Question The acute Author of the * Part 4. c. 2. sect 1. Dispute against English-Popish Ceremonies contends stifly that the extremes are good and evil and not necessary and unlawful On the other side The Bishops commission'd for the Review and Alteration of the Liturgy make the extremes to be commanded and forbidden not good and evil for they say expresly indifferent things may be really good Their words are these Those things which we call indifferent because neither expresly commanded nor forbidden by God have in them a real goodness Answ to Except N. 18. Sect. 8. Yea Mr. Bradshaw too goes this way Those things saith he are called in a moral respect indifferent which is the indifferency we are speaking of whether they be qualities inclinations habits or actions that have in them neither vertue nor vice Treat of Indifference c. 8. sect 6. Herein such actions of man's will are most frequent that are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God And so another learned person The nature of indifference lies not in any thing entermediate between good and bad but in something undetermined by divine Laws as to the necessity of it so that if we speak as to the extremes of it Stillingst Iren. c. 3. sect 8. p. 50. it is something lying between a necessary duty and an intrinsecal evil and so Ames and many others If this be any more than a Logomachy and the difference be not meerly verbal and if good and evil be understood of that which is Morally so for my part I think it will scarce amount to any more because nothing is morally good or evil but what is made so by some discovery of God's will then I cannot but cast in my mite and vote to the latter scale and accordingly shall give you the full notion and description of this Intrinsecal indifferency as I have gather'd it out of several rendring in the margent to every one his peculiar due Those actions are intrinsecally indifferent that have in their matter neither (a) Indifferency apparently carries in its notion a negation of Moral goodness and illness I say Signanter of Moral goodness and illness because the most indifferent actions are transcendently and may be naturally good Jeanes's Treat of Indiff pag. 2. Moral goodness nor illness (b) Bradsh Treat of Indiff c. 8. sect 6. vertue nor vice as being (c) Res mediae sunt quarum tota species nuliâ divinâ lege naturali vel positivâ aut pracipitur aut prohibetur Sanders de Oblig Consc praelect 6. sect 22. p. 235. Actus in suo genere indifferens est quando ejus objectum nihil includit quod pertinet ad voluntatem Dei vel prae cipientem vel prohibentem Ames Medull l. 2. c. 3. sect 14. Actiones quae neque imperantur neque prohibentur neque obedientiae neque inobedientiae rationem habent in suâ intrinsecâ naturâ sunt indifferentes aut mediae Ames Cas Consc l. 3. c. 18. sect 4. in their whole kind neither commanded nor forbidden either by the (d) Bradsh of Indiff c. 8. sect 5. Law of Nature Reason or Scripture but (e) The nature of things indifferent is neither to be commanded nor forbidden but left free and arbitrary Hooker of Eccl. Pol. p. 59. left free and arbitrary so that they may (f) These things are implied in an indifferent action 1 Absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a divine Law that God has left it free for men to do it or no. 2 That one part has not more propension to the rule than the other 3 That neither part hath any repugnancy to the rule Stillingfl Iren. c. 3. sect 8. p. 50. either be done or not without sin or transgression of any Law Or more briefly in the Apostles words and therefore more safely 'T is that which neither commendeth nor discommendeth us to God by doing or forhearing whereof we are either better or worse more or less acceptable to him To this purpose the Apostle speaks 1 Cor. 8.8 concerning meat and eating i. e. not eating in general as some carry it for that is a duty of the 6th Commandment but eating this or that or any one kind of meat in particular that is indifferent and commends us not to God He that eats the fat and drinks the sweet is no more acceptable to God than he that eats the lean and drinks the sowr and this is applicable to a world of other things Once more That is indifferent which makes neither one way nor other or not more one way than another for the glory of God when equal glory is brought to God either way This notion of it I gather from Rom. 14.6 He that regardeth a day regards it to the Lord and he that regardeth not a day to the Lord he doth not regard it c. i. e. both of them aim at God's honour and real tribute of glory redounds to him either way and therefore both are lawful So then we may conceive the case concerning these Indifferencies thus some things are commanded (a) Illud secundum speciem bonum est quod lege Dei ita praeceptum est ut non sit fas homini illud negligere aut quicquam facere quod ei repugnet Et illud malum est quod lege Dei ita prohibitum est ut non sit fas homini illud admittere aut prascribere quocurque praetextu Forbes Iren. l. 1. c. 18. sect 13. in specie and in their whole kind as to pray hear give alms c. These are intrinsecally morally good or necessary and duties which are in their own nature pleasing and acceptable to God and whereby glory redounds to him so that in the general and abstracting from circumstances it is better and more agreeable to God's will and more pleasing to him to pray than not to pray and therefore though a man be not bound to pray at all times yet always to omit it and never to pray is sinful Other things are forbidden in specie as to steal lye commit adultery c. These are in their own nature evil and unlawful and therefore can never be made good by any circumstances whatsoever Others are neither commanded nor forbidden in specie but lye between both by way of contradiction as not forbidden or unlawful but lawful not commanded or necessary but arbitrary or unnecessary and so are left indifferent either to be done or not to be done according as (a) Indifferency taken in specie as to the nature of the act inclines neither way but supposing it lye under positive determinations either by Laws or Circumstances it then necessarily enclines either to the nature of good or evil Stillingfl Iren. p. 51. circumstances require so that though a man should never do them in all his life-time he should not sin as to laugh ride c. The first sort of actions are good per se and if
neither to speaker nor hearer then they are not indifferent and if words when cloathed with circumstances cannot be indifferent then neither Thoughts nor Works which are as much the issue and product of reason as speech 2. For Reason 'T is this Either they are agreeable to those Rules laid down in the Word of God for regulating all our actions before mentioned or not for Contradictio caret omni medio If they be agreeable to the Rule they are good for goodness is Conformity to the Rule if not they are evil Even as a Statuary or carver of Images 't is Ames's comparison oft-times has no peculiar reason to make this Image rather than that Cas Consc l. 3. c. 18. yet if he make any at all either he follows the rules of his Art and then he makes a good statue or he departs from those rules and then he makes a bad one and does not work like an artist so many times it may be to a Christian a matter meerly indifferent to do such a thing at this time or another in this place or another c. and may be left to his own choice and pleasure therein but yet as he is a Christian he is obliged to regard such and such circumstances in all his actions and therefore whatsoever he does he doth it either well or ill for either he observes these circumstances and then his action is good or he neglects them and then 't is bad 3. For Authority Aquinas determines the question thus 12ae q. 18. a. 9. Quemvis actum humanum in individuo consideratum quando ex deliberatâ ratione procedit bonum esse vel malum necesse est So another great Scholar of our own Nulla est individua actio humana quae est indifferens sed propter circumstantias necessario vel bona vel mala si Thomae omnibus Thomistis credimus Mort. Ap. part 1. l. 1. c. 47. I shall need to add no more because this last testimony is pregnant with many others Yet for all this I add 5 And lastly An action even in individuo may be