incident to creatures commonly called Generation the other supernaturall the priuiledge of God himselfe which we terme Creation Now euery making which is a Generation requireth a really-being subiect because it is either a motion or mutation which supposeth a matter wherein it is receiued but the making of Creation is alway without any matter subiect being desined to be A making something of nothing But these aduersaries admit of no such duplicity of making holding it a meere impossibilitie for any Agent in this sort to create Thus therefore somewhat otherwise we answer There be two sorts of Agents or Efficients the one Vniuersall the other Particular or Partiall They differ thus That the Efficient vniuersall is cause of the whole being and essence of it effect making both matter and forme and this action of this Agent is not Motion or Mutation but a bare Emanation The Particular Agent is not cause of the whole essence of that it maketh seeing it alway requireth the preexistence of the matter and the action thereof is truely called Motion or Mutation So then it is impossible for a partiall or halfe efficient as you may terme him to worke or make a thing of nothing but for an vniuersall it is not onely possible but euen easie And is it not thinke you to answer euery point of their reason an infirmitie in the maker not to bee able to make a thing without matter for why is the existence of the matter necessarie but because the efficient can doe nothing and doth not this import a defect of the workmans abilitie No say the aduersaries for it is no imperfection to be vnable to doe things impossible but we denie that this is vnpossible vnto any but vnto particular agents naturall as for God to whom nothing is vnpossible but to denie himselfe as he is the whole and sole cause of being so is he able euen from a not being to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being Secondly say they vnlesse we grant an euer-being of motion we must needs admit either of a proceeding in infinitum or els of this senselesse contradiction that before the first motion there was a motion more ancient two maine absurdities the one in reason the other in nature For the progresse in infinitum they thinke it is thus proued for before the motion whereby the first mooued body was made there was of necessity requisite some potentiall being thing because that motion is only incident vnto things of a potentiall existence If that be granted then they inferre that there was some motion wherby this subiect had it being and so in infinitum But to stop their long iourney wee may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a creation It is true indeed that there must needes bee a thing capable of motion before there can be any moouing for in euery motion there is a thing moouing and a thing mooued but there is no necessitie that this mooueable should haue its being by motion for it was made by creation which was no motion but a simple and bare emanation For there is a two-fold mediate action whereby a cause is said to worke according to which duplicitie of action they hane thus distinguished of causes efficient There is say the Schoolemen a double efficient or working cause one called Efficiens per transmutationem that is such a cause whose operation is alway ioined with some change in the thing working according as is the resistance either of the bodie betweene it and the patient or of the thing whereon hee worketh which doth more or lesse withstand his impression The other is Efficiens per emanationem as when without any repugnancy of any patient or labour of the agent the effect or worke doth voluntarily and freely arise from the action of the working cause as the shadow from the body such is God whose vnresistable power by his bare word of command euen of nothing made this admirable worke of the world as the shadow and obscure representation of his wisedome and omnipotency not changed in his nature there being nothing by Reaction to imprint any thing in the impassionable Godhead And this is the full and sufficient answer to the second argument Thirdly they reason thus There is an eternall mouer therefore there hath bene an eternall motion and a thing moued in asmuch as these relatiues cannot be but together in nature For answer whereto wee must remember that there is an absolute both consideration and being of God Absolute I say and out of relation otherwise Gods being should be onely in relation It is true indeed that relatiues are alway together in nature beginning to be and finishing their being in one and the same moment For instance a father is not a father vntill he haue a sonne nor is he a father longer than he hath a sonne And yet for all that those things which are Relatiues may haue being one before another thogh not as Relatiues yet as things really subsisting in nature For example who can deny that Adam was in nature before either conception or birth of his bloody sonne Cain yet was he not a father vntill God had blessed him with that after-cursed-ofspring And who seeth not that the Carpenter had being in Nature before he builds the house although he be no actuall builder till the house be in making So God that was from euerlasting before all times had his being without motion though not as a mouer yet as a thing really and perfectly existing but when in fulnesse of time according to the free determined purpose of his will he began the frame of the world then also began he to be a Relatiue a builder in respect of this goodly house and palace the world a Father that is the Beginning of being vnto the childe of the creation the image of his greatnesse and indeed in these and such kinde of