for the matter or substance of the invisible Agents so fancied they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit but that it was the same with the Soul of man and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame to a man that sleepeth or in a Looking-glasse to one that is awake which men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancy think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines umbrae and thought them Spirits that is thin aeriall bodies and those invisible Agents which they feare to be like them save that they appear and vanish when they please Thus far he In which Period are many strange and forced Expressions without any proof or illustration I will touch them briefly but first I must expound that Phrase used twice by him Invisible Agents by that he must understand the false Gods of the Gentiles for the first Clause that they conceited those false Gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man I yeeld onely more excellent so was every Daemon esteemed and so even those Heroes which were from humanity in the esteeme of Idolatrous men exalted to a coelestial excellency thought of a greater perfection then themselves had in their earthly condition and that they had influence and power over these earthly things and therefore had Prayers and sacrifice offered to them But then let us consider his Philosophy concerning mans soul he saith That these Idolaters who thought their Gods like mans soul thought a mans soul was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame or in a Looking-glasse I am perswaded he dreamt when he writ this he did not so much as see it in any glasse in this world and although it is too much to say he never read it in any book for his Book will witness that many unexpected things are in Books yet I can say that I never heard or read of any Idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the Soul These two things are things of a very little Entity the meanest of Accidents the one a Dreame the work of a sleeping fancie the other the apparition of a Looking-glasse the weak effect of a poor Accident Colour in which it produced it self in a most feeble and weake condition Contrariwise the soul of man is the most excellent and substantial part in the most excellent Creature man the Author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attaine unto and all this affirmed by these Idolaters in their Philosophical Books Sect. 5. But he seems to give a reason for it thus which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancie think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines Umbrae I cannot conceive to what this Relative Which looks by the preceding words it should be referred to the Dreames or Image in a Looking-glasse but by the consequent words it seems to look further to the Invisible Agents for no man was ever so foolish to think that Dreams or the Image in a Looking-glasse are real substances nor yet is it true of one piece of them which is the Image in the Looking-glasse to say it is a Creature of the fancy for the Image is there whether the fancy conceit it so or no. But then to take this word Which as it relates to the invisible Agents which the words following implie and therefore call them Ghosts no man ever called the image in a Looking-glasse a Ghost now then in this Sense although a strange perturbed one he saith that men not knowing these Gods of theirs those invisible Agents to be nothing but Creatures of the fancy called them Ghosts I beleeve if they had known them to be Creatures of the fancy they would not have so called them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines and Umbrae Certainly I am perswaded that the Latines did never call their Gods Imagines or Umbrae This is a most perplexed discourse I know not how to make sense of it nor I beleeve he himself for mark he goes on and thought them Spirits that is thin aerial bodies Consider the relative Them what doth he meane by it Their Gods those Invisible Agents That cannot be for the following words and these Invisible Agents which they feared to be like them Now if by them before he meant these Invisible Agents he could not say that they thought them like themselves but for the other mentioned before the Dreames or Images in a Glasse no man ever thought to be Spirits or aerial bodies But he puts a difference betwixt Spirits and Ghosts or Imagines or Umbrae or I know not what how that they apaear and vanish when they please and it seems the Ghosts did not this I beleeve is not delivered by any I am confident by none of his enemies that are studied in Schoole and Vniversity-Learning but thus he builds Castles in the aire and I was about to say fights against them but he leaves them upon these weak foundations and never casts a Trench or plants a Battery against them with any solid Argument it may be he throwes a stone an ill word somtimes but not the least attempt to prove what he sayes that ever I read Hee proceeds with a discourse from which I withhold my hand till I come to his Treatise of Angels which will administer occasion of fuller censure and here I will leap over to Page 52. CHAP. XIII The opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second causes Devotion to what we feare taking things casual for Prognostiques mistaken for seeds of Religion Of the Sybils and their Oracles IN which he sets down foure things wherein consists the natural seed of Religion Opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second Causes Devotion towards what we feare and taking things Casual for Prognostiques Certainly here is a foundation laid for Atheisme Sect. 1. It is impossible that so goodly a tree as Religion should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these First I observe here that these he cals seeds he puts not for the immediate but remote causes of Religion the immediate Cause to consent what I can with his Phrase or the body of the tree which supports these glorious Acts is the assurance that there is a GOD these foure Seeds as he calls them do but produce that beleefe in us and that very weakly not able to make a man forsake all for God which Religion must do Another observation may be that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false Religion only but even of true for so presently he discourseth that these seeds produced either true or false Religion according to their culture so that the culture of Abraham Moses our blessed Saviour was but
by God and therefore not that thing or Art by which God did make the World and in or with it Nature her self Again Nature works necessarily that which it works insomuch as even in man what he doth naturally is necessarily done and what by reason liberally or freely so that here was a great boldnesse in him with God whilest he commended himself by a high and great phrase to make that phrase speak diminishingly of God in these transcendent works of his But to return whence this observation distracted me when God gave these natures to every thing he disposed them to advance his Great Designe of the beautious World and by that Nature which he gave them ingrafted in them dispositions to move thus or thus as his infinite wisdome knew fittest either for the particular effect of each nature or their combined effects to the whole according to which dispositions they cannot choose but work and this is called appetite the natural inclination and bent of each thing to produce those effects which either are agreeing to its self or the publique good Sect. 5. Now these things are acted by them without their knowledge onely his who directeth them to this end As Scotus speaks a great States-Mâ—n gives divers Officers dispatches of Letters about his publique ends they carry the Letters and bâ—ing diligent in their several charges bring about the Design and it may be said their diligence effected the Project So here these things do as it were carry Gods Letters go on his Errands and although they know not what they do yet they by their acting according to that method he disposeth them in bringing those mighty works of wisdom to pass which we observe are done by them or as you discern in a Clock which being made artificially and kept in motion distinguisheth the hours of the day to us the hand moves to one or two a Clock and when it comes thither it makes such a noise which speaks the hour of the day the Clock moves and moves to this end to strike and tell the time of the day but yet the Clock thinks not of the hour but moves to that purpose so is it in these inferiour things they move like a Clock in their order and the Maker of them aimed them at such or such an effect they move to it themselves not knowing what they do and move to that end is designed them and certainly as when we see a Clock move in such a Method and produce such effects as are beyond the reach of such dull things as Iron and Brasse which are the Materials we are sure that there was some wiser head in the contrivance and ordering of it so certainly when we discern in these creatures acts of a higher and more excellent condition then their nature can produce constantly acted by them we cannot chuse but perceive that great and powerfull wisdome and providence of God in their operations which we should not forget to consider punctually therefore to his Argument we say that these things have an appetite to actions or such objects not a knowledge of them an appetite they have for nothing moves but by its appetite unlesse forced this appetite is the bent of its Nature to this or that this is not out of knowledge in its self but in God who so disposed it in its fall it is barely that natural inclination which God hath given to each thing and in some cases may be called instinct and is dâ—scerned both in aversenesse and inclinations so that heavy bodies out of this regard move downwards and light upwards having such inclinations naturally in them but being disposed by a greater wisdom and if they have any contrary motion that is forced which appeares because these upon the remove of obstacles when they come to themselves retreat like rivers into their own channels by natural motions into their own places as hath been shewed so then both that all natural bodies have appetite appears and likewise how this in the wisest and the most excellent method which may be is in them although their own Reason guide them not to it but that infinitely wise Reason of their Maker This as I conceive he writeth as an introduction to this Chap. of Imagination but how it conduceth to his design I see not what follows comes a little closer CHAP. IX Of motion ceasing dreames decaying sense imagination memoâ—y experience c. Sect. 1 HE begins with that refuted axiome when a body is once in motion it moveth unlesse somthing els hinder it eternally and whatsoever hinders it cannot in an instant but by degrees extinguish it The rule he gives in his first part hath been already overthrown and his instance which he uâ—geth for illustration from perturbed water being but a particular instance in one only example cannot be of force to draw a general conclusion from it according to any rules of logick but if it could be it is so far from proving his conclusion that it clearly ovetthrows it for let it be inquâ—red why the water after that the winds cease at any time gives over rowling or as his instance is in the 3. Chap. of Humane Nature why after it is put into motion the standing water gives over motion The Answer cannot be made from any external thing but only from its self that standing water being a heavy body works out his enemy motion and by degrees gets its rest so that the water it s own self produceth its own rest after motion and for that other piece that this stop is not in an instant although in that instance he gives the phrase he useth is proper enough to say the â—iâ—derance is by dâ—grees because nature hath to do with an enemy a violent motion wâ—ich cannot be forced away but by degrees yet in natural motions we may find it either when a heavy body falleth down the further it goes the swifter it moves and yet stops upon the sudden when it comes to the place of its rest So likewise in that other instance when the Bladder ascends the stop is in that instant it gets upon the top of the water For although all motion is in time unlesse generation and corruption say the Philosophers yet the terms of motions are in instant like those times by which they are measured as must needs appear evident Sect. 2. Then he comes to apply this illustration of his rule to the businesse in hand pag. 5. I must now reckon by pages so also saith he it hapneth in the motion which is made in the internal parts of a man then when he sees dreams c. for after the object is removed or the eye shut we stil retain an image of the thing seen though more obscure then when we see it Here observe how strangely he joynes together seeing and dreaming as if seeing were a relick of sense not sense or a result out of it as dreaming is but wherein can we find the convenience
