amiss to declare that no fault is to be found with these Terms of Form and Essential Difference Honey is doubtless Honey by its Form and thus it is that it differs essentially from Salt but this Form or this Essential Difference consists only in the different Configuration of its Parts 'T is this different Configuration which makes Honey to be Honey and Salt to be Salt And though it be accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey or Salt and so to have the Form of Honey or Salt yet it may be said to be essential to Honey or Salt that they may be what they are to have such or such a Configuration in their parts just as the Sensations of Cold of Heat of Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul but only to the Soul which feels them in as much as by these Sensations she is said to feel Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods II. That GOD alone is our true and proper Good III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks I HAVE I think brought sufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice That our Sensations are in the Objects is a most fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philosophy It is my Business at present to bring others drawn from Morality wherein the same Prejudice joyn'd with this other That the Objects of our Senses are the true and sole Causes of our Sensations is most highly dangerous There is nothing so common in the World as to see Men devoted to sensible Goods some love Musick some Banquetting and others have a Passion for other things Now this is the way of Reasoning these Men must have taken to perswade themselves that these Objects are their Goods All the pleasant Tasts we are delighted with in Feasting the Sounds which gratifie the Ear and those other Pleasures we are sensible of upon other occasions are doubtless contain'd in sensible Objects or at least these Objects give us the Sensation of them or lastly are the only means of Conveying them to our Senses Now it is impossible to doubt that Pleasure is good and Pain evil We receive a Conviction from within and consequently the Objects of our Passions are most real goods to which we must cleave if we will be happy This is the Reasoning we generally fall into almost without being aware of it Thus because we believe that our Sensations are in Objects or that the Objects are of themselves capable of giving us the Sensation of them we consider these things as our own Goods though we are infinitely exalted above them since they are able to act only upon our Bodies and to produce some Motion in their Fibres but are incapable of acting upon our Souls or making us sensible either of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her self on occasion of what happens in the Body it is GOD alone who hath that Power And if she be not the Cause of her own Pleasure and Pain according to the Diversity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body as it is most highly probable she is not since she feels Pleasure and Pain without consenting thereunto I know no other Hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof except that of the Author of Nature Certainly it is GOD alone who is our true Good He only is able to fill us with all the Pleasures we are capable of enjoying and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them Such as He has affixt to the Motions which happen in our Body to make us the more sollicitous for its Preservation are very little in themselves very weak as to their Capacity and very short in their Duration Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to we are as it were become their Vassals But those which He shall make His Elect sensible of in Heaven will be infinitely greater since He hath Created us that we might know and love Him For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the greatest Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods GOD being infinitely above all other things the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him will certainly exceed all other Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrac'd touching the Sovereign Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue and more generally in the former than in the other it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reins to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures Now the first cause of their Error is this That judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the real Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation which they naturally had that Pleasure was good for them at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence Whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure they reap'd from sensible things could not exist in those things as their true Causes nor any other way and consequently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd The Stoicks on the other hand being perswaded that sensible Pleasures were only seated in and fitted for the Body and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own plac'd Felicity in Vertue see then the Origine of their Errors Viz. They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul but in the Body only and made use of this their false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain was not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of the Senses were not Good in their own Nature that they were common to Men and Beasts c. Notwithstanding it is easie to see that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things they were in the right in some for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplish'd Vertue that is to say in their Knowledge and Love of GOD and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them Let it then be well remembred That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Troublesome in themselves that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures that we have no reason either to fear or love them but it is GOD alone whom 't is our duty to fear and our duty to love since 't is only He that has Power
which all the things and words they see and hear stand in to one another For though these things depend mostly on the Memory yet 't is very evident they make great use of their Reason in the manner of their Learning their Language But since that Aptness and Facility there is in the Fibres of a Child's Brain to receive the Pathetick Impressions of sensible Objects is the cause of our judging them incapable of Speculative Science it is easie to be redressed For it must be acknowledg'd that were the Fears Desires and Hopes of Children removed or prevented were they never caus'd to suffer Pain and removed as far as possible from their little Pleasures they might be taught as soon as they could speak things most difficult and abstract or at least sensible Mathematicks Mechanicks and such like Sciences as are necessary in the conduct of their Life But they have but little concern for applying their Minds to abstract Sciences whilst they are hurried with Desires or molested with Fears which is worth while to be well considered For as a Man of Ambition who had just lost his Estate or Honour or was suddenly rais'd to an unexpected Preferment would not be in a Capacity of resolving Metaphysical Questions or Aequations of Algebra but only to do those things to which he was influenced by his present Passion So Children in whose Brain an Apple or a Sugar-plumb makes as deep an Impression as a great Post a Title or Preferment in that of a Man of Forty Years old are not qualified to attend to abstracted Truths that are taught them So that we may affirm there is nothing so opposite to Children's Advancement in Science as those continual Diversions we give them as Rewards and the Pains we constantly are inflicting and threatning them withal But that which is infinitely more considerable is that the fears of Correction and the desires of sensible Gratifications which fill the Capacity of a Child's Mind utterly alienate him from the sense of Piety and Religion Devotion is still more abstract than Science it has less of the relish of corrupted Nature in it The Mind of Man is strongly enough inclin'd to Study but has no Inclination to Piety at all If then great Agitations will not give us leave to Study though we Naturally find Pleasure in it how is it Possible for Children whose Thoughts are continually intent and busied about sensible Pleasures wherewith they are rewarded and sensible Pains with which they are affrighted to preserve amongst all these Avocations a Liberty of Mind to relish the things belonging to Religion The Capacity of the Mind is very strait and limited 't will contain but a little furniture and when once 't is full it has no farther room for any Novel Thoughts unless it empties it self first of the former to receive them But when the Mind is filled with sensible things it does not evacuate it self at its Pleasure In order to conceive this it must be considered that we are all incessantly carried towards Good by our Natural Inclinations and that Pleasure being the Character whereby we distinguish it from Evil Pleasure must unavoidably be more our concern and business than all things besides Pleasure therefore being conjoyn'd to the use of Sensible things because they are the Goods of the Body of Man there is a kind of necessity these Goods should fill up the whole extent of our Mind till GOD diffuses some bitterness upon them which creates in us a dislike and aversion by given us through his Grace a Sensation of those Heavenly Delights which extinguish all Earthly Enjoyments Dando menti Coelestem delectationem quâ omnis terrena delectatio superatur But because we are as much inclin'd to fly Evil as to love Good and Pain is the Character which Nature has affix'd to Evil all that has been said of Pleasure ought in a contrary sense to be understood of Pain Seeing therefore the things which make us sensible of Pleasure and Pain fill the capacity of the Mind and 't is not in our Power to quit them and to be unconcern'd about them when we wou'd 'T is plain that we cannot give Children a relish of Piety no more than we can any other Men unless we begin according to the Precepts of the Gospel with a Deprivation of all those things which affect the Senses and promote great Desires and Fears Since all the Passions obnubilate and extinguish Grace and that internal Delectation which GOD makes us sensible of in our Duty The least Children are instructed with Reason no less than perfect Men though they want Experience They have too the same Inclinations though they are carried by them unto different Objects They should then be accustomed to follow the conduct of Reason since they have it in them and they ought to be excited to