parts employ'd in the Production of that Motion and who can give an uncontroverted Demonstration of it Certainly that appears altogether impossible though perhaps by long thinking we might imagine such a Construction of Muscles as would be fit to perform all the Motions we know them to be capable of we must not therefore pretend to determine the true Construction of the Muscles However because it cannot be reasonably doubted but that there are Spirits susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of a very subtile heterogeneous Matter and that acriminious and pungent Humours may creep into the Nerves that Hypothesis may be suppos'd Now to proceed to the Solution of the Question propos'd We must first examine how many sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because their Number is indefinite we must insist on the Principal the Causes of which seem to be different We must consider in what Parts they are made what Diseases precede and follow them whether they are attended with Pain or free from it and above all what are the Degrees of their Swiftness and Violence for some are very swift and violent others are very swift but not violent a third sort are violent and not swift and others again are free from both these Symptoms Some finish and begin afresh perpetually others keep the Parts rigid and unmoveable for some time and others deprive us of their Use and altogether deform them All this being well weigh'd it will be no hard matter to explain in general after what has been said concerning Natural and Voluntary Motions how the Convulsive are perform'd For if we conceive that some Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits mixes with those contain'd in
of their Motion to the lesser which they met with and that the latter should rebound at the Encounter of the former without the like Loss of their own For otherwise the first Element would not have all the Motion that is necessary above the second nor the second above the third and so all his System would be absolutely false as is manifest to those who have a little consider'd it But in supposing that Rest has Force to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest cannot be mov'd by another less than it self though most violently striking against it 't is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than an equal Mass of little ones since they may always by that Supposition communicate their own Motion but cannot always receive any from the lesser Thus this Supposition being not contrary to all that Monsieur des Cartes had laid down in his Principles from the beginning to the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and according very well with the Consequence of these same Principles he thought the Rules of Motion which he believ'd he had demonstrated in their Cause were sufficiently confirm'd by their Effects I agree with Monsieur des Cartes in the Bottom of the Thing that great Bodies communicate their Motion much easier than the lesser and that therefore his first Element is more agitated than the second and the second than the third but the Cause is manifest without recourse to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can but communicate to any great ones an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water of a River can only communicate to a Boat a descending Motion which is common to all the little Parts the Water is composed of each of which Particles besides its common Motion has infinite others which are particular Which Reason makes it evident that a Boat for instance cannot have so much Motion as an equal Volume of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water a direct Motion and common to all the Parts of it If twenty Parts of a fluid Body drive against any other Body on one side whilst there are as many urging it on the other it remains immoveable and all the Particles of the surrounding Fluid it swims in rebound without losing any thing of their Motion Therefore gross Bodies whose Parts are united one to the other can receive only a circular and uniform Motion from the Vortex of the encompassing subtile Matter This Reason seems sufficient to give us to understand why gross Bodies are not so much agitated as little ones and that it is not necessary to the explaining these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Monsieur des Cartes's Philosophical Principles cannot therefore be of Use in proving or defending his Rules of Motion And we have Reason to believe that if Monsieur des Cartes himself had without Prepossession examin'd his Principles afresh at the same time weighing such Reasons as I have alledg'd he would not have believ'd the Effects of Nature had corroborated his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction in attributing the Hardness of hard Bodies only to the Rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Effort of the subtile Matter I now come to give the Rules of the Communication of Motion in a Vacuum which follow upon what I have before establish'd concerning the Nature of Rest. Bodies being not hard in a Vacuum since they are only so by the pressure of the subtile Matter that surrounds them if two Bodies meet together they would flatten without rebounding We must therefore suppose them hard by their own Nature and not by the pressure of the subtile Matter to give these Rules Rest having no Force to resist Motion and many Bodies being to be consider'd but as one at the Instant of their Collision 't is plain they ought not to rebound save when they are equal in their Bulk and Swiftness or that their Swiftness compensates for the Want of Bulk or their Bulk the Want of Swiftness And 't is easie from hence to conclude that they ought in all other Cases so to communicate their Motion as afterwards to proceed along together with an equal Pace Wherefore to know what ought to happen in all the different Suppositions of the Magnitude and Celerity of Colliding Bodies we need only add together all the Degrees of Motion of two or more which ought to be consider'd but as one in the Moment of their Concourse and afterwards divide the Summ of the whole Motion proportionably to the Bulk of each respective Body Hence I conclude that of the seven Rules of Motion Monsieur des Cartes has given the three first are good That the Fourth is false and that B ought to communicate its Motion to C in proportion to the bigness of the same C and after go along in Company so as if C be double to B and B have three Degrees of Motion it must give away two of them For I have sufficiently prov'd that Monsieur des Cartes ought not to have suppos'd in Rest a Force to resist Motion That the Fifth is true That the Sixth is false and that B ought to communicate half of its Motion to C. And that the Seventh is false and that B ought ever to communicate its Motion to C in proportion to the Magnitude and Motion of both B and C. But that if according to the Supposition C be double to B and have three Degrees of Motion whilst C has but two they must proceed together in Company C and B being but one Body at the time of their Collision and therefore we must add together the Degrees of Swiftness which are five and afterwards divide them in proportion to their bigness and so distribute 1 3 2 to B and 3 â
to C which is double to B. But these Rules though certain from what I have said are yet contrary to Experience since we are not in a Vacuum The chief of those Experiences which are contrary to what I have said about the Rules of Motion is the constant rebounding of hard Bodies when they meet one one way and another another or at least their not going in Company after their Encounter In Answer to which we must call to mind what we have formerly said of the Cause of Elasticity namely That there is a Matter of a strangely-violent Motion which continually passes into the Parts of hard Bodies and makes them so by its compressing both their outward and inward Parts For it will be easie from hence to see that at the time of Percussion two encountring Bodies drive and turn off the Current of this Matter from the places nearest to the stricken which Matter resisting with great Violence repells the two Bodies which strike against each other and restores its Passage which the Percussion had stopp'd up That which more clearly still proves my Opinion is
THE Sight is the First the most Noble and Comprehensive of all the Senses insomuch that had it been given us for the Discovery of Truth it alone had had more to do than all the Other wherefore if we can overthrow the Authority the Eyes obtain over our Reason it will be sufficient to undeceive us and to possess us with a general distrust of all the other Senses Our business therefore is to make it appear That we ought in no wise to rely on the Testimony of our Sight in our Judgment of the Truth of things as they are in their own Nature but only in discovering the Relation they have to the welfare and preservation of our Body That our Eyes generally deceive us in all the Representations they make of things in the Magnitude in the Figures and Motions of Bodies in Light and Colours which are the only things we see That none of these things are really what they seem to be that all Mankind is mistaken in them and that hereby we fall into other Errors numberless and infinite We begin with Extension Lo then the Reasons that induce us to believe that our Eyes never represent it to us such as it is in it self With Glasses we discover as often as we please Animals much less than a grain of Sand which is almost invisible Nay there have been seen a thousand times less than they These animated Atoms walk and move no less than other Animals Therefore they must have Legs and Feet Bones in their Legs to support them Muscles to move them Tendons and infinite Fibres in every Muscle lastly Blood or animal Spirits extreamly subtil and refin'd either to fill or make these Muscles move successively Without this it is impossible to conceive they live are nourish'd or translate their little Bodies into different places according to the different Impressions of Objects or rather 't is impossible for those Men themselves have spent all their Life in Anatomy and in disclosing Nature to imagine the number the diversity the delicacy of all the parts these little Bodies are necessarily compounded of whereby they live and perform all those things we see them do The Imagination is lost and confounded at so incredible a littleness it cannot catch the vanishing parts nor take hold of them as being too little to be grasp'd by it And though Reason justifies our Assertion the Senses and Imagination withstand the Conviction and bring us back to Doubt and Uncertainty Our Sight is extreamly short and limited but it ought not to prescribe limits to its Object The Idea it gives us of Extension has very narrow bounds but it does not from thence follow the bounds of Extension are so It is doubtless infinite in a certain Sense and that diminutive part of Matter which is hidden from our Eyes is capable of containing a World in which may be hid as many things though less proportionably as appear in this great World in which we live These little Creatures which we have been speaking of may possibly have other little Animals to prey upon them and which are imperceptible to them by reason of their unspeakable smallness as the others are imperceptible to us What an Hand-worm is in comparison to us That those little Animals are in respect of an Hand-worm and perhaps there may be in Nature less and less still to infinity proceeding in that prodigious proportion of a Man to an Hand-worm We have Evident and Mathematical Demonstrations of the Divisibility of Matter in infinitum and that 's enough to persuade us there may be Animals still less and less than others in infinitum though our Imagination is frighted and starts at such a conception GOD made Matter only to frame his wonderful Works out of it wherefore since we are certain that there are no parts of it the Minuteness whereof is capable of giving Limits to his power in the formation of these little Animals why should we unreasonably confine and lessen the Idea of an Infinite Artist by measuring the Greatness and Depth of his Power and Wisdom by our finite and shallow Imagination We have been in part undeceiv'd by Experiment which hath discover'd to us such Animals as are a thousand times less than an Hand-worm why should we suppose that they are the Last and the Least of all For my part I see no reason to imagine 'T is much more reasonable to be believ'd there are far less than those already discover'd For in fine little Animals are never wanting for the Microscopes but we want Microscopes for them If one examines in the midst of Winter the Cicatricle of a Tulip-roop with a plain Magnifying or a Convex Glass or even with the bare Eye one may easily discover it in the Leaves which are become green Those which are to make the Flower or the Tulip the little triangular part which contains the Seed and the six little Columns that incompass it at the bottom of the Tulip Thus it cannot be doubted but the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root contains in it a Tulip all entire It 's reasonable to believe the same thing of the Cicatricle of a grain of Mustard of that of the kernel of an Apple and generally of all sorts of Trees and Plants though it cannot be discern'd with the Eye nor yet with a Microscope and we may with some sort of certainty affirm That all Trees lye in Miniature in the Cicatricle of their Seed Nor does it appear unreasonable to think that there are infinite Trees conceal'd in a single Cicatricle since it not only contains the future Tree whereof it is the Seed but also abundance of other Seeds which may all include in them new Trees still and new Seeds of Trees Which new Seeds possibly may be big with other Trees and other Seeds of Trees as fruitful as the former in an incomprehensible littleness and thus in Infinitum So that according to this Notion which will not be thought impertinent or whimsical except by those who measure the Wonders of the Infinite Power of GOD by the Idea's of their Senses and Imagination it may be said that in the single kernel of an Apple may be involved Apple-trees Apples and Seeds of Apple-trees for infinite or almost infinite Ages in that proportion of a perfect Apple-tree to an Apple-tree in its Seeds And That Nature does only open and unfold these little Trees by giving a sensible growth to that which is out of its Seed and insensible but most real increases to those which we conceive to be in their Seeds in proportion to their Bigness For it cannot be doubted but there are Bodies little enough to insinuate themselves between the Fibres of those Trees which we conceive in their Seeds and to be serviceable to their Nourishment What has been said of Plants and their Cicatricles we have liberty to conceive of Animals and of the Cicatricles of which they are produc'd We see in the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root an
very few in Natural Philosophy to which it has not given some occasion and if a Man should make a considerate Reflexion thereupon he would possibly be astonish'd at it But though I am not willing to dwell too long upon these things yet I cannot so easily pass by the contempt Men generally have for Insects and other little Animals which are produc'd out of a Matter call'd by them Corrupted 'T is a very unjust contempt founded only on the Ignorance of the thing despis'd and the fore-mention'd Prejudice There is nothing despicable in Nature and all the Works of GOD are worthy of our Respect and Admiration especially if we attend to the wonderful ways he takes both in making and perserving them The least of Flies are as compleat as Animals of an excessive bulk or stature The proportions of their Limbs are as just as those of the other And it seems moreover that GOD has design'd them greater Ornaments to recompense them for the Littleness of their Bodies They have Coronets and Plumes and other Attire upon their Heads which out-shine all that the Luxury of Men can invent And I dare venture to say that all those who have never made use of any thing but their Eyes have never seen any thing so splendid so exact or so magnificent in the Palaces of the greatest Princes as may be seen with Glasses on the Head of an ordinary Fly 'T is true these things are exceedingly Little but it is still more surprizing to find such a Collection of Beauties in so little Room and though they are very common yet that is no Diminution to their Value nor are those Animals thereby less perfect in themselves but on the contrary the Power and Wisdom of GOD appear more wonderful who with such Profusion and Magnificence has shewn an almost infinite number of Miracles in their Production And yet our Sight conceals all these Beauties from us It makes us despise all these Works of GOD so worthy of our Admiration And because these Animals are little in Relation to our Body it causes us to consider them as little absolutely and consequently as despicable by reason of their Littleness as if Bodies could be little in themselves Let us strive then to forbear following the Impressions of our Senses in the judgment which we pass on the Magnitude of Bodies And when we say for Instance That a Bird is little let it not be absolutely understood For nothing is Great or Little in it self Even a Bird is great in comparison of a Fly and if it be little in respect of our Body it doth not follow it is absolutely so since our Body is not the most perfect Rule by which we ought to measure others It is it self very little in reference to the Earth as is the Earth it self in respect of the Circumference which the Sun or Earth describe round each other And so is that Circumference in relation to the space contain'd betwixt us and the six'd Stars and so continuing the progression on For we may still imagine spaces greater and greater ad infinitum But it must not be imagin'd that our Senses exactly inform us of the Relation other Bodies have to our own For Exactness and Justness are no ways essential to sensible Notices which should only be Instrumental to the Preservation of Life It is true we know exactly enough the Relation Bodies which are near us have with our own But in proportion to the distance these Bodies are remov'd from us we know less of them because then they have less relation to our Body The Idea or Sensation of Magnitude which we have upon sight of a Body lessens in proportion to the Body's being in a less capacity of hurting us And that Idea or Sensation increases proportionably as the Body approaches nearer or rather as the Relation it has to our Body is augmented Finally If this Relation altogether ceases that is if any Body is so little or so distant from us as to be incapable of hurting us we forthwith lose the Sensation of it So that by our Sight we may sometimes judge pretty nearly of the Relation other Bodies have to ours And of that which they have to one another But we ought never to think they are of the same Magnitude they appear to us Our Eyes for Example represent the Sun and Moon of one or two Feet diameter but we should not imagine with Epicurus and Lucretius that they are really of that dimension This same Moon seems to us upon sight far greater than the greatest Stars yet no Man doubts but it is incomparably less Thus we see daily on the Earth two things or more of whose magnitude we can have no exact assurance because to make a judgment of this Nature 't is necessary to know the precise distance of these Bodies which is very difficult to be known We are even hard put to 't to judge with any kind of certainty of the Relation there is betwixt two Bodies though never so near us We are forc'd to take them in our hands and hold them one against the other to compare them and after all we often hesitate without being able justly to determine any thing This is visibly acknowledg'd as often as a Man would examine which are biggest of some pieces of Coin that are almost equal for he is then oblig'd to put them one upon another to discover by a surer Method than by Sight whether they correspond in bigness Our Eyes therefore not only deceive us in the Magnitude of Bodies absolutely consider'd but even in the Relation those Bodies have betwixt themselves CHAP. VII I. Of the Errors of Sight about Figures II. We have no Knowledge of the least of them III. The Knowledge we have of the greater is not exact IV. An Explication of some Natural Judgments which prevent our Deception V. That these very Judgments deceive us in some particular junctures OUR Sight is less liable to deceive us in the Representation of Figures than in the Representation of any other thing because Figure is not a thing of an absolute kind but its Nature consists in the Relation which is between the parts which terminate some space and a certain point which we conceive in that space and which we may call as in a Circle the Centre of the Figure Notwithstanding we are mistaken a thousand ways in Figures and the Knowledge we receive from our Senses is not exceedingly exact concerning any one of them We have already prov'd that our Sight discovers not to us all sorts of Extension but only that which is in some considerable proportion to our Body and that for this reason we see not all the parts of the minutest Animals nor those that constitute all hard and liquid Bodies Thus not being able to perceive these parts by reason of their Littleness it follows we are as unable to perceive their Figures since the figure of Bodies is nothing but the Term that
that account we judge it is equally distant from us And thus upon the same grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven are rang'd in the same just distance in a vault perfectly convex since our Mind ever supposes Equality where it discovers no Inequality which yet it ought not positively to admit unless there be evident conviction for it I shall not here insist longer on the Errors of our Sight in respect of the Figures of Bodies since a Man may be sufficiently instructed in any Book of Opticks That Science in effect does only instruct us how to put fallacies on our Eyes and its whole drift and artifice consists meerly in finding means of making us form those Natural Judgments I have been speaking of at a time when they are most impertinent and unseasonable And this cheat may be acted in so many different ways that of all the Figures that are in the World there is not any single one but may be painted in a thousand different fashions so that the Sight must unavoidably be deceiv'd But this is not the proper place of explaining these things more throughly What I have said is sufficient to let us see we should not give over-much credit to the Testimony of our Eyes even in their Representations of the Figures of Bodies though in point of Figures their reports are much more faithful than in any other occasion CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest. HAVING already discover'd the most Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight touching Extension and its Figures I come now to correct those in which this same Sight ingages us about the Motion of Matter And this has no great difficulty in it after what I have already said of Extension For there is so necessary a relation and dependence betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd in the Magnitude of Bodies we must as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too But that I may advance nothing but what is clear and distinct it is necessary to take off whatever is equivocal from the word Motion For this Term has generally two significations The first denotes a certain Power or Force which we imagine in the Body mov'd and which we suppose the cause of its Motion The second is the Translation or continued Conveyance of a Body either in its removal from or approaching to another which we consider as at rest When I say for Instance That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is to be understood in its first signification But if I say simply that I see a Boul in a great Motion it is to be taken in the second In a word the Term Motion signifies at once both Cause and Effect which are yet two things altogether different I am perswaded that Men are under most palpaple and most dangerous mistakes concerning the Force that gives this Motion and Translation to the Bodies mov'd Those fine Terms Nature and Impress'd Qualities are good for nothing but to shelter the Ignorance of the Falsly Learned and the Impieties of the Libertine as I could easily demonstrate But this is not a place proper to discourse of the Power that moves Bodies since that is not of a visible Nature and I am only speaking here of the Errors of our Eyes I defer it till a time when it will be more âeasonable Motion taken in the second sense that is for the Translation of a Body in its removal from another is something of a visible kind and the Subject of this Chapter I have I think sufficiently demonstrated in the sixth Chapter that our Sight does not acquaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies in themselves but only with the mutual relation they stand in to each other and especially to our own From whence I infer that we are incapable of knowing the true and absolute Magnitude of their Motion that is of their swiftness or slowness but only the relation these Motions have to one another and more especially to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body Which I thus prove It is certain that we know not how to judge how great the Motion of a Body is but by the Length of the Space the Body has ran over Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length of the Space describ'd by the Motion it follows that 't is impossible for us to know the true Quantity of the Motion This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have said of Extension and all the force it has proceeds from its being a necessary Conclusion of what I have there Demonstrated I shall now give one which depends on no Supposition I say then that supposing we were able clearly to discover the true Quantity of the Space describ'd it would no way follow that we could know the Quantity of Motion also The Greatness or the Swiftness of Motion includes two things The first is the Translation or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another as from Paris to St. Germains The second is the Time that necessarily goes to the making this Conveyance Now it is not enough to know exactly how far Paris is distant from St. Germains to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion But it must moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Journey Granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight or indeed any other way whatever of the Time that is spent in the passage and of the true Quantity of Duration This is sufficiently evident in that at certain times one Hour seems to us as long as four and on the contrary at other times four Hours slip insensibly away When for Instance a Man's Mind is fill'd with Joy Hours seem no longer than a Moment because then the time passes away without thinking of it But when a Man is dejected with Grief and lies under some sensible Pain or Affliction every day is thought an entire Year The reason of which difference is That in this case the Mind is weary of its Duration because it is Painful The more it applies it self to the thought of it the more it discovers it and thereby finds it longer than in the season of Mirth and Joy or some diverting Imployment which as it were carries the Soul out of it self to fix her closer to the Object of her Joy or her Diversion For as a Man finds a piece of Painting so much larger by how much he stands to consider all the little things represented in it with greater attention or as he finds the head of a Fly considerably
is perpendicularly over our Heads and 't is upon that account her Diameter grows greater in her Ascent above the Horizon because then she 's approaching nearest us The reason then that we see her Greater when she rises is not the Refraction of her Rays meeting with the Vapours which proceed from the Earth since the Image which is at that time form'd from those Rays is lesser but 't is the Natural Judgment we make of her Remoteness occasion'd by her appearing beyond those Lands which we see at a vast Distance from us as has been before explain'd and I am amaz'd to find Philosophers asserting that the reason of this Appearance and Delusion of our Sences is harder to be discover'd than the greatest Aequations of Algebra This Medium whereby we judge of the Remoteness of any Object by knowing the Distance of the things betwixt us and it is often of considerable use when the other means I have spoke of are wholly insignificant for by this last Medium we can judge that certain objects are many Leagues distant which we cannot do by any of the other And yet if we strictly survey it it will be found in several things deficient For first we can only make use of it about things upon the Earth since it can be but very rarely and then very unprofitably imploy'd upon those in the Air or in the Heavens Secondly it cannot be made use of on the Earth but about things a few Leagues distant In the third place we ought to be certain that there are neither Mountains nor Valleys nor any thing of the like nature betwixt us and the Object that hinders us from applying the afore-said Medium Lastly I am perswaded there is no body but has made sufficient Tryals upon the Subject to be convinc'd that it is a thing extreamly difficult to judge with any certainty of the Remoteness of Objects by a sensible View of the things lying betwixt us and them and we perhaps have dwelt two long upon it These then are all the Means we have to judge of the Distance of Objects in which since we have found considerable Imperfections we cannot but conclude that the Judgments that are grounded upon them must needs be very Precarious and Uncertain Hence it is easy to manifest the truth of the Propositions I have advanc'd The Object C was suppos'd considerably remote from A Therefore in many Instances it may be advanc'd on towards D or may have approach'd towards B and no one can discover it because there is no infallible Means whereby to judge of its Distance Nay it may recede towards D when it is thought to approach towards B because the Image of the Object is sometimes augmented and inlarged upon the Retina whether it be because the Air betwixt the Object and the Eye occasions a greater Refraction at one time than at another whether it proceeds from some little Tremlings which happen in the Optick Nerve or lastly that the Impression which is caus'd by an unexact Union of the Rays upon the Retina is diffus'd and communicated to the parts which ought to receive no Agitation from it which may proceed from any different causes Thus the Image of the same Objects being larger on these occasions gives the Soul reason to believe the Object approaches nearer The like may be said of the other Propositions Before I conclude this Chapter I would have it observ'd That it is of great concern to us in order to the Preservation of our Life to have a nicer Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in Proportion to their Nighness to us and that it is a thing useless and insignificant to know exactly the truth of these things when happening in places very remote For this evidently shews that what I have generally advanc'd concerning all the Sences how they never Discover things to us as they are absolutely and in their own Nature but only in Relation to the Preservation of our Body is found exactly True in this particular since we know the Motion or Rests of Objects proportionably better as they approach nearer to us and are incapable of judging of them by the Sences when they are so remote as to seem to have no Relation at all or very little to our Body as for instance when they are five or six hundred Paces distant if they be of a Moderate Bigness or even Nearer than this when they are Lesser or somewhat farther off when they are proportionably Greater CHAP. X. Of our Errors about sensible Qualities I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united IV. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is they produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the fore-going Chapters that the Judgments we form upon the Testimony of our Eyes concerning Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true And yet it must not be allow'd that they are altogether false they contain so much Truth at least as this amounts to that there are Extension Figures and Motions whatever they be which are extrinsical or without our selves I confess we often see things that have no Existence nor ever had and it ought not to be concluded that a thing is Actually without us from our Seeing it without us There is no necessary Connexion between the Presence of an Idea to the Mind of a Man and the Existence of the Thing represented by the Idea Which is manifest enough from the Consideration of what happens to Men in a Dream or a Delirium And yet we may safely affirm that ordinarily Extension Figures and Motions are without us when we see them so These things are not in the Imagination only but are Real And we are not deceiv'd in believing them to have a Real Existence and wholly independent on our Mind tho' it be a very hard thing to prove it It is certain then that the Judgments we form concerning the Extension the Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth But 't is another case in point of those Judgments we make concerning Light Colours Tasts Smells and all other Sensible Qualities For Truth has nothing to do with them as shall be made manifest in the remainder of this First Book We make not here any Distinction between Light and Colours because we suppose them to have no great Difference and that they cannot be separately Explain'd We shall likewise be oblig'd to speak of other Sensible Qualities in general at the same time we shall treat of these Two in particular because they may be accounted for upon the same Principles The things which follow demand the greatest Attention imaginable as being of the highest Importance and very different as to their
will about them They have no Relish of Tasts unless some change happens in the disposition of the Fibres of their Tongue and Brain In short the Sensations have no manner of Dependence upon the Will of Men And 't is only he that created Men that still preserves them in that mutual correspondence of the Modifications of their Soul to those of their Body So that if a Man would have me represent to him Heat or Colour I cannot make use of words to do it But I must impress in the Organs of his Senses such Motions as Nature has affixt these Sensations to I must bring him to the Fire and shew him a piece of Painting And this is the reason why 't is impossible to give Men that are born Blind the least Knowledge of that which we understand by Red Green Yellow or the like For since 't is impossible for a Man to make another understand him when he that hears has not the same Idea's as he that speaks it is manifest that since Colours are neither conjoyn'd to the sound of words nor to the Motion of the Auditory but to that of the Optick Nerve we can never represent them to Men that are Blind since their Optick Nerve cannot be Vibrated by colour'd Objects We have therefore some sort of Knowledge of our Sensations Let us now see how it comes to pass that we are still casting about to know them and that we believe our selves destitute of any Knowledge of them The reason of it undoubtedly is this The Soul since the Original Sin is now as it were Corporeal in her Inclination the Love she has for sensible Objects is perpetually lessening the Union or the Relation she has with those that are intellectual She is disgusted and uneasy in conceiving things that will not enter by the Senses and is presently for leaving the Consideration of them She imploys her utmost endeavour to produce the Images that represent them in her Brain and she is so throughly inur'd to this kind of Conception from our Infancy that she thinks that she can have no Knowledge of what she can have no Imagination Notwithstanding there are a great many things which being not Corporeal cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images as to instance our Soul with all her Modifications At what time therefore our Soul would represent to her self her own Nature and her own Sensations she endeavours to form a Corporeal Image thereof She is in search of her self amongst all Corporeal Beings One while she takes her self for one Thing and another while for Another sometimes for Air sometimes for Fire or for the Harmony of the parts of her own Body And being thus desirous of finding her self among the mass of Bodies and of imagining her own Modifications which are her Sensations as the Modifications of Bodies we need not wonder if she 's bewildred in her wandrings and is misguided out of the Knowledge of her self That which induces the Soul to be still more fond of Imagining her Sensations is her judging them to be in the Objects And moreover that they are the Modifications of them and consequently that they are something Corporeal and fit to be Imagin'd She judges then that the Nature of her Sensations consists only in the motion which produces them or in some other Modification of a Body which is manifestly different from what she feels this being nothing Corporeal nor possible to be represented by Corporeal Images This is what confounds her and makes her believe she is altogether ignorant of her own Sensations As for those who make none of these fruitless Attempts to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images and yet are desirous of having their Sensations explain'd to them they must understand that neither the Soul nor its Modifications can be known by Idea's taking the word Idea in its most proper signification as I have determin'd and explain'd it in the third Book but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation So that when they ask us to explain the Soul and her Modifications by any Idea's they demand what is impossible for all the Men in the World put together to give them Because Men cannot instruct us by giving us Idea's of things but only by making us attentive to those we have already The second Error whereinto we fall about our Sensations is the attributing them to Objects which has been explain'd in the XI and XII Chapters The third is our judging that all Mankind have the same Sensations of the same Objects We believe for example that all the World sees the Sky Azure the Meadows Green and all visible Objects in the same manner as we see them and so likewise all the other sensible Qualities of the other Senses There are many who will wonder even that we call in question those things which they believe indubitable However I can certify them they have not any Reason to judge of these things as they do And though I cannot Mathematically demonstrate they are in an Error I can nevertheless demonstrate 't is the greatest chance in the World if they are not And I have Arguments strong enough to convince them they are certainly deceiv'd That the Truth of what I here advance may be here acknowledg'd we must call to mind what has been already prov'd namely That there is a vast difference betwixt our Sensations and the causes of our Sensations We may conclude from thence that absolutely speaking it is possible for similar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optick Nerves to produce in different Persons different Sensations that is to cause them to see different Colours And it may so fall out that a Motion which shall produce in one Person the Sensation of Blew shall cause the Sensation of Green or Gray in another or perhaps a new Sensation which never any man had besides It is certain I say that this is possible and there is no reason in the World that can prove the contrary However we will grant that it is not probable it should be so It is much more reasonable to believe that GOD acts always uniformly in the Union he has establish'd betwixt our Souls and our Bodies and that he has affixt the same Idea's and the same Sensation to similar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain of different Persons Let it be granted then that the same Motions of the Fibres which terminate in the middle of the Brain are accompany'd with the same Sensations in all Men if it fortunes that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain they will not by consequence excite the same Sensations in their Soul Now to me it seems indisputable that the Organs of the Senses of all Men being not dispos'd in the same manner cannot receive the same Impressions from the same Objects The blows for instance that Porters give one another by way of Complement would cripple some sort of People The
the Sensations we have of Colours And indeed it cannot be doubted but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight of different Persons as well as in those of Hearing and Tasting For what reason is there to suppose an exact conformity and resemblance in the disposition of the Optick Nerve of all Men since there is such an infinite variety in all the things of Nature but especially in those that are Material There is then great probability that all Men do not see the same Colours in the same Objects Nevertheless I am of Opinion that it never happens at least very rarely that any Persons see Black and White of a different Colour from what our selves see them though they do not see them equally Black or White But as to middle Colours such as Red Yellow Blue and especially those that are compounded of these three I am persuaded there are very few Men that have exactly the same Sensations For there are Men sometimes to be met with who see some sort of Bodies of a yellow Colour for instance when they view them with one Eye and of a Green or Blue when they behold them with the other And yet supposing these Men to be born with one Eye only or with two Eyes so dispos'd as to see that of a Red or Yellow Colour which others call Green or Blue they would believe they saw Objects of the same Colours as others do because they would always have heard the Name Green given to that which they see Yellow and Blue to that which to them seems Red. It might as a farther proof be alledg'd that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour because according to the Observations of some Men the same Colours are not equally pleasing to all sorts of People since on supposition these Sensations were the same they would be equally agreeable to all Mankind But because very strong Objections might be urg'd against this Argument founded on the Answer I gave to the former Objection I thought it not solid enough to be propos'd Indeed is is very rarely found that a Man is much more pleas'd with one Colour than another as he takes greater pleasure in one Taste than another The reason of it is That the Sensations of Colours are not given us to judge whether the Bodies about us are fit to nourish us or not This is the part of Pleasure and Pain to shew which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil. Objects in point of Colours are neither good nor bad to eat If Objects on account of their Colour should either seem agreeable or disagreeable the Sight of them would constantly be succeeded with the course of the Animal Spirits which excite and accompany the Passions since the Soul cannot be affected without some Commotion We should often hate good Things and be fond of the bad so that our Life could not be long preserv'd In short the Sensations of Colour are given us meerly to distinguish Bodies from one another and this is effected well enough whether a Man sees Grass green or red provided the Person who sees it green or red sees it always in the same manner But so much for our Sensations Let us now say something of our Natural Judgments and our Voluntary Judgments that attend them The fourth thing to be consider'd which we confound with the three others whereof we have been speaking CHAP. XIV I. Of the False Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. The Reasons of these False Judgements III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments WE instantly fore-see that there are very few Persons who will not be offended at this general Proposition we lay down namely That we have not any Sensation of External things but contains one or more Judgments We know well enough too that the generality of Men are of opinion that there is not any Judgment True or False in our Sensations Insomuch that these Persons surpriz'd with the Novelty of this Proposition will undoubtedly say with themselves How is this possible I do not judge the Wall to be white I see well enough it is so I do not judge that Pain is in my Hand I feel it most infalliby there And who can doubt of things so certain unless he has a different Sensation of Objects from what I have my self In fine their Inclinations for the Prejudices of Childhood will carry them much farther And if they proceed not to Contumely and to the Contempt of those whom they believe of a contrary Sentiment to themselves they will doubtless deserve to be reckon'd amongst the moderate sort of People But 't is not our business to stand prophesying any longer what ill Reception and Success our Thoughts shall meet with 't is much more expedient to draw them out with such convincing Arguments and to set them in so clear a Light as to leave it impossible for a Man to engage them with his Eyes open or to consider them attentively without submitting to them We are to prove that we have no Sensation of External things which does not include some false Judgment or other And the Proof is as follows To me it seems past Controversie that our Souls take not up such vast spaces as are those we see betwixt us and the fix'd Stars though it should be allow'd that they are extended Thus it is unreasonable to believe our Souls are in the Heavens when they see the Stars there Nor is it more credible that they depart out of their Bodies a mile suppose when they see the Houses at that distance The Soul then must necessarily see Stars and Houses where they are not since she goes not out of the Body wherein she is and nevertheless sees them out of it Now whereas the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul and which are the only Stars the Soul can see are not in the Heavens it follows that all Men who see the Stars in the Heavens and thereupon voluntarily judge that they are there make two false Judgments the one Natural and the other Free and Voluntary The one is a Judgment of the Senses or a Compound Sensation which ought not to be a measure for us to judge by The other is a Free Judgment of the Will which a Man may avoid making and consequently must not make if he would avoid falling into Error But let us see upon what grounds a Man believes those same Stars he immediately sees to be out of the Soul and in the Heavens The reason is this That it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when she pleases For she can perceive them only at such times as those Motions are excited in her Brain to which the Idea's of these Objects are affix'd by Nature Now because the Soul has no Perception of the Motions of her Organs but only of her own Sensations and is confident these same
enough to Punish and Reward us to make us sensible of Pleasure and of Pain Finally it is only in GOD and from GOD we ought to hope to receive the Pleasures towards which we have so strong so natural and so just an Inclination CHAP. XVIII I. That our Senses make us liable to Error even in things which are not sensible II. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. III. That sensible Manners are not to be regarded WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses in respect of their Objects as of Light Colours and other Sensible Qualities Now let us see how they misguide us even in regard to those Objects which are not of their Jurisdiction by diverting us from an attentive Consideration of them and inclining us to judge of them from their Testimony and Report a thing that well deserves to be throughly explain'd Attention and Application of the Mind to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects is the most necessary thing in the World to discover what truly they are For as it is impossible to see the Beauty and Excellency of any piece of Art without opening the Eyes and looking fixedly upon it So the Mind cannot evidently see the most part of things with the Relations they bare one to another unless it considers them with Attention But it is certain that nothing casts us off more from our Attention to clear and distinct Idea's than our own Senses and consequently nothing sets us so remote from Truth or so soon throws us into Error For our better conceiving these things 't is absolutely necessary to know That the three ways the Soul has of perceiving viz. by the Senses by the Imagination and by Intellect do not all equally affect her and consequently she does not fix an equal Attention on every thing she perceives by their means For she applies her self most to that which touches her nearest and she is careless enough of that which affects her but a little Now what she perceives by the Senses affects her much and takes up all her Application what she knows by her Imagination touches her less pathetically But that which the Vnderstanding represents to her I would say what she of her self perceives independently on the Senses and Imagination scarce quickens or awakens her at all No body doubts but that the least sensible Pain is more present to the Mind and makes it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of far greater Importance The reason which may be given for this is That the Senses represent the Objects as present the Imagination represents them as absent Now the order of things requires that among many Goods or many Evils propos'd to the Soul those which are present should give her more concern or application than others which are absent because 't is necessary for the Soul suddenly to determine what ought to be done on this occasion And thus she is more intent to a simple prick of a Pin than to the most exalted Speculations And the Pleasures and Evils of this World make a greater Impression on her than the ineffable Pains and infinite Pleasures of Eternity The Senses then do extreamly warp and bend down the Soul to what they represent to her But whereas she is of a limited and finite Nature and so cannot conceive distinctly many things at once she cannot have a distinct Perception of what the Understanding represents to her at the same time her Senses offer any thing to her consideration She forsakes then the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding however proper to discover the truth of Things in their own Nature to apply her self intirely to the confus'd Idea's of the Senses which affect her tenderest part and give her not a representation of things as they are in their own Nature but only as they stand related to her Body If a Man to give an instance would explain any Truth he must necessarily make use of Speech and express his Notions and Internal Sensations by Motions and Manners sensible Now the Soul is incapable of perceiving many things distinctly at the same time so having always a great Attention to what comes in to her by way of the Senses she is scarce at leisure to consider the Reasons which she hears alledg'd But her greatest Application is confin'd to the sensible Pleasure she receives from the finely turn'd Periods the Conformity of the Gestures to the Words from the Genteel Mein of the Face from the Air and the Way and Manner of the Speaker Yet after she has heard she will needs judge because it is the Custom And thus her Judgments must be different according to the diversity of the Impressions she has receiv'd through the Senses If for example the Speaker has a voluble Tongue and easiness of Delivery if he observes the numerousness of Words and a delightful Cadence in his Periods if he has the Look of a Gentleman or of a Man of Parts if he be a Person of Quality or is attended with a great Retinue if he dictates with Authority or speakes in a grave decisive Manner if others listen to him with Silence and Respect if he has some Reputation in the World or is acquainted with the great Wits of the Age In fine if he has the happiness to please or to be esteem'd he will have Reason in every word that he advances and there shall be nothing even to his Band and Cuffs but shall prove something or other But if he be so unfortunate as to have the Qualities quite contrary to these let him demonstrate as long as he pleases he shall prove nothing Let him say the finest things in the World no Man shall ever regard them The Attention of the Auditors being imploy'd upon that only which strikes their Senses the Disgust they conceive at the sight of a Man so uncouth and ill-contriv'd will wholly take them up and hinder the Application they ought to allow to his Thoughts A dirty or a rumpled Band is enough to make the Wearer despis'd and all that comes from him and that way of talking like a Dotard or a meer Philosopher will make the most noble and exalted Truths which are above the reach of the generality of Mankind be look'd on as Ravings and Extravagances Such are the ordinary Judgments of Mankind Their Eyes and their Ears set up for Judges of Truth and not their Reason even in things that depend only on Reason because Men apply themselves meerly to the Sensible and Agreeable Manners of Men and seldom afford any Attention that is Resolute and Serious towards the Discovery of Truth Yet what greater Injustice is there than to judge of things by the Manner of them and to despise Truth because it comes not dress'd in those Ornaments that please us and indulge and flatter our Senses It should be reckon'd a Reproach to Philosophers and such as pretend to Sense to be more inquisitive after these agreeable out-side
