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A16623 A treatise of the nature and vse of things indifferent Tendinge to proue, that the ceremonies in present controuersie amongst the ministers of the gospell in the realme of Englande, are neither in nature nor vse indifferent. Bradshaw, William, 1571-1618. 1605 (1605) STC 3530; ESTC S106384 14,281 36

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A TREATISE OF THE NATVRE AND VSE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT TENDINGE TO PROVE THAT THE CEREMONIES IN PRESENT CONTROVERsie Amongst the ministers of the gospell in the Realme of England are neither in nature or vse Indifferent Iohn 18.23 IF I haue spoken euell beare witnesse of the evell but If I haue spoken well why smitest thou mee Math. 5. 11. Blessed are yee when men reuil you and persecut you say all manner of euel against you for my sake falsly Reioyce and be glad for great is your reward in heauen for so persecuted they the prophets that were before you Printed 1605. THE PRINTER TO THE Reader A Copy of this Treatisse by the prouidence of God cōming into my hand I thought it behoofull for my Countrimen that they should be made acquainted with it that by meanes thereof they might receaue som lyght of the truth for which so many suffer The author whosoeuer hee is hath litle cause to be offended with it The paines he hath taken in it doth perswad me that he cannot but desier the same in it self though daunger want of meanes might hinder him from publishing it But howsoeuer good reader accept it as a testimonie of my vowes for the good of my Countrey the weale whereof shall euer possesse me though I cannot possesse it Farewell A TREATISE OF THINGES Indifferent CAP. 1. Of thinges Indifferent ingenerall A Thing Indifferent in the largest extent of sence is any Mean between two Extreames 2 Extreames properly are the vtvttermost bounds and limitts of any thing being in direct opposition one vnto the other 3 To be a Mean between two Extreames is so to be seated between thē as that it stand equally affected to either inclinnyng no more to the one then to the other 4 Hence the Latins call things indifferēt Res mediae Midle matters And that by reason of that analogie proportion that is between them those things that in phisicall or Mathematicall Dimensions possesse the midle place in any line figure or bodie For that is properly called the midle of any thing that in position being as neere as can be to both extreāes inclineth no more to the one then to the other but is a like equally distant from both 5 And they are therfore called things indifferent because in their relation to those extreames between which they are seated and vnto which they are referred they stand indifferently disposed and affected to either whence of the Greeks they are called Adiaphora vnto which our English terme doth precisly answere For as that is iust the midle of a line that leaueth on both sids so much to either extreame that there is in respect of it no difference between the one and the other but vnto it both are equall a like So those things are called indifferēt properly that without any difference doe equally agree vnto or dissent from those extreames vnto which they haue reference relation 6 By all this it may appeare that things Indifferent are not such simply in thēselues of themselues considered but as they are compared and haue relatiō to the saide opposite extreames as the Center in a circle considered in it selfe and by it selfe is not the midle of any thing but only as it hath reference to the opposite extreames in the Circumference from any of which it is equally distant and in that respect only is it called the mean or midle of such a figure 7 The very essence therefore of a thing indifferent consists in that equall and indifferent reference and relation that it hath to some two opposite terms or extreames vnto which either in sence or reason it is compared and by which onlye it is measured So that it is in the number of those things that in schooles are called relatiues all which haue only but an accidentall being The subiects therof being variable according to the diuers references and respects that they haue vnto diuers things For as a man simply considered in himselfe is nether husband Father nor Master but onely in respect of Wife Child and Seruant And as the same man in diuers respects may be a father a sonne a master and a seruant So nothing is in of it selfe indifferent but only in relation reference to some opposit extreās And those thinges which in some such respect may be indifferent in some other respect may be Extreames Cap. 2. Of things more commonly called Indifferent 1 Though things indifferent may in that former generalitie spread themselues to any mediocritie whatsoeuer Yet Custome the mistris of all speach and language hath restrained limitted the name to such things only as are a Mean between good and euell So that to omitt what in rigorous proprietie of speach may be comprehended vnder the name that is giuen vnto them In commen vse of speach a thing indifferent is