indifferent in respect of any Precept or Prohibition though not in respect of good and evil There may be the necessity of something in an action when it is done to make it good viz. bonitas intentionis or directionis and bonitas principii and yet the action it self pro hic nunc be no ways necessary but indifferent and a matter of liberty This is very well illustrated by one by comparing it with what is usually said of God's particular actions Stillingfl Iren p. 52. That God is free in himself either to do or not to do that action as suppose the Creation of the world but when he does it he must necessarily do it with that goodness holiness and wisdom which is suitable to his nature so may many actions of men be in themselves indifferent and yet there must be a concomitant necessity of good intention and principle to make the action good But this concomitant necessity does not destroy the radical indifferency of the action it self it is only an antecedent necessity from the obligation of the Law which destroys indifferency Thus much also for the nature of this circumstantial extrinsecal indifferency Again This circumstantial indifferency is either Absolute or Comparative Absolute When a thing being considered alone by it self without relation to others is neither good nor evil Comparative When a thing being compared with others is neither better nor worse than they but they are indifferently and alike good or evil as to eat at ten a Clock or eleven c. The use of these two distinctions will appear anon Now the grand difficulty in this point is Whether the command of Authority does take away the indifferency of a thing Dub. so as to make it become necessary and consequently not the matter of scandal given There 's great stickling and strugling Pro and Con between the Conformists and Non-conformists especially on the Conformists part because this is the main Bulwark to which they retreat when beaten off from other arguments concerning the lawfulness expediency necessity of the Ceremonies that they are indifferent and therefore when commanded by authority become necessary because these indifferent things are the (a) Res adiapkora sunt legum humanarum propriissima maximè idonea materia Sanders de Oblig Consc p. 235. paulo post Restant sola adiaphora velut campus in quo se exerceat exeratque vim illa suam inducendi obligationem ubi nulla praefuit potestas humana p. 236. proper matter of humane Laws I desire to render to Cesar the things that are Cesars and to speak indifferently in this point of indifference between Magistrate and Subject not encroaching voluntarily upon either Therefore Solut. I answer in general according to the grounds laid down That where a thing is indifferent intrinsecally or in its own nature but not circumstantially but has some circumstantial goodness and necessity or there is some good reason from some circumstance for the enjoyning of it there the command renders it necessary but where there is not so much as any circumstantial goodness and necessity or any good reason from some circumstance there the command cannot make it (a) It was not the force or authority of the Canon Act. 15. but the reason and ground whereupon the Canon was made which caused the necessity of abstaining saith Sprint an advocate for Conformity Reply to Ans p. 258. necessary What God has left indifferent and not made necessary neither in its own nature nor by any particular circumstance no man has power to make so for no man has any authority or power but what is given him from above John 19.11 Jam. 1.17 If it be answered they have authority in the general which includes this particular I reply 1 No man has any authority at all either in general or particular directly or indirectly vertually or formally to do injustice but to take away a mans right and due his liberty without any reason is to do injustice Ergo. Again 2 Such a command cannot render the thing commanded necessary because it doth not at all (b) Where there is no other reason to warrant the doing of what a humane Law prescribes besides the bare will and authority of the Law-maker in this case a humane Law cannot bind us to obedience Engl. Pop. Cerem Epist p. 14. oblige for it has no dependance upon nor coherence with the Will of God it is no way agreeable to his Will which I prove thus That command which has no (c) Lex est aliquid pertinens ad rationem quum sit regula humanorum actuum mensura Aqu. 12ae q. 90. a. 1. reason for it but only the will of the Lawgiver has no (a) Teste Augustino nihil est justum ac legitimum in temporali lege quod non sit ex aternâ lege profectum Aqu. 12ae q.
93. a. 3. dependance upon the Will of God nor coherence with it for then that would be a good and sufficient reason or is no way agreeable to the Will of God either in general or particular and therefore has no obligation following upon it for that (b) Leges humanae obligant homines in foro conscientiae ratione legis aeternae à qua derivantur Id. q. 96. a. 4. Obligation of a Law which we speak of is nothing but the necessity of obeying under pain of sin against God That is an excellent notion of Petrus de Alliaco for which I am beholding to a Reverend and Learned Divine Gilbert's Assize Serm. on Jam. 2.12 p. 12. That as the will of God exerting and putting forth his natural power or strength is in natural things the first efficient Cause so the will of God exerting his moral power or authority is in moral things the first obliging Rule And as all things in nature act dependingly upon the will of God putting forth his natural power as the first efficient cause so in Morality all Laws oblige dependingly upon the will of God putting forth his Moral power as the first obliging Rule Whence I infer That where there is no intimation of God's Will neither express nor implicit in the nature of the thing nor in any circumstance there can no obligation arise 3 That command which has no Conformity to the rule and end of all Laws the * Necesse est legem semper ad bonum commune ordinari Aqu. 12ae q. 90 a. 2. publick good can have no obligation at all following upon it for the due matter of a Law is wanting but such a command has no Conformity c. Ergo. 4 That the Command of Authority does not render such an indifferent thing necessary may be proved I think undeniably from that passage mentioned Matth. 15 1-9 Mark 7 1-13 concerning the Disciples eating with unwashen hands for which they are complained of by the Scribes and Pharisees those great Masters of Ceremonies to Christ as transgressors of the Tradition of the Elders But Christ is so far from condemning that he justifies and vindicates them for it and on the contrary condemns their Antagonists for standing so strictly and laying so much stress upon such unnecessary trifles Here I observe First That the Rite or Ceremony in question was in it self indifferent i. e. neither commanded nor forbidden by any Law of God and so far from being unlawful that it seems rather a matter of civil decency and good manners Secondly This was commanded by a lawful Authority for 1 the Scribes and Pharisees who here urged it and stickled for it sate in Moses's seat Mat. 23.2 i. e. were the Rulers of the people or some of them at least who did succeed Moses in the ordinary office of Teaching and Ruling the people And 2 it was a Tradition of the Elders Now the Elders were the Sanhedrim that is the Supreme Authority of the Nation and a Tradition of the Elders is a Resolution Constitution or Determination of such a case made by them who therefore are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Domini constitutionum juridicarum Thirdly This constitution of Authority did not render this indifferent practice or usage necessary as is evident from the whole drift and scope of our Saviour Christ's discourse here From all which the conclusion or inference holds firm and strong That an indifferent thing commanded by lawful Authority is not thereby made necessary For the further clearing hereof I shall pass from one end of my thoughts to the other by these steps having first prepared the way by these Distinctions First I distinguish between the Matter and the Form of a Command or between the thing commanded and the stamp of Authority set upon it to make it currant The ground of this distinction