controuersies we must warily vse these termes of relation especially in regard of the creatures lest wee binde God onely vnto a relatiue being and so make his existence dependent on the creatures Their fourth argument is in substance this If God so long before had being without being a Creator there was doubtlesse some defect in the foregoing time the supplie whereof in the moment of creation moued him to make the world rather at that time than any other For there is no new action but presupposeth some new incitement which moued the Agent to vndertake the worke more then before but there could bee nothing at this time more than before that could moue God the principall and perfectest workeman to take in hand this busienesse and worke rather now than before for then how could he be the primary and principall cause But this in short may be the answer Indeed there was all this time an impediment forasmuch as God would not actually create vntill the time foreappointed in his secret purpose was accomplished Nay but say the aduersaries God vntill this time
principally vnderstand the frame of all things in heauen and in earth lesse principally Man as being but a part thereof As for the other terme namely Eternall that also hath two acceptions for things are said to bee Eternall two waies First improperly that which neuer shall haue end more fitly called Euiternall or Immortall Properly that is said to be Eternall which neither had beginning nor shall haue end nor as Boethius addeth any succession Now Eternall we take in the more proper and latter sense So that the Question may thus more plainlie be expressed Whether the heauen and earth with the bodily Creatures therein contained had a beginning or shall haue an end of being But because that part of the opinion which concerneth the worlds eternitie a parte ante as the schoole-men speake that is its being from euerlasting is not so directly pertinent vnto our purpose we will with all possible breuitie runne ouer the speciall reasons and foundations thereof the rather because the authors and maintainers thereof from the want of beginning inferre the vncapablenesse of an end Now the chiefe Patron and desender of this opinion in regard of authoritie though not of time was Aristotle who as I take it rather affecting singularitie than for any soundnesse of the matter or strength of argument tanght it in his Lycoeum For the Philosophers which liued before him with generall consent agreed in the contrarie opinion Trismegistus who with his learning watered the then barren countrey of Greece as Diodorus Siculus witnesseth in his first booke of Antiquities Musaeus Orpheus Linus Epicharmus Hesiodus and Homer amongst the Poets Zoroastes Anaxagoras Melissus Empedocles Pherecides Philolaus Democritus and Plato as Philo Indaeus Laertius Diogenes Sulcitius Seuerus Alexander Aphrodisiensis Plutarch and Tully witnesse which also his bookes intituled Timaeus and Critias together with those De Republica doe testifie Onely Aristotle in a selfe-conceit of singularity howsoeuer elsewhere honoring antiquitie rather liketh in this case a new broched opinion of his owne contrary to so many foregoing Philosophers and therefore Hierophantes a deuout though idolatrous Priest condemned him of arrogancie and selfe-loue not onely because contrarie to the common receiued opinion of his countrey continued so many ages vngainsaied hee denied the pluralitie of Gods but also and much more for that he stucke not to teach that the world was from euerlasting which all Greece confessed to haue had beginning in time But to fetch the beginning of this phantasticall opinion somewhat higher we will beginne with Democritus the archpatron of fortune who will haue the World Eternall and withall chanceable But Eternitie and Chance being as the learned Sir Philip obserued things vnsufferable together If Chanceable then not Eternall Againe what is more absurd then to thinke the World was made by the vntended and casuall concourse of indiuisible substances for whence came these substances If you say they came from Euerlasting so were Eternall can you conceiue such chanceable effects to proceed from so certaine necessary causes Nay rather if you wil needs maintane the infinitenes of these diminitiue bodies grant they had beginning from that Infinite One that glued the Infinite parts of your Infinite All together by his vnmeasurable Power and Wisedome For can we imagine such a perfect Order and Stabilitie to consist in these disioined substances Order Constancie are children onely of Wisdome sooner may we prooue Darknesse to proceed from the Sunne than Constancie and Order from inconstant chance constant in nothing but in Inconstancie Finally we must either exclude Gods Wisedome and prouident care of the World made or els Fortune from making of the World for the World is Gods possession onely by right of creation vnlesse we imagine a deed of gift passed by Fortune at her death or Fortune the true Owner if the true Maker disinherited by violence driuen out of her dominion by God as an Vsurper But God hauing nothing to plead for his title vnto his kingdome but the right of creation if that plea be improoued God cannot any longer call the World his owne and therefore without crueltie may cast off all care of this his supposed ofspring For it is onely Gods Fatherhood that bindes him vnto his Prouidence Therefore not to stay long in this opinion of Fortune let vs now come vnto Nature deified especially by Strato a Naturalist who fearing to ouersway God with the weight of this burthen either in the making or gouerning of the World hath granted hm a Remedie or Otium as they terme it thinking it more reason