their Duty by a dexterous management of their good Inclinations 'T is the way to extinguish their Reason and to debauch their best Inclinations to hold them to their Duty by sensible Impressions They seem to be in the performance of their Duty but they are only so in shew and appearance Vertue is not at the bottom of their Heart or Mind their Moral or their Intellectual Part They know Vertue very little but they love it much less Their Minds abound with nothing but Fears and Desires with Aversions and sensible Fondnesses which they cannot get rid of to come to the use of their Liberty and Exercise of their Reason Thus Children who are Educated in that dis-spirited and slavish manner grow harden'd by degrees and become insensible to all the Sentiments of an Honest Man and a Christian which insensibility cleaves to them all their day And when they are in hopes of securing themselves from the Lash by their Authority or their management they give themselves up to every thing that flatters their Concupiscence and their Senses because indeed they know no other Goods than the Goods of the Senses It is true there are some particular Junctures in which it is necessary to instruct Children by their Senses but this ought never to be done but where Reason is defective They ought at first to be perswaded by Reason of what their Duty is and if they have not Light enough to discover their Obligations to it it seems best to let them alone for some time For this would not be to instruct them to force them upon an External Performance of what they do not conceive their Duty Since 't is the Mind which ought to be instructed and not the Body But if they refuse to do what Reason tells them they ought to do they are no longer to be born with But rather Severity should be used to some excess For in such Conjunctures He that spares his Son according to the Wise Man has a greater degree of hatred than of love for him If Chastisements be not instructive to the Mind nor conducive to the love for Vertue they
necessary Truths contradict them or disabuse them and they fly out in a Passion In the fifth place Because much Incense of Applause is usually given them in all their Imaginations though never so false and remote from common Sense and such as differ from their Opinion though only to defend undeniable Truths are rally'd and ridicul'd And 't is the fulsome Flatteries of those about them that strengthen them in their Errours encourage that illegitimate Esteem of themselves and set them up for unappealable Judges of all things In the sixth place They dwell only upon Sensible Notions as fitter for common Conversation and to keep up the Esteem of Men than the pure and abstract Ideas of the Mind which we employ in the finding out of Truth Lastly Those who aspire to any Dignity strive as much as possible to accommodate and demean themselves to the Measure and Capacity of others because nothing provokes Mens Envy and Aversion like the pretending to uncommon Notions Rare it is for Men whose Minds and Hearts are taken up with the Thoughts and Desires of making their Fortunes to be able to discover hidden Truths but when they do they abdicate them out of Interest and because the Defence of them will not accord with their Ambition A Man must side commonly with Injustice to become a Magistrate Solid and uncommon Piety is a frequent Bar to a Benefice and the generous Love of Truth often deprives Men of the Pulpit it should be taught in All these Reasons in conjunction extremely subject Men to Errour and incapacitate for the Discovery of occult Truths such as are exalted above others by their Honours Birth and Fortune or who are only intent upon making Establishments and raising Estates For among the things that are requisite to the avoiding Errour in Questions any whit abstruse there are two especially not easie to be met with in the Persons foremention'd viz. Attention of Mind to go to the bottom of Things and Retention not to judge of them with too much Precipitation Those very Men who are Elected for the Instructing others and who should have no other Aim or Interest than the qualifying themselves for that purpose commonly grow Erroneous as soon as they take Publick Employments either because having but little time to themselves they cannot give Attention and Application to things that require much or that being strangely ambitious of being thought Learned they confidently pronounce of all things without Reserve and are impatient either of Opposition or Instruction CHAP. X. Of the Love of Pleasure with regard to Morality I. That Pleasure is to be shunn'd though it make us happy II. It ought not to carry us to the loving Sensible Goods WE have treated in the three last Chapters of the Inclination we have for the Preservation of our Being and shewn how it occasions us to fall into several Errours We shall now speak to That we have for our Well-being that is for Pleasures and whatever makes us more happy or content or is thought capable of doing it And we will attempt to discover the Errors that spring from this Inclination There is a Tribe of Philosophers that endeavour to persuade the World That Pleasure is no Good nor Pain an Evil that 't is possible to be happy in the midst of most violent Pains and miserable in the midst of the greatest Pleasures As these Philosophers are very Pathetical and Imaginative they carry away weak Minds which give way to the Impression their Discourse produces in them For the Stoicks are somewhat Visionary and Visionists are vehement and so easily imprint on others the false Sentiments they are themselves prepossess'd with But because there is no Conviction against Experience and internal Conscience or Sensation all these pompous and magnificent Reasons which dazle and stagger the Imaginations of Men vanish with all their Gaudery and Lustre as soon as the Soul is touch'd with any sensible Pleasure and Pain And those who have plac'd all their Confidence in this false Persuasion of their Mind find themselves upon the least Assault of Vice destitute of Wisdom forceless and unnerv'd they are sensible they were deceiv'd and find they are vanquish'd If the Philosophers cannot give their Disciples Strength to Conquer their Passions they should at least forbear to seduce them and make them fancy they have no Enemies to Assault Things should be spoken as they are Pleasure is always a Good and Pain always an Evil But it is not always for our Good to enjoy Pleasure and 't is sometimes advantageous to suffer Pain But to make my Meaning more intelligible we must know First That none but GOD is powerful enough to act upon us and to produce in us the Sense of Pleasure and Pain For 't is manifest to every Man that consults his Reason and despises the Reports of Sense that 't is not the Sensible Objects that really act upon us nor is it any more the Soul that produces in her self her Pain and Pleasure occasionally from them Secondly That in ordinary Procedure no Good is to be given but to encourage us to or recompence us for some good Action nor any Evil to be afflicted but either to prevent a wicked Action or to punish it and therefore since GOD always acts with Order and by the Rules of Justice every Pleasure must incline us to some Good Action or Reward us for it and every Pain avert us from some bad Action or punish us for it Thirdly There are Actions which are good in one sense and evil in another 'T is for instance an evil Action to expose ones self to Death when GOD forbids it but a good when he commands it For all our Actions are good or bad because GOD had commanded or forbidden them by his first General Will which is the Order and Institution of Nature or by his other Wills or particular Commandments which are necessary to its re-establishment I affirm then That Pleasure is always good but that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it and that first Because instead of engaging us to him who alone is capable of causing it it disengages us from him to unite us to the falsly seeming Cause of it it loosens us from GOD to unite us to a vile Creature For though those whom true Philosophy has enlightned think sometimes that Pleasure is not caus'd by External Objects which may in some measure incline them to the acknowledging and loving GOD in all things yet since the Sin the Reason of Man is so feeble and his Senses and Imagination so prevalent over his Mind that they speedily corrupt his Heart whilst he deprives not himself according to the Advice of the Gospel of whatever leads not of it self to GOD. For the best Philosophy is unable to cure the Mind and withstand the Corruptions of Pleasure Secondly Because Pleasure being a Reward it is an Act of Injustice for a Man to produce in his Body those Motions which oblige GOD
is very efficacious to the keeping up Society But there is a strange Corruption in these Inclinations no less than in Friendship Compassion Good-will and others which tend to the uniting Men together What ought to hold up a Civil Society is commonly the Cause of its Disunion and Downfal and not to depart from my Subject is often the Cause of the Communication and Establishment of Errour Among all the Inclinations necessary to Civil Society those which subject us most to Errour are Friendship Favour Gratitude and whatever induce us to speak too advantageously on others in their Presence We set no Bounds to our Love of the Person of our Friends together with them we love whatever after any sort appertains to them and whereas they commonly express their Vehemence and Passion for the Defence of their Opinions they insensibly incline us to believe approve and defend them with as great or greater Obstinacy and Passion than themselves because it would often look but ill in them to be hot in maintaining their Opinions whereas we might defend them without being blam'd for it For in them it would be Self-love in us Generosity Our Affection for other Men proceeds from as many Accounts as they may please and serve us several ways Likeness of Humours of Inclinations Employments their Air their Behaviour their Vertue Estate the Affection or Esteem they express for us the Services they have formerly done or those we hope from them and many other particular Reasons determine us to love them If it fortune then that any one of our Friends that is some Person who has the same Inclinations an handsome Deportment delightful Discourse a vertuous Repute or is of great Quality who testifies an Esteem and Affection for us who has done us any former Service or from whom we hope any future or in fine whom we love for any other particular Reason If such a Person I say chances to advance any Proposition we greedily embrace it without consulting our Reason We maintain his Opinion insollicitous for the Truth