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A45646 A refutation of the objections against moral good and evil in a sermon preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul, October the third, 1698 : being the seventh of the lecture for that year, founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq. / by John Harris. Harris, John, 1667?-1719. 1698 (1698) Wing H854; ESTC R23964 16,783 31

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A REFUTATION of the Objections Against MORAL GOOD and EVIL IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul October the Third 1698. BEING The Seventh of the LECTURE for that Year Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq By JOHN HARRIS M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY LONDON Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin at the King 's Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1698. JEREM. ix 24. Let him that glorieth glory in this that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am the Lord who exercise loving kindness judgment and righteousness in the earth for in these things do I delight saith the Lord. IN these Words as I have already shewed there are these two Things considerable I. A Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes II. An Account of some of those Attributes which he exerciseth in the Earth and in which he delights On the former of these I did in my last Discourse endeavour to remove the Objections against the Attributes of God in general and to shew that they are plainly discoverable by Reason and agreeable to Philosophical Truth As to the Second The Attributes of God mentioned here by the Prophet and which he is said to delight to exercise in the Earth I think it not necessary to discourse particularly of them having in my last Sermon shewn how They as well as all other Excellencies and Perfections which we can discover in the Creatures must of necessity be in the Divine Nature in the greatest Perfection because they are all derived from Him But that which I judge will be more proper to be done now as being agreeable to my Design of Answering the Atheistical Objections in their Natural Order will be from hence to Remove two Great Barrs to the true Knowledge of God and of his Attributes which Sceptical and Unbelieving Men have here placed in the Way For indeed till this be done no true Notion of God or of his Perfections can be established in Mens Minds nor any Ground fixt whereon to build a Rational Belief of Natural or Revealed Religion or any kind of Worship of the Supream and Almighty Being And these Two great Objections of our Adversaries are 1. That there is in reality no such thing as Moral Good and Evil but that all Actions are in their own Nature indifferent 2. That all things are determined by Absolute Fatality And that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are Necessary Agents without having any Power of Choice or any real Liberty in their Nature at all These are two of the strongest Holds of Atheism and Infidelity which 't is therefore absolutely necessary to batter down and demolish And these do in some sense communicate with and run into one another and indeed the former plainly follows from the l●tter But however they being very frequently made use of distinctly by the Opposers of Religion and the former being maintained by some Persons whom I cannot find do hold the latter I shall endeavour to Refute them severally Beginning with that which I have first proposed viz. That there is in reality no such things as Moral Good and Evil but that all Actions are in their own Nature purely Indifferent And this Position our Adversaries are very express in maintaining as will sufficiently appear by their own Words The Virtues that Men extoll so highly saith Mr. Blount are not of equal weight and value in the Balance of Nature but that it may fare with them as with Coin made of Copper or Leather which tho' it may go at a high Rate in one Country by Proclamation yet will it not do so in another for want of Intrinsick Value 'T is plain enough what he means by this but how this Assertion will agree with his allowing some things to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good and Just in their own Nature as he doth in his Account of the Deists Religion let the Admirers of those Contradictory Oracles of Reason consider But indeed 't is no new or uncommon thing with these kind of Men to make Contradictory Propositions subservient to their Purposes as they often do in this very Case For when you upbraid them with a Disbelief of Revelation they will say that 't is enough for any Man to live up to the Principles of Natural Religion and to adhere inviolably to all things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for those are things that are Obligatory on all Mankind and not like Revealed Truths mere Political and Topical Institutions