is plain in reason Secondly I distinguish between an Intrinsecal and an Extrinsecal Indifference as before Thirdly I distinguish between unlawful and inconvenient This I ground upon the Apostles words 1 Cor. 6.12 All things are lawful for me but all things are not expedient Where he supposes that things may be lawful in some respect but inconvenient or inexpedient in others Whence I gather 1 That unlawful and inconvenient are not the same no more than lawful and convenient for Contrariorum eadem est ratio 2 I further gather the nature of inconvenient or inexpedient and how it differs from unlawful viz. That inconvenient or inexpedient is only an irregular circumstance of something in its own nature lawful He is there speaking of indifferent things and tells us That though in their own nature these be all lawful to make use of yet they may be so circumstantiated as to render them inconvenient or inexpedient Which circumstantial irregularity puts on such a kind of evil as the good or rule it offends against is of if it be only against some debitum natura then 't is malum physicum or naturale as to fast to the detriment of a mans health to eat that which agrees not with his constitution If against good manners then 't is malum morale as to be slovenly in eating either of these irregularities render a thing but inexpedient But if it be against any Command of God then 't is malum Theologicum or peccatum and so falls in with unlawful Fourthly I distinguish between a particular inconvenience which is only so to some particular persons or at some particular time and a general inconvenience which is alike inconvenient to all persons at all times and in all places This distinction has common experience to warrant its validity Fifthly I distinguish between submission for wrath and for conscience-sake i. e. meerly for fear of the penalty or else for fear of sin and to avoid that which he should be guilty of in case of disobedience and non-submission This distinction the Apostle makes to my hand Rom. 13 5. Sixthly I distinguish between an arbitrary and a necessary submission where there is no sin in the submission and yet 't is not a duty but free and arbitrary and where there is sin in the non-submission and submission is a duty and necessary The ground of this distinction will appear afterwards Now these distinctions I apply thus Prop. 1. It is certain that the Command of lawful authority That Magistrates ought to be obeyed in things good and lawful does not arise from the authority vested in themselves but from the immediate command of God that in such things they ought to be obeyed Discourse conc Liturg p. 55. quatenus command i. e. the form of the Command doth not necessarily bring an obligation to obedience along with it The obligation does not arise meerly from the form for then every command or every thing having the stamp of Authority upon it should oblige which none will say Therefore 2. The Matter of the Command must have some influence into the obligation thereof There being only
OF Scandal Together with A Consideration of the Nature OF CHRISTIAN LIBERTY AND Things Indifferent Wherein these weighty Questions are fully Discussed Whether Things Indifferent become necessary when commanded by Authority Neg. Whether Scandalous things being enjoyned may lawfully be done Neg. Whether a Restraint laid upon things indifferent without a reasonable Ground be not an infringement of Christian Liberty Aff. Who is to be judge whether there be a reasonable Ground or no in such cases How far forth we are bound in Conscience to obey Humane Laws LONDON Printed for Benj. Alsop at the Angel over against the Stocks-Market 1680. TO THE READER THere are but one or two things by way of Preface that I shall trouble the Reader withal in his passage to the ensuing Discourse and they relate partly to the Pedigree and partly to the Age of this exposed Birth When as the Ceremonies those Dregs of Romish Superstition and Troublers of our Nation which for divers years together seemed to be dead and were taken by many to be deadly began to be revived again and pressed with more eagerness and fierceness than ever so that now there was no room left for Composition but every Minister must either pay the whole I cannot say Debt but demanded Conformity even to the least mite and last farthing or become Bankrupt it highly behoved every one to cast up his accounts and consider with himself whether he were solvendo par and could with a good conscience defray the great and extraordinary charges of such an intire Compliance as was required or whether he must not be constrained in such a storm to throw over-board not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his tackling Acts 27.19 but also to part with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mark 12.44 all his living to redeem and secure the life of his soul and conscience On the one hand the Avengers of the blood of their Diana-Ceremonies pursued the scent so hotly that there was no possibility of escaping for any one who did not take sanctuary at their Altars The storm was so impetuous and outragious as threatned inevitable ruine as to all outward concerns to every one who did not shelter himself under the Act of Vniformity and swim along with the stream that way that the Wind and Tide carried him On the other hand there seemed to be such Gulfs and Shelves and Rocks as threatned evident shipwrack of a good conscience or endanger'd drowning in the passage and practice of what was enjoyned So that it was the great concernment of every one that would look to the end of his Voyage that is beyond these temporal things to those that are eternal and would secure his interest in another world to look about him and to take care that he did not condemn himself in his judgment in that thing which he allowed in his practice but to be fully perswaded and satisfied in his own mind that so he might not act doubtingly but in faith as is required Rom. 14.22 23. This posture of affairs put me upon an impartial Examination and Consideration of what was alledged on both sides and finding that the resolution of the case in general besides the consideration of particulars depended chiefly upon these Points handled in the following Discourse for if the command of Authority does not alter the nature of things and render that necessary which before was but indifferent then according to their own principles the Law of Scandal takes hold of me and I am bound not to do that at which another is offended And again If that which is commanded remain still indifferent then I am bound also to assert my Christian Liberty and not tamely to give it up Issachar-like and so make my self a servant yea a slave of men by my own consent and voluntary act Thereupon I enter'd upon a more narrow search of these Principles as I may call them and upon the whole I came to that result and issue in my thoughts which I have Transcribed into these Papers Concerning the point of Scandal though many have travel'd in the same way before me yet they have left such hedges and ditches behind them that would put a man either to a stand that he can go no further or to a leap or to a turn to get over or pass by them These I have endeavoured to level for I am a great friend to such levelling and to make every thing as smooth and plain as possibly I could and likewise to lay down such general Rules as may lead us to a determination of such other cases of the same nature as may occur These things were then scribled and some of them delivered in a publick Auditory before that fatal blow was given Aug. 24.62 and have lain in obscurity ever since and whether they are happily or unhappily now brought forth and exposed to publick view the event must determine I have but one word more and that 's a word of Request and I think a very reasonable one viz. That the Reader will be so charitable as to believe that it was purely the powerfully convincing evidence of Truth shining in my eyes that inclined me like a strong Bias to run counter to my own interest And surely he must be highly uncharitable that can imagine that any one person much less a considerable number of persons of unexceptionable Morals and in all other respects serious and sober should be so desperately bent upon