that God should haue an exemption from trouble than Gods priests who for his sake be dispensed withall But let vs see what this Nature may bee so highly by Strato magnified There is a particular Nature and there is a generall or vniuersall Nature The particular is that which in euery seuerall single substance ministreth Essence to the whole compound and withall is author of such action and motion as is agreeable to the subiect wherein it is as the Nature of fire causeth the fires ascention the Nature of earth the earths going downward and in regard of this Nature we say it is Naturall to the fire to ascend to the earth to descend the bodies hauing in them cuen of themselues by their inherent forme a promptnesse and inclination vnto these motions Now if by the conspiring of these many manifold Natures this All we now speake of were made as if the Elements Ethereall parts should in their town-house set downe the bounds of euery ones office then consider what followeth that there must needs haue beene a wisdome ouerruling power which made them concur for their natures being so diuers and contrary would rather haue wrought each others destruction than so friendly haue cōsorted to make vp so vnexpressable an harmony For to grant knowledge vnto them whereby to moderate the extremity of their naturall fury or intendment of such agreement were to enter into a bottomlesse pit of absurdities seeing that knowledge alway presupposeth roason reason sense both which are neuer found either iointly or in part in bodilie senselesse creatures Now touching the Vninersall Nature which some will haue to be nothing but an influent virtue helping furthering the actions of euery particular naturall body others an Vniuersall ouerruling and as it were an Ideall Nature subsisting For as the particular nature of euery particular body causeth and mainetaineth the particular actions of the body wherein it is so this generall Nature is the author and maintainer of all actions and bodies to which the single seuerall bodies are in subiection by their obedience acknowledging a kinde of superiority in that nature which we call vniuersall And in the respect of this nature the fire is said in some cases to goe downeward by nature as to hinder the discontinuitie of things in the world and so that emptines which nature so much abhorreth Now if by this vniuersall nature
they vnderstand a nature of wisedome and goodnesse and pronidence which with knowledge performeth its actions and so of purpose deliberately hath knit togethet these so many points to such an excellent vnitie this Nature wee reiect not but retaine as that God and Maker of all things that by his infinite irresistable power bath conioined the disagreeing parts of this visible world and of things contrary made a perfect harmony permitting in their nature a mutuall resistance yet so as they hinder not their friendly copulation in the worlds composition In sum touching Nature and Fortune they are thus onely saith Scaliger to be interpreted that Nature signifies Gods ordinary power and thus things extraordinary may be called vnnaturall Fortune his vnreuealed will and thus may wee call things chanceable that are beside expectation or beyond reason Now touching the Epicure who as Tully saith deriued his opinion from Democritus we will in one word answer his reason recorded by Tully in his second booke de Natura Deorum and so come vnto Aristotle and his Scholar the Atheist The Epicures reason is briefly thus propounded by way of interrogation What eies saith he in his scoffing impudency had Plato to behold the framing of this so great a worke Or what tooles and fellow-workemen had God to make the World withall The answer is that Plato his eie was the eie of reason gathering by necessary consequence both the being of the Deity as also confusedly apprehending the infinitenesse of God his power and wisdome shinig in the world as in a most cleere glasse reflecting in some sort the Image of Gods inuisible Nature vpon the eies of all the beholders Touching absence of instruments and fellow-workemen whereby the Epicure would inferre the impossibility to create in God we are not to thinke that God infinite in power is tied to the helpe of secundary instrumentall causes they being but supplies of defects and helps of wants in the otherwise insufficient agents and therefore not requisit to the eternall infinitenesse of Gods ability Nay we may adde further which is Gods priuiledge God of nothing is powerfull enough to make all things much more without instruments Now a possibility of creating in God may thus briefly be shewn according to the maner of being of euery thing so also is the order of working but Gods being and beginning dependeth vpon nothing but himselfe why then should it be thought impossible that Gods action is not tied vnto any matter And indeed the reason as far as I can perceiue why other things require a subject whereon to worke is onely the impotency of the Agents but God Al-sufficient and powerfull who can out of the rocks bring water out of darkenesse light can also as he hath done make all things of nothing An other reason may be this taken from the difference of the principall efficients God Nature Arte. Arte alway presupposeth a thing really and perfectly subsisting Nature onely a matter with a power to be God a farre more powerfull Agent then either Arte or Nature is able of that which is nothing at all to make a thing of actuall and reall subsistence For if Nature can of a thing in the lowest degree of being and next to a not being make a thing actually subsisting God All-sufficient and infinit in power can of nothing create any thing in what degree