Whereas at another time if you tell them of some gross Immoralities that they are Guilty of and which are plainly contrary to Reason and to the clearest Light of Nature Then they will answer you That Good and Evil are only Thetical things which receive their very Essence from Human Laws or Customs only but that by Nature nothing is either Good or Bad and that all Actions are alike and Indifferent so hard is it as an Excellent Person observes to contradict Truth and Nature without contradicting ones self But to go on Spinoza takes care to deliver himself very plainly as to this Matter Bonum Malum nihil Positivum in Rebus sc. in se consideratis indicant And in another Place he tells us Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quae fiunt propter ipsos fieri id in unaquàque re proecipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum illa omnia praestantissima aestimare à quibus optimè afficiebantur Unde has formare debuerunt Notiones quibus Rerum naturas explicarunt sc. Bonum Malum Ordinem Confusionem c. And the same thing also he asserts in many other places Mr. Hobbs also expresly maintains That there is nothing simply nor absolutely Good or Evil nor any common Rule about them to be taken from the Objects themselves but only from the Person who calleth that Good which he likes or desires and that Evil which he hates c. Nothing saith he is in its own Nature Just or Vnjust because naturally there is no Property but every one hath a Right to every thing And therefore he defines Justice to be only keeping of a Covenant And in another place he tells us That Good and Evil are only Names that signifie our Appetites and Aversions which in different Tempers Customs and Doctrines of Men are different The same thing he asserteth also in many other places of his Writings And this Doctrine the Translator of Philostratus is so fond of that tho' he be sometimes very desirous of being thought an Original yet he Transcribes this entirely from Mr. Hobbs as indeed Mr. Hobbs according to his usual way had before in a great measure done from Sextus Empiricus who in very many places declares that it was the Opinion of the Scepticks that there was nothing Good or Evil in it self And he endeavours to prove this Point by the very same Arguments which the
are some Stupid and Barbarous People among whom no such thing can be discovered For my part I do most heartily believe that 't is impossible for a Rational and Thinking Mind acting as such to be insensible of the Difference between Moral Good and Evil I cannot Imagine that such a Person can think it a thing indifferent in its own Nature whether he should Venerate Love and Worship the God that made him and from whom he derives all the Good he can possibly enjoy or whether he should Slight Despise Blaspheme or Affront him It seems utterly impossible to me that any thinking and considerate Man should judge it an indifferent thing in its own Nature whether he should honour and reverence his Father or abuse him and cut his Throat or that he can esteem it to be as good and decent a thing to be Ungrateful or Unjust as it is to acknowledge and to return a Kindness to render every one their Due and to behave our selves towards others as we would have them do towards us I do not think that the Instances produced by a late Ingenious Writer of some wild People's exposing their Sick and Aged Parents to die by the Severities of Wind and Weather nor of others who eat their own Children are of force to prove that there is really and naturally no difference between Good and Evil any more than I will believe that he cited those Passages with a design to make the World think so for I think allowing the truth of all these Relations no such Inference can be thence deduced A Practical Principle of the Truth and Power of which a Man may be demonstratively assured may yet be over-born in some Respects by other Opinions which Ignorance and Superstition may have set up in a Man's Mind This Gentleman saith p. 25. Of Human Understanding That a Doctrine having no better Original than the Superstition of a Nurse or the Authority of an Old Woman may be length of time grow up to the dignity of a Principle in Religion or Morality Now should a precarious and wicked Opinion over-rule a Man in one or two particular Cases and carry him against the Rules of Morality will it follow from thence that a Man doth believe those Rules of no Natural Force and that it is an Indifferent thing whether he observe them or not Ought I to conclude that because I have read of a King that Sacrificed his Son to Moloch that therefore he believed it as good and reasonable a thing to burn his Children alive as to preserve take care of them and give them a good Education Certainly 't would be a fairer and more reasonable Inference to conclude that his Reason and Natural Affection was over-power'd by his Idolatrous and Superstitious