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Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
nature_n	figure_n	matter_n	motion_n	3,415	5	9.0997	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A25846	Logic, or, The art of thinking in which, besides the common, are contain'd many excellent new rules, very profitable for directing of reason and acquiring of judgment in things as well relating to the instruction of for the excellency of the matter printed many times in French and Latin, and now for publick good translated into English by several hands.; Logique. English. 1685	Arnauld, Antoine, 1612-1694.; Nicole, Pierre, 1625-1695.	1685 (1685)	Wing A3723; ESTC R7858	106,112	258

Substances like to Manners of which sort are Cloath'd Arm'd c. There are others which we may call simply Real and these are the true Manners which are not Substances but Manners of Substance Lastly there are others which we may call Negatives because they represent the Substance to us with a Denial of some real or substantial Manner Now if the Objects represented by these Ideas whether Substances or Manners are really such as they are represented to us we call 'em true If not they are false Ideas in such a manner as they may be And these are they which in the Schools are called Entia Rationes Entities of Reason which happen for the most part when the Mind conjoins two Ideas real in themselves but distinct thus the Idea of a Golden Mountain is an Entity of Reason compounded of two Ideas of a Mountain and Gold which the Mind represents as conjoin'd when really they are not so CHAP. III. Of Aristotle's Ten Predicaments TO this Head of the Objects of Ideas the ten Predicaments of Aristotle may be reduc'd as being but several Classes under which that Philosopher comprehended all the Objects of our Thoughts compredending all Substances under the First and all accidents under the other Nine The first Substance which is either Spiritual or Corporeal the second Quantity which is either discrete when the Parts are divided as Numbers Or Continued when the parts are conjoined and then either successive as Time and Notion or Permanent which by another name is call'd Space or Extension in Length Breadth and Profundity length alone making lines Length and Breadth making surface and all together causing Solidity Third Quality of which Aristotle makes four Kinds The first comprehends Habitude a disposition of Mind or Body acquir'd by reiterated Acts as the Sciences Vertue Vice Excellency in Painting Writing Dancing The Second Natural Ability such as are the Faculties of the Soul or Body the Understanding the Will the Memory the Five Senses Swiftness of Foot The Third Sensible Qualities as Hardness Softness Ponderosity hot cold colours sounds odors and several sorts of Relishes The Fourth Form and Figure which is the extrinsecal determination of Quantity as Round Square Spherical Cubical Fourthly Relation of one thing to another as of Father to Son Master to Servant King to Subject of Power to the Object of sight to the Thing Visible to which may be added all things denoting Comparison as like equal bigger less Fifth Action either consider'd in it self as to walk leap to know to love or externally as to strike to saw to break to manifest to hear Sixth Suffering as to be stricken broken to be manifested heated Seventh where as when we answer to Questions about Place He is at Rome at Paris in his Study or a bed Eighth When we answer to questions about Time as when did he Live a hundred Years ago When was this done Yesterday Ninth Scituation as Sitting Standing Lying behind before upon the Right-hand on the Lost The Tenth the manner of having as to have any thing about a Man for Cloathing Ornament Armour or to be Cloath'd Adorn'd Arm'd to wear Breeches c. These are Aristotle's Ten Predicaments form'd for the Birth of so many Misteries though to say truth of very little use and so far from rectifying of Judgment which is the Scope of Logic that they frequently do much mischief and that for two Causes which it will be worth while to display in this place The first is that these Predicaments are things lookt upon as things grounded upon Reason and Truth whereas they are things meerly Arbitrary and which have no ground but the Imagination of a Man that has no Authority to prescribe Laws to others who have as much Right as he to dispose in the same or any other order the Objects of Thinking according to the Rules of Philosophy which every one embraces In a word the following Distic contains whatever falls under our Consideration according to the new Philosophy Mens Mensura quies motus Positura Figura Sunt cum materia Cunctarum Exordia rerum For the followers of this Philosophy believe they have drain'd all Nature out of these seven Heads 1. Mens or the Thinking Substance 2. Matter or the Extended Substance 3. Measure or the Bigness or Smallness of every part of the Matter 4. Position or Scituation one in respect of another 5 Figure 6. Their Motion 7. Their Rest or slower Motion The other Reason why we think this Series of Predicaments to be pernicious is this because it occasions Men to satisfie themselves with the outward Rind of Words instead of Profiting by the wholsome Fruit and to believe they know all things so they are able to say by rote certain names of Arbitrary Signification which yet imprint no clear or distinct Ideas as we shall afterwards demonstrate Here something might be said of the Attributes of the Lullists Goodness Patience