not the greatest that is possible Children in their Mother's Womb whose Bodies are not yet compleatly form'd and who are of themselves in a state of the greatest Weakness Impotency and Want that can possibly be conceiv'd ought to be united likewise to their Mothers in the strictest manner imaginable And though their Soul be separate from that of their Mothers yet since their Body is not loos'd and disengaged from her's it ought to be concluded they have the same Sentiments and the same Passions in a word all the same Thoughts as are excited in the Soul on occasion of the Motions which are produc'd in the Body Thus Infants see what their Mothers see they hear the same Cries they receive the same Impressions of Objects and are agitated with the same Passions For since the Air of the Face of a Man in a Passion pierces those which look upon him and Naturally impresses in them a Passion resembling that with which he is possess'd though the Union of that Man with those that consider him be not very great and binding one would think there were good Reason to believe the Mothers capable of imprinting on their Infants all the same Sentiments they are touch'd with and all the same Passions themselves are acted withal For in short the Body of an Infant in the Womb is all of a piece with the Body of the Mother the Blood and the Spirits are common to them both the Sensations and Passions are the Natural Result and Consequents of the Motions of the Blood and Spirits and these Motions are necessarily communicated from the Mother to the Child Therefore the Passions and Sensations and generally all the Thoughts occasion'd by the Body are common to the Mother and the Child These things seem to me beyond exception true for several Reasons which yet I advance not here but as a Supposition which I think will be sufficiently demonstrated by what follows For every Supposition that can stand the shock of all the Difficulties possible to be rais'd against it and repel them ought to pass for an indisputable Principle The invisible Bonds and Cements wherewith the Author of Nature has united all his Works are worthy of the Wisdom of GOD and the Admiration of Men there is nothing in the World at once more surprizing and instructing than this but we are too inconsiderate to regard it We leave our selves to be conducted without considering who conducts us or how he does it Nature is conceal'd from our Eyes as well as its Author and we feel the Motions that are produc'd in us without considering from what Springs they are And yet there are few things more necessary to be known by us since upon the Knowledge of them it is that the Explication of all things relating to Man depends There are certainly in our Brain some secret Springs and Movements which naturally incline us to Imitation for this is necessary to Civil Society It is not only necessary for Children to believe their Fathers for Disciples to believe their Masters and Inferiours their Superiours It is moreover necessary that all Men should be inclinable to take up the like Exteriour Manners and to do the same Actions as those with whom they mean to live For to the intent that Men should have a Connexion and Dependance on each other 't is necessary they come near to one another in the Characters hoth of Body and Mind This is the Fundamental Principle of Abundance of things we shall treat of in the following Discourse But as to what we have to say in this Chapter it is farther necessary to know that there are in the Brain some Natural Dispositions which incline us to Compassion as well as to Imitation It ought to be known then That the Animal Spirits do not only Naturally convey themselves into the Parts of our Body for the performing the same Actions and the same Motions which we see others do but farther for the Receiving after a manner their Hurts and Injuries and participating of their Miseries For Experience teaches us that when we very attentively consider a Man violently struck or dangerously wounded the Spirits impetuously hasten to the Parts of our Body correspondent to those we see wounded in another provided we turn not the current of them another way by a voluntary and forcible Titillation of a different Part from that which we see hurt or wounded Or that the Natural Course of the Spirits towards the Heart and Viscerous parts which is usual in sudden Commotions changes not the Determination of the Flux of the Spirits we are speaking of and hurries them along with them Or lastly unless some extraordinary Connection of the Traces of the Brain with the motions of the Spirits effects the same thing This Translation of the Spirits into the Parts of our Body which are Analogous to those we see injuriously treated in others makes a very sensible Impression on Persons of a fine and delicate Constitution who have a lively Imagination and very soft and tender Flesh. For they feel for instance a kind of shivering or trembling in their Legs by an attentive beholding any one that has a Sore there or actually receives a blow in them For a confirmation of this take what a Friend of mine wrote to me to the same purpose An Old Gentleman that liv'd with one of my Sisters being sick a Young Maid held the Candle whil'st he was Blooded in the Foot But as she saw the Surgeon strike in the Lancet she was seiz'd with such an Apprehension as to feel three or four days afterwards such a piercing Pain in the same part of her Foot as forc'd her to keep her Bed all that time The Reason whereof is this That the Spirits impetuously diffuse themselves into these parts of our Body that by keeping them more intense they may render them more Sensible to the Soul and may put her upon her guard and make her solicitous to avoid those Evils which we behold in others This Compassion in Bodies produces another Compassion in Minds It induces us to Condole and Comfort others in their Troubles because in so doing we Comfort and Solace our selves In fine it gives a check to our Malice and Cruelty For the horrour of Blood and the fear of Death in a word the sensible impression of Compassion often prevents those Persons from Butchering beasts who are the most convincingly perswaded they are meer Machines Because a great many Men are unable to Kill them without Wounding themselves by a Repercussive stroke of Compassion But that which here is most especially remarkable is That the Sensible View of a Wound receiv'd by another produces in those which behold it a so much greater Wound as their Constitution is more weak and delicate Because that sensible View impetuously throwing the Animal Spirits into the Parts of the Body which are correspondent to those they see hurt or wounded they must needs make a greater Impression in the Fibres
according to the first Supposition saw it with the like Application and Commotion The Mother being sensibly smitten imitated the Picture at least in outward posture according to the second Supposition For her Body being compleatly form'd and the Fibres of her Flesh hard enough to withstand the torrent of the Spirits she could not possibly imitate it or become perfectly like it in all things But the Fibres of the Infant 's Flesh being extreamly soft and consequently capable of being moulded into any Figure the rapid course of the Spirits produc'd in his Flesh all that was necessary to render him entirely like the Image which he saw And the Imitation to which Children are the most dispos'd was almost as perfect as it possibly could be But this Imitation having given the Body of the Child a shape too extraordinary was the occasion of its Death There are many other Instances to be met with in Authors of the Power of the Mother's Imagination and there is nothing so odd or extravagant but they sometimes miscarry of For they not only bring forth Deform'd and Mis-shapen Children but the Fruits they have long'd to Eat as Apples Pears Grapes and the like The Mother strongly imagining and impatiently longing to Eat Pears for instance the Infant receives the same impatient Longings and strong Imaginations and the current of the Spirits actuated with the Image of the desir'd Fruit diffusing it self through the little Body which by reason of it flexibility and softness is readily dispos'd for a change of its Figure the poor Infant is fashion'd in the shape of the thing it too ardently desires But the Mother suffers not in her Body by it because it is not soft and plyable enough to receive the Figure of the thing imagined and so she cannot imitate or make her self entirely like it Now it ought to be suppos'd that this Correspondence I have been explaining and which is sometimes the cause of such great Disorders is an unuseful thing and an inconvenient Ordinance in Nature On the contrary it seems to be very advantagious to the Propagation of an Humane Body and the Formation of the Foetus and it is absolutely necessary to the Transmitting several Dispositions of the Brain which ought to be different at different Seasons and in different Countries For it is necessary for instance that Lambs in particular Countries should have their Brain altogether dispos'd for the avoiding and flying Wolves by reason of their abounding in those places and being very formidable Creatures to them It is true this Communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is sometimes attended with unlucky Consequences when the Mothers suffer themselves to be transported with some outragious Passion Notwithstanding it seems to me that without this Communication Women and other Creatures could not easily Propagate their Young Ones in the same Species For though some Reason may be given for the Formation of the Foetus in general as Monsieur Des-Cartes has happily enough attempted yet it is most difficult without this Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of the Infant to explain why a Mare does not produce a Calf and a Hen an Egg which contains a little Partridge or some other Bird of a new Species And I am of opinion that those who have thought much upon the Formation of the Foetus will agree in the same Notion 'T is true that the most reasonable Opinion and that which is most agreeable to Experience touching that very difficult Question about the Formation of the Foetus is this That Infants are already wholly form'd even before the Action whereby they are conceiv'd and that their Mothers only bestow upon them the ordinary Growth in the time of their being big with them Nevertheless this Communication of Animal Spirits and of the Brain of the Mother with the Spirits and Brain of the Infant seems however to be serviceable in regulating this Growth and determining the parts imploy'd in its Nourishment to the posturing themselves almost in the same manner as in the Body of the Mother That is in rendring the Infant like to or of the same Species This is manifest enough by the Accidents which occur when the Imagination of the Mother is disordered and some tempestuous Passion changes the Natural Disposition of her Brain For then as we have just explain'd this Communication alters the Natural Formation of the Infant 's Body and the Mother proves Abortive sometimes of her Foetus so much more resembling the Fruits she longed for as the Spirits find less Resistance in the Fibres of the Infant 's Body We deny not however but GOD Almighty without that Communication we have been mentioning might have dispos'd all things necessary to the Propagation of the Species for infinite Ages in so exact and regular a manner that Mothers should never have miscarried but have always born Children of the same Bigness and Complection and perfectly alike in all things For we ought not to measure the Power of GOD by our weak Imagination and we are ignorant of the Reasons which might have determined Him in the Construction of his Work We daily see that without the help and assistance of this Communication Plants and Trees produce regularly enough their like and that Birds and many other Animals stand in no need of it for the Breeding and Hatching of their Young ones when they brood upon Eggs of a different Species as when a Hen sits on the Eggs of a Partridge For though we have reason to suppose that the Seeds and Eggs have originally contain'd in them the Plants and Birds which proceed from them and that the little Bodies of these Birds may have receiv'd their Conformation by the Communication before-mentioned and the Plants have receiv'd their's by another Communication which is equivalent yet this perhaps would be but a Conjecture But though it should be more than Conjecture yet we ought in no wise to judge by the things which GOD has made what those are which it is possible for Him to make Yet if it be consider'd that Plants which receive their Growth from the Action of their Mother-plant resemble it much more than those which proceed from the Seeds that the Tulips for instance which arise from the Root are of the same colour with their Mother-Tulip and that those which are deriv'd from the Seed are generally very different It cannot be doubted but that if the Communication of the generating Plant with the generated is not absolutely necessary to make it of the same Species it is always necessary to make it of the same Likeness So that though it were fore-seen by GOD that this Communication of the Mother's Brain with the Brain of her Child would sometimes be the occasion of the Death of the Foetus and the Generation of Monsters by reason of the disorderly Imagination of the Mother Yet this Communication is so admirable and so necessary for the Reasons I have alledg'd and for several others
instance who enter upon the Study of Algebra or Analyticks are incapable of taking Algebraick Demonstrations without a great deal of pains and when they have once master'd them they retain them but a short time because Squares for example Parallelograms Cubes Solids and the like being exprest by aa ab a 3 abc c. the Traces whereof have no Natural Connection with their Idea's the Mind finds no hold to fasten the Idea's to and to examine the Relations of them by But those who begin to Study Common Geography most clearly and readily conceive the little Demonstrations that are explain'd to them provided they distinctly understand the Terms made use of Because the Idea's of a Square a Circle or the like are Naturally Connected with the Traces of the figures they see describ'd before their Eyes And it often happens that the meer shewing of the figure used in the Demonstration makes them sooner comprehend it than the Discourses made to explain it Because words being Connected to Idea's by an arbitrary institution only excite not these Idea's readily and distinctly enough to make us easily understand their Relations For 't is chiefly upon that account there is so much difficulty found in learning the Sciences By the way it may be discover'd from what I have been saying that those Writers who coin abundance of new Words and Figures to explain their Notions by spend much pains to very little purpose They think to make themselves intelligible when indeed they take the way of becoming incomprehensible We define say they all our Terms and all our Characters and others ought to agree to them It is true others agree to them with their Will but their Nature is repugnant They cannot fasten their Idea's to these Novel Terms because to that is required custom and long practice The Authors perhaps have attain'd that custom but the Readers have not And when a Man endeavours to instruct the Mind 't is necessary he first know it since he ought to conform to Nature and offer her nothing provoking or offensive Yet we ought not to condemn the Industry and Care Mathematicians take in defining their Terms for Definition is evidently necessary to take away Equivocation But the ordinary and receiv'd Terms ought to be imploy'd as far as possibly they can or such whose common signification is not very remote from that which they pretend to introduce which is a thing not constantly observ'd among the Mathematicians Nor do we pretend by what has been said to condemn Algebra especially such as Mr. Des-Cartes has restor'd and left it to us For though the Novelty of some Expressions in that Science give the Mind some trouble at first yet there is so little variety and confusion in these Expressions and the Assistances the Mind receives from them so much out-weigh the Difficulty found in them that I am of Opinion 't is impossible for a Man to invent a way of Reasoning and Expressing his Reasonings more suited or better accomodated to the Nature of the Mind or that can carry it farther in the Discovery of unknown Truths The Expressions of that Science do not distract the Capacity of the Mind they burden not the Memory they contract and abridge in a wonderful manner all our Idea's and our Reasonings and even render them in some measure sensible by Practice In fine their usefulness is much greater than the Natural Expressions of the delineated Figures of Triangles Squares and others of like Nature which are inserviceable to the Disquisition and Unfolding of Truths any whit intricate and obscure But so much for the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain 'T is seasonable to say something of the Connection of Traces with one another and consequently of the Connection between the Idea's corresponding to these Traces This Connection consists in this that the Traces of the Brain are so firmly connected to one another as 't is impossible to excite them again without the whole retinue which were imprinted at the same time If a Man for instance happens to be in some publick Solemnity in case he observes all the Circumstances and all the Principle Persons that assisted at the time the place the day and all other Particularities the remembrance only of the Place or some other less observable Circumstance of the Ceremony will be sufficient to bring the Representation of all the other to his Mind 'T is upon this account that when we can't recollect the Principal Name of a thing we sufficiently specifie it by making use of a Name which signifies some Circumstance of that thing as not being able to call to Mind the proper Name of a Church we can make use of another Name signifying a thing that has some Relation to it We can say 'T is that Church where there was such a Throng where Mr. such a one Preach'd where we went on Sunday And thus not having the proper Name of a Person ready at hand or when it is more convenient to denote him in another manner we can do it by saying He whose Face was disfigured by the Small-pox the Portly and well-made Gentleman the little crooked Man according as we stand affected towards him though to express a Man in terms of contempt is neither a sign of good Nature nor good Manners Now the mutual Connection of these Traces and consequently of their Idea's one with another is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick but also of infinite other things of greatest concernment in Morality and Politicks and in all Sciences in general which are any ways related to Man and consequently of many things we shall treat of in the sequel of our Discourse The cause of the Connection of many Traces together is the Identity of time wherein they were imprinted on the Brain For 't is enough for many Traces to have been produc'd at the same time to cause that they should never afterwards be excited but in company of one another because the Animal Spirits finding the Channel of these Co-temporary Traces gaping and half open continue their courses in them by reason of their meeting with a more free passage through them than through the other parts of the Brain This is the cause of Memory and the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts The Connections of the Traces are not always conjoyn'd with the Emotions of the Spirits because all the things we see do not always appear either Good or Evil These Connections too may change or break because being not of perpetual necessity for the preservation of Life there is no need they should always be the same But there are certain Traces in our Brain which have a Natural Connection with one another as also with certain Commotions of the Spirits that being necessary to the Preservation of Life And this Connection can't be broken at least not easily because 't is convenient it should always be the same For instance the trace of a
six hours a day they sometimes study six different things 'T is visible that this fault proceeds from the same Cause as the others I have been speaking of For there is great probability that if those who studied in this manner knew evidently how disproportion'd it was to the Capacity of their Mind and that it was more apt to fill it with Error and Confusion than with true Science they would not let themselves be transported with the disorderly motives of their Passion and Vanity For indeed this is not the way to be satisfy'd in our pursuits but the most ready means to know nothing at all CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation to it or that include not something of Infinity in them II. The Inconstancy of the Will is the Cause of that want of Application and consequently of Error III. Our Sensations take us up more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals V. And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar sort of Men. THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error for want of being Infinite or for being of less Extent than the Objects of its Consideration as has been explain'd in the two last Chapters But because it is Inconstant and nothing Resolute in its Action and unable to keep the View fixt and steady on the Object long enough to examine all the parts of it The better to conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of the Mind we must know that the Will is the Directress of its Action that the Will applies it to the Objects which it loves and that the same Will is it self in perpetual fluctuation and disquietude whereof I assign this to be the Cause 'T is not to be doubted but GOD is the Author of all things and has made them only for Himself and that he draws the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression which he perpetually influences him withal 'T is impossible for GOD to have will'd that there should be any Will that did not love Him or that lov'd Him less than any other Good if there could be any other besides Himself it being impossible for Him to ordain that a Will should not love that which was supreamly Amiable or should love that more which was less lovely And thus Natural Love must needs carry us to GOD as proceeding from GOD and nothing being able to stop the motions thereof unless GOD Himself that impresses them There is then no Will whatever but necessarily follows the motions of this Love The Righteous and the Wicked the Blessed and the Damned love GOD with this Love and 't is this Love in one sense that is the Cause of the Misery of the latter For this Natural Love we have for GOD being the same thing with the Natural Impression which carries us towards Good in general towards Infinite Soveraign Good 't is manifest that all Minds love GOD with this Love since there is no other that is the Universal the Infinite the Soveraign Good For lastly All Spirits and even the Divels passionately desire to be Happy and to possess the Soveraign Good and they desire it without Choice Deliberation and Liberty by the bent and necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for GOD for an Infinite Good for a Good that comprehends in Himself all Goods the Natural Motion of our Heart can never stop till we arrive to the possession of this Good The Will then labouring thus with a perpetual thirst being toss'd and agitated with Desires Eagerness and Restless longings for that Good it is not in Possession of cannot but with much Uneasiness suffer the Mind to dwell any time upon Abstract Truths which don't affect it and which it judges incapable of making it Happy It therefore pushes the Mind forward continually to the Research of other Objects and when in this hurry and agitation communicated to it by the Will it meets with any Object that carries the Mark of Good I mean that by approaching the Soul makes it sensible of some internal Delight or Satisfaction then this Thirst of the Heart rises anew these Desires Eagernesses and Fervencies are re-kindled and the Mind oblig'd to wait on them fixes it self only on the Object that either is or seems to be the cause of them to approximate it to the Soul that regales and feeds upon it for some time But the Emptiness of the Creatures being unable to fill the Infinite Capacity of the Heart of Man these little Pleasures instead of extinguishing its Thirst only provoke and inflame it and give the Soul a foolish and vain Hope of being satisfy'd in the multiplicity of Earthly Pleasures which produces a far greater Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which ought to make the Discovery to the Soul of all these Goods It 's true when the Mind falls by chance upon an Object of an Infinite Nature or which includes something great and mighty in it its unsettledness and casting about ceases for some time For finding that this Object bears the badge and character of that which the Soul desires it dwells upon it and closes in with it for a considerable time But this closing and adhesion or rather obstinacy of the Mind to examine Subjects infinite or too vast and unweildy is as useless to it as that Levity wherewith it considers those that are proportion'd to its Capacity since 't is too weak to accomplish so difficult an Enterprise and in vain it endeavours to effect it That which must render the Soul happy is not as I may speak the Comprehension of an Infinite Object this she is not capable of but the Love and Fruition of an Infinite Good whereof the Will is capable through the Motion of Love continually impress'd on it by GOD Himself Which being thus we need not wonder at the Ignorance and Blindness of Mankind because their Mind being subjected to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart which incapacitate it from considering any thing with a serious Application is unable to penetrate into a subject any whit perplex'd and difficult For in short the Attention of the Mind is to intelligible Objects what a steady View of the Eyes is to those of Sight And as a Man that can't fix his Eyes on the Bodies that are about him can never see them well enough to distinguish the differences of their least parts and to discover all the Relations those little parts have to one another So a Man who cannot fix the Eye of his Mind upon the things desir'd to be known can never have a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish all the parts and to observe all the Relations that may possibly be between themselves or themselves and other subjects Yet it is certain that all our Knowledge consists in a clear View of the Relations things stand in to one another So that when it happens as
it is not only most agreeable to Reason but moreover apparent from the Oeconomy of all Nature that GOD never effects by most Round-about and difficult ways what can be done in ways most simple and easie GOD makes nothing needless and without Reason That which shews His Wisdom and His Power is not the working little things by great means this is against Reason and the sign of a limited Understanding But on the contrary the effecting great things by most simple and easie ways Thus it is that purely with Extension He produces all we see admirable in Nature even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals For those who would have absolute Substantial Forms and Faculties and Souls in Animals distinguish'd from the Blood and Organs of their Body for the performance of their functions will at the same time have GOD to want Understanding or suppose him unable to effect those admirable things with Extension all alone They measure the Power of GOD and His supream Wisdom by the Littleness of their own Mind Since then it is possible for GOD to to make all things visible to our Minds by simply Willing they should see what is in the midst of themselves that is what He has in Himself Relative and Representative of these things it is not likely He should have done otherwise and that He should produce for that purpose infinite upon infinite Idea's with every Mind that He has created But 't is to be well observ'd that we cannot conclude that our Minds see the Essence of GOD from their seeing all things in GOD in this Nature because what they see is most imperfect whereas GOD is most perfect They see matter Divisible Figur'd c. and in GOD there is nothing Divisible or Figur'd For GOD is all Being as being infinite and comprehending all But He is not any Being in particular mean while what we see is only one or more Beings in particular and we comprehend not that perfect Simplicity of GOD who concludes all Beings within Himself Besides which it may be said that we see not the Idea's of Things so much as the Things represented by the Idea's for in seeing a Square for instance we use not to say we see the Idea of that Square which is united to the Mind but only the Square that is without The second Reason which obliges me to think that we see all Beings because GOD wills the discovery of what is in Himself representing them and not because we have so many Idea's created with us as there are things to be seen is that this instates created Minds in an absolute Dependance upon GOD and in the greatest that possibly can be For it being so we not only can see nothing but what GOD will have us see but also can see nothing except what He makes us see We are not sufficient of our selves but our sufficiency is of GOD Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid à nobis tanquam ex nobis sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est 'T is GOD Himself that enlightens the Philosophers in that Science which ungrateful Men call Natural though it is deriv'd to them from Heaven GOD hath shewed it unto them Deus enim illis manifestavit He is properly the Light of the Mind and the Father of Lights Pater Luminum 'T is He who teaches Men Knowledge Qui docet hominem Scientiam In a word He is the true Light that lighteth every Man that cometh into the World Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum For 't is no easie thing to comprehend distinctly the Dependance our Minds have on GOD in all their particular Actions supposing they have every thing we distinctly know to be necessary to their Acting or all the Idea's of things present to their Mind And that general and confus'd term Concourse whereby they offer to explain the Dependance Creatures have on GOD raises no distinct Idea in a considerate Mind and yet it is convenient Men should most distinctly know how altogether impotent they are without GOD. But the strongest Reason of all is the manner of conduct the Mind takes in the perceiving every thing It is manifest and known to every one 's own experience that when we would think on any thing in particular we first cast about our View upon all Beings in general and afterwards apply our selves to the consideration of the Object we desire to think on Now it is undoubtedly certain that we could not desire the sight of any particular Object but we must have already seen it though it were confusedly and in general So that it being possible to desire the seeing all Beings sometimes one and sometimes another it is certain that all Beings are present to our Mind and it seems that all Beings can be no otherwise present to our Mind than as GOD is present to it that is He that contains all things in the simplicity of his Essence It seems too that the Mind would not be capable of representing to it self the universal Idea's of Genus Species and the like unless it saw all Beings included in one For every Creature being a particular Being it can't be said we see any thing created when we see for example a Triangle in general In fine I do not believe there is any way of accounting for the manner of the Mind 's knowing several abstract and general Truths but by the presence of Him who can enlighten the Mind ten thousand different ways In short the finest the most sublime the most solid and primary proof or that which supposes least things of the Existence of a GOD is the Idea we have of what is infinite For it is certain that the Mind perceives infinite though it does not comprehend it and that it has a most distinct Idea of GOD which can only arrive through the Union it has with Him Since 't is inconceivable that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect as is that we have of GOD should be any thing of a created Nature But the Mind has not only the Idea of infinite but this Idea is precedaneous to that of finite For we conceive infinite Being from our conceiving Being only not considering whether it be finite or infinite But in order to conceive Finite Being it is necessary to prescind somewhat from that general Notion of Being which consequently must precede it So then the Mind perceives not any thing except in the Idea it has of Infinite and so far is that Idea from being form'd of a confus'd collection of all the Idea's of particular Beings as the Philosophers imagine that on the contrary all these particular Idea's are only participations of that general Idea of infinite as GOD derives not his Being from the Creatures but all the Creatures have their subsistence from Him The last Proof which possibly may go for a Demonstration with those who are us'd to abstract Reasonings is this 'T is impossible for GOD
him also to be an Opiniastre and so conclude all Devoutness Wilfulness and Bigottry Nay they think the Vertuous and Good more Opinionated than the Vicious and Wicked Because these latter urging their Corrupt Opinions as they are buoy'd up by the different commotions of their Blood and Passions stay not long in the same Sentiments but desert them Whereas the Religious remain constant and immovable in theirs as being built upon fixed and unshaken Foundations which depend not on any thing so wavering as the Circulation of the Blood See now the reason why the common sort of People judge the Pious and Vertuous as Opinionated as the Vicious Which is That Good Men are as Passionate for Truth and Vertue as Wicked Men for Vice and Falshood Both one and the other talk much after the same Manner in defending their Opinions In this they are alike though they differ in the Main But this is enough for the World that is unable to distinguish their Reasons and acknowledge the Difference to judge them Alike in every thing because they are Alike in that external way whereof every body is a competent Judge The Godly then are not Obstinate and Opinionated they are only Constant as they ought to be But the Vicious and Licentious are ever Opinionated though they continue but an Hour in their Opinion For those are the Opinionated only who defend a False Opinion though they defend it but a little time The case is much the same with some Philosophers who maintain Chimerical Opinions which they afterwards reject They would have others who defend certain Truths the certainty whereof they plainly see to quit them as Naked Opinions as themselves have done those they were impertinently conceited with And because 't is not easie to pay Deference to them to the prejudice of Truth and the Love a Man naturally has for her makes him heartily espouse her they judge this Man an Opiniastre Those Persons would be to blame obstinately to defend their Chimera's but the others are to be commended for maintaining Truth with Strength and Resolution of Mind The Manner of them both is the same but the Sentiments are different And 't is this Difference of Sentiments which makes the one Constant and the other Obstinate and Opiniated The Conclusion of the Three First Books FROM the Beginning of this Treatise I have distinguish'd as it were two Parts in the Simple and Indivisible Essence of the Soul one whereof was purely Passive the other both Active and Passive together The First is the Mind or Vnderstanding the Second is the Will I have attributed to the Mind three Faculties because it receives its Modifications and its Idea's from the Author of Nature three several ways I have called it Sense when it receives from GOD Idea's confounded with Sensations that is Sensible Idea's upon occasion of some Motions happening in the Organs of the Senses by the Presence of Objects I nam'd it Imagination and Memory when it receiv'd from GOD Idea's confounded with Images which make a sort of languid and feeble Sensaâions which the Mind receives only from some Traces produc'd or excited in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits Lastly I call'd it Pure Mind or Pure Intellect when it receives from GOD the All-pure Idea's of Truth without any mixture of Sensations and Images not by the Union it hath with the Body but with that it has with the WORD or WISDOM of GOD not because it exists in the Material and Sensible World but because it subsists in the Immaterial and Intelligible World not for the knowing Mutable things that are fit for the Preservation of Corporeal Life but for piercing into Immutable Truths which conserve in us the Life of the Spirit I have shewn in the First and Second Book That our Senses and Imagination are very useful to the knowing the Relations External Bodies have to our own that all the Idea's the Mind receives by means of the Body are for the Interest of the Body that 't is impossible to discover any Truth whatever with Evidence by the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination that these confus'd Idea's are of use only in uniting us to our Body and by our Body to all sensible things and that lastly if we desir'd to avoid Error we should not credit their Reports I concluded likewise That it was Morally impossible to know by the pure Idea's of the Mind the Relations which Bodies have with our own that we ought not to reason upon these Idea's to know whether an Apple or a Stone are good to eat but the way to know is to try by Tasting And that though we may employ our Intellect for obtaining a confus'd Knowledge of the Relations foreign Bodies have with ours 't is always the surest way to make use of our Senses I give one Instance more since so necessary and essential things cannot be too deeply imprinted on the Mind I have a Mind to examine for Example Whether 't is more advantagious to be Just or Rich. If I open the Eyes of my Body Justice looks like a Chimaera I see no Allurements that it has The Just I see miserable deserted persecuted naked of Defence and destitute of Comfort For He that is their Comforter and Supporter is not apparent to my Eyes In a word I see not what use Justice and Vertue can be put to But if I contemplate Riches with my Eyes open I presently see the Lustre and Splendor of them and am dazl'd Power Greatness Pleasure and all sensible Goods are the Retinue and Attendants of Wealth and I have no room to doubt but a Man must be Rich if he will be happy Again If I employ my Ears I hear how all Men have Riches in Esteem and that their Talk is only about ways of acquiring them and that they are constantly giving Praises Incense and Honour to those that possess them This Sense then and all the rest inform me that I must be Rich before I can be Happy But let me shut my Eyes and stop my Ears and only interrogate my Imagination and it will constantly represent what my Eyes had seen what they had read and what my Ears had heard to the Advantage and Commendation of Riches but it will represent them in a quite other manner than my Senses For the Imagination always augments the Idea's of those things which are related to the Body and are the Objects of our Love If I resign my self to its Conduct it will presently lead me into an Inchanted Palace much what the same with those celebrated by Poets and Romancers in magnificent Descriptions and here I shall be ravish'd in gazing on those Beauties that need not be describ'd which will convince me that the God of Riches that inhabits it is the only capable of making me Happy Lo here what my Body is able to perswade me for it speaks only on its own behalf and 't is necessary to its welfare that the Imagination bow
Creatures which are either useful to our selves oâ those we love We have yet many other particular Inclinations which depend on these which probably we may treat of elsewhere In this Fourth Book my only Design is to reduce the Errours of our Inclinations to three Heads to the Inclination we have for Good in general to Love of of Our selves and of our Neighbour CHAP. II. I. The Inclination for Good in general is the Principle of the Restlesness of of the Will II. And consequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance III. The first Instance shewing that Morals are but little known by the generality of Men. IV. The second Instance shewing that the Immortality of the Soul is controverted by some People V. That we are in extreme Ignorance in point of Abstract things and which have but little reference to us THAT vast Capacity which the Will has for all Goods in general by reason of its being made for a Good that comprehends in it all Goods can't be fill'd by all the things the Mind represents to it and yet the continual Motion which God impresses it withall is never stopt which necessarily gives a perpetual Disturbance and agitation to the Mind The Will which seeks after what it desires obliges the Understanding to represent all sorts of Objects which when represented by the Understanding the Soul cannot taste or if she tastes she remains unsatisfied She cannot taste them because the View of the Mind is seldom accompanied with Pleasure which is the Seasoning whereby the Soul relishes her Good and she is not satisfied because nothing can stop the Motion of the Soul except the Author of the Impression Whatever the Mind represents as the Good of the Soul is finite and whatever is finite may detain her Love for a moment but cannot fix it When new and extraordinary Objects come under the consideration of the Mind or such as have a Character of Infinite the Will gladly bears with an attentive Discussion for some time as hoping to find what she is in Search of because that which appears Infinite bears the Signature of its real Good but after a while is disgusted with this as with the rest and leaves it Hence it is ever restless and fluctuating because it is fated to seek what it never can find though always in hopes of And it loves whatever is Great Extraordinary and Infinite because having miss'd of its true Good in common and familiar things it fancies it may be found in such as are unknown We shall shew in this Chapter that the Restlessness of our Will is one of the Principal Causes of our Ignorance and the Errours we are guilty of upon infinite subjects and in the two following shall explain what it is that breeds that our Inclination for all that 's Great and Extraordinary First It is plain enough from what has been said That the Will is only solicitous to apply the Understanding to those Objects which are related to us and is very negligent as to the rest For that being by a Natural Impression ever longing and Impatient after Happiness it turns the Understanding only upon those things which afford us Pleasure and Advantage Secondly That the Will permits not the Understanding to busie it self long even about things that afford some Pleasure because as has been said all Created things may please us for a season but they quickly grow distastful and then our Mind declines them and takes new ways to other Delights and Satisfactions Thirdly That the Will is prompted to put the Understanding on these desultory advances from Object to Object from that confus'd and as it were distant Representation the Understanding gives of Him who includes in Himself all Beings as has been said in the Third Book For the Will desiring as I may so speak to bring its real good closer so as to be affected by it and to receive its quickning Motion excites the Understanding to represent it by peice-meal But then this is no longer the General the Universal and infinitely Perfect Being which the Mind perceives but something of a limited and imperfect Nature which the Will speedily abandons as finding it unable to stops Its Motion and please It any considerable time and so pursues after another Object Mean while the Advertency and Application of the Mind being absolutely necessary to the discovery of Truths ever so little abstruse it is manifest that the Vulgar of Men must be most grosly Ignorant even in point of such things as have some reference to them but inconceivably Blind as to all Abstract Truths and to which they have no sensible Relation But we must try to make these things manifest by some examples There is no Science that stands in so near a Relation to us as Moral Philosophy which teaches us our Duties to God and our King our Kindred and Friends and in general to all about us Besides it points out the way we must follow to become eternally Happy so that all Men are under an Essential Obligation or rather an dispensible Necessity of resigning themselves to the Study of it Notwithstanding Generations of Men have successively continued six thousand Years and yet this Science is still very imperfect That part of Morals which respects our Duty to God and which questionless is the Principal of all as relating to Eternity has been little known by Men of the greatest Learning and there are still to be found Men of Sense who have no Knowledge of it though the easiest part of all Moral Philosophy For first of all What difficulty is there to find out the Existence of a God Every of his works is a proof of it All the Actions of Men and Beasts prove it Whatever we think whatever we see whatever we feel demonstrates it In a word there is nothing in the World but proves that there is a God or at least may prove it to Men of attentive Minds who seriously betake themselves to Search after the Author of all things Again it is evident that we must pursue the Orders of God if we will be happy For since He is Just and powerful we cannot Disobey him without being punish'd nor obey Him without a recompence But what is it he requires of us That we love Him that our Thoughts be possess'd with Him and our Heart set upon Him For what end had God in Creating Minds and all things else Certainly no other than Himself So that being made for Him we are indispensibly oblig'd from diverting elsewhere the Impression of Love which He perpetually maintains in us in order to our perpetual loving Him These Truths are not very difficult to be discover'd by any attentive and considering Man and yet this sole Moral Principle That to become Vertuous and Happy 't is absolutely necessary to Love God above all things and in all things is the Foundation of all Christian Morality Nor is there need of very great Application to deduce from thence all necessary
Proof is this We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it This is the General Principle of all the Sciences Necessary Existence is included in the Idea that represents a Being Infinitely Perfect They willingly grant it and consequently we must conclude that an Infinitely Perfect Being exists Allow'd say they on Supposition that this Being Exists But let us make a like Answer to a like Argument that we may judge of the solidity of their Answer A like Argument is this We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it This is the Principle We clearly conceive four Angles to be included in the Idea which represents a Square or we clearly conceive possible Existence to be included in the Idea of a Marble Tower Therefore a Square has four Angles therefore a Marble Tower is possible I say these Conclusions are true supposing a Square has four Angles and that a Marble Tower is possible just as they answer That GOD exists supposing he exists that is in short that the Conclusions of these Demonstrations are true supposing they are true 'T is true should I form such an Argument as this We must attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it we clearly conceive necessary Existence to be included in the Idea of a Body Infinitely Perfect Therefore an Infinitely Perfect Body exists Should I form such an Argument I say I might reasonably be answer'd that it was inconcluding for the actual Existence of a Body Infinitely Perfect and that all it could inferr was this That supposing such a Body was in Being it would have an independent Existence The Reason whereof is this that the Idea of a Body Infinitely Perfect is a Fiction of the Mind or a compos'd Idea and which consequently may be either false or contradictory as indeed it is For we cannot clearly conceive a Body Infinitely Perfect because a Being particular and finite as Body is cannot be conceiv'd Universal and Infinite But the Idea of GOD of Being in General Unlimited Infinite Being is no Fiction of the Mind 'T is not a compos'd Idea that includes any Contradiction there is nothing more simple though it comprehends whatever is or whatever may be Now this Simple and Natural Idea of Being or of Infinite includes necessary Existence For 't is evident that Being I say not this or that Being has its Existence of it self and that Being connot be actually inexistent since 't is impossible and contradictory that true Being should be without Existence 'T is possible for Bodies not to be because they are such particular Beings which participate of Being and depend on it But Being without Restriction is necessary independent and derives what it is only from it self all that is proceeds from it and on that account it self is whatever is But were there not any thing in particular this would be because it is from it self and it could not be clearly conceiv'd as not Being were it not for our representing it as Being in particular or such a Being and our considering quite another Idea than belong'd to it For those that perceive not that GOD is commonly consider not Being but this or that Being and consequently a Being that may or may not exist However in order to make this Argument of the Existence of a GOD more distinctly conceiv'd and to give a clearer Answer to some Objections that might be made to it we must remember that in perceiving a created Being we see it not in it self nor by it self but as has been prov'd in the Third Book by the View of certain Perfections that are in GOD representing it So that the Essence of that Creature may be seen without seeing its Existence we may see in GOD what represents it though it does not exist And for the Reason necessary Existence is not included in the Idea that represents it it not being necessary that it exist in order to our seeing it But the Case is different with the Infinitely Perfect Being we can't see him but in himself For nothing Finite can represent what 's Infinite GOD therefore cannot be seen but he must exist The Essence of a Being Infinitely Perfect cannot be seen without seeing its Existence We cannot see it barely as a possible Being For what is there to contain it Nor can we thing of it but it must exist But 't is to no purpose to offer these Demonstrations to the Common sort of People These are Demonstrations which we call Personal because they convince not Universally If we would convince them we must apply such as are of a more sensible Nature and surely they are plentiful enough For there is no Truth that has more Proofs than that of the Existence of a GOD. This we urg'd only to shew that Abstract Truths making little Impression on our Senses pass for Illusions and Chimeras Whereas gross and palpable Truths that strike the Senses forcing the Soul to consider them induces us to believe they have much Reality because ever since the Fall they have made powerful Impressions on our Mind For the same Reason 't is never to be hop'd that the Vulgar of Men will ever submit to that Demonstration which proves Brutes to be insensible namely that since they are innocent as all the World allows and I suppose if they were capable of Sensation it might happen that under an Infinitely Just and Omnipotent GOD an Innocent Creature might suffer Pain which is a Penalty and the Punishment of some Sin Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom Sub justo Deo quisquam nisi mereatur miser esse non potest which St. Austin with a great deal of Reason urges against Julian to prove Original Sin and the Corruption of our Nature They fancy there is nothing of Strength or Truth in this nor in many other Axioms which prove that Beasts have no Sensation because as has been said these Axioms are Abstract have nothing sensible or palpable in them and make no Impression on the Senses Those sensible Actions and Motions perform'd by Beasts for the Preservation of their Life though only probable Inducements affect us more and consequently weigh more with us to believe they endure Pain when we strike them and they cry than that abstract Reason of Pure Intellect though most certain and evident in it self For 't is plain that most Men have no other Reason to believe that Beasts have Souls than the sensible View of all those things they do for the Preservation and Security of Life Which from hence is sufficiently apparent that most People fancy there is no Soul in an Egg though the Transmutation of an Egg into a Chicken is infinitely harder than the bare Conservation of the Chicken when compleatly form'd For as greater Art is requir'd to fabrick a Watch out of a piece of
since it rather respects Morals and Politicks than our Subject And whereas this Inclination is always accompany'd with the Passions it might perhaps be more appositly treated of in the next Book But 't is not of so great concern to be so nicely methodical in this Case That we may rightly comprehend the Cause and Effects of this Natural Inclination it is requisite to know that GOD loves all his Works and that he strictly unites them to one another for their mutual Preservation For Loving incessantly the Works he produces it being his Love that produces them he also continually impresses on our Heart a Love for his Works that is he produces constantly in our Heart a Love like his own And to the intent the Natural Love we have for our selves might not swallow up or too much infringe upon that which we have for exteriour things but on the contrary that these two Loves which GOD puts in us might cherish and strengthen each other he has so artfully united us with all things about us and especially with those Beings of the same Species as our selves that their Evils naturally afflict us their Joy rejoyces us their Rise their Fall or Diminution seem to augment or diminish respectively our own Being The new Honours of our Relations or Friends the fresh Atchievements of those who have the nearest Engagements to us The Conquests and Victories of our Prince and even the late Discoveries of the New World give as it were an additional growth to our Substance Belonging to all these things we rejoyce at their Grandure and Extent We gladly would that even the World was without Bounds and that Notion of some Philosophers that the Works of GOD are infinite not only seems worthy of GOD but most agreeable to Man who can conceive nothing nobler than the being a part of Infinity whilst as inconsiderable as he is in himself he fancies he feels himself infinitely enlarg'd by an expansion of Thought into the infinite Beings that surround him 'T is true the Union we have with all those Bodies that rowl in the vast spaces is not very binding and consequently insensible to the greatest part of Men and there are some who interess themselves so little in the Discoveries made in the Heavens that one would think they had no natural Union to them did we not know that it was for want of Knowledge or for their too applicative Adherencies to other things The Soul though united to the Body which she animates is not always sensible of the Motions that occur in it or if she be yet she does not always actually consider them The Passion whereby she 's acted being often greater than the Sensation wherewith she 's affected makes her seem to have a stricter Adherence to the Object of her Passion than to her own Body For 't is chiefly by the Passions that the Soul expands her self abroad and finds she is actually related to all surrounding Beings as it is especially by Sensation that she expands through her own Body and finds she is united to all the Parts that compose it But as we are not to conclude that the Soul of a Man in a Passion is not united to his Body because he exposes himself to Death and is unconcern'd for his own Preservation so it ought not to be imagin'd we are not naturally engag'd to all things because there are some we are not at all concern'd for Would you know for instance whether Men have any Adhesions to their Prince or their Country Enquire out such as are acquainted with the Interests of them and have no particular Engagements of their own to take them up and you will then see how earnest they are for News how impatient to hear of Battels how joyful for a Victory and how melancholy upon a Defeat And this will convince you how strictly Men are united to their Prince and their Country In like manner would you know whether Men are united to China Japan the Planets or Fix'd Stars Enquire out or only imagine to your self some whose Country or Family enjoy a settl'd Peace who have no particular Passions and that are not actually sensible of the Union that binds them to nearer Objects than the Heavens and you will find if they have any Knowledge of the Magnitude and Nature of these Stars they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them will consider them with Pleasure and if they have Art enough will willingly be at the pains of observing and calculating their Motions Such as are in the hurry of Business have little Curiosity for the Appearance of a Comet or the Incidence of an Eclipse but Men that have no such Dependencies to nearer things find themselves considerable Employment about such Events because indeed there is nothing but what we are united to though we have not always the Sense of this Union as a Man does not always feel the Soul united I don't say to his Arm or Hand but to his Heart and Brain The strongest Natural Union which GOD has establish'd between us and his Works is that which cements and binds us to our Fellow-Brethren Men. GOD has commanded us to love them as our Second-selves and to the end that Elective Love with which we prosecute them might be resolute and constant he supports and strengthens it continually with a Natural Love which he impresses on us and for that purpose has given us some invisible Bonds which bind and oblige us necessarily to love them to be watchful for their as our own Preservation to regard them as parts necessary to the whole which we constitute together with them and without which we could not subsist There is nothing more admirably contriv'd than those Natural Correspondencies observable between the Inclinations of Men's Minds between the Motions of their Bodies and again between these Inclinations and these Motions All this secret Chain-work is a Miracle which can never be sufficiently admir'd nor can ever be understood Upon the Sense of some sudden surprizing Evil or which a Man finds as it were too strong for him to overcome by his own Strength he raises suppose a loud Cry This Cry forc'd out frequently without thinking on it by the disposition of the Machine strikes infallibly into the Ears of those who are near enough to afford the Assistance that is wanted It pierces them and makes them understand it let them be of what Nation or Quality soever for 't is a Cry of all Nations and all Conditions as indeed it ought to be It makes a Commotion in the Brain and instantly changes the whole Disposition of Body in those that are struck with it and makes them run to give succour without so much as knowing it But it is not long before it acts upon their Mind and obliges their Will to desire and their Understanding to contrive means of assisting him who made that Natural Petition provided always that urgent Petition or rather Command be just and according