Opinion and that the reason why he did such a Wicked and unnatural Action was because he expected some very great Benefit for it from the Idol or that he would Inflict some very great Judgment upon him if he did not do it And so in the Cases above-mentioned one may well enough believe that those Barbarous and Inhumane Wretches that Starved their Parents and Eat their Children did not nor could not believe it was as good and reasonable so to do as it would be to preserve them but only that they were under the Power of some Wicked Superstition or Abominable Custom that had unhappily crept in among them which they thought it a greater Evil to break if they thought at all than they did to Act against their Judgment Natural Reason and Affection For this way as he observes 't is easie to imagine how Men may come to worship the Idols of their own Minds grow fond of Notions they have been long acquainted with there and stamp the Characters of Divinity upon Absurdities and Errors c. p. 26. So that I cannot see any Consequence at all in asserting the Non-existence of Moral Good and Evil from a few Barbarous and Ignorant Wretches doing some Actions that bear hard on the Rules of Morality For notwithstanding that they may be lost in a great measure in some places yet these things and many others that might be instanced in do certainly carry such Self-evidence along with them that a free and unprejudiced Mind must needs perceive which way to determine as soon as ever they can be proposed to it and considered of by it For any one in the World that doth but understand the meaning of the Terms in any of the lately mentioned Moral Propositions will be demonstratively assured of the Truth of them And he will see as clearly that God is to be worshipped that Parents are to be honoured and in a word that we ought to do to others as we would be done unto as he assents to the Truth of such Axioms as these That a Thing cannot be and not be at the same Time That Nothing hath no Properties And that the whole is greater than any one and equal to all its Parts taken together For the Reason why all Mankind allow these as first Principles is because their Truth is so very Apparent and Evident that they approve themselves to our Reason at first sight And so I think do all these Great Principles in Morality they certainly affect impartial and considerate Minds with as full a Conviction as any of the former can possibly do And would no more have been denied or disputed than the others are had they not been Rules of Practice and did they not require something to be done as well as to be believed For he that rightly understands what is meant by the words God and Worship will see the Necessary connexion between those Terms or the Truth of this Proposition God is to be worshipped as evidently as he that knows what a Whole and a Part is will see that the Whole must be greater than a Part. And no Proposition in Geometry can be more demonstratively clear than these Moral ones are to Men that are not wilfully Blind and wickedly Prejudiced against such Practical Truths For as one hath well observed Morality may be reckoned among those Sciences that are capable of Demonstration And that these Moral Truths have a stronger connexion one with another and a more necessary Consequence from our Idea's and come nearer to a perfect Demonstration than is commonly imagined insomuch that as he saith in another place They are capable of real Certainty as well as Mathematicks Now if the case be so as most certainly it is it will plainly follow that Those things that do thus demonstratively approve themselves to the unprejudiced Reason of all Mankind must be good and lovely in their own Natures or Morally so antecedent to the Obligation of Human Laws Customs or Fashions of particular Countries And in this plain Distinction between Good and Evil which our Reason when duly used Impowers us thus at first sight to make is founded that which we call Conscience which is a kind of an Internal
just Indignation in us against the offending Person and we cannot avoid being uneasily moved and affected in such Cases While on the contrary a very pleasing Satisfaction of Soul arises in us when we see or hear of an Instance of great Kindness Justice Generosity and Compassion Now this Sympathizing of our Natural Affections with our Reason and their approving and disapproving the very same things that it doth is a very convincing Argument that there is an Essential difference between Actions as to their being Good or Evil and that we have a plain Knowledge of such a distinction For no doubt God implanted these Passions and Affections in our Natures and gave them this Turn which we plainly perceive they have in order to prepare the way for our Reasons more thoroughly assuring us of the Natural Goodness and Excellence of Moral Virtue when it comes to be Ripe and sufficient for that End