his own undoing as to shut his eyes against the light and refuse to admit of truths of such comfortable importance as these tending to Conformity are of Vale. OF SCANDAL Together with A Confideration of the Nature of Christian Liberty and Things Indifferent c. 1 Cor. X. 32. Give none offence neither to the Jews nor to the Gentiles nor to the Church of God THE Apostle Paul being consulted by the Corinthians among other things concerning the lawfulness of eating meat offer'd in sacrifice to Idols first states the case by distinguishing of those Idolothytes and accordingly passes a different Verdict and Sentence upon them Some were eaten in the Idol's Temple some elsewhere Some were eaten in the Idol's Temple chap. Cudworths True Notion c. In Exposit Legis 8. v. 10. in the nature of a feast upon or after a sacrifice A thing very usual among the Heathen as Abravanel has observ'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In old time saith he whosoever sacrificed to Idols presently made a feast of the sacrifices Hence that Invitation of one in Virgil's Eclogues to his friend Cùm faciam vitulâ pro frugibus ipse venito And this was so usual that Plutarch somewhere remarks it for a strange and uncouth rite in the worship of the Goddess Hecate that they which offer'd sacrifice to her did not partake thereof Now this practice of eating thus of Idolothytes in the Idols Temple and at the Idols Table the Apostle absolutely condemns as being a Communion with Devils and a partaking with them
and Corinthians as we have seen does not Pharisee-like lay a burden upon other mens shoulders and put a yoke upon their necks which himself was not willing to touch or bear but declares both his Resolution in this case 1 Cor. 8.13 Wherefore if meat make my Brother to offend I will eat no flesh while the world standeth lest I make my Brother to offend Mark he does not only say I 'le not give my Brother any just occasion of offence but I 'le not do that if I may as lawfully leave it undone whereupon he may take occasion of offence nor only I 'le not eat of things offer'd to Idols but I 'le eat no flesh nor only I 'le forbear for a little while or for some certain time but I 'le never eat thereof while the world stands nor only I 'le forbear in case of his damnation but in case of his offence if it make him to offend Conclusio Apostolico pectore dignissima saith Justinian A truly noble and imitable Resolution which though as to the amplification in some particulars should be hyperbolical as Calvin and P. Martyr think yet in the general does most convincingly hold forth that Christians should rather abridge themselves in the use of their Christian Liberty than be an occasion of scandalizing any And as here he declares his Resolution so in the next verse to the Text his Practice Even as I please all men in all things 1 Cor. 10.33 not seeking mine own profit but the profit of many that they may be saved i. e. Not in respect of any points of Faith but in the use of my Christian Libert I do so accommodate my self to all either by doing or forbearing as may be most acceptable to them gaining upon them and profitable for their souls See also 1 Cor. 9 19-22 For though I be free from all men yet have I made my self a servant unto all c. Which general may be verified by many particulars as his Purifying of himself Act. 21.24 26. his forbearing his power to take wages of the Corinthians and some other Churches 1 Cor. 9.18 1 Thess 2.6 and 2 Ep. 3.9 his Circumcising of Timothy for the Jews sake Act. 16.3 his not suffering Titus to be circumcised for the Gentiles sake Gal. 2.3 4 5. That the truth of the Gospel might continue with you And this was the practice of the other Apostles also with him 2 Cor. 6.3 Giving or we giving none offence in any thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which words though some as Anselme and the Syriack Interpreter understand as a Rule and Direction to the Corinthians yet generally and more suitably to the Context they are look't upon as Paul's Speech of himself and some others with him that they did so behave themselves as none might take offence at them Ita in omnibus vitam meam ac conversationem dirigo ut non dico accusationis sed nec indignationis locum cuiquam tribuam saith Euthymius Thus much may serve for the present support of the point to keep it from sinking in your thoughts while we open the three principal spurs or roots of it by taking a survey of the Nature 1 of Christian Liberty as to this particular 2 Of Things Indifferent 3 Of Scandal all rugged thorny and disputable points for each of them has some incumbrance upon it some considerable difficulty attending it which will render our passage thorow them the more operose and troublesome But we shall endeavour briefly to remove the several difficulties that occur and make the way as plain and smooth as possibly we can that even a child may both run and read and that by a narrow Consideration and strict Examination of these three things as I said 1. What our Liberty is in things indifferent which we must not make use of to the scandal and offence of others 2. What the nature of these Indifferencies are wherein we have this liberty 3. What the nature of that Scandal is for which we must forbear the use of our liberty in these Indifferencies And first for the first what our Liberty is in things indifferent This Liberty as it is a freedom from the Mosaical Pedagogy and Ceremonies is one branch of Christian Liberty Now that we may the better understand the nature of Liberty as Christian i. e. belonging to us as Christians in opposition to and contradistinction from the Jews we shall a little reflect upon Jewish bondage to see what that was for as they say Contraries are the best Commentaries and their mutual opposition the most effectual exposition Of Jewish bondage these were two principal branches 1. A numerous train of external Rites and Ceremonious observances which lay like a mask or folded vail upon the fair face of spiritual worship so that they could scarce see wood for trees discern the inward beauty thereof or were like the pictures in a book which children look mostly at not regarding the sense Now this was a burden and yoke which galled their necks and almost broke their backs Act. 15.10 so that they were not able to bear it 2. The restraint that lay upon them in reference to certain meats days and other things in their own nature indifferent concerning which it was said unto them Touch not taste not handle not c. whereby their hands were tied and their mouths gagg'd and a knife set to their throats and so their liberty was restrain'd and they were brought into bondage and thraldom thereby Now Christian Liberty snaps asunder the bonds of both these Impositions For 1. It has discharged the Ceremonies from any further attendance upon the worship of God and admitted only a few plainer in the two Sacraments of Baptism and the Lords Supper into their rooms so that true Gospel-worshippers do worship God in spirit and in truth Joh. 4.23 eminently over what they did then 2. That Ceremonial restraint is also now taken off which lay upon the use of indifferent things which is the particular under present consideration which to us Christians God has cleansed Act. 10.15 and made pure Tit. 1.15 and given us freely to enjoy 1 Tim. 6.17 and therefore nothing is now to be refused viz. upon any such account 1 Tim. 4.4 And this Liberty we are bound strenuously to assert and stand fast in not suffering our selves to be again intangled with this yoke Gal. 5.1 nor subjecting our selves to any humane Ordinances either by way of Doctrine or Command not to touch taste handle c. Col. 2 20-22 whereby any tye should lye upon us for a total and universal abstinence from any of the good creatures of God So then Christian Liberty allows a free use of things indifferent But now notwithstanding this general permission there may be a particular occasional and accidental restraint of this liberty pro hic nunc upon several occasions and in several cases As 1 In case of Scandal to our selves if we find them snares and occasions of