the Will of man as a Will it essentially depends on the Love that God bears to himself on the Eternal Law and in short on the Will of God It is only because God loves himself that we love any thing for if God did not love himself or did not continually influence the Soul of man with a Love like his own that is with the Motion of Love which a Man feels in himself for Good in general we should love nothing we should will nothing and consequently should be destitute of Will since Will is nothing else but that Impression of Nature that carries us towards Good in general as hath been said several times But the Will considered as the Will of Man essentially depends upon the Body since it is by reason of the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits that it feels its self affected with all its sensible Commotions And therefore I have called Natural Inclinations all the Motions which the Soul has common with pure Intelligences together with some in which the Body hath a great Share but of which it is only the indirect Cause and End and I have explained them in the foregoing Book Here I understand by Passions All the Motions which naturally affect the Soul on occasion of the extraordinary Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits And so shall these sensible Commotions be the Subject of this Book Though the Passions be inseparable from the Inclinations and Men be only susceptible of a sensible Love and Hatred because they are capable of a Spiritual Love and Hatred however it was though fit to treat of them separately in order to prevent Confusion For if it be considered That the Passions are far stronger and livelyer than the Natural Inclinations that they have for the most part other Objects and are always produced by different Causes it will be granted That we do not distinguish without Reason things that are inseparable in their own Nature Men are capable of Sensations and Imaginations only because they are capable of pure Intellections the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind and yet none finds fault with those that distinctly treat of those Faculties of the Soul which are naturally inseparable Last of all the Senses and Imagination differ not more from the pure Understanding than the Passions from the Inclinations And therefore as the three first Faculties use to be distinguished so ought also the two last that we may the better distinguish what the Soul receives from its Author with Relation to its Body from that which it also has from him but without that Relation The only Inconveniency that may grow out of the distinction of two things so naturally united is the necessity of repeating some things that had been said before as is usual in the like occasions Man is one though he be Compounded of several parts and the union of those parts is so intimate that one of them cannot be affected without a Commotion of the whole All his Faculties are linked together and so subordinated that it is impossible to explain some of them without touching upon the others So that when we labour to find out a Method to prevent Confusion we necessarily fall into Repetitions but 't is better to repeat than not to be Methodical because we ought above all to be plain and intelligible and therefore whatever we can doe in this occasion is to repeat if possible without wearying the Reader The Passions of the Soul are Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to love our Body and whatever is useful for its preservation As the natural Inclinations are Impressions of the same Author that principally move us to love him as the Sovereign Good The natural or occasional Cause of these Impressions is the Motion of the Animal Spirits which disperse through the Body to produce and maintain in it a disposition suitable to the Object perceiv'd that the Mind and Body may in that conjuncture mutually help each other For 't is the Institution of God that our Willings be attended with such Motions of our Body as are fit to put them in execution and that the Motions of our Body which Machinally rise in us at the perception of some Object be follow'd with a Passion of the Soul that inclines us to will what seems at that time profitable to the Body It is the continual Impression of the Will of God upon us that keeps us so strictly united to a portion of matter for if that Impression of his Will should cease but a moment we should instantly be rid of the Dependency upon our Body and all the Changes it undergoes For I cannot understand what some people imagine that there is a necessary Connection betwixt the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits and the Commotions of the Soul Some small Particles of Choler violently move in the Brain must therefore the Soul be agitated with some Passion and must that Passion be Anger rather than Love What Relation can there be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemy's Imperfections the Passion of Contempt or Hatred and the Corporeal Motion of some Particles of the Blood that beat against some parts of the Brain How they can imagine that the one depend upon the other and that the Union or Connection of two things so distant and so incompatible as the Mind and Matter can be caused and preserved any otherwise than by the continual and Almighty Will of the Author of Nature is to me unconceivable Those that suppose that Bodies necessarily and by themselves communicate their Motion to each other in the instant of their concourse make but a probable supposition neither is their prejudice altogether groundless since Bodies seem to have an Essential Relation to Bodies But the Mind and Body are two sorts of Beings so opposite that those who think that the Commotions of the Soul necessarily follow upon the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits do it without the least probability For nothing but our own Consciousness of the Union of those two Beings and the Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures can make us imagine another Cause of the Union of our Soul and Body than the Will of God It is hard to determine whether that Union or Connection of the thoughts of the Mind of Man with the Motions of his Body is a punishment of Sin or a Gift of Nature And some persons believe it a rash and imprudent Attempt to chuse one of these Opinions rather than the other It is well known that Man before his Sin was not a Slave but absolute Master of his Passions and that he could merely by his Will stop at his pleasure the Agitation of the Blood that caused them But we can hardly persuade our selves that the Body did not importune the Soul of the first Man to find out such things as were fit for the preservation of his Life We can scarce believe but Adam before his
us The second is a New Determination of the Motion of the Will towards that Object provided it be or seem to be a Good Before that View the Natural Motion of the Soul was either undetermin'd that is to say she was carried towards Good in general or it otherwise determined by the knowledge of some particular Object But in the very instant of the mind 's perceiving that Relation of the new Object to it self that general Motion of the Will is forthwith determin'd conformably to the perception of the Mind The Soul advances near that Object by her Love that she may relish it and discover her good in it through a sensible delectation which the Author of Nature affords her as a Natural Reward of her Inclination to Good She judged that that Object was a Good by an abstracted and unpathetick Reason but she persists in the persuasion of it through the Efficacy of Sensation and the livelyer that Sensation is the stronger is her adhesion to the Good that seems to be the Cause of it But if that particular Object be considered as Evil or able to deprive us of some Good there happens no New Determination in the Motion of the Will but only the Motion towards the Good oppos'd to that seemingly evil Object is augmented which augmentation is greater or lesâer as the Evil seems to be more or less formidable to us For indeed we hate only because we love and the Evil that is without us is judg'd no farther Evil than with reference to the Good of which it deprives us So that Evil being consider'd as a privation of Good to fly from Evil is to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to tend towards Good and therefore there happens no new determination of the Natural Motion of the Will at the presence of an unwelcome Object but only a Sensation painful distasteful or imbitter'd which the Author of Nature inflicts on the Soul as a pain naturally consequent to her being depriv'd of Good Reason alone had not been sufficient to carry her to it wherefore this painful and vexing Sensation is superadded to quicken her Thence I conclude that in any Passion whatsoever all the Motions of the Soul towards Good are the Motions of Love But as we are affected with divers Sensations according to the various Circumstances that attend the View of Good and the Motion of the Soul towards it so we come to confound our Sensations with the Commotions of the Soul and to imagine as many different Motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Upon this head it must be observed that Pain is a true and real Evil and no more the Privation of Pleasure than Pleasure the Privation of Pain for there is a great difference betwixt not feeling or being depriv'd of such a Sensation of Pleasure and the actual enduring of Pain So that every Evil is not precisely so because it deprives us of Good but only that Evil as I have explain'd that is without us or is not a Modification of our Soul Nevertheless as by Goods and Evils we commonly understand things good or evil and not the Sensations of Pleasure and Pain which are rather the natural Tokens by which the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil it may be said methinks without Equivocation that Evil is nothing but the privation of Good and that the natural motion of the Soul that removes us from Evil is the same with that which carries us to good for in brief all natural Motion being an Impression of the Author of Nature whose acting centers in himself and who can incline us only towards himself The true Motion of the Soul is always essentially the Love of Good and but accidentally an Aversion from Evil. I grant that Pain may be consider'd as an Evil and in that sense the Motion of the Passions which is stir'd up by it is not real since we never will Pain and though we positively will the absence of Pain yet 't is only because we positively will the Preservation or Perfection of our Being The third thing to be observ'd in every Passion is the Sensation that attends them the Sensation of Love Hatred Desire Joy Sorrow which are all different in the different Passions The fourth thing is a new Determination of the course of the Animal Spirits and Blood to the outward and inward parts of the Body Before the View of the Object of the Passion the vital Spirits were dispers'd throughout the whole Body for the preservation of all its parts in general but at the appearance of that new Object all this Order and Oeconomy is disturb'd and most part of the Spirits are thrown into the Muscles of the Arms Legs Face and other exteriour parts of the Body to put them in a disposition suitable to the ruling Passion and to give it such a gesture and motion as are necessary for the obtaining or avoiding the imminent Good or Evil But if its own Forces are insufficient for its occasions these same Spirits are distributed in such a manner as make it machinally utter certain words and cries and which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an air and comportment as is capable of actuating others with the same Passion it self is possess'd with For Men and Beasts having a mutual cohesion by the Eyes and Ears when any one of them is in a violent Commotion it necessarily affects the Spectators and Hearers and naturally makes upon their Imagination such an Impression as troubles them and moves them to preserve it As to the rest of the Animal Spirits they violently descend into the Heart Lungs Liver Spleen and other Viscera thence to draw contributions and to hasten those parts to send forth a sufficient and timely supply of Spirits necessary to preserve the Body in that extraordinary Contention The fifth thing is a sensible Commotion of the Soul who feels her self agitated by an unexpected overflow of Spirits This sensible Commotion of the Soul always attends that Motion of the Spirits that the Soul may participate of all that affects the Body even as the Motion of Spirits is raised in the Body when the Soul is carried toward any Object For the Body and Soul being mutually united their Motions are reciprocal The sixth thing are several Sensations of Love Hatred Joy Desire Sorrow that are produced not by the Intellectual view of Good or Evil as those that have been already mention'd but by the various concussions that are caused in the Brain by the Animal Spirits The seventh thing is a certain Sensation of Joy or rather internal Satisfaction which detains the Soul in her Passion and assures her that she is in the fittest State she can be in reference to the Object she considers This internal satisfaction attends all the Passions whatsoever whether they proceed from the sight of an Evil or from the sight of a Good Sorrow as well as Joy This satisfaction makes
all the Passions pleasant and induces us to yield our consent and give up our selves to them and 't is that satisfaction which must be overcome by the Delights of Grace and the Comforts of Faith and Reason For as the Joy of the Mind is the result of a certain or evident Knowledge that we are in the best state that can be in relation to the Objects perceiv'd by the Understanding so the pleasantness of the Passions is a natural consequence of that confused Sensation we have of being in the best state we can be in reference to those things we perceive by our Senses Now 't is by the Joy of the Mind and the Comforts of Grace that the false delight of the Passions which makes us Slaves to sensible Goods must be vanquished All the forementioned things are to be found in all the Passions unless they be raised by confused Sensations and that the Mind perceive not the Good or Evil from whence they proceed for then 't is plain that they have not the three first qualifications It likewise appears that all these things are not free since they are in us without our Consent and even against it since the Sin but that the Consent of our Will is the only thing which is really in our power However it will be fit to explain all these things more at large and to make them more sensible by some Instances Let us suppose a Man to whom an Affront has been actually offer'd or one whose Imagination is either naturally strong and lively or over-heated by some Accident as a Disease or a Surfeit of Sorrow and Melancholy This Man in his Closet fancies that such a one who perhaps does not think upon him is willing and ready to wrong him The sensible View or the Imagination of the Opposition betwixt the Actions of his Enemy and his own designs will be the first Cause of his Passion That the Motion of this Man's Will may acquire some new determination it is not absolutely necessary that he should receive or imagine he receives any Affront for 't is sufficient that his Mind only should think on it without his Body's being concern'd in it However as this new determination would not be the determination of a Passion but only a most weak and languishing Inclination 'T is better to suppose that some great opposition is actually made to this Man's Designs or that he strongly fancies that it will be so than to make another Supposition wherein the Senses and Imagination are little or not at all concern'd The second thing to be consider'd in this Man's Passion is an increase of the Motion of his Will towards that Good of which his real or pretended Enemy endeavours to deprive him the stronger the opposition is or appears the more considerable will be the increase He at first hates his Adversary only because he loves that Good and his Hatred against him grows in proportion to his Love for it because the Motion of the Will in the Passion of Hatred is at bottom nothing else but a Motion of Love that Motion of the Soul towards Good not differing from that by which she avoids its Privation as has been already observ'd The third thing is a Sensation suitable to that Passion in our Instance 't is a Sensation of Hatred But though the Motion of Hatred be the same with that of Love yet the Sensation of Hatred is altogether different from that of Love as any one may experience in himself Motions are Actions of the Will but Sensations are Modifications of the Mind The Motions of the Will are natural Causes of the Sensations of the Mind and these Sensations of the Mind reciprocally encourage and keep up the Motions of the Will in their Determination The Sensation of Hatred is in the Man before us the natural result of the Motion of his Will excited upon the view of Evil and this Motion is afterwards maintained by the Sensation it hath produced What we have just now said of this Man might happen to him though he had not a Body But because he 's made up of two Substances naturally united the Motions of his Soul are communicated to his Body and those of his Body to his Soul so that the new Determination or the increase of the Motion of his Will naturally causes a new Determination in the Motion of the Animal Spirits which is always different in all the Passions though the Motion of the Soul be still almost the same The Spirits therefore are violently driven into the Arms Legs and Face to dispose the Body in a manner adapted to the Passion and to shed over the Face the Look of an injured Person with reference to all the Circumstances of the Injury receiv'd and to the Quality and Capacity both of the Agent and Patient That Expansion of the Spirits is so much the more strong abundant and quick as the Good is greater the Opposition more vehement and the Brain livelyer affected And therefore if the Person whereof we speak only imagine himself injur'd or if he receive a real but slight injury that makes no considerable concussion in the Brain the Expansion of the Animal Spirits will prove weak and languishing and perhaps insufficient to alter the natural and ordinary Disposition of the Body But if the Outrage be exceeding great or the Imagination enflam'd the Brain will be extraordinarily shaken and the Spirits so violently dispers'd that in a moment they will imprint on the Face and Body the Symptoms of the ruling Passion If he be strong enough to obtain the Victory his Countenance will be fierce and threatning If weak and unable to withstand the overwhelming Evil he will appear humble and submissive His Moans and Tears naturally exciting in the Spectators and even in his Enemy Motions of Pity he will draw from thence those succours which he could not expect from his own strength True it is that if the Spirits and Fibres of the Brain in the Spectators and Adversary of that unhappy Wretch be already agitated with a violent Motion contrary to that which breeds Compassion in the Soul the bemoanings of the Distress'd will but increase their Fury and so would his undoing be inevitable should he always keep the same Countenance and Aspect But Nature has provided for it for at the sight of the imminent loss of a great good there are naturally produced on the Face such strange and surprizing Characters of Rage and Despair as to disarm the most Barbarous Enemies and to make them as it were unmovable That frightfull and unexpected sight of the Lineaments of Death drawn by the Hand of Nature upon the Face of an unfortunate Person stops in the very Enemy stricken therewith the Motions of the Spirits and Blood that carried him to Revenge and in that favourable moment of Audience Nature printing again an humble submissive air upon the Face of the poor Wretch that begins to entertain some hopes because of the unmovableness and
a convenient Staâe but the Soul relishes it with great Satisfaction whereas it is never in a State conârary to its Good and Preservation but that she endures it with pain And therefore when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the Course of the Spirits which the View of the Object of the Passion produces in the Body to put in it the most convenient State with relation to that Object the Soul by Nature's Law is affected with a Sensation of Satisfaction and Delight because her Body is in the Disposition it requires whereas when according to the Laws of Reason the Soul stops the Current of the Spirits and withstands those Passions she suffers a Pain proportionable to the Evil that may from thence arise to the Body For as the Reflection that the Soul makes upon her self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing her Duty and submitting to the Orders of God she is conscious that she is in a due and convenient state or when having given her self up to her Passions she is afterwards affected with Remorse which teaches her that she is in a corrupt Disposition So the Course of the Spirits raised for the good of the Body is first attended with sensible and afterwards with Spiritual Joy or Sorrow according as the Course of the Animal Spirits is retarded or promoted by the Will There is however this notable difference betwixt the Intellectual Joy that attends the clear Knowledge of the good Estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure that accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the intellectual Joy is solid and substantial without Remorse and as immutable as its Original Cause the Truth whereas sensible Joy is almost ever followed with the Sorrow of the Mind or the Remorse of the Conscience and is as restless and fickle as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood from whence it proceeds To conclude the first is for the most part attended with an exceeding Joy of the Senses when it is derived from the Knowledge of the great good that the Soul possesses whereas the other is very rarely accompanied with any great Joy of the Mind though it proceeds from a Good considerable for the Body but contrary to the Good or Perfection of the Soul 'T is nevertheless true That without the Grace of our Lord the satisfaction the Soul relishes when she gives her self up to her Passions is more grateful than that which she enjoys when she follows the Rules of Reason which satisfaction is the Source of all the Disorders that have attended the Original Sin and would have made us all Slaves to our Passions had not the Son of God rid us from their Tyranny by the Delectation of his Grace For what I have said on behalf of the Joy of the Mind in opposition to the Joy of the Senses is only true amongst the Christians and was altogether false in the Mouths of Seneca Epicurus and all the most rational of the Heathen Philosophers because the Yoke of Christ is only sweet to those that belong to him and his Burthen only light when his Grace helps us to support the Weight of it CHAP. IV. That the Pleasure and Motion of the Passions engage us in Errours and false Judgments about Good That we ought continually to resist them How to impugn Libertinism ALL those general Qualities and Effects of the Passions that we have hitherto treated of are not free they are in us without our Leave and nothing but the Consent of our Will is wholly in our Power The View or Apprehension of Good is naturally followed with a Motion of Love a Sensation of Love a Concussion of the Brain a Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion of the Soul that encreases the first Motion of Love a new Sensation of the Soul that likewise augments the first Sensation of Love and lastly a Sensation of Satisfaction which recompenses the Soul for the Bodies being in a convenient State All this happens to the Soul and Body naturally and mechanally that is without her having any part in it nothing but her Consent being her own real Work This Consent we must regulate preserve and keep free in spite of all the Struggle and Attempts of the Passions We ought to submit our Liberty to none but God and to yield to nothing but to the Voice of the Author of Nature to inward Evidence and Conviction and to the secret Reproaches of our Reason We ought never to consent but when we plainly see we should make an ill Use of our Liberty in with-holding our Consent This is the principal Rule to be observ'd for the avoiding of Errour God only makes us evidently perceive That we ought to yield to what he requires of us to him alone therefore we ought to devote our Services There is no Evidence in the Allurements and Caresses in the Threats and Frightnings caused in us of the Passions they are only confused and obscure Sensations to which we must never yield up our selves We must wait till all those false Glimpses of the Passions vanish till a purer Light illuminates us till God speaks inwardly to us We must enter within our selves and there seek him that never leaves us that always enlightens us He speaks low but his Voice is distinct his Light is weak but pure But no his Voice is as strong as 't is distinct and his Light is as bright and active as 't is pure But our Passions continually keep us from home and by their Noise and Darkness hinder us from being instructed by his Voice and illuminated by his Light He speaks even to those that ask him no Questions and those whom Passions have carried farthest from him fail not yet many times to hear some of his Words but loud threatning astonishing Words sharper than a two-edged Sword piercing into the inmost Recesses of the Soul and discerning the Thoughts and Designs of the Heart For all things are open to his Eyes and he cannot see the unruly Actions of Sinners without lashing them inwardly with smarting Reproofs We must then re-enter into our selves and approach near him we must interrogate him listen to him and obey him for by always listning to him we shall never be deceived and always obeying him we shall never be subjected to the Inconstancy of the Passions and the Miserie 's due to Sin We must not like some pretenders to Wit whom the Violence of Passion has reduced to the Condition of Beasts who having a long time despised the Law of God seem at last to have retained no Knowledge of any other than that of their infamous Passions We must not I say imagine as do those Men of Flesh and Blood that it is following God and obeying the Voice of the Author of Nature to give up our selves to the Motions of Passions and to comply with the secret Desires
of our Heart This is the utmost possible Blindness 't is according to St. Paul the temporal Punishment of Impiety and Idolatry that is to say the Desert of the most enormous Crimes And herein indeed the greatness of this terrible Punishment consists that instead of allaying the Anger of God as do all the others in this World it continually exasperates and encreases it till that dreadful Day comes wherein his just Wrath shall break out to the Confusion of Sinners Their Arguings however seem likely enough as being agreeable to common Sense countenanc'd by the Passions and such I am sure as all the Philosophy of Zeno could never overthrow We must love Good say they Pleasure is the Sign which Nature has affix'd to it to make it known and that Sign can never be fallacious since God has instituted it to distinguish Good from Evil. We must avoid Evil say they again Pain is the Character which Nature has annex'd to it and a Token in which we cannot be mistaken since it was instituted by God for the distinguishing it from Good We feel Pleasure in complying with our Passions Trouble and Pain in opposing them and therefore the Author of Nature will have us to give up our selves to our Passions and never to resist them since the Pleasure and Pain wherewith he affects us in those Cases are the infallible Criterion of his Will And consequently it is to follow God to comply with the Desire of our Hearts and 't is to obey his Voice to yield to the Instinct of Nature which moves us to the satisfying our Senses and our Passions This is their way of Reasoning whereby they confirm themselves in their infamous Opinions And thus they think to shun the secret Reproofs of their Reason and in Punishment of their Crime God suffers them to be dazzled by those false Glimpses delusive Glarings which blind them instead of inlightning them and strike them with such an insensible Blindness as they do not so much as wish to be cured of it God delivers them to a reprobate Sense he gives them up to the Desires of their corrupt Heart to shameful Passions to Actions unworthy of Men as the Holy Scripture speaks that having fatned themselves by their Debauches they may to all Eternity be the fit Sacrifice of his Vengeance But let us solve this Difficulty which they offer The Sect of Zeno not knowing how to untie the Knot has cut it by denying that Pleasure is a Good and Pain an Evil But that 's too venturous a Stroke and a Subterfuge unbecoming Philosophers and very unlikely I am sure to convert those who are convinc'd by Experience That a great Pain is a great Evil. Since therefore Zeno and all his Heathen Philosophy cannot solve the Difficulty of the Epicures we must have recourse to a more solid and inlightned Philosophy 'T is true that Pleasure is Good and Pain Evil and that Pleasure and Pain have been join'd by the Author of Nature to the Use of certain Things by which we judge whether they are Good or Evil which make us persue the Good and fly from the Evil and almost ever follow the Motions of the Passions All this is true but relates only to the Body which to preserve and keep long a Life much like to that of Beasts we must suffer our selves to be ruled by our Passions and Desires The Senses and Passions are only given us for the good of the Body sensible Pleasure is the indelible Character which Nature has affix'd to the Use of certain Things that without putting our Reason to the trouble of examining them we might presently imploy them for the preservation of the Body but not with intent that we should love them For we ought only to love those Things which Reason undoubtedly manifests to be our Good We are Reasonable Beings and God who is our Sovereign Good requires not of us a blind an instinctive a compell'd Love as I may say but a Love of Choice an enlightned Love a Love that submits to him our whole Intellectual and Moral Powers He inclines us to the Love of him in shewing us by the Light that attends the Delectation of his Grace that he is our Chief Good but he moves us towards the Good of the Body only by Instinct and a confused Sensation of Pleasure because the Good of the Body is undeserving of either the Attention of our Mind or the Exercise of our Reason Moreover our Body is not our selves 't is something that belongs to us and absolutely speaking we cannot subsist without it The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our Good for Bodies can be but the Good of Bodies We may make use of them for the Body but we must not be taken up with them Our Soul has also her own Good viz. the only Good that is superiour to her the only one that preserves her that alone produces in her Sensations of Pleasure and Pain For indeed none of the Objects of the Senses can of themselves give us any Sensation of them it is only God who assures us of their Presence by the Sensation he gives us of them which is a Truth that was never understood by the Heathen Philosophers We may and must love that which is able to make us sensible of Pleasure I grant it But by that very Reason we ought only to love God because he only can act upon our Soul and the utmost that sensible Objects can do is to move the Organs of our Senses But what matters it you 'll say from whence those grateful Sensations come I will taste ' em O thou ungrateful Wretch know the Hand that showres down Good upon thee You require of a just God unjust Rewards You desire he should recompence you for the Crimes you commit against him and even at the very time of committing them you make use of his immutable Will which is the Order and Law of Nature to wrest from him undeserved Favours for with a guilty Managery you produce in your Body such Motions as oblige him to make you relish all sorts of Pleasures But Death shall dissolve that Body and God whom you have made subservient to your unjust Desires will make you subservient to his just Anger and mock at you in his turn 'T is very hard I confess that the Enjoyment of Corporeal Good should be attended with Pleasure and that the Possession of the Good of the Soul should often be conjoin'd with Pain and Anguish We may indeed believe it to be a great Disorder by this Reason that Pleasure being the Character of Good and Pain of Evil we ought to possess a Satisfaction infinitely greater in loving God than in making use of sensible Things since He is the true or rather the only Good of the Mind So doubtless will it be one Day and so was it most probably before Sin entred into the World At least 't is very certain that before the Fall Man suffered
no Pain in discharging his Duty But God is withdrawn from us since the Fall of Adam he is no more our Good by Nature but only by Grace we feel now no Delight and Satisfaction in the Love of him and he rather thrusts us from than draws us to him If we follow him he gives us a Rebuff if we run after him he strikes us and if we be obstinate in our Persuit he continues to handle us more severely by inflicting very lively and sensible Pains upon us And when being weary of walking through the rough and stony Ways of Vertue without being supported by the Repast of Good or strengthned by any Nourishment we come to feed upon sensible Things he fastens us to them by the relish of Pleasure as though he would reward us for turning back from him to run after counterfeit Goods In short since Men have sinn'd it seems God is not pleas'd that they should love him think upon him or esteem him their only and sovereign Good It is only by the delectable Grace of Christ our Mediator that we sensibly perceive that God is our proper Good For Pleasure being the sensible Mark of Good we then perceive God to be our Good when the Grace of our Redeemer makes us love him with Pleasure Thus the Soul not knowing her own Good either by a clear View or by Sensation without the Grace of Jesus Christ she takes the Good of the Body for her own she loves it and closes to it with a stricter Adhesion by her Will than ever she did by the first Institution of Nature For Corporeal Good being now the only one left that is sensible must needs operate upon Man with more Violence strike his Bâain livelier and consequently be felt and imagined by the Soul in a more sensible manner And the Animal Spirits receiving a more vehement Agitation the Will by consequence must love it with a greater Ardency and Pleasure The Soul might before Sin blot out of her Brain the too lively Image of Corporeal Good and dissipate the sensible Pleasure this Image was attended with The Body being subject to the Mind the Soul might on a sudden stop the quavering Concussion of the Fibres of the Brain and the Commotion of the Spirits by the meer Consideration of her Duty But she lost that Power by Sin Those Traces of the Imagination and those Motions of the Spirits depend no more upon her whence it necessarily follows that the Pleasure which by the Institution of Nature is conjoin'd to those Motions and Traces must usurp the whole Possession of the Heart Man cannot long resist that Pleasure by his own Strength 't is Grace that must obtain a perfect Victory Reason alone can never doe it None but God as the Author of Grace can overcome himself as the Author of Nature or rather exorate himself as the Revenger of Adam's Rebellion The Stoicks who had but a confused Knowledge of the Disorders of Original Sin could not answer the Epicures Their Felicity was but Ideal since there is no Happiness without Pleasure and no Pleasure to be sensibly perceiv'd by them in Vertuous Actions They might feel indeed some Joy in following the Rules of their phantastick Vertue because Joy is a natural Consequence of the Consciousness our Soul has of being in the most convenient State That Spiritual Joy might bear up their Spirits for a while but was not strong enough to withstand Pain and overcome Pleasure Secret Pride and not Joy made them keep their Countenance for when no body was present all their Wisdom and Strength vanished just as Kings of the Stage lose all their Grandeur in a Moment It is not so with those Christians that exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they certainly know that they are in the most convenient State Their Joy is great because the Good they possess through Faith and Hope is Infinite for the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a great Joy and that Joy is so much livelier as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces Joy as also that sensible Pleasure which ever attends the Presence of Good Their Joy is not restless and uneasie because grounded on the Promises of God confirm'd by the Blood of his Son and cherished by that inward Peace and unutterable Sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost sheds into their Hearts Nothing can separate them from their true Good which they relish and take Complacency in by the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Good are not so great as those they feel in the Love of God They love Contempt and Pain They feed upon Disgraces and the Pleasure they find in their Sufferings or rather the Pleasure they find in God for whom they despise all the rest to unite themselves to him is so ravishing and transporting as to make them speak a new Language and even boast as the Apostles did of their Miseries and Abuses when they departed from the presence of the Council rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS Such is the Disposition of Mind in true Christians when they are most basely affronted for the Defence of Truth CHRIST being come to restore the Order which Sin had overthrown and that Order requiring that the greatest Goods be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to be in the manner we have said But we may farther confirm and strengthen Reason by Experience for 't is known that as soon as any Person has formed but the bare Resolution to despise all for God he is commonly affected with a Pleasure or internal Joy that makes him as sensibly and lively perceive that God is his Good as he knew it evidently before The true Christians assure us every Day that the Joy they feel in an unmixt loving and serving God is inexpressible and 't is but reasonable to believe the Relation they make of what happens within them On the contrary the Impious are perpetually vexed with horrible Disquietudes and those that are shar'd betwixt God and the World partake of the Joys of the Just and of the Vexations of the Impious They complain of their Miseries and 't is reasonable to believe that their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the Quick and through the very Heart when they love any thing besides him and 't is this Stroke that causes a real Misery He pours an exceeding Joy into their Minds when all their Adherencies are to him only and that Joy is the Spring of true Felicity The Abundance of Riches and Elevation to Honours being without us cannot cure us of the Wound God makes and Poverty and Contempt that are likewise without us cannot hurt us under the Almighty's Protection By what we have said 't is plain That the Objects of the Passions are not our Good that we must not follow their
corrupted his Mind he becomes if I may so speak bold and fierce against Truth Sometimes he rashly impungs it without knowing it at other times he consciously betrays it and relying upon his imaginary Learning is always ready to assert either the Affirmative or Negative according as he is possessed with a Spirit of Contradiction It goes quite otherwise with those that make no Ostentation of Learning they are not positive neither do they speak unless they have something to say and it even often happens that they remain silent when they should speak They have neither that Fame nor those outward Characters of Learning which spur Men on to speak without Knowledge and so may decently hold their Peace but the Pretenders are afraid to make a stop since they are sensible they shall be despis'd for their Silence even when they have nothing to say and that they are not always in danger of falling into Contempt though they speak but Impertinencies provided they utter them with a Scientifick Confidence What makes Men capable of thinking enables them to know the Truth but neither Honours Riches University-Degrees nor Chimerical Erudition makes them capable of thinking It 's their own Nature for they are made to think because they are created for the Truth Even bodily Health qualifies them not for thinking well but only is a less Hinderance than Sickness Our Body assists us in some manner in perceiving by Sense and imagining but not at all in conceiving For though without its Help we cannot attentively meditate nor oppose the continual Impression of the Senses and Passions which endeavour to perplex and obliterate our Ideas because in this present State we cannot overcome the Body but by the Body yet 't is plain that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind nor produce in it the Light of Understanding since every Idea that discovers the Truth proceeds from Truth it self All that the Soul receives from the Body relates only to it and when she follows those Glimpses she sees nothing but Phantasms and Dreams that is to say she sees not things as they are in themselves but only as they have relation to her Body As the Idea of our own Greatness or Littleness is a frequent occasion of Errour so likewise the Ideas of outward things that have refference to us make no less dangerous an Impression We have already observ'd that the Idea of Greatness is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits and a great Motion of the Spirits is ever accompanied with the Idea of Greatness and that on the contrary that of Littleness is always followed with a small Motion of Spirits which is in its turn accompanied with the Idea of Meanness From that Principle 't is easy to infer that such things as produce in us great Motions of Spirits must naturally appear greater stronger and more real and perfect than others for in the word Greatness I comprehend all those Qualifications and such like So that sensible Good must needs seem to us more considerable and solid than that which cannot be felt if we judge of it by the Motion of the Spirits and not by the pure Idea of Truth A great House a sumptuous Retinue a fine Furniture Offices Honour Riches will then appear to us to have more greatness and reality in them than Justice and other Vertues When we compare Vertue to Riches by the pure Eyes of the Mind we prefer Vertue but if we make use of our Corporeal Eyes and Imagination and judge of those things by the Motion of the Spirits which they raise in us we shall doubtless chuse Riches rather than Vertue 'T is from the same Principle that we imagine that spiritual and insensible things are almost nothing that the Ideas of our Mind are less noble than the Objects they represent that there is less reality and substance in the Air than in Metalls and in Water than in Ice that those vast Spaces that reach from the Earth to the Firmament are empty or that the Bodies that fill them have not so much reality and solidity as the Sun and Stars In short our reasoning upon that false Principle induces us into an infinite number of Errours concerning the Nature and Perfection of every thing A great Motion of Spirits and by consequence a strong Passion always attending the sensible Idea of Grandeur and a small Motion and consequently a weak Passion still accompanying the sensible Idea of Meanness we are very attentive to and bestow a great deal of our time on the study of such things as raise the sensible Idea of Grandeur whereas we neglect those which afford but the sensible Idea of Meanness Those great Bodies for instance which make their Circumvotions over our Heads have ever made a great Impression upon Men who at first ador'd them because of their Light and Brightness or sensible Idea of Grandeur some bolder Wits presum'd to examine their Motions so that the Stars have been in all Ages the Object either of the Study or of the Veneration of the greatest part of Mankind It may even be said that the fear of their Phantastick Influences which still fright Astrologers and weak Persons is a sort of Adoration paid by a Brain-sick Imagination to the Idea of Greatness that represents Celestial Bodies But the Body of Man on the contrary that is infinitely more admirable and deserves more our Application than whatever we can know of Saturn Jupiter and other Planets has remained a long time almost unknown The sensible Idea of dissected parts of Flesh having nothing great but being rather distastful and noisome it is but a few years since Men of Parts have looked upon Anatomy as a Science that deserved their study There have been Princes and Kings that boasted of being Astronomers the height and magnitude of the Stars seem'd to suit their Dignity and Grandeur but I know not of any that were ever ambitious of knowing Anatomy and skilfully dissecting a Heart or a Brain The same may be said of several other Sciences Rare and extraordinary things incite in Mens Minds greater and more sensible Motions than such as are seen every day we admire them and by a natural Consequence we fix on them an Idea of Greatness that is followed with Passions of Esteem and Reverence This perverts the Reason of several Persons who are so very respectful and curious of all the Remains of Antiquity and whatever comes from far or is rare and extraordinary that they are as Slaves to them because the Mind dares not sit and pronounce upon the Objects of its Veneration I grant Truth is in no great danger because some Men are taken up with the Medals Arms and Habits of the Ancients or with the Dress of the Chinese and Savages It is not altogether unserviceable to know the Map of Ancient Rome nor the ways from Tomquin to Nanquin though it be more useful to us to know those from London to Oxford or from Paris to St. Germain or Versailles
great and solid Truth which they have rendred familiar and which bears 'em up and strengthens them in all Occasions CHAP. IX Of Love and Aversion and their principal Species LOve and Hatred are the Passions that immediately succeed Admiration for we dwell not long upon the Consideration of an Object without discovering the Relations it hath to us or to something we love The Object we love and to which consequently we are united by that Passion being for the most part present as well as that which we actually admire our Mind quickly and without any considerable Reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to find out the Relations they have to each other and to us or else is naturally aware of them by a preventing Sense of Pleasure and Pain Then it is that the Motion of Love we have for our selves and for the beloved Object extends to that which is admired if the Relation it has immediately to us or to something united to us appear advantageous either by Knowledge or Sensation Now that new Motion of the Soul or rather that Motion of the Soul newly determin'd join'd to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation that attends the new Disposition that the same new Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Love But when we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the Union or Relation of the admired Object would prove disserviceable to us or to something united to us then the Motion of the Love we have for our selves or for the Thing united to us terminates in us or cleaves to the united Object without following the View of the Mind or being carried to the admired Thing But as the Motion towards Good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints on the Soul carries her to whatever is known and felt because what is either intelligible or sensible is Good in it self so it may be said that the Resistance of the Soul against that natural Motion which attracts it is a kind of voluntary Motion which terminates in Nothingness Now that voluntary Motion of the Soul being join'd to that of the Spirits and Blood and followed by the Sensation that attends the new Disposition which that Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Aversion or Hatred That Passion is altogether contrary to Love and yet 't is never without Love It is altogether contrary to it because Aversion separates and Love unites the former has most commonly Nothingness for its Object and the latter has always a Being The former resists the natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas the latter yields to it and makes it victorious However Aversion is never separated from Love because Evil the Object of the former is the Privation of Good so that to fly from Evil is to fly from the Privation of Good that is to say to tend to Good And therefore the Aversion of the Privation of Good is the Love of Good But if Evil be taken for Pain the Aversion of Pain is not the Aversion of the Privation of Pleasure because Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure and therefore is not the Privation of it But the Aversion of Pain being the Aversion of some internal Misery we should not be affected with that Passion should we not love our selves Lastly If Evil be taken for what causes Pain in us or for whatever deprives us of Good then Aversion depends on Self-love or on the Love of something to which we desire to be united So that Love and Aversion are two Mother-Passions opposite to each other but Love is the First the Chief and the most Universal As at that great Distance and Estrangement we are from God since the Fall we look upon our Being as the Chief Part of the Things to which we are united so it may be said in some sense that our Motion of Love for any thing whatsoever is an Effect of Self-love We love Honours because they raise us our Riches because they maintain and preserve us our Relations Prince and Country because we are concern'd in their Preservation Our Motion of Self-love reaches to all the Things that relate to us and to which we are united because 't is that Motion which unites us to them and spreads our Being if I may so speak on those that surround us proportionably as we discover by Reason or by Sensation that it is our Interest to be united to them And therefore we ought not to think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the Cause and Rule of all other Affections but that most part of other Affections are Species of Self-love For when we say that a Man loves any new Object we must not suppose that a new Motion of Love is produc'd in him but rather that knowing that Object to have some Relation or Union with him he loves himself in that Object and that with a Motion of Love coeval to himself For indeed without Grace there is nothing but Self-love in the Heart of Man The Love of Truth of Justice of God himself and every other Love that is in us by the first Institution of Nature have ever since the Fall been a Sacrifice to Self-love There is no doubt however but the most wicked and barbarous Men Idolaters and Atheists themselves are united to God by a natural Love of which consequently Self-love is not the Cause for they are united to him by their Love to Truth Justice and Vertue they praise and esteem good Men and do not love them because they are Men but because they see in them such Qualities as they cannot forbear to love because they cannot forbear to admire and judge them amiable And therefore we love something besides our selves but Self-love over-rules all the rest and Men forsake Truth and Justice for the smallest Concerns For when by their natural Force they venture their Goods and Lives to defend oppress'd Innocence or on any other Occasion their greatest Spur is mere Vanity and the hopes of getting a Name by the seeming Possession of a Vertue which is reverenc'd by all the World They love Truth and Justice when on their side but never against themselves because without Grace they cannot obtain the least Victory over Self-love There are many other sorts of natural Love We naturally love our Prince Country Relations those that have any Conformity of Humour Designs and Employments with us But all those sorts of Love are very weak as well as the Love of Truth and Justice and Self-love being the most violent of all conquers them so easily as to find no other Resistance but what it creates against it self Bodies that strike against others lose their Motion proportionably as they communicate it to the stricken and after having moved many other Bodies may at last entirely lose their own Motion It is not so with Self-love It determines every