and in the mean time to keep Children and Young Persons in whom we perceive these Natural Efforts to be very strong by a kind of Anticipation or Natural Instinct from doing such things as their Reason freely exercised will afterwards condemn them for And now upon the whole there being thus plainly proved an Essential and Natural Difference between Moral Good and Evil and that the Reason of all Mankind freely and impartially exercised doth agree in this Point that Morality conduces to the Happiness and Immorality to the Misery of Human Nature We may very justly conclude from hence that all other Rational Agents must judge of Good and Evil after the same manner and plainly distinguish one from the other And they also must Know and Understand that their Perfection and Happiness though they may differ in some Circumstances from us doth consist in Acting according to the Eternal Rules of Right Reason and Moral Virtue For if the Case be not so several Rational Natures all derived from the same Deity may come to make contradictory Judgments even when they Act according to the Great and Common Rule of their Nature But the Principle of Right Reason at this Rate would be the most precarious thing imaginable and Men could never possibly be assured that they were in the Right in any Point or knew any thing at all Assuredly therefore this Great Rule of Right Reason that God hath given his Creatures to govern and direct themselves by is no such uncertain thing is in no respect Contradictory to it self but must be Uniformly and Constantly the same in all Beings that are endowed with it when it is rightly and perfectly followed And from hence also we cannot but conclude that the same Eternal Constant and Uniform Law of Right Reason and Morality that God hath given as an Universal Guide to all Rational Beings must also be in Him in the greatest and most exquisite Perfection And that not only because all Perfections and Excellencies in the Creatures must necessarily be in that First Being from whom they are derived as I have already proved But also that if it were not so God must be supposed to have given us a Rule of Action that is contrary to his own Nature or at least vastly different from it And that he hath contrived our Powers and Faculties so as to deceive us in the most Material and Essential Points and indeed hath lest us no possible way of knowing the Truth of any thing whatsoever For If when as I have shewn above God hath not only fixed in our Natures a Desire of Happiness but also disposed them so that every Power Faculty and Capacity of them convinces us that the Exercise of Moral Virtue is the Way and indeed the only Way to make us entirely happy If I say after all this there be no such things as Moral Virtue and Goodness but that all Things and Actions both in us and the Deity are purely and in their own Natures Indifferent 't is plain Reason is the most ridiculous thing in the World a Guide that serves to no manner of Purpose but to bewilder us in the Infinite Mazes of Errour and to expose us to Roam and Float about in the boundless Ocean of Scepticism where we can never find our Way certainly to any Place nor direct our Course to the Discovery of any Truth whatsoever But this not being to be supposed of the Deity who contains in himself all Possible Excellence and Perfection it must needs be that our Reason will direct us to conclude the Deity also guided and directed in all his Proceedings by the Eternal Rules of Right Reason and Truth and consequently that He will and doth always exercise loving Kindness Judgment and Righteousness in the Earth as the Prophet here speaks And indeed the Hobbian Notion of a Deity guided only by Arbitrary Will Omnipotent without any regard to Reason Goodness Justice and Wisdom is so far from attributing any Perfection to God or as they pretend being the Liberty and Sovereignty of the Deity that it really introduces the greatest Weakness and Folly and the most Brutish Madness that can be for what else can be supposed to be the Result of Irresistible and Extravagant Will pursuing the most fortuitous Caprichio's of Humour without any Wisdom Ends or Designs to Regulate its Motions by And of this the Ancient Heathens were so sensible that they always connected Goodness with the Idea that they had of an Omnipotent Mind's being Supream Lord over all things in the Universe for Mind not guided and directed by Goodness was according to them not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mere Folly and Madness and consequently no true Deity There is a Remarkable Passage of Celsus's to this purpose which though introduced upon another Design yet very clearly shews the Idea that the Heathens had of the Goodness and Wisdom of the Deity God saith he can't do evil things nor will any thing contrary to Nature or Reason for God is not the President or Governour of Irregular or Inordinate