are yè subject to Ordinances Touch not c. i. e. Why do you dance after their pipe tune your Fingers to their Tongues and conform your Practice to their Precepts and Doctrines You ought not to do so It 's a renouncing of your interest in Christ's Death Besides Do you think a Magistrate might now forbid his Subjects the use of all those things which God made unclean by the Ceremonial Law though he left their Judgements free or command the use of all those Rites then established though not upon a sacred but a civil account Prop. 4. The meer determination of the Practice quatenus determination doth not infringe our Liberty for then it might not justly be determin'd in any case whatsoever but it may justly be determin'd in some cases without breach of liberty viz. in the cases before mentioned The reason whereof is Because those things in such a case put off pro hic nunc the nature of indifferency and become necessary and so lye without the verge and bounds of Liberty But Prop. 5. A needless and unnecessary deprivation of this Liberty of Practice is the direct and formal breach of it Not meerly the Determination as was said but the needlesness of it i. e. when there is no reason at all for it but meerly the Determiners will My reason is Because it is an unjust restraint of our liberty as being made without reason which is the rule and foundation of Justice and therefore a breach of our liberty There 's a twofold goodness or necessity Intrinsecal or general engraven in the nature of things by some divine Command natural or positive as to pray read be diligent in our callings c. and Extrinsecal Circumstantial or Particular arising only from circumstances as to take Physick when I am sick to recreate my self when I am tired out and wearied with the Duties of my particular calling to have a convenient place for the publick Assemblies of the Church c. Now every lawful humane constitution must have one of these to vouch and warrant it It must be grounded either upon the Intrinsecal goodness of the thing and therefore that is a lawful Constitution which enjoyns persons to assemble themselves together on the Lord's day for the publick and solemn worship of God Or upon some Extrinsecal and Circumstantial goodness and therefore that is a lawful Statute which prohibits the Exportation of Wool because it would deprive the Natives of a great part of their maintenance about dressing and ordering of it and that is a good Law which provides for the conveniency of place c. about publick worship But otherwise those Laws which have neither such an intrinsecal nor circumstantial goodness have not the due and (a) We must distinguish between an indifferency as to its nature and indifferency as to its use and end or between an indifferency as to Law and indifferency as to Order and Peace Here I say that in things wholly indifferent in both respects that is in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God nor that has any apparent respect to the Peace and Order of the Church of God there can be no rational account given why the nature of such indifferencies should be alter'd by any humane Laws and Constitutions But matters that are only indifferent as to a command but are much conducing to the peace and order of a Church are the proper matter of humane Constitutions concerning the Churches Polity Stillingfl Iren. p. 53. and the same may be said of civil affairs proper matter of a good Law For every Law should be for the publick good which such Law cannot be because they have nothing at all of goodness in them and consequently do intrench upon Christian Liberty Now that this circumstantial goodness is necessarily required to warrant the determination of an indifferency I prove thus Either the Magistrate must have regard to good and convenient circumstances in the lawful determination of things in their own nature indifferent or a thing being so indifferent he may cloath it with what circumstances he pleases But he may not do so which I prove by these instances To dig a pit is in general and in its own nature an indifferent thing but a Magistrate may not command me to dig it in an high-way or in a street or any great thorough-fare because it might occasion the ruine of many and so is not only inconvenient but unlawful Again A Magistrate may lawfully command me to cover my fire and rake it up in a safe place but he may not command me to lay it among straw or near Gunpowder because this would be to the evident endangering of my house and consequently unlawful Therefore to make a lawful determination of an indifferency so as thereby not to encroach on Christian Liberty there must be a concurrence of circumstances constituting a circumstantial goodness or necessity without which if the restraint depend meerly and solely upon the Law-makers will it is a direct breach of Liberty because (a) Iniquam exercetis dominationem si ideò negatis licere quia vultis non quia debuit non licere Tertull. Apol c. 4. It were much more tolerable if men would plead for the necessity of the things which it seems good unto them to command and on that ground to command their observance than granting them not necessary in themselves to make them necessary to be observed meerly by vertue of their commands for reasons which they say satisfie themselves but come short of giving satisfaction to them from whom obedience is required For whereas the will of man can be no way influenced unto obedience but by meer acknowledged Soveraignty or conviction of reason in and from the things themselves commands in and about things wherein they own not that the Commanders have an absolute Soveraignty as God has in all things and the Civil Supreme Magistrate in things Civil that are good and lawful nor can they find the reasons of the things themselves cogent are a yoke which God has not designed the sons of men to bear Discourse conc Liturgies and their Impos p. 44. unjust Besides for any person to stamp and imprint the character of a Law upon his own will in publick affairs which concern the practice and obedience of others and to say Sic volo sic jubeo I will have it so because I will have it so looks too like a flower of the Imperial Crown of Heaven for any creature to wear in his bosom and is such a badge of Soveraignty as no creature ought to usurp or pretend to being the peculiar Prerogative of the Supreme Majesty of Heaven whose property it is to will because he will Rom. 9 15. Nay further Hereby you pull up the flood-gates of Justice and expose us to an inundation of violence and oppression you set infinite gins and snares to entrap the conscience withall you go about to legitimate any spurious brood that shall be begotten
conscience either immediately or mediately and therefore must not take our selves bound in conscience to submit to them 2. We must weigh the penalties we are to undergo with the priviledges we are to part with and chuse the lighter E. g. For a Minister to be hindred from executing his office or a private person from receving of the Sacrament is a penalty and to serve God in that manner and method which I judge most agreeable to the Rules of the word and most acceptable to him is my priviledge but I will rather part with this priviledge as to some circumstantial point wherein the substance and stress of the duty does not consist than suffer that penalty of being deprived of the Ordinances I◠the other case when a force lies upon us and our liberty is restrain'd thereby we are innocent and guiltless because only passive and it 's done without our consent which only makes us culpable We may not yield up our liberties yet if they be taken away from us we may submit without sin Thus have I transcribed my thoughts and stated the case as clearly as I could in this ravel'd point of Christian Liberty by showing wherein it does consist how far forth it is liable to be imposed upon and baffled by humane Constitutions and what must be done for the asserting thereof The total Sum of the whole discourse is this That though Obedience to Magistrates and Christian Liberty are very consistent yet for Magistrates to lay a restraint upon Indifferencies meerly quia placet libet is an abridgment and infringment of Christian Liberty which we must not willingly admit of nor be accessory to though we may submit But if they do it quia expedit when there are sufficient reasons for it from any circumstantial consideration so long as those reasons hold good of which