same thing for powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects but imagination and memory are such therefore they are not the same The major hath its proof and illustration already the minor shall be thus confirmed first imagination is busied about and acts things which come not into the reach of memory as â—oyning two things together a horse and a man it makes a centaure this presently after he applyes to imagination which he calls compounded imagination now these two although in their parts they were discerned by sense before and wrapt up in the memory yet conjoyned together having been never in the sense cannot be in the memory unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory but are the fruits of imagination only so likewise we may say that there are many things in the memory which are not imagined when they are in the memory as thus The memory is like a Book in which those things which are attentively perceived by sense are by that attention ingraved or lockt up as was before exprest or written in it imagination is that internall eye which reads this book and sometimes reads one word somtimes another Now as it happens out that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not yea it cannot see all things at once so it is in the memory it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once and perhaps sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined yet are in the Memory and therefore certainly where there are so distinct acts and Objects the things themselves are distinguished for we never say a man imagineth any thing of which he hath not an actuall conception nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory of which he hath formerly had no sense so that those are as much distinguished in and by their Acts and Objects as any two Faculties can be Sect. 8. What he saith presently after That much memory or memory of many things is called Experience is not true in those general terms which he proposeth for Memory of many things maketh not Experience but Memory of many things alike so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand water washt it that this lump of lead felt heavy teat Bladder of Air Light makes not an Experimentall conclusion from such remembrances of either heat or weight or lightnesse but when he shall find that this Air and all he meets with this Lead and many others are such then he hath Experience and by Experience he knows that it is so with all other if he shall reply and produce common language that we usually say that we had once Experience of such or such a passage and therefore one tryal and sense with remembrance of it makes an experience I answer That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used for a particular apprehension with remembrance but because experience is the mother of knowledge and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer nor doth one Conception give us the certainty of any Science therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature and in that sense he must take it because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things and should have rather said It is the remembrance of any thing And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit which is that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing or many for Memory contains many things at quiet in it which yet are not experiments until applyed to something else either in speculation or practice so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that Storehouse to furnish us with directions in our businesse at hand and when we find things of like nature these are called Experiments But this being but a nominal discourse as much of that which follow I might have saved as I shall do such things and have suffered him to beguile any man with it for it is not material whether true or false only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments and the usefullest I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap. CHAP. X. The origine of Dreams their variety c. WHerein impertinently I think to his maine purpose in that Chap. he entreth into a long discourse of Dreams which because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand I shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory and very erroneous First then he saith there That because the Brain and Nerves are so benummed in the sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external Objects there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a mans body Sect. 1. This I conceive erroneous in that latitude of terms which he useth for no doubt there are many Prophetick Dreams concerning which the Scripture both the Old and New Testament are full of Instance as Gen. 40. the Butler and Baker had Prophetick Dreams so likewise Gen. 41. Pharaoh had a Prophetick Dream such another you may find Dan. 2. of Nebuchadnezzer In the New Testament we may observe in the 1. Chap. of S. Mat. v. 20. How an Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream so likewise S. Paul Acts 16.9 Now these and many more which the Scripture and story furnish us withall and we are bound to believe do shew us that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts there being nothing in them that could prognostick any such thing and therefore this Universal Proposition Thâ—re can be no dream but such was a fault not to be pardoned He spake much better in his Humane Nature Cap. 3. Num. 3. where he saith That the Causes of Dreams if they be natural are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts That Parenthesis if they be natural stopt a great gap for these instances were not natural It was much he should correct the first Copy making it more erroneous error it had before but the rent in his Leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of Humane Nature Sect. 2. Error it had before it was not true to say that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts for as the greatest Philosopher that was meer man Solomon expresseth it Eccles. 5.3 A Dream cometh through the multitude of businesse not onely when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent but even then when they are in the best Composure if a Man have his Fancy disturbed with earnestnesse of thoughts about any businesse in the day in the Night when he takes his rest and both the Outward and Inward Senses are lockt up by Sleep his Fancy being
natural Man And this leaves all the world without excuse for not knowing there is a God or knowing there is one but not worshiping him as God or knowing him thus as Nature teacheth him for worshiping Idols or Images which they must needs know not to be the Author of these great effects A PARAENETICAL digression to Mr. HOBBES NOw Mr. Hobbes if this Treatise come to your hand as it is likely it may give me leave to advise you a little with words that may lye by you and so not passe sleightly away You are a man as I observe in this Philosophy-treatise of more then ordinary conceipt you have spent much time in the search of Nature although you are full of Paradoxes and those not strengthened with any greater reason then your own Authority yet they tast of a mighty Acumen ingenii as likewise of a most industrious and working head to contrive and bring those apparent Errors to such ends as you have brought them but good Sir consider why do you so constantly in your Leviathan and upon all occasions so unnecessarily take advantages to speak against the known and most received Truths in Divinity What need had you in this place to dispute the case of the Eternity of the World and to say that the question of the origin of the world should be left to those which are lawfully over us in ordering Divine worship Pag. 237. Sir we know who you meane by that from your Leviathan to wit the Supream Magistrate suppose he should be an Atheist and deny the Creation would you doe so likewise you seem to be ready and invite others to it in scorning those reasons are brought for it and labouring to weary the faith of a Christian man in it It is true Faith is able to support a fainting Soul against the distractions which wicked Reason can object but it is a wicked Reason that troubles and distracts it John 20.20 It is said of the Disciples that they were glad when they saw the Lord after his Resurrection not that they doubted of it before they were not all Didymusses but Faith her self is comforted by Reason and visible experiments as it is tyred and wearied in strugling against Reason Consider with your self what you will answer Almighty God at the last day when he shall say I have assisted thee in the purchase of so much Learning how hast thou used it to my honour why didst thou abuse it to my dishonour in disputing against and disturbing my poore servants from their assents to those Divine truths I prescribed in my word It will not serve your turn to say You did it by Fate for the same Fate will fatalize you to a worse condition then that brought you to this if you do not repent it is not in this one point but twentie more you are guiltie of this fault studying to countenance Atheisticall Wits with shewes of Reason to abet their wickednesses For God's sake if you think there is one and his Son Jesus Christ's sake without whom you cannot be saved if you think there is a Jesus Christ and that there will be a Salvation with your own hand blot out these hand-writings of your own which will lye against you and condemn you it were better done by you with pardon from God for them then by others reasons confuted to nothing and the guilt remaine with you I am perswaded you can object little against this I have writ and although after these Arguments I have discussed Pag. 238. You say concerning the Worlds magnitude and beginning you are content with that doctrine which the Scriptures perswade and the fame of those Miracles which confirme them the Country-custome and the due reverence of the Lawes this you say you are content with but like a discontented man you wrangle against all can any thing be more clearly delivered in Scripture then the Creation of the world hath not the constant custome of your Nation ever since Christianity was planted acknowledg'd it yea I could tell you the custome of this Nation before Christianity was setled even the Druids acknowledged it is it not an act antiently confirmed by our Laws and yet unrepealed you then did but speak this and not doe it but snarle under a colour of reason against that which you professe and certainly ought to repent for doing and though you say this reasoning contemned by learned men yet I can shew you somwhat like this even in one which you your self commend in your Epistle and I am perswaded you cannot satisfactorily answer this I have said laying aside the Scripture but with scornes as you use to doe or with other as weake blasphemies I pray God forgive you and work a repentance in you And now Reader do thou forgive the tediousness of this digression in general let me advise this that if thou meetest with any of these muddy-souled Writers which with Thomas will beleeve nothing but what they see doe then consider our Saviours answer Jo. 20.29 Blessed are they that do not see and yet beleeve Doth God reveale in his Sacred and blessed Word any thing that seems incongruous to thy Reason know it is most agreeing although thou discoverest it not and beleeve what he requires against thine owne reason so shalt thou be blessed by God and thy Faith shall be crowned with happiness which is my prayer and shall be my endeavour in this and all I write CHAP. XV. Concerning the opinion of a Deity Formed Religion what and wherein founded Sect. 1. THus having past a few Observations upon his Seeds of Religion I skip many impertinent discourses of his in the way and come to his Notes upon the dissolution of Religion which are entred upon by him Pag. 58. thus From the propagation of Religion it is not hard to understand the Causes of the resolution of the same into its first Seeds or Principles which are onely an opinion of a Diety and Powers invisible and supernatural Let the Reader at first consider the inconstancy of this Writer how immediately he not only deserts what he had writ in this very Chapter but opposeth it He just before made those four fancies to be the Seeds of Religion now he makes it only One and that not the same with any of the other nay he opposeth himself in this very Sentence for he speaks of the resolution of it into its first Seeds and Principles in the Plurall number and yet saith which are only an opinion of a Diety Thus inconstant is Errour but then that is an intolerable Phrase for him to use to terme the Seeds of Religion an Opinion of a Diety for although this word Opinion may have a large Sense and be taken for whatsoever knowledge any man hath of any thing whether by Faith or Demonstration yet since he hath formerly defined it in a weak manner to be be a poore and faint assurance Pag. 31. it was unworthily and disgracefully done of him to call