Desires nor of erroneous Disorder and Confusion but of a Nature truly Just and Righteous 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Orig. contr Cels. lib. 5. p. 240. Cantabr Excellently to the same Purpose is that Saying of Plotinus The Deity doth always act according to his Nature or Essence and that Nature or Essence discovereth Goodness and Justice in all its Operations for indeed if these things should not be there i. e. in God where can they else be found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 265. Ficin And 't is plain that the Heathens had a true Notion that the Deity must be a Good Just and Righteous Being because several of the old Atheists as Protagoras c. argued against the Existence of a Deity from the Worlds being so ill Made and Ordered as it is and from there being so much Evil and Misery among Mankind as they pretended to find in the World but now there had been no manner of force in this Argument and it had been
Modern Assertors of this Opinion do make use of And tho' Mr. Hobbs boast much of his Notions about these things to be new and originally his own yet 't is plain that it was the Old Atheistick Doctrine long before Plato's Time For he tells us Lib. 2. De Rep. p. 358. That there were a sort of Men who maintained That by Nature Men have a boundless Liberty to act as they please and that in such a state to do that to another which is now called an Injury or a piece of Injustice would be Good tho' to receive it from another would be Evil And that Men did live a good while at this rate but in Time finding the Inconveniencies of it they did agree upon Laws in order to live peaceably and quietly with one another And then that which was enacted by these Laws was called Just and Lawful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is the Principle we see of those Atheistical Men which tho' some of them do now and then take Care to conceal or to express a little cautiously yet they understand one another well enough and so indeed may any one do them that thinks it worth his while to consider seriously of and to search into the Bottom of the Matter And this is truly one of the Great Depths of Atheism and Infidelity 'T is a Principle that when once thoroughly understood and imbibed confirms a Man in the Disbelief of all manner of Religious Obligation For he that hath once swallowed down this abominable Tenet will as some of the lately mentioned Writers discover themselves to do believe nothing of the Deity but that he is Almighty and Arbitrary Power or a Blind fatal and Necessary Agent Either a Being that makes his Will his Law and who is not guided in his Actions or Dispensations by the Dictates of Reason nor by any Rules of Justice and Goodness or else one that properly speaking hath no Ends nor Designs at all but is without any Understanding Freedom of Will Choice or Wisdom one who cannot possibly help doing as he doth but is impelled in every thing by absolute Necessity So that there being as according to these Principles there cannot be no Goodness in the Deity there can be none any where But all Actions antecedent to Human Laws will be Indifferent And the Obligation that Men are under to Human Laws being only as Hobbs saith from Fear of Punishment no doubt a Man of this wicked Perswasion will stick at the Perpetration of no Villany nor Immorality that will any way advantage himself and which he can commit secretly and securely but will pursue his own Private Benefit and Interest the only Good he understands and thinks himself obliged to mind by all possible Means and Endeavours This therefore being the Case before us it will very much concern us to Return a fair Answer to and fully to Refute this Dangerous Objection against all Religion and indeed against the Good and Welfare of all Governments and all Civil Societies and which I wish we had not so much reason to believe is fixt in the Minds of too many amongst us And in order to do this the more clearly and effectually it will be necessary first truly to state the Point and to dis-engage it from some Difficulties and Perplexities which our Adversaries have designedly clouded it withall Say they whatever is the Object of any Man's Desires that he calls Good as also whatsoever is in any respect Beneficial and Advantageous to him And on the other hand that which is hurtful and prejudicial to him and is the Object of his Hatred and Aversion that he calls Evil and so doubtless it is to him Now say they further Since that which may be Good to one Man or desired by him now may be Evil to another or may be the very same Person be hated and shunned at another Time it plainly follows that the Nature of Good and Evil is perfectly precarious and will be as various and changeable as the different Humours and Inclinations of Mankind can make it And thus Mens Actions will be denominated accordingly Every one accounting that a Good one