every one is to be judge for so much as concerns his own practice this is no breach at all Our liberty remains still entire to us notwithstanding such a determination Now if any one shall stumble at this and think it strange that I take off the lawfulness of the determination from the Will which perhaps they may call the Authority of the Lawgiver and lay it upon a concurrence of circumstances and so attribute and ascribe that to circumstances which I deny to Authority I shall offer this which is very observable for their further satisfaction viz. That a concurrence of circumstances which I may call a Providential or emergent necessity constituting and making up such an extrinsecal goodness as I spake of before may do that which no humane Authority can (a) Providential necessity may make that which is sinful scandalizing to be obedience to the 6th Commandment as rather to eat Idolothytes than to starve but the will of Superiors can make no such change Rutherf of Scand p. 78. Divine necessity by Gods Ordinance alters the case not humane by enforcing authority Tailor of circumsp Walk c. 21. For it can make that which otherwise and abstracting from those circumstances is unlawful to become lawful much more then that which otherwise is but indifferent to be necessary I say a concurrence of circumstances may make that which otherwise is unlawful to be lawful as is evident by David's eating the shew-bread when he was an hungred which otherwise had been unlawful and therefore the Jews when there was no such providential necessity chose rather to dye than to eat swines-flesh 2 Mac. 7.1 forbidden by God as the shew-bread was though commanded by man So if Saul and his Army had been ready to starve and could have got no other provision but the Amalekites cattel certainly God's preferring mercy before sacrifice would have warranted them to have killed and eaten thereof though otherwise they were commanded to destroy them and reserve none Now if that in those things which otherwise are unlawful a concurrence of circumstances can do that which no humane authority can viz. make them lawful then much more in Indifferencies may it do that which no humane authority can viz. lay a restraint upon the use of them as is evident by this instance Had Daniel forborn the Ceremony of kneeling at prayer or looking towards Jerusalem out of any natural necessity or by reason of any infirmity whereby it might have been prejudicial to his life it had been none offence But when there is no such necessity but only he is forbidden to pray by a Law and that upon pain of death he will not obey The reason whereof is very well rendred by the learned Rutherford Because God places saith he Treat of Scand p. 81. acts of providential necessity as emergent significations of his approving will which are to us in place of a divine Commandment of God's revealed will and these providential acts of necessity do no less oblige us to moral Obedience than any of the express written Commandments of God But then this holds only as he adds elsewhere in commands affirmative and positive p. 83. so as there can be no sin eligible by such a case but I think he should have said only in positive commands for the command about the shew-bread was negative yet David's necessity dispenc'd with it Thus we have paid the first General its portion and discharged that Obligation Proceed we now to the second General concerning Indifferency in consideration of this Question What is the general nature of those indifferent things about which Christians have this liberty Quest I answer Answ in general Indifferency is a (a) Indifferent things are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lying in the middle between two extreams or (b) Bradsh Treat of things indifferent c. 1. sect 5. that whereby things do equally without any difference agree to or dissent from those extreams to which they have reference and relation This is twofold (c) This distinction though first hammer'd out at my own Anvil yet since I have met with the substance of it though cloathed with other terms in a judicious learned Author whereby I am confirmed in the use of it Stillingst Iren. p. 53. whose words are quoted before p. 24. Intrinsecal material or specifical and extrinsecal or circumstantial opposite to that twofold goodness I spake of before This I gather from the Apostles words 1 Cor. 6.12 All things are lawful for me i. e. all such things as are intrinsecally and in their own nature indifferent but all things are not expedient i. e. not indifferent in regard of circumstances Let this distinction be well marked for being dextrously managed it will serve as a clue to unlabyrinth us a key to open most of the intricacies and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to salve the difficulties and solve the doubts in this point concerning the nature of this intrinsecal indifferency I find some contest about the extremes to which it should relate the distinct and clear determination whereof is of great moment to the true state and resolution of the
they be evil 't is only per accidens the second are evil per se yet may be good per accidens as God can bring light out of darkness c. The third are neither good nor evil per se but may be either per accidens The first cannot universally and always be omitted without sin the second cannot at any time whatsoever be done without sin the third may be either done or left undone without sin The first are necessary to be done some time or other the second necessary to be omitted and forborn at all times the third neither necessary to be done or left undone but may be either done or not as circumstances require The first commendeth us to God the second discommendeth the third doth neither By the first we are the better by the second the worse by the third neither better nor worse In the first we must therefore set all circumstances in order because they must be done In the last we must therefore do them because cirrumstances call for it one must be done because the circumstances are good in the other we must make the circumstances good because they must be done as 't is between Holy-days of God's and Man's institution Holy duties must be performed on God's Holy days because the days are holy but man's days are holy because holy Duties must be performed on them and therefore for man's days 't is more proper to say they are Days set a-part for holy Duties than that they are Holy-days Thus much for the nature of things intrinsecally indifferent Those things are Extrinsecally indifferent which have their whole suit of circumstances as I may call it wherein they are drest up indifferent and neither vertuous nor vicious when there is no Moral goodness in any of the circumstances e. g. It 's indifferent whether a man dine in the Hall or Parlor at eleven a Clock or twelve on fish or flesh c. These particular circumstances are not determined either Pro or Con by any Precept or Prohibition and therefore are indifferent And here be it remarked and remembred 1 That an action intrinsecally good may have some indifferent circumstances put on it as in hearing the word 't is indifferent whether I sit or stand wear a Cloak or a Coat c. 2 An action intrinsecally indifferent may have some circumstances good which may render it necessary e. g. If I have a commodity it is indifferent for me either to sell it or use it my self but if there comes one that has extraordinary need of it I am bound to let him have it so in those several cases before mentioned wherein Liberty in things indifferent may be restrained 3 There are general Rules concerning circumstances which must be brought down and applied to particulars by humane wisdom and discretion for the regulating and right ordering of them e. g. 1. For Persons Quis. When actions are peculiar to an office or condition of life then none must perform them but persons in that capacity either of the office as in the Ministry or of the condition as in Marriage 2. For Place Ubi Actions must be done in places suitable and convenient so Christ seeing the multitudes went up into a Mountain to preach Matth. 5.1 as at other times in private houses Luk. 14.1 12 15. 