our Ideas and what we are the best acquainted with and so far as we perceive them distinct from one another Seperately existing or necessarily connected our Reasonings about them are the surest of any we have so that if we are mistaken in these I cannot see how we have or are capable of having any Knowledge at all Solidity Extension and Figure I do not only perceive to be constantly united but necessarily and inseparably to co-exist together in the same Subject which I call Matter or Body so that wherever any one of these is found I certainly conclude from thence that there are the other two also but it does not follow that where ever these three co-exist together there is Motion Perception or Will there being no necessary Connexion between any of these Ideas and the other Ideas of Matter before mentioned as is plain not only from the Natures of the Ideas themselves but from their separate Existence actually perceived by us How then does Matter which we suppose to exist without any Motion Perception or Will come to have Motion added to it All the Motion we perceive in Bodies without us is made by Successive Impulses from from one Body to another where every portion of Matter owes its Motion to some other but this cannot help us to conceive how Motion should begin where every thing is at rest the only Idea we receive from Body in Motion is that of a Capacity of being moved when it is at rest and not of a power of moving its self this we have from what passes within us when without any external Impulse upon us by a bare Thought or Determination of our selves we begin a Motion in our own Bodies and by that means communicate it to others which were before at rest which power of beginning Motion we call Will but Matter is supposed to exist without Perception and Will and consequently without this power of beginning Motion in its self and there being nothing else to communicate it to it it must eternally continue in the same state of Union Indistinction and Rest There needs no more for the overthrowing this Hypothesis no stress being ever laid upon it In the next place then if we imagine all the parts of this Material World loose from one another and all in motion 't will be quite as irrational to think that so it must have been eternally and necessarily till at some certain time the scattered moving Atoms met together or were disposed after such a manner as produced the present Structure and Constitution of things Many are the Absurdities and Inconsistencies this Opinion is chargeable with but I shall at present instance but in two The first is the supposing an eternal motion of different Particles of Matter before the Production of the World which implies an infinite succession of Effects without any Cause to produce them For Motion being something distinct from Matter and separable from it does not necessarily exist because Matter exists for then it would always exist in every Particle of Matter nor does it exist of it self by a necessity independent of the necessity of Matter 's Existence because it cannot exist without it and Matter could not produce it in its self from all Eternity because it cannot produce it at all and therefore there can be no such thing as eternal Motion or succession of Motion in different parts of Matter because every Motion is a meer Effect and Passion and there is no active power any where assignable or conceivable that could produce or cause such an Effect so that to suppose an eternal Motion without an eternal Power of moving is one very great Absurdity those are guilty of that set up the Hypothesis of Atoms The other is the ascribing such new Effects to Matter and Motion together in the production of the World as for a whole Eternity before never proceeded from them and could not possibly at any time be produced by them For Matter and Motion not implying Perception and Will several Bodies in motion being now actually perceived to exist without them and the whole System of moving Atoms being in the present Hypothesis supposed so to exist before the Beginning of the World we shall never be able from hence to account for the Existence of Beings endued with Perception and Will which are Qualifications in their own Natures as utterly distinct from those of Extention Figure and Motion as Figure and Motion are from one another or from any other Ideas we perceive That these last may be where the other are not is plain How then do those other come to be added to them If Matter at rest whatever degree of Extention or kind of Figure it is imagin'd to have can never make us conceive any possibility of Motion in it without the help of something else besides Extention and Figure neither can Matter and Motion together what-ever variety of Bulk Texture or Motion we represent to our selves give us any Idea of perception and Will or a power of producing them But Matter in motion must eternally move on or rest and move by turns if you please without advancing to any new Perfections which is too plain to need any proof if it had not been very learnedly and fully made out already by others and therefore I shall not enlarge in the Disparagement of matter nor expose this ridiculous Scheme of things by shewing all the peculiar Inconsistencies in it but leave the farther Disproof of it to those general Arguments which equally conclude against all the false Hypotheses concerning the being of the World which I reserve till I have done with them in particular And the next of them to be considered is that in which it is supposed that the World has eternally existed under the same Form that we now behold it as to the principal