their Doctrine with Miracles every where it must therefore be understood of the Governours to whom this Religion is committed but how harshly in Common language that Relative those men will be applyed to these Governours may easily appeare to any man who reads it well his Conclusion is that they the Governours being suspected the Religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and without the feare of the Civil Sword contradicted and rejecâ—â—d Sect. 2. I conceive if his premises had been true the Conclusion would not be deduced out of them for Religion formed is like the statute Lsw as before is expressed the Governours may be thought as Iudges whose ability or integrity may be suspected in expounding the sense of it yet the Law is still as true and remaines as unsuspected as if they were vertuous the folly and corrupt mannage of the Iudges may let in a loosnesse of living and a neglect of the Law but it lessens not the Obligation of it nor the estimation but amongst sleight and trivial persons So if Bishops or the Governours in Religion cease to have Apostolical integrity or sufficiencies or that degree of it which should be expected from such persons they open a gap to the Countenancing of wickedness and prophaneness but the Religion of Christians which is built and founded upon the revealed will of God in the Statute Book the Bible is not tainted by it nor the duty to it in the Opinion of any but men of Fancy for they neither being the foundation nor the evidence of the foundation onely preservers of it out of Office not of nature they may do much harme to the building but not corrupt the foundation nor destroy the evidence of it which was set out by those who were instruments in the first forming that Religion not them which were Governours afterwards Sect. 3. He goes on indeed in some Method and ingenuity to shew how Governours may fall under this suspicion and first he saith That which taketh away the reputation of wisdome in him who formeth or addeth to Religion when it is already formed is the enjoyning a beleefe of contradictories I here stop and tell you there is a difference betwixt the formers of a Religion and the Governours as I have shewed and for this word Contradiction I say that in the forming of Religion which is to be done by the revealed will of God immediately the wit of man is not to dispute contradictions but whatsoever it shall please God to reveale we are to beleeve though it appeare to us Contradictory I dare say I can demonstrate some things which a weak and silly man would think contradictions and a man exceeding me in learning as much as I do him may serve me so and much rather that infinite perfection and not to be fathomed abysse of Gods most unsearchable wisdom may say a thousand things apparent to it feasible by that infinite power which the wisest man may be at a losse to find possible and therefore whatsoever is delivered by the first agents in forming a Religion by the immediate revelation of God must be beleeved although it appear to us full of contradictions but what he speaks to us concerning the Governours if they should adde any thing to the former credenda things to be beleeved which to humane judgement appeares contradictory their wisdome will be disparaged by it may be allowed But at the latter end of that sentence he saith Sect. 4. A man may have a revelation of many things above but of nothing against natural reason This seems to be flat against the excellency of that Faith for which the Father and patterne of the faithfull is commended by St. Paul Rom. 4.18 who speaking of Abraham saith Who against not onely above hope beleeved in hope where in expresse terms the Apostle overthrows his distinction for against hope must be against that hope which natural Reason could give him he beleeved in the promise which God made in Faith as it was with him so it must be with us It is said in the following verse that he considered not his own body now dead nor the deadnesse of Sarahs womb so must we not consider our impossibility in things delivered by God how they oppose our reason but beleeve without thought of nature or reason for it yea though it be against our reason and therefore it is most appositly phrased by St. Paul in the first and last Chapters to the Romans Obedience unto faith men must captivate their Reason to the revelations of God and not considering what Reason saith against it submit to it Thus I think in those cases where the instruments of forming a Religion doe propose any thing though contrary to our reason or contradictory in our apprehension we ought to submit to it although not in those cases to these who have the government in Religion when it is once formed Sect. 5. I will adde one note more pertinent to this business that although in the following 59. pag. he puts downe examples which illustrate his other grounds of suspicion yet as a man guilty he sets down none for this but having as I have reason to mistrust some ill design puts it downe in a language and manner fit enough to steale a beleefe of what he speaks into an inconsiderate Reader although he gives no proof of what he writes to a judicious Reader And now I have finished what I intended concerning this Chapter for the other things which he saith bring these persons into suspicion by reason of the deficience of those qualities I grant to him and cannot choose but say they were handsome and ingenious expressions and likewise fitted with very pertinent examples but they accidentally only when unluckily they happen to be observed by weak capacities doe distract the vivacity and quicknesse of their Faith and so perhaps may in tract of time quench and extinguish the flame of it to its first Principles as I have shewed And here I will settle my self to what followes in the next Chapter CHAP. XVIII Concerning the equality or inequality of men by nature Their prudence and self-opinion of it not universal Sect. 1. THis Chapter is intituled Of the naturall Condition of Mankind as concerning their felicity or misery and is the prettiest great nothing that ever I read it makes a brave and gallant shew of ingenious Paradoxes but is only a shew where truths and falshoods are so ingeniously mixed as the one sets off the other with a great semblance of reality although it be but a semblance He describes a man by his worst peices only many of which are truly in him but delivering them only without his good he makes him little better then an incarnate Devill yea what is worser makes him seeme to act those things justly which we abominate in them so that he should be the hatefullest creature in the world I will therefore for the honour of Mankind
endeavour to rescue it from such foule scandals and aspersions not catching at every word but driving at the maine sense of what he delivers Sect. 2. He layes the foundation of this Chapter upon equality of men which are saith he made so equall by nature that there is an inconsiderable difference I put not down his own words but the sense to avoid tediousnesse This Conclusion for the most part is true but in general false for if we look to the bodies of some men we see them so decrepid that their strength is not considerable alone and what he talkes of confederacy by that accompt he may bring a Fly in competition for a Fly with company enough can effect any thing and for the Soule there are some men so sottish and uncapable of designe or contrivance that certainly there are many Beasts which exceed them in fitness for such business as he allot's them but allow this phrase as he utter's it to be understood of the greater sort and number of men not of all Sect. 3. Then let us consider that Phrase Nature hath made men what shall we understand by Nature Natura naturans the God of Nature who at the first made men then we must affirme this of Adam and Evah which were made without question in no state of enmity nor in an absolute equality but such a difference as was necessary for two friends which might assist one another wishing each other good and the good of each other was the good of both the hopes of each the hopes of both so that those could not be the works of Nature which he meanes being such as were made for peace and amity and where was impossibility of hostility betwixt them the hurt of either being the hurt of both because which soever was destroyed the other lost much of assistance We will therefore see how other sons of Nature are made in what condition whatsoever Man else was made by nature he was made a poor helpless Child in the greatest disproportion both of Soul and body to his Parents that possibly can be and in this state there are none of those things which he fancieth nor hopes of attaining ends nor feares of others assistance but the poor Infant confides and trusts in hâ—s Parents and submits to them Methinks he discourses of Men as if they were Terrigenae born out of the earth come up like Seeds without any relation one to the other I let alone his secret vaunt of Knowledge in the latter end of this 60. Pag. Sect. 4. But in the bottome of that page he saith Prudence is but Experience which equall time bestowes equally upon all men in those things they equally apply themselves to See here the unconstancy of this Author Chap. the 2. Of which I have discoursed he saith Experience is memory of many things Chap. 8. pag. 34. he saith Prudence depends upon Experience now it is but Experience These two are impossible to be true both for nothing doth depend upon it self that which it depend's upon must be distinct from what depend's upon it now we may distinguish thâ—se three thus Memory retaines the actions done and past Experience collects from thence the practices of men in such cases but Prudence according to both Memory Experience and the rules of right reason drawne from all the guidance of History or Natural reason or what else can supply any assistance to the intended end directs a man in his actions and therefore he spake very weakly of Prudence when he said it was but Experience and contrarily there is a mighty difference in mens Prudence for Prudence is a thing acquired by industry and paines in which as men differ in the industry so they doe in Prudence yea all men have not the like advantages of conversing with able men and Bookes which are great helps for the getting Prudence though they may have the same industry Sect. 5. Pag. 61. He saith that that which may make such equality that is of Prudence concerning which he had spoken before incredible is but a vaine conceit of our own wisdome c. for such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty or more Elâ—quent or more Learned yet they will hardly beleeve there are many so wise as themselves for they see their owne wit at hand and others at a distance This is a strange contradictory passage to its self for first consider that what was conceited by this to be opposed was the equality of Prudence to oppose this he introduceth mens conceits of their own wisdome he that reflects upon his Exposition of names in Cap. 5. pag. 22. shall find Prudence and Wisdome two things Therefore a high esteeme of a mans own wisdom may be without the like imagination of his own Prudence Then consider that he saith Men will allow others more witty learned eloquent but not more wise he proves this because men see their own wit at hand mark how he said just before that they would allow others more wit but not more wisdom the reason saith he because they see their wit at hand would not this if it prove any thing prove the contrary to what he useth it That because their wit not their wisdom is discerned at hand others at a distance therefore their wit must appear great though not their wisdom This manner of false reasoning unreasonable arguing is frequent with him throughout the whole Book Sect. 6. But to the Conclusion this estimation of a mans own eminence in Prudence is least discerned of any thing in that universality which he expresseth for first if Prudence as he just before defined it be but Experience it is impossible that young men should think they have as much Experience as old then if Prudence be as it is the guide of a mans actions to their designed ends then consider that there are none but Fooles who do not take advise of men more excellent in their several wayes then themselves Doe not men that would get health advise with Physicians for the setling their estates advise with Lawyers for the managing of a business at Court or Countrey advise with others more prudent in these practises In this particular business although I am confident I speak more rationally then he or perhaps then some others would doe with whom I consult yet I advise with those lesse scient but I think more prudent then my self whether it be discretion to publish this or not what is the reason of this but that I and all others doe acknowledge our selves to be lesse prudent though we find our selves more learned then some others well then that doubt he raiseth was but a fancy of his own and had no foundation upon any ground of reason or experience and therefore what he builds upon it must needs fall of its self where I leave it and step to the consideration of other inferences which he introduceth the