certain and undeniable Principles We must then look upon Geometry as a sort of universal Science which opens and enlarges the Mind makes it attentive and affords it so much Skill as to regulate its Imagination and to draw from it all the possible Succours For by the assistance of Geometry the Mind regulates the Motion of the Imagination and the Imagination regulated keeps up the View and Application of the Mind But that we may learn to make a good use of Geometry we must observe that all the things that fall under the Imagination are not as easily imaginable one as the other since all the Images do not equally fill the Capacity of the Mind 'T is more difficult to imagine a Solid than a Plain and this than a simple Line because the clear perception of a Solid requires a greater thought than that of a Plain and a Line Even Lines differ as to this amongst themselves a Parobolick Elliptick or some other very composed Line requires more thinking that is takes up the Mind more than the Figure of a Circle and this than a right Line because 't is harder to imagine Lines that are described by very composed Motions and have several different Relations than those that are drawn by Motions very simple and have but a few Relations For Relations cannot be clearly perceived without the Attention of the Mind to several things and as their number is greater so must the thought or the perception be more extended Hence it happens that there are Figures so much composed that they extend beyond the reach of a distinct Imagination whereas others may be imagin'd with great facility Amongst the three sorts of Right-lined Angles viz. the acute the right and the obtuse none but the Right raises a very distinct and determinate Idea For as there are an Infinity of either acute or obtuse Angles that differ all from one another so we can imagine nothing nicely nor distinctly when we imagine an acute or obtuse Angle But we cannot be mistaken in imagining a right Angle the Idea of it is so very distinct and its Image which it raises in the Brain so very neaâ and just True it is that we may determine the general and indefinite Idea of an acute Angle to the particular Idea of an Angle of 30 degrees which Idea is as accurate as that of an Angle of 90 that is or a right Angle but the Image of it which we may endeavour to imprint on the Brain will never âe so very exact as that of a right Angle being not used to describe that Image we cannot draw it but by thinking on a Circle or on the determinate Portion of a Circle divided into equal Paââs But to imagine a right Angle we need not think on that division of a Circle the bare Idea of a Perpendicular is sufficient for the Imagination to draw the Image of that Angle and we can ââpresent Perpendiculars without trouble being used to see all things standing upright Hence it is easie to judge That to have a simple distinct and well-determin'd Object apt to âe easily imagin'd and consequently to make the Mind attentive and to promote its Evidence in the Truths it is in quest of we must reduce all the Magnitudes we consider to plain Superficies termin'd by Lines and right Angles as are perfect Squares and other right Angled Figures or to bare right Lines for these are the Figures whose nature is the most easily known We pretend not however that all the Subjects of our Knowledge and Enquiry may be represented by Geometrical Lines and Figures There are many which neither can nor ought to be brought under that Rule For Instance the Knowledge of a God Allmighty All-just on whom all things depend all manner of ways who commands his Creatures to obey his Orders that they may be capable of Happiness that Knowledge I say is the Principle of all Morality and of an infinite number of certain and undoubted Consequences yet neither the Principle nor the Consequences can be represented by Geometrical Figures Neither is it possible to figure and represent by Lines many Notions of Natural Philosophy which yet may evidently discover to us several Truths However it may be truly said that an Infinity of things may be examin'd and learn'd by that Geometrical Method which is ever advantageously imploy'd since it accustoms the Mind to Attention by causing it to make a regular use of its Imagination and that things which are learn'd that way are more clearly demonstrated and easier retain'd than others I might have ascribed to the Senses the Assistances we derive from Geometry to preserve the Attention of the Mind but though Lines be something sensible yet I thought Geometry belongs rather to the Imagination than to the Senses It would be unprofitable to set down my Reasons for it which could only justifie the order I have observed in this Treatise and that 's a thing not very material to our purpose I have not yet spoken of Arithmetick and Algebra because the Cyphers and Letters of the Alphabet that are used in those Sciences are not so serviceable to strengthen the Attention of the Mind as to encreaâe its Extent as we shall explain it in the following Chapter These are the general Helps to improve the Attention of the Mind I know of no other besides a firm Resolution of being attentive of which we forbear to speak because we suppose it in those that give up themselves to study There are however some others particular to some Persons as some Meats some Drinks some Places some Dispositions of the Body and the like which every one must learn from Experience observing the State of his Imagination after the Meal and what Things best preserve or most dissipate the Attention of the Mind This only may be said in general That the moderate Use of such Aliments as make many Animal Spirits is very fit to improve the Attention of the Mind and the Strength of the Imagination when 't is weak and languishing CHAP. V. Of the Means to improve the Extent and Capacity of the Mind That Arithmetick and Algebra are of absolute Necessity to it WE ought not hastily to imagine that the Extent and Capacity of the Mind can really be increased The Humane Soul is if I may so speak a determined Quantity or a Portion of Thought contained within some certain Bounds which she cannot pass She cannot grow greater or more capacious than she is She neither swells up nor dilates as 't is commonly believed of Liquors and Metals and perceives never more at one time than another This I confess seems contrary to Experience since sometimes we think upon many Objects and sometimes but upon one and even we often suppose that we think upon nothing However if it be consider'd that Thought is to the Soul what Extension is to Matter it will plainly appear that as a Body cannot truly be more extended at one time than another so if
Water that feels warm to the Hands will seem cold if we wash with it any Part near the Heart Salt that is savoury to the Tongue is pricking and smarting to a Wound Sugar is sweet and Aloes very bitter to the Tongue but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the other Senses So that when we say a Thing is cold sweet bitter c. that same has no certain Signification Secondly Because different Objects can cause the same Sensation Plaister Bread Snow Sugar Salt c. are of the same Colour and yet their Whiteness is different if we judge of 'em otherwise than by the Senses And therefore when we say that Meal is white we say not any thing distinctly significative The third Reason is Because such Qualities of Bodies as occasion Sensations altogether different are however almost the same whereas such as excite very near the same Sensation are often very different The Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness differ but little in Objects whereas the Sense of Sweet essentially differs from that of Bitter The Motions that cause Smart and Tickling differ but in more or less and yet the Sensations of Tickling and Smart are essentially different On the contrary the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does however that sharp Quality is the farthest from Bitterness that possibly can be For a Fruit that is sharp for being unripe must undergo a great many Changes before it grows bitter from Rottenness or too much Ripeness When Fruits are ripe they taste sweet and bitter when over-ripe Bitterness and Sweetness therefore in Fruits differ but in degree of more and less which may be the Reason why they seem sweet to some Persons whilst they taste bitter to others Nay there are those to whom Aloes seem as sweet as Honey The same may be said of all sensible Ideas so that the Words Sweet Bitter Salt Sowre Acid c. Red Green Yellow c. of such and such a Smell Savour Colour c. are all equivocal and raise no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind However School-Philosophers and the vulgar part of Men judge of all the sensible Qualities of Bodies by the Sensations they receive from them Nor do the Philosophers only judge of these sensible Qualities by their own Sensations of them but also judge of the Things themselves from the Judgments they have pass'd about sensible Qualities For from their having had Sensations of certain Qualities essentially different they judge that there is a Generation of new Forms producing those fantastick Differences Wheat appears yellow hard c. Meal white soft c. Thence upon the Testimony of their Eyes and Hands they infer That those Bodies are essentially different unless they chance to think on the Manner of the Transmutation of Wheat into Flower For Meal is nothing but bruised and ground Corn as Fire is only divided and agitated Wood as Ashes are but the grossest Parts of the divided Wood without Agitation as Glass is but Ashes whose Particles have been polished and rounded by the Attrition caus'd by the Fire And so in other Transmutations of Bodies 'T is therefore evident that sensible Words and Ideas are altogether unserviceable to a just stating and clear resolving of Questions that is to the Discovery of Truth Yet there are no Questions how intricate soever they may be by the equivocal Terms of the Senses but Aristotle and most part of other Philosophers pretend to resolve them in their Books without the foregoing Distinctions and without considering that they are equivocal by Errour and Ignorance If for example those Persons who have employed the best part of their Life in reading Ancient Philosophers and Physicians and have wholly imbib'd their Spirit and Opinions are ask'd whether Water be wet whether Fire be dry Wine hot the Blood of Fishes cold Water rawer than Wine Gold perfecter than Mercury whether Plants and Beasts have Souls and a thousand like undetermin'd Questions they rashly answer by consulting only the Impressions of Objects upon their Senses or the Tracks the reading of Authors has left upon their Memory They never think those Terms are equivocal 't is a Wonder to them they should need a Definition and they cannot endure those that endeavour to let 'em understand that their Procedure is too quick and that they are seduced by their Senses and though they are never at a loss for Distinctions to perplex the most evident Things yet in these Questions in which Equivocation needs so much to be removed they find nothing to distinguish If we consider that most of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians contain some equivocal Terms like to those that have been spoken of we shall not doubt but that those Learned Gentlemen that could not define them were unable to say any Thing solid and real in the bulky Volumes they have compos'd Which is in a manner sufficient to overthrow most of the Opinions of the Ancients It is not so with Des Cartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish those Things He ne'er resolves any Question by sensible Ideas and whoever shall be at the pains to read him shall see that he clearly evidently and almost ever demonstratively explains the chief Operations of Nature by the sole and distinct Ideas of Extension Figures and Motion The second sort of equivocal Words that is much in request amongst Philosophers contains all those general Terms of Logick by which any Thing may be easily explain'd without so much as knowing it Aristotle was the Man that made the most of it his Books are full of nothing else and some are but a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all Things by the specious Words of Genus Species Act Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers can hardly understand that those Words signifie Nothing and that one is not more learned than he was when he has heard that Fire dissolves Metals by its dissolving Faculty that a Man digests not because his Stomach is weak or because his Concoctive Faculty does not operate as it should do I grant that those who use such general Terms and Ideas for the Explication of all Things commonly fall not into so many Errours as those that only employ such Words as raise the confused Ideas of the Senses The School-Philosophers are not so liable to be deceived as some opinionative and dogmatical Physicians who build Systems upon Experiments the Reasons of which are unknown to them because the School-men talk so generally that they do not venture much out of their Depth Fire heats dries hardens and softens because it has the Faculty of producing those Effects Sena purges by its purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its nutritious Quality These Propositions are not liable to mistake for a Quality is that which denominates a Thing by such a Name Master Aristotle's Definition is undeniable But he speaks true only because he says nothing and if his rambling
false Supposition of the Philosophers which we are here endeavouring to destroy that the surrounding Bodies are the true Causes of our Pain and Pleasure Reason seems to justifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry and approve the universal Depravation of Morals Reason I grant teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks for instance as the Sovereign Divinity because they can never make us altogether happy when we have them or unhappy when we want them neither did the Heathens worship them with an equal Homage as their great Jupiter whom they fansied to be the God of Gods or as the Sun whom our Senses represent as the universal Cause that gives Life and Motion to all things and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity if we suppose as the Pagan Philosophers that he Comprehends in his Being the true Causes of what he seems to produce as well upon our Soul and Body as upon all the Beings that surround us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Worship to Leeks and Onions they deserve at least some particular Adoration I mean they may be thought upon and loved in some manner if it be true that they can in some sort make us happy and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us Surely Men that listen to the Reports of Sense think Pulse capable of doing them good otherwise the Israelites would not have bewailed the loss of them in the Wilderness or look'd on themselves as unhappy for being deprived thereof had they not fansied to themselves some great Happiness in the Enjoyment of them See what an Abyss of Corruption Reason plunges us into when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philosophy and follows the footsteps of the Senses But that the Falshood of that wretched Phylosophy and the Certainty of our Principles and Distinctness of our Ideas may not be longer doubted it will be necessary plainly to establish the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philosophers or to prove in few words that there is but one true Cause since there is but one true God that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God that all Natural things are not real but only occasional Causes and some other Truths depending on them It is evident that all Bodies great and little have no force to move themselves a Mountain a House a Stone a Grain of Sand the minutest and bulkiest Bodies imaginable are alike as to that We have but two sorts of Ideas viz. of Spirits and Bodies and as we ought not to speak what we conceive not so we must only argue from those two Ideas Since therefore our Idea of Bodies convinces us that they cannot move themselves we must conclude that they are moved by Spirits But considering our Idea of finite Spirits we see no necessary Connexion betwixt their Will and the Motion of any Body whatsoever on the contrary we perceive that there is not nor can be any Whence we must infer if we will follow Light and Reason That as no Body can move it self so no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cause of its Motion But when we think on the Idea of God or of a Being infinitely perfect and consequently Almighty we are aware that there is such a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that it is impossible to conceive he should will that a Body be moved and it should not be moved And therefore if we would speak according to our Conceptions and not according to our Sensations we must say that nothing but his Will can move Bodies The moving force of Bodies is not then in themselves this force being nothing but the Will of God Bodies then have no proper Action and when a moving Ball meets with another and moves it the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter as not having in it self the Impression it communicates though the former be the Natural Cause of the latter's Motion and therefore a natural Cause is not a true and real Cause but only an occasional which in such or such a Case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner 'T is certain that all things are produced by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies for Experience teaches us that those Bodies whose parts are in greater Motion are always the most active and those that Cause the greatest Alterations in the World so that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God who Created the World because he will'd it who spake and it was done who moves all things and produces all the Effects we see because he has established some Laws by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together and because those Laws are efficacious they and not the Bodies act There is then no Force Power nor true Cause in all the Material and sensible World Nor need we admit any Forms Faculties or real Qualities to produce Effects which the Bodies bring not forth or to divide with God his own Essential Force and Power As Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing so likewise the most Noble Spirits are subject to the same impotency on that respect They cannot know any thing unless God enlightens them nor have the Sensation of any thing unless he modifies them nor will unless he moves them towards himself They may indeed determine the Impression God has given them to himself towards other Objects but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power For if to be able to sin is a Power it is such a one as the Almighty wants saith St. Austin somewhere If Men had of themselves the Power of loving Good it might be said that they have some Power but they cannot so much as love but because God Wills it and that his Will is Efficacious They love because God continually drives them towards Good in general that is towards himself for whom alone they are Created and preserved God moves them and not themselves towards Good in general and they only follow that Impression by a free Choice according to the Law of God or determine it towards false and seeming Goods according to the Law of the Flesh But they cannot determine it but by the sight of Good For being able to doe nothing without an Impression from above they are incapable of loving any thing but Good But though it should be supposed which is true in one sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truths and loving Good should their Thoughts and Will produce nothing outwardly it might still be said that they were impotent and unoperative Now it seems undeniable that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the smallest Body in the World it being evident there is no necessary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm for instance and the Motion of the same Arm. It moves
indeed whenever we will it and we may be call'd in that sense the natural cause of the Motion of our Arm yet natural Causes are not true but only occasional as acting by the mere force and efficacy of the Will of God as we have already explain'd For how is it possible for us to move our Arm To perform this 't is requir'd we should have Animal Spirits and send them through certain Nerves towards certain Muscles to swell up and contract them for so that Motion is perform'd as some pretend though others deny it and assert that the Mystery is not yet discover'd However it be most Men know not so much as that they have Spirits Nerves and Muscles and yet move their Arms with as much and more dexterity than the most skilful Anatomists Men therefore will the moving their Arm but 't is God that is able and knows how to doe it If a Man cannot overthrow a Tower yet he knows what must be done to effect it but not one amongst them knows what the Animal Spirits must doe to move one of his Fingers How should they then move the whole Arm of themselves These things appear very evident to me and I suppose to all thinking Persons though they may be incomprehensible to others such as are only used to the confused voice of the Senses But Men are so far from being the true Causes of the Motions produc'd in their Body that it seems to imply a Contradiction they should be so For a true Cause is that betwixt which and its Effect the Mind percieves a necessary connexion for so I understand it But there is none besides the infinitely perfect Being betwixt whose Will and the Effects the Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion and therefore none but God is the true Cause or has a real Power of moving Bodies Nay it seems unconceivable that God should communicate this Power either to Angels or Men And those that pretend that the Power we have of moving our Arm is a true Power must by Consequence grant that God can give Spirits the Power of creating annihilating and doing all possible things in short that he can make them Almighty as I am going to pove God needs not Instruments to act 't is enough he should Will the Existence of a thing in order to its Existing because it is contradictory that he should will a thing and his Will should not be fulfilled And therefore his Power is his Will and to communicate his Power is to communicate his Will so that to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel can signifie nothing else but to will that whenever that Man or Angel shall desire that such or such a Body be moved it may actually be moved In which Case I see two Wills concurring together that of God and that of the Angel and to know which of them is the true Cause of the Motion of that Body I enquire which is the Efficacious I see a necessary Connexion betwixt the Will of God and the thing willed in this Case God wills that whenever the Angel shall desire that such a Body be moved it be really so There is then a necessary Connexion betwixt the Will of God and the Motion of that Body and consequently God is the true Cause of that Motion and the Will of the Angel is only occasional Again to make it more evidently manifest let us suppose God wills it should happen quite contrary to the Desire of some Spirits as may be thought of the Devils or some other wicked Spirits in Punishment of their Sins In that Case it cannot be said God communicates his Power to them since nothing happens of what they wish However the Will of those Spirits shall be the natural Cause of the produced Effects as such a Body shall be removed to the Right because they wish it were moved to the Left and the Desires of those Spirits shall determine the Will of God to act as the Will of moving the Parts of our Body determine the first Cause to move them and therefore the Desires of all finite Spirits are but occasional Causes If after all these Reasons it be still asserted that the Will of an Angel moving a Body is a true and not a bare occasional Cause 't is evident that the self-same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things since God might as well communicate to him his Power of Creating and annihilating Bodies as that of moving them if He should will that they should be created and annihilated in a word if he will'd that all things should be performed according to the Angel's Desires as he wills that Bodies be moved as the Angel pleases if therefore it may be said that an Angel or Man are true Movers because God moves Bodies as they desire that Man or Angel might likewise be call'd true Creatours since God might create Beings on occasion of their Will Nay perhaps it might be said that the vilest of Animals or even mere Matter is the real Cause of the Creation of some Substance if it be supposed with some Philosophers that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it And lastly since God has resolved from all Eternity to create some certain things at some certain times those Times might also be called the Causes of the Creation of such Beings with as much right as 't is pretended that a Ball meeting with another is the true Cause of the Motion that is communicated to it because God by his general Will that constitutes the Order of Nature has decreed that such or such Communication of Motions should follow upon the Concourse of two Bodies There is then but one true Cause as there is one true God Neither must we imagine that what precedes an Effect does really produce it God himself cannot communicate his Power to Creatures according to the Light of Reason He cannot make them true Causes and change them into Gods But though he might doe it we conceive not why he should will it Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences all can doe nothing 'T is he who has made Spirits that enlightens and moves them 't is he who has created Heaven and Earth that regulates all their Motions In fine 't is the Authour of our Being that performs our Desires Semel jussit semper paret He moves even our Arms when we use them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets That we make him subservient to our unjust and criminal Desires All those little Divinities of the Heathens all those particular Causes of Philosophers are Chimeras which the wicked Spirit endeavours to set up that he may destroy the Worship of the true God The Philosophy we have received from Adam teaches us no such things but that which has been propagated by the Serpent for ever since the Fall the Mind of Man is turned Heathen That Philosophy join'd to the Errours of the Senses has made
Solidity they will float at unequal Distances from the Centre of the Vortex in which they swim But if two Planets have very near the same Force to continue that Direct Motion or if a Planet carries in its small Vortex one or several other smaller Planets which it shall have conquer'd according to our Way of conceiving the Formation of Things Then the smallest Planets will turn about the greatest whilst the greatest shall turn upon its own Centre and all these Planets shall be carried by the Motion of the great Vortex at a Distance very near equal from its Centre We are obliged by the Light of Reason to dispose in that Order the Parts that compose the whole Universe which we imagine to have been formed by the most simple Ways For all that had been said is only grounded on the Idea of Extension the Parts of which are supposed to move in the most simple Motion which is that in a Right Line And when we examine by the Effects whether we are mistaken in the Explication of Things by their Causes we are surprized to see the Phenomaena of Celestial Bodies so perfectly agreeing with our Ratiocinations For we perceive all the Planets that are in the middle of a small Vortex turning upon their own Centre as the Sun does and swimming in the Vortex of the Sun and about the Sun the smallest and least solid nearest to it and the most solid at a greater distance We likewise observe that there are some as the Comets which cannot remain in the Vortex of the Sun And lastly that there are several Planets which have other smaller turning about them as the Moon does about the Faith Jupiter has four of them Mars has three and perhaps Saturn has so many and so small that they resemble a continued Circle of which the thickness cannot be perceived because of their too vast distance Those Planets being the biggest we can observe it may be imagin'd that they have been produced from Vortexes which had a sufficient strength to conqueâ others before they were involved in the Vortex we live in All these Planets turn upon their own Centre the Earth within 24. hours Mars within 25. or thereabouts Jupiter within about 10 c. They all turn about the Sun Mercury the nearest in about 4. Months Saturn the remotest in about 30. Years and those that are betwixt them in more or less time which however keep not an exact proportion with their distance For the matter in which they swim makes a swifter Circumvolution when 't is nearer to the Sun because the Line of its Motion is then shorter When Mars is opposite to the Sun he is then near enough to the Earth but is at a vast distance from it when he is in Conjunction with him The like may be said of the other superiour Planets as Saturn and Jupiter for the inferiour as Venus and Mercury are to speak properly never opposite to the Sun The Lines which all the Planets seem to describe about the Earth are no Circles but are very like Ellipses which Ellipses seem very much to differ because of the different Situation of the Planets in reference to us In short whatever may be observed with any certainty in the Heavens touching the Motion of the Planets perfectly agrees with what has been said of their Formation by the most simple ways As to the fixed Stars Experience teaches us that some diminish and entirely vanish away whilst others that are wholly new appear the lustre and bulk of which sensibly increase They increase or diminish proportionably as the Vortexes in whose Centre they lye admit more or less of the first Element We cease to see them when they are overspread with Spots and Crusts and begin to discover them when those Spots which obstruct their lustre are entirely dissipated All these Stars keep very near the same distance from each other since they are Centres of Vortexes which are not conquer'd and remain Stars as long as they can resist the Invasion of others They are all bright like as many little Suns because they are all as he is the Centers of unconquer'd Vortexes They are all at an unequal distance from the Earth though they appear as if they were fastned to a Vault for if the Parallaxe of the nearest with the remotest has not yet been observable by the different situation of the Earth from 6 to 6 Months it is because that difference is too inconsiderable in reference to our distance from the Stars to make that Parallaxe sensible Perhaps by means of the Telescopes it will one day or other become somewhat observable In short whatever the Senses and Experience may observe in the Stars differs not from what we have discover'd by the Mind whilst we examin'd the most simple and natural Relations that are betwixt the Parts and the Motions of Extension To search after the Nature of Terrestrial Bodies we must conceive that the first Element being made up of an infinite number of different Figures the Bodies that result from their Mixture must be very different So that there will be some whose Parts shall be branched others long others very near round but all irregular several ways When their Parts are branched and gross they are hard but flexible and not elastick as Gold If their Parts be not so gross they are soft and fluid as Gums Fat 's Oyles but if their branched Parts be extremely fine they are like the Air. If the long Parts of Bodies are gross and inflexible they are pungent incorruptible and dissolvible as Salts if those long Parts be flexible they are insipid like Water if the gross Parts be of very irregular and different Figures they are like Earth and Stones In short thence must needs arise Bodies of several different Natures and two will hardly be found exactly alike by reason of the infinite number of Figures incident to the first Element which can never be complicated after the same manner in two different Bodies What Figure soever those Bodies may have if their Pores be large enough to give way to the second Element's passing all manner of ways they will be transparent like Air Water Glass c. If the first Element entirely surrounds some of their Parts and affords them a sufficient force and commotion to repel the second Element on all sides they will appear Luminous like flame if they drive back all the second Element that falls upon them they will be very white if they receive it without repelling it they will be very black and lastly if they repel it by several Concussions and Vibrations they will appear of different colours As to their Situation the heaviest or those that have least force to continue their direct Motion will be the nearest to the Centre as are Metals Earth Water and Air will be more remote and all Bodies will keep the same Situation in which we observe them because they will recede from the Centre of the Earth as far
Fourth Part of his Philosophical Principles which runs thus That the former Hypothesis is to be retain'd notwithstanding its being false to find out the true Causes of natural Things he expresly asserts the contrary in these words Though I pretend not that the Bodies of this visible World were ever produced in the manner that has been described before of which the Reader has been already sufficiently forewarn'd yet I must still keep to the same Hypothesis to explain what appears upon Earth For if I may as I hope I can plainly shew by those means the most intelligible and certain Causes of all Natural things and they cannot be found out another way I may thence reasonably conclude that though the World was not at the Beginning fram'd in this manner but created immediately by God yet the Nature of all things it contains ceases not to be the very same as though they had been produced in that very method Des Cartes knew that to understand the Nature of things they must be consider'd in their Birth and Original and that beginning with those that are most simple we ought to drive them up to the Fountain head and that the business is not to examine whether God working by the most simple ways formed the World by degrees or struck it out at a single Blow but that in what manner soever God may have produced his Works they ought to be first consider'd in their Principles if we would understand them and afterwards we should observe how consistent our thoughts are with the Operations of God by comparing them together He knew that the Laws of Nature by which God preserves all his Works in their present Order and Situation are the same Laws with those by which he might have formed and disposed them It being evident to all considering Men that if God had not disposed his Works in an instant in the same manner they would have order'd and postur'd themselves in time the whole Oeconomy of Nature would be destroy'd since the Laws of Preservation would be contrary to those of the first Creation If the whole Universe remains in the Order in which we see it 't is because the Laws of Motion which preserve it in that Order were capable of producing it in it and if God had established it in an Order different from that into which those Laws of Motion should have put it all things would be turned upside down and place themselves by the force of those Laws in the Order which they at present keep A Man desires to discover the Nature of a Chicken to that end he opens every day Eggs taken from under a Brood-Hen he examines what part moves and grows first he quickly perceives that the Heart begins to beat and to drive out Blood through small Conduits on all sides that are the Arteries which Blood comes back to the Heart through the Veins that the Brain likewise appears at first and that the Bones are the last formed By that he frees himself from many Errours and even draws from those Observations several Consequences very useful for the Knowledge of living Creatures What fault may be found with the conduct of such a Man and how may it be given out that he pretends to persuade that God formed the first Chicken by creating an Egg and giving it a competent degree of heat to hatch it because he tries to discover the Nature of Chickens in their first Formation Why then should Des Cartes be accused of being opposite to the Holy Scriptures for that designing to discover the Nature of visible things he examines the formation of them by the Laws of Motion which are inviolably observ'd on all occasions He never doubted but that the World was created at first with all its perfection that there were Sun Earth Moon and Stars that in the Earth there were not only the Seeds of Plants but also the Plants themselves and that Adam and Eve were not born Infants but made adult The Christian Faith teaches us that and natural Reason persuades us the same for when we consider the infinite Power of God we cannot think he should ever have made any thing which was not altogether perfect But as we should better understand the nature of Adam and Eve and the Trees of Paradise by examining how Children are insensibly form'd in their Mothers Womb and how Plants are deriv'd from their Seeds than by merely considering how they were when Created by God at the Creation of the World so if we can find out Principles very simple and easie out of which as out of some Seeds we can manifestly shew the Stars the Earth and all visible things might have been produced though we very well know that it was never so yet that will be more conducible to explain their Nature than if we should only describe them so as they now are or as we believe they were Created and because I suppose I have found out such Principles I shall indeavour briefly to Explain them Des Cartes was persuaded that God formed the World all at once but he also believed that God Created it in the same State and Order and with the same Disposition of Parts in which it would have been had it been made gradually and by the most simple ways And that thought is worthy both of the Power and Wisdom of God of his Power because he has made in a Moment all his Works in the highest Perfection and of his Wisdom because he has shewn that he perfectly foresaw whatever could befall Matter if it were moved by the most simple ways and likewise because the Order of Nature could not subsist if the World had been produced by ways that is by Laws of Motion contrary to the Laws by which it is preserv'd as I have already mention'd 'T is ridiculous to say that Des Cartes believed the World might have been formed of it self since he owns with all those that follow the light of Reason that Bodies cannot move themselves by their own strength and that all the immutable Laws of the Communication of Motions are but consequences of the immutable Will of God who always acts in the same manner His proving that God alone gives Motion to Matter and that Motion produces in Bodies all their different Forms was sufficient to hinder the Libertines from making an Advantage of his System On the contrary if Atheists should reflect on the Principles of this Philosopher they would quickly be forced to confess their Errours for if they can assert with the Heathens that Matter is uncreated they cannot also maintain that it can move it self by its own Power So that Atheists would at least be obliged to acknowledge the true Mover if they refused to confess the true Creatour But the Ordinary Philosophy affords 'em sufficient pretences to blind themselves and defend their Errours for it speaks of some impress'd Virtues certain motive Faculties in a word of a certain Nature which is the Principle of
Motion in every thing And though they have no distinct Idea of it yet by reason of the Corruption of their Heart they willingly put it in the room of the true God imagining that it performs all the Wonders that they see occur CHAP. V. An Explication of the Principles of the Peripatetick Philosophy in which is shewn that Aristotle never observed the Second Part of the General Rule and his Four Elements with the Elementary Qualities are examined THat the Reader may compare the Philosophy of Des Cartes with that of Aristotle it will be convenient to set down in few words what the latter has taught concerning Elements and Natural Bodies in general which the most learned believe he has done in his Four Books Of the Heavens For his Eight Books of Physicks belong rather to Logick or perhaps to Metaphysicks than to Natural Philosophy since they consist of Nothing but loose and general terms that offer no distinct and particular Idea to the Mind Those Four Books are entituled Of the Heavens because the Heavens are the chief amongst the simple Bodies which he treats of That Philosopher begins his Work by proving that the World is perfect in the following manner All Bodies have three Dimensions and cannot have more because the number three comprehends all according to the Pythagoreans But the World is the Coacervation of all Bodies and therefore the World is perfect By that ridiculous Proof it may also be demonstrated that the World cannot be more imperfect than it is since it cannot be composed of parts that have less than three Dimensions In the Second Chapter he first supposes some Peripatetick Truths as that all Natural Bodies have of themselves the force of moving which he proves neither here nor elsewhere but on the contrary asserts in the First Chapter of his Second Book of Physicks that to endeavour to prove it is absurd because 't is evident of it self and that none but those who cannot distinguish what is known of it self from what is not insist upon proving plain by obscure things But it has been shewn elsewhere that it is altogether false that natural Bodies should have of themselves the force of moving and it appears evident only to such as follow with Aristotle the Impressions of their Senses and make no use of their Reason Secondly He says that all local Motion is made in a Line either direct or circular or composed of both but if he would not think upon what he so rashly proposes he ought at least to have open'd his Eyes that he might see an Infinite number of different Motions which are not made of either the right or circular Or rather he ought to have thought that the Motions composed of the direct may be infinitely varied when the compounding Motions increase or diminish their swiftness in an infinite number of different ways as may be observed by what has been said before There are says he but two simple Motions the right and the Circular and therefore all the others are composed of them But he mistakes for the Circular Motion is not simple since it cannot be conceived without thinking upon a Point to which it relates and whatever includes a Relation is relative and not simple This is so true that the Circular Motion may be conceived as produced from two Motions in a right Line whose Swiftness is unequal according to a certain Proportion But a Motion composed of two others made in a right Line and variously increasing or diminishing in swiftness cannot be simple Thirdly He says that all the simple Motions are of three sorts one from the Centre the other towards the Centre and the third about it But 't is false that the last viz. the Circular Motion should be simple as has been already said And 't is false again that there are no simple Motions besides upwards and downwards For all the Motions in a right Line are simple whether they approach to or remove from the Centre the Poles or any other Point Every Body says he is made up of three Dimensions and therefore the Motion of all Bodies must have three simple Motions What Relation is there betwixt simple Motions and Dimensions Besides every Body has three Dimensions and none has three simple Motions Fourthly He supposes that Bodies are either simple or composed and calls simple Bodies those that have the force of moving themselves as Fire Earth c. adding that the compounded receive their Motion from the compounding But in that sense there are no simple Bodies since none have in themselves any Principle of their Motion there are also none composed since there are no simples of which they should be made and so there would be no Bodies at all What Fancy is it to define the simplicity of Bodies by a Power of moving themselves What distinct Ideas can be fixed to the Words of simple and composed Bodies if the simple are only defined in Relation to an Imaginary moving force But let us see what Consequences he draws from those Principles The Circular Motion is simple The Heavens move Circularly and therefore their Motion is simple But simple Motion can be ascribed only to a simple Body that is to say to a Body that moves of it self And therefore the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the four Elements that move in right Lines 'T is plain enough that such Arguments contain nothing but false and absurd Propositions Let us examine his other Proofs for he alleadges a great many shameful and nonsensical ones to prove a thing as useless as it is false His second Reason to shew that the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the Four Elements supposes that there are two sorts of Motion one natural and the other violent or against Nature But 't is sufficiently plain to all those that judge of things by clear and distinct Ideas that Bodies having not in themselves any such Principle of their Motion as Aristotle pretends there can be no Motion violent or against Nature 'T is indifferent to all Bodies to be moved or not either one way or another But this Philosopher who judges of things by the Impressions of the Senses imagines that those Bodies which by the Laws of the Communications of Motions always place themselves in such or such a Situation in reference to others doe it of their own accord and because it is most convenient for them and best agrees with their Nature Here follows the Argument of Aristotle The Circular Motion of the Heavens is natural or against Nature If natural the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the Elements since the Elements never move circularly by a natural Motion If the Circular Motion of the Heavens is against their Nature they will be some one of the Elements as Fire Water c. or something else But the Heavens can be none of the Elements as for instance if the Heavens were Fire that Element tending naturally upwards the Heavens would
have two contrary Motions viz. the circular and the ascending which is impossible If the Heavens be some other Body which moves not circularly by its own Nature they will have some other natural Motion which cannot likewise be for if that Motion be ascending they will be Fire or Air and if descending Water or Earth Therefore c. I shall not insist upon shewing the particular Absurdities of those Reasonings but only observe in general that all that which this Philosopher here says has no signification and that there is neither Truth nor Inference well drawn His third Reason is as follows The first and most perfect of all simple Motions must be that of a simple Body and of the first and most perfect among simple Bodies But the circular Motion is the first and most perfect amongst simple Motions because every circular Line is perfect and that no right Line is so For if it be finite something may be added to it if infinite it is not yet perfect since it has no end and that things are not perfect but when they are finished and therefore the circular Motion is the first and most perfect of all and a Body moving circularly is simple and the first and most Divine amongst simple Bodies Here you have his fourth Reason Every Motion is either natural or not but every Motion which is not natural to some Bodies is natural to some others For we see that the ascending and descending Motions which are not natural to some Bodies are so to others for Fire naturally descends not but Earth does Now the Circular Motion is not natural to any of the Four Elements there must then be a simple Body to which that Motion is natural and therefore the Heavens which move Circularly are a simple Body distinguished from the Four Elements Lastly The Circular Motion is either natural or violent to some Body or other If it be natural 't is evident that Body must be one of the most simple and perfect But if it be against Nature 't is strange how that Motion endures for ever since we see that all Motions against Nature are of a short continuance And therefore we must believe after all those Reasons that there is some Body separated from all those that environ us whose Nature is the more perfect as it lies at a greater distance Thus argues Aristotle but I defie the best and most intelligent of his Interpreters to fix distinct Ideas to his Words and to shew that this Philosopher begins with the most simple Things before he speaks of the more composed which is however altogether necessary to exact Reasonings as I have already proved If I were not afraid of being tedious I would be at the pains to translate some Chapters of Aristotle But besides that none who can understand him care to read him in English or in any other vulgar Tongue I have sufficiently shewn by what I have related from him that his Way of Philosophizing is wholly unserviceable to the Discovery of Truth For he says himself in the Fifth Chapter of this Book That those that mistake at first in any thing mistake ten thousand times more if they proceed So that it being apparent that he knows not what he says in the two first Chapters of his Book we may reasonably believe that it is not safe to yield to his Authority without examining his Reasons But that we may be the more persuaded of it I proceed to shew that there is no Chapter in this First Book but has some Impertinency In the Third Chapter he says That the Heavens are incorruptible and uncapable of Alteration of which he alledges several Childish Proofs as that they are the Habitation of the Immortal Gods and that no Change was ever observed in them This last Proof would be good enough could he say that ever any Body was come back from thence or that he had approached Celestial Bodies sufficiently near to observe their Alterations And yet I doubt whether at this time any one should yield to his Authority since Telescopes assure us of the contrary In the Fourth Chapter he pretends to prove That the Circular Motion has no Opposite though it be plain that the Motion from East to West is contrary to that which is made from West to East In the Fifth Chapter he very weakly proves That Bodies are not Infinite drawing his Arguments from the Motion of simple Bodies For what hinders but there may be above his Primum mobile some unmovable Extension In the Sixth he loses time in shewing That the Elements are not Infinite For who can doubt of it when he supposes with him that they are included within the surrounding Heavens But he ridicules himself by drawing his Proofs from their Gravity and Lightness If Elements says he were Infinite there would be an Infinite Heaviness and Lightness which cannot be Ergo c. Those that desire to see his Arguments at length may read them in his Books for I reckon it a loss of Time to relate them He goes on in the Seventh Chapter to prove That Bodies are not Infinite and his first Argument supposes it necessary for every Body to be in Motion which he neither does nor can demonstrate In the Eighth he asserts That there are not many Worlds of the same Nature by this ridiculous Reason That if there were another Earth besides this we inhabit the Earth being ponderous of its own nature it would fall upon ours which is the Centre of all ponderous Bodies Whence has he learned this but from his Senses In the Ninth he proves That it is not so much as possible that there should be several Worlds because if there was any Body above the Heavens it would be simple or composed in a natural or violent State which cannot be for Reasons which he draws from the Three sorts of Motions already spoken of In the Tenth he asserts That the World is Eternal because it cannot have had a Beginning and yet last for ever because we see that whatever is made is corrupted in Time He has learned this likewise from his Senses But who has taught him that the World will always endure He spends the Eleventh Chapter in explaining what Incorruptible signifies as though Equivocation was here very dangerous or that he was to make a great Use of his Explanation However that Word Incorruptible is so clear of it self that Aristotle needed not have troubled himself with explaining in what Sense it must be taken or in what Sense he takes it It had been more convenient to define an infinite Number of Terms very usual with him which raise nothing but sensible Ideas for so perhaps we should have learned something by the reading of his Works In the Last Chapter of this First Book of the Heavens he endeavours to shew That the World is incorruptible because 't is impossible it should have had a Beginning and yet last eternally All Things says he subsist either for a
finite or infinite Time but what is only infinite in one sense is neither finite nor infinite and therefore nothing can subsist in that Manner This is the way of arguing with the Prince of Philosophers and the Genius of Nature who instead of discovering by clear and distinct Ideas the true Cause of natural Effects lays the Foundation of a Pagan Philosophy upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses or upon such Ideas as are too general to be useful to the Search after Truth I condemn not Aristotle for not knowing that God has created the World in Time to manifest his Power and the Dependency of Creatures and that he will never destroy it to shew that he is immutable and never repents of his Designs But I may find fault with him for proving by trifling Reasons that the World is of Eternal Duration For though he be sometimes excusable as to the Opinions he maintains yet he 's for the most part intollerable as to the Reasons he alledges when he treats of Subjects that are somewhat difficult What I have already said may perhaps be sufficient to evince it though I have not related all the Errours I have met with in the Book whence the former are extracted and that I have endeavour'd to make him speak plainer than is customary with him But for an entire and full Conviction that the Genius of Nature will never discover the secret Springs and Contrivances of it it will be convenient to shew that his Principles upon which he reasons for the Explication of natural Effects have no Solidity in them 'T is evident that nothing can be discover'd in Physicks without beginning with the most simple Bodies that is with the Elements into which all others are resolv'd because they are contain'd in them either actually or potentially to speak in a Peripatetick Stile But no distinct Explication of those simple Bodies can be found in the Works of Aristotle whence follows that his Elements being not clearly known 't is impossible to discover the Nature of Bodies which are compos'd of them He says indeed that there are four Elements Fire Air Water and Earth but he gives no clear Manifestation of their Nature by any distinct Idea He pretends not that those Elements are the Fire Air Water and Earth that we see for if it were so our Senses at least would afford us some Knowledge of them I grant that in several places of his Works he endeavours to explain them by the Qualities of Heat and Cold Moisture and Dryness Gravity and Levity But that Method is so impertinent and ridiculous that it cannot be conceiv'd how so many Learned Men could be satisfied with it which I proceed to demonstrate Aristotle pretends in his Book of the Heavens that the Earth is the Centre of the World and that all Bodies which he is pleas'd to call simple because he supposes that they are mov'd by their own Nature must move by simple Motions He asserts that besides the Circular Motion which he pretends to be simple and by which he proves that the Heavens which he supposes to move circularly are a simple Body there are two other simple Motions one downwards from the Circumference to the Centre and the other upwards from the Centre to the Circumference That those simple Motions are proper to simple Bodies and consequently that Earth and Fire are such Bodies one of which is altogether heavy and the other perfectly light But because Gravity and Levity may be proper to a Body either wholly or in part he concludes that there are two other Elements or simple Bodies one of which is partly light and the other partly ponderous viz. Water and Air. Thus he proves that there are four Elements and no more It is plain to all those who examine the Opinions of Men by their own Reason that all those Propositions are false or cannot at least be taken for clear and undeniable Principles which may afford very plain and distinct Ideas whereon to lay the Foundation of Natural Philosophy 'T is certain that nothing can be more absurd than to establish the Number of Elements upon the imaginary Qualities of Heaviness and Lightness saying without any farther Proof that some Bodies are ponderous and others light of their own Nature For if any thing may be asserted without Proof it may be said that all Bodies are naturally heavy and endeavour to approach the Centre of the World as the place of their Rest. And the contrary may be asserted too viz. That all Bodies are light of their own Nature and tend to rise to the Heavens as to the place of their greatest Perfection For if you object to him who maintains the Gravity of Bodies that Fire and Air are light he needs but answer that Fire and Air are not light but that being less ponderous than Earth and Water they seem to us to be light And that it goes with those Elements as with a piece of Wood that appears light upon the Water not by reason of any natural Levity since it falls down when in the Air but because Water being heavier seizes the lower Place and forces it to ascend On the contrary If you object to him that defends the natural Levity of Bodies that Earth and Water are ponderous he will likewise answer That those Bodies seem heavy because they are not so light as those that surround them That Wood for instance appears to be ponderous when in the Air not because of its natural Gravity since it ascends when in the Water but because it is not so light as Air. And therefore 't is ridiculous to suppose as an undeniable Principle that Bodies are either light or heavy of their own Nature it being on the contrary evident that none has the Force of moving it self and that 't is indifferent to be moved either upwards or downwards to the East or to the West to the South or to the North or in any other possible manner But let us grant to Aristotle That there are four Elements such as he pretends two of which are heavy viz. Earth and Water and the two other light of their own Nature viz. Fire and Air what Consequence may be drawn from thence for the Knowledge of the Universe Those four Elements are not the visible Fire Air Water and Earth but something quite different which we know neither by the Senses nor by Reason having no distinct Idea of them Let all natural Bodies be compos'd of them since Aristotle has said it But the Nature of those Compounds is still unknown and cannot be discovered but by knowing the four Elements or the simple Bodies of which they are made since the Composed is known only by the Simple Fire says Aristotle is light by its own Nature the ascending Motion is simple Fire is therefore a simple Body since Motion must be proportion'd to the Moveable Natural Bodies are compos'd of simple there is then Fire in all natural Bodies but a Fire