Magnitude and the rest But it is such a ridiculous Invention to think that they are able to give a Reason of all things by the application of a few Metaphisical words that it is not worth refuting And therefore a very Modern Author has affirm'd with great Reason that the Rules of Aristotles Logic are serviceable not so much to discover what we are Ignorant of but to explain to others what we know already but that Lully taught us to prattle fluently and without Judgment of that of which we know nothing at all And therefore Ignorance is to be preferr'd far before this false Knowledg for as St. Austin judiciously observes in his Book of the utility of Belief such a disposition of the Mind is highly to be blam'd for two Reasons One for that he who is perswaded that he understands the Truth renders himself uncapable of Learning any more and Secondly because such a Presumption and Rashness is a sign of an ill-govern'd and ill-qualified Mind Opinari saith he Duas ob res turpissimum est quod discere non potest qui sibi jam se scire persuasit per se ipsa temeritas non bene affecti Animi signum est For the word Opinari in the purity of the Latin Tongue signifies a disposition of Mind that consents too lightly to uncertain things and so believes that he knows what he does not understand and therefore all the Philosophers maintain'd Sapientem nihil Opinari and Cicero blaming himself for that defect says that he was Magnus Opinator CHAP. IV. Of the Composition and Simplicity of Ideas wherein is discours'd the manner of knowing by Abstraction or Precision WE have affirm'd by the by in the second Chapter that we may apprehend the Mode or Form without considering distinctly the Substance of which it is the Mode from whence we take an occasion to explain what is Abstraction of the Intellect The narrow Limits to which our Souls are confin'd are the reason that we cannot perfectly apprehend things if a little compounded without considering 'em in

Instruction another for Flattery another for Reprehension Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to but that it should peirce and run through ' em Nor would any one think it well that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov'd should answer Sir speak lower I hear you well enough For 't is the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof and it is necessary to imprint that Idea in the mind of the Servant which the Master would have it make But sometimes these accessory Ideas are fix'd to the words themselves for that usually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce ' em And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signifie the same thing some are injurious some are mild some modest others impudent some honest others dishonest for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree men have affix'd other Ideas which are the cause of this variety And this observation may serve to discover a peice of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown upon 'em which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives For example if they are accus'd of Ignorance or Imposture presently they cry out for being call'd ignorant and falsifying fellows which is not reasonable because that the words do not signifie the same thing for the Adjective ignorant and falsifiing beside the signification of the offence which they discover they include the Idea of Scorn whereas the Substantives of ignorance and imposture denote the thing to be such as it is without aggravation or extenuation And we might instance other things that would signifie the same thing after such a manner as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the others charge And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of unless some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency Hence also may be understood the difference between a plain and a figur'd Stile and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely when they are express'd by a figure then if they were restrain'd to a plain manner of Speech Which proceeds from hence that figur'd expressions besides the principal thing signifie the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth For example of this half Verse of Virgil Vsque adeone mori miserum est were express'd simply and without a Figure Non est usque adeo mori miserum Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force and the reason is because the first Expression signifies more then the second for it does not only express the thought that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die but it represents also the Idea of a Man as it were provoking death and undauntedly looking it in the face which without question is a great and lively Accession to the signification of the words Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impression in the Hearer for the mind is only instructed by the verity of Ideas but she is not rous'd but by the representation of Affections sivis me flere dolendum est Primum ipse tibi If thou wouldst have me weep it first behoves thy self to grieve But as figur'd stile not only signifies the things themselves but also those affections of the mind which we conceive in meditating and speaking we may judge from thence the use which we ought to make of it and what are the Subjects most proper for it Visible it is that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters meerly speculative which we contemplate with a calm and placid Eye and which produce no motion in the