consists in a tract of time It is true time is necessary to warre it is the measure of all rest or actions in the world it is the measure of their existence how long they stay and tarry in the world and so may be reckoned amongst those outward accommodations with which all natural things are fitted but it is no essential part of any To say that the nature of warre or peace a Horse or Tree or Men consists in time were foolish they are in time measured by time but time is not essentiall constitutively as his friends the Schoolmen and University learning teacheth but consecutively they doe not make these things follow them and therefore it was weakly explained by him when he said that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warres Sect. 4. But he illustrates this by foule weather saith he the nature of foule weather lyeth not in a shower or two of raine but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together So the nature of warre consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary His instance by which he illustrates this Conclusion is erronious for foule weather is not an inclination of time as he seemes to speak or else he prove's not that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warre but of the heavens in that time nor is the weather foule if there be onely an inclination to foulnesse as hap's in lowring cloudy weather where is no raine yet it is faire as weather is faire effectively in making the wayes faire and this distinction is often observed by our writers of Almanacks when they will be exact in their Prognostiques of weather they say now it is inclinable to raine then it will be raine and when it doth raine or in such a time as raine hath such a predominance to make the wayes foule we call it a foule day or weeke but if there be only a disposition to raine or so little as allayes the dust only we say for all that it is faire weather not foule Sect. 5. As his Illustration is to blame so is his Conclusion the disposition to warre no not the known disposition to it is warre for that disposition is nothing but an inclination to warre but an actual or habitual hostility not enmity only makes warre a man may hate another one King another and yet not make warre upon him yet that hatred is a disposition to war So that a disposition to war makes not war and then the knowledge of it cannot make it other then it is but then is war when two Nations endeavour the subjugation or assaulting one another or one doth it alone for although true friendship requires a mutual consent of both parties yet a war doth not for war may be and is commonly begun by one party before the other undertakes it and we say often that one Nation makes war and invade's the other unprovided But because he vaunts often of the propriety of speech I may tell him that war is not properly spoke of single men but Kings or Nations for single men hate one another cantend one with another fight one with another are at enmity one with the other but not at war that is proper to publique persons or Nations only Sect. 6. What he writes afterwards of the incommodities of war is ingenious but the application is not rightly made to those men of which he speaks who live without other security then what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withall For let us consider these men either planting neare other men or alone we shall still unlesse war disturbe them find them adopting and fitting their habitations for their own profit and content if a man should in an Hermeticall way live alone he would fit his habitation for such a solitary life if he should live amongst neighbours he would accommodate his affaires the best way he could to have a neighbourly friendship with them The application I cannot see how it can be forced unlesse his conclusion that all men are at war were granted for instance we can have none but of Hermites but for the plantation of families upon the same territories with others we see Abraham and Lot planting amongst the Canaanites who having ground sufficient lived peaceably with them and they fitted themselves with all usefull things for a good time having no warre I goe on with him therefore on the last particle of the 62. Page he there begins CHAP. XXI The conceit of an universal war by nature vain Of the passions and their objects The great Law-maker and his Laws Justice done among the Americans The law of Nature and dictate of Conscience Of militarie valour and prudence The habits of Justice and Injustice Of propriety occupancy c. Sect. 1. IT may seeme strange to some man who hath not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another and he may therefore not wresting to this inference made from the passions desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience It is true the inference from those passions being too weake to prove his conclusion that every man is at war with every man we can hardly assent to such an universal proposition concerning a war with all by all men the practise of whâ—ch was never experimented by any Let us see his instance briefly it consist's in three things that men travel armed they keep their doores locked these two might be spared in my particular who do neither and that in his house he lock's his chests by these saith he this man accuseth mankind as much by his deeds as he doth by his words he saye's so but I say no. For he accuseth not mankind of this wickednesse that all the world and each man naturally is at war one with another but these mistrust that there are some evill and wicked men in the world these know men may be ill by these actions they expresse it but he conclude's they are so for certainly as Love and Friendship are mighty excellencies in the conversation of man with man so hatred and warres the greatest evill which he affirme's to be in every man towards every man Sect. 2. But saith he neither of us accuse nature in it the desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sins no more are the actions which proceed from those desires till they know a Law that forbids them which till lawes be made they cannot know nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it Thus he we agree both that the passions are not sins nor the acts proceeding out of them men may love hate feare hope c. but the misapplication of the act to the wrong objects to love that we should hate
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
these things life or death are such some men have thought this temporall life a misery clothed with these circumstances they possesse it with like a rotten house which when the winds and raine drives in is worse then the open fields like a Prison it were better have no house then that such is the body to the soul and therefore men may and have often wished to be delivered out of it and death to some men is as desired as a freedome from a Gaole This Gentleman talkes up and downe in these books not only like a natural man but like the worst of them and the wickedest for wise men among them have written much in contempt of these sensual temporal things in which he placeth the only aime and happiness of man Sect. 4. Certainly even in Nature the life of man is not the principal thing of man's happinesse and then not of mans intention and care for Life is a thing which a man enjoyes in common with Beasts and Trees and therefore if man's happinesse should be in that he were no better yea much worse then they whose excellency consists in a relation to man to live only is to be a Beast a Plant only but to live vertuously and reasonably to glorifie that God who gave him those abilities by which his life is happy that is the end of man and of mans life which he is to leave then when he cannot enjoy it upon these conditions and to a Christian man as to the best of Philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of Eternity this life hath been reputed of little value and to die no misery because it is but the passage to a better and more spirituall life although perhaps there may be some difficulties in opening the gate yet it is not to be compared with the happiness it admits into nay it hath been of such esteem amongst men of honour alwaies that they would choose to die vertuously rather then live dishonourably Instances would be numerous out of the Roman story so that it is impossible in that absolute sense without limitation in which he speaks it to be true that this is the whole right of Nature as his Leviathan or his chiefe or principal as his Corpus politicum to preserve this life or to avoid this enemy death which for multitudes may and for not a few reasons ought to be despised These phrases which he useth Sect. 5. From whom we expect the lesse of power he meane's Death and the greatest of bodily paines in the loosing must be censured next and first of the first By death we doe not loose all power yea without doubt like a man out of prison he is more active and able then he was within so is the soul when it is broke out of this gaole or dunghill its natural corruptible body nor can he say that he meant bodily power for then he would not have left out that word Bodily in this which he joyned with Paine in his following sentence men without question who have hopes of that better life hereafter do not expect the losse of all power by this death but rather the increase of it and therefore suppose he should say he meant bodily power which indeed must needs be lost by death yet who is troubled to loose a bag of Silver when in its room shall be left a bag of Gold to loose bodily power and gaine spirituall It was said of our Druids in England who taught the Immortality of the soule Ignavi est rediturae parcere vitae it was a poor dull thing to spare that life which would returne again but then if they had pryed into and could have considered the glorious immortall existence which men shall have hereafter for the mortall and contemptible being here it might have been said that it were not only a dul but a beastly thing for a man so much to affect the sensual pleasures of this fleshly life as to be unwilling for the losse of them to gaine Spirituall perfections we cannot then say that we expect to loose by death all our power and if we do leave bodily powers we are not loosers but gainers by it Sect. 6. His next phrase is That by death we expect in the losing these Powers the greatest bodily paine This Gentleman I guesse hath only looked upon Death in those horrid vizards and disguises which fearfull men masque it with he hath not been so often in the house of mourning as I have and there made this observation that Death is not so horrid as many men conceit it nor the paines so great that Death is not so fearful is apparent not only in experience of those Martyrs who have dyed for the glory of CHRIST and so by their blessed sufferings for him have had an assurance that they shall reigne with him but even in those who with heroick spirits have confronted Death in politique concernments yea sought it which shewed that there is not a necessity of nature to preserve Life or that they expected the greatest paine in the losing it I could fill divers sheets with instances both ancient and moderne these I let passe lest they kick me in the teeth whilest I follow them in the Chase for the former consider how many wicked men have killed themselves for feare of worse paines alive so Sardanapalus so Cleopatra so Nero multitudes esteeming the paines of Death deliverance from the pains of unhappie life and themselves made choice of death upon such Conditions but take one instance where men were not concerned in the benefit of death themselves but took it in relation to others good we may read in the life of Otho or rather in his death that when after his losse in that great and fatal battell betwixt his forces and those of Vitellius he being retreated and discontented his Souldiers flocked to him beseeching him to head them again and regaine the losse of that day promising how that they were all ready to dye in that cause with and for him if there should be necessity and to give him assurance of what they said one of the most obscure and meanest sort of Souldiers drew his sword and killing himself told him know O Caesar that we are all provided thus to die for thee this man had no end for himself but onely to encourage Otho either for his Countries good or his owne to engage againe yet go on and we shall find that Otho unmoved with this or any thing else killed himself likewise and his souldiers carrying him to his funeral Pile many more slew themselves there to dye with him so that as love of his Country or Otho's imagined vertues provoked the first so a bare love to his person inflamed the rest to dye with him now certainly there could not be a necessity of Nature in these men to expect the greatest pains in death nor indeed can I think there is such paine Old men weare out questionless