which is not like to that we see for Fire is often but in potentia in the Bodies that are made of it What signifie all these Peripatetick Discourses That there is Fire in all Bodies either actual or potential that is to say that all Bodies are compos'd of something we see not and the Nature of which is wholly unknown unto us Now we have made a very fair Progress But though Aristotle shews us not the Nature of Fire and other Elements of which all Bodies are made up yet one may imagine that he will at least discover their principal Qualities and Properties Let us also examine what he says upon that Account He declares that there are four principal Qualities which belong to the Sense of Touching viz. Heat Cold Humidity and Siccity of which all the other are compos'd He distributes those primitive Qualities into the four Elements ascribing Heat and Dryness to Fire Heat and Moisture to the Air Cold and Moisture to Water and Cold and Dryness to Earth He asserts that Heat and Cold are active Qualities but that Dryness and Moisture are passive He defines Heat What congregates Things of the same kind Cold What congregates Things either of the same or of different Species Moisture What cannot easily be contain'd in its own Limits but is easily kept within foreign Bounds and Dryness What is easily contain'd within its own Limits but will hardly be adapted to the Bounds of surrounding Bodies Thus according to Aristotle Fire is a hot and dry Element and therefore congregates Homogeneous Things is easily contain'd within its own Limits and hardly within others Air is a hot and moist Element and therefore congregates Homogeneous Things can hardly be kept within its own Limits but easily within others Water is a cold and moist Element and therefore congregates both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Things is hardly contain'd within its own Limits but easily within others And lastly Earth is a cold and dry Element or such an one as aggregates Things both of the same and different Natures is easily contain'd within its own Limits but can hardly be adapted to others There you have the Elements explain'd according to the Opinion of Aristotle or the Definitions he has given of their principal Qualities and because if we may believe him the Elements are simple Bodies out of which others are constituted and their Qualities are simple Qualities of which all others are compos'd the Knowledge of those Elements and Qualities must be very clear and distinct since the whole Natural Philosophy or the Knowledge of all sensible Bodies which are made of them must be deduc'd from thence Let us then see what may be wanting to those Principles First Aristotle fixes no distinct Idea to the Word Quality It cannot be known whether by Quality he understands a real Being distinguish'd from Matter or only a Modification of Matter he seems one while to take it in the former and at another time in the latter Sense I grant that in the 8th Chapter of his Categories he defines Quality that by which Things are denominated so or so but that is not plain and satisfactory Secondly His Definitions of the four Primitive Qualities viz. Heat Cold Moisture and Dryness are either false or useless We will begin with his Definition of Heat Heat says he is that which congregates Homogeneous Things First Though that Definition should be true That Heat always congregates Homogeneous Bodies yet we cannot see how it perfectly explains the Nature of Heat Secondly 'T is false that Heat congregates Homogeneous Things for Heat dissipates the Particles of Water into Vapour instead of heaping them together It congregates not likewise the Parts of Wine or any Liquor or Fluid Body whatsoever even to Quick-silver On the contrary it resolves and separates both Solid and Fluid Bodies whether of the same or different Natures and if there be any the Parts of which Fire cannot dissipate it is not because they are homogeneous but because they are too gross and solid to be carry'd away by the Motion of the fiery Particles Thirdly Heat in reality can neither congregate nor segregate the Parts of any Body whatsoever for that the Parts of Bodies may be congregated separated or dissipated they must be moved But Heat can move nothing or at least it appears not that it can move Bodies for though we consider Heat with all the possible Attention we cannot discover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not it self We see indeed that Fire moves and separates the Parts of such Bodies as lie expos'd to its Action but it is not perhaps by its Heat it being not evident whether it has any it is rather by the Action of its Parts which we visibly perceive to be in a continual Motion for these fiery Particles striking against a Body must needs impart to it somewhat of their Motion whether there is or is not any Heat in Fire If the Parts of that Body be not very solid Fire will dissipate them but if they be very gross and solid Fire can but just move them and make them slide one over the other And Lastly If there be a Mixture of subtile and gross Parts Fire will only dissipate those which it can push so far as to separate them from the others So that Fire can only separate and if it congregate 't is only by Accident But Aristotle asserts quite contrary Separating says he which some ascribe to Fire is but congregating Homogeneous Things for 't is only by Accident that Fire carries off Things of different Nature If this Philosopher had at first distinguished the Sensation of Heat from the Motion of the small Particles of which the Bodies called hot are composed and had afterwards defined Heat taken from the Motion of Parts by saying that Heat is what agitates and separates the invisible Parts or which visible Bodies are made up he would have given a tolerable definition of Heat though not full and satisfactory because it would not accurately discover the Nature of Motion in hot Bodies Aristotle defines Cold what congregates Bodies of the same or different Nature but that Definition is worth nothing for Cold congregates not Bodies To congregate them it must move them but if we consult our Reason we shall find that Cold can move nothing for we understand by that word either what we feel when we are cold or what causes our Sensation As to our Sensation 't is plain that it is merely Passive and can neither move nor drive any thing And as to the Cause of that Sensation reason tells us if we examine things that it is merely rest or a Cessation of Motion So that Cold in Bodies being no more than the Cessation of that sort of Motion which attends Heat 't is evident that if Heat separate Cold does not And therefore Cold coacervates neither things of the same nor of different nature since what cannot drive on Bodies cannot amass
if they were just and good And none perhaps could forbear laughing if instead of the Definitions which Aristotle gives of Hunger and Thirst when he says that Hunger is the desire of what is hot and dry and Thirst the desire of what is cold and moist we should substitute the Definitions of those words calling Hunger the desire of that which coacervates things of the same nature and is easily contained within its own Limits and difficultly within others and defining Thirst the desire of that which congregates things of the same and different natures and which can hardly be contained within its own bounds but is easily kept within others Surely 't is a very useful Rule to know whether Terms have been well defined and to avoid mistakes in reasoning often to put the Definition instead of the thing defined for that shews whether the words are equivocal and the Measures of the Relations false and imperfect or whether we argue consequently If it be so what Judgment can be made of Aristotle's Arguments which become an impertinent and ridiculous Nonsence when we make use of that Rule and what may also be said of all those who argue upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses since that Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all exact and solid Reasonings brings nothing but confusion in their Discourses 'T is not possible to lay open the foolish Capriciousness and Extravagance of Aristotle's Explications upon all sorts of matters When he treats of simple and easie Subjects his Errours are plain and obvious to be discover'd but when he pretends to explain very composed things and depending on several Causes his Errours are as much compounded as the Subjects he speaks of so that it is impossible to unfold them all and set them before others That great Genius who is said to have so well succeeded in his Rules for defining well knows not so much as which are the things that may be defined because he puts no Distinction betwixt a clear and distinct and a sensible Knowledge and pretends to know and explain other things of which he has not so much as a distinct Idea Definitions ought to explicate the Nature of things and the words of which they consist must raise in the Mind distinct and particular Notions But 't is impossible to define in that manner sensible Qualities as Heat Cold Colour Savour c. When you confound the Cause with the Effect the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation that attends it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which are not to be known by clear Ideas but only by internal Sensation as I have explain'd it in the third Book it is impossible to fix to those words Ideas which we have not As we have Distinct Ideas of a Circle a Square a Triangle and therefore know distinctly their Nature so we can give good Difinitions of them and even deduce from our Ideas of those Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by such words as are fixed to those Ideas But we cannot define either Heat or Cold in as much as they are sensible Qualities because we know them not distinctly and by Ideas but only by Conscience and inward Sensation Neither must we define the Heat that is without us by any of its Effects For if we substitute such a Definition in its place we shall find that it will only conduce to lead us into Errour For Instance if Heat be defined what congregates homogeneous things without adding any thing else we may by that Definition mistake for Heat such things as have no Relation to it For then it might be said that the Loadstone collects the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because 't is hot that a Dove eats Hempseed when it leaves other Grain because that Bird is hot that a covetous Man separates his Guineas from his Silver because he is hot In short there is no impertinency but that Definition would induce one into it were he dull enough to follow it And therefore that Definition explains not the nature of Heat nor can it be imploy'd to deduce all its properties from it since by literally insisting upon it we should draw ridiculous Conclusions and by putting it instead of the thing defined fall into Nonsense However if we carefully distinguish Heat from its Cause though it cannot be defined in as much as it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea yet its Cause may be defined since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But we must observe that Heat taken for such a Motion causes not always in us the Sense of Heat For Instance Water is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and most probably it feels warm to Fishes at least 't is warmer than Ice whose Parts are more quiet but 't is cold to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Body what has less Motion than another being in some manner quiet in respect of that And therefore 't is not with reference to the Motion of the Fibres of our Body that the Cause of Heat or the Motion that excites it ought to be defined We must if possible define that Motion absolutely and in it self for then our Definition will be subservient to know the Nature and Properties of Heat I hold not my self oblig'd to examine farther the Philosophy of Aristotle and to extricate his so much confus'd and puzling Errours I have shewn methinks that he proves not the Existence of his four Elements and defines them wrong that his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not their Nature and that all the Second Qualities are not made of them and lastly that though we should grant him that all Bodies are compos'd of the four Elements and the Second Qualities of the First his whole System would still prove useless for the finding out of Truth since his Ideas are not clear enough to preserve Evidence in all our Reasonings If any doubt whether I have propos'd the true Opinions of Aristotle he may satisfie himself by consulting his Books of the Heavens and of Generation and Corruption whence I have exextracted almost all that I have said of him I would relate nothing out of his Eight Books of Physicks because some learned Men pretend they are but a mere Logick which is very apparent since nothing but rambling and undetermin'd Words are to be found in them As Aristotle often contradicts himself and that almost all sorts of Opinions may be defended by some Passages drawn out of him I doubt not but some Opinions contrary to those I have ascrib'd to that Philosopher may be prov'd out of himself And I shall not warrant for him but it is sufficient for me that I have the Books I have quoted to justifie what I have said of him and I care little whether those Books are Aristotle's or not taking them for such as I find them upon the
Existence by the continual Sensations which God produces in us and which we cannot correct by Reason without offending Faith though we can correct by Reason the Sensations that represent them as endu'd with some Qualities and Perfections that are not in them So that we ought not to believe that they are such as we see or imagine them but only that they exist and that they are such as we conceive them by Reason But that we may proceed orderly we must not yet examine whether we have a Body whether there are others about us or whether we have only bare Sensations of Things which exist not Those Questions include too great Difficulties and are not perhaps so necessary as may be imagin'd to perfect our Mind and to have an accurate Knowledge of Natural and Moral Philosophy and some other Sciences We have within us the Ideas of Numbers and Extension whose Existence is undeniable and their Nature immutable and which would eternally supply us with Objects to think on if we desire to know all their Relations It is necessary to begin to make use of our Minds upon those Ideas for some Reasons which it will not be amiss to explain whereof the principal are Three The First is That those Ideas are the most clear and evident of all For if to avoid Errour we must still keep to Evidence in our Reasonings 't is plain that we must rather argue from the Ideas of Numbers and Extension than from the confus'd or compos'd Ideas of Physicks Morals Mechanicks Chymistry and other Sciences Secondly Those Ideas are the most distinct and exact of all especially those of Numbers So that the Habit which proceeds from the Exercise of Arithmetick and Geometry of not being content till we precisely know the Relations of Things endues the Mind with such an Exactness of Thought as is not to be found in those that are satisfied with the Probabilities so obvious to be met with in other Sciences The Third and chief Reason is That those Ideas are the immutable Rules and common Measure of all the Objects of our Knowledge For those that perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures or rather the Art of making such Comparisons as are requisite to know them have a kind of Universal Knowledge and a very sure Means evidently and certainly to discover whatever goes not beyond the ordinary Limits of the Mind But those that are not skilful in this Art cannot with Certainty discover such Truths as are somewhat intricate though they have very clear Ideas of Things and endeavour to know their Compound Relations These or the like Reasons mov'd some of the Antients to apply their Youth to the Study of Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry Undoubtedly they well knew that Arithmetick and Algebra endue the Mind with such an Insight and Penetration as was not to be gotten by other Studies and that Geometry manages the Imagination so well as that it is not easily puzzl'd or confounded for that Faculty of the Soul so necessary to Sciences acquires by the Use of Geometry such an universal Nicety as promotes and preserves the clear View of the Mind even in the most intricate Difficulties And therefore he that desires always to preserve Evidence in his Perceptions and discover naked Truâhs without Mixture of Darkness and Errour must begin with the Study of Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry after he has obtain'd some Knowledge at least of himself and the Sovereign Being As for Books that make the Way to those Sciences easie I may refer to the Meditations of des Cartes as to the Knowledge of God and our selves to the Elements of Mathematicks newly printed as to Arithmetick and Algebra to the New Elements of Geometry printed in 1667 or to the Elements of Father Taquet Jesuit printed at Antwerp in 1665 as to ordinary Geometry and as to Conick Sections and the Solution of Geometrical Problemes to the Treatises of Monsieur de la Hire intituled Of Conick Sections Of Geometrical Places and Of the Construction of Equations to which may be added the Geometry of des Cartes I would not have advis'd to the Elements of Mathematicks as to Arithmetick and Algebra if I knew any Author who had clearly demonstrated those Sciences but Truth obliges me to a thing for which I may be blam'd by some People for Algebra and Analyticks being altogether requisite for the Discovery of compos'd Truths I must needs shew my Esteem for a Book which carries those Sciences very far and which in the Opinion of many Learned explains them more clearly than they had been hitherto By the careful Study of those general Sciences we shall evidently know a great Number of Truths very serviceable in all accurate and particular Sciences We may afterwards study Natural and Moral Philosophy as being very useful though noâ very fit to make the Mind nice and quick-sighted And if we desire to preserve Evidence in all our Perceptions we must take a special Care not to be opinionated of any Principle that is not evident and to which the Chinese for instance would not be suppos'd to dissent after having throughly weigh'd and consider'd it And therefore we must only admit in Physicks those Notions which are common to all Men such as Axioms of Geometry and the clear Ideas of Extension Figure Motion Rest and others of that nature if there be any Perhaps it will be said that Extension is not the Essence of Matter But what is that to the purpose 'T is sufficient that the World which we conceive to consist of Extension appears like to that we see though it be not made of such a Matter which is good for nothing and altogether unknown whilst so much Noise is made about it It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are actually External Beings corresponding to those Ideas for we argue not from those Beings but from their Ideas We must only take care that our Reasonings which we make upon the Properties of Things agree with our inward Consciousness that is that our Thoughts perfectly agree with Experience because in Physicks we endeavour to discover the Order and Connexion of Effects with their Causes either in Bodies if they exist or in the Sense we have of them if they are not in being I say not however that we can doubt whether Bodies are actually existing when we consider that God is not a Deceiver and that the Order he has constituted in our Sentiments of Things both as to natural Occurrences and such as are wrought to create our Belief of what Reason is at a Loss to comprehend is very regular But I observe this because 't is not necessary to insist at first very long upon a thing which no body doubts of and is not extremely conducible to the Knowledge of Physicks consider'd as a true Science Neither must we puzzle our Heads with enquiring whether there are in the Bodies about us some other Qualities besides those of which we have clear
to another more exact by which we might accurately know how much London is larger than that open place contained in it There are therefore several sorts of Questions First There are some in which we seek a perfect Knowledge of all the exact Relations of two or several things betwixt each other Secondly There are some in which we search after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation betwixt two or several things Thirdly There are some in which we enquire after the perfect Knowledge of some Relation nearly approaching to the exact Relation that is betwixt two or more several things Fourthly There are some in which we are content to find a general and indefinite Relation 'T is evident First That to resolve the Questions of the First sort and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality betwixt two or more things we must have distinct Ideas perfectly representing them and compare them together in all the possible manners We may for Instance resolve all the Questions that tend to discover the exact Relations betwixt 2 and 8 because both Numbers being accurately known may be compared together as much as is necessary to know the exact Relations of their Magnitude and Quality We may know that 8 is 4 times 2 and that 8 and 2 are even but not square Numbers 'T is plain Secondly That to resolve Questions of the second sort and accurately to know some Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is betwixt two or more things 't is necessary and sufficient distinctly to know those Faces by which they must be compared to discover the enquired Relation For Instance to resolve such Questions as tend to discover some exact Relations betwixt 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even and square Numbers it 's sufficient exactly to know that 4 and 16 can be divided into equal parts without Fractions and that both are the product of a Number multiplied by it self and 't is to no purpose to examine what is their true Magnitude It being plain that to know the exact Relations of Quality betwixt things a distinct Idea of their Quality is sufficient without thinking on their Magnitude and that to know the exact Relations of Magnitude we need not search after the true Quality an accurate Knowledge of their Magnitude being all that is required Thirdly It clearly appears that to resolve the Questions of the third sort or to know some Relation very near approaching the exact Relation that is betwixt two or several things it is enough nearly to know the Faces by which they must be compared to discover the Relation required whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For Instance I may evidently know that the â 8 is greater than 2 because I may very near know the true Magnitude of the â 8 but I cannot discover how much the â 8 is greater than 2 because I cannot exactly find out the true Magnitude of the â 8. Lastly 'T is evident that to resolve the Questions of the fourth sort or to discover general and undefinite Relations it is enough to know things in a manner propotion'd to the need we stand in of comparing them together to find out the required Relation So that 't is not necessary to the Solution of all sorts of Questions to have very distinct Ideas of their Terms or perfectly to know the things expressed by those words But our knowledge must be the more exact as the Relations we search after are more accurate and numerous For as we have said in imperfect Questions imperfect Ideas of the things consider'd are sufficient to resolve them perfectly that is as far as they reach And many Questions may be resolved even without any distinct Idea of their Terms as when we are ask'd whether Fire is capable of melting Salt hardning Clay resolving Lead into Vapours and the like we understand perfectly those Questions and may very well solve them though we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Clay c. Because the Querists only desire to know whether we are ascertained by sensible Experiments that Fire produces those Effects And therefore may receive a satisfactory Answer by a knowledge drawn from the Senses CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions QUestion 's are of two sorts some are simple and others compound The former may be solved by the bare Attention of the Mind to the Ideas of the words in which they are expressed but the Solution of the latter must be perform'd by comparing them to a third or to many other Ideas We cannot find out the unknown Relations that are express'd in the Terms of a Question by immediately comparing the Ideas of those Terms since they can neither be joined nor compared We must then have one or several mean Ideas that we may make such Comparisons as are necessary to discover those Relations taking a special Care that those mean Ideas be the more clear and distinct as the Relations enquired after are more exact and numerous That Rule is but a Consequence of the first but of an equal importance with it For if exactly to know the Relation of the things compared it is necessary to have clear and distinct Ideas of them It plainly follows from the same Reason that we must have an accurate knowledge of the mean Ideas by which we intend to make our Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of measure with each of the things measured to find out their Relations I shall give some Instances of it When we put a piece of Cork or other small and light Vessel in the Water with a Loadstone in it and offer to the North Pole of that Stone the same Pole of another Magnet which we keep in our Hands we presently perceive that the former Load-stone flies back as though it were driven by a violent Wind. 'T is requir'd to discover the Cause of that Effect 'T is plain that to render a Reason of the Motion of that Load-stone it is not sufficient to know the Relations it has to the other for we might perfectly know them all and yet not understand how two Bodies could repel each other without meeting We must therefore examine what are the Things which we distinctly conceive capable according to the Course of Nature of moving Bodies for 't is requir'd to find out the natural Cause of the Motion of a Load-stone which is certainly a Body And therefore we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Being which by a clear Knowledge we cannot conceive capable of moving Bodies neither must we ascribe their Effect to an understanding Agent since we are not assur'd that Intelligences are the ordinary Causes of the natural Motions of Bodies and know not so much as whether they can produce Motion We plainly know that it is a natural Law that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Load-stone by the Means of
which two Principles of Errour I remember to have been often seduc'd For to return to the Difficulty in hand 't is not possible to conceive how those little Fetters should be indivisible by their own Essence and Nature nor consequently how they should be inflexible since on the contrary I conceive them most divisible nay necessarily divisible by their own Essence and Nature For the Part A is most certainly a Substance as well as B and consequently 't is plain that A may exist without B since Substances may exist without one another otherwise they would be no Substances It cannot be said that A is no Substance for 't is plain that that is not a bare Mode whereas every Being is either a Substance or the Mode of a Substance And therefore since A is not a Mode it is a Substance and may exist without B and much more the Part A exists separately from B so that this Fetter is divisible into A and B. Moreover if this Fetter were indivisible or crooked by its own Nature and Essence there would happen a thing quite contrary to what we see by Experience for not one Body could be broken Let us suppose as before a Piece of Iron composed of many Fetters perplexed within one another and A a B b to be two of them I say it will not be possible to disintangle them and consequently to break the Iron For to break it the Fetters that make it up must be bent which however are supposed inflexible by their own Nature and Essence If they be not supposed inflexible but only indivisible by their own Nature the Supposition would be unserviceable for solving the Question For then the Difficulty will be Why those little Fetters obey not the Force that is used to bend a Bar of Iron Neither must they be supposed indivisible if they be not supposed inflexible For if the Parts of those Fetters could change their situation in reference to one another 't is visible that they might be separated since there is no Reason why if one part may be somewhat removed from the other it could not be entirely removed And therefore whether these little Fetters are supposed indivisible or inflexible the Question cannot be solved by that means for if they be only supposed indivisible a Piece of Iron must be broken without trouble and if they be supposed inflexible it will be impossible to break it since the little Fetters that make up the Iron being intricated within one another it will be impossible to disintangle them Let us therefore solve the Difficulty by clear and undeniable Principles and find the Reason why that little Band has two Parts A B so firmly united to one another 'T is needful I perceive to divide the Subject of my Meditation into Parts that I may examine it the more exactly and with less Intention of Thought since I could not at first at a single view and with the whole Attention I am capable of discover what I enquired after This I might have done at the beginning for when the Subjects of our Meditation are somewhat abstruse 't is always the best way to consider them by parts and not fruitlessly weary our selves with the vain Hopes of meeting happily with the Truth What I enquire after is The Cause of the strict Union betwixt the minute Parts that make up the little Fetter A B. Now I conceive only distinctly three Things that can be the Cause sought for viz. The very Parts of that little Fetter or the Will of the Author of Nature or lastly invisible Bodies surrounding such little Bands I might yet alledge as the Cause of these things the Form of Bodies the Qualities of Hardness or some occult Quality the Sympathy betwixt Parts of the same Species c. but since I have no distinct Idea of those fine things I neither must nor can ground my Reasonings thereupon so that if I find not the Cause I search after in those things of which I have distinct Ideas I will not fruitlessly trouble my self with the Contemplation of such rambling and general Notions of Logick and shall forbear speaking of what I understand not But let us examine the first of these things that may be the Cause why the Parts of that small Band are so firmly joined viz. the very Parts of which it is made up When I only consider the Parts of which hard Bodies are composed I am inclined to believe That no Cement which unites the Parts of that Fetter can be imagin'd besides themselves and their own Rest for of what Nature could it be It cannot be a thing subsisting of it self since all those minute Parts being Substances for what Reason should they be united by other Substances but themselves Neither can it be a Quality different from Rest because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion that may separate those Parts but their own Rest but besides Substances and their Qualities we know not any other sorts of things 'T is true that the Parts of hard Bodies remain united as long as they are in Rest one by another and that when they are once in Rest they remain of themselves in the same state as long as they can but this is not what I enquire after and I know not how too I came to mistake the Subject I endeavour here to discover why the Parts of hard Bodies have so great a strength to remain in Rest one by another that they withstand the Force that is used to move them I might however answer my self that every Body has truly Force of continuing fix'd in its present state and that this Force is equal whether in Motion or Rest But that the Reason why the parts of hard Bodies remain in Rest by one another and that we can difficultly move and separate them is our not imploying sufficient Motion to overpower the Rest. This is probable but I am seeking Certainty if it be to be found and not bare Probability And how can I know with Certainty and Evidence that each Body has this Force to continue in the state it 's in and that this Force is equal both as to Motion and Rest since Matter on the contrary seems indifferently passive to either and altogether destitute of Force Let us have recourse then with M. des Cartes to the Will of the Creatour which is it may be that Force which Bodies seem to have in themselves which is the second thing above mention'd suppos'd capable of preserving the Parts of this little Fetter we speak of so closely link'd to one another Certainly 't is possible that God may will every Body should remain in its present state and that his Will should be the Force which unites their Parts to one another as I otherwise know his Will to be the Moving Force which puts Bodies in Motion For since Matter is incapable of moving it self I have Reason methinks to conclude it is a Spirit and even the Author
of Nature which puts it and preserves it in Motion by preserving it successively in different places by his bare Will in as much as an Almighty Being acts not with Instruments and his Will is necessarily follow'd by Effects I acknowledge then it 's possible that God may will that every thing remain in its present state whether it be Motion or Rest and that his Will may be the natural Power which Bodies have of remaining in the state they once have obtain'd And if so we must like M. des Cartes measure that Power conclude what ought to be the Effects of it and give Rules for the Force and Communication of Motions upon the Collision of different Bodies in proportion to their Magnitude since we have no other way of coming to the knowledge of that general and immutable Will of God who makes the different Power these Bodies have of acting upon and resisting one another consist in their different Magnitude and Swiftness But however I have no infallible proof that God wills by a positive Will that Bodies remain in Rest and one would think it sufficient for God to will the Existence of Matter not only to cause it to exist but to exist in Rest. The case is not the same with Motion since the Idea of a Matter mov'd certainly includes two Powers to which it is related viz. that which created and also that which mov'd it But the Idea of a Matter in Rest includes only the Idea of a Power which has created it whilst there is no necessity of any other Power to put it in Rest since if we barely conceive Matter without thinking on any Power we shall necessarily conceive it in Rest. Thus it is I conceive things for I am to judge by my Ideas and my Ideas tell me Rest is but the privation of Motion For God need but cease to will the Motion of a Body to make its Motion cease and to cause it to Rest. But I remember I have heard from many very ingenious Persons that Motion seem'd to them as much the privation of Rest as Rest the privation of Motion And some will not doubt to affirm for Reasons I can't comprehend that Motion seems rather a privation than rest I do not distinctly call to Mind the Reasons they alledge however this ought to make me suspicious lest my Ideas should be false For though most Men say what they please upon Subjects that seem of little moment yet I have Reason to believe the Persons I speak of were pleas'd to speak what they thought wherefore I must still examine my Ideas more carefully To me it seems a thing of undoubted Certainty and the Gentlemen before mention'd won't deny it that 't is the Will of God which moves Bodies The Force then which that Bowl I see in Motion has is the Will of God that moves it what now is God requir'd to do to stop it Must he Will by a positive Will that it should Rest or is it sufficient to cease to will its Motion 'T is plain that if God but cease to will the Motion of this Bowl the cessation of its Motion and consequently Rest will succeed the cessation of the Will of God For the Will of God which was the Force that moved the Bowl desisting that Force desists and the Bowl will be no longer mov'd Therefore the cessation of the moving Force produces Rest Rest then has no Force to cause it but is a bare privation that supposes no positive Will in God Thus we should admit in God a positive Will without any Reason or Necessity if we ascribed to Bodies any Force to remain in Rest. But to overthrow this Argument if possible Let us now suppose a Bowl at Rest as before we suppos'd it in Motion what must God do in order to agitate it Is it enough that he ceases to will its repose if so I have hitherto made no advance for that Motion will be equally the privation of Rest as Rest of Motion I suppose then that God desists to will the Rest of this Bowl but supposing it I see it not put in Motion and if any others do I desire them to inform me with what degree of Motion it is carried Certainly 't is impossible it should be mov'd or have any degree of Motion and 't is impossible to conceive any degree of Motion in it barely from our conceiving that God ceases to will it should be at Rest because it goes not with Motion as it does with Rest. Motions are infinitely various and are susceptible of more and less but Rest being nothing one cannot differ from another One and the same Bowl which moves twice as fast at one time as at another has twice as much Force or Motion at one time as at another But it cannot be said that the same Bowl has Rest double at one time to its Rest at another There must therefore be a positive Will in God to put a Bowl in Motion or to give it such a Force as it may move it self with But he need only cease to will it should be mov'd to cause its Motion to desist that is to make it Rest. Just as to the creating a World it is not enough that God cease to will its non-existence unless he likewise positively will the manner it shall exist in But in order to annihilate it there is no need of God's willing it should not exist since God cannot will Nothingness by a positive Will but barely that he cease to will its Being I consider not here Motion and Rest according to their relative Capacity for 't is manifest that resting Bodies have as real Relations to those about them as Bodies in Motion I only conceive that Bodies mov'd have a moving Force and that others at Rest have no Force at all to persevere in it because the Relations of mov'd to the circumambient Bodies perpetually changing they need a continual Force to produce these Changes it being indeed nothing but these Changes that cause all that Novelty we observe in Nature but there is no need of Force to do nothing When the Relation of a Body to those surrounding it is constantly the same there is nothing done and the Continuance of that Relation I mean the Action of the Will of God which preserves it is not different from that which preserves the Body it self If it be true as I conceive That Rest is but the Privation of Motion the least Motion or that of the least Body mov'd will include a greater Force or power than the Rest of the greatest Body and so the least Force and the least Body suppos'd to be mov'd in a Vacuum against another never so great and bulky will be capable of moving it since the largest Body at Rest will have no power of resisting the least Body that shall strike against it Therefore the Resistance which is made by the Parts of hard Bodies to hinder their Separation necessarily proceeds from
something else than their Repose But 't is necessary to demonstrate by sensible Experiments what we have been proving by abstracted Reasonings to see whether our Ideas comport with the Sensations we receive from Effects For it often happens that such Reasonings deceive us at least will not convince others and especially such as are prejudiced to the contrary M. Des Cartes's Authority has such an influence upon some Mens Reason that unless we prove all imaginable ways that great Man in an Errour we cannot disabuse them What I have said will be readily admitted by such as are not prepossess'd with a contrary Opinion and I perceive that I shall even be blam'd by them for proving things which seem to them indisputable However the Cartesians well deserve our endeavours to content them The others may pass over this Discourse if they think it tedious Here then are some Experiments which sensibly demonstrate that Rest has no power to resist Motion and which consequently evince that the Will of the Author of Nature which constitutes the Power and Force every Body has to continue in its present state respects not Rest but Motion only since Bodies consider'd in themselves have no Force at all We daily see great Ships whilst floating in the Water mov'd with little Bodies striking against them From which Experience I conclude notwithstanding all the subterfuges of Monsieur des Cartes and the Cartesians that if these great Bodies were in a Vacuum they might be moved with much greater facility since the Reason of a Vessel 's being mov'd in the Water with some difficulty is the resistance the Water makes to the imparted Motion which in a void space will not be found Now that which manifestly shews that Water resists the Motion impressed on the Vessel is the cessation of its Motion some time after the Impulsion which certainly would not happen did not the Vessel lose its Motion by communicating it to the Water or if the Water yielded to its passage without any opposition or lastly imparted to it some of its own Motion Therefore since a Vessel agitated in the Water ceases by degrees to move 't is an infallible sign that the Water instead of forwarding as Monsieur des Cartes pretends withstands its Motion and consequently it would be infinitely easier to move a great Body in a Vacuum than in Water since there would be no resistance on the part of surrounding Bodies 'T is evident therefore that Rest has no Force to resist Motion and that the least Motion contains more Power and Force then the greatest Rest or at least that we ought not to measure the Force of Motion and Rest by the Proportion we find between the Magnitude of Bodies in those two States as Monsieur des Cartes has done 'T is true there is some reason to believe that the Vessel is mov'd whilst in the Water by reason of the continual change which happen in the watery parts about it though to us it seems not to change its place And this has been an inducement to M. Des Cartes and some Persons to believe that 't is not the bare Force of the impelling Agent which makes it advance in Water but that having before receiv'd a great deal of Motion from the little parts of the surrounding Liquid which press it equally on all sides this Motion is only determin'd by the adventitious Motion of the impelling Body so that what moves a Body in Water could not do it in a Vacuum And thus it is that M. Des Cartes and his Followers defend the Rules of Motion they have given us Let us suppose for Example a Piece of Wood of a Foot square plac'd in a liquid Body all the little parts whereof act and move against it and because they press it equally on all sides as well towards A as B the piece of Wood stirs neither one way nor another Now if I drive another Piece of Wood of half a Foot against the former on the side A I see it advance forward hence I conclude that it might be mov'd in a Vacuum with less Force than that of the Piece that drives it for the foregoing Reasons But the Persons I speak of deny it and answer that the reason of the greater Piece's advancing when urg'd by the little one is that the latter unable to move it singly being joyn'd with the parts of the agitated Liquid determines them to drive it by imparting some of their Motion to it But 't is manifest that by this Answer the Piece of Wood when once mov'd could never diminish its Motion but must on the contrary perpetually increase it For according to this Answer the Piece of Wood is more driven by the Water to the side of A than B therefore it must perpetually proceed and because this Impulsion is continual its Motion must constantly increase But as I have said the Water is so far from facilitating its Motion that it continually resists it which resistance still lessening it more and more at last makes it altogether insensible But I am now to prove that the Piece of Wood which is equally push'd by the little parts of the encompassing Water has no Motion or Force at all capable of moving it though it continually changes its immediate place and the Surface of the Water round it is different at different times For if it be so that a Body equally press'd on all sides as a Piece of Wood be destitute of Motion undoubtedly that foreign Force that strikes against it must communicate it since at the time of this Force's urging it on the Water resists and insensibly dissipates the impress'd Motion causing it by little and little at last to cease It is certain at least to those I speak to that there is no more Motion in Nature at one time than another and that Bodies at rest cannot be put in Motion but by the Collision of some agitated Bodies which communicate their Motion to them Whence I conclude that a Body which I suppose created perfectly at Rest in the midst of Water will never receive any degree of Motion from the little parts of the Water which surround it and which strike continually against it provided their Force be equal on all sides because all these little parts which dash equally against it on all sides rebounding again with their whole Motion communicate none of it and consequently this Body ought to be consider'd as at Rest and without any moving Force though it continually changes its Situation Now the proof I have for the rebounding of these little parts together with their whole Motion is this That otherwise the Water which touches this Body must grow very cold or even congeal'd and become almost as hard as the Wood upon its Surface since the Motion of the watry parts ought to be equally diffus'd into the little parts of the Body they encompass But that I may accommodate my self to the Patrons of M. Des Cartes's Opinion I am willing
two parts as close as they are yet the Air cannot get in and therefore 't is that which compresses and constringes the two parts together and makes them so difficult to be disunited unless we glide them over one another For all this it is manifest that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles would be one and the same thing in a vacuum for neither have we different Ideas of them so that it would be to talk without understanding our selves to make them differ absolutely and without any regard to the surrounding Bodies I now come to make some Reflexions upon M. Des Cartes's Opinion and the Original of his Errour I call his Opinion an Errour because I can find no sincere way of defending what he has said upon the Rules of Motion and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies towards the end of the second Part of his Principles in several places and that he seems to have evidently prov'd the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man most distinctly conceiving that Matter could not naturally move it self but that the moving Force of all Bodies was nothing but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that therefore the Communications of their Motion upon their mutual Collision must come from the same Will yielded to be carry'd away with this Notion That the Rules of the different Communication of Motions must be fetch'd from the Proportion found between the different Magnitudes of Colliding Bodies it being impossible to penetrate into the Designs and Will of God And whereas he concluded that every thing had the Force to persevere in its present State whether it were in Motion or Rest because God whose Will constituted this Force acts always in the same manner he inferr'd that Rest had an equal Force with Motion Thus he measur'd the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Greatness of the Body it resided in as well as those of Motion And hence he gave the Rules of the Communication of Motion which are seen in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavour'd to refute 'T is a hard matter not to submit to the Opinion of Monsieur des Cartes when we contemplate it on the same side For once more since the Communication of Motions proceeds only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they have once been put in whether it be Motion or Rest it seems that we ought to seek for the Rules of the different Communications of Motion upon the Concourse of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion that is found between the Magnitudes of these same Bodies I do not therefore admire that Monsieur des Cartes should light upon this Notion but I only wonder he did not correct it when having push'd on his Discoveries he found out the Existence and some Effects of the subtile Matter which surrounds all Bodies I am surpriz'd to find him in the 132d Article of the Fourth Part attribute the Elastick Force of certain Bodies to the subtile Matter and yet not ascribe to it their Hardness and the Resistance they make to our Endeavours to bend and break them but only to the Rest of their Parts For I think it evident that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of some Bodies is the same with that which impowers them to resist the Violence that is us'd to break them For indeed the Force which is employ'd in breaking a piece of Steel has but an insensible Difference from that which is us'd to bend it I mean not to multiply Reasons here which one might give for the proving these things nor to answer some Difficulties possible to be urg'd about Bodies which are not sensibly springing and yet are difficultly bent For all these Difficulties vanish if we consider that the subtile Matter cannot easily make new Tracks in Bodies which break in bending as in Glass and temper'd Steel which it can easier do in such Bodies as are compos'd of branchy Parts and that are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And Lastly that there is no hard Body but has some kind of Elaterium 'T is a hard matter to persuade one's self that Monsieur des Cartes did positively believe the Cause of Hardness to be different from that which makes the Elasticity and what looks most likely is that he made not sufficient Reflexion on that matter When a Man has for a long time meditated on any Subject and is well satisfied about that of his present Enquiry he commonly thinks no farther on it he believes that the Conceptions he had of it are undeniable Truths and that it is needless to examine them any more But a Man has so many Things in him which disrelish his Application provoke him to precipitate Judgments and subject him to Errour that though his Mind remains apparently satisfied yet it is not always well instructed in the Truth Monsieur des Cartes was a Man like us No greater Solidity Accuracy Extent and Penetration of Thought is any where to be met with than in his Works I confess but yet he was not infallible Therefore 't is very probable he remain'd so settl'd in his Opinion from his not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something in the Consequence of his Principles contrary to it He grounded it on very specious and probable Reasons but such notwithstanding as being not capable of themselves to force his Consent he might still have suspended his Judgment and consequently as a Philosopher he ought to have done it It was not enough to examine in a hard Body what was in it that might make it so but he ought likewise to have thought on the invisible Bodies which might give it Hardness as he did at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he ascrib'd to them the Cause of their Elasticity He ought to have made an exact Division and comprehensive of whatever might contribute to the Hardness of Bodies It was not enough to have sought the Causes of it in the Will of God he ought also to have thought on the subtile Matter which surrounds these Bodies For though the Existence of that violently agitated Matter was not yet proved in the place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not however rejected he ought therefore to have suspended his Judgment and have well remember'd that what he had written concerning the Cause of Hardness and of the Rules of Motion was fit to be revis'd which I believe was neglected by him or at least he has not sufficiently consider'd the true Reason of a thing very easie to be discover'd and which yet is of greatest Consequence in Natural Philosophy I thus explain my self Monsieur des Cartes well knew that to the Support of his System the Truth of which he could not reasonably suspect it was absolutely necessary that great Bodies should always communicate some
