nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
Perception More intire for here again we have the prospect lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent whereas in the other it opens gradually and successively the Light stealing in upon us more and more as we go further and further as it does upon Men that travel toward the East To which may be further added that Intuitive Knowledge supposes and proceeds from perfection of the Understanding whose Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear For it must be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas themselves Whereas Demonstrative Knowledge and the necesslty of Reasoning in order to it is founded upon the narrowness of our Intellectual Capacities which not being able to perceive the Truth or Falshood of a Proposition by the single collation of the two Ideas that compose it are fain to make use of a third as a common measure between them and so from the consideration of something more clear and better known to proceed in the search