there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine for it often happens that there is little paine and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness and so with some impatience I have found complaining of common accidents and such which had no participation of death in them and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death as Aches in particular parts sometimes they were galled and that troubled them sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed c. All which shewed that these paines not those of Death were more sensible then even death its selfe Sect. 9. He proceeds It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him justly and honestly he had said truth but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is that a man to save himself from a little pain should act things prejudiciall to the glory of God the publique good or else some greater good of his own any man who hath sense of any thing but sense and unworthy ease cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse such are those before specified Therefore in such Cases that they for paine or death its self are relinquished is against reason What he adde's And that which is not against reason we call right c. I agree to for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason but his deduction It is therefore a right of Nature that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath This deduction by what is already said cannot be true but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good CHAP. XXIII Of using or misusing meanes in order to their end The regulation of mans judgment in it The preservation of life and estate when necessary Of right and wrong Law c. Sect. 1. 1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus And because where a man hath right to the end and the end cannot be attained without the meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the end it is consequent that it is not against reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body How vile and illogicall is this had he proved that the body were the end of man or instead of body had he said for the preservation of that end his axiome explained thus might have borne him out in it but as it is puâ— there is no connexion for suppose a man hath right to the end his own happiness and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end his application of it to the body is of no force Well I will examine his Aphorisme First he who hath right to the end hath not right to all meanes of getting it is apparent for he who hath right to an estate or an house hath not right to take it by force he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it and so though a man have right to his body or life yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions It is a most just rule of law that a man must so use his owne as he must not hurt another a man hath right to water and a Meadow but he must not so use his water and his meadow as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him for the preservation of that life to hurt others and destroy their lives But once again for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe that it hath no truth but concerning the last end and in that it hath for since all mens actions are for an end that is his summum bonum his happiness every man out of necessity of nature doth what he doth for it and the utmost he can for it but this life or body is not mans happiness and for any second end there being no necessity of the end it self there is much less of any means which conduce to it and therefore of such ends of which nature mans temporall life and body are there is no manner of truth in it no more then if we should say it were right for a man to doe what he can any thing to obtain pleasure or profit upon which he sets his heart Sect. 2. His 8. Numb must be likewise examined which saith Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes and of the greatness of the danger This hath some truth in it and yet not to be so understood that by right of nature a man may judge what he will and accordingly act and what he acts is right as he seems to imply here from hence enforces afterwards for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated and what they act contrary to those rules or Lawes although it may be effected yet it is wicked so it is in those no doubt but every man will in such an impossible state as he supposeth man judge of the meanes and necessity but yet there is a law of nature in every man by which his judgement should be guided and what he judgeth though never so congruent to his will contrary to this law is not right so that as a Judge though what he judgeth must be performed and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge all other judgement is by power but not by right so is it with this man he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe but if not right it is wicked to doe so The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion convinceth not me For saith he if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self then it is reason that another may be Judge c. It is reason say I that in such a Case I am Judge but it is reason likewise that I judge according to Law and make my will be guided by reason not my reason regulated by my will because it is mine it is not therefore right but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason of which he himself afterwards
grants there are divers lawes both of men in society to men single and to men that live together although not united in a policy Sect. 3. In his 9. Number he affirms As a mans judgement in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit so also the strength c. of every man is then rightly imployed when he useth it for himself To use the Phrase of the time this Gent. is very selfish and indeed there is some reason in what he writes for as his judgement so his strength c. but his judgement is to be imployed according to the law of nature only for himself and so his strength when some greater good shall be proposed to him the good of his family his Nation the glory of God in his vertuous death then this life is to be neglected and contemned as a limb is to be lost rather then a life the lesse good rather then the greater so a private life rather then that of a Nation But his Argument is feeble and of no force when he saith Else a man hath no right to preserve himself for although it be right for a man to preserve himself yet not with those other greater losses it is right for a man to preserve each piece of his estate yet to preserve it by force or losse of a Sons life or his owne when that piece of his estate shall be inconsiderable it is not right for him to doe it In a word a mans understanding strength or whatsoever a man hath he hath right to bestow upon the preservation of this life but then when they are not called for by some more excellent and more desirable good then this life then they are to be bestowed upon that better imployment not this Sect. 4. Now I am arrived at his 10. and last Number which I meane to handle in this Chapter which begins thus Every man by nature hath right to all things that is to say to doe whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth to possess use and enjoy all things he will and can A good large Commission I will examine it and to the understanding it I will return to his Leviathan where I left Pag. 64. and discussing the beginning of that 14. Chap. lay a foundation for that truth which this Number occasions me to deliver First then let me observe that as in the beginning of this Chap. he define's right by equity liberty so immediately after he define's liberty to be the absence of external impediments and again a little after putting a distinction betwixt right and law he saith that Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and Liberty which in one and the same matter are inconsistent in which proposition he discovers a mighty weakness for in his definition of right he make's it nothing but the power and ability to doe what he will as indeed he make's it afterwards when right implies an equitable title to what he doth and a man may have right when he hath not power to doe accordingly but is hindred by externall impediments from acting according to his right that definition of his is therefore very weak for what he speaks that Law and Right are inconsistent I am so directly in my judgement against it that I think there is no right to any thing but by law which I will thus confirme by what followes Sect. 5. Right and wrong or injury are opposite termes so that right is the convenience or agreement which one thing hath with another and wrong is the disagreement as it is a right line which agree's with the rule of streightness a crooked line or a wrong one which deviates from those rules a right shot that which hit's the white and a wrong which misseth So it is a right action which is according to the rules of Actions and a wrong which differ's from them These rules are that we call law which regulate's our actions and when they are done accordingly they are right and we have right to doe them and to this purpose he said in the preceding Chap. Where no law no injustice and I may say where can be no injustice there can be no justice contraries appertaine to the same subject and expell each other out of it So then if right be an agreeing with some rule or law it is so farre from being inconsistent with it that it cannot be without it As in a Common-wealth a man hath only such a right to use or act any thing as the law of that Common-wealth gives him so in the generality of this world a man can only have right to doe or act such things which the universal law of nature direct's or impowers him to doe Thus his Leviathan being touched concerning this point I will returne to his De Corpore politico where I left and shew what manner of right the law of Nature gives a man and whether there be such a large Charter as he expresseth or no. CHAP. XXIV Of the law and right of nature Man's subjection to God and dominion over the Creatures The rules of his actions Man exempted out of Adam's charter why Noah's Patent And his Sons pâ—ssâ—ssing themselves of the world The titles of propriety discussd Jus Vtile c. Sect. 1. TO understand which let us conceive that the law of Nature belonging to every thing is that law which was given it at the Creation and the right of nature or jus Naturale must be that authority or title is granted by that law to use or doe any thing which title can be nothing but that jus or right which God gave him Gen. 1.28 29. Which we find to extend to the Earth the Fowle the fishes the living things that move upon the earth the herbs and trees This is his Jus Naturale but yet this is not to be used as he will although he be Lord of them there are lawes for Lords as well as servants Kings as well as subjects and they must be subject to the King of heaven as their subjects to them yea in these things which they are made Lords over We may see in the 4. of Genesis that Cain and Abel brought Oblations to GOD of those things over which they had a most peculiar dominion they pay'd God as it were a tribute out of those things he gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave them at their creation from whence it appeare's that man hath not such right to any thing much lesse to all things to do what he pleaseth with or to them for then they had had no right to have neglected that duty of Oblation and then they could have done nothing by which God should have put a difference betwixt Cain and his Oblation and Abel and his Oblation as he did Sect. 2. Then secondly let us consider that here is not in this Charter expressed any right a man hath over other men but this