act upon our Mind In a word we are neither our own Light nor our own Felicity as I have proved at large in the Third Book and elsewhere Lastly God inclines us to this particular Good For God inducing us to all that 's Good by a necessary Consequence inclines us to particular Goods by producing the Idea or Sensation of them in our Mind This therefore is all that God effects in us when we sin But whereas a particular Good includes not in it all Good and the Mind considering it with a clear and distinct View cannot imagine it concludes all God does not necessarily and invinsibly incline us to the love of it We are conscious of the Liberty we have to stay this Love and of our Tendency to proceed farther In a word we feel the Impression we have for Good Universal or to speak as others do we are sensible that our Will is not under any constraint or necessity to fix upon this particular Good So then this is what the Sinner does He stops he rests he follows not the Impression of God he does nothing For Sin is Nothing He knows that the grand Rule he is to observe is to employ his Liberty so far as it will go and that he is not to fasten upon any Good unless he be inwardly convinc'd it would be offending against ORDER to refuse to stay upon it If he discovers not this Rule by the light of his Reason he learns it at least from the secret Reproaches of his Conscience He is obliged then to follow the Impression he receives for the Universal Good and to think of other Goods besides what he enjoys and what he is only to make use of For 't is by thinking on other Goods besides what he enjoys that he can produce in himself new Determinations of his Love and make use of his Liberty Now I prove that by the Impression God gives him for Good in general he may think of other Goods besides that of his present Enjoyment it being precisely in this that the Difficulty consists 'T is a Law of Nature that the Ideas of Objects should offer themselves to our Mind when we desire to think of them provided our Capacity of Thought be not fill'd up by the lively and confus'd Sensations we receive occasionally from the Motions in our Body Now we can Will the thinking on all things because the natural Impression which carries us towards Good reaches to all possible Objects of our Thought And we can at all times think on all things because we are united to Him who comprehends the Ideas of all things as I have formerly proved If it be true then that we can Will the considering nearly what we already see as afar off since we are united with the Universal Being and if it be certain that by virtue of the Laws of Nature Ideas approach us when we desire it we ought thence to infer First That we have a Principle of our Determinations For 't is the actual Presence of particular Ideas that positively determines towards particular Goods the Motion we have towards Good in general and so changes our Natural Love into Free and deliberate Loves Our Consent or Acquiescence in the preception of a Particular Good has nothing real or positive in it on our Part as I shall explain by and by Secondly That the Principle of our Determinations is always free in regard to particular Goods For we are not invincibly inclin'd to love them since we can examine them in themselves and compare them with the Idea which we have of the Sovereign Good or with other particular Goods Thus the Principle of our Liberty consists in this that being made for God and united to him we can always think on the true Good or on other Goods besides those which our Thoughts are actually engag'd on But this on supposition that our Sensations do not take up the Capacity of our Mind For to the end we may be free with the Liberty foremention'd it is necessary not only that God should not push us invincibly to particular Goods but also that we should be able to employ our Impression for Good in general to the loving other Objects than those we love at present But as those only can be the actual Objects of our Love which can be of our Thoughts and that we cannot actually think except on those which occasion very lively Sensations whilst they occasion them it is plain that the dependance we have upon our Body weakens our Liberty and in many Junctures quite destroys the use of it So that our Sensations obliterating our Ideas and the Union we have with our Body whereby we discern only our selves enfeebling that we have with God whereby all things are present to us the Mind ought not to give way to be shar'd by confus'd Sensations if it would preserve entire the free Principle of its Determinations From all which it is evident that God is not the Author of Sin and that Man endues not himself with any new Modifications God is not the Author of Sin because he continually impresses on the Sinner who stops at a particular Good a Motion to go farther gives him a Power of thinking on other things and tending to other Goods than those which actually engage his Thoughts and Affections and commands him not to love whatever he can refuse to love without inward Disquiet and Remorse withal continually recalling him to his God by the secret Reproaches of his Reason 'T is true that in one sense God inclines the Sinner to Love the Object of his Sin if this Object appears Good to a Sinner for as most Divines say whatever there is of a positive nature of Act or Motion in the Sin proceeds from God But 't is only by a false Judgment of our Mind that the Creatures seem good to us I mean capable of acting in us and making us happy But the Sin of a Man consists not in his loving a particular Good for every Good as such is amiable but in his loving only this Good or loving it as much or more than another that is greater or in his loving a Good which God forbids him to enjoy for that the Mind being subject to the Body pursuant to the Fall the Love or rather the Enjoyment of this Good would encrease his Concupiscence and alienate him from the love of the supreme Good In a word the Sin of Man consists in his not referring all particular Goods to the supreme or rather in his not considering and loving the supreme Good in all the particular and so not regulating his Love by the WILL of GOD or according to essential and necessary ORDER of which all Men have a more or less perfect Knowledge as they are stricter or looser united to God or are more or less Sensible to the Impressions of their Senses and Passions For our Senses import our Soul into our whole Body and our Passions as it were export
our Freedom on its respect But whereas this inward Sensation is sometimes absent from our Mind and we consult only what confus'd remains it has left in our Memory we may by the consideration of abstracted reasons which keep us from an inward feeling persuade our selves that 't is impossible for Man to be free Just as a Stoick who in want of nothing and Philosophizing at his Case may imagine that Pain is no Evil because the Internal Sense he has of himself does not actually convince him of the contrary and so he may prove like Seneca by reasons in one sense most true that 't is a contradiction for the wise man to be miserable But though our Self-consciousness were insufficient to convince us of our Freedom yet Reason might evince as much For since the light of Reason assures us that God acts only for himself and that he can give no Motion to us but what must tend towards him the Impression towards Good in general may be irresistible but 't is plain that that which we have for particular Goods must be necessarily free For if it were invincible we should have no Motion to carry us to God though he gives it only for himself and we should be constrain'd to settle on particular Goods though GOD ORDER and REASON forbid us So that Sin could not be laid at our door and God would be the real Cause of our Corruptions forasmuch as we should not be Free but purely Natural and altogether necessary Agents Thus though inward Sensation did not teach us we were free Reason would discover it was necessary for Man to be created so if we suppose him capable of desiring particular Goods and only capable of desiring them through the Impression or Motion which God perpetually gives us for himself Which likewise may be prov'd by Reason But our capacity to suffer Pain cannot be prov'd this way but can only be discover'd by Conscience or inward Sensation and yet no Man can doubt but a Man is liable to suffer Pain As we know not our Soul by any clear Idea we have of it as I have before explain'd so 't is in vain to try to discover what it is in us that terminates the Action which God impresses or that yields to be conquer'd by a resistible Determination and which we may change by our Will or by our Impression towards all Good and our Union with him who includes the Ideas of all Beings For in short we have no clear Idea of any Modification of our Soul Nothing but our Internal Sense can teach us that we are and what we are and this only must be consulted to convince us we are free And its Answers are clear and satisfactory enough upon the Point when we actually propose to our selves any particular Good for no Man whatever can doubt whether he be invinsibly inclin'd to eat of a Fruit or avoid some slight inconsiderable Pain But if instead of hearkning to our Inward Sensation we attend to abstracted Reasons which throw us off the Contemplation of our selves possibly losing sight of them we may forget that we are in Being and trying to reconcile the prescience of God and his absolute power over us with our Liberty we shall plunge into an Errour that will overturn all the Principles of Religion and Morality I produce here an Objection which is usually made against what I have been saying which though but very weak and defective is strong enough to give a great many trouble to evade The Hating of God say they is an Action which does not partake of Good and therefore is all the Sinner's God having no part in it And consequently Man acts and gives himself new Modifications by an action which does not come from God I Answer That Sinners hate not God but because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil for Good consider'd as such cannot be the Object of Hatred Therefore they hate God with that very Motion of Love he influences them with towards Good Now the Reason why they conclude he is not Good is their making an undue use of their Liberty for being not convinc'd with irresistible Evidence that he is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently to hate him In Hatred two things may be distinguish'd viz. the Sensation of the Soul and Motion of the Will This Sensation cannot be Evil for it is a Modification of the Soul and has neither Moral Good nor Ill in it Nor is the Motion more corrupt since it is not distinguishable from that of Love For External Evil being only the privation of Good 't is manifest that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to pursue Good Wherefore all that is real and positive even in our Hatred of God himself has nothing Evil in it and the Sinner cannot hate God without an abominable abuse of the action which God incessantly gives to incline him to the Love of Him God works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence and yet is not the Author of Concupiscence AS the Difficulties that are rais'd about Concupiscence are near akin to those before explain'd I think it convenient to shew that God is not the Author of Concupiscence though it be he that works all in us even in the production of sensible Pleasure It ought I think to be granted for the Reasons produc'd in the Fifth Chapter of the First Book of the preceding Treatise and elsewhere that by the natural Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body Man even before the Fall was inclin'd by preventing Pleasures to the use of sensible Goods and that as often as such and such Traces were delineated in the principal part of his Brain such and such Thoughts arose in his Mind Now those Laws were most Proper and Equitable for the Reasons I there have given Which being suppos'd as before the Trangressions all things were perfectly well order'd so Man had necessarily that Power over his Body as that he could prevent the production of these Traces when he would Order requiring that his Mind should have the Dominion over his Body Which Power of his Mind precisely consisted in this that according to its different Desires and Applications it stopt the Communication of Motions which were produc'd in his own Body by circumambient Objects over which his Will had not an immediate and direct Authority as over his proper Body And it cannot I think be conceiv'd how he could hinder the Formation of the Traces in his Brain any other way Therefore the Will of God or the general Law of Nature which is the true Cause of the Communication of Motions depended on some occasions upon the Will of Adam For God had that consideration for him that he produc'd not without his consent new Motions in his Body or at least in the principal part to which his Soul was immediately uniâed Such was the Institution of Nature before the Sin ORDER would
have it so and consequently HE whose essential and necessary Will is always conformable to ORDER Which Will remaining immutably the same the Establish'd Order was subverted by the first Man's Disobedience because for the demerits of his Sin it was consonant to Order that he should be Lord of nothing It is not reasonable that the Sinner should suspend the Communication of Motions that the Will of God should conform to his or that any exceptions should be made to the Law of Nature on his Behalf In so much that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends on his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions pursuant to that most just and exact Law which unites the two Parts of which he is compos'd Thus the formal Reason of Concupiscence no less than that of Sin is nothing real and positive being no more in Man than the loss of the Power he had to wave and suspend to the Communication of Motions on some occasions Nor are we to admit any positive Will in God to produce it For this loss which Man has sustain'd was not a consequence of Order or of the immutable Will of God which never swerves from it and is constantly the same but only a consequence of Sin which has rendred Man unworthy of an Advantage due only to his Innocence and Uprightness Wherefore we may say that not God but Sin only has been the Cause of Concupiscence Nevertheless God Works all that is Real and Positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence for God does every thing but all that has nothing of Evil. 'T is by the general Law of Nature that is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce in Man's Body certain Motions and that these Motions raise in the Soul certain Sensations useful to the preservation of the Body or the Porpagation of the Species Who then dare presume to say these things are not good in themselves I know it is said that Sin is the Cause of certain Pleasures But do they that say it conceive it Can it be thought that Sin which is nothing should actually produce something Can nothing be suppos'd to be a real Cause However 't is so said but possibly for want of taking due pains of seriously considering what they say or because they are unwilling to enter on an Explication that is contrary to the Discourses they have heard from Men who it may be talk with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Knowledge Sin is the Cause of Concupiscence but not of Pleasure as Free Will is the Cause of Sin though not of the natural Motion of the Soul The Pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its Motion or Love and there is nothing good but what God does The Rebellion of the Body and the guilt of Pleasure proceed from Sin As the Adherency of the Soul to a particular Good or its Rest proceeds from the Sinner But these are only Privations and Nothings whereof the Creature is capable Every Pleasure is Good and likewise in some measure makes happy the Possessour at least for the time of the Enjoyment But it may be said to be evil because instead of elevating the Mind to Him that is the true Cause of it through the Errour of our Intellectual and corruption of our Moral Part it prostrates it before sensible Objects that only seem to produce it Again it is evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently meriting rather to be punish'd than rewarded to oblige God pursuant to his Primitive Will to recompense us with pleasant Sensations In a word not to repeat here what I have said in other places it is evil because God at present forbids it by Reason of its alienating the Mind from himself for whom he hath made and preserves it For that which was ordain'd by God to preserve Righteous Man in his Innocence now fixes sinful Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely establish'd as the easiest and most obvious Expedients to teach Man without calling off his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the invironing Bodies at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fasten him on Objects incapable of acting in him and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he enjoys occasionally from them THE SECOND ILLUSTRATION UPON THE First CHAPTER of the First BOOK Where I say That the Will cannot diversly determine its Propensity to Good but by commanding the Vnderstanding to represent to it some particular Object IT must not be imagin'd that the Will commands the Understanding any other Way than by its Desires and Motions there being no other Action of the Will nor must it be believ'd that the Understanding obeys the Will by producing in it self the Ideas of Things which the Soul desires for the Understanding acts not at all but only receives Light or the Ideas of Things through its necessary Union with Him who comprehends all Beings in an intelligible manner as is explain'd in the Third Book Here then is all the Mystery Man participates of the Sovereign Reason and Truth displays it self to him proportionably to his Application and his praying to it Now the Desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer that is always heard it being a natural Law that Ideas should be so much readier and more present to the Mind as the Will is more earnest in desiring them Thus provided our Thinking Capacity or Understanding be not clogg'd and fill'd up by the confus'd Sensations we receive occasionally from the Motions occurring in our Body we should no sooner desire to think on any Object but its Idea would be always present to our Mind which Idea Experience witnessing is so much more present and clear as our Desire is more importunate and our confus'd Sensations furnish'd to us by the Body less forcible and applicative as I have said in the foregoing Illustration Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to represent to it some particular Object I meant no more than that the Soul willing to consider that Object with Attention draws near it by her Desire because this Desire consequently to the efficacious Wills of God which are the inviolable Laws of Nature is the Cause of the Presence and Clearness of the Idea that represents the Object I could not at that time speak otherwise than I did nor explain my self as I do at present as having not yet prov'd God the sole Author of our Ideas and our particular Volitions only the occasional Causes of them I spoke according to the common Opinion as I have been frequently oblig'd to do because all cannot be said at once The Reader ought to be equitable and give Credit for some time if he would have Satisfaction for none but Geometricians pay always down in hand THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE
continually operates by Order represents to their Understanding as often as desir'd the clear and lively Idea of that Object So that according to this Explication the Memory and other Habits of pure Intelligences consists not in an Easiness of operating which results from any Modifications of their Being but in the immutable Order of God and in a Right the Mind obtains to those things which have been already submitted to it And all the Power of the Mind immediately and solely depends on God alone the force or facility of acting which all Creatures have in their Operations being in this Sence but the efficacious Will of the Creatour Nor do I think we are oblig'd to give up this Explication by reason of the evil Habits of Sinners and damn'd Persons For tho' God does all that is Real and Positive in the Actions of Sinners it is evident by what I have said in the first Illustration that he is not the Author of Sin Nevertheless I believe as I think I ought that after the Action of the Soul there remain some Changes which dispose it to that same Action again But as I know them not so I cannot explain them for I have no clear Idea of my own Mind wherein to discover all the Modifications it is capable of I believe by Theological and not clear and evident Proofs that the Reason of pure Intelligences seeing the Objects they have before consider'd more distinctly than others is not meerly because God represents them in a livelier and perfecter manner but because they are really more dispos'd to receive the same Action of God in them Just as the facility of playing on an Organ which some have acquir'd proceeds not from any greater Force and Action which the Animal Spirits that are necessary to the Motion of the Fingers have in them than in other Men but from the Smoothness and Glibness which the Passages of the Animal Spirits have gotten by Exercise as in this Chapter is explain'd But yet I grant the Use of Memory and the other Habits is unnecessary in those who being perfectly united to God find in his Light all sorts of Idea's and in his Will all the facility of acting that can be desired THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Seventh CHAPTER of the Second BOOK A Reduction of the Proofs and Explications I have given of Original Sin Together with the Answer to the Objections that I thought most urgent IN order to answer methodically to the Difficulties that may arise touching Original Sin and its manner of Derivation from Fathers to Children I thought fit to exhibit in few words what I have said on that Subject in several places of the foregoing Treatise Here follow my principal Proofs which I have disposed after a particular fashion to make them more sensible to those that will consider them I. God wills Order in his Works What we clearly conceive to be agreeable to Order God wills and what we conceive clearly to be repugnant to It God wills not which is a Truth manifest to all those who can consider the infinitely perfect Being with a steady and clear'd View Nothing can unfix or trouble their prospect of this Truth whilst they clearly see that all the Difficulties that can be raised against this Principle proceed but from the Ignorance of those things which are necessary to be known to solve them II. God has no other End in his Operations than himself this Order demands III. God creates and preserves the Mind of Man to be taken up with him to know and to love him as being himself the End of his own Works Order will have it so God cannot will that a Being should love what is not amiable or rather He cannot will that what is less amiable should be more beloved Therefore 't is evident that Nature is corrupted and in Disorder since the Mind loves Bodies that are not amiable and that commonly more than God Original Sin then or the Corruption of Nature needs no Proof For every one finds plain enough in himself a Law which captivates and disorders him a Law that is not given by God since it is contrary to Order by which His Will is governed IV. Nevertheless Man before his Fall was admonished by preventing Sensations and not by clear Knowledge whether he ought to unite to or separate from the encompassing Bodies Order required it 'T is a Disorder that the Mind should be oblig'd to apply it self to them for though it may be united to them it is not made for them It ought therefore to have Knowledge of God and Sense of Bodies Again whereas Bodies are incapable of being the Good of the Mind it would with Regret and Pain unite to them if it knew them to be only what they are without being sensible of something in them which is not Wherefore the Counterfeit Good ought to be discerned by a preventing Sensation that it may be lov'd with a Love of Instinct and the True Good ought to be known by a clear Knowledge that it may be lov'd with a rational Love and a Love of Choice Lastly Man being made and preserved by God to know and love him ought not to have the Capacity of his Mind either possess'd or shar'd in spight of him with the Knowledge of the infinite Figures and Configurations of Bodies about him or of that he animates and yet to know by a clear Knowledge Whether such a Fruit at such a Season be fit for Nourishment of his Body manifestly requires the Intelligence of so many things and the making so many Argumentations as would quite fill up the most comprehensive of created Minds V. But though the first Man was advertis'd by preventing Sensations Whether he ought or ought not to make use of surrounding Bodies yet he was not mov'd by involuntary and rebellious Passions and he obliterated out of his Mind the Idea's of sensible things when he pleas'd whether he us'd them or not because Order would have it so The Mind may be united to a Body but it should command it and not depend on it Again All the Love which God invests us with ought to terminate on him because he produces nothing in us but what is for himself Lastly Bodies are not amiable but below what within us is capable of loving Therefore in the first Institution of Nature Bodies could not turn our Mind towards them nor incline it to consider them and love them as its Goods VI. The Bodies about us act not on our Soul save when they produce some Motions in our Body and that these Motions are communicated to the principal Part of our Brain For it is by the Changes which happen in this Part that the Soul changes her self and finds her self mov'd by sensible Objects This I have sufficiently prov'd and Experience demonstrates the same Which being suppos'd it is clear from the preceding Article that Adam stopt when he pleas'd the Motions communicated to his Body at least those communicated to the
to furnisâ an Animal with parts quite useless and to congeal the Fruits after they are perfectly formed Is not this rather because God does what he pleases and that his power supersedes all Order and Rule For to mention things of greater Importance than the Fruits of the Earth wherewith he may do as he sees good the Clay whereof God makes Vessels of wrath is the same with that which he fashions Vessels of Mercy ANSWER These are the difficulties which serve only to obscure the Truth as proceeding from the darkness of the Mind We know that God is just we see that the wicked are Happy ought we to deny what wee see ought we to doubt of what we know because we may possibly be so stupid as not to know and so Libertine as not to believe what Religion teaches us of future Torments So we know that God is Wise and all that he does is Good mean while we see Monsters or defective Works What are we to believe that God is out of his aim or that these Monsters are not his handiwork Certainly if we have sence and constancy of Mind we shall believe neither the one nor the other For 't is manifest that God does all and that whatever he does is as perfect as possible with relation to the simplicity and fewness of the means he imploys in the Formation of his Work We must hold fast to what we see and not quit our ground for any difficulties impossible to be resolv'd when our Ignorance is the cause of that Impossibility If Ignorance must raise Difficulties and such like Difficulties overthrow the best establisht Opinions what will remain certain among Men who know not all things What Shall not the brightest Lights be able to disperse the least Darkness and shall any little shadow Eclipse the clearest and the liveliest Light But though the answering such sort of Difficulties might be dispenc'd with without Prejudice to the fore-establisât Principle yet it is not amiss to show they are not unanswerable For the Mind of Man is so unjust in its Judgments that it may possibly prefer the Opinions which seem to result from these imaginary Difficulties before certain Truths which no Man can doubt of but because he will and with that design ceases to examine them I say then that God wills order though there are Monsters and 't is moreover because God wills order that there are Monsters and this is my reason Order requires that the Laws of nature whereby God produces that infinite Variety so conspicuous in the World should be very simple and very few in number Now 't is the simplicity of these general Laws which in some particular Junctures and because of the Disposition of the subject produces irregular Motions or rather Monstrous Combinations and consequently God's willing order is the cause of these Monsters Thus God does not positively or directly will the Existence of Monsters but he positively wills certain Laws of the Communication of Motions whereof Monsters are the necessary consequences because these Laws though of a most simple kind are nevertheless capable of producing that variety of forms which can't be sufficiently admired For Example In consequence of the general Laws of the Communication of Motions there are some Bodies which are driven near the Centre of the Earth The Body of a Man or an Animal is one of these that which upholds him in the Air breaks under his Feet is it just or according to Order that God should change his general Will for that particular Case Surely it seems not probable That Animal therefore must necessarily break or maim its Body And thus we ought to argue about the generation of Monsters ORDER requires that all Beings should have what 's necessary to their Preservation and the Propagation of the Species provided this may be done by most simple Means and worthy the Wisdom of God And so we see that Animals as also Plants have general Means to preserve themselves and to continue their Species and if some Animals fail thereof in some particular Occasions 't is because these general Laws whereby they were form'd reach not these private Emergencies because they respect not Animals separately but generally extend to all Beings and that the Good of the Publick must be preferr'd before Particular Advantages 'T is evident That if God made but one Animal it would not be Monstrous But Order would require That he should not make that Animal by the same Laws that he at present forms all others for the Action of God must be proportion'd to his Design By the Laws of Nature he designs not the making one Animal but a whole World and he must make it by the simpliest Means as Order requires 'T is enough then that the World be not monstrous or that the general Effects be suitable to the general Laws to vindicate the Work of God from Censure and Reproach If for all particular Changes God had instituted so many particular Laws or if He had constituted in every Being a particular Nature or Principle of all the Motions that arrive in it I confess it would be hard to juâtifie his Wisdom against so visible Disorders We should perhaps be forc'd to confess either that God wills not Order or that he knows not how or is not able to rectifie Disorder For in short it seems to me impossible to ascribe an almost infinite Number of second Causes of natural Forces Vertues Qualities and Faculties to what we call the Sports and Disorders of Nature with a Salvo to the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Author of all things OBJECTION against the Second Article GOD can never act for Himself A wise Being will do nothing useless but whatever God should do for himself would be useless because he wants nothing God wills nothing for himself if by the Necessity of his Essence he has all the Perfection he can desire And if God desires nothing for himself he works nothing for himself since he works only by the Efficacy of his Will The Nature of Good is to be communicative and diffusive 't is to be useful to others and not to it self 't is to seek out 't is if it be possible to create Persons whom it may make happy Therefore it is a Contradiction for God who is essentially and supremely good to act for himself ANSWER GOD may be said to act for himself two ways either with intent to derive some Advantage from what he does or to the end his Creature may find its Happiness and Perfection in him I enquire not at present whether God acts for himself in the first sense and whether to receive an Honour worthy of himself he has made and restor'd all things by his SON in whom according to the Scripture all things subsist I only assert that God cannot create and preserve Spirits in order to know and love created Beings 'T is an Immutable Eternal and necessary Law That they should know and love God as I
have explain'd in the Third Article Thus this Objection does not impugn my Principle but on the contrary corroborates it and if it be certain that 't is the Nature of Good to disseminate and communicate it self abroad for I stand not to examine that Axiome 't is evident That God being essentially and supreamly Good it is no Contradiction he should act in the Sence I intended OBJECTION against the Fourth Article Ignorance being a Consequence of Sin Adam before his Fall had a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of his own Body and of those he liv'd amongst He must for Example have been perfectly acquainted with the Nature of all Animals to give them as he did such Names as agreed to them ANSWER 'T is a Mistake Ignorance is neither an Evil nor a Consequence of Sin 'T is Errour or Blindness of Mind which is both one and the other None but God knows all things without any Shadow of Ignorance Ignorance is incident to the brightest and most enlightned Intelligences Whatever is finite cannot comprehend Infinity and thus there is no Spirit that can comprehend only all the Properties of Triangles Adam knew the first minute of his Creation whatever was requisite he should know and nothing more and it was to no purpose for him to know exactly the Disposition of all the Parts of his Body and of those he made use of the Reasons are to be seen in this Article and elsewhere The Imposition of Names in Scripture rather denotes the Authority than the perfect Knowledge of the Imposer As the Lord of Heaven had made Adam the Lord of Earth he conceded him the Privilege of giving Names to the Animals as he himself had done to the Stars 'T is evident That Sounds or Words neither have nor can have any natural relation to the things they signifie let the Divine Plato and the Mysterious Pythagoras say what they please of it One might perhaps explain the Nature of an Horse or an Oxe in an entire Book but a Word is not a Book and it 's ridiculous to imagine That Monosyllables as Sus which in Hebrew signifies a Horse and Sâbor which signifies an Oxe should represent the Nature of these Animals Notwithstanding there is great probability these Names were impos'd by Adam since they are found in Genesis the Author whereof assures us That the Names which Adam gave the Creatures were the same which were in use in his time for I cannot see what else can be meant by these Words Omne quod vocavit Adam animae viventis ipsum est nomen ejus And whatsoever Adam call'd every living Creature that was the Name thereof But I grant that Adam gave Names to Animals which have some reference to their Nature and I subscribe to the Learned Etymologies that an Author of this Age gives us of them I will that he call'd domestick Animals Behemoth because of their keeping silence the Ram Ajil because he is strong the Buck Sair because swift the Hog Chazir because of his little Eyes the Ass Chamor because in the East Country red Asses are common But I can't conceive that any more is requisite than to open the Eyes to know if a Buck be swift an Ass red and whether a Hog has little or great Eyes Adam calls by the Name of Beir and Behemah what we term a Brute or a great domestick Creature because these Beasts are mute and stupid What should we thence conclude That he knew perfectly their Nature That is not evident I should rather be apprehensive lest it should be thence concluded That Adam being simple enough to put a Question to an Oxe as being the largest of domestick Animals and wondring that he could not answer him despis'd him and nam'd by a Term of Contempt Beir and Behemah Second OBJECTION against the Fourth Article Some preventing Sensations are incommodious and painful Adam was just and innocent and consequently ought not to feel the smart of them He ought then on all occasions to be guided by Reason and Knowledge and not by preventing Sensations like those we have at present ANSWER I confess there are preventing Sensations which are disagreeable and painful but they never occasion'd any Pain in the first Man because in the instant they gave him any he by an Act of his Will withstood the Impression and in the very instant of that Volition he ceas'd to be touch'd with it These Sensations did only respectfully caution him what ought to be done or omitted and did not incommode his Felicity They but made him sensible that he was capable of losing it and that he who made him Happy could punish and make him miserable if he fail'd in his Fidelity But to perswade our selves that the first Man was never overtaken with the Sense of any lively Pain we need but consider these two things First that Pain is very light when the Motions it is annex'd to are very languid because it is always proportion'd to the force of the Motions that are communicated to the chief part of the Brain Secondly That is of the Nature of Motion to include a Succession of Time and it cannot be violent at the first instant of its Communication Which being suppos'd it is plain that the first Man never felt a violent surprizing Pain that was capable to make him miserable because he could put a stop to the Motions that caus'd it But if so be he could effectually stop them at the first instant of their Action there is no doubt but he would do it since he was always desirous of Happiness and that Aversion is naturally conjoin'd to the Sense of Pain Adam therefore never suffer'd any violent Pain but I think we are not oblig'd to say that he never felt any light and inconsiderable smart such as is that when we tast a sowre Fruit supposing it to be ripe His Felicity had been very tender if so little a thing had been able to disturb it For such Delicacy is a sign of Weakness for how can that Joy and Pleasure be substantial that such a Trifle can dissolve and annihilate Pain never truly molests our Happiness but when it is involuntary and possesses us in spight of our Resistance JESUS CHRIST was happy though on the Cross in the midst of his Groans and Agonies because he suffered nothing but what he was willing to undergo Thus Adam suffering nothing against his will it cannot be said we make him unhappy before his Sin in supposing him admonish'd by preventing but respectful and submissive Sensations of what he ought to avoid for the preservation of his Life OBJECTION against the Fifth Article Adam felt preventing Pleasures But these are involuntary Motions Therefore Adam was agitated with involuntary Motions ANSWER I Answer that Adam's Sensations preceded his Reason the proofs I have shown for it in the Fourth Article But I deny that they preceded his Will or that they stirr'd up in it any particular Motions For Adam was willingly admonish'd
by these Sensations what he ought to do for the preservation of his Life But he was never willing to be perturbated by them in spight of his VVill. For that 's a Contradiction Moreover when he desir'd to apply himself to the contemplation of Truth without any distraction of Thought his Senses and his Passions kept an intire Silence Order would it should be so for that 's a necessary sequel of that absolute power he had over his Body I answer secondly that it is not true that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion and its Love Pleasure and Love are modes of the Souls Existence But Pleasure has no necessary relation to the object that seems to cause it and Love is necessarily related unto Good Pleasure is to the Soul what Figure is to Body and Motion is to Body what Love is to the Soul But the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure I grant that the Soul which has a constant Propeâsity to Good advances as I may say more readily towards it when instigated by a sense of Pleasure that when discourag'd by her suffering Pain as a Body when driven runs easier along if it have a Spherical than if it have a Cubical Figure But the figure of a Body differs from its Motion and it may be Spherical and yet remain at rest 'T is true in this case it goes not with Spirits as with Bodies those cannot feel a Pleasure but they must be in motion because God who only makes and preserves them for himself drives them perpetually on towards good But that does not prove that the pleasure of the Soul is the same thing as its Motion For two things though differing from each other may yet be always found inseparably together I answer lastly that although pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul yet that which the first Man felt in the use of the goods of the Body did not incline him to the Loving Bodies 'T is true Pleasure carries the Soul towards the object that causes it in her But it is not the Fruit that we eat with Pleasure which causes the Pleasure in us Not Bodies but God only can act upon the Soul and in any manner make it happy And we are in an Error to think that Bodies have in them what we feel occasionally from their presence Adam before his Sin being not so stupid as to imagine that Bodies were the causes of his Pleasures was not carry'd to the love of them by the motions that accompany'd his Pleasures If pleasure contributed to the fall of the first Man it was not by working in him what at present it does in us But only by filling up or dividing his capacity of Thought it effac'd or diminish'd in his Mind the presence of his true good and of his Duty OBJECTION against the sixth Article What likelyhood is there that the immutable Will of God had a dependance on the will of Man and that on Adam's behalf there were exceptions made to the general Law of the Communication of Motions ANSWER At least it is not evident but such exception might be made now it is evident that immutable order requires the subjection of the Body to the Mind and 't is a contradiction for God not to love and will order for God necessarily loves his Son Therefore it was necessary before the Sin of the first Man that exceptions should be made in his favour to the general Law of the Communication of Motions This seems it may be of a too abstracted nature Here then is somewhat of a more sensible kind Man though a Sinner has the power of moving and stopping his Arm when he pleases Therefore according to the different Volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to the raising or stopping some Motions in his Body which certainly cannot be perform'd by the general Law of the Communication of Motions If then the will of God be still submitted to our own why might it not be submitted to the will of Adam If for the good of the Body and of civil Society God stops the communication of motions in Sinners why would he not do the like in favour of a Righteous Man for the good of his Soul and for the preservation of the Union and Society with his God for whom only he was made As God will have no Society with Sinners so after the Sin he depriv'd them of the power they had to sequester themselves as it were from the Body to unite themselves with him But he has left them the Power of stopping or changing the communication of Motions with reference to the preservation of Life and of Civil Society Because he was not willing to destroy his Work having before the construction of it decreed according to St. Paul to re-establish and renew it in Jesus Christ. OBJECTION against the Seventh Article Man in his present state conveys his Body all manner of ways he moves at pleasure all the parts of it which are necessary to be mov'd for the prosecution and shunning of sensible good and evil and consequently he stops or changes every moment the natural communication of motions not only for trifles and things of little importance but also for things useless to Life and civil Society and even for Crimes which violate Society shorten Life and dishonour God all manner of ways God wills order it is true But will order have the laws of motions violated for the sake of Evil and kept inviolable on the account of Good Why must Man lose the power of stopping the motions which sensible objects produce in his Body since these Motions keep him from doing good from repairing to God and returning to his duty and yet retain the power of doing so much evil by his Tongue and his Arm and other parts of his Body whose motions depend upon his will ANSWER To the answering this Objection it must be consider'd that Man having sin'd ought to have return'd to his Original nothing For being no longer in Order nor able to retrieve it he ought to cease to Exist God loves only order the Sinner is not in order and therefore not in the Love of God The Sinner therefore cannot subsist since the subsistence of Creatures depends on the will of the Creator but he wills not that they should exist if he does not love them The Sinner cannot by himself regain lost order because he cannot justifie himself and all that he can suffer cannot atone for his offence He must then be reduc'd to nothing But as it is unreasonable to think that God makes a Work to annihilate it or to let it fall into a state worse than annihilation 't is evident that God would not have made Man nor permitted his Sin which he foresaw unless he had had in view the Incarnation of his Son in whom all things subsist and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty a Perfection
there were Wheels and Pumps to raise the Water Nevertheless I can't see why divining is not sometimes allowable provided a Man sets not up for a Prophet and speaks not in too positive a strain I rather think he is permitted to speak his Thoughts whilst he pretends not to be Infallible nor Lords it unjustly over others by dogmatical Decisions or by the help of Scientifick Terms 'T is not always divining to speak of things which are not visible and which contradict Prejudices If so be we speak no more than we easily conceive and which readily makes its way into the mind of others who desire to understand Reason I say then that supposing the general Laws of the Communication of Motions such as they are there is great Probability that the particular Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of her Infant is necessary to form its Body in a requisite manner or at least is necessary to give the Brain of the Infant certain dispositions which ought to vary according to different Times and Countries as I have explain'd in the same Chapter I confess there is no Communication between the Brain of an Hen and that of a Chicken in the Egg which nevertheless is perfectly well form'd But it ought to be observ'd that the Chicken is farther advanc'd in the Egg when the Hen lays it than the Foetus when it descends into the Matrix which may well be concluded since there goes less time to the hatching Chickens than there goes to the bringing forth Whelps though the Belly of the Bitch being very hot and her Blood in perpetual motion the Whelps should be sooner form'd than the Eggs hatch'd were not the Chickens farther advanc'd in their Eggs than the Whelps in their Cicatricles Now there is great probability that the formation of the Chicken in the Egg before it was laid was effected by the communication I am speaking of I answer in the second place that the growth of the Body of Fowls is possibly more conformable to the general laws of Motion than that of four-footed Animals and that so the communication of the Females Brain with that of her young ones is not so necessary in Fowls as in other Animals For the reason that makes that communication necessary is probably the remedying the defect of these general Laws which in some particular Cases are insufficient to regulate the Formation and Growth of Animals I answer lastly there is no such necessity to the preservation of the Life of Birds that they should have so many particular Dispositions in their Brain as other Animals They have Wings to fly harm and to secure their feed and have no need of all that particular Mechanism which is the principle of the cunning and docility of some domestick Creatures Therefore the old ones need not instruct their young in many things as they breed them nor capacitate them to be taught many afterwards by giving them a disposition of Brain that 's fit for Docility Those who breed young Dogs for the Game sometimes find those which naturally set meerly from the instruction they receiv'd from their Damm who often us'd to set with them in her Belly There is a great difference almost always observable in the breed of these Creatures some of which are much more Docil and Tractable than others of the same Species But I do not think there ever was a Fowl that taught any thing extraordinary to her young that a Hen for Example ever hatch'd a Chicken who could do any thing but what they all do naturally Birds then are not so tractable or capable of Instruction as other Animals The Disposition of their Brain is not ordinarily capable of many Changes nor do they act so much by Imitation as some domestick Animals Young Ducks which follow an Hen don't stay for her Example to take the Water and the Chickens on the contrary never betake themselves to swim though hatch'd and led by a Duck that loves the Water But there are Animals that easily and readily imitate the uncommon Motions which they see others do However I do not pretend that much stress is to be laid on these last Reflections since they are not necessary to establish my Opinion Second OBJECTION against the Twelfth Article 'T is likewise divining to affirm That the Mother before her Sin might have any intercourse with her Embryo there being no necessary relation between our Thoughts and Motions happening in our Brain And therefore that Communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is useless ANSWER It is evident That without this Communication the Infant was incapable of having any Commerce with its Mother or the Mother with her Infant without a particular Miracle Now before the Sin Order requir'd That the Mother should have notice of all the Corporeal wants of her Infant and that the Infant should resent its Obligations to its Parents Therefore since all things were in Order before the Sin and that God acts always agreeably to Order the Mother and the Child had some Commerce by means of this Communication To understand wherein this Commerce may have consisted it must be remembred That the Connexion of the Tracks of the Brain with the Ideas of the Soul may be several ways effected either by Nature or by the Institution of Men or some other way as I have shewn how in the Second Book In beholding a Square or the Look of a Person suffering any Pain the Idea of a Square or of an afflicted Person rises in the Mind This is common to all Nations and the Connexion between these Ideas and these Traces is natural When an Englishman hears pronounc'd or reads the Word Square he has likewise the Idea of a Square but the Connexion which is between the Sound or the Letters of that Word and its Idea is not natural nor is it general with all the World I say then That the Mother and her Infant must naturally have had a Correspondence between them upon all the things that could be represented to the Mind by natural Connexions That if the Mother for Instance had seen a Square the Infant would have seen one too and that if the Infant had imagin'd any Figure he would have likewise excited the Traces of the same Figure in the Imagination of his Mother But they would have had no Commerce together about things of a purely Spiritual Nature nor even about Corporeal things whenever they conceiv'd them without the help of the Senses and Imagination The Mother might have thought on GOD have heard or read the Word Square or the like and yet the Child not have discover'd what were her Thoughts thereof unless in Tract of Time she should have setled a new Commerce of intellectual Ideas with it much what the same with that of Nurses when they teach their Children to speak I explain and prove these things One would think I had sufficiently prov'd them by the Explication I gave of the Cause of
Hereditary Aversions and Marks which Children bring with them into the World deriv'd from the Traces of their Mothers Now these Traces of corporeal things are inseperable from their Ideas which makes the Ideas to be communicated along with them and the Children to see feel imagine the same things as their Mothers They have now whether they will or not the Sensations of their Mothers but were they not Sinners they would have had the power of hindring when they pleas'd the Effect of that their Communication with their Mother They might likewise have re-excited in their Brain the Tracks which they receiv'd from their Mothers by the same reason that we imagine what we please when our Sensations are not too vivid and affecting which being suppos'd it is evident That the Mother when considerately attending to her Infant might have discover'd by a kind of Repercussion whether or no it receiv'd the Impression she excited in it and likewise other things that it might think upon For as the Mother could not vibrate the Fibres of her Brain but the Fibres of the Infant 's Brain must have receiv'd the Impression so the Infant could not stop that Vibration or cause any other without giving the Mother notice by some light Impression provided she made her self very attentive by the power she had of stifling every other Noise than that which her Infant caus'd in her Thus it must be acknowledg'd That the Mother and the Infant would have had some intercourse before the Sin or else we must deny all Correspondence between their Brains or the power of the Soul over the Body to be such as I have before maintain'd This appears evident though the wanton Imagination starts and Prejudices band against it 'T is true this Commerce at first would have reach'd but to Matters that come under the Senses and Imagination it not being absolutely necessary that the Child which had only a Corporeal Dependence on the Mother should receive from her any other Ideas than those of sensible Objects For its Soul being strictly united to God whilst in a State of Innocency would have receiv'd immediately from him all the Ideas which respected not the Body But whereas in time we may affix the most abstract Ideas to things sensible which have no relation to them this Commerce between the Mother and her Child would very likely have quickly extended to things of a more Spiritual Order if they strove to correspond about such sort of Matters I am sensible that what I now say will not seem reasonable to very many and that even those who resist their Prejudices and labour against the continual Tide of sensible Impressions will admire at the Novelty of this Notion But if we seriously reflect on the way that a Master takes to instruct his Disciples and observe what different means he is oblig'd to make use of to manifest his own Ideas of things to them the Comparisons he makes and the Judgments he passes about these Ideas and the other Dispositions of his Mind in reference to his Scholars we shall see it will be a much harder Task for him to discover his Thoughts and inward Dispositions of Mind to them than for a Mother to do it to her Infanâs provided we only suppose that the Traces of the Mother's Brain are imprinted on the Child's which is evident from all that I have said before For in fine it is manifest that the Voice and all exteriour Signs that we employ to express our Thoughts to others obtain the desir'd Effect only because they imprint on the Brain of our Hearers the same Traces and raise the same Emotions of the Spirits as accompany our Ideas and our inward Disposition on their respect OBJECTION against the Seventeenth and following Articles 'T is a rash Assertion to say Children in Baptism are justify'd by actual Motions of their Will towards God We must not give vent to such New Opinions which do no good but only make a noise ANSWER I grant that we ought not positively to affirm That Children are justify'd by formal Acts of their Will I believe it impossible to know any thing of it and that we are not positively to assert any thing but what we know But because there are but too many who are apt to believe That Justification of Children is only external and by Imputation by reason say they they are incapable of performing any Act of Love towards God I think it fit to let them know that they are brought by Prejudice to that Opinion For the Prejudices of Men in respect of Children are such as make them commonly fansie they have no Thought in their Mother's Womb and in the beginning of their Age and even that they are absolutely incapable of thinking They believe that they have not so much as the Ideas of things that it is their Masters that furnish them with Discourse and that if they have any Inclinations they are of another Nature from ours and incompetent to carry them to the Sovereign Good The greatest part of Men can't distinctly conceive That Childrens Souls are like those of grown up Persons And that they don't come to Strength and Perfection by degrees like the Body And that if they were deliver'd one moment from the Impression the Body made upon them and mov'd by the Delectation of Grace they would in that moment be more pure and enlighten'd than the Souls of the greatest Saints who feel always working in their Mind and Heart the Leaven of Concupiscence Concupiscence is commonly look'd upon as Natural and is not always consider'd as a consequence of Sin and this makes Men conclude unawares that the Stupidity of Children is a necessary consequence of their Infirmity of Body Tenderness of Age and also incapacity of Mind Which Conclusion or Prejudice is constantly represented to the Mind and prepossess it in such a manner as hinders it from examining the thing in its own Nature Therefore those who have treated of the Effect of Baptism in the Ages past have omitted the explaining the Regeneration of Infants by the actual Motions of their Heart Not that they were induc'd by strong Reasons to judge it impossible for their Works do not shew they have ever so much as examin'd it but as is visible because they have supposs'd it so and that it has hardly entred their Heads to doubt of it or possibly because they waâ'd giving an Explication so repugnant to Prejudices at a Time when no such Attempts were made to get rid of them as now-a-days there are But if it be consider'd how necessary it is to give a closer Explication than that for Instance which St. Austin gives in several places which looks towards Imputation though in others he speaks in a way that does not countenance it If it be consider'd that Imputation is very commodious and likely for that Reason embrac'd by some Ancient and Orthodox Divines and moreover absolutely necessary for those who without