of being soeuer Now touching the Atheist out of Aristotle his Philosophie he hath drawen this subtile Interrogatorie which hee propoundeth with so vnsauorie scorne If the world were not from Euerlasting but made by the God you talke of I would know of you where he liued before the time that hee made the world how he busied himselfe all the time before for it is an absurdity euen among vs to say he was idle as also what he did if he did not make it from euerlasting Touching the place of his being and the maner of his worke I may not vnfitly answer as a learned Father of the Primitiue Church did vnto the same demand He was in a wood prouiding fewell for that fire which should in heltorment such curious priers into matters beyond their reach But for his location I may thus more fitly answer that God is tied to no place being in all places to fill them with his goodnesse in no place to be circumscribed by the circumference Touching his action we answer that howsoeuer the externall worke the after-fruit of his externall working had no externall sensible being yet was hee not vnoccupied his very decreeing being an action and that also hauing relation vnto the creatures which should afterward haue being The Hebrewes who many times do but trifle in matters of waight giue vnto this friuolous question as friuolous an answer saying that God to keepe himselfe vnoccupied spent that time in trifling experiments now making a world on this fashion now on that then by and by dissoluing his loose displeasing worke at length by many trials to haue light vpon this world this fashion which for his conceiued liking he established But these learned Rabbins meant a more serious matter then their words beare shew of and that was that God did not rashly nor without great deliberation make the world on this fashion rather than any other and that he sawe he might haue made it many other waies and sooner and more worlds but would not alluding as I take it to Gods counsell-taking at the dedecree touching the time and maner of the worlds creation which was the sum of our first giuen answer But more soundly and to the purpose we answer that the actions of the Deity are of two sorts immanent internall or externall and transeunt the immanent actions are those which bee in the Deitie from one person vnto another as to loue together and such like the transeunt actions are those that passe from the Godhead to some externall obiect they may both bee thus illustrated As in the element of fire there is a facultie of heating and enlightning whence proceedeth heat and light vnto the externall neere bodies and beside this facultie there is also in it a naturall power to go vpward which when it commeth into act is receiued in no other subiect but the fire it selfe so that if fire could by abstractiue imagination be conceiued of as wanting these two transeunt operations yet could we not iustly say it had no action forasmuch as it might mooue vpward which is an immanent and inward action So and much more so though we grant that there was no externall worke of the Godhead vntill the making of the world yet can there be no necessarie illation of idlenesse seeing it might haue as indeed it had actions immanent included in the circle of the Trinity Againe thus reason these blasphemous Atheists against the truth If for mans sake God made the world and all things therein how cōmeth it to passe that there are in the world so many noisome creatures as vipers
and such like which procure rather our annoiance than serue any way for our vse and benefit For to say they are chanceable or of a voluntary selfe procreation is in our Philosophy absurd especially seeing we extend Gods power and prouidence vnto verie flies and such like creatures But we may answer first that there is nothing so cumbersome which is not some way seruiceable Or if now disobedient yet not so created but for mans rebellion against God permitted or rather directed to arme themselues against him for whose vse and helpe they were created like vnto that sword which Hector gaue Aiax which so long as he vsed against men his enemies serued for his helpe and defence but after that he began to vse it or rather to abuse it to the hurt of hurtlesse beasts it turned into his owne bowels For vntill the transgression Adam liued as Lord of the creatures hauing the now most dangerous and pernicious creatures vnder him in subiection For the diuell that subtle seducer was not so simple a sot as to make choise of the serpent to beguile him wth inticements if he had knowen or but suspected any resident feare in man of the serpent by some foregoing remembred mischiefe for that had beene rather to terrifie him from all attention then any way to allure him to follow his counsell So that all things which now are vnto corrupted man most cumbersome as punishments of his disloialty were by creation ordained for his furtherance Nor need they wonder that Gods power and knowledge should stretch it selfe vnto flies and such diminutiue creatures as they tearme them nay it is far more insensible that the estate of flies should bee vnknowen vnto him for that were to bound the infinitnesse of his knowledge But to leaue the professed Atheist who though from Aristotle his schoole he sucked his noisome error yet went farre beyond Aristotle in impiety For Aristotle at least in words confested Gods being an infinitnes which also hee went about to prooue and confirme by reason whereas these godlesse Heretikes doe not onely deny both in their works and by consequence of words but euen shamelesly with direct speeches not only his omnipotency but euen his very being let vs therefore come to Aristotle and his