be only such things as are honest I think no man ever justified his Conclusion as he understands these termes of profit and right He ends this Sect. with an endeavour to prove his Conclusion For saith he there is little use and benâ—fit of that right a man hath when another as strong or stâ—engtâ— then himself hath right to the same This Argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid which was that every man had right to every thing even in anothers possâ—ssion but that appeares to be a mistake in him and therefore this Argument is weak which is drawne ex non concessis CHAP. XXV Concerning nature's right liberty power Of warre and self-preservation by it For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty c. Sect. 1. THus having finished my discourse upon this subject as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be the liberty every man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature This definition I except against as not cut out even to the thing defined First it is too narrow for this right of nature concernes not himself alone but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life Yea if it have such a liberty which consisteth in to do or not to doe as he expound's it presently after then it is a right of nature to forbeare to use his owne power for the preservation of his life aswell as to use it so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature Secondly like an ill made garment as it is too streight in one place so it is too wide in another the liberty a man hath to use his power as he will himself for the preservation of his owne life is not a right of nature for the right of nature as I have shewed is a result out of the law of Nature which impower's him for that action but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation c. as I have shewed before but only such things as are just and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of Nature to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that Nature which gives him his nature are to be preferred before his life Sect. 2. The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty thus By liberty is understood according to the proper signification of the word the absence of externall impediments This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right for externall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition take away the right to have it especially this natural right for other rights by civill institution and donation do in some manner depend upon outward things because those Nationall lawes which give them these rights are outward although right and title be an inward thing the issue of that outward law but in natural right the very law which give 's a man this right is an internall law a law writ in man's heart and therefore the liberty which attend's this right and which he saith this right is can in no sense be understood to be the absence of externall impediments he adds Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would This is weakly said or most impertinently or both for external impediments can take away no part of natural power which alone is necessary to natural right this may hinder nature in its operations but this cannot take away the power of operating and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him These rights are internal things which are not much concerned in what is outward but remaine and keep their being whatsoever outward things happen Sect. 3. His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this A law of nature Lex naturalis is a precept or general Rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of preserving the same and to omit that by which it may be best preserved He is a most unhappie man in his definitions which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with First for this we may observe that if he had said such a Precept as he seâ—s down had been a law of nature or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature he had spoke truth but saying a law of Nature is such a precept he makes this precepe to be the Predicate as we University-men abused with Universityâ—learning terme it and then it must be as large as the subject A law of nature is what this is not for first he makes this precept to be only a prohibition To a negative law A precept saith he by which a man is forbidden c. when certainly although there are negative precepts yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts no negative which is not supported by an affirmative and this law forbidding must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoyned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned University learning he would have writ more properly and have seduced himself into fewer errors next observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse that he makes Nature aiming in all her intendments at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the universal when indeed the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique and particulars only as they are parts of the publique The latter part of that Section I have shewed erroneous already which affirmes law and right inconsistent Sect. 4. His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus And because the condition of man as hath been declared in the precedent Chap. is a condition of war of every one against every one in which case every one is governed by his own reason He said somewhat like truth when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a
to be in our Saviour a manhood which he called Jesus begotten by Joseph on Mary and something above a manhood which he called Christ which not untill he was thirty yeares old came into him at his baptisme that Jesus suffered as he speake's a little after but Christ did not being spirituall Thus you see â—renaeus his expression concerning Cerinthus where you may observe that he allowe's our Saviour no being before he was borne of Mary as he terme's her for although he grant's him an additionall after his baptisme by the descending down of Christ unto him yet that person had no being before and that additionall was long after his birth of the blessed Virgin and it is not expressed that he thought that Christ which came into Jesus had any being before that coming down And Tertullian adversus haereticos Num. 312. affirme's of Cerinthus that he say'd Christ was onely a man without Divinity to which that of Irenaeus well enough agree's I quote Tertullian now in Pamelius his edition 1617. So that there it seem's that Cerinthus concerning our Saviour's Divinity had the same opinion with Socinus Well to goe on with the story of Cerinthus he was a man of a most turbulent Spirit Epiphanius saith he was the man that raised the charge against St. Peter at Jerusalem for communicating with the Gentiles Acts 11. in the Case of Cornelius as likewise that he raised the tumult against St. Paul about Circumcision with a whole leafe of such schismaticall practices of his for they say he was a Jew by his Father and so stood still for the priviledges of their Nation and the observation of their Rites upon this ground the loving Spirit of St. John justly abhorred him and therefore as Irenaeus in his third Book and third Chapter there are some who have heard Polycarpus report c. which Polycarpus was constituted Bishop of Smyrna by St. John as Irenaeus Eusebius and all agree and that Angell of the Church of Smyrna which St. John writ to Apocalyps 2.8 he say'd Irenaeus who himselfe had seene Polycarpus reported that St. John goeing to wash himselfe in the Bath at Ephesus saw Cerinthus and presently hasted out againe unwashed saying that he might feare the Bath would fall where was that enemy of the Truth Cerinthus so that here you see two things that the Opinion of Cerinthus was much the same with that of the Socinians that this Cerinthus was abhorred by St. John not as a man but as an enemy to truth so that St. John hating his opinions might be reasonably thought to provide against them and all this evident out of that most ancient Author which Socinus himselfe quote's now let us see de facto what was done The same Author Irenaeus in his eleventh Chapter of his third Book somewhat before the midle of that Chapter affirme's in expresse termes that St. John was willing by his declaring the Gospell to take away the errour of Cerinthus then which we could have nothing more cleare a most Authentique Author affirming it upon most just and reasonable grounds Socinus then say'd too much when he affirmed that it was farre from all reason that Saint John should write against Ebion and Cerinthus here we see the contrary as much as it is possible for story to give but he dispute's againe against it page 7. Deinde versimile non est c. Moreover it is not likely that John would passe over so great a matter so slightly with silence but that he would name the haeretiques or at the least their haeresy either secretly or openly and detest it which since he hath not done why did he not somewhere clearely say that Christ was by nature God and Man or that he existed before he was born of Mary why did he affect to be so obscure and sparing in a thing of so great moment the ignorance whereof bring 's eternall destruction c. thus farre he I will not undertake to understand all the Apostle's reasons but am confident he had abundance of reason for all he did but will answer all he sayth first that the Scripture seldome set's down the haeretiques or haeresyes against which it write's although sometimes it doth Secondly to that he saith the Apostle doth not clearly witnesse that Christ was by nature God and Man or existed before he was born of Mary I shall shew him that he hath in as cleare termes as possibly could be although not in the same and I am confident that had he expressed this Mystery in those very words he set's down he and his Companions would have cavilled at them that those Termes are used otherwise in some places that there was some Copy or other without one of them or all that they did relate to something before or behind and not to Christ which are their usuall evasions but it is a vanity of them to teach the Apostle how he should expresse himselfe he hath done it abundantly and as clearly as those words would doe as we shall see shortly Sect. 2. But he urgeth farther that St. John give 's this and no other reason towards the end of his Gospell John 20.31 Cur Jesu signa I translate it why he writ the Miracles of Jesus or as others would have it his whole history then that we should believe that Jesus is Christ the Sonne of God and believing that we should have life eternall I will not trouble his lection which is very erroneous but let the Reader observe that although St. John say that this was the cause why those things which he writ were written yet he useth not that phrase put upon him by Socinus this non aliam and no other but suppose he had this will serve our designe for all we labour for is to prove that our Saviour is the Sonne of God it is true these troublesome men have brought distinctions of the Sonne into naturall and adopted and the like but that he is such a Sonne as believing of which we may have eternall life can be conceived nothing lesse then that he must be the naturall Sonne of the same nature with his Father all other beliefe I doubt will fall short of that excellency and therefore Beza most genuinely according to the Originall which prepose's an Article both to Christ and the Sonne reade's it thus That ye should believe that Jesus is that Christ that Sonne of God which Emphasis doth exceedingly much elevate the Conceipt of him shewing him to be an extraordinary Christ and an extraordinary not merely an adopted Sonne which all his Servants are here bound to believe so that it seeme's St. John writ this Gospell to shew that our Saviour was in some eminent and peculiar way the Sonne of God that which he adde's that believing in him we might have eternall life is an absolute avoyding a strong Argument to prove his Godhead for although I think by life here is meant eternall life yet in the Originall there