enquire What I have said of that Author is methinks evident enough Let every one deduce his Consequences according to his Knowledge without attributing those Thoughts to me which I never had Those who pretend to dive into the Designs of others frame commonly such Phantasms as resemble but themselves it being customary with Men to taint and infect others with the Venom of their own Passions We are apt to measure all things by our selves and they would do well to consider who condemn me whether they do not judge themselves un-a-wares in doing it But if they would have me declare my self upon the Citations of Tertullian I grant a Man has right to make use of them for several Reasons and likewise that they are sometimes most usefully employ'd to make some practical Truths more sensible which are barren and unfruitful as long as they lie dormant in our inward Reasons and raise in us no contrary Motions to those which the Goods of the Body excite in us Nevertheless I can't think those Mens Opinions very unreasonable who believe we are not to cite Authors by Name save when they are infallible and that except in things out of Reasons Prerogative and which Authority ought to take place no Quotations are to be made This formerly was the Custom of the Fathers St. Cyprian never cited Tertullian though he has taken a great deal from him and if it be true what St. Jerome reports of that Holy Bishop by hear-say viz. That talking of Tertullian he call'd him his Master either his Name must not have been so Authoritave nor his Expression so forcible as they are at present upon Mens minds or else St. Cyprian was wonderfully rigorous in the Observance of that Custom of his Time it being very strange such a Disciple should never have mention'd his Master in any of his Works St. Jerome's History is commonly urg'd in Defence of Tertullian and I have been sometimes told I was too blame to speak so as I did of a Man whom St. Cyprian call'd his Master But I question whether St. Jerome would not have been too easie of belief in what made for the Honour of Tertullian To me he seems to have had somewhat too great an Inclination for him since he in some measure excuses his Fall by retorting his Heresie on the Envy of the Romish Clergy and the evil Usage he receiv'd from them But if that Story which is founded only on what St. Jerome heard one Person say be true I must confess I know not what to make of that Silence observ'd by St. Cyprian in his Writings with reference to Tertullian That Silence of a Scholar may be suspected to conceal some Mystery not advantagious to the Master and if that History as well as Tertullian's own Works did not give us sufficiently to understand that he was not altogether worthy of the great Esteem that is paid him by very many yet I question whether St. Cyprian's Conduct his Silence his Stile his Ways would not be sufficient to lessen it and to make us think That probably that Author's Reputation was not so well establish'd in Africa it self which ought to have been more favourable to him than a Clime so temperate as ours Our own Country and Africa produce very different Wits the Genius of the former being natural rational and irreconcileable to all over-strain'd Manners it is strange to find any among them addicted to an Author who never studied nor follow'd Nature and who instead of consulting his Reason suffers himself to be transported by his ungovern'd heats into altogether obscure monstrous and extravagant Expressions But this probably is owing to the mighty Force of Imagination which disarms Reason and even changes Nature And indeed a Man in the Fury of Passion perturbates and even changes the natural situation of our Imagination to adapt it to his own And then there is no Motion but what seems Natural no Expression but 's Agreeable no Nonsence but 's convincing For we stand to examine nothing seriously Now as the Passions vindicate themselves and irregular immaginations take delight only in their Irregularity 't is impossible to judge soberly of things as long as the Brain preserves the violent Impression it has receiv'd There is no Man in the Transport of Passion but is perpetually sollicited to justifie it nor any disturb'd in Brain but is pleas'd in the disturbance For if those who fancy themselves Cocks Wolves Oxen please themselves wonderfully in imitating the actions that are customary with these Creatures though quite contrary to the nature of Man it may easily be judg'd that we shall be far from condemning the Behaviour of those who by the Contagion of their Imagination have made us in a manner like them For in condemning them we are conscious we condemn our selves There 's a very particular Reason why some of the Learn'd should glory in espousing Tertullian and expressing so extraordinary an esteem for him Which is that affected obscurity which serves as one of the principal Rules of his Rhetorick In these days all empty and senseless Expressions and all obscure and perplex'd ways of speaking go under the name of nonsence But there have been found such as have look'd upon Obscurity as one of the greatest mysteries in Eloquence with whom the Art of perswading consisted partly in being unintelligible If publick Haranguers had always the clear and distinct Ideas of the Truths they went about to perswade and spoke only to persons that were capable of a competent Attention to understand them the precept of affecting obscurity in discourse would be the most extravagant in the World But though this precept absolutely contradicts all Reason yet it may be said to be proportionate and fit for the Genius of most Men not only because a Mysterious Obscurity conceals the Ignorance of the Speaker but also for its raising such a sense in others as disposes them to yield and be convinc'd Experience manifests that most Men esteem what they do not comprehend that they reverence like Mysteries whatever is above their reach and think an Orator has a wonderful Talent when he dazles them by the glitterings of discourse and by a Language of Imagination when Reason has nothing to do The Inclination Men have for Grandeur exceeds that which they have for Truth wherefore Pompous Nonsence which perswades by the Impression is better receiv'd than pure Argumentation which perswades by force of Evidence since Evidence makes way only by Reflections which always cost the Maker trouble but sensible Conviction flows into the Soul and penetrates it in a most agreeable manner The Good which alone is capable of satisfying our desires is at once Infinite and Inaccessible and great and obscure Expressions have something of this Character So that Obscurity raising our Desires whilst Greatness provokes our Admiration and Esteem these Expressions win us by the Motions they produce in us When we understand or think we understand a difficult and obscure Author
Will being not equal even among the Damn'd it is plain they are not all equally opposite to Order and that they do not hate it in all cases unless in consequence of their Hatred to God For as no one can hate Good consider'd barely as such so no one can hate Order but when it seems to thwart his Inclinations But though it seem contrary to our Inclinations it nevertheless retains the force of a Law which Condemns and also punishes us by a Worm that never dies Now then we see what Order is and how it has the strength of a Law by that necessary Love which God has for himself We conceive how this Law comes to be general for all Minds God not excepted and why it is necessary and absolutely indispensible Lastly we conceive or we may easily conceive in general that it is the Principle of all Divine and Humane Laws and that 't is according to this Law that all Intelligences are judg'd and all Creatures dispos'd in the respective rank that belongs to them I acknowledge it is not easie to explain all this in particular and I venture not to undertake it For should I go to show the Connexion particular Laws have with the general and account for the agreement which certain manners of acting have to Order I should be forc'd to engage in Difficulties that it may be I could not resolve and which would lead me out of sight of my subject Nevertheless if it be consider'd that God neither has nor can have any other Law than his own Wisdom and the necessary Love he has for it we shall easily judge that all Divine Laws must depend on it And if it be observ'd that he has made the World with reference only to that Wisdom and Love since he acts only for Himself we shall not doubt but all natural Laws must tend to the Preservation and Perfection of this World according to indispensable Order and by their dependance on necessary Love For the Wisdom and Will of God regulates all things There is no need I should explain at present this Principle more at large what I have already said being sufficient to infer this Consequence That in the first institution of Nature it was Impossible for Minds to be subjected to Bodies For since God cannot act without Knowledge and against his Will he has made the World by his Wisdom and by the motion of his Love He has made all things by his Son and in his Holy Spirit as we are taught in Scripture Now in the Wisdom of God Minds are perfecter than Bodies and by the necessary Love God has for himself he prefers what is more perfect to what is less so Therefore it is not possible that Minds should be subject to Bodies in the first institution of Nature Otherwise it must be said that God in creating the World has not follow'd the Rules of his Eternal Wisdom nor the Motions of his natural and necessary Love which not only is inconceivable but involves a manifest contradiction True it is that at present the created Mind is debas'd below a material and sensible Body but that 's because Order considered as a necessary Law will have it so 'T is because God loving himself by a necessary Love which is always his Inviolable Law cannot love Spirits that are repugnant to him nor consequently prefer them to Bodies in which there is nothing evil nor in the hatred of God For God loves not Sinners in themselves Nor would they subsist in the Universe but through JESUS CHRIST God neither preserves them nor loves them but that they may cease to be Sinners through the Grace of CHRIST JESUS or that if they remain eternally Sinners they may be eternally condemned by immutable and necessary Order and by the Judgment of our LORD by vertue of whom they subsist for the Glory of the Divine Justice for without Him they would be annihilated This I say by the way to clear some difficulties that might remain touching what I said elsewhere about Original Sin or the general Corruption of Nature 'T is if I mistake not a very useful reflection to consider that the Mind has but two ways of knowing Objects By Light and by Sensation It sees them by Light when it has a clear Idea of them and when by consulting that Idea it can discover all the properties whereof they are capable It sees things by Sensation when it finds not in it self their clear Idea to consult it and so cannot clearly discover their properties but only know them by a confus'd Sensation without Light and Evidence 'T is by Light and a clear Idea the mind sees the Essences of things Numbers and Extension 'T is by a confus'd Idea or Sensation that it judges of the Existence of Creatures and knows its own What the Mind perceives by Light or by a clear Idea it perceives in a most perfect manner moreover it sees clearly that all the Obscurity or Imperfection of its Knowledge proceeds from its own Weakness and Limitation or from want of Application and not from the Imperfection of the Idea it perceives But what the mind perceives by Sensation is never clearly known not for want of any Application on part of the Mind for we always are very applicative to what we feel but by the defectiveness of the Idea which is extreamly obscure and confus'd Hence we may conclude that it is in God or in an immutable nature that we see all that we know by Light or a clear Idea not only because we discover by Light only numbers Extension and the Essences of Beings which depend not on a free Act of God as I have already said but also because we know these things in a very perfect manner and we should even know them in an infinitely perfect manner if our thinking Capacity were infinite since nothing is wanting to the Idea that represents them We ought likewise to conclude that we see in our selves whatever we know by Sensation However this is not as if we could produce in our selves any new modification or that the sensations or modifications of our Soul could represent the Objects on occasion whereof God excites them in us But only that our Sensations which are not distinguished from our selves and consequently cannot represent any thing distinct from us may nevertheless represent the existence of Beings or cause us to judge that they exist For God raising Sensations in us upon the presence of Objects by an action that has nothing sensible we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its essence but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its existence For there is always a pure Idea and a confused Sensation in the Knowledge we have of things as actually existing if we except that of God and of our own Soul I except the Existence of God For this we know by a pure Idea and without Sensation since it depends not on any cause and
and the Accidental Form Accidents Others say that the Forms produce both other Forms and Accidents Others still that bare Accidents are not only capable of producing Accidents but even Forms But it must not be imagin'd that those for instance who say that Accidents can produce Forms by vertue of the Form they are join'd to understand it the same way For one part of them will have Accidents to be the very Force or Virtue of the Substantial Form Another that they imbibe into them the Influence of the Form and only act so by vertue of it A Third lastly will have them to be but Instrumental Causes But neither are these latter sort altogether agreed about what is meant by Instrumental Cause and the vertue they receive from the Principal Nor can the Philosophers compromise about the Action whereby second Causes produce their Effects For some of them pretend that Causality ought not to be produc'd since it is this which produces Others will that they truly act by their own Action But they are involv'd in so many Labyrinths in explaining precisely wherein this Action consists and there are so many different Opinions about it that I cannot find in my Heart to recite them Such is the strange variety of Opinions though I have not produc'd those of the Ancient Philosophers or that were born in very remote Countries But we have sufficient Reason to conclude that they are no more agreed upon the subject of second Causes than those before alledg'd Avicenna for instance is of Opinion that Corporeal Substances cannot produce any thing but Accidents This according to Ruvio is his Hypothesis He supposes that God produces immediately a most perfect Spiritual Substance That this produces another less perfect and this a third and so on to the last which produces all Corporeal Substances and Corporeal Substances Accidents But Avicembrom not able to comprehend how Corporeal Substances which cannot penetrate each other should cause alterations in them supposes that there are Spirits which are capable of acting on Bodies because they alone can penetrate them For these Gentlemen not admitting the Vacuum nor the Atoms of Democritus nor having sufficient knowledge of the subtil matter of M. des Cartes could not with the Gassendists and Cartesians think of Bodies which were little enough to insinuate into the pores of those that are hardest and most solid Methinks this diversity of Opinions justifies this thought of ours that Men often talk of things which they understand not and that the Power of Creatures being a Fiction of Mind of which we have naturally no Idea every Man makes it and imagines it what he pleases 'T is true this Power has been acknowledg'd for a Real and True by most Men in all Ages but it has never yet been prov'd I say not demonstratively but in any wise so as to make an impression upon an Attentive thinking Man For the confus'd Proofs which are built only upon the fallacious Testimony of the Senses and Passions are to be rejected by those who know how to exercise their Reason Aristotle speaking of what they call Nature says it is Ridiculous to go about to prove that Natural Bodies have an inward Principle of Motion and Rest because says he it is a thing that 's Self-Evident He likewise does not doubt but a Bowl which strikes another has the force of putting it in Motion This is witnessed by his Eyes and that 's enough for him who seldom follows any other Testimony than of the Senses very rarely that of his Reason and is very indifferent whether it be intelligible or not Those who impugn the Opinion of some Divines who have written against Second Causes say like Aristotle that the Senses convince us of their Efficacy And this is their first and principal Proof 'T is evident say they that the Fire burns that the Sun shines that Water cools and he must be out of his Senses who can doubt of it The Authors of the other Opinion says the great Averroes are out of their Wits We must say almost all the Peripateticks use sensible Proofs for their Conviction who deny this Efficacy and so oblige them to confess we are capable of acting on them and wounding them 'T is a judgment which Aristotle has already pronounc'd against them and it ought to be put in Execution But this pretended Demonstration cannot but create Pity For it gives us to know the Weakness of an Humane Mind And that the Philosophers themselves are infinitely more sensible than Reasonable It evinces that those who glory in being the Inquirers of Truth know not even whom they are to consult to hear any News of it Whether Soveraign Reason which never deceives but always speaks things as they are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of Interest and with reference to the preservation and convenience of Life For in fine what prejudices will not be justified if we set up our Senses for Judges to which most of them owe their Birth As I have shown in The Search after Truth When I see a Bowl shock another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is the True Cause of the motion it impresses for the true cause that moves Bodies is not visible to my Eyes But if I interrogate my Reason I evidently see that Bodies having no Power to move themselves and their moving force being nothing but the Will of God which preserves them successively in different places they cannot communicate a Power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain that there must be Wisdom and that Infinite to regulate the communication of motions with that exactness Proportion and Uniformity which we see A Body cannot know that infinite multitude of impuls'd Bodies round about it and though we should suppose it to have knowledge yet it would not have enough so proportionably to regulate and distribute at the instant of protrusion the moving force it self is carried with When I open my Eyes the Sun appears to me splendidly glorious in Light And it seems not only to be visible it self but to make all the World so too Methinks 't is he that arrays the Earth with flowers and enriches it with Fruits That gives Life to Animals and striking by His Heat into the very Womb of the Earth impregnates Her with Stones Marbles and Metalls But in consulting my Reason I see nothing of all this And if I faithfully consult it I plainly discover the seducement of my Senses and find that God Works all in all For knowing that all the changes which accrue to Bodies have no other principle than the different Communications of Motions which occur in visible and invisible Bodies I see that God does all since 't is his Will that causes and his Wisdom that regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and Universally of all the changes
incident to the Corporeal World which is an Opinion sufficiently now receiv'd among Men of Letters But let their Opinion about it be what it will that matters not much since it seems much easier to conceive that a Body drives another when it strikes it than to comprehend how Fire can produce Heat and Light and educe from the power of matter a substance that was not in it before And if it be necessary to acknowledge that God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motion by a much stronger reason we should conclude that none but He can Create and Annihilate real Qualities and substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate For it seems to me at least as difficult to educe from matter a substance that was not in it or to reduce it into it again whilst yet there nothing remains of it as to create it or Annihilate it But I stick not to the Terms And I make use of those because there are no other that I know of which express without Obscurity and Ambiguity the changes suppos'd by the Philosophers to arrive every moment by the force of second Causes I had some scruple to set down here the other Arguments which are commonly urg'd for the Force and Efficacy of natural Causes For they appear so weak and trifling to those who withstand Prejudices and prefer their Reason before their Senses that I can scarce believe methinks that Reasonable Men could be perswaded by them However I produce and answer them since there are many Philosophers who urge them ARGUMENT I. If second Causes did not Operate say Suarez Fonseca and some others Animate things could not be distinguish'd from Inanimate since neither one nor the other would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I answer that Men would have the same sensible proofs that have convinc'd them of the distinction they make between things Animate and Inanimate They would still see Animals do the same Actions as eat grow cry run bound c. and would discern nothing like this in Stones And this one thing makes the vulgar Philosophers believe that Beasts live and that Stones do not For we are not to fancy that they know by a clear and distinct view of Mind what is the Life of a Dog 'T is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could prove here that the principle of the Life of a Dog differs not from the principle of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can consist but in the Motion of their Parts And we may easily judge that the same subtil matter which causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits in a Dog and which is the principle of his Life is no perfecter than that which gives Motion to the Spring of a Watch or which causes the Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion It behoves the Peripateticks to give those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call the Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which Perceives and Desires Sees Feels Wills and then we shall clearly resolve their Difficulties if after that they shall persist in raising them ARGUMENT II. It were impossible to discover the Differences or Powers of the Elements So that Fire might refrigerate as Water and nothing would be of a settled and fix'd Nature ANSWER I answer That whilst Nature remains as it is that is to say whilst the Laws of the Communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a Contradiction that Fire should not burn or separate the Parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot refrigerate like Water unless it becomes Water for Fire being only Fewel whose Parts have been violently agitated by an invisible surrounding Matter as is easie to demonstrate it is impossible its Parts should not Communicate some of their Motion to approaching Bodies Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its Virtues and Qualities are unchangeable But this Nature and these Vertues are only Consequences of the General and Efficacious Will of GOD who does all in all things Therefore the Study of Nature is in all respects false and vain when we look for other true Causes than the Wills of the ALMIGHTY I confess that we are not to have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we require the Reason of particular Effects For we should be ridiculous to assert for Instance That GOD dries the Ways or Freezes the Water in the River We must say The Air dries the Earth because it moves and bears off the Water with it that dilutes it Or that the Air or the subtil Matter Freezes the River in Winter because at that time it communicates not sufficient Motion to the Parts that constitute the Water In a Word we must if we can assign the Natural and particular Cause of the Effects propos'd to Examination But because the Action of these Causes consists in the moving Force which actuates them which moving Force is the Will of GOD which create them we ought not to say they have in themselves a Force or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last arriv'd to a general Effect of which we seek the Cause 't is no good Philosophy to imagine any other than the general And to feign a certain Nature a first Moveable and universal Soul or some such Chimera whereof we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like an Heathen Philosopher For Example when we are ask'd whence it comes that some Bodies are in motion or that the agitated Air communicates its Motion to the Water or rather whence proceeds the mutual Protrusion of Bodies Motion and its Communication being a general Effect on which all others depend we cannot answer I do'nt say like Christians but Philosophers without ascending to God who is the Universal Cause Since 't is His Will that is the moving Force of Bodies and that regulates the Communication of their Motions Had he will'd there should be no new Production in the World he would not have put its Parts in motion And if hereafter He shall will the Incorruptibility of some of the Beings he had made he shall cease to will the Communication of Motions in point of those Beings ARGUMENT III. 'T is needless to Plow to Water and give several preparatory Dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire from them For GOD has no need of preparing the Subjects on which he Works ANSWER I answer That GOD may do absolutely all he pleases without finding any Dispositions in the Subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural ways that is by the General Laws of the Communication of Motions which he has constituted and which he almost always follows in his Actings GOD never multiplies his Wills without Reason
special a regard as to give it all things necessary to its preservation and likewise a Seed for perpetuating it's kind This proves second causes no more than the Plurality of Causes of contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees imagin'd to account for these effects But 't is a certain Sign of the Grandeur Wisdom and Magnificence of God For God does no works unbecoming an infinite Wisdom and he does them with that profusion as is a manifest proof of his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is repair'd again by the same Law that destroy'd it So great is the Wisdom Power and Fecundity of that Law God prevents not the destruction of Beings by any new Will not only because the first suffices to restore them but especially because his Wills are of much greater value than the Reparation of these Beings They are far more valuable than all that they produce And God had never made this World since not worthy of the Action by which it was produc'd unless he had other prospects than are known by the Philosophers and knew how to honour himself in JESUS CHRIST with an honour which the Creatures are not capable of giving him When a House falls and crushes an Honest Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when a Body is forc'd to rebound by the shock it receives from the Encounter of another But God does not multiply his Wills to redress either the true or apparent Disorders which are the necessary Consequences of natural Laws God ought not to correct nor change these Laws though they sometimes produce Monsters He is not to confound the Order and simplicity of his Ways He must neglect mean and little things I would say he must not have particular Wills to produce effects which are not equivalent to or worthy of the Action of the Producer God works not Miracles save when Order which he constantly follows requires it which Order requires that he should act by the most simple ways and make no exceptions to his general Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on particular occasions which we are absolutely ignorant of Though we are all united to Order or the Wisdom of God yet we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but we cannot discover in it what God ought to Will nor is it our business to be very sollicitous to know it A great instance of what I have said we have in the Damnation of an infinite number of Persons whom God suffer'd to perish in times of Ignorance and Error God is infinitely Good He loves all his Works He wills that all Men should be sav'd and come to the Knowledge of the Truth for he has made them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are Damn'd They live and die in blindness and will remain in it to all Eternity Comes not this from his acting by the simplest means and his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not to prevent by Indeliberate Pleasures the will of the first Man whose Fall has disorder'd Nature It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because that is the most simple way but for several too Theological and abstract Reasons to be here explain'd In fine we ought to believe this conformable to the Order which God follows and to the Wisdom he always consults in the intention and execution of his designs The first Man's Sin has produc'd infinite Evils I confess but certainly Order requir'd that God should permit it and that he should instate Man in a peccable condition God minded to repair his laps'd Work seldom gives Victorious Graces that prevail over the malice of the greatest Sinners Sometimes he gives Graces useless to the conversion of the Receiver though he foresees their inutility and sometimes sheds them in great Plenty yet with little effect Commonly he acts as it were by degrees giving Men secret inspirations of Self-denial and Repentance as formerly he gave them Counsels in his Gospel Thus he prepares them for the grace of Conversion and last of all bestows it Why all these round-about Methods and ways indirect Would it not have been enough for him to have positively Will'd the Conversion of a Sinner to have effected it in an efficacious and irresistible manner But is not it visible that this proceeds from his acting by the simplest Methods and Orders willing it though we do not always see it For God must necessarily follow Order and Wisdom in his actings though these are Unfathomable Abysses to the Mind of Man There are certain most simple Laws in the Order of Grace by which God for the most part acts For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Nature though we know them not as we see those of the Communications of Motions Only let us follow the Counsels which are given us in the Gospel by him who perfectly knows the Laws of Grace This I say to pacify the unjust Complaints of Sinners who despise the Counsels of JESUS CHRIST and charge their Malignity and disorders upon God They would have God show Miracles in their behalf and dispense with the general Laws of Grace They lead their Life in Pleasures they seek out for Honours and daily renew those wounds which sensible Objects have given their Brain and add more to them and after this expect God should cure them by a Miracle Not unlike wounded Men who in the excess of their Pain tear their Cloaths renovate their Wounds and when in the sight of approaching Death complain of the cruelty of their Surgeons They would have God to save them because say they God is Good Wise Powerful and needs but determine it to make us happy Why did he make us to damn and destroy us They ought to know that God Wills they should be sav'd and to that intent has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom which he consults We cannot believe that he deserts us whilst he gives us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice Yes God is willing that all Mankind should be sav'd but by ways that we ought to study with care and follow with caution and weariness God is not to consult our Passions in the Execution of his designs He can have no regard but to his Eternal Wisdom nor follow any other rule than the Divine Order which Order will have us imitate JESUS CHRIST and obey his Counsels for our Sanctification and Salvation But if God has not predestin'd all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model and Exemplar of the Elect 'T is because herein God acts by the most simple means with reference to his designs which all make for his Glory 'T is because God is an universal Cause which ought not to act like particular Causes which have particular Volitions for all they do 'T
least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say perfectly Accommodates with Religion whose end is to Unite us to God in the strictest Bonds 'T is Customary with us to Love only those things which are capable of doing us some Good This Philosophy therefore Authorises only the Love of God and Condemns the Love of every thing else We ought to fear nothing but what is able to do us some Evil. Therefore this Philosophy approves the fear of God and absolutely Condemns all other Thus it justifies all the just and Reasonable Motions of our Soul and Condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For we can never justifie the Love of Riches the desire of Greatness the Extravagance of Debauchery by this Philosophy by the Principles whereof the Love for Bodies is absurd and ridiculous 'T is an indisputable Truth 't is a Natural Opinion 't is even a Common Notion that we ought to Love the cause of our Pleasure and to Love it proportionably to the Felicity it either Actually does or is able to possess us with 'T is not only just but as it were necessary that the cause of our happiness should be the Object of our Love Therefore this Philosophy will teach us to Love God only as being the only Cause of our Felicity That surrounding Bodies cannot Act upon that we Animate and consequently much less upon our Mind That 't is not the Sun which enlightens us and gives us Life and Motion Nor that fills the Earth with Fruits and Beautifies it with Flowers and supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy seconding the Scripture teaches that 't is God alone who gives us Rain and Regulates the Seasons that fills our Bodies with Food and our hearts with Joy that he alone is able to do us good and thereby has given a perpetual Testimony of what he is though in the ages passed he suffer'd all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say that 't is Nature that fills us with good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Ambiguity for fear of deceiving the Ignorant For we must distinctly acknowledge one cause of our happiness if we we make it the only Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undeniable Truth That we ought to fear things that are able to harm us and to fear them in Proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy teaches us that God only can do us evil that 't is he as says Isaiah who forms the Light and creates Darkness who makes Peace and creates Evil and there is no Evil but what he does as says the Prophet Amos. Therefore it is he only that is to be fear'd We must not fear either Plague or War or Famine or our Enemies or even Devils themselves But God alone We ought to shun the Sword when we see a Blow a coming we are to fly the Fire and avoid a ruinous House that 's ready to crush us but we must not fear these things We may fly from those Bodies which are the Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear God as the true Cause of all the misfortunes of Sinners and hate only Sin which necessarily provokes the cause of our Happiness to become the Cause of our Misery In a Word all the Motions of our Mind must center upon God since he alone 's above it and the Motions of our Body may relate to the Bodies round it This is what we learn from that Philosophy that admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being suppos'd I cannot see but we have reason to fear and Love Bodies and that to regulate our Love by Reason we need but prefer God before all things the First and Vniversal to every Second and Particular Cause We can see no need of Loving him with all our Strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex totâ animâ ex totis viribus as says the Scripture Yet when a Man contents himself in preferring God to all things and adoring him with a Worship and a Love of Preference without making a continual Effort to Love and Honour him in all things It often fortunes that he deceives himself that his Charity vanishes and is lost And that he is more taken up with sensible than the supream Good For should it be demanded of the greatest Sinners and even Idolaters whether they preferr'd the universal to particular Causes they would make no scruple to answer amidst their Debauches Errours and Extravagance that they are not wanting to their essential Duty and that they are very sensible of what they owe to God 'T is acknowledg'd that they are deceiv'd But take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they have no probable Pretext left to justifie their Conduct and Behaviour whilst if it be granted them they will think and Discourse with themselves in the following manner when blinded by their Passions and attentive to the Testimony of their Senses I am made for Happiness Neitheir can I nor indeed ought I to supersede my Love and Respect for whatever can be the Cause of my Felicity Why then must not I Love and respect sensible Objects if they be the true Causes of the Happiness I find in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Sovereign Being as only worthy of Sovereign Worship and I prefer Him before all the World But since I see not that He requires any thing from me I enjoy the Goods he affords by Means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me And I pay not my Gratitude to him which perhaps would be to his Dishonour As he gives me no Blessing immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of his Creatures 't is a Sign he requires not the immediate Application of my Mind and Heart at least that he desires the Creatures should partake with him in the Acknowledgments and Resentments of my Heart and Mind Seeing he has communicated Part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has environ'd him with Splendour and Majesty and has given him the Supremacy in all his Works and seeing from the Influence of this great Luminary we receive all the necessary Blessings of Life Why should we not employ a part of this indebted Life in rejoicing in his Light and testifying the Sense we have of his Greatness and his Benefits Wou'd it not be the most shameful Ingratitude to receive from that excellent Creature abundance of all things and yet to shew no Sense of Gratitude to him for them And should we not be unspeakably blind and stupid to be unmov'd with Fear and Veneration in Respect of him whose Absence freezes us to Death and whose too near Approach can burn and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all things and infinitely more estimable than his Creatures But we are to fear and Love
Ville under Ambiguous Terms advances that this Principle is not to be found in St. Austin He answers but one single passage of that Father's Works and to explain it makes that learn'd Man argue at an Extravagant rate Lastly he opposes to his constant Doctrine only the Book of Categories as if he knew not that Book to be none of St. Austin's and that it belongs rather to Logick than to Physicks I will not stand to prove this in particular for I see no necessity of answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book And I design to keep inviolably to the resolution I made and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the Search after Truth viz. That I would answer none of those who oppos'd me before they understand me or whose Discourses gave occasion to believe they were made from some other motive than the Love of Truth As for the rest I shall indeavour to content them I have no delight in disquieting Mens Minds and troubling my own repose by contentious Books or Works absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth and only proper to violate Charity and scandalize our Neighbours And if I now put Pen to Paper 't is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be call'd in Question and that I desire to make it clearly understood That no Man is permitted to charge me with Heresie for consequences deducible from the Principles I have establish'd Which is not as if I thought it possible to inferr directly any Heresie or even Error from the Book concerning the Search after Truth I am ready to answer with Charity and Respect all those who shall do me the honour to make their Animadversions without Passion and I shall always be glad to follow Truth as soon as any Man can discover it to me I disown all principles from which may be concluded any falshood But I offer to prove That we cannot justly treat as Hereticks even obstinate Defenders of such Principles as Divines may inferr impious Conclusions from provided the Embracers of these Principles disown the consequences Since if it might be allow'd no Writer whatever could escape the Imputation of Heresie My proofs of my assertion are as follow Which I do not deduce from that which is least Reasonable in the common Opinions of Phisophers with design to make them Odious or Ridiculous but choose to take for the subject of what I offer to prove universally receiv'd Opinions upon which the Peripateticks are so bold and presuming as to insult perpetually over their Adversaries ARGUMENT I. The Peripateticks and almost all Men believe that Beasts have Souls and that these Souls are nobler than the Bodies which they Animate 'T is an Opinion receiv'd in all times and in all Nations that a Dog suffers Pain when he is beaten That he is susceptible of all the Motions of the Passions Fear Desire Envy Hatred Joy Sorrow and even that he knows and loves his Master Yet from this Opinion consequences may be drawn directly opposite to what we are Taught by Faith The first Consequence opposite to Faith That God is Vnjust Beasts suffer Pain and some of them are more miserable than others Now they never sinn'd or made an ill use of their Libirty since they have none Therefore God's Vnjust in Punishing them and making them Miserable and unequally Miserable since they are equally Innocent Therefore this Principle is false That under a Righteous God a Creature can be miserable without deserving it a Principle nevertheless imploy'd by St. Austin to Demonstrate Original Sin against the Pelagians Moreover there is this difference between the condition of Men and Beasts that Men after Death may receive an Happiness which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life But Beasts at Death lose all they have been miserable and innocent and have no Future Retribution Therefore though God be Just yet Man may suffer in Order to Merit but if a Beast suffers God is not Just. It may be said perhaps that God may do with the Beast as he thinks fit provided he observes the Rules of Justice with respect to Man But if an Angel should think in like manner that God could not punish him without some Demerits and that he was not oblig'd to do justice unto Man should we like that thought Certainly God renders Justice to all his Creatures and if the meanest of them are liable to Misery they must needs be capable of being Criminal The second Consequence contrary to Faith That God Wills Disorder and that Nature is not corrupted The Soul of a Dog is substance more noble than the Body Animated by it For according to St. Austin 't is a spiritual Substance more noble than the noblest Body Besides which reason demonstrates that Bodies can neither Know nor Love and that Pleasure Pain Joy Sorrow and the other Passions cannot be Modifications of Bodies Now 't is believed that Dogs know and Love their Masters and that they are susceptible of Passions as of Fear Desire Joy and Sorrow and many others The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body but a Substance nobler than Bodies But the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body and has no other End or Felicity than the enjoyment of Bodies Therefore God makes the more noble for the less noble Therefore God Wills disorder Therefore Man's Nature is not corrupted Concupiscence is no disorder God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies and subject him to the Motions of Concupiscence c. It may be still said perhaps that the Soul of Beasts is made for Man but 't is hard to escape by this subterfuge For whether my Dog or my Horse has or has not a Soul is indifferent to me 'T is not my Horse's Soul which carries or draws me but his Body 'T is not the Soul of a Chicken which nourishes me but its flesh Now God might and ought consequently to create Horses to perform all their functions which we need without a Soul if it be true that he has made them only for our use Again the Soul of an Horse is more valuable than the noblest Body God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man Lastly God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon Swallows are of very little use to Man and they might have fed upon grain as other Birds What need then of so innumerable a number of Souls to be Annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds since the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfectest Animal Wherefore in affirming that Beasts have Souls that is to say substances more noble than Bodies we deprive God of Wisdom make him act without Order destroy Original Sin and consequently overthrow Religion by taking away the necessity of a Mediator The third Consequence contrary to Faith The Soul of Man is Mortal or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another
be enquir'd why GOD who so loves the Glory he receives in the Establishment of His Church had not begun it many Ages before Thus it suffices to say That an Eternity ought to forego the Incarnation of the WORD to manifest why this Great Mystery was accomplish'd neither sooner nor later GOD then must have created the Universe for the Church and the Church for JESUS CHRIST and JESUS CHRIST that He might find in Him a Sacrifice and High-Priest worthy of the Divine Majesty We shall not doubt of this Order of the Designs of GOD if it be observ'd that He can have no other End of his Actions than Himself And if it be conceiv'd that Eternity does not belong to Creatures we shall acknowledge they were produc'd when 't was requisite they should be Which Truths suppos'd let us try to discover something in the Method GOD takes for the Execution of His Grand Design VII Were I not persuaded that all Men are no farther Reasonable than enlightned by Eternal Wisdom it would no doubt be great Temerity to speak of the Designs of GOD and offer to discover any of His Ways in the Production of His Work But whereas it is certain that the word Eternal is the Universal Reason of Minds and that by the Light which he continually sheds in us we may have some Communication with GOD I ought not to be blam'd for consulting that Light which though Consubstantial with GOD Himself fails not to answer those who know how to enquire of it by a serious Attention VIII However I confess that Faith teaches a great many Truths not discoverable by the natural Union of the Mind with Reason Eternal Truth answers not to all we ask since we ask sometimes more than we can receive But this must not serve for a Pretence to justifie our Laziness and Inapplication IX Vulgar Heads are soon wearied with the Natural Prayer the Mind by its Attention ought to make to inward Truth in order to receive Light and Understanding from it and thus fatigu'd by that painful Exercise they talk of it in a contemptuous manner They dishearten one another and cover their Weakness and Ignorance under the delusive Appearances of a counterfeit Humility X. But their Example is not to infuse into us that agreeable Vertue which cherishes Carelessness and Negligence in the Mind and comforts it under its Ignorance of most necessary Truths We must pray constantly to Him who enlightens all Men That he will bestow His Light upon us recompence our Faith with the Gift of Understanding and especially to prevent us from mistaking Probability and confus'd Sensations which precipitate proud Minds into Darkness and Errour for the Evidence which accompanies His Resolves XI When we design to speak of GOD with any exactness we must not consult our selves nor the vulgar part of Men but elevate our Thoughts above all Creatures and with great Reverence and Attention consult the vast and immense Idea of a Being infinitely perfect which representing the true GOD very different from what the Vulgar fancy Him to themselves we are not to treat of Him in popular Language Every Body is allow'd to say with the Scripture that GOD Repented Him that He created Man that He was Angry with his People that he deliver'd Israel from Captivity by the Strength of His Arm. But these or the like Expressions are not permitted Divines when they should speak accurately and justly Therefore 't is not to be wondred if in the Sequel of Discourse my Expression shall be found uncommon It ought rather to be carefully observ'd whether they be clear and perfectly adapted to the Idea which all Men have of an Infinitely Perfect Being XII This Idea of a Being infinitely perfect includes two Attributes absolutely necessary to the Creation of the World an unlimited Wisdom and an irresistible Power The Wisdom of GOD affords infinite Ideas of different Works and all possible Ways for the executing His Designs and His Power renders Him so absolutely Master of all things and so independent of all Assistances whatever that He need but Will to execute what he Wills For we must above all take notice that GOD needs no Instruments to work with that His Wills are necessarily efficacious in a Word that as His Wisdom is His own Understanding His Power is no other than His Will Among these innumerable Ways whereby GOD might have executed His Design let us see which was preferable to all other and let us begin with the Creation of this Visible World from which and in which He forms the Invisible which is the Eternal Object of His Love XIII An excellent Artist ought to proportion his Action to his Work he does not that by Ways compound which may be perform'd by more simple he acts not without End and never makes insignificant Essays Whence we are to conclude that GOD discovering in the infinite Treasures of His Wisdom an Infinity of possible Worlds as necessary Consequences of the Laws of Motion which he could establish was determin'd to the Creation of that which might be produc'd and preserv'd by the simplest Laws or which should be the perfectest that could be considering the simplicity of the Ways necessary to its Production and Preservation XIV GOD might doubtless have made a perfecter World than that we inhabit He might for Instance have caus'd the Rain which fecundates the Earth to have fallen more regularly on Plow'd Lands than in the Sea where it is not necessary But in order to this He must have chang'd the Simplicity of His Ways and have multiplied the Laws of the Communications of Motions by which our World subsists and so there would not have been that Proportion between the Action of GOD and His Work which is necessary to determine an infinitely wise Being to act or at least there would not have been the same Proportion between the Action of GOD and this so perfect World as there is between the Laws of Nature and the World we inhabit For our World imagine it as imperfect as you will is sounded on so Simple and Natural Laws of Motion as make it perfectly worthy of the infinite Wisdom of its Author And indeed I am of Opinion that the Laws of Motion necessary to the Production and Preservation of the Earth and all the Stars in the Heavens are reduc'd to these Two First That mov'd Bodies tend to continue their Motion in a right line Secondly That when two Bodies meet their Motion is distributed to each in proportion to their Magnitude so that after the Collision they ought to move with equal degrees of Celerity These two Laws are the Cause of all those Motions which produce that variety of Forms which we admire in Nature XVI 'T is own'd notwithstanding that the second is âever manifestly observable in the Experiments that can be made upon the Subject but that comes from our seeing only what happens in visible Bodies and our not thinking on the invisible that surround