onely any mediocritie between good and evell 2 The proper Extreames therefore of things indifferent being good euell they cannot retaininge the nature of their indifference communicate or pertake of either for whatsoeuer standeth equally affected to good and evell cannot in that affection haue in it either good or evell It being impossible that either of the extreames should be foūd in the Mean without distruction of the nature thereof 3 Whatsoeuer then voyde of all euell (a) such they say are our Ceremonies For those things are good that are decent orderly meāes of edification participateth but the least measure of good or voyde of all good pertaketh but the b) Such wee say and haue proued the Ceremonies to be least degree of evell cannot beare the name of a thing indifferent For there can be noe indifferencie in that which inclinneth more to the one extreame then to the other 4 A thing indifferent therfore being a mean between good evell it is So are not these ceremonies so seated between them that it is as far remooued from Good as a thinge not euill can be and as far remoued from evill as a thing not Good can be and as neare vnto Good and evill as any thīg can be that is neither good nor euill So that whatsoever is Indifferent is neither good nor evill whatsoeuer is either good or euill is not Indifferent whatsoever is not Indifferent is either good or evill 5 Things indifferent being equally devided from good evill are in like manner deuided from all the properties of either For euery propertie being vnseperable from that subiect from the nature whereof it springeth noe one can be communicated to any thing but vnto that vnto which the subiect it selfe communicateth it selfe Yf therfore the propertie of any extreame be found in a thing indifferent the extreāe it s●lfe is to be sound likewise therein Which to imagin is as absurd as to looke to find the Circumference of a Circle in the Center 6 No indifferent thing therefore as it is an indifferent thing d But they say
that the Ceremonies in controuersie haue For that which is a grace and ornament to Good maketh the better hath power to make any thing good or evill better or worse For it is the property only of good evill either to make or increase good or evill in any thing 7 That e But such are the ceremonies incōtrouersie which doth more hurt or good then some things that are good or euell is not indifferent but either good or evill for nothing but Good can exceed in goodnes that which is good and nothing but evill can exceed in hurt that which is evil 8 Whatsoeuer f This doe the Ceremonies incontrouersie worketh vpon any affectiō of man stirring vp in him loue hatred delight sorrow zaele mallice envie Ielousie hope feare c. cannot be apprehended as a thing indifferent by him in whom these passiōs are wrought For it is the propertie only of those thīgs that present themselues as good or evil to begett and moue such passions in the soule of man For it is impossible that a thing indifferent apprehēded as a thing indifferent should beget any thinge in the soule of man but Indifferencie and a Stoicall apathie or sencelesnes So that whatsoeuer a g As our Prelates doe the Ceremonies man intirely loueth delighteth in admireth commendeth persueth with zeale cōmaundeth with authoritie Whatsoeuer also a man shall abhorre condeme forbid punish persecute he cānot in any sinceritie affirme that he iudgeth that thing to be indifferent but to be in some degree either good or evell 9 The omission of that is indifferent the commission whereof is indifferent and that whose h Such is the omission of our cerem●n●es said to be and that in a high degree omission is evel is certainly good 10 All the former premises considered this must needes follow That I To commaund our ceremonies is to commaund as the● saye a great good yea a publicke common good to commaund a thing indifferent is to cōmaūd noe good to for bid a thing indifferent is to forbid noe evell k But to vse the ceremonies is to doe much good if they edifie the soule To doe a thing indifferent is to doe no good To forbeare a thing indifferent l None are more spitfully intreated then those that forbeare these ceremonies and therefore sure their in they doe much euell is to doe no evell And therefore to punish for a thing indifferent is to punish for no evell Cap. 3. Of thinges indifferent in speciall 1 The essence of things indifferent consisting in a meere and equall priuation of Good and Evell there cannot be giuen any true kindes or degrees of thē For all priuattiues considered in them selues are of the same nature 2 Though their be no true kindes of them yet they may be varied according to the diuersitie of those extreames with which they are compared And therefore may be distinguished accordinge to the commen distinctions of good and evell 3 That Good that hath not an Evell opposite vnto it in the same kinde cannot be the extreame of any thing indifferent therfore cannot varie distinguish or denominat a thing indifferent as if their be not an opposit colour vnto white then it is impossible to imagine how