is his soul. Give me leave to apply this to our purpose the Divinity and Humanity of Christ make one person what is done by either is done by Christ 1 Cor. 2.8 they have crucified the Lord of glory which was according to his Humanity and he is the Lord of glory according to his Divinity not his Humanity so the same Christ may be said to ascend up by hâ—s Humanity where he was before with his Divinity There is one place more which they insist upon that is John 3.13 where our Saviour saith No man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven even the Son of man which is in heaven here say they it is intimated that he had been in heaven before because it is said in the Preterperfect Tense he ascended first I will answer ad homines that this Text cannot avail their turn for first if it were true that he ascended in body yet it must be such an one as descended first that is such an one as came down from heaven before and then he must be in heaven before the beginning if in the beginning he ascended into heaven which they say but then mark the Clause that is one who is in heaven when our Saviour spake it to the later they say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 existens being in heaven because it is a Participle of the Present Tense by a Grecism may be understood of the Preterperfect Tense he was in heaven I confess such a language is many times used but that it should be so here I utterly deny for it is not fit for us to think that our Saviour in so pithy a short delivery of such Mysteries did use any Tautology or unnecessary or non-significant terms now consider if he had said that no man ascended into heaven but he that descended who was in heaven what would this last clause adde to the rest no man can ascend up to heaven but then he must be in heaven no man can descend from heaven but then when he descended he must be there and this is apparent to every man upon the repeating of the very Terms who understand's them and therefore if it should be construed who was in heaven there must be something more in it then I can discern or else it is a Tautology but no such thing taking it who is in heaven because that was neither expresly nor impliedly delivered before so then to understand this Text we may go two wayes either take these words figuratively and that Socinus seem's to allow in his 7. chap. against the 10. of Wiceus thus a man may be said to ascend into heaven as I spake before as Socrates by contemplation and to descend by looking down and busieing himself about the things of this world so God is said to humble himself to behold the things that are in heaven and earth and he is in heaven now at this instant who contemplate's divine Excellencies even in this Discourse Or else we may expound it thus according to those two natures which were in that one person no man ascended c. Christ's humanity was elevated by the incarnation and union it had with his Divinity it was a great descent of his Divinity to be united to his Humanity and by this Divinity he is still in heaven and this mightily enforceth his Argument to prove what went before to Nicodemus If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things he reprove's them for not believing him who onely can tell them being the onely person who is acquainted truly with heaven who hath been in heaven by ascent by descent by a present inhabitation now let us see how this can agree with our Saviour's bodily ascent into heaven indeed in the first sense I do wonder Socinus and they did not apply it to our Saviour's being with God in Contemplation even before John Baptist his preaching but I do not find that they have done it but that that Text is invironed with so many Circumstances that would not abide it and they only press this for to prove a corporal presence of his humanity which the Text will endure for the reasons before specified and this later hath no colour for them Well I have done with what I find they excuse rather then defend their exposition by now I shall apply my self to the conâ—utation of it Sect. 4. It is a hard thing to prove a negative and in Logick it lies upon them to justifie what they affirm against all the stream of Christian writers but I will endeavour to repeat what others have said before and argue it clearly first then we may observe Heb. 9.12 it is said that Christ entered once into the holy place this word once intimate's no more no other time but then this a man might think were clear enough but they have an evasion he entered once as high Priest at other times before he entered as a Lay-man methink's they should say as Embassador to receive his commands from his King Now Reader consider how unfit this answer is for their months certainly if then in the beginning he did go up to heaven in his Humanity he was as much a Priest then as the Word for he was not nor could be the Word by their Doctrine untill he delivered the Will of God that he could not do untill he received his Commission and direction from God if they say he had it by the decree and predetermination of God it is answered that undoubtedly so was his Priesthood and therefore he was then as much Priest as Word and if it might be said the word was with God a man may say the Priest was with him which that Text to the Hebrewes denye's because it saith he entred but once into the holy place which was after his death therefore could not be said to do it before this Argument thus pressed I have not read urged by others and I do not know how they can avoid it well then I know not of any thing more need be said to these words we see them inconsistent with their glosse and not agreeing to ours who hold that the word is eternally produced and with God Sect. 5. I will go on verse 3. all things were made by him there is not one word which is not wrested by them by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all things say they is understood all things of the Gospell for so it is often used in Scripture not absolutely but according to the Subject matter that is in hand and so it is here the Gospell of St. John was the matter in hand and these things were established by our Saviour I do not deny that that phrase all or all things should be understood of the subject matter I do deny that the immediate subject matter is the renovation or Gospell but is the Creation for if the Apostle had intended that
if he have deserted the use of them any man may use them not else yet let a man consider these two instances he shall find that they are exceeding short to entitle any man to the interest of the whole world or all the creatures in it And yet I may adde further that in both those instances a man hath but a temporal use of those things not a full interest and estate in them untill his extremity be relieved or untill the right owner laid claim to them A man hath found a ring he wear's it the use of it is his but the ring is the right owner 's still and when he find's and claim 's it the use likewise must be the old owner's it was never the finder's more then the use so is it with these the extremity supplied the Commonwealth restored he hath no longer use of them he cannot justly sell or alien any of those things from the true owner which he may do with any thing is his own and therefore he had no right interest and title in them He goe's on page 102. Sect. 10. But you may object a certain portion is not allotted to every single man but any part of the world neither is it lawful for one to subdue the whole for then it would be lawful for one man if he had power to deprive others of the necessaries for life yea to kill another which seem's to oppose what he had said before when God decreeing to man the use of this life did decree likewise to bestow upon him the use of these things usefull to his life which saith he one man cannot take from another unless in extreme necessity but he doth subvert the end which God intended in the creation of another To this he adde's another objection concerning the birthâ—right of the Eldest Son who he saith hath title to his Father's estate without compact this second I esteem very weak and so meddle not with what he write's concerning it but the first I am perswaded is of invincible force and his answer to it is miserable his answer is page 103. we answer saith he not onely in extreme necessities a man may subdue the world such a necessity being granted such a necessity is impossible say I because the world cannot be necessary to relieve any man's extreme necessity but onely very little parts of it but also if any profit or commodity may be promised to arise thence as any Lord may use his good neither can he offend against that justice by which he is bound to render to his neighbour that which is his the rest in that Paragraph is but flourished to this purpose now let a man consider how this satisfies the preceding argument that argument was drawn from the end which God intended in the creating of both these the preservation of either was equally intended doth not then that man violate that justice which ought to be used towards his neighbour when for his commodities even in superfluities he shall deprive his Brother of necessaries In his discourse there is no semblance of satisfaction to this objection when in his answer he only affirm's that a man hath right to all thingâ— for his commodity but never set's down God's end is preserved in that right I mean to urge this Argument stronger hereafter Sect. 11. In the 104. page he undertake's boldly that he will prove by most efficacious Arguments there is a right to the whole world belonging to every man Page 105. he begin's his proof first saith he because in extreme necessity a man's ancient right doth revive he prove's that because saith he my calamity cannot produce a right in me to such things to which I had no right before my first answer to this is that it is no more then what was said before secondly I answer as before that no man can have such an extremity as may need the whole world he cannot eat drink or clothe himself with the whole but parts onely thirdly I answer his calamity revive's no title in the miserable man but onely reduceth him to be the object of mercy and what inconsiderable title he hath is a capability of a passive right to acts of humanity by which every man who look's upon that wretched spectacle is bound to relieve him and when extremity give 's not leave to any man to stay for the convenience of asking he take's that out of a supposall that it will not be denyed His second Argument begin's in the last line of Page 105. and is thus framed the most Learned part of Divines and Lawyers consent that in a moderation of a Lawful defence the defendant is not made a publick person but doth use his ancient right which God hath granted to every man I will not trouble the Reader with every word the sense of the Argument consist's in this that a man may defend himself against violence that in that defence he may Lawfully kill another And this ariseth not out of that that he hath done me wrong or injury but out of that regard that God would have me defend my self Now saith he if it be lawfull to kill another much rather to take his goods in defence of my self To understand the force or invalidity of this Argument let us look back to what hath been said how far my life is to be cared for and preserved by me one rule of which is when a more publick concernment will not be obtained by the losse I am not to preserve my life by the ruine of multitudes of my Nation or Kingdom of which I am a member again since he in this Discourse supposeth that men believe there is a God and that this God is a just judge punishing vice and rewarding vertue therefore I am to forsake this life and resign it rather then commit such sinnes which are of a greater moment and esteemed so by him of which nature are Regicides Paricides nor ought a man in rescue of himself to kill his King or his Father I am perswaded there is none that think 's there is a God which doth not think that such things are an abomination to him then we will suppose two men private persons the one assaulting the other surely if a man can safely avoid the danger he ought to do it but if he cannot he may kill rather then be killed because there is no reason why a man should not think himself of as usefull a condition as another private man to the publick state or glory of God but my killing this man is not because I have a right over his person but because I have a right to defend mine own person from the injuries which are offer'd to it by another private person who hath no more right to kill me then I him which is none but in my own defence for of two evils the Less is to be chosen either are evils in se but this the Less to me and