Mind For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul when Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no way mov'd such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature and seem to be a kind of Convulsion For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous then the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts upon all manner of Subjects and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions then upon truths the most weighty and necessary for Salvation On the other side when the Subject of the Discourse is such that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind it is a fault to deliver himself in a jejune and frigid stile and without any manner of motion Therefore Divine Truths not being simply propos'd only to be known but much more to be belov'd reverenc'd and ador'd by Men without doubt the noble elevated and figur'd manner of Elocution observ'd by the Holy Fathers is much more proportionable to the Subject then a flat and meager Stile like that of the Scholastics since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know but also endeavours to raise in us those Sentiments of Love Reverence and Affection which the Fathers had for those Truths when they wrote and which representing to us the Image of that Holy disposition must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us Whereas the Scholastic stile being plain and contenting it self with the Ideas of the Naked Truth is nothing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity which render it not only less profitable but less delightful since the soul it self is more delighted in observing the motions of her affections then in acquiring knowledg Lastly 't is by means of this Observation that we may resolve that famous Question among the Ancient Philosophers whether there be any words to be counted unchast And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoicks who justify'd that we might make use indifferently of any words though impudent and obscene They were of opinion saith Cicero in a Letter which he wrote upon this Subject that there were no words that were either nastie or obscene for they say that the obscenity proceeds either from the things or it is in the words It does not proceed simply from the things because they may be express'd in other words that are not esteem'd so nauseous nor is it in the words consider'd as they are because it happens ofttimes that one word signifies two things and so in one signification it may be nauseous in another well enough approv'd But all this is no more then a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence that those Philosophers did not consider those accessory accidents which the mind adds to the principal Ideas of things for from thence it comes to pass that one and the same thing may be express'd honestly by one sound and lasciviously by another if one of the sounds has

we adhere to their Opinions till by Consultation with others we found ' that all their Opinions agreed In which case we thought we might be allow'd our Liberty The Reader will find more Additions then Alterations or Retrenchments not being duly inform'd of the faults that were found in what was already done However t is true that we understood of some general Objections that were made against the Book which we thought no Let to our farther Progress believing that they themselves who made 'em would easily be satisfy'd when we should give our Reasons for what we did For which Cause it will not be amiss to return an answer to the cheifest of those Objections Some there were offended at the Title Of the Art of Thinking instead of which they would have had The Art of well Reasoning But we desire 'em to consider that in regard the aim and design of Logic is to give Rules for all the Actions of the Understanding and as well for simple Ideas as for Judgment and Arguments there was no other word that comprehended all those different Actions whereas the word Thought comprehends 'em all Simple Ideas are thoughts Judgments are thoughts and Arguments are thoughts True it is a man might have said the Art of well thinking but that Addition was not necessary being sufficiently imply'd by the word Art which signifies of it self a method of doing any thing well And therefore it is enough to say the Art of Painting the Art of Numbring since no man supposes it to be an Art to Paint ill or mistake in casting accompts There is another Objection against that multitude of things drawn from other Sciences discours'd of in this Logic. Which because it assaults the whole design and gives us an occasion to explain our selves it is necessary to examine with so much the more care To what purpose say they all this motley variety of Rhetoric Ethics Physic Metaphysics and Geometry When we thought to meet only with Logical Precepts we are transported of a suddain into the Upper Region of the most lofty and notional Sciences before the Author know whether we understand 'em or not Rather ought he not to have consider'd that if we had all those Sciences already perfect we should have no need of his Logic And had it not been better for him to have given us a plain and down-right Logic with Rules explain'd by Examples drawn from common Things then to encomber 'em with perplex'd and intricate Notions But they who argue thus have not sufficiently consider'd that the greatest disadvantage to a Book is not to be read since it can only be serviceable to those that read it And so whatever