parts of its Structure with a constant Succession of several of the chief Species or sorts of things in it This Opinion of the Eternity of the World has been the most exploded of any tho' most of the Favourers of it have at the same time asserted the eternal Existence of a God too and the Reason of this is because the greatest part of the most ancient Philosophers and learned Men thought they perceived such visible Marks and Tokens of the Newness of the World in the Rise Propagation and Increase of Societies and Governments Languages and Laws Arts and Sciences and the Tradition of the Original and Beginning of Things was in their time so fresh and so generally received in all Countries that few of them were able to reconcile all this with the eternal Duration of the World And this Tradition having all along continued and the Truth of those ancient Observations having been more and more confirm'd by many new Inventions of things since and some of them of such general Use that 't is impossible to imagine they should not have been invented before if the World had been of a very long
Nature and Distinction of these two kind of Beings as far as we are capable of perceiving them that so I may cut off a great many Disputes and Mistakes occasion'd by the Confusion of our Ideas upon this Subject and what I have to say afterwards may be better understood I do not perceive any such Connexion betwixt the Ideas of Perception and Will and those of Extension Figure and Motion that where-ever the former are there must the latter be also nor do I see any Reason why Perception and Will may not exist separately from Extension Figure and Motion as well as Extension Figure and Motion may exist separately from Perception and Will only because these are actually perceiv'd so to exist and we have not yet been actually conscious of such a separate Existence of the other But this does not hinder but that Perception and Will may so exist and have a Subject or Substance of their own distinct from that which supports these Qualities of Extension Figure and Motion If Thinking and Willing were common to every Being we knew we could no more frame an Idea of a pure material Substance existing without these Qualifications than we can now of a pure thinking Substance existing without those Qualities we attribute to Matter only but 't is certain from an actual Separation of these different Ideas perceivable in different Subjects that some of them may exist without the other tho' without this actual Separation we could not have been so certain of it and therefore tho' the other have never yet been perceived to exist separately from these it does not follow from thence that they cannot so exist but considering the vast distance and distinction in the Natures of the several Ideas without any conceivable Resemblance or Relation to one another 't is very probable they do arise from different Principles and are founded in different Subjects However having no farther Certainty of it from natural Reason and I purposely wave all other Proof at present let us suppose that Perception and Will Extension Figure and Motion have all the same common Subject to support them are radically and ultimately founded in the same Substance and issue from the same Principle which Subject Substance or Principle we know nothing more of than that it is something which sustains these different Qualities or whatever else we call them which could not exist of themselves without it Supposing I say all this 't is ridiculously and without any colour of Reason inferr'd from hence that therefore Perception and Will are only different Modifications or Dispositions of Extension Figure and Motion or do in some manner or other wholly result from them For why may not distinct Qualities co-exist together in the same Subject without being made one from another or why should Perception and Will be Modifications of Extension Figure and Motion any more than Extension Figure and Motion are different Modes of Perception and Will I cannot see what ground they can have for the contrary of either of these who affirm what we call the Mind or Soul of Man to be nothing else but Matter under a peculiar Disposition of its Parts But that Thinking and Willing upon a Supposition that they actually exist in matter and cannot exist without it are not therefore Modifications or Effects of the other Qualities of Matter which are antecedently in it before the Addition of these may be farther illustrated by this Instance Motion is something added to the original and essential Qualities of Matter owes its Capacity of existing to it and cannot exist without it but 't is plain that Motion is no Extension or effect of Solidity Modification or Figure which are every thing we conceive in Motion before Matter is added to it but something in its own nature distinct from all these and not resulting from any conceivable Difference of them So that it does not follow that because Matter is solid or so and so extended or figured that therefore it must be in motion And if this be true of Motion it must be much more so of Perception and Will For Motion does involve Matter in the very Idea of it there 's no conceiving of Motion without conceiving at the same time something that is moved and I cannot consider a thing as moved without considering it as extended too and Extension necessarily implies the other essential Properties of Matter but I can form a Notion of Perception and Will and be conscious of something perceiving and willing without having any Ideas at the same time of Solidity Extension Figure or Motion and therefore if Motion