which he likes which promotes his Interest and is conducible to his Advantage And calling that an Evil one which he disapproves of and which is contrary to his Interest and Inclination To all which I say that these Men run their Argument a great way too far and conclude much more from it than the Nature of the thing will bear For allowing as a first Principle that all Men desire Good and that they cannot do otherwise Allowing also that Apparent or seeming Good hath the same Effect as real Good while it is the Object of any particular Man's Desires Nay allowing also this Apparent Good to be a very precarious Thing and to depend very much on the different Humours Tempers and Inclinations of Mankind which is the whole Basis on which these Writers found their Argument I say Granting all this it doth not come up to the Question between us nor form any Real Objection against the natural difference between Good and Evil and the Eternal Obligation of Morality for the Point in dispute is not whether such an Essential and Immutable Difference as this now spoken of be discernible in all the Actions of Mankind for 't is readily allowed that there are a great many Indifferent and which are neither good nor bad in their own Natures but may be either as Circumstances determine This I say is not the Case but whether there be not some such Actions as do plainly discover themselves to the Unprejudiced Judgment of any Rational Man to be Good and Evil in their own Natures antecedent to the Obligation of any Human Laws Or in other Words whether there be not some Actions which do carry along with them such a clear and unalterable Reasonableness and Excellency as that they do approve themselves to be Good and Lovely to any Unprejudiced Mind and consequently Mankind must be under an Universal and Eternal Obligation to perform them and to avoid and shun their Contraries As also whether we have not all the reason in the World to believe that those Actions which the Mind of Man can thus discover to be Morally and Essentially Good are agreeable to the Will of God and directed by it And to conclude that the Deity also acts and proceeds in all Respects according to the same Universal and Eternal Dictates of Reason and is Just and Good Equitable and Righteous in all his Dealings with his Creatures and that he exerciseth these things in the Earth This I take to be the true state of the Case and this is what we Assert and our Adversaries Deny and what I shall now endeavour to prove In order to which it must be allowed in the 1. Place That Man is a thinking Being and hath the Power of Reasoning and Inference It must be allowed also that we are capable of Knowing this
and do most evidently discover such a Power in our selves And since all Intelligent Creatures do naturally desire to be happy we must do so too and consequently endeavour to obtain that Kind of Happiness which is agreeable to our Natures and Faculties i. e. a Happiness that shall relate to our whole Natures and not to the Body only Now the Happiness of any Being consisting in the free and vigorous Exercise of its Powers and Faculties or in the Perfection of its Nature and the Nature of Man being Reason the Happiness of Mankind must consist chiefly in the free and vigorous Exercise of his Reasoning Faculty or being in such a Condition as that we can do all things that are agreeable to and avoid all such things as are disagreeable to it Now all this supposed and granted as I think none of it can be denied it will plainly follow that all such Actions as do Universally approve themselves to the Reason of Mankind and such as when duly examined and considered do constantly and uniformly tend towards and promote the Happiness of Man considered as to his whole Nature and chiefly as to that part of him in which his Nature doth more properly consist which is his Rational and Understanding Faculty Such Actions I say must necessarily be said to be in their own Nature Good and their Contraries must be denominated Evil after the same manner for whatsoever is universally Approved is universally Good to call a thing Good being nothing else but to declare its conducibility to that end it was designed for Now according to our Adversary's Assertion Men call that Good which promotes their own Advantage and Happiness and so no doubt it ought to be esteemed all that they mistake in being that they don't understand wherein their true Happiness consists And therefore if a Thing doth in its own Nature approve it self to the impartial Reason of Mankind and can on due Examination manifestly appear to conduce to the Interest Advantage and Happiness of Human Nature such a thing must be all Rational and thinking Men be pronounced naturally and morally Good and its Reverse Evil in the same manner And that this is the case is Reference to that which is commonly called Moral Good and Evil will appear plain and evident