contributes to cause a Book to be read contributes to render it useful Now it is certain that had I gratify'd their fancies and made a dry barren Logic with the usual Examples of Animal and Horse how exact soever and methodical it might have been it would have only augmented the number of so many other Books of which the World is full and which are therefore never read Whereas it is this Collection of different Things that has procur'd the Sale of this and caus'd it to be with less annoyance and distast then others Nevertheless this was not the Principal Aim we had in this mixture for we are apt to believe we have follow'd the most natural and most useful way of handling this Art by applying a remedy as much as in us lay to an inconvenience that rendr'd the Study of it almost fruitless The Experience shews us that of a thousand young men that Learn Logic there are hardly ten that know any thing of it six months after they have performed their Exercises Now the real cause of this so frequent either forgetfulness or negligence seems to be this for that all the Subjects treated of in Logic being of themselves abstracted and remote from use the examples also by which they are explain'd are no way taking and seldom discourst of otherwhere so that making no impression upon the fancy they are with the greater difficulty retain'd in memory which suddenly loses all the Ideas it had a while ago conceiv'd Moreover finding these common Examples not sufficient to prove that the Art it self may be appli'd to any thing useful they accustom themselves to immure Logic within it self not suffering it to extend any farther whereas Logic was invented to be serviceable as an Instrument to the rest of the Sciences so that having never seen its true use they never make any use of it but are glad to be rid of it as of a mean and unprofitable Knowledg For remedy of which Inconveniency we thought it the best way not to seperate Logic according to the usual custom so far from the rest of the Sciences for the Service of which it was design'd but to join them together both the one and the other by the means of Examples drawn from solid Reading shewing at the same time both the Rules and the Practise to the end that so the Schollar may learn to judg of those Sciences by Logic and retain Logic in his memory by the help of the Sciences So that this variety is so far from being a means to darken these precepts that nothing can contribute more to brighten and explain them for of themselves they are too subtil to make any Impression upon the Mind if there be not something to make 'em pleasing and acceptable to the Fancy Therefore to render this mixture the more acceptable we have not borrow'd examples at a venture from those Sciences but have made choice of the most important Points of truth and which might be most serviceable to the Rules and Principles to find out the truth in other matters which could not be handled at the same time For Example as to what concerns Rhetorick we consider'd that there is little advantage to be drawn from that Art for the finding out of thoughts expressions and embellishments Our wit furnishes us with thoughts Use affords us Expression and for figures and ornaments they are many times superfluous so that all the Benefit from thence consists in avoiding certain evil habits of writing and speaking especially an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile compos'd of false Imaginations Hyperboles and forc'd Figures the most unpardonable of all Vices in an Oratour Now perhaps you will find in this Logic as much Information for the knowing and avoiding those defects as in those Books that expresly handle that Subject The last Chapter of the First Part shewing the nature of figured Stile at the same time shews the use of it and discovers the true Rule by which you may know Legitimates from Spurious Figures The Chapter where we treat of Places in general may very much avail to prune off the superfluous abundance of vulgar Arguments That article wherin are mark'd out false and ill-cohering Ratiotinations into which the Vain-glory of long and ornamental Haranguing frequently engages many while it throws disgrace

Parts and according to the several shapes that they may receive Which is that which we generally call knowing by Abstraction But in regard that things are variously compounded some of Parts really distinct which we call Integral as the Body of Man Number c. It is easie thence to understand that the Mind may consider one Part and not another because these Parts are really distinguish'd But this is not that which we call Abstraction Now it will be more advantagious to consider these Parts separately to a distinct knowledg of which we can never else attain For example the Body of Man can be no otherwise known then by dividing it into all it's Parts as well similar as dissimilar and by setting several names upon every one Arithmetic also stands upon this foundation For we have no need of Art to measure or compt little Numbers for the Mind is able to receive them entire So that the whole Art consists in numbring seperately those Parts of Number which being whole we cannot reck'n For as Capacious as the Mind is it is impossible for it to multiply two Numbers consisting of eight or nine Figures without a seperate Multiplication of each Figure by it self Secondly we know by Parts when we apply our selves to one manner not considering the Substance or to two seperately which are not however inherent in one and the