may be joyned to the other Qualities of Matter without resulting from them tho' they are necessarily implied in the Idea we have of it 't is much more probable that Perception and Will may co-exist with Motion and all the rest of the material Qualities without being the effects or product of them when they carry no Marks of such an Original upon them and in their Conception have no manner of appearance of any Relation to them And if it does not follow that because Matter is of such a nature and so modified therefore it moves much less can it be inferr'd that because Matter is so and so disposed and moved therefore it thinks and wills This being premised it plainly appears from hence that 't is much more probable in Reason that God should be the only eternal Being than that Matter any way considered should be co-eternal with him For the Notion of God is full and compleat without any Consideration of Matter and the Addition of the Idea of Matter to it does not add any thing to the Perfection of the Divine Being The Power of producing Matter and Motion and forming an infinite variety of Beings out of them is indeed a Perfection very worthy of God and what we justly attribute to him but the actual Existence of any of these does no way heighten the Idea we have of him whom we conceive to be as perfect in himself before their Existence as after it The actual Communication of some of his Perfections to a particular rank of his Creatures and the giving them the Use and Enjoyment of his other Works do raise a new Idea of him in them which they call by the name of Goodness but this they look upon only as a voluntary opening and disclosing the Glory of his original Nature and not a necessary additional Advancment of it It is therefore most agreeable to our Reason and all the Notions we have of the Divine nature that God should have existed alone from all Eternity and in time produced the World and all things in it But if any Man had rather believe that Matter at rest or Matter and Motion or the present Frame of the World with the several kinds of beings in it were co-eternal with God he must at the same time hold that Whatever was co-eternal with God did either subsist eternally of its self dictinctly and independently
of him Or is really a necessary part of the Divine nature and helps to make up the Idea of God Or did eternally proceed from him because he had eternally an effectual will to produce it But the first of these Suppositions cannot be true for neither Matter it self nor Matter and Motion nor the present Constitution of things can be eternal independently of God because as has been fully proved already neither of them can be supposed to have existed eternally without a God From which proof it sufficiently appears that neither of them have the essential Properties of an eternal Being viz. necessary Existence and all possible Perfection nor the Consequence of them viz. the actual production of all temporary Beings For which soever of them is supposed there are suppos'd also wanting those Perfections we ascribe to God which are certainly the chief if not the only ones imaginable by us And there can be no necessity of Existence where these are wanting because then we may suppose a necessary eternal Being with them which will be of greater Perfections than another necessary eternal Being without them but we cannot suppose two necessary and independent eternal Beings of unequal Perfections therefore what wants any of these Qualifications we ascribe to God cannot exist necessarily and of it self And further what we suppose destitute of Knowledge and Will can have no sufficient power of producing Temporary Beings was it in its self allowed to be eternal as is manifest from what has been said upon the several Hypotheses that exclude the Being of a God And therefore what ever is supposed eternal which does not enter into the Idea we have given of God must be taken into it as necessarily belonging to the Divine Nature or be look'd upon as the free eternal effect of his eternal Will Thus some have affrm'd that the World and every thing we see or know is God Others that all things flowed from God by which if they mean necessary Emanation they must be referred to his Being and Essence if production to his Will So that however we express our selves upon these Matters every thing that we can imagine or frame any Notion of must be either God or some way proceed from him be reckoned to his Nature or his Works The Inference from all which is this That 't is most rational to think that no more belongs to the Idea of God than what we have before ascribed to him and that he did in time of his own free will produce every thing not contained in that Idea even original Matter and Motion as well as the frame and Structure of the World and the Variety of particular Beings in it But if any Man asserts the Eternity of any of these together with God in the full extent of the Idea we have given of him however his Opinion may be true or false it can make no change in our Thoughts with regard to Religion the Idea of God being so far the same here as we have establisht it the same Consequences will every where flow from it and the Assertors of any such Opinion will bear the same Relation to God and be under the same Obligations with us that differ from them in some other things relating to God which however held have no other Influence upon us than as we are obliged not to Entertain any false Notions of God willingly when we may have better Information or if we cannot yet other Opinions may appear more suitable to our Reason and more for the Honour of God