Word will not serve his purpose section 9. page 332. A Word internal and external both of God and Man section 10. page 333. The Philosophers in all ages call'd the Son of God his Word section 11. page 335. as well they who writ after as who before St. John section 12. page 336. Which is yielded by Socinus section 13. page 336. Discourse concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist section 17. page 343. Whether in the Socinian or Catholike sense may be more truly said The Word was God section 18. page 345. How the Word is God with though not God of the Father section 21. page 351. The conceipt of Smalcius and Valkelius how the Word was with God in the Beginning chapter 33. section 1 page 352. Improbable section 2. page 353. The Socinians collusions about the Word 's being made Flesh section 14. page 374. How the Word is man though it lack the personality of man section 15 page 379. The Word 's being made flesh import's not the same of the Father and the holy Ghost with whom he is the same God section 16. page 381. The World was divided among Noah's sonnes not by consent but by casual occupancy or choice as every of them thought fit chapter 24. section 4. page 187. Smalcius's several acceptions of the word World and the making of it in St. John wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader chapter 33. section 11. page 367. Discovered by the Bishop page 369. The word World never used single in the Bible for Heaven nor for the reformed or regenerated part of men section 12. page 370. It is used for the men in the world section 13. page 371. How the World knew not the Word bâ—t by supernaturall grace page 372. The whole World no particular man's right chapter 36. section 5. page 424. section 6. page 426. section 11. page 433. section 13. page 439. Noâ— can it be expedient for him to destroy it section 7. page 429. Nor can there be a necessity priviledging him to subdue it section 10. page 432. FINIS Points Comma's c. to be rectified by the curious or censorious READER TItle after annexed dele Epist. Dedic p 2. l. 13. r. honour Epist. to the Reader p. 1. l. 6. for State read State Table to the Chap. and Sect. ch 5. s. 2. r. Colours light ch 14 s 1. r. principle ch 16. s 5 r Râ—ligion ch 17. s. 5. r. examples ch 21. s. 4. l 4. r. live s. 10 l. 1. r. Dominions l 2. r. wives â— 11. l. 1 r. various ch 23. s. 2. l. 2. r. judgment ch 25. s 8. r fo is ch 28. s. 8 l. 2 r. Reason s. 11. r. it s. 12. l. 3 r it ch 28. s. 15. l. 5. r. Reason ch 29. s. 3. l. 2. r. Justice ch 32. s. 5. l. 4 r. Resurrection s. 21. r. Tautologie ch 33 s. 1 l 2. r. beginning ch 33. s. 13. r. Terms s. 15. l. 3. r. Man ib. l. 7. r. Smaâ—â—iâ—â—'s ch 35. s. 4. l. 6. r. scandal s. 5. l. 4. r. Vasques s. 7. l. r. him In the Book Page 3 l. 17. r. endeavour p. 5. l. 5. r. light or colour figured l. 11. r. the understanding ib r. horse doth l. 24. r. it p. 6. l. 29. r. appearance may p. 8. l. 1. r. suâ—ject ib p. 9. r. subject p. 11. l. 19 r. brain p. 13. l 32. r. â—â—aring p. 14. l. 2. r. species p 14. l. 18. r. concussion p. 16. l 20. r. pellucid things would p. 20 l. 15 r. that which p. 21. l. 13. r. motion by p. 22. l 2. r conceive's to p. 23. l. 13 r. eye is l. 17. r. Sun is p. 26. l. 7. r. or if not l. 22 r. coâ—e to l. 25. r. effects is p. 31 l. 29. r. visible p. 33. l. 1. r. colour because p 34. l. 8. r. other only p. 35 l. 20. r. predominant so p. 42 l. 13. r. heavens The p. 49. l. 1. r. but motion p. 51. l. 2. r. like Thus l. 27. r. colour can p. 54. l. 12 r. limitation p. 55. l. 7. r. Men measuring p. 56. l. 12. r. Animals expell p 57. l. 17. r. preserve them l. 20 r. preserve themselves p 62. l. 19. r. wisdom p. 64. l. 11 r. see 's p. 70. l. 10 r. experience I answer l. 30 r. being out p. 72. l. 31. r. like earnestnesse p. 74. l. 7. r. choler p. 76. l 1. r. he by l. 27. r. a man p. 77 l. 18. r. understanding But p. 78. l. 14. r. Negations p. 81. l. 20. r. man was l. 22. r. make l 23. r. men not l. 29. r. please p. 83. l. 18. r. Agents l. 19. r. fancy p. 84. l. 8. r. and p. 86. l 26. r God like p. 87. l 9 r. leade's us p. â—8 l. 3. r. Causeâ— p. 89. l. 3. r. that among p. 105. l. 21. r. 〈◊〉 p. 106. l. 1. r. Argument l 25. r. together had compacted p. 110. l. 15. r. heavens l. 19. r. years fail p. 111. l. 12. r. instant p. 112. l. 25. r. standing p. 114. l. 25. r. duration p. 122. l. 15. r. Grammatical p. 128. l. 11. r. Floud is p. 132. l. 19. r. God is p. 137. l. 7. r. Chapter l. 24. r. misery p. 141. l. 2. r. wisdom p. 142. l. 28. r. or if p. 146. l. 26. r. exâ—ellencies p. 153. l. 24. r. words p. 158. l 2. r. consequent l. 15. r. Nature p. 163. l. 9. r. possessions p. 167. l. 22. r. Leviathan ib. principal p. 169. l. 1. r. great p 171. l. 7. r. she p. 174. l 23. r. word p. 190. l. 4. r. life p. p. 192. l. 3. r. outward p. 192. l. 31. r. nature p. 193. l. 32. r. thâ—sts p. 191. l. 30. r. war p. 195. l. 23. r. which by p. 196. l. 12. r. layd p. 201. l. 1. r. many p. 202. l. 18. r. need l. 29. r. men scramble p. 203. l. 1. r. Free-gift l. 19 r. signes by p. 204 l 31 r. himself but p. 209. l. 4. r. sinne 's independence ib. r. Covenants l. 14. r. right over l. 15. r. another Here p. 210. l. 24 r suspicion it is voyd but p 213. l. 2. r. Covenant which p. 214. l. 33. r. tongue p. 218. l. 14. r. Vertue p. 219. l. 22. r. wickednesse p. 222. l. 9. r. done according p. 227. l. 10. r. here were l. 22. r. him who p. 230. l. 8. r. do such actions then l. 12. r. evident because p. 232. l. 27. r. felicity although the evidence which l. 29. r. evidence given p. 234. l. 19. r. roomes p. 235. l. 13. r. disputes l. 5 r. field p. 236. l. 25. r. felicity either l. 51. r. the Stoick instead p 238. l. 9. r. thing without l. 23. r. Truth cannot l. 27. r. understanding can p 239. l. 13. r. desire's they p 240 l. 6. r. they who p. 247. l. 22. r. we have p. 259. l. 15. r.
man desirous to preserve his life It being 〈◊〉 in nature the principal of mans happinesse Nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gaind by Death Which is not so terrible and painfull as pretended Ancient instances The most signal that of Otho and his souldiers Cato's double attempt to dispatch himself Arria'â— magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband Paetus A moderne iâ—stance in a young child Death seiseth upon men like sleep Diogenes takes them for brother and Sister A young child mistook one for the other Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended The three periods of death In which of them and when otherwise pain most affects the sick In what cases life should not â—e preâ—er'd to Death He that hath right to the end hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end The ultimate end excepted He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment To which he is oblig'd by Reason When the law of Nature for preservation may be dispenced with c. As the right for a mans preserving some piece of his estate Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right and division of it from Law What right is properly and what wrong Whence is proved the consistence of Right with Law What is the law what the Right of Nature Man in his most peculiar dominion subject and tributary to God Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over the creatures but not over other men Mans will not to bâ— the rule of his judgement nor the reason of his actions Why men aâ—e exempt from Gods general charter of domâ—nion at manâ— creation· To put a restraint on any vâ—ce which had no positive law against it As the sin of Sodomâ— it may be reasonably suppos'd had none How Mr Hobbes would have out-Cained Cain in the justification of fratricide The contradiction in mutuall domiâ—ion every man over every man No new Patent made to Noah but thae to Adam re-enforced Noah's sonnes like coheires or entercommoners in their right They had not the world divided among them by consent but by casual occupancy or choice as every of them thought fit Obj. Ans. The Children of Israel dispossess'd the Canaanites by Gods prerogative which he had receiv'd The first generation of men understâ—od their titles of propâ—iety without Gods peremptory command Jus and Utile not the same thing Places c not 〈…〉 that first sâ—iseth How Tulâ—ie understâ—oâ— Utile far othâ—â—wise then Mâ— Hobbes Mr. Hobbes's Aâ—gument ex non concessis The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbs defines it Nor liberty as he describe's it External impediments may hinder but not take away naturall power Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes definition of the law of nature A veine of erours that run through his book Mr. Hobbes may be allowd to say he declares when he proves nothing But not to suppose a multitude of falshoods to make up the horridness of one conclusion A terme wanting to Mr. Hobbes's just engagement in a war And to him a remembrance of his owne principles War not the onely preservative of mans right or Nature's The discourse of mans laying downe his right to all things c. unnecessary That is not alwayes really good for which a man paâ—ts with 〈◊〉 right A man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good Obj. Ans. Tertullian's signal instance in the Christians of his time He may suffer imprisonment c. without reluctance for the same reason Obedience being better then sacrifice A man may renounce hâ—s right pro â—ris et fociâ— For the good of his posterity Monastick retreats Diversity of Merit The Catchers title so scaâ—terd mony Benignity to a Musician varieth not the nature of this or that Donors contract How the owner keeps his ptoderty who intended to renounce it The distinction ex congruo ex condigno misundâ—â—stood by Mr. Hobbes How otherwise expounded by the Schooles Mr. Hobbes's vaine supposition of transferring right c. His justiying most horrid sins where no Covenant had been made against them His reason frustrate An instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited His imperfect definition of injustice Suspition makes not Covenants voyd The case put between two nations entring League of Confederacy The evil consequences of his opinion Plato's ingenious Fable The Casuists metus â—adens A propriety where is no Coercive Power The foundations wherein Mr. Hobbes builds a Common wealth and the justice of it The Foole 's argument unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes's principles His doctrine more honest then Mr. Hobbes Taking away the feare of God an unreasonable supposition Uâ—certain whether taugh or learned of the other the Foole or Mr. Hobbes Mr. Hobbes's horrid supposal of getting Heaven by unjust violence He pretends to confute the Foole. But by inadvertense fights against himself The violation of faith not â—llowed for a Kingdome Mr. Hobbes mistake's the question And changeth 〈◊〉 termes fraudulently hâ—re and otherwhere He that means to deceive will not declare his intent The Bishops Conclusion Mr. Hobbes's illogical Anâ—wer Another like it The Law of Nature give 's rules for the attaining eternal felicity afrte death The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken As that enterd into by Theeves The other by an Adulteress Mr Hobbes's subtilty in writing against Rebelion which cannot be by his doctrine Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he puts upon natural knowledge What a perswasive the natural knowledge or beliefe we have of eternal happinesse is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity The transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternal happinesse For which we loth worldly pleasures And welcome tortures Obj. Ans. The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happinâ—sse Merchant adventurer Mr. Hobbes can render himself more sâ—cure of temporal then he seemes to be with little satisfaction of eternal felicity The promises and oathes of men which he make's his greatest assurance being very fallible His scornful scale of knowledge Our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julus Caesar. Being not only deliver'd to us by Tradition but most consonant â—o Reason In Mans fellâ—wship with other Creatures and his excellency above them A very chiâ—d requires he satisfaction of his Will A man's Will satisfied wiâ—h no woâ—ldly goods whether bâ—dâ—ly sensual or intellectual Hâ—s knowledge â—s defective and cannot doe it Nor ought else which is not infinite and that infinite is God Riches doe it not whâ—ch bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more when men have most Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life None positively of his eminencies but by revelation What Faith doâ—'s towaâ—d it What dreams visions ecstasies c.