were true that God acted by particular Wills since Miracles are such only from their not happening by General Laws Therefore Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the Opinion I have establish'd But as to ordinary Effects they clearly and directly demonstrate General Laws or Wills If for Instance a Stone be dropp'd upon the Head of Passengers it will continually fall with equal speed not distinguishing the Piety or Quality or Good or Ill Disposition of those that pass If we examine any other Effect we shall see the same Constancy in the Action of the Cause of it But no Effect proves that God acts by particular Wills though Men commonly fancy God is constantly working Miracles in their Favour That way they would have God to act in being consonant to their own and indulgent to Self-love which centers all things on themselves and very proportionate to their Ignorance of the Complication of Occasional Causes which produce extraordinary Effects naturally falls into Mens Thoughts when but greenly studied in Nature and consult not with sufficient Attention the abstract Idea of an Infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being Infinitely Perfect CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE II. Of the Laws of GRACE in particular and of the Occasional Causes which regulate and determine their Efficacy PART I. Of the Grace of JESVS CHRIST I. SINCE none but GOD can act immediately and by himself on Minds and produce in them all the various Motions they are capable of 'T is he alone who sheds his Light within us and inspires us with certain Sensations which determine our diverse Volitions And therefore none but he can as a True Cause produce Grace in our Souls For Grace or that which is the Principle or Motive of all the Regular Motions of our Love is necessarily either a Light which instructs us or a confus'd Sensation that convinces us that God is our Good since we never begin to love an Object unless we see clearly by the Light of Reason or feel confusedly by the tast of Pleasure that this Object is good I mean capable of making us happier than we are II. But since all Men are involv'd in Original Sin and even by their Nature infinitely beneath the Majesty of God 'T is Jesus Christ alone that can by the Dignity of his Person and the Holiness of his Sacrifice have access to his Father reconcile him to us and merit his Favours for us and consequently be the meritorious Cause of Grace These Truths are certain But we are not seeking the Cause which produces Grace by its own Efficacy nor that which merits it by its Sacrifice and Good Works We enquire for that which regulates and determines the Efficacy of the General Cause and which we may term the Second Particular and Occasional III. For to the end the General Cause may act by General Laws or Wills and that his Action may be regular constant and uniform 't is absolutely necessary there should be some Occasional Cause to determine the Efficacy of these Laws and to help to fix them If the Collision of Bodies or something of like Nature did not determine the Efficacy of the General Laws of the Communication of Motions it would be necessary for God to move Bodies by particular Wills The Laws of Union of the Soul and Body become efficacious only from the Changes befalling one or other of these two Substances For if God made the Soul feel the Pain of pricking tho' the Body were not prick'd or though the same thing did not happen in the Brain as if it were he would not act by the General Laws of Union of the Soul and Body but by a particular Will If Rain fell on the Earth otherwise than by a necessary Consequence of the General Laws of Communication of Motions the Rain and the Fall of every Drop that composes it would be the Effect of a particular Will So that unless Order requir'd it should rain that Will would be absolutely unworthy of God 'T is necessary therefore that in the Order of Grace there should be some Occasional Cause which serves to fix these Laws and to determine their Efficacy And this is the Cause we must endeavour to discover IV. Provided we consult the Idea of intelligible Order or consider the sensible Order which appears in the Works of God we shall easily discover that Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of General Laws and are of use in fixing them must necessarily be related to the Design for which God has establish'd them For Example Experience evidences that God has not made and Reason certifies that he ought not to make the Courses of the Planets the Occasional Causes of the Union of our Soul and Body He ought not to will that our Arm should be mov'd in such or such a manner or that our Soul should feel the Tooth-ake when the Moon shall be in conjunction with the Sun if so be this Conjunction acts not on the Body God's Design being to unite our Soul to our Body he cannot in prosecuting that Design give the Soul Sensations of Pain save when there happen some Changes in the Body repugnant to it Wherefore we are not to seek out of our Soul or Body the Occasional Causes of their Union V. Hence it follows that God designing to form his Church by Jesus Christ could not according to that Design seek the Occasional Causes which serve to settle the General Laws of Grace by which the Spirit of Jesus diffus'd through his Members communicates Life and Holiness to them except in Jesus Christ and in the Creatures united to him by Reason Thus the Rain of Grace is not deriv'd to our Hearts by the diverse situations of the Stars nor by the Collision of certain Bodies nor even according to the different Courses of the animal Spirits which give us Motion and Life All that Bodies can do is to excite in us Motions and Sensations purely Natural For whatever arrives to the Soul through the Body is only for the Body VI. Yet as Grace is not given to all that desire it nor as soon as they desire it and is granted to those who do not ask it it thence follows that even our Desires are not the Occasional Causes of Grace For this sort of Causes have constantly and most readily their Effect and without them the Effect is not produc'd For Instance the Collision of Bodies being the Occasional Cause of the Change which happens in their Motion if two Bodies did not meet their Motions would not alter and if they alter'd we may be assur'd they met The general Laws which shed Grace upon our Hearts find nothing therefore in our Wills to determine their Efficacy as the general Laws which regulate the Rains are not founded on the Dispositions of the Places rain'd upon For it indifferently rains upon all Places on hollow and manur'd Grounds even on the Sands and the Sea it self VII We are therefore reduc'd to confess that
the Grace of the Creator XXXVI In the establish'd Order of Nature I can see but two Occasional Causes which shed Light on Minds and so determine the General Laws of the Grace of the Creator one which is in us and depends in some measure on us the other which is found in the Relation we have with surrounding Objects The former is nothing but the diverse Motions of our Will the second is the Occurrence of sensible Objects which act on our Mind in consequence of the Laws of Union of our Soul with our Body XXXVII We are taught by our own inward Consciousness That the Love of Light produces it and that Attention of Mind is a Natural Prayer by which we obtain Instruction of God for all the Enquirers of Truth who apply themselves to Truth discover it in proportion to their Application And if our Prayer were not interrupted nor our Attention disturb'd if we had any Idea of what we ask and should ask it with a competent Perseverance we should not fail to obtain whilst we were capable of receiving it But our Prayers are continually interrupted unless Self-interess'd our Senses and Imagination muddy and confound all our Ideas And âhough the Truth we consult answers our Enquiries the confus'd Noise of our Passions deafens us to its Answers or makes us speedily forget them XXXVIII If it be consider'd that Man before the Fall was animated with Charity and possess'd with all that was requisite to his Perseverance in Innocence and that by his Perseverance and Application he ought to merit his Reward 't will easily be conceiv'd that the several Desires of his Will were establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Light receiv'd in his Understanding otherwise his Distraction had not been voluntary nor his Attention meritorious But Nature however corrupted is not destroy'd God has not desisted to will what he once will'd And the same Laws still subsist Therefore our manifold Volitions are still the Occasional or Natural Causes of the Presence of Ideas to our Mind But because the Union of the Soul with the Body is chang'd into a Dependence on it by a Natural Consequence of Sin and the immutable Will of God as I have explain'd elsewhere our Body at present disturbs our Ideas and speaks so loud in favour of its respective Goods that the Mind but seldom consults and distractedly listens to Internal Truth XXXIX Moreover Experience daily teaches us that our Conversation with Understanding Persons is capable of instructing us by raising our Attention that Preaching Reading Converse a thousand Occurrences of all sorts may raise some Ideas in us and likewise inspire us with good Thoughts The Death of a Friend is doubtless capable of putting us in Mind of Death unless some great Passion takes us up And when a Preacher of great Natural Endowments undertakes to demonstrate a most simple Truth and convince others of it it must be own'd that he may persuade his Hearers and even move their Conscience give them Fear and Hope and raise in them such other Passions as put them in a less State of Opposition to the Influence of the Grace of Jesus Christ. Men being made for a sociable Life 't was requisite they should mutually communicate their Thoughts and Motions 'T was fit they should be united in Mind as well as Body and that speaking by the Voice to their Ears and by Writing to their Eyes they should infuse Light and Understanding into one anothers Minds XL. But Light whatever way produc'd in us whether by particular Desires or fortuitous Instances as the Occasional Causes of it may be call'd Grace especially when it nearly relates to Salvation though it be but a Consequence of the Order of Nature because since Sin God owes us nothing and all the Good we have is merited for us by Jesus Christ in whom our very Being subsists But this kind of Grace though merited for us by Jesus Christ is not the Grace of our Lord but that of the Creator since Jesus Christ is not usually the Occasional Cause of it but the Cause of it is discoverable in the Order of Nature XLI There are still several other Natural Effects which we might reasonably look upon as Graces For Example Two Persons have at the same time two Desires of Curiosity The one to go see an Opera the other to hear a celebrated Preacher If they satisfie their Curiosity he that goes to the Opera shall find such Objects as according to his present Disposition of Mind shall raise in him Passions that will damn him whilst the other shall find in the Preacher so great Force and Light that the Grace of Conversion working in him at that moment shall be able to save him Which suppos'd Let but a shower of Rain or any other Accident happen that may stay them at home Though the Rain be a Natural Effect as depending on the Natural Laws of the Communication of Motions yet it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Damnation it prevents and a Punishment to him whose Conversion it hinders XLII Grace being conjoin'd to Nature all the Motions of our Soul and Body have some relation to Salvation This Man is sav'd by having in a State of Grace made a false Step which happily broke his Neck and another is damn'd by having on some Occasion misfortunately avoided the Ruines of a falling House We know not what is for our Advantage but we well know there is nothing of it self so indifferent but has some reference to our Salvation because of the Mixture and Combination of Effects depending on the General Laws of Nature with others that depend on the General Laws of Grace XLIII As therefore Light points out to us the True Good the Means to obtain it our Duties to God in a word the Ways we are to follow it is sufficient to cause those who are animated with Charity to do good to merit new Graces and to conquer some Temptations as I shall explain in another Place so I think we may lawfully give it the Name of Grace though Jesus Christ be only the Meritorious Cause of it And whereas External Graces which have no immediate Influence on the Mind come nevertheless into the Order of Predestination of Saints I consider them also as True Graces In a word I see not why we may not give the Name of Grace to all Natural Effects when relating to Salvation subservient to the Grace of Jesus Christ and delivering us from some Hindrances to his Efficacy Yet if others will not agree with me I shall not contend with them about Words XLIV All these Graces if we may be allow'd to call them so being those of the Creator the General Laws of these Graces are the General Laws of Nature For we must still observe that Sin has not destroy'd Nature though it has corrupted it The General Laws of the Communications of Motions are always the same and those of the Union of the Soul
whom according to St. Paul God has made all things is the Man Jesus Christ. 'T is to teach Men that they are created and that they subsist in Jesus Christ 't is to unite them straitly to him 't is to induce them to make themselves like him that God has figur'd Jesus Christ and his Church in the principal of his Creatures For 't is necessary that Jesus Christ should be found in the whole Work of God that it might be the worthy Object of his Love and of the Action that produc'd it LVI If we consider the manner of the First Man's Creation as related by Holy Scripture how his Wife was form'd out of his Flesh and Bone his Love to her and the Circumstances of their Sin we shall doubtless judge that God thought on the Second Adam in the Formation of the First that he consider'd the Father of the future World in creating the Father of the present and that he design'd the First Man and Woman for express Types of Jesus Christ and his Church St. Paul permits us not to doubt of this Truth when he assures us we are form'd of the Flesh and Bone of Jesus Christ that we are his Members and that the Marriage of Adam and Eve is the Figure of Jesus Christ and his Church LVII God might perhaps form Men and Animals by ways as simple as common Generation But since this way typified Jesus Christ and his Church since it wore the Impress of the principal of God's Designs and represented as I may say the well-belov'd Son to his Father that Son in whom alone the whole Work of the Creation subsists God ought to prefer it before all other thereby likewise to teach us that as intelligible Beauties consist in their Relation to Eternal Wisdom so sensible Beauties must though in a manner little known to us relate to Incarnate Truth LVIII Doubtless there are many Analogies and Agreements betwixt the most principal of the Creatures and Jesus Christ who is their Pattern and their End For all is full of Jesus Christ every thing represents and typifies him as much as the Simplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit But I shall not venture to enter on the Particulars of this Subject For besides that I am fearful of mistaking and have not a competent Knowledge either of Nature or Grace of the present World or the future to discover their Relations I know that the Imagination of Men is so sarcastical and nice that we cannot by Reason lead them to God much less to Jesus Christ without tiring their Patience or provoking their Railery Most Christians are accustom'd to a Philosophy that had rather have recourse to Fictions as extravagant as those of the Poets than to God and some of them are so little acquainted with Jesus Christ that a Man would perhaps be reckon'd a Visionist if he said the same things with St. Paul without using his Words For 't is rather that great Name which persuades them than the View of Truth The Authority of Scripture keeps them from blaspheming what they do not understand but whereas they are but little conversant with it it cannot much enlighten them LIX 'T is certain that the Jewish People was the Figure of the Church and that the most Holy and Remarkable Persons among the Kings Prophets and Patriarchs of that Nation were the Types of the Messiah our Saviour Jesus Christ which is a Truth not deniable without undermining the Foundations of the Christian Religion and making the most Learned of the Apostles pass for the most Ignorant of Men. Jesus Christ being not yet come ought at least to be typified For he ought to be expected he ought to be desired and by his Types he ought to strew some sort of Beauty over the Universe to make it acceptable to his Father Thus it was necessary he should in some manner be as ancient as the World and that he should die presently after the Sin in the Person of Abel The Lamb that was slain from the Foundation of the World The Beginning and End Alpha and Omega Yesterday and to Day He is was and is to come These are the Qualifications St. John attributes to the Saviour of Men. LX. But supposing that Jesus Christ ought to be typified 't was necessary it should be done by his Ancestors especially and that their History dictated by the Holy Spirit should be handed down to future Ages to the end we might still compare Jesus Christ with his Figures and acknowledge him for the true Messiah Of all Nations God loving that most which had nearest Relation to his Son ought to make the Jews the Fathers of Jesus Christ according to the Flesh since they had been the most lively and express Figures of his Son LXI But if driving this Difficulty up higher the Reason be demanded of the Choice God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of Jesus Christ I think I may and ought affirm that God acting always by the simplest ways and discovering in the infinite Treasures of his Wisdom all the Combinations of Nature with Grace chose that which was to make the Church the most ample most perfect and most worthy of his own Greatness and Holiness as I have said before Secondly I think I ought to answer that God foreseeing that what was to happen to the Jewish People by a necessary Consequence of Natural Laws would have more Analogy to his Design of typifying Jesus Christ and his Church than all that could befall other Nations thought fit to choose that People rather than any other For in brief Predestination to the Law is not like Predestination to Grace and though there be nothing in Nature that can oblige God to shed his Grace equally on a whole People yet methinks Nature may merit the Law in the Sense I here understand it LXII 'T is true that all that befell the Jews who represented Jesus Christ was not a necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature There was need of Miracles to make the Jews lively and express Figures of the Church But Nature at least furnish'd Ground-work and Materials and possibly the principal Strokes in most Instances and Miracles finish'd the rest Whereas no other Nation would have been so proper for so just and accomplish'd a Design LXIII If I mistake not we are oblig'd to think that God having a Wisdom prescious of all the Events and Consequences of all possible Orders and all their Combinations never works Miracles when Nature is sufficient and that therefore he must choose that Combination of Natural Effects which as it were remitting him the Expence of Miracles nevertheless most faithfully executes his Designs For Example 'T is necessary that all Sin should be punish'd But that 's not always done in this World Yet supposing it was requisite for the Glory of Jesus Christ and the Establishment of Religion that the Jews should be punish'd in the Face of the whole World for the Crime
they had committed in murthering our Saviour it was fit that Jesus Christ should come into the World about the Reign of Herod supposing that People by the necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature was to be divided about that time that Civil Wars and perpetual Seditions were to weaken them and that lastly the Romans were to ruine and disperse them with the total Destruction of their City and Temple 'T is true there seems to be something extraordinary in the Desolation of the Jews But as it shews greater Wisdom in God to produce so surprizing Effects by the most simple and general Laws of Nature than by particular Wills which are always Miracles I question whether on that Occasion we are to fly unto a Miracle But for my part I dispute it not here since 't is a Fact that we cannot easily nor need we explain our selves upon And I produce this Instance only to make some Application of my Principles and to make them more easily intelligible to others I have I think said enough of Nature and Grace to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons about an infinite Number of Difficulties which disturb only their Minds who must needs judge of God by themselves For if Men would consult the Idea of an Infinitely Perfect Being of a General Cause of an Infinite Wisdom and if they would consent to the Principles I have establish'd conformable to that Idea I believe they would neither be surpriz'd nor offended at the Conduct of GOD and that they would change their Murmurs and Censures into Wonder and Adoration CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE III. Of the Manner of GRACE's acting in us PART I. Concerning Liberty I. THERE is nothing more rude and unform'd than the Substance of Spirits if we separate it from God For what 's a Mind void of Understanding and Reason destitute of Motion and Love Yet it is the Word and Wisdom of God which is the universal Reason of Minds and 't is the Love whereby God loves himself that gives the Soul the Motion she has towards Good If the Mind knows Truth 't is by its Natural and Necessary Union with Truth it self If it is reasonable 't is so through supreme Reason Lastly If it be a Spirit or Intelligence 't is in one sense because its Substance is enlightned penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself These Truths I have explain'd in another Place So likewise the Substance of the Soul is not capable of loving Good save by its Natural and Necessary Union with the Eternal and Substantial Love of the Supreme Good it advances not towards Good any farther than convey'd by God it is volent only from the Motion it continually receives from him it lives only through Charity and wills merely through the Love of Good which God makes it participate though it abuses it For in fine God making and preserving Minds only for himself inclines them towards him as long as he preserves their Being and communicates the Love of Good to them whilst they are capable of receiving it Now that natural and continual Motion of the Soul towards Good in general towards Good indefinite towards God is what I here call Will Since 't is that Motion which capacitates the Substance of the Soul to love different Goods II. This Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is invincible for 't is not in our Power not to will to be happy We necessarily love what we clearly know and lively feel to be our Good All Minds love God by the Necessity of their Nature and if they love any thing else by a Free Choice of their Will 't is not because they seek not God or the Cause of their Felicity but because they are deceiv'd 'T is because perceiving by a confus'd Sensation that surrounding Bodies make them happy they consider them as good and by an Ordinary and Natural Consequence love them and unite to them III. But the Love of all these particular Goods is not naturally invincible Man consider'd in his Original State might supersede loving those Goods that fill'd not the whole Capacity of his Affection There being but one Good which includes all others he might sacrifice every other Love to the Love of this For God having made Minds only for himself cannot invincibly carry them to the loving any thing besides him or without relation to him Lastly our own inward Consciousness informs us that we can reject a Fruit though we are inclin'd to take it Now that Power of loving or not loving particular Goods the Non-invincibility which is found in the Motion which carries Minds to the loving what does not seem every way inclusive of all Goods That Power or Non-invincibility is what I call Liberty Thus placing the Definition instead of the thing defin'd that Expression our Will is free signifies that the Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is not invincible in point of Good in particular To the Word Free the Idea of Voluâtary is commonly annex'd but in the Sequel of this Discourse I shall take the Word in the Sense I have observ'd as being the most Natural and Ordinary IV. The Word Good is equivocal and may signifie either Pleasure which makes formally happy or the true or seeming Cause of Pleasure In this Discourse I shall constantly take the Word Good in the second Sense because indeed Pleasure is imprinted on the Soul that she may love the Cause that makes her happy that she may advance towards it by the Motion of her Love and may strictly unite to it to be perpetually happy When the Soul loves nothing but her own Pleasure she in effect loves nothing distinct from her self For Pleasure is only a Condition or Modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy and content But whilst the Soul cannot be the Cause of her own Pleasure she 's unjust ungrateful and blind if she loves her Pleasure and forgets to pay the Love and Devotion which is due to the true Cause that produces it in her As none but God can act immediately and by himself on the Soul and make her sensible of Pleasure by the actual Efficacy of his all-potent Will so he alone is truly Good However I term the Creatures Good which are the seeming Causes of the Pleasures we feel occasionally from them For I am unwilling to deviate from the customary way of Speaking any farther than is necessary to explain my self clearly All Creatures though Good in themselves or Perfect with reference to the Designs of God are not Good with reference to us They are not our Good nor the true Cause of our Pleasure or Felicity V. The natural Motion which God constantly imprints on the Soul to carry it to love him or to make use of a Term which is the Abridgement of several Ideas and can be no longer equivocal or confus'd after the Definition I have given of it the Will is determin'd towards particular Goods either
it and though never so desirous of Happiness or the Enjoyment of Pleasures no Pleasure is stronger than his Light Not but that Pleasures can blind him perturbate his Reason and fill up his thinking Capacity For the Mind being finite all Pleasure is capable of dividing and distracting it But that Pleasures being subjected to his Will he is too cautious to be intoxicated by them For the sole invincible Pleasure is that of the Blessed or that which the First Man had found in God if God should have prevented and hindred his Fall not only because this Pleasure fills all the Faculties of the Soul without disturbing her Reason or carrying her to the Love of a pretended Good but also because nothing withstands the Enjoyment of this Pleasure neither the Desire of Perfection nor that of Felicity For when we love God we are perfect when we enjoy him we are happy and when we love him with Pleasure we are happy and perfect all at once Thus the perfectest Liberty is that of Minds which can at all times overcome the greatest Pleasures of Minds to which no Motion towards particular Goods is ever irresistible 'T is that of a Man before the Sin before Concupiscence troubled his Mind and corrupted his Heart And the most imperfect Liberty is that of those to whom no Motion towards a particular Good though never so little but is invincible in all sorts of Circumstances X. Now betwixt these two sorts of Liberty there are more and less Perfect to an Infinity of Degrees which is a thing not sufficiently minded 'T is commonly imagin'd that Liberty is equal in all Men and that 't is an Essential Faculty of the Mind the Nature whereof remains constantly the same though its Action varies according to the diversity of Objects For we regardlesly suppose a perfect Equality in all things wherein no sensible Inequality appears Men indulge their Mind and rid it of all tedious Application by giving things an abstract Form consisting in a sort of indivisible Essence But this is an Errour Liberty being no such Faculty as is imagin'd There are not two Persons equally free in respect of the same Objects Children have less Liberty than Men arriv'd to the perfect Exercise of their Reason Nor are there two Men whose Reason is equally clear constant and certain in regard of the same Objects Those whose Passions are unruly and who have been unaccustom'd to resist them are less free than others who have couragiously impugn'd them and who are naturally Men of Temper and there are not two Men equally moderate equally sensible to the same Objects and who have equally fought for the Preservation of their Liberty Some Persons there are so sold to Sin that they less resist or think of resisting it when awake than pious Men in their Sleep since we are taught by the Word of Truth that he who commits Sin becomes a Slave to it XI ' True it is that by the Institution of Nature all Men are equally free For God does not invincibly determine Men to the Love of any particular Good But Concupiscence corrupts the Moral and Intellectual Part and since Man has lost the Power of obliterating the Tracts of sensible Pleasures and stopping the Motions of Concupiscence That Liberty which had been equal in all Men if they had not sinn'd grows unequal according to their different degrees of Light and as variously work'd on by Concupiscence For Concupiscence it self which is equal in all Men in as much as they have lost their Power over their Body is a thousand ways unequal because of the Diversity that is found in the Construction of the Body in the Multiplicity and Motion of the Spirits and those almost infinite Alliances and Relations obtain'd through the Commerce of the World XII To our distincter understanding the Inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Persons we must observe that every Man perfectly reasonable perfectly free and who would be truly happy may and ought upon the Presence of any Object which gives him the sense of Pleasure suspend his Love and carefully examine whether this Object be the true Good or whether the Motion which carries him towards it exactly comport with that which leads him to the true Good Otherwise he would love by Instinct and not by Reason and if he could not suspend the Judgment of his Love before he had examin'd it he would not be perfectly free But if he clearly discovers that this Object which gives him the Sense of Pleasure is truly good to him and if the Evidence in conjunction with the Sensation be such as will not permit him to suspend his Judgment then though perfectly free he is no longer free in respect of that Good but he invincibly loves it because Pleasure agrees with Evidence But being that God alone can act in us as our Good and the Motion which byasses us towards the Creatures is repugnant to that which carries us towards God every Man perfectly reasonable and entirely free may and must forbear to judge that sensible Objects are his Goods He may and ought to suspend the Judgment which regulates or should regulate his Love For he can never evidently see that sensible Goods are true Goods since that can never be evidently seen which is not XIII This Power of suspending the Judgment which is the actual Rule of Love this Power which is the Principle of our Liberty and by which Pleasures are not always invincible is very much weaken'd since the Sin though not quite destroy'd And that we may have actually this Power when we are tempted by an Object 't is necessary besides the Love of Order to have a thoughtful Mind and to be sensible to the Remorse of Conscience for a Child or a Man asleep have not actually this Power But all Men are not equally enlightned the Mind of Sinners is full of Darkness Consciences are not equally tender the Heart of Sinners is hardned The Love of Order actual Graces are unequal in all Men Therefore they are not equally free nor have equal Power of suspending their Judgment Pleasure determines them and moves some rather than others This Man can suspend his Judgment and wave his Consent when a present Object gives him the Tast of a most quickning and sensible Pleasure and another is of so narrow a Mind and corrupt an Heart that the least Pleasure is irresistible and the least Pain insupportable Being not wont to fight against sensible Allurements he becomes so dispos'd as not even to think of resisting them Thus he has not then the Power of deferring his Consent since he even wants the Power of making a Reflection and in regard to that Object he is like a Man asleep or out of his Wits XIV The more weak is Reason the more sensible grows the Soul and more readily and falsly she judges of sensible Good and Evil. If a Leaf pricks or even tickles a Man when asleep he wakes in a start
exceeds Pleasure is a pure and reasonable Love XXX So likewise we must conclude that we always demerit when we love a false Good by the Instinct of Pleasure provided we love it more than we are invincibly forc'd For when our Liberty is naturally so straitned and our Capacity of Mind so little that we are carried in an irresistible manner then though we are corrupt and our Love be evil and against Order yet we don't demerit To demerit I mean to deserve to be punish'd we must pursue false Goods with more ardency or tend farther than Pleasure irresistibly carries us For we must observe that there is great difference between a Good and a Meritorious Action between a Corrupt and a Demeritoous The Love of the Blessed is Good but it is not Meritorious The Love of a Righteous Person is often deprav'd in his Sleep but it is not Demeritorious Whatever is conformable to Order is good and whatever is contrary to it is naught But there is nothing of Merit or Demerit save in the good or ill use of our Liberty save in that in which we are the Factors But we make a good use of our Liberty when we follow Light when we unconstrain'd and of our selves advance to the true Good or were at first determin'd by preventing Delectation or the Light of Reason when we sacrifice sensible Pleasures to our Duty and surmount Pain by the Love of Order On the contrary we make an ill use of our Liberty when we make Pleasure our Reason when we sacrifice our Duty to our Passions our Perfection to present Felicity the Love of Order to the Love of our selves and all this at a time when we might really have prevented it But I proceed to explain this still more clearly XXXI When two Objects are offer'd to the Mind and it determines it self about them I confess it never fails to take that side where most Reason and Pleasure appears or all things consider'd where most Good is to be found For the Soul not being able to will or love but through the Love of Good since the Will is nothing but the Love of Good or the Natural Motion of the Soul towards it she unavoidably loves what has most conformity with what she loves invincibly But 't is certain that when sensible Pleasure or something of like nature does not perturbate the Mind we may ever suspend the Judgment of our Love and not determine especially in point of false Good For the Soul can have no Evidence that false Goods are the true or that the Love of the former agrees perfectly with the Motion which carries us to the latter Therefore when a Man loves false Goods whilst his Senses and Passions leave his Reason entirely free he demerits Because then he may and ought to suspend the Judgment of his Love For if he stood any time to examine what was speedily to be done the false Good would appear in its own Colours the Pleasure which it seems to infuse into the Soul would vanish the Idea of some other Good would present it self to the Mind the Remorse of Conscience and perhaps the Delectation of Grace would change all the Dispositions of his Mind and Heart For the State of a Traveller has nothing certain A thousand different Objects are continually offer'd to the Mind and the Life of Man on Earth is nothing but a continual train of Thoughts and Desires XXXII At first Sight it seems that in point of the true Good we cannot suspend the Judgment of our Love for we cannot suspend our Judgment save when Evidence is not perfect Now we may see with the clearest Evidence that God is the true Good and that none but he can be good to us We know that he is infinitely more amiable than we can conceive But it is observable that though we cannot suspend the Judgment of Reason in respect of Speculative Truths when the Evidence is entire yet we may suspend the Judgment of our Love in point of Goods whatever Evidence there is in our Ideas For when Sense fights against Reason when Tast opposes Light when that is found sensibly bitter and disagreeable which Reason clearly represents as sweet and delectable we may suspend our Choice and follow either Reason or the Senses We may act and commonly do act against our Light because when we attend to the Sensation Light disappears unless we strive to retain it And because we are ordinarily more attentive to Sensation than to Light because Sensation is always more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge XXXIII 'T is Pleasure which makes Minds actually happy Therefore we ought to enjoy Pleasure when we love the true Good Yet a Mind thinks on God draws nigh him by its Love and tasts no Satisfaction On the contrary God fills it sometimes with Bitterness and Drought he deserts it and repels it as I may say not that it may cease to love him but rather that its Love may be more humble more pure and meritorious Lastly he prescribes it certain things which render it actually miserable But if it approaches Bodies it finds it self happy in proportion to the Strictness of its Union to them Certainly this is perplexing to a Man never so intelligent since we are invincibly passionate for Happiness Therefore we merit much if following our Light we renounce our selves notwithstanding those discomforting Droughts if we sacrifice our actual Happiness to the Love of the true Good if living by Faith and relying on the Promises of God we remain inviolably bent upon our Duty Hence we clearly understand that Jesus Christ might merit his Glory though he knew the true Good in the highest Evidence because having an extreme Love for his Father he was entirely conformable to his Orders without being carried by preventing Pleasures because being steadily guided by his Light he suffer'd most violent Pains and sacrific'd the most lively and sensible Pleasures to his Charity For he took on him a Body like to ours that he might have a Victim to offer to God and that duly receiving through this Body as the Occasional or Natural Cause an abundance of various Sensations he might accomplish a perfect Holocaust to the Honour of the true Good by the enduring Pain and the Privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV To the end every one may have a most perfect Idea of the Grace of Jesus Christ I think it requisite to add that it consists not in Delectation alone For all Grace of Sensation is the Grace of Jesus Christ. But of this Grace there are many Species and of every Species infinite degrees God sometimes casts Distast and Bitterness on the Objects of our Passions he weakens their sensible Charms or makes us hate or abhor them And this kind of Grace of Sensation makes the same Effect as preventing Delight It restores and fortifies our Liberty reinstates us almost in Equilibrio and thereby puts us in a Capacity of following our Light in the Motion of
is very efficacious to the keeping up Society But there is a strange Corruption in these Inclinations no less than in Friendship Compassion Good-will and others which tend to the uniting Men together What ought to hold up a Civil Society is commonly the Cause of its Disunion and Downfal and not to depart from my Subject is often the Cause of the Communication and Establishment of Errour Among all the Inclinations necessary to Civil Society those which subject us most to Errour are Friendship Favour Gratitude and whatever induce us to speak too advantageously on others in their Presence We set no Bounds to our Love of the Person of our Friends together with them we love whatever after any sort appertains to them and whereas they commonly express their Vehemence and Passion for the Defence of their Opinions they insensibly incline us to believe approve and defend them with as great or greater Obstinacy and Passion than themselves because it would often look but ill in them to be hot in maintaining their Opinions whereas we might defend them without being blam'd for it For in them it would be Self-love in us Generosity Our Affection for other Men proceeds from as many Accounts as they may please and serve us several ways Likeness of Humours of Inclinations Employments their Air their Behaviour their Vertue Estate the Affection or Esteem they express for us the Services they have formerly done or those we hope from them and many other particular Reasons determine us to love them If it fortune then that any one of our Friends that is some Person who has the same Inclinations an handsome Deportment delightful Discourse a vertuous Repute or is of great Quality who testifies an Esteem and Affection for us who has done us any former Service or from whom we hope any future or in fine whom we love for any other particular Reason If such a Person I say chances to advance any Proposition we greedily embrace it without consulting our Reason We maintain his Opinion insollicitous for the Truth of it and even sometimes against the Conviction of our Conscience according as we are determin'd by either the Obscurity and Confusion of our Mind the Corruption of our Heart or the Advantages we hope to reap from our False Generosity There is no need of bringing particular Examples of what I say since we rarely can be in Company an Hour together without observing several if we make but a little Reflexion Favour and Laughter according to the Common Saying are seldom on the side of Truth but almost always on the side of those we love 'T is a Well-bred and Obliging Gentleman that speaks he is certainly therefore in the right If what he says be only probable it 's look'd upon as true if absolutely impertinent and ridiculous it will at least amount to a Probability If it be a Man that loves me esteems me has done me some Kindness or is dispos'd or capacitated to do it has maintain'd my Opinion on other Occasions I shall be both ungrateful and unwise if I oppugn his or even fail to applaud him Thus Truth is sported with and made to truckle to our Interest and we caress the false Opinions of each other A worthy Man ought not to take it ill to be inform'd or instructed if it be done by the Rules of good Manners but if our Friends are disgusted when we modestly represent to them their Mistake we must permit them to love themselves and their Errours since they will have it so and because we have no Power to command them nor to change their Mind But a true Friend ought never to approve the Errours of his Friend for we ought to consider that we do them greater Injury than we imagine when we defend their Opinions without distinction Our Applauses serve only to swell their Heart and strengthen them in their Errours whereby they grow incorrigible and act and decide at last as if they were infallible Whence comes it that the most Rich the most Powerful the most Noble and generally all that are above others believe themselves commonly infallible and deport themselves as if they had more Reason than Men of a Lower and Meaner Condition but from a servile Approbation indifferently given to all their Thoughts So likewise the Approbation we give our Friends insensibly leads them to believe themselves wiser than others which makes them arrogant presumptuous and imprudent and obnoxious to the grossest Errours without perceiving them For which Reason it is that our Enemies often do us better Service and open our Mind more by their Oppositions than our Friends by their Applauses because the former keep us to our Guard and make us give heed to what we advance which one thing suffices to acquaint us with our Ramblings but the latter lull us to sleep and give us an ungrounded Confidence that makes us Vain and Ignorant Men should never therefore admire their Friends and submit to their Opinions out of an Affection as they ought not out of Disaffection to oppose their Enemies But they ought to divest themselves of the Spirit of Flattery and Contradiction that they may grow sincere and approve the Evidence of Truth where ever they find it We ought moreover to fix it well in our Mind that most Men are dispos'd to Flatter or Compliment us through a kind of Natural Inclination either to shew their Parts or to obtain the good Favour of others from the Hope of a Return or lastly out of a kind of Invidiousness and Raillery And we ought never to let our Brains be turn'd with any thing they can say to us Is it not a thing of daily Practice to see Men that are unacquainted cry up each other to the Heavens upon the very first Intercourse And what more common than for Men to give excessive Praises and to express even Extatick Admiration to a Person upon a Publick Performance even in the Company of those with whom they have ridiculed him just before Whenever a Man cries out and turns pale with Admiration as if astonish'd at what he hears 't is no good Proof that the Speaker utters Wonders but rather that he has a flattering Auditory that he has Friends or it may be Enemies that give themselves diversion That he talks in an engaging strain that he is Rich or Powerful or if you will 't is a good Proof that his Discourse is founded on the confus'd and obscure but very moving and agreeable Notions of the Senses or that he has a lively Imagination since Praises are bestow'd on Friendship Riches Honours Probabilities but rarely upon Truth 'T will perhaps be expected that having treated in general of the Inclinations of the Mind I should now descend to an exact Discussion of all the particular Motions it is sensible of upon the Sight of Good and Evil viz. That I should explicate the Nature of Love Hatred Joy Sorrow and all the Intellectual Passions whether General or Particular
Simple or Compound But I have not oblig'd my self to account for all the different Motions whereof the Mind is capable I am willing to have it known that my principal Design in all the foregoing Treatise concerning the Search after Truth was to make Men sensible how weak and ignorant they are and how subject to Errour and Sin I have said it and I say it again perhaps it will be remembred I had never design'd a Thorough particular Explication of the Nature of the Mind but I have been oblig'd to say something of it to lay open its Errours in their Principle to unfold them methodically in a Word to make my self intelligible If I have transgress'd the Bounds I had prescrib'd my self ât was because I had methought new things to say which seem'd of moment and which I believ'd might be read with Pleasure Perhaps I was mistaken but that Presumption was necessary âo encourage me to write them For who would say any thing if he did not hope to be attended to I have said it 's true several things which seem to have less Analogy with the present Subject than would be the particular Treatment of the Motions of the Soul and I acknowledge it But 't is not my Intention to put my self under any Constraint when I propose to my self a Method I lay down a Rule to go by but I presume it may be permitted me to turn aside as I walk when any thing falls in my way to be consider'd I presume too I have the Liberty of diverting to a Resting Place provided I lose not Sight of the Road I am to pursue Such as will not ease themselves with me may go on if they please 't is but turning to a new Page But if they take it amiss I would let them know that there are many who find that the Resting Places I have made choice of make their Journey easier and more pleasant The End of the First Volume PREFACE to the Second Volume Which may serve as an Answer to the ANIMADVERSIONS on the First SOme time since was publish'd a Book entituled Animadversions upon the Search after Truth wherein at the same time are examin'd part of M. des Cartes 's Principles being a Letter by an Academick in Paris c. 'T is said this Book attacks me and truly not without Reason for the Title shews it and the Author manifests it was his Design which gives me a Right and imposes on me a sort of Obligation of speaking my Thoughts of it For besides that I ought to disabuse some people who delight in these petty Quarrels and immediately determine on the side of the Criticks that gratifie their Passion I think my self bound to give some Answer to the Aggressor that I may not be thought to be âilent out of Insolence or Impotence The Animadverter may pardon me if he pleases if I sometimes seem to give him Provocation I should be very sorry so much as to design it But I cannot defend my self without wounding him nor repell the Blows he makes at me without making him feel and others know his Weakness and Imbecillity Self-defence is a natural Obligation but the Defence of Truth is absolutely indispensible See here in short his Design He supposes the Book he animadverts on is a Method for laying the Foundations of the Sciences He reduces this Method to fourteen Heads and shews that they are either Suppositions without Proof or Assertioâs without Foundation and consequently that the Substance of the Book is intirely useless to the Enquiry after Truth though there are here and there some Observations in it that place it in the rank of Works which have gain'd the Estimation of our Age. I answer in General that the Author of the Animadversions has not understood or has dissembled the Understanding the Design of the Book he impungs it being plain that the principal Design of it is to discover the Errours we are subject to 'T is true it treats of the Nature of the Senses Imagination and Intellect but 't is manifest and I precaution in several places that this is only to discover these Errours in their Causes This being the Method I always endeavour to observe as believing it most advantageous to the enlightning the Mind The Title of the first Page of the Book he opposes wherein are to be seen in Capitals CONCERNING THE ERROURS OF THâ SENSES the very Table of the same Book or rather the Place where I make the Division of the whole Work might have taught him my Design if he had desir'd to know it where he might have read these words which methinks are clear enough And so all the Errours of Men and the Causes of them may be reduc'd to five Heads and we shall treat of them according to that order First We shall speak of the Errours of the SENSES Secondly Of the Errours of IMAGINATION Thirdly Of the Errours of the PURE INTELLECT Fourthly Of the Errours of our INCLINATIONS And fifthly Of the Errours of the PASSIONS And thus having made an Essây to rid the Soul of the Errours which she is subject to WE SHALL Lastly LAY DOWN A GENERAL METHOD TO CONDUCT HER IN THE SEARCH OF TRUTH 'T is plain enough from this Division that the first Volume which is the subject of our Aâthor's Animadversions treats only of the Senses Imagination and Intellect and that the Method which he supposes I have given ought to be the Subject of the Second Volume Nevertheless as he is pleased to make me undertake a Design I do not execute that he may have the more to Charge upon my Conduct so he goes to prove it was my Design to lay down a Method in that Book I do him no Injury says he in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundations of the Sciences For besides that the Title expresses so much he declares himself upon the Point in the following manner Let us examaine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice I do a Man no Injury when I say he designs to draw an Hercules but if I shew that instead of an Hercules he takes a Polyphemus or Thersites I make him ridiculous Should I say with many others that the Animadverter is a Cartesian or that he designed by his Animadversions on my Book to defend the Doctrine of Des Cartes I should not wrong him but if at the same time I should shew that he opposes me without understanding me I should possibly offend him 'T is then injuring a Man to charge upon him Designs which he never had to render him ridiculous But a Man must be wretchedly in the wrong who imposes them on such as have like me in several places explain'd themselves clearly upon
their Operation So likewise in point of free Causes I believe that God incessantly gives the Mind an Impression towards Good in General and that he moreover determines this Impression towards particular Goods by the Idea's or Sensations that he gives us as I have explain'd in the first Illustration which is the same with what the Divines intend by affirming That God moves and prevents our Wills Thus the Force which puts our Minds in Motion is the Will of God which Animates us and inclines us towards Good For God Creates not Beings to constitute the moving force of Minds for the same Reason that he Creates none to be the moving force of Bodies The Wills of God being of themselves Efficacious He need but Will to do And we ought not to multiply Beings without necessity Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions proceeds likewise from the Action of God in us as appears from the first Illustration But all we Act or produce is by our Wills that is by the Impression of the Will of God which is our moving force For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than they are of God as mov'd Bodies impel not others but in as much as they have a moving force that translates them which is no other than the Will of God which Creates or preserves them successively in different places Therefore we Act no otherwise than by the Concourse of God and our Action consider'd as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from his but is as say most Divines the self same Action eadem numero actio Now all the Changes which arrive in the World have no other Natural Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Volitions of Minds For First by the General Laws of the Communications of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible produce by their various Motions all these divers Changes whose Cause is not apparent And Secondly by the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body when circumambient Bodies Act upon our own they produce in our Soul a multiplicity of Sensations Idea's and Passions Thirdly Our Mind by its Volitions produces in it self infinite different Idea's for they are our Volitions which as Natural Causes intend and Modifie our Mind Their Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has establish'd And Lastly when our Soul acts upon our Body she produces several Changes in it by vertue of the Laws of her Union with it and by means of our Body she effects in those about it abundance of Changes by vertue of the Laws of Communication of Motions So that the Motions of Bodies and the Volitions of Minds are the only Natural or Occasional Causes of Natural Effects which no Man will deny who uses any Attention supposing only he be not prepossest by those who understand not what they say who fancy perpetually to themselves such Beings as they have no clear Idea's of and who offer to explain things which they do not understand by others absolutely incomprehensible Thus having shown that God by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will performs whatever is done by the Motions of Bodies and the Wills of Minds as Natural or Occasional Causes it appears that God does every thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that the Creatures have of themselves any Efficacious Action but that the Power of God is in a manner Communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has establish'd on their account This then is all that I can do to reconcile my Thoughts to the Opinion of those Divines who defend the necessity of immediate Concourse and hold that God does All in all things by an Action no ways differing from the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I think their Opinions utterly indefensible and especially that of Durandus together with the Sentiments of some of the Ancients refuted by St. Austin who absolutely deniâd the necessity of God's Concurrence pretending that Second Causes did all things by the Power which God in their Creation gave them For though this Opinion be less intricate and perplex'd than that of other Divines yet to me it seems so repugnant to Scripture and so suitable to Prejudices to say no worse of it that I think it altogether unwarrantable I confess that the School-Men who make God's immediate concourse to be the same Action with that of the Creatures do not perfectly agree with my Explication and all those that I have read except Biel and Cardinal d' Ailly are of Opinion That the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I make it indispensable for me to speak nothing but what I clearly conceive and always to take the side that best comports with Religion I think I am not liable to blame for deserting an Opinion which to many Men seems still more inconceiveable as they strive more to comprehend it and for establishing another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Sacredness of our Religion and Christian Morality which is a Truth already prov'd in the Chapter that 's the Subject of these Reflexions However 't is not inconvenient to say something to it that I may fully verifie what I have said upon the present Question Both Reason and Religion evince That God will be Lov'd and rever'd by his Creatures Lov'd as Good and Rever'd as Power Which is such a Truth as it would be Impiety and Madness to doubt of To love God as he requires and deserves we must according to the First Commandment both of the Law and Gospel and by Reason it self as I have somewhere shown Love Him with all our Strength or with the whole extent of our Loving Capacity 'T is not sufficient to prefer Him before all things unless we moreover Love Him in all things For otherwise our Love is not so perfect as it ought to be and we return not to God all the Love that he gives us and gives us only for Himself in whom every one of His Actions Center So to render to God all the Reverence that is due to Him 't is not enough to adore Him as the Supreme Power and fear Him more than His Creatures we must likewise fear and adore Him in all His Creatures all our respects must perpetually tend towards Him to whom alone Honour and Glory are to be ascrib'd Which is what God Commands us in these Words Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart and with all thy Soul and with all thy Strength And in these Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and Him only shalt thou serve Thus the Philosophy that convinces us that the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that none but God is Strong and Powerful enough not only to Act on our Soul but even to give the