same Subject This is done by the Geometricians who make a Body extended in Length Breadth and Profundity the Object of Geometry But for the more accurate knowledg of this they first apply themselves to the Consideration of one only Dimension Then they consider two dimensions Length and Breadth which they call a Superficies and lastly all the three dimensions together which they call solid Bodies Hence it appears how vain and ridiculous the Subtleties of the Skeptics are who endeavour to call in question the certainty of Geometry because it supposes Lines and Superficies that never were for it does not suppose Lines without Latitude nor Superficies without Profundity but it supposes that Longitude may be consider'd without the consideration of Latitude which is a thing beyond all Controversy for in measuring the distance between City and City we only measure the length of the way not troubling our selves about the Breadth Now by how many the more Manners we divide things so much the more capable we become of accurately understanding ' em Thus we see in motion when the determination to what place is not rightly distinguish'd as well from the motion as the parts of the determination so long nothing can clearly be concluded concerning the causes of Reflection and Distinction which is done by the help of this Distinction as may be seen in the Second Chapter of Des Cartes's Optics Thirdly we know by Abstraction when the thing has several Attributes but we only consider one setting all the rest aside For Example I consider That I think and by Consequence that I am he who thinks Now in this Idea of my self thinking I can only consider the Thing-Thinking not considering that I am the Thing-Thinking tho' in Me My self and the Thing-Thinking are one and the same and so the Idea which I have conceiv'd of the Person-Thinking will not only represent me my self but all other Persons that think In the same manner if I consider an Equilateral Triangle as it is describ'd in such a Paper with all its other determining Circumstances that Idea will only represent this Triangle to me But if I call off my thoughts from the consideration of these particular accidents and apply my self to the consideration of this Figure as consisting of three Lines the Idea thus form'd will hence more clearly explain the Equality of the Lines and thence I become more apt and Skilful to make a representation of all other Triangles of the same Nature If I am to go farther and not to stop at the Contemplation of the Equality of Lines but am to consider it as a figure consisting of three right Lines this Idea will express all the sorts of Triangles Lastly if omitting the number of the Lines I only conceive a superficies bounded with Right-Lines I shall form an Idea of Figures consisting of Right-Lines and thus by degrees I may ascend to extension it self For in these Abstractions the inferiour degree contains the Superiour together with some conjoin'd determination Thus I think contains the Thing Thinking thus an equilateral Triangle contains a Triangle and thus a Triangle comprehends a Right-lin'd Figure and the upper degree represents many things so much the more clearly by how much the less it is determin'd Lastly It is manifest that by the benefit of Extraction Common Ideas are produc'd out of Singular and out of Common ones still more Common By which we are admonish'd to proceed to what is to be said concerning the Vniversality and Particularities of Ideas CHAP. V. Of the Vniversality Particularity and Singularity of Ideas ALtho' whatever exists be Singular nevertheless by the help of Abstractions we may have several sorts of Ideas of which some will express Singulars and such is the Idea which every one has of himself others will express many things together as when a Man thinks a Triangle considering nothing else but that it is a figure containing three Lines and as many Angles which Idea so form'd may serve for the apprehension of all other Triangles Ideas representing one thing are calld Singular and Individual and their Objects are called Individuals but they that represent several things are called Vniversal Common or General The names that denote the first are Proper Names as Socrates Rome Bucephalus These that signify the latter Common and Appellatives as a Man a City a Horse And as well Vniversal Ideas as Common names may be call'd Generical Terms Note that there are two sorts of Generical Terms one of those that are called Vnivocals to which the Vniversal Ideas are so tied that the same name may agree with several things according to the same sound and the same Notion that is annexed to the Sound of which sort are a Man a City a Horse The other is of those that are called Equivocalls the Sound of which is the same annexed to different Ideas so that the same sound or word may agree to several things but not according to the same but various Ideas which custom has subjected to the word Thus Canon signifies a great Gun and Ecclesiastical decree and a Rule of Art for these significations belong all to different Ideas These Vniversal Equivocalls are of two sorts For various Ideas subjected to one Sound have either no Relation one with another as in the word Canon or else they have some Relation as when the name primarily signifies one Idea others no otherwise then as they relate to the first Idea as the Cause Effect or Sign and these Equivocalls are called Analogous thus Animals the Air and Diet are said to be Healthy Now the Idea first joyn'd to