white should be an extreame to any other colour or any other colour a mean vnto it 4 That which is properly a mean must agree with the extreames in althinges in which the extreames doe agree for example If blacke and white be both of them colours that which is properlie a mean between blacke and white must be a colour also for it were absurd to call any thing but a colour a mean between blacke and white so that the mean followes the common natures qualities of both the extreames for as it is saide before That only is a mean that is not only equally distant from two extreāes but withall is as neere to both as may be which cannot be verified of that mean that shall not be found to agree with the extreams in those things wherin the extreames doe agree within them selues and therefore things indifferent follow their extreames As therfore that cannot be an extreame that hath not in the same kind an opposite so that can be no medium to any extreams that doth dissent from them in that wherein they shall accord and agree So that that denomination and predication that belonges to both extreames belongs also to their mean The mean between two opposite Qualities is a Qualitie betweene two substances a substance between two actions an Action between two goods a Good betweē two evills an Euil betwen two quantities a quantitie c. 5 Hence it will followe that no a All substances therefore are indifferent only by accident in respect of some vse substance as it is a substance can be called thing indifferent because that ther is a no substance that is evill as it is a substance For an indifferent substāce must needs if ther were any such be a mean between a good and an evill substance Yf then there be no evill substaunces it cannot be imagined how there should be any indifferent 6 The like may be saide of all b As also of all artificiall which imitate natures created species and kindes of things cosidered not only in their substances but qualities and dispositions For the voyce of God pronouncynge them all to be good none of them are evell and if none of them be evell none are indifferent For indifferent created things can haue no place either reall or imaginatiue but between a created Good and a created Evell There is therefore no Creature of God nor noe created propertie or qualitie of any creature that is by creation a Thing Indifferent 7 Also vpon the said groūds it apperes that there is noe B And therefore there cannot be made an absolut and perpetuall law concerning any thing vnder the name of indifferent for a law bindeth onlye to good and punisheth for euell and therfore to imagine a law that bindeth to the doinge of a thing indifferent when that thing indifferent turns evel● as the most indifferent thing may then the force of the law ceaseth absolute Indifferent thing because their is no thing in nature either absolutly good or absolutly evell It being impossible that any thinge should be an absolute Mean whose extreames are not absolute for where one extreame is absolute and the other not absolute the Mean cannot be absolute for if it be it enclineth more to one extreame then the other which is to distroye the nature of a thinge indifferent CAP. 4. Of the first distinction of things indifferent 1 Things indifferent therefore being to be distinguished according to those distinctions of Good and Evell that are equally commen to them both we are in the next place distinctly to propounde the same and by them accordingly to distinguish the other 2 First therfore Good Euell is such either in
appearance onely or indeed also Whence arriseth the first distinction of things indiferent for accordinglie some thinges are indifferent in appearaunce onely some indeed 3 A Thing indifferet in appearaunce onely is that which is a mean betweene that Good and Euell a cōsider whether the misticall ●●ts of an Id●latrous religion worship be not at least an evell in appearaunce sheew and therfore cannot be so much as in appea aunce indifferent that is in sheew and appearance onely For that appeareth to be indifferent that being Good or euell indeed appeareth or seemeth to be neither 4 A thing indifferent indeed is that which is a Mean between those thinges that are in truth and veritie Good or evell So that such an indifferent is voyde of all true good b If our Ceremonies were such The Deuill and Antich st all superstitious and lewd persons would not so much dote vpon them and the h●●tes of so many learned and godly men wold not burn against them as they doe and evill 5 As that which is good in appearaūce onely is indeed either euill or indifferent and that which is evell in appearaunce only is indeed either good or indifferent and that which is indifferent in appearaūce only is indeed either good or evill So that which is indifferent indeed is in truth neither good nor euill 6 As c If Turcisme Iudaisme Pag ●isme and the grosest Idolatrye that euer was amongst the Heathen were estab●ished by that lawe and authoritie that these Ceremonies are any poynt or percell therof might bee mainetained by the s●me or the like g●oūds That M. Hooker