which I take to be the present Case and therefore shall wave any further Enquiry into these Matters as having no prospect of a Possibility of knowing any thing more about them Thus have I with as much Brevity and Dispatch as the Subject would allow examined all the Accounts that are or can be given of the present Existence of things And from particular Observations upon each of them not all that might be made but such as I judg'd sufficient for my purpose I think I have made it very evident that there must be a God or Being of such a nature as I before described who was the true and only Cause or Author of every thing we see or know or has over been beside him and without the Supposition of such a Being the World could not possibly have ever existed any other way I shall now add some general Reflexions to strengthen the common Hypothesis concerning the Original of the World and so conclude the Proof of a God That the World is as we now perceive must be ascribed to Chance Necessity or Wisdom but Chance is nothing Necessity without a God unintelligible and therefore Wisdom or what is meant by it God who is a wise Being made the World and all things in it in the form and manner we now behold and admire The World 's being made by chance is being we know not how being made without any Cause and to speak thus is to use Words without any Meaning under them There 's no Man that has made any Enquiries into the Nature of Things but knows that nothing can be that before was not without owing its Original to some real positive Being of antecedent Existence Inadequate and insufficient Causes are often assigned for the Production of things because being next to and immediately preceding the Effects they are solely taken notice of without any regard had to their Subordination to or Direction by others and oftentimes something is thought to be the next and immediate Cause of a thing which is no ways concern'd in it but in both these Cases 't is by reason of some real Efficiency observed that these Judgments are made which must all proceed from some real Being tho' there may be a Mistake in attributing it to a wrong one or to one that had only a share in the Effect and therefore there must be something real assign'd which was as much and as properly the immediate Cause of the meeting of the Parts of Matter in order to make a World as the parts of Matter so met were the Cause of the Production of the World which can be nothing else but such and such particular Determinations of Figure and Motion in the several parts of Matter but these must be either eternal or the Effect of certain eternal sixt Rules resulting from the Natures of Matter and Motion or be made by a divine Power in all which there can be nothing casual but every thing necessary or providential For supposing the whole System of Matter so and so figured and moved we cannot consider it as indifferent to several Effects but necessarily determined to one which must inevitably follow such a supposed Disposition unless something extrinsical to Matter should restrain or change the Determination If any thing extrinsical to Matter or besides Matter and Motion be allowed it must be God if there be nothing else existing but Matter and Motion then are all the Effects
continuance or have been lost again after they were once invented the same Objections have constantly lain against the Eternity of the World and these have been strengthen'd by several other Arguments drawn from the many Absurdities and Inconsistencies that seem to be implied in the Notion of eternal Succession All which and whatever else can be said against the Eternity of the World when asserted together with the eternal Existence of a God do more strongly conclude against this Supposition when the Being of a God is not taken into it under which respect I now consider it and thus consider'd it is moreover besides what has been already alledg'd attended with the same Difficulties and chargeable with the same Objections as the former Hypothesis was For Matter and Motion were no more capable of eternally producing such a Succession of various Objects as we perceive in the World than they were of producing them and the World together in time and yet if we suppose an eternal Succession of new Objects without a God they must all be produced by the Power of Matter and Motion For every particular new Object being produced in time must owe its Being to that which was eternal and nothing in this Supposition being eternal but Matter and Motion which under all Changes continue the same every new Generation of Beings must have their Original from these the precedent Generation having no other Powers nor Differences from the succeeding but what arise from the various Disposition of Matter and Motion This is plain as to all such Beings as want the Faculties of Perception and Will and upon Examination the Case will be found to be the same with respect to such as are endued with these Qualifications For even these also in the present Hypothesis must be allowed to derive their whole Being from Matter and Motion because they are temporary Beings which began to be and there is nothing else eternal but Matter and Motion and consequently there is no other Cause assignable for their Production Which need not be proved to those who hold the Eternity of the World without a God because there are none I believe of this Opinion but do ascribe the Original of Perception and Will to Matter and Motion making the former only different Modisications of the latter in which they act very consistently with themselves in making an absurd Scheme all of a piece