when we shew 2. That there are some Things and Actions which the Free and Unprejudiced Reason of all Mankind cannot but acknowledge to be Comely Lovely and Good in their own Natures as soon as ever it considers them and makes any Judgment about them And this is what is apparent to the Observation of all Men to have been ipso facto done and the Truth of it cannot be denied For have not all Nations in the World agreed in paying some kind of Worship and Veneration to the Deity Was there ever any Place where or Time when Obedience to Parents Gratitude for Benefits received Acts of Justice Mercy Kindness and Good Nature were not accounted reasonable good and decent things I know some Persons have boldly told the World that 't is quite otherwise and that there are some whole Nations so Savage and Barbarous as to have no Notion of any Deity who have no manner of Religious Worship at all and who have no Notion or Idea of Moral Good and Evil But when we consider that these Accounts come originally only from a few Navigators who probably did not stay long enough at those Places to acquaint themselves with the Language of the Natives and who consequently could not have much Knowledge of their Notions Opinions and Customs it will be too hardy a Conclusion to inferr positively that Men pay no Worship to nor have any Idea of a God only because they did not see them at their Devotions And moreover when we have had later and more accurate Accounts of some of those Places which do plainly disprove the former Assertions we have good reason I think to suspend our assent to them And then as to their Notions of Good and Evil it will not follow that they account Stealth and Murder as good and comely things as Justice and Mercy only because these Relators had some of those Acts committed on them For commonly they themselves shew them the way by wickedly Robbing Imprisoning and Murdering them and therefore why the Poor Indians may not return some such Actions upon their Enemies and Invaders without being supposed to be quite Ignorant of the Difference between Good and Evil I confess I do not see And by what too often appears from their own Relations and Books of Travels the Indians have not more reason to be thought Savage and Barbarous than those that give us such an Account of them for by their Actions they discover as poor Notions of Morality as 't is possible for any Men to have But after all suppose the Fact true as I do really believe it is not That there is any Nation of Men so Stupid as to be quite devoid of any Notion of a God or of the Difference between Good and Evil All that can be concluded from hence is that some Men may for want of Commerce with other Parts of the World and for want of Thinking and cultivating and exercising their Rational Faculties degenerate into meer brute Beasts and indeed as such the Relators describe them according to whose Account of them many Species of the Brute Creation discover more Understanding and Act if I may so speak more rationally but it cannot be fairly argued from hence that they never have had any Notion or Belief of these things or that their Reasons will not assent to the Truth of them hereafter when their unhappy Prejudices may be removed and they may become civilized by Commerce Much less sure will this Prove that there is no Notion of a Deity nor of Moral Good and Evil in all the other Parts of the World and amongst Men that can think and do exercise their Reason and Understanding Will not a General Rule stand its Ground tho' there be a few Exceptions against it Will Men take their Measures to judge of Human Nature only from the Monstrosities of it from the worst and most stupid Parts of Mankind Men may as well argue that all Mankind are devoid of Arms or Hands or are Universally Defective in any other Part of the Body because some few are daily born so or rather have them cut off We see there are often Natural Defects in Mens Minds as well as their Bodies and that some are born Fools and Idiots as well as others Blind and Lame and a great many we see make themselves so by their own Fault But sure no one will conclude from hence that all Mankind are Fools and Idiots unless he be a degree worse than one himself And yet Men may even as justly make any of these absurd Inferences as to say there is in the Minds of Men no Power to distinguish a Natural Difference between Good and Evil only because there