lesse profane followers The Peripatetickes principall and most subtle argument which also they vrge with greatest vehemency is briefly this say they either the world was from euerlasting or else made anew proceeding from not being vnto this being which now it hath But it was not made a new for then either it proceeded from a power and fitnesse which it had to bee vnto this actuall being or else it was made of nothing If before it was actually subsisting it had a being potentiall from euerlasting seeing things that are potentially though in the basest degree of being yet are not meerely nothing it followeth that it alwaies was at least potentially and so eternall If we say that it was made of nothing that is in their Philosophy an absurd impossibility For it is with them a principle not questionable That euery making presupposeth a subiect Now if wee obiect that the necessary presence of a reall subiect dependeth only vpon the Makers infirmity and imperfection they answer that the disability of doing impossibilities is not defect or imbecillity To which said argument of theirs as they would haue it there may bee a double answer giuen For first wee affirme that the world proceeded from not being to being To the proposition of their prosyllogisme we answer by deniall thereof and reiect their distinction as sophisticall putting contrariety the greatest opposition betwixt things not only agreeing but euen all one For there is a potentiall being incident to things that are not at all and therefore doe the Schoolemen distinguish of the potentiall being after this manner A thing say they may bee said to haue a potentiall being two waies first that is said to bee potentially which is not yet either in whole or in part subsisting in nature which hauing no reall or actuall cause of being may notwithstanding afterward haue a true cause of its essence and existence So that it is not any thing in or of it selfe but is vertually contained within the ability of some thing that may afterward bring it vnto a true and reall being As for example there is a potentiall being of moe worlds then one inasmuch as God by his vnresistable vndecaied power is able as well to make more worlds as hee was to create this one world which wee behold and inhabite yet who will say that there are more worlds then one either totally or partially really and truely now being in nature Indeed it is a thing within the compasse of Gods omnipotencie to bring in a multiplicitie of worlds and therefore we may not vntruely say that this multiplicitie of worlds hath a being potentiall So likewise who will denie that a man sound and without maime or lacke of his limmes that neuer set foot ouer his threshold hath power with supposition of health and strength to trauell ouer the whole circuit of the countrey yet is it absurd to say that this iourney of his is any way in nature either wholly or in part Secondly that may iustly and is more properly said to be potentially that hauing an actuall and reall subsisting euen separate from it efficient cause wherein it was before vertually contained yet lacketh somewhat which by nature it is capable of As for instance hereof a childe altogether vnlettred may iustly be said to be potentially disposed toward the receit of learning inasmuch as it hath a reasonable soule which is alway accompanied with a capacitie of learning To applie this distinction vnto our purpose we say that to be potentially in the first degree is indeed to be nothing because this potentiall being is a meere not being so was the world from euerlasting hauing such an abilitie and capablenesse that I may so speake of being forasmuch as God by his omnipotency was from euerlasting powerfull enough to create the world as in time hee did actually make the same Now for that other kinde of potentiall being incident vnto things onely that haue receiued an actuall being from their causes it was in that rude Chaos created by God the first day of the begunmaking of the world and was afterward perfected in the worke of distinction as the Schoole-men call it when God out of that confusion or rather vpon that rude lumpe brought this admirable varietie and difference of creatures for the ornament of the world for that the world was in this sort potentially onely at the creation of the first matter which was in the time by Moses mentioned Secondly we answer that it is not impossible for God of nothing to make things really and truly subsisting as we before proued To their Axiome or principle which they call Vndeniable we answer that there is a twofolde faction or making One naturall
times that the quantities of mens bodies haue a perceiuable impairing as also the length and continuance of their liues so that if in that infinit space of foregoing time men had had being as without question the world was neuer void of men the principall and most noble member thereof through continuall and incessant decay their bodies had beene brought to as little a quantitie as they are capable of if not cleane consumed but we see their quantitie is not yet come vnto the lowest therefore had they not being from euerlasting Secondly and more specially had this world beene from euerlasting infinite also had beene the propagation of man and so wee should bring into the world an actuall infinitenesse as absurd in Nature as Parologismes be in Logicke for in this infinite space and generation there had beene an infinite number of mens soules which being by Nature vncapable of mortalitie we can not say that as one was created another was destroied and so should there be an infinitenesse in regard of number actually subsisting in Nature And thus hoping that small power