not blending Truth with Falshood but taking in all the Absurdities that do any way depend upon one another and belong to the main building However that I may leave no room for Exception from any side I think my self obliged to shew that if Perception and Will are not the Issue and Effects of Matter and Motion as has already been shewn they are not the Existence of intelligent Beings without a God is inconceivable and impossible because no other Cause of their Production can be assigned For suppose it should be enquired how such a purticular man came to exist how he came to begin to be a conscious Being he did not put himself together in such a manner as we now perceive him to exist he did not give himself those Capacities and Powers he is conscious of together with his Consciousness of them this is a flat Contradiction and granted to be so on all hands Whence then did he derive this mighty Difference of Being we perceive in him by which he is distinguish'd from all other that fall under our Cognizance Not from some intelligent Being of infinitely greater Perfections of the like kind with those he perceives in himself not from any mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion both these Causes are set aside in the present Enquiry Nothing then remains but that the Man which now exists and sometime ago began to be must have received his Existence and all those Qualifications which distinguish him from Matter from some other man of the like nature with himself who existed before him but this is absurd and irrational not only upon the account of the infinite Subordination of Causes and Effects which follows from this Supposition which by every body is rejected as a shocking repugnant Notion but because it is hereby affirm'd that one Being may solely by its own power produce another Being of the same Nature and Perfections with its self which I take to be the next Impossibility to a Being's making it self For supposing the Existence of a God and that that may be allowed we have seen before 't is impossible that God should have another God of all the like Perfections with himself but of a distinct Existence proceeding from him in like manner we conceive it utterly impossible that any kind of Matter should produce the least new Particle of Matter nay one part of Matter never imparts any Motion to another without losing its self what the other receives and in all other material Productions there is only a new disposition of the parts of Matter and not any new Being of a distinct Nature from it which new Disposition is not received entirely from some other Being of the same kind or texture with its self but from material Particles and Motions conveyed from several distant parts of Nature and yet such different dispositions of Matter as are observ'd in the World cannot be conceived to be the product of Matter and Motion alone without the Assistance and Regulation of some other Being of higher Perfections as has been shewn before How then is it possible that one Mind or conscious Being should produce another entire distinct Mind or Being of equal Perfections with its self without losing any thing from it self or borrowing any Assistance from any other kind of Being existing in the World and what is as strange do all this without being conscious of this its chief Perfection as well as it is of all its other This I say cannot possibly be and therefore if the World be eternal without a God all the continual Changes and new Productions that have ever been in it must be ascribed to matter and Motion but Matter and Motion not being able to produce such Effects from hence I conclude that the Eternity of the World considered as it now is without the eternal Existence of a God is impossible And thus I have consider'd all the several Hypotheses which pretend to give any account of the present Constitution of things called the World with exclusion to the Being of a God I shall now take a short Review of each of them in conjunction with the Existence of a God and then pass to more general Reflexions to shew the Incompetency and Falshood of any other account whatsoever that can be given of the Original and Existence of things besides that of their proceeding in some manner from God But before I enter upon the Consideration of these Hypotheses which do all tho' in different manners establish an eternal Co-existence of Matter and Mind I think it necessary to premise something concerning the
be convinced that we cannot help having those Sentiments we feel upon such Occasions that we do not reason our selves into them and if by the Unhappiness of our Temper or any other way we should want these Sentiments of Gratitude Reverence or the like we should find some difficulty in reasoning our selves into the same outward Behaviour as would have followed if we had been so affected and tho' we were never so well convinced that our Happiness was really concern'd in such a Behaviour all our Actions would come slower be performed with more Constraint and less Conformity to one another than if they had proceeded from a lively natural Sense till Habit which is another additional help to Reason had given us greater Ease and Dispatch And thus we should find our selves originally made and disposed with respect to all the general Duties of Morality and Religion if we entred upon a particular Examination of our whole Frame and Constitution from whence we may conclude that these natural and original Inclinations and Propensions to some Actions and Restraints from and Aversions to others which we feel in our selves without being conscious of any previous