ridiculous to bring it if both the Atheistical Proposers of it and their Antagonists had not had a clear Notion that Goodness Justice and Righteousness are naturally included in the Idea of a God Accordingly Vaninus tells us That Protagoras used to say Si Deus non est unde igitur Bona si autem est unde Mala Amph. Aetern Provid p. 90. And the same thing Tully tells us also Lib. De Nat. Deorum that Diagoras used to object against a Deity All which sufficiently proves that they were all Agreed that there was some common Standard of Good and Evil and that the Notion of a Deity had always these Attributes of Goodness and Justice connected with it And if this be so as undoubtedly it is we shall gain one more good Argument for this Natural and Eternal Distinction between Good and Evil and a yet much Nobler Foundation for Morality For we cannot but think that a God who hath Perfect Goodness Justice and Mercy Essential to his Nature and who hath Created several Orders of Being in the World to make them Happy and in order to display his own Glory by his Just Kind and Gracious Dealing with them we cannot but think I say that God will give to those of his Creatures whom he hath endowed with Reason and a Power of Liberty and Choice such a Method of knowing his Will the Way that leads to their own Happiness as that they shall never be Mistaken about it but by their own gross Fault and Neglect And also that he will make the difference between Good and Evil and between Virtue and Vice so plain and conspicuous that no one can miss of the Knowledge of his Duty but by a wilful Violation of those Powers and Faculties God hath graciously implanted in his Nature And all this we see God hath Actually done and indeed much more having over and above connected very great Rewards with the Practice of Virtue and Morality And hath either naturally planted in the Minds of Men a Notion of some future State or else hath given our Nature such a Power as that we may attain to such a Notion for we find a very plain Belief and Expectation of such a State among many of the Ancient and Modern Heathens And over and above all this he hath also given us a clear Revelation of his Will in the Holy Scripture that sure Word of Prophecy and Instruction whereby we may if we will gain a yet plainer Knowledge of our Duty be more perfectly Instructed in the Method of Eternal Salvation and find also much higher Encouragements and much greater Helps and Assistances than we had before in the State of Nature And all this is vouchsafed us to enforce the more effectually the Practice of Moral Virtue and to enable us more perfectly to perform those Things which the Universal Reason of Mankind approves as Good Lovely and Advantageous to Human Nature FINIS Books Printed for Richard Wilkin at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard REmarks upon some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge and to the Natural History of the Earth In Octavo And Immorality and Pride the great Causes of Atheism The Atheist's Objection that we can have no Idea of God Refuted The Notion of a God neither from Fear nor Policy The Atheist's Objections against the Immaterial Nature of God and Incorporeal Substances Refuted A Refutation of the Objections against the Attributes of God in General In Six Sermons Preach'd at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul 1698. being the first Six of the Lecture for that Year Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq By John Harris M. A. and Fellow of the Royal Society Dr. Payne's Discourses on several Practical Subjects In Octavo Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Christian Religion in Two Parts In Octavo A Serious Proposal to the Ladies in Two Parts In Twelves Letters concerning the Love of God between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. Norris A Treatise of the Asthma divided into Four Parts In the First is given a History of the Fits and the Symptoms preceeding them In the Second The Cacochymia that disposes to the Fit and the Rarefaction of the Spirits which produces it are Described In the Third The Accidental Causes of the Fit and the Symptomatic Asthmas are Observ'd In the Fourth The Cure of the Asthma Fit and the Method of Preventing it is Proposed To which is annex'd a Digression about the several Species of Acids distinguish'd by their Tastes And 't is observ'd how far they were thought Convenient or Injurious in general Practice by the Old Writers and most particularly in relation to the Cure of the Asthma By Sir John Floyer In Octavo a Anima Mund. in Or. of Reason p. 117. b Oracles of Reason p. 89. a A. Bish. Tillots Serm. Vol. 4. p. 315. b Op Posthum p. 164. c Ibid p. 37. Vid. etiam p. 171 185 360 c. d Leviath p. 24. e Ibid. p. 63 64. f P. 73. g Ibid. p. 79. h Vid. Hum. Nature p. 38. Element de Cive c. 1. §. 2. a Blount's Life of Apollonius p. 151. b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pyrrh Hypot p. 46. And again p. 147. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c Vid. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. p. 450 451 c. 462 463 c. a Spinoz Op. Posthum p. 36. b ●stendam ad Dei naturam neque Intellectum neque Voluntatem pertinere Ibid. p. 18. Vid. Etiam p. 29. a Essay of Human Understand p. 274 275 b Pag. 284. a Essay of Hum. Understand p. 276. a Mich. 6. 8. Deut. 10. 12. 1 Sam. 15. 22. Psal. 50. 8.