3. For Means Quibus auxiliis We must use only lawful means and not do evil that good may come of it Rom. 3.8 4. For the End Cur. We must do all to the glory of God 1 Cor. 10.31 L. 2. dist 40. qu. 1. Which words as Capreolus observeth may be understood two manner of ways 1 Negatively That we must do nothing against God's glory whereby he may be dishonoured 2 Affirmatively And so actions may have a threefold reference to the glory of God as both Capreolus and Scotus 2. Sent. dist 41. observe 1 Habitual where there is the habit of grace and this is not enough 2 Actual when we actually think of and aim at the glory of God and this is more than is required in all performances for though it ought frequently to be done yet it is not necessary in every action Well it may be our happiness in the next life but cannot be our duty in this because it would leave no room nor place for other duties 3 Vertual which presupposes the two former and adds further 1 The Negation of any other end contrary to the glory of God and 2 a natural tendency of the action to some end subordinate to the glory of God and naturally referrible thereto 5. Quomodo For the Manner whether in regard of the inward frame of spirit or outward behaviour and here are many rules in both respects fitted for several occasions as 't is faith c. decently c. 6. Quando For the Time It must be done in season Psal 1.3 He brings forth fruit in due season 4 Every action though in its own nature secundum speciem and in regard of the Matter it be in different yet when cloathed with its whole suit systeme and compages of individuating circumstances is necessarily either good or evil according to its consonance or dissonance from the Rules before laid down Though it have not any antecedent good or evil to render it necessary or unlawful yet it must have a concomitant good or evil whereby it becomes necessarily either good or evil when it is done There 's a great dust raised by Scotus Bonaventure and others of the School-men about this who hold the negative I shall not wade far into the controsersie you may see it learnedly clearly and satisfactorily handled Jeanes Scholast Pract. Divin part 2. p. 2. Engl. Pop. Cerem part 4. c. 3. only give you some brief hints about it Observe 1 The question is not to be understood of indeliberate actions which proceed either from the disposition of natural qualities as to hunger thirst c. or from the force of imagination as to scratch the head c. but of actions properly humane 2 Not of actions considered only in regard of their matter or object but circumstances 3 Nor of actions or circumstances compared one with another for so there is no question but there may be some action or circumstance neither better nor worse as far as we can judge than another but of things considered absolutely and by themselves 4 Nor of Indifference as it lies between commanded and forbidden but between good and evil 5 Not of every particular circumstance but of all together And accordingly I affirm That no deliberate action considered absolutely and singly by it self and adequately with its whole suit of individuating circumstances but is either good or evil And I prove it both by Scripture Reason and Authority 1. For Scripture Thus much is plainly intimated by Christ Mat. 12.36 Every idle word that men shall speak they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement i. e. for every unprofitable unfruitful word that brings good
means cannot be had by reason of any either natural or moral hinderance there a less convenient becomes necessary so long as the End may be attain'd thereby Yea further yet 10. In the case put I may not only do that which I judge to be inconvenient but suffer another to do that which I judge to be unlawful rather than be deprived of a necessary Ordinance E. g. If either I must have my Child baptized with the sign of the Cross or not baptized at all I may suffer it to be done in that way though I judge it an unlawful addition because the manner concerns him that does it not me at least not so much so long as there is all the essence He must be responsible for any irregularity in the manner not I. Thus Jacob took Laban's Oath though by his Idols And Christ did joyn with the Jewish Church in their Administrations of God's Ordinances though there were many Corruptions therein rather than not partake of the Ordinances at all But 11. If the inconvenience be such as would overthrow the main end of the duty and is inconsistent therewith then the indifferency is so far from becoming necessary that notwithstanding the command it is unlawful and I may not obey whatever the penalty be E. g. If I may not pray or read in the Congregation but with such a tone and modulation of the voice as would Pender what is so prayed or read unintelligible I must rather suffer any penalty than perform the duty in such a manner because the Congregation cannot be edified thereby nor understandingly joyn with me therein and so I do but take God's name in vain Lastly In all these cases there is left unto every private person a Judgement of Discretion to discern and try whether the thing commanded be (a) Ille judicat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per modum privatae discretionis qui de sensu aequitate aut veritate dogmatis sive sententiae propositae à judicibus suprà nominatis judicat sine ullà potestate publicâ tantùm comprehendendo approbando intellectum suum admittendo Actus enim intelligendi non exercetur sine actu judicandi De judicis cujuscunque subordinati definitionibus adhibetur hoc judicium non solum ut intelligatur ejus sententia sed etiam ut Aequitas seu Veritas ejusdem consensio cum lege Supremi Judicis percipiatur obedientis animo persuadeatur Daven de Judice c. 3. lawful or no and how far forth the reasons that are publickly held forth to bottom the command upon are solid and valid as was shewed before Some indeed object That this will overthrow all obedience if Children Servants c. are not bound to obey till they be satisfied of the lawfulness of the Command But I answer Though 't is true the same Command viz. the fifth which enjoyns obedience to Parents and Masters enjoyns obedience to Magistrates also yet I conceive there is a different tie and that Subjects are not so strictly bound to Magistrates as Children are to their Parents or Servants to their Masters And therefore 't is observable that when the Apostle lays out the particulars of this obedience he bids Children obey their Parents in all things Col. 3.20 viz. in the Lord as he expounds it Eph. 6.1 i. e. in whatsoever is agreeable to God's will and not contrary thereto And so 't is for the obedience of Servants Col. 3.22 Servants obey in all things your Masters according to the flesh And so Wives must be subject to their own husbands in every thing Eph. 5.24 but he saith not the like for Subjects to Magistrates The reason whereof I conceive to be this That Children are for their Parents and Servants for their Masters but now Subjects are not for Princes but Princes for their Subjects i. e. for their benefit and advantage and therefore Subjects are not so strictly bound to Magistrates as Children are to their Parents and Servants to their Masters Thus having dispatch't these preliminary Discourses concerning Liberty and Indifferency we pass on to the principal and fundamental point of Scandal where we are to consider the nature of that Scandal for which we must forbear the use of our Liberty in things indifferent And we shall view it both as to the Quid Nominis and Quid Rei 1. For the Quid Nominis Much lies in that neither have I met with any one that gives a full and satisfactory account of it and therefore I shall be the more large and particular about it There are two words used in the N. T. translated Scandal and Offence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence our English word comes and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the difference between which is but small if any and concerning which Criticks are not agreed upon their Verdict and therefore I must return an Ignoramus Of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have spoken before in opening the words of the Text. Now for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 't is a Scripture-word (a) Yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nostras