Deliberation concerning the Reasonableness or Unreasonableness of what we do or after Judgments of this Nature made we look upon as certain Motions of the Soul carrying us on to act according to such Judgments with more Ease Quickness and Application of Mind than we should have done upon the bare Conviction of our Reason without them All these Dispositions I say and Sentiments of the Soul being given us by God and assisting us conformably to the Dictates of our Reason in discharging what we call the Duties of Religion we have sufficient Cause from hence to conclude that God did design us for the Practice of such Duties and consequently that an obedient Compliance with this Design will contribute more to our Happiness than our Disobedience can which is a farther Proof that we are actually under Obligations to God or that there really is such a thing as Religion Which Obligations together with God's Right of obliging we are constantly put in mind of by the Oeconomy and Constitution of Humane Society and the several Relations in it The different kinds of Government and Subjection to be found in the World are the chiefest Marks and Characters by which Men are distinguish'd from one another in Society these take up a large share in their Thoughts and Discourses and a great part of their Actions are influenc'd and determined by the Notions and Opinions they have of them all which do lead us to acknowledge that we are under higher Obligations of Obedience to God than we can be to any humane Governour whatsoever for whether we consider our selves as Servants Children or Subjects or any other way inferiour to others whatever Reasons we alledge for our Duty and Obedience to Masters Parents or Princes or for their Right of commanding us they will conclude more strongly upon us when we consider our selves with relation to God Now all the Reasons and Grounds of our Obedience to Men and of their right of obliging us are Power Goodness and Property When a person has a Power of contributing to my Happiness or Misery and I do some way or other belong to him so as to be call'd his I look upon my self as obliged to obey him or act according to his Will and if besides his having this Power and Property I consider him as more inclinable to do me good than ill I conceive my self under higher Obligations of Obedience to him But God has all these Titles to our Obedience in the highest degree possible for by giving us our intire Being and every thing that belongs to our Nature 't is plain that he has not only a greater Power of contributing to our Happiness or misery than any man can have but also a greater Property in us by this Act of Creation or Production than can accrue to any Man by Conquest Purchase Covenant Generation or any other way whereby Men come to have a Property in one another And that he has more Goodness towards us or is more inclinable to contribute to our Happiness than Misery is manifest from his own Nature enjoying Happiness and that other Character of it his Wisdom in designing every thing for the best Ends they are capable of as also from the Benefits we have already received from him The inference I draw him from hence is that as our Reason and Judgment which tell us what ought or ought not to be done and natural Inclinations and Aversions preventing or seconding our Reason but always conformably to it which dispose us to action were given us by God with a design of engaging us to act accordingly so were we put into such a State and Condition with regard to one another that the necessary Relations resulting from Society might put us in mind of our relation to God and the proper peculiar Actions consequent upon it so that by a constant traditional Education in the exercise of these Duties of Subjection of different sorts to one another we should be led to the Acknowledgment of our Obligations to a Superior Being more easily than if every Man had been left to himself to find them out by the use of his own Faculties only without these particular Occasions of setting his Reason and Inclinations on work All which Considerations concerning the State of humane Nature and Society are at least very probable Arguments that we are actually obliged by God to such a particular way of living as we call Religion and consequently we have Reason to conclude that a careful practice of Religion all things considered will contribute more to our Happiness than a Neglect or Transgression of it because the same God who designs us for Happiness designs us also for the Practice of the Duties of Religion tho' we do not yet perceive an immediate Connexion betwixt Religion and Happiness which is the next thing to be proved 3. In the third place then I shall give some positive and direct Proof from the Nature of Religion it self that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would certainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of considered only in his present Condition as included within the Bounds of this Life 'T is plainly percieved upon a short transient View and Comparison of the Humane and Divine natures that Man was made and designed by God for Happiness and we are more nearly and necessarily convinc'd by the irresistible Desires of Happiness and Aversions to Misery we Experience in our selves and by our constant unalterable Endeavours to attain the one and avoid the other that the Enjoyment of the purest most unallayed Happiness we are capable of must be the ultimate End of our Being and all our actions Since therefore God has made us capable of and designed us for such an End and we find our selves necessarily determined to