Couel● W●lkes mainetaine the Indifferencie of ●●es ceremonies And their is noe Arti. of faith and ●●ligion but by the same method that the S●●veo● vseth against the Discipl●ne of other reformed Churche● it may be traduced and oppugned a● most odious gro●se and impious the grossest evill may by meāes of some counterfeit or shadow cast vpon it be in appearaunce the greatest good and the greatest good may be disguised and in sheew transformed into the greatest evill So with much more facilitie may either of them by the wit of man haue cast vpon thē the formes of things indifferent So that there must be speciall heed taken that we admitt not of all things as indifferent indeed that present themselues to vs vnder that name and shape Florentines can disguise collor any thīg and it is now a dayes the common excercise of the greatest wittes of the world to transforme good into Euill Euill into good and both into Indifferent so that in these dayes scant any thing is as it appeares or appeares as it is Cap. 5. The 2 distinction of things Indifferent 1 Good and Euill is eyther Some of our 〈◊〉 Divins think all external things Indifferent which sheews that they that talke most o● them know lest what they are Internall or Externall accordinge to which difference ariseth a second destinction of Things Indifferent 2 An Externall Indifferent is whatsoeuer hath in it nether inward good nor b What inward hurt and evill is in these Ceremonies they best know that are best acquainted with the state of their flocke Euill 3 An Internall Indifferent is whatsoeuer hath in it neither inward good b What inward hurt and evill is in these Ceremonies they best know that are best acquainted with the state of their flocke nor evill 4 Something c The Doctor of Oxford aske what hurt can a wise man see in a square Cap a surplice Inded their is no outwarde hurt or euill in it but it must be considered wether their be not any inward hurt theirin for if it can be proued that by them the soules of many are poysoned with superstitious conceits then it is apparent that they haue inwarde hurt in them Externall Indifferent may haue in it internall good or Euill somethinges internally Indifferent may haue in them outward Good or Euill Chap. 6. OF the 3. distinction of things Indifferent 1 Thirdly Good and Euill is either of it self or by accident which also make the 3 distinction of things Indifferent 2 An Indifferent by accident is a meane between those Extreames that a If it can be proued that these Ceremonies are but evill by accident they being not good of themselues it is enough to argue that they are evill and not indifferent For if many things that are good in themselues be to bee for borne when by some accident they doe hurt much more ought a thing in different when it hurteth though but by accident are Good and Euill by accident and not of thems●lues for that must needs be only accidentally indifferent whose Extreāes by which it is limited and defined are but accidentallie good or Euill so that whatsoeuer is Indifferent onely in relation of some accidentall good or Euill is Indifferent not of it selse but by accident 4 b Ergo their is no thing absolutely Indifferent as our Divines of state dreāe but ●y some circumstaunce of time place person vse it may be either ve●y good or very evill There is nothing so good of it selfe but it may be made Euill by accident nothing so euill of it self but it may become good by accident Nothing so good or Euil but it may become Indifferent by accident nothing so Indifferent of it selfe but it may become Good or Euill by accident 5. Vnto this head may be referred such things as are Indifferent by comparison for as ther are some things good simplie that are Euill in comparison somethings Euill simplie that are good in comparison so also there is some good and Euill that in comparison with others is Indifferent Cap. 7. OF a 4. Destinction of things Indifferent 8 THings are Good or Evill either Actually or Potentially d A possibilitie of evill in a thinge indifferent maketh it evill and worthy to be remoued Nature teacheth to prevent evills and 〈◊〉 a man cannot doe in prevention thereof then to leaue of a thing in it selfe indifferēt which doth no good may doe hurt So are also Things Indifferent 2 A thing actually Indifferent is that which hath in it neither actuall good nor hurt 3 A Thing Potentially Indifferent is that which in act doth either hurt or good though in po●sibilitie it may doe neither 4 There is nothing actually Indifferent but is potentially good or a euill Their is nothing potentially onely indifferent but it is actually either good or euill Th●rfore their is nothing absolutly Indifferent Chap. 8. OF the 5. Distinction of things Indifferent 1 LAstly Good and evill is either Corporall in respect of the body or spirituall in r●spect of the minde In which respect Things Indifferent doe alwayes vary 2 A Thinge Indifferent in respect of the bodie is any such thing that applyed to the bodie doth it neither good nor hurt As that which maketh a man neither rich nor poore Strong nor Weake bewtifull