Gatakerus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conjectures it to have been of familiar use formerly In hanc classem verborum scilicet quorundam quorum usus jam evanuit nec in veterum scriptis extat am pliùs vestigia tamen adhuc residua sunt ex quibus olim familiaria fuisse liquido possit deprehendi redigi potest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod apud antiquos Graecae linguae autores deprehendere hactenus nequiverunt qui sunt rerum istarum indagatores diligentissimi atque acerrimi Verum apud Hellenistas quos nuncupant crebrum est atque admodum familiare Gatak Adversar Miscellan cap. 41. p. 415. never used by any profane Author as H. Stevens observes Criticks say it signifies properly the bridge in a trap which when a Mouse or other Vermine touches the trap falls and so they are taken And indeed so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word very near of kin to it is used by Aristoph in Acharn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast set a trap or snare of words and thence 't is used to signifie any kind of snare in general whether proper or metaphorical or omne id quod exitii causam praebe◠saith Grotius whatsoever tends to the hurt or ruine of another or whereby he is drawn into sin as a bird into a snare Others will have it to signifie primarily any thing that makes a man to halt from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 claudico or to go lame and thence any thing that occasions a man to sin And so if there be any difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 't is this the former signifies that which makes a man stumble the latter that which makes him halt a common effect of stumbling It is rendred A thing that doth offend Mat. 13.41 they shall gather out of his kingdom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all things that offend An occasion to fall Rom. 14.13
of evil and scandal in these indifferencies that in the former it 's enough quòd de sui ratione habent quòd sint inductiva ad peccandum 22 ae q. 43. a. 1. as Aquinas speaks The possibility of Scandal subsequent does aggravate their evil and sinfulness though scandal does not actually follow as we see in that of Christ to Peter Mat. 16.23 Thou art an offence to me He does not say I am offended with thee but Thou art an offence He checks him for laying a stumbling-block in his way though he could not was not capable of being offended and stumbling at it yet this did not excuse him His sin was never the less but every whit as great as if the effect had followed But now in these Indifferencies it is only actual scandal following thereon that renders a man culpable and therefore I am not bound to forbear such an action except I know that it doth give offence 9. occasion The word or action or omission of one man can but occasion or be an imperfect cause or cause by accident of the sin of another for nothing is properly the cause of a man's sin but his own will Thus Aquinas Nihil potest esse homini sufficiens causa peccati nisi propria voluntas Et propter hoc non dicitur dans causam ruinae sed dans occasionem 22 ae q 43. a 1. 10. either to sin himself This seems to me to be that wherein the formality or at least the principal notion of Scandal in things indifferent doth consist and which mostly if not only renders culpable whenas another takes occasion thereby to sin For 1 The Scripture-use and acceptation of the word runs generally in this channel as was shew'd before and those effects attributed to it by the Apostle imply no less as wounding their weak conscience 1 Cor. 8.12 i. e. not only with a natural wound by grief but a moral spiritual wound by sin Verberatur alterius conscientia saith P. Martyr inloc quando malè aedificatur ad ea impellitur agenda de quibus aliter sentit which is a sin Rom. 14.23 and destroying Rom. 14.20 or causing to perish 1 Cor. 8.11 viz. morally too by inducing into sin which is the ruine and undoing of the soul 2 In this also agree all Divines that I have met with both ancient and modern Tertullian aedificans ad delictum Aquin. praebens occasionem ruinae Spiritualis c. 22ae q. 43. a. 1. quae est peccatum as himself explains it a. 2. quod aliis spiritualem perniciem affert Ames Medul l. 2. c. 16. sect 53. quo alii possint vel excitari ad peccandum vel impediri aut retardari à benefaciendo id fect 44. quo impeditur Evangelii cursus P. Martyr in 1 Cor. 8.8 quo alius deterior redditur Polan Synt. quo aliquis possit à pietate salute vel revocari vel impediri Lucas which is or may be the occasion of another man's halting or falling into sin or swerving from the straight way of righteousness Gillesp He only gives scandal who induces his Brother directly or collaterally into sin Dr. Jer. Tail 3 Because to be scandalized is sinful So Aquin. 22 ae q. 43. a. 2. Scandalum passivum semper est peccatum in eo qui scandalizatur non enim scandalizatur nisi in quantum aliqualiter ruit spirituali ruirâ quae est peccatum Now the particular sin which Scandal in things indifferent does occasion is ordinarily one of these two with their concomitants and consequents viz. Either 1 A like speech action or omission but with a condemning or at least with a doubting conscience Every example does animate and encourage him that observes it to do the like The eye affects the heart saith Jeremy Lam. 3.51 But if he that is scandalized either think it unlawful or be not satisfied of its lawfulness and yet takes example by the other he falls into sin This the Apostle calls being made weak Rom. 14.21 i. e. apt to fall brought into danger of sin This was the case Rom. 14. It was before the plenary promulgation of the Gospel and destruction of the Temple lawful to observe Jewish Festivals and distinction of meats and yet not necessary but indifferent v. 14. I know and am perswaded that nothing is unclean of it self because Christ was come in the flesh yet many of the New-Convert-Christians were not so fully acquainted with and satisfied about their Liberty in these things but did still esteem one day above another v. 5. and some meats unclean v. 14. and consequently did condemn or at least scruple the non-observation of those days and the eating of those meats Now such by seeing others which were higher Scholars perhaps in Christ's School than themselves to neglect those days and that distinction of meats were apt to be drawn to act against their own consciences and judgements which was a great sin for every man should be fully perswaded in his own mind v. 5. but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean to him it is unclean v. 14. and therefore such an one is damned or condemned by his own conscience if he eat v. 23. which was scandalizing and a heinous sin in those that did occasion it Neither was the case much unlike among the Christian Corinthians It was lawful to eat any meat bought in the shambles or set before them at their neighbours table 1 Cor. 10.25 27. yet sometimes some might be scandalized thereby which was when they did not think it lawful yet by another's example were emboldened to eat as the Apostle speaks c. 8. v. 10. 2 The other sin which the use of Liberty in things indifferent does occasion is Censuring such a word action or omission as unlawful and the person as licentious which because there is no ground for in the nature of the thing it being as I said indifferent it is the sin of rash judging condemned by Christ Mat. 7.1 That this is one way whereby the person scandalized may fall is evident by the Apostle's words 1 Cor. 10.29 Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience q. d. I do culpably scandalize another by doing such a thing that I have otherwise liberty to do or not to do if another judges or censures me for it fo v. 30. For if I by grace be a partaker why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks i. e. though I may lawfully and comfortably make use of my liberty yet if another take occasion to reproach or condemn me for it I do ill therein I ought not to do it And Rom. 14.16 Let not your good be evil spoken of Thus we use to say There is a scandal lies upon such a man for such a thing i. e. he is evil spoken of for it he is censured and condemned for it as a loose and ungodly person or at least as one that does amiss in that particular The case is