of it and even sometimes against the Conviction of our Conscience according as we are determin'd by either the Obscurity and Confusion of our Mind the Corruption of our Heart or the Advantages we hope to reap from our False Generosity There is no need of bringing particular Examples of what I say since we rarely can be in Company an Hour together without observing several if we make but a little Reflexion Favour and Laughter according to the Common Saying are seldom on the side of Truth but almost always on the side of those we love 'T is a Well-bred and Obliging Gentleman that speaks he is certainly therefore in the right If what he says be only probable it 's look'd upon as true if absolutely impertinent and ridiculous it will at least amount to a Probability If it be a Man that loves me esteems me has done me some Kindness or is dispos'd or capacitated to do it has maintain'd my Opinion on other Occasions I shall be both ungrateful and unwise if I oppugn his or even fail to applaud him Thus Truth is sported with and made to truckle to our Interest and we caress the false Opinions of each other A worthy Man ought not to take it ill to be inform'd or instructed if it be done by the Rules of good Manners but if our Friends are disgusted when we modestly represent to them their Mistake we must permit them to love themselves and their Errours since they will have it so and because we have no Power to command them nor to change their Mind But a true Friend ought never to approve the Errours of his Friend for we ought to consider that we do them greater Injury than we imagine when we defend their Opinions without distinction Our Applauses serve only to swell their Heart and strengthen them in their Errours whereby they grow incorrigible and act and decide at last as if they were infallible Whence comes it that the most Rich the most Powerful the most Noble and generally all that are above others believe themselves commonly infallible and deport themselves as if they had more Reason than Men of a Lower and Meaner Condition but from a servile Approbation indifferently given to all their Thoughts So likewise the Approbation we give our Friends insensibly leads them to believe themselves wiser than others which makes them arrogant presumptuous and imprudent and obnoxious to the grossest Errours without perceiving them For which Reason it is that our Enemies often do us better Service and open our Mind more by their Oppositions than our Friends by their Applauses because the former keep us to our Guard and make us give heed to what we advance which one thing suffices to acquaint us with our Ramblings but the latter lull us to sleep and give us an ungrounded Confidence that makes us Vain and Ignorant Men should never therefore admire their Friends and submit to their Opinions out of an Affection as they ought not out of Disaffection to oppose their Enemies But they ought to divest themselves of the Spirit of Flattery and Contradiction that they may grow sincere and approve the Evidence of Truth where ever they find it We ought moreover to fix it well in our Mind that most Men are dispos'd to Flatter or Compliment us through a kind of Natural Inclination either to shew their Parts or to obtain the good Favour of others from the Hope of a Return or lastly out of a kind of Invidiousness and Raillery And we ought never to let our Brains be turn'd with any thing they can say to us Is it not a thing of daily Practice to see Men that are unacquainted cry up each other to the Heavens upon the very first Intercourse And what more common than for Men to give excessive Praises and to express even Extatick Admiration to a Person upon a Publick Performance even in the Company of those with whom they have ridiculed him just before Whenever a Man cries out and turns pale with Admiration as if astonish'd at what he hears 't is no good Proof that the Speaker utters Wonders but rather that he has a flattering Auditory that he has Friends or it may be Enemies that give themselves diversion That he talks in an engaging strain that he is Rich or Powerful or if you will 't is a good Proof that his Discourse is founded on the confus'd and obscure but very moving and agreeable Notions of the Senses or that he has a lively Imagination since Praises are bestow'd on Friendship Riches Honours Probabilities but rarely upon Truth 'T will perhaps be expected that having treated in general of the Inclinations of the Mind I should now descend to an exact Discussion of all the particular Motions it is sensible of upon the Sight of Good and Evil viz. That I should explicate the Nature of Love Hatred Joy Sorrow and all the Intellectual Passions whether General or Particular
us The second is a New Determination of the Motion of the Will towards that Object provided it be or seem to be a Good Before that View the Natural Motion of the Soul was either undetermin'd that is to say she was carried towards Good in general or it otherwise determined by the knowledge of some particular Object But in the very instant of the mind 's perceiving that Relation of the new Object to it self that general Motion of the Will is forthwith determin'd conformably to the perception of the Mind The Soul advances near that Object by her Love that she may relish it and discover her good in it through a sensible delectation which the Author of Nature affords her as a Natural Reward of her Inclination to Good She judged that that Object was a Good by an abstracted and unpathetick Reason but she persists in the persuasion of it through the Efficacy of Sensation and the livelyer that Sensation is the stronger is her adhesion to the Good that seems to be the Cause of it But if that particular Object be considered as Evil or able to deprive us of some Good there happens no New Determination in the Motion of the Will but only the Motion towards the Good oppos'd to that seemingly evil Object is augmented which augmentation is greater or lesâ—er as the Evil seems to be more or less formidable to us For indeed we hate only because we love and the Evil that is without us is judg'd no farther Evil than with reference to the Good of which it deprives us So that Evil being consider'd as a privation of Good to fly from Evil is to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to tend towards Good and therefore there happens no new determination of the Natural Motion of the Will at the presence of an unwelcome Object but only a Sensation painful distasteful or imbitter'd which the Author of Nature inflicts on the Soul as a pain naturally consequent to her being depriv'd of Good Reason alone had not been sufficient to carry her to it wherefore this painful and vexing Sensation is superadded to quicken her Thence I conclude that in any Passion whatsoever all the Motions of the Soul towards Good are the Motions of Love But as we are affected with divers Sensations according to the various Circumstances that attend the View of Good and the Motion of the Soul towards it so we come to confound our Sensations with the Commotions of the Soul and to imagine as many different Motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Upon this head it must be observed that Pain is a true and real Evil and no more the Privation of Pleasure than Pleasure the Privation of Pain for there is a great difference betwixt not feeling or being depriv'd of such a Sensation of Pleasure and the actual enduring of Pain So that every Evil is not precisely so because it deprives us of Good but only that Evil as I have explain'd that is without us or is not a Modification of our Soul Nevertheless as by Goods and Evils we commonly understand things good or evil and not the Sensations of Pleasure and Pain which are rather the natural Tokens by which the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil it may be said methinks without Equivocation that Evil is nothing but the privation of Good and that the natural motion of the Soul that removes us from Evil is the same with that which carries us to good for in brief all natural Motion being an Impression of the Author of Nature whose acting centers in himself and who can incline us only towards himself The true Motion of the Soul is always essentially the Love of Good and but accidentally an Aversion from Evil. I grant that Pain may be consider'd as an Evil and in that sense the Motion of the Passions which is stir'd up by it is not real since we never will Pain and though we positively will the absence of Pain yet 't is only because we positively will the Preservation or Perfection of our Being The third thing to be observ'd in every Passion is the Sensation that attends them the Sensation of Love Hatred Desire Joy Sorrow which are all different in the different Passions The fourth thing is a new Determination of the course of the Animal Spirits and Blood to the outward and inward parts of the Body Before the View of the Object of the Passion the vital Spirits were dispers'd throughout the whole Body for the preservation of all its parts in general but at the appearance of that new Object all this Order and Oeconomy is disturb'd and most part of the Spirits are thrown into the Muscles of the Arms Legs Face and other exteriour parts of the Body to put them in a disposition suitable to the ruling Passion and to give it such a gesture and motion as are necessary for the obtaining or avoiding the imminent Good or Evil But if its own Forces are insufficient for its occasions these same Spirits are distributed in such a manner as make it machinally utter certain words and cries and which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an air and comportment as is capable of actuating others with the same Passion it self is possess'd with For Men and Beasts having a mutual cohesion by the Eyes and Ears when any one of them is in a violent Commotion it necessarily affects the Spectators and Hearers and naturally makes upon their Imagination such an Impression as troubles them and moves them to preserve it As to the rest of the Animal Spirits they violently descend into the Heart Lungs Liver Spleen and other Viscera thence to draw contributions and to hasten those parts to send forth a sufficient and timely supply of Spirits necessary to preserve the Body in that extraordinary Contention The fifth thing is a sensible Commotion of the Soul who feels her self agitated by an unexpected overflow of Spirits This sensible Commotion of the Soul always attends that Motion of the Spirits that the Soul may participate of all that affects the Body even as the Motion of Spirits is raised in the Body when the Soul is carried toward any Object For the Body and Soul being mutually united their Motions are reciprocal The sixth thing are several Sensations of Love Hatred Joy Desire Sorrow that are produced not by the Intellectual view of Good or Evil as those that have been already mention'd but by the various concussions that are caused in the Brain by the Animal Spirits The seventh thing is a certain Sensation of Joy or rather internal Satisfaction which detains the Soul in her Passion and assures her that she is in the fittest State she can be in reference to the Object she considers This internal satisfaction attends all the Passions whatsoever whether they proceed from the sight of an Evil or from the sight of a Good Sorrow as well as Joy This satisfaction makes