will serue to confound an aduersary already ouercome wee passe to the other part of the Question purposing as much breuitie as its difficultie and obscuritie will beare The Question is touching the worlds immortality whether as it had a beginning of being so it shall also haue an end Aristotle when hee first heard of their opinion who appointed an end vnto the world scoffingly burst out into these words I was once afraid that my house either by force of tempest or by iniury of time or lastly by some defect in the workeman-ship should haue suddenly ouerwhelmed me but now I haue great cause to feare my owne and my houses ruine because of those that in words goe about to pull downe the world But for the plainer and more speedy proceeding in the controuersie let vs in one word set downe the true meaning of the question There is a twofold end the one of corruption the other of annihilation the end of corruption I call that whereby a thing is changed from being to a not being not simplie as if it ceased altogether to be in nature but because it loseth that being which before it had as for example when wood by force of fire is turned into ashes we may not vntruely say there is a corruption of the wood forasmuch as it ceaseth to be wood is become ashes yet can we not say heere is any annihilation for we see there is a substance remaining but the matter which before was vnder the forme of wood hath now put on the form of ashes so of wood corrupted are ashes generated according to that worne axiome of Aristotle That the corruption of one thing is the generation of an other The end of annihilation is when a thing so loseth its present being that no part thereof neither matter nor yet forme abideth any longer in nature but as it first was made of nothing so is it againe turned into nothing The question then as I take it must be thus vnderstood that the world shall haue an end though not of annihilation yet of corruption that is in other terms though it shall not vtterly be abolished and turned vnto nothing for the matter thereof shall still remaine yet shall it be changed into another estate and condition The first part of the assertion is prooued by the authoritie of the learned For Plato witnesseth in his Timaeus so saith Bochus and Methodius and Damascene in his second booke viz. of Orthodoxal faith testified also by the wise Salomon Eccles 3. I haue learned saith the Preacher that all the works of the Lord indure for euer that is as I interpret it though not without corruption yet without annihilation Now whether they haue this state of corruption by nature or no there is a great question but we may probably answer that of themselues and their naturall disposition infused by God they haue no naturall inclination or desire of corruption much lesse of annihilation forasmuch as euery thing hath a naturall loue of its being and an innated hatred of all things that bee enemies vnto the same testified by that naturall Sympathie and Antipathie which may be obserued in things destitute of reason for so we see in experience the lambe which neuer had experience of the woolues crueltie euen at the first sight doth tremble and flie for feare Nay in creatures of a lower degree then these tearmed by Aristotle Plant-animals wee may obserue the like antipathie Scaliger reporteth of a tree growing in the Prouince which hee calles Pudefatamea that at a mans neere approching for modesty draweth in his farre-spreadding boughes at his departure spreeds it selfe againe for that cause tearmed by the inhabitants the shame-fast-tree But wee may more probably attribute this it contraction to a naturall diuining as it were and fore-feeling that it hath of some harme whereof it is in danger as may be proportionably gathered by the like behauiour in other things of the same kinde For so Aristotle writeth of the Spongies that when a man puts foorth his hand to displace them as also before a tempest shrinke vp together on a heape a if they meant to shift for themselues either by flight or else by vniting their dispersed forces for the stronger resistance which are euident proofes of that naturall ingrafted desire in all things to preserue there being For whereas the first matter is said to desire corruption for that as not contented with the forme it presently enioieth it desireth an other whereupon followes the expulsion of the former before inherent the answer it that in this laboring to procure an other forme then that it had it intends not corruption but rather perfection not disliking the form incumbent seeing it desireth both but as Esopsdogge snatching greedily at the shadow which he thought had beene a substance meant not to lose that which he had fast hold of in his teeth So the first matter greedily caried to the desire of many formes wherein indeede consisteth its perfection loseth that which before it had for as much as by a law of Nature Two formes of diuers not subordinate kinds are at the same time vnsufferable together So then it desires perfection but in steed therof accidentally gaineth corruption expulsion of the preexistent forme Nothing therefore simply desires it owne corruption but so as it may tend to it further perfection consummation much lesse its vtter abolition For as much as it is farre better to be in the vilest and most base degree of being then not to be at all Therefore the annihilation of the world shal not be of it selfe nor yet by any meanes internall Nor can it proceed from any external naturall agent no not that vniuersal fore mentioned nature is able to bring it vnto nothing For as nature cannot make some thing of nothing so neither is she of power sufficient to bring a thing from