of our Heart This is the utmost possible Blindness 't is according to St. Paul the temporal Punishment of Impiety and Idolatry that is to say the Desert of the most enormous Crimes And herein indeed the greatness of this terrible Punishment consists that instead of allaying the Anger of God as do all the others in this World it continually exasperates and encreases it till that dreadful Day comes wherein his just Wrath shall break out to the Confusion of Sinners Their Arguings however seem likely enough as being agreeable to common Sense countenanc'd by the Passions and such I am sure as all the Philosophy of Zeno could never overthrow We must love Good say they Pleasure is the Sign which Nature has affix'd to it to make it known and that Sign can never be fallacious since God has instituted it to distinguish Good from Evil. We must avoid Evil say they again Pain is the Character which Nature has annex'd to it and a Token in which we cannot be mistaken since it was instituted by God for the distinguishing it from Good We feel Pleasure in complying with our Passions Trouble and Pain in opposing them and therefore the Author of Nature will have us to give up our selves to our Passions and never to resist them since the Pleasure and Pain wherewith he affects us in those Cases are the infallible Criterion of his Will And consequently it is to follow God to comply with the Desire of our Hearts and 't is to obey his Voice to yield to the Instinct of Nature which moves us to the satisfying our Senses and our Passions This is their way of Reasoning whereby they confirm themselves in their infamous Opinions And thus they think to shun the secret Reproofs of their Reason and in Punishment of their Crime God suffers them to be dazzled by those false Glimpses delusive Glarings which blind them instead of inlightning them and strike them with such an insensible Blindness as they do not so much as wish to be cured of it God delivers them to a reprobate Sense he gives them up to the Desires of their corrupt Heart to shameful Passions to Actions unworthy of Men as the Holy Scripture speaks that having fatned themselves by their Debauches they may to all Eternity be the fit Sacrifice of his Vengeance But let us solve this Difficulty which they offer The Sect of Zeno not knowing how to untie the Knot has cut it by denying that Pleasure is a Good and Pain an Evil But that 's too venturous a Stroke and a Subterfuge unbecoming Philosophers and very unlikely I am sure to convert those who are convinc'd by Experience That a great Pain is a great Evil. Since therefore Zeno and all his Heathen Philosophy cannot solve the Difficulty of the Epicures we must have recourse to a more solid and inlightned Philosophy 'T is true that Pleasure is Good and Pain Evil and that Pleasure and Pain have been join'd by the Author of Nature to the Use of certain Things by which we judge whether they are Good or Evil which make us persue the Good and fly from the Evil and almost ever follow the Motions of the Passions All this is true but relates only to the Body which to preserve and keep long a Life much like to that of Beasts we must suffer our selves to be ruled by our Passions and Desires The Senses and Passions are only given us for the good of the Body sensible Pleasure is the indelible Character which Nature has affix'd to the Use of certain Things that without putting our Reason to the trouble of examining them we might presently imploy them for the preservation of the Body but not with intent that we should love them For we ought only to love those Things which Reason undoubtedly manifests to be our Good We are Reasonable Beings and God who is our Sovereign Good requires not of us a blind an instinctive a compell'd Love as I may say but a Love of Choice an enlightned Love a Love that submits to him our whole Intellectual and Moral Powers He inclines us to the Love of him in shewing us by the Light that attends the Delectation of his Grace that he is our Chief Good but he moves us towards the Good of the Body only by Instinct and a confused Sensation of Pleasure because the Good of the Body is undeserving of either the Attention of our Mind or the Exercise of our Reason Moreover our Body is not our selves 't is something that belongs to us and absolutely speaking we cannot subsist without it The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our Good for Bodies can be but the Good of Bodies We may make use of them for the Body but we must not be taken up with them Our Soul has also her own Good viz. the only Good that is superiour to her the only one that preserves her that alone produces in her Sensations of Pleasure and Pain For indeed none of the Objects of the Senses can of themselves give us any Sensation of them it is only God who assures us of their Presence by the Sensation he gives us of them which is a Truth that was never understood by the Heathen Philosophers We may and must love that which is able to make us sensible of Pleasure I grant it But by that very Reason we ought only to love God because he only can act upon our Soul and the utmost that sensible Objects can do is to move the Organs of our Senses But what matters it you 'll say from whence those grateful Sensations come I will taste ' em O thou ungrateful Wretch know the Hand that showres down Good upon thee You require of a just God unjust Rewards You desire he should recompence you for the Crimes you commit against him and even at the very time of committing them you make use of his immutable Will which is the Order and Law of Nature to wrest from him undeserved Favours for with a guilty Managery you produce in your Body such Motions as oblige him to make you relish all sorts of Pleasures But Death shall dissolve that Body and God whom you have made subservient to your unjust Desires will make you subservient to his just Anger and mock at you in his turn 'T is very hard I confess that the Enjoyment of Corporeal Good should be attended with Pleasure and that the Possession of the Good of the Soul should often be conjoin'd with Pain and Anguish We may indeed believe it to be a great Disorder by this Reason that Pleasure being the Character of Good and Pain of Evil we ought to possess a Satisfaction infinitely greater in loving God than in making use of sensible Things since He is the true or rather the only Good of the Mind So doubtless will it be one Day and so was it most probably before Sin entred into the World At least 't is very certain that before the Fall Man suffered
Motions unless it be for the Preservation of Life that sensible Pleasure bears the like Proportion to Good as Sensations to Truth and that as our Senses deceive us in Matters of Truth so do likewise our Passions in point of our Good that we ought to yield to the Delectation of Grace because it evidently moves us to the Love of a true Good is not followed with the secret Reproaches of Reason as the blind Instinct and confused Pleasure of the Passions but is always attended with a secret Joy suitable to the good State we are in Last of all since God alone can operate upon the Mind of Man he cannot find any Happiness out of God unless we would suppose that God rewards Disobedience or that he commands to love more what less deserves to be loved CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Vnion with God by the Knowledge of Truth and the Love of Vertue and contrariwise that its Imperâ—ection proceeds only from its Dependency on the Body caused by the Disorder of the Senses and Passions THE shortest Reflection is sufficient to let us know that the Good of the Mind must needs be something of a Spiritual Nature for our Bodies are much inferiour to our Mind they are unable to act upon it by their own strength they cannot immediately unite themselves to it lastly â—hey are not intelligible of themselves and therefore cannot be its Good whereas Spiritual things being intelligible of their own Nature can be united to the Mind and consequently be its Good provided they be Superiour to it For that a thing may be the Good of the Mind it must not only be Spiritual as it self but it must also be Superiour to it that it may act upon it enlighten it and reward it since otherwise it cannot make it perfecter and happier nor by consequence be its Good Now of all Intelligible or Spiritual things God alone is thus Superiour to the Mind whence it follows That nothing but God alone either is or can be our true Good and that we cannot become either more happy or more perfect but by enjoying him Every one is persuaded that the Knowledge of Truth and the Love of Vertue make the Mind moâ—e perfect and that the Blindness of the Mind and the Depravation of the Heart lessens its natural Perfection The Knowledge of Truth and the Love of Vertue cannot then be any thing else but the Union of the Mind to God or if I may so speak a Possession of him and on the conâ—rary the Blindness of the Mind and the Depravation of the Heart can be nothing else but a separation of the Mind from God and its Union with something Inferiour to it viz. with the â—â—dy since that is the only Union that can make it imperfect and unhappy And therefore to know the Truth or to know things as far as they are agreeable to the Rules of Truth is really to know God And to love Vertue or to love things as far as they are amiable or according to the Rules of Vertue is to love him The Mind is situate as it were betwixt God and Bodies betwixt Good and Evil between that wâ—iâ—h enlightens and that which blinds it that which rules and that which misrules it that which can make it perfect and happy and that which can render it imperfect and miserable When it discovers some Truth or sees things as they are in their own Nature it sees them in the Ideas of God that is discovers them by a clear and distinct view of what is in God representing them For as I have observed elsewhere the Mind of Man contains not in it self the Perfections or Ideas oâ— all the Beings it is capable of perceiving 't is not the universal Being and therefore cannot see iâ— it self such things as are distinguish'd from it self It does not instruct or enlighten it self by consulting with it self as being neither Perfection nor Light to it self it stands in need to be enlightned by the immense Light of Eternal Truth Thus the Mind by knowing Truth is united to God and in some manner knows and possesses him We may not only say That a Mind perceiving the Truth partly knows God who comprehends it we may add also That in some sort it knows things as God himself knows them For the Mind knows their true Relations and so does God the Mind sees them in viewing the Perfections of God that represent them God perceives them the same way for God neither perceives by Sense nor Imagination but sees in himself as being the Intellectual World the Corporeal and Sensible World which he has created 'T is the same with the Mind in its Knowledge of Truth it comes not to it by Sensation or Imagination for Sensations and Pantasms offer but false Representations of things to the Mind so that whosoever discovers the Truth sees it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which Good sees it for this material and sensible World is not intelligible of it self so that the Mind sees in the Light of God as does God himself all the things which it plainly sees though it sees them very imperfectly and so very differently from God in that respect Thus when the Mind sees Truth it not only is united to God possesses and beholds God but also sees Truth in one sense as God himself sees it So when we love according to the Rules of Vertue we love God for by regulating our Love according to these Rules the Impression of Love towards him which he continually produces in our Heart is not turn'd off by free Will nor chang'd into Self-Love The Mind at that time freely follows the Impression which God gives and God never giving any Impression which does not tend towards him since he only acts for himself it is plain That to love according to the Rules of Vertue is to love God But 't is not only to love God 't is likewise to love as God loves He loves himself only and his Works but because they relate to his Perfections and proportionably to the degrees of Conformity they have with them It being the same Love by which God loves himself and whatever he has made or done To love according to the Rules of Vertue is to love God only to love him in all things and to love things proportionably as they partake of his Goodness and Perfections since this is to love them according to the degree they are lovely In short 't is to love by the Impression of the same Love by which God loves himself for 't is the Love by which God loves himself and whatever else with relation to him that animates us when we love as we ought whence I conclude That we then love as God loves It is therefore evident That the Knowledge of Truth and the regular Love of Vertue constitute all our Perfection since they are the costomary Attendants on our Union with God which also
a great Number but also differ by the different Perceptions and Judgments that cause or accompany them Those different Judgments of the Soul concerning Good or Evil produce different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently cause in the Soul Sensations that are not altogether like Whence it proceeds that some Passions are observ'd to differ from each other though their Commotions be not different In the mean while the Commotion of the Soul being the chief Thing observable in every Passion 't is better to refer them to the Three original Passions in which those Commotions are very different than to treat confusedly and disorderly of them in reference to the different Perceptions we may have of the Good and Evil that raises them For we may have so many different Perceptions of Objects in reference to Time to our selves to what belongs to us to the Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or Choice that it is wholly impossible to make an accurate Enumeration of them When the Soul perceives any Good which she cannot enjoy it may perhaps be said that she hopes for it though she desires it not However 't is plain that this her Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment And therefore 't is the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good of which we take the Enjoyment to be possible that adopts Hope into a true Passion It is the same when Hope grows into Security For the latter is a Passion only because of the Commotion of Joy that mixes with that of Desire since the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as certain is a Passion but as much as it is a foregoing Taste of the Good that affects us Last of all When Hope diminishes and is succeeded by Despair 't is visible again that the latter is a Passion but because of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as unattainable would not be a Passion should we not be actuated by that Judgment But because the Soul never looks upon Good or Evil without any Commotion and even without any Alteration in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment that produces it confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil For the Words Hope Fear Boldness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Grief and the Names of all other Passions in common use are short Expressions made up of several Terms by which can be explain'd in particular whatever Passions contain We understand by the Word Passion the View of the Relation any thing has to us the Commotion and Sensation of the Soul the Concussion of the Brain and the Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion and Sensation of the Soul and lastly a Sensation of Pleasure that always attends the Passions and makes them grateful All these we commonly understand by the Name of Passions but sometimes it only signifies either the Judgment that raises it or only the Commotion of the Soul or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood or lastly something else that accompanies the Commotion of the Soul It is very useful for the Knowledge of Truth to abridge Ideas and Expressions but that often causes some considerable Errour especially when those Ideas are abridg'd by popular Use For we ought never to abridge them but when we have made them very clear and distinct by a great Application of Mind and not as 't is ordinarily done as to Passions and sensible Things when we have made them familiar to us by their Sensations and the mere Action of the Imagination which easily imposes on the Mind There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind and the Sensations or Commotions of the Soul Pure Ideas are clear and distinct but 't is a hard Task to make them familiar whereas Sensations and Commotions are intimate with us but can never plainly and distinctly be known Numbers Extension and their Properties may be clearly known but unless we make them sensible by some expressive Characters 't is very difficult to represent them to our Mind because whatever is abstracted moves us not On the contrary the Commotions and Sensations of the Soul may easily be represented to the Mind though the Knowledge we have of them be but confused and imperfect for all the Words that raise them lively strike the Soul and make it attentive Thence it proceeds that we often imagine we rightly understand some Discourses that are altogether incomprehensible and that reading some Descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we persuade our selves that we perfectly comprehend them because they strongly move us and that all the Words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul The hearing of the very Names of Shame Despair Impudence c. straightway excite in our Mind a confused Idea and obscure Sensation that powerfully influences us and because this Sensation is very familiar to us and presents it self without any Trouble or Endeavour of the Mind we fancy it to be clear and distinct These Words however are the Names of compounded Passions and by consequence abridg'd Expressions which popular Use has made up of many confused and obscure Ideas Seeing we are oblig'd to employ such Terms as common Use has approv'd of the Reader should not be surpriz'd to meet with Obscurity and sometimes with a sort of Contradiction in our Words And if it were but consider'd that the Sensations and Commotions of the Soul that answer to the Terms us'd in such Discourses are not wholly the same in all Men because of their different Dispositions of Mind they would not so easily condemn us when they could not enter into our Opinions This I say not so much to prevent Objections against my self as that we may understand the Nature of the Passions and what we are to think of Books treating of such Matters After so many Cautions I shall not stick to say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive namely Desire Joy and Sorrow and that it is specially by the different Judgments the Soul makes of Goods and Evils that such as relate to the same Primitive Passion differ from each other For Instance I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution that is the Mean betwixt them both are Species of Desire That Boldness Courage and Emulation c. have a greater Relation to Hope than to all others and that Timidity Cowardise Jealousie c. are Species of Fear I may say that Alacrity and Glory Kindness and Gratefulness are Species of Joy caused by the Sight of the Good that we know to be in us or in those to whom we are united as Derision or Jeering is a sort of Joy commonly arising at the Sight of the Evil that befalls those from whom we are separated Lastly That Distaste
and greatness worthy of the Wisdom and the Power of its Author Man then may be consider'd after his Sin without a Restorer but under the Expectation of one In considering him without a Restorer we plainly see he ought to have no Society with God that that he is unable of himself to make the least approaches to him that God must needs repel him and severely use him when he offers to leave the Body to unite himself to him that is to say that Man after the Sin must lose the power of getting clear of sensible impressions and motions of concupiscence He ought likewise to be annihilated for the foremention'd Reasons But he expects a Restorer and if we consider him under that Expectation we see clearly that he must subsist He and his Posterity whence his Restorer is to arise and thus it is necessary that Man after his Sin preserve still the power of diversely moving all those parts of the Body whose motion may be serviceable to his Preservation 'T is true that Men abuse daily the power they have of producing certain motions and that their power of moving their tongue for Example several ways is the cause of innumerable Evils But if it be minded that power will appear absolutely necessary to keep up Society to comfort one another in the Exigences of thiâ— present Life and to instruct them in Religion which affords hope of a Redeemer for whom the World subsists If we carefully examine what are the motions we produce in us and in what parts of our Body we can affect them we shall clearly see that God has left us the power of our Body no farther than is necessary to the preservation of Life and the cherishing and upholding civil Society For example the Beating of the Heart the Dilatation of the Midriff the peristaltick motion of the Guts the Circulation of the Spirits and Blood and the diverse motions of the Nerves in the Passions are produc'd in us without staying for the order of the Soul As they ought to be much what the same on all occasions nothing obliges God to submit them now to the will of Man But the motions of the Muscles imploy'd in stirring the Tongue the Arms and Legs being to change every minute according to the almost infinite diversity of good or evil Objects all about us it was necessary these motions should depend on the will of Men. But we are to remember That God acts always by the simplest ways and that the Laws of Nature ought to be general and that so God having given us the power of moving our Arm and Tongue he ought not to take away that of striking a Man unjustly or of slandering or reproaching him For if our natural Faculties depended on our Designs there would be no Uniformity nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature which however must be most simple and general to be answerable to the Wisdom of God and suitable to Order So that God in pursuance of his Decrees chuses rather to cause the Materiality of Sin as say the Divines or to make use of the Injustice of Men as says one of the Prophets than by changing his Will to put a stop to the Disorders of Sinners But he defers his revenging the injurious Treatment which they give him till the time when it shall be permitted him to do it without swerving from his immutable Decrees that is to say when Death having corrupted the Body of the voluptuous God shall be freed from the necessity he has impos'd on himself of giving them Sensations and Thoughts relating to it OBJECTION against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles Original Sin not only enslaves Man to his Body and subjects him to the Motions of Concupiscence but likewise fills him with Vices wholly Spiritual not only the Body of the Infant before Baptism being corrupted but also his Soul and all his Faculties stain'd and infected with Sin Though the Rebellion of the Body be the principle of some grosser Vices such as Intemperance and Vncleanness yet it is not the Cause of Vices purely Spiritual as are Pride and Envy And therefore Original Sin is something very different from Concupiscence which is born with us and is more likely the Privation of Grace or of Original Righteousness ANSWER I acknowledge That Children are void of Original Righteousness and I prove it in shewing That they are not born upright and that God hates them For methinks one cannot give a clearer Idea of Righteousness and Vprightness than to say a Will is upright when it loves God and that it is crooked and perverse when it draws towards Bodies But if by Righteousness or Original Grace we understand some unknown Qualities like those which God is said to have infus'd into the Heart of the first Man to adorn him and render him pleasing in his sight it is still evident that the Privation of this is not Original Sin for to speak properly that Privation is not hereditarily transmitted If Children have not these Qualities 't is because God does not give 'em them and if God does not bestow them 't is because they are unworthy to receive them and 't is that Vworthiness which is transmitted and which is the Cause of the Privation of Original Righteousness And so that Vnworthiness is properly Original Sin Now this Unworthiness which consists as I have shewn in this That the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupt and their Heart bent upon the Love of Bodies this I say is really in them 'T is not the Imputation of the Sin of their Father they are actually themselves in a disorder'd State In like manner as those who are justify'd by JESUS CHRIST of whom Adam was the Type are not justify'd by Imputation But are really restor'd to Order by an inward Righteousness different from that of our LORD though it be he that has merited it for them The Soul has but two natural or essential Relations the one to God and the other to her Body Now 't is evident That the Relation or Union which she has with God cannot vitiate or corrupt her and therefore she is neither vicious nor corrupt at the first instant of her Creation but by the relation she has to her Body Thus one of the two must needs be said either that Pride and other which we call Spiritual Vices can be communicated by the Body or that Children are not subject to them at the moment of their Birth I say at the moment of their Birth for I do not deny but these ill Habits are easily acquir'd Though pure Intelligences had no other relation than to God and at the instant of their Creation were subject to no Vice yet they fell into Disorder But the Cause of it was their making a wrong use of their Liberty whereof Infants have made no use at all For Original Sin is not of a free Nature But to come to the Point I am of Opinion That they err who think that the Rebellion
likewise that it is not Voluntary But as long as there is any Obscurity in the Subject we consider and we are not perfectly assur'd we have discover'd all that 's necessary to the Resolution of the Question as it most commonly happens in those which are abstruse and difficult and include many Relations we are free to deny our Consent and the Will may still command the Vnderstanding to apply it self to something new Which makes us not so averse to believe that the Judgments we form on such kind of Subjects are Voluntary Howbeit the generality of Philosophers suppose that even the Judgments we form upon things obscure are no ways Voluntary and will have the Consent to Truth in general to be an Action of the Vnderstanding which they call Assensus to distinguish it from the Consent to Good which they attribute to the Will and term Consensus but see the cause of their Distinction and Mistake Which is That in this state of Life we often evidently perceive some Truths without any reason to Doubt of them and so the Will remains not indifferent in the Consent it gives to Truths so manifest as has been just explain'd But 't is not so in point of Good there being no Particular Good we know but we have reason to doubt whether we ought to Love it Our Passions and Inclinations which we naturally have for Sensible Pleasures are though confus'd yet through the Corruption of our Nature very strong Reasons which render us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God himself And so we are manifestly sensible of our Indifference and are inwardly convinc'd we make use of our Liberty in our Loving GOD. But we do not in like manner apprehend that we imploy our Liberty in Consenting to Truth especially when accompanied with full Evidence and Conviction which induces us to believe our Consent to Truth is not Voluntary As if it was necessary our Actions should be indifferent to become Voluntary and that the Blessed did not love God most Willingly without being diverted from it by something or other in like manner as we Consent to that evident Proposition that twice 2 are 4 without being diverted from the Belief of it by any shew of a contrary Reason But to the end we may distinctly discover what the difference is between the Consent of the Will to Truth and its Consent to Goodnesâ— it is requisite to know the difference which is found between Truth and Goodness taken in the ordinary acceptation and with reference to us That difference consists in this That we have an Interest and Concern in Goodness but Truth does not at all affect us For Truth consists only in the Relation which two things or more haâ—â— between them but Goodness consists in the Relation of agreement which things have with our selves which is the reason that the Will has but One Action in respect of Truth which is its Acquiescence in or Consent to the Representation of the Relation which is betwixt things and that it has two in respect of Goodness namely its Acquiescence in or Consent to the Relation of agreement the thing has with our selves and its Love or Tendency towards that thing which actions are extreamly different though they are usually confounded For there is a great deal of difference betwixt simply Acquiescing and being carried to love the thing which the Mind represents since we often Acquiesce in things we could gladly wish were not and which we have an aversion to Now upon a due consideration of things it will visibly appear That 't is ever the Will which Acquiesces not only in things if they be agreeable to it but the Representation of things and that the reason of the Will 's Acquiescing always in the Representation of things of the clearest Evidence is as we have already said because there is no farther Relation in them necessary to be consider'd which the Vnderstanding has not already throughly discuss'd Insomuch that 't is as it were necessary for the Will to leave off disquieting and tireing it self in vain and to rest satisfy'd in a full assurance that it is not deceived since there is nothing left to put the Vnderstanding upon a fresh Inquiry This is especially to be observ'd that in the Circumstances we are under we have but a very imperfect Knowledge of things and consequently there is an absolute necessity we should have this Liberty of Indifference whereby we are impower'd to withold our selves from giving our Consent For the better discovering this Necessity it must be consider'd that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations to the imbracing Truth and Goodness so that the Will never reaching after things but what the Mind has some notice and apprehension of must needs pursue that which has the Face and Appearance of Truth and Goodness But because all that has the look of Truth and Good is not always what it appears to be it is plain that if the Will had not this Liberty but must infallibly and necessarily have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an Appearance of Truth and Goodness it would have almost ever been Deceived Whence probably it might be concluded That the Author of its Being was the Author of its Errors and Seducements We have therefore a Liberty given us by God that we might avoid falling into Error and all the Evils consequent upon Errors by not resting with a full Assurance upon Probabilities but only upon Truth that is by commanding the Mind with an indefatigable Application to examine every thing till it has fully enlightned and unravell'd all that comes under its Examinations For Truth generally comes attended with Evidence and Evidence consists in a clear and distinct View of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are necessary to give a certain and well-grounded Judgment The use then we should make of our Liberty is to IMPLOY IT AS FAR AS IT WILL GO That is never to consent to any thing whatever until we are as it were forc'd to 't by the secret Reproaches of our Reason To submit our selves to the false Appearance of Truth is to inslave our selves contrary to the Will of God but honestly to yield to the inward Reproaches of our Reason which accompany the Denial of our Submission unto Evidence is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth which speaks within us Here then are Two Rules founded upon what I have been saying which are the most necessary of all others both for Speculative Sciences and Morality and which may be look'd on as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences The First which respects the Sciences is this A Man should never give an entire Consent but only to Propositions which appear so evidently true that he cannot deny it them without feeling an internal Pain and the secret Vpbraidings of his Reason that is without being plainly convinc'd he would make an ill use of his Liberty in case he should refuse to give his Consent
the Christians is quite different from that they deny not but Pain is an Evil and that it is hard to be separated from those things to which Nature has united us or to rid our selves from the Slavery Sin has reduc'd us to They agree that it is a Disorder that the Soul shall depend upon her Body but they own withall that she depends upon it and even so much that she cannot free her self from that Subjection but by the Grace of our Lord. I see saith St. Paul another Law in my Members warring against the Law of my Mind and bringing me into Captivity to the Law of Sin which is in my Members O wretched Man that I am who shall deliver me from the Body of this Death the Grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord shall do it The Son of God his Apostles and all his true Disciples command us above all to be Patient because they know that Misâ—ry must be the Expectâ—tion and Portion of the Righteous In short true Christians or true Philosophers say nothing but what is agreeable to sound Reason and Experience whereas all Nature continually impugns the proud Opinion and presumption of the Stoicks The Christians know that to free themselves in some manner from the Subjection they are under they must endeavour to deprive themselves of all those things that they cannot enjoy without Pleasure nor want without Pain it being the only means to preserve that Peace and Liberty of Mind which they owe to their Deliverer's Beneficence On the contrary the Stoicks following the false Notions of their Chimerical Philophy imagine that they are wise and happy and that they need but think upon Vertue and Independency to become Vertuous and Independent Sound Reason and Experience assure us that the best way not to feel the smart of stinging is to shun the Nettle but the Stoicks say Sting me never so much I shall by the strength of my Mind and the help of my Philosophy raise my self so high above my Body that all your pricking shall not reach me I can demonstrate that my Happiness depends not upon it and that Pain is not an Evil and you shall see by the Colour of my Face and by the whole deportment of my Body that my Philosophy has made me invulnerable Their Pride bears up their Courage however it hinders not but that they should suffer Pain with Vexation and be really miserable so that their Union with their Body is not destroyed nor their Pain vanished but all this proceeds from their Union with other Men strengthened by the desire of their Esteem which in some manner withstands the Union of their Soul with their Body The sensible view of the Spectators to whom they are united stops the Course of the Animal Spirits that should follow upon the pain and blots out the Impression they would make upon their Face for was there no body to look on them that Phantasm of Constancy and Liberty of Mind would presently vanish So that the Stoicks do only in some degree withstand the Union of their Soul to their Body by making themselves greater Slaves to other Men to whom they are united by a drift of Glory And 't is therefore an undoubted truth that all Men are united to all sensible things both by Nature and their Concupiscence which may sufficiently be known by Experience and of which all the Actions of Mankind are sensible demonstrations though Reason seems to oppose it Though this Union be common to all Men 't is not however of an equal Extent and Strength in all for as it proceeds from the Knowledge of the Mind so it may be said that we are not actually united to unknown Objects A Clown in his Cottage does not concern himself with the Glory of his Prince and Country but only with the honour of his own and the Neighbouring Villages because his Knowledge does not extend farther The Union with such Objects as we have seen is stronger than the Union to those we have only imagin'd or heard relation of because by Sensation we are more strictly united to sensible things as leaving deeper Impressions in our Brain and moving the animal Spirits in a more violent manner than when they are only imagin'd Neither is that Union so strong in those that continually oppose it that they may adhere to the Goods of the Mind as it is in those who suffer themselves to be carried away and inslav'd by their Passions since Concupiscence increases and strengthens that Union Last of all the several Employments and States of this Life together with the various dispositions of divers Persons cause a considerable difference in that sensible Union which Men have with Earthly Goods Great Lords have greater Dependencies than other Men and their Chains as I may call them are longer The General of an Army depends on all his Souldiers because all his Souldiers reverence him This Slavery is often the Cause of his Valour and the desire of being esteem'd by those that are Witnesses of his Actions often drives him to Sacrifice to it more sensible and rational desires The same may be said of all Superiours and those that make a great Figure in the World Vanity being many times the Spur of their Vertue because the love of Glory is ordinarily stronger than the love of Truth I speak here of the love of Glory not as a simple Inclination but a Passion since that love may become sensible and is often attended with very lively and violent Commotions of the Animal Spirits Again the different Ages and Sexes are primary Causes of the difference of Passions Children love not the same things as adult and old Men or at least love them not with that Force and Constancy Women depend only on their Family and Neighbourhood but the dependencies of Men extend to their whole Country because 't is their part to defend it and that they are mightily taken up with those great Offices Honours and Commands that the State may bestow upon them There is such a variety in the Employments and Engagements of Men that it is impossible to explain them all The disposition of Mind in a Married Man is altogether different from that of a single Person for the former is in a manner wholly taken up with the care of his Family A Fryar has a Soul of another make and depends upon fewer things than the Men of the World and even than Secular Ecclesiasticks but he is stronger fastned to those few things One may argue in the same manner concerning the different States of Men in general but the little sensible engagements cannot be explain'd because they differ almost in every private Person it often hapning that men have particular Engagements altogether opposite to those that they ought to have in reference to their condition But though the different Genius and Inclinations of Men Women Old Men Young Men Rich Poor Learned and Ignorant in short of all the different Sexes Ages and
Motion in every thing And though they have no distinct Idea of it yet by reason of the Corruption of their Heart they willingly put it in the room of the true God imagining that it performs all the Wonders that they see occur CHAP. V. An Explication of the Principles of the Peripatetick Philosophy in which is shewn that Aristotle never observed the Second Part of the General Rule and his Four Elements with the Elementary Qualities are examined THat the Reader may compare the Philosophy of Des Cartes with that of Aristotle it will be convenient to set down in few words what the latter has taught concerning Elements and Natural Bodies in general which the most learned believe he has done in his Four Books Of the Heavens For his Eight Books of Physicks belong rather to Logick or perhaps to Metaphysicks than to Natural Philosophy since they consist of Nothing but loose and general terms that offer no distinct and particular Idea to the Mind Those Four Books are entituled Of the Heavens because the Heavens are the chief amongst the simple Bodies which he treats of That Philosopher begins his Work by proving that the World is perfect in the following manner All Bodies have three Dimensions and cannot have more because the number three comprehends all according to the Pythagoreans But the World is the Coacervation of all Bodies and therefore the World is perfect By that ridiculous Proof it may also be demonstrated that the World cannot be more imperfect than it is since it cannot be composed of parts that have less than three Dimensions In the Second Chapter he first supposes some Peripatetick Truths as that all Natural Bodies have of themselves the force of moving which he proves neither here nor elsewhere but on the contrary asserts in the First Chapter of his Second Book of Physicks that to endeavour to prove it is absurd because 't is evident of it self and that none but those who cannot distinguish what is known of it self from what is not insist upon proving plain by obscure things But it has been shewn elsewhere that it is altogether false that natural Bodies should have of themselves the force of moving and it appears evident only to such as follow with Aristotle the Impressions of their Senses and make no use of their Reason Secondly He says that all local Motion is made in a Line either direct or circular or composed of both but if he would not think upon what he so rashly proposes he ought at least to have open'd his Eyes that he might see an Infinite number of different Motions which are not made of either the right or circular Or rather he ought to have thought that the Motions composed of the direct may be infinitely varied when the compounding Motions increase or diminish their swiftness in an infinite number of different ways as may be observed by what has been said before There are says he but two simple Motions the right and the Circular and therefore all the others are composed of them But he mistakes for the Circular Motion is not simple since it cannot be conceived without thinking upon a Point to which it relates and whatever includes a Relation is relative and not simple This is so true that the Circular Motion may be conceived as produced from two Motions in a right Line whose Swiftness is unequal according to a certain Proportion But a Motion composed of two others made in a right Line and variously increasing or diminishing in swiftness cannot be simple Thirdly He says that all the simple Motions are of three sorts one from the Centre the other towards the Centre and the third about it But 't is false that the last viz. the Circular Motion should be simple as has been already said And 't is false again that there are no simple Motions besides upwards and downwards For all the Motions in a right Line are simple whether they approach to or remove from the Centre the Poles or any other Point Every Body says he is made up of three Dimensions and therefore the Motion of all Bodies must have three simple Motions What Relation is there betwixt simple Motions and Dimensions Besides every Body has three Dimensions and none has three simple Motions Fourthly He supposes that Bodies are either simple or composed and calls simple Bodies those that have the force of moving themselves as Fire Earth c. adding that the compounded receive their Motion from the compounding But in that sense there are no simple Bodies since none have in themselves any Principle of their Motion there are also none composed since there are no simples of which they should be made and so there would be no Bodies at all What Fancy is it to define the simplicity of Bodies by a Power of moving themselves What distinct Ideas can be fixed to the Words of simple and composed Bodies if the simple are only defined in Relation to an Imaginary moving force But let us see what Consequences he draws from those Principles The Circular Motion is simple The Heavens move Circularly and therefore their Motion is simple But simple Motion can be ascribed only to a simple Body that is to say to a Body that moves of it self And therefore the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the four Elements that move in right Lines 'T is plain enough that such Arguments contain nothing but false and absurd Propositions Let us examine his other Proofs for he alleadges a great many shameful and nonsensical ones to prove a thing as useless as it is false His second Reason to shew that the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the Four Elements supposes that there are two sorts of Motion one natural and the other violent or against Nature But 't is sufficiently plain to all those that judge of things by clear and distinct Ideas that Bodies having not in themselves any such Principle of their Motion as Aristotle pretends there can be no Motion violent or against Nature 'T is indifferent to all Bodies to be moved or not either one way or another But this Philosopher who judges of things by the Impressions of the Senses imagines that those Bodies which by the Laws of the Communications of Motions always place themselves in such or such a Situation in reference to others doe it of their own accord and because it is most convenient for them and best agrees with their Nature Here follows the Argument of Aristotle The Circular Motion of the Heavens is natural or against Nature If natural the Heavens are a simple Body distinguished from the Elements since the Elements never move circularly by a natural Motion If the Circular Motion of the Heavens is against their Nature they will be some one of the Elements as Fire Water c. or something else But the Heavens can be none of the Elements as for instance if the Heavens were Fire that Element tending naturally upwards the Heavens would
finite or infinite Time but what is only infinite in one sense is neither finite nor infinite and therefore nothing can subsist in that Manner This is the way of arguing with the Prince of Philosophers and the Genius of Nature who instead of discovering by clear and distinct Ideas the true Cause of natural Effects lays the Foundation of a Pagan Philosophy upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses or upon such Ideas as are too general to be useful to the Search after Truth I condemn not Aristotle for not knowing that God has created the World in Time to manifest his Power and the Dependency of Creatures and that he will never destroy it to shew that he is immutable and never repents of his Designs But I may find fault with him for proving by trifling Reasons that the World is of Eternal Duration For though he be sometimes excusable as to the Opinions he maintains yet he 's for the most part intollerable as to the Reasons he alledges when he treats of Subjects that are somewhat difficult What I have already said may perhaps be sufficient to evince it though I have not related all the Errours I have met with in the Book whence the former are extracted and that I have endeavour'd to make him speak plainer than is customary with him But for an entire and full Conviction that the Genius of Nature will never discover the secret Springs and Contrivances of it it will be convenient to shew that his Principles upon which he reasons for the Explication of natural Effects have no Solidity in them 'T is evident that nothing can be discover'd in Physicks without beginning with the most simple Bodies that is with the Elements into which all others are resolv'd because they are contain'd in them either actually or potentially to speak in a Peripatetick Stile But no distinct Explication of those simple Bodies can be found in the Works of Aristotle whence follows that his Elements being not clearly known 't is impossible to discover the Nature of Bodies which are compos'd of them He says indeed that there are four Elements Fire Air Water and Earth but he gives no clear Manifestation of their Nature by any distinct Idea He pretends not that those Elements are the Fire Air Water and Earth that we see for if it were so our Senses at least would afford us some Knowledge of them I grant that in several places of his Works he endeavours to explain them by the Qualities of Heat and Cold Moisture and Dryness Gravity and Levity But that Method is so impertinent and ridiculous that it cannot be conceiv'd how so many Learned Men could be satisfied with it which I proceed to demonstrate Aristotle pretends in his Book of the Heavens that the Earth is the Centre of the World and that all Bodies which he is pleas'd to call simple because he supposes that they are mov'd by their own Nature must move by simple Motions He asserts that besides the Circular Motion which he pretends to be simple and by which he proves that the Heavens which he supposes to move circularly are a simple Body there are two other simple Motions one downwards from the Circumference to the Centre and the other upwards from the Centre to the Circumference That those simple Motions are proper to simple Bodies and consequently that Earth and Fire are such Bodies one of which is altogether heavy and the other perfectly light But because Gravity and Levity may be proper to a Body either wholly or in part he concludes that there are two other Elements or simple Bodies one of which is partly light and the other partly ponderous viz. Water and Air. Thus he proves that there are four Elements and no more It is plain to all those who examine the Opinions of Men by their own Reason that all those Propositions are false or cannot at least be taken for clear and undeniable Principles which may afford very plain and distinct Ideas whereon to lay the Foundation of Natural Philosophy 'T is certain that nothing can be more absurd than to establish the Number of Elements upon the imaginary Qualities of Heaviness and Lightness saying without any farther Proof that some Bodies are ponderous and others light of their own Nature For if any thing may be asserted without Proof it may be said that all Bodies are naturally heavy and endeavour to approach the Centre of the World as the place of their Rest. And the contrary may be asserted too viz. That all Bodies are light of their own Nature and tend to rise to the Heavens as to the place of their greatest Perfection For if you object to him who maintains the Gravity of Bodies that Fire and Air are light he needs but answer that Fire and Air are not light but that being less ponderous than Earth and Water they seem to us to be light And that it goes with those Elements as with a piece of Wood that appears light upon the Water not by reason of any natural Levity since it falls down when in the Air but because Water being heavier seizes the lower Place and forces it to ascend On the contrary If you object to him that defends the natural Levity of Bodies that Earth and Water are ponderous he will likewise answer That those Bodies seem heavy because they are not so light as those that surround them That Wood for instance appears to be ponderous when in the Air not because of its natural Gravity since it ascends when in the Water but because it is not so light as Air. And therefore 't is ridiculous to suppose as an undeniable Principle that Bodies are either light or heavy of their own Nature it being on the contrary evident that none has the Force of moving it self and that 't is indifferent to be moved either upwards or downwards to the East or to the West to the South or to the North or in any other possible manner But let us grant to Aristotle That there are four Elements such as he pretends two of which are heavy viz. Earth and Water and the two other light of their own Nature viz. Fire and Air what Consequence may be drawn from thence for the Knowledge of the Universe Those four Elements are not the visible Fire Air Water and Earth but something quite different which we know neither by the Senses nor by Reason having no distinct Idea of them Let all natural Bodies be compos'd of them since Aristotle has said it But the Nature of those Compounds is still unknown and cannot be discovered but by knowing the four Elements or the simple Bodies of which they are made since the Composed is known only by the Simple Fire says Aristotle is light by its own Nature the ascending Motion is simple Fire is therefore a simple Body since Motion must be proportion'd to the Moveable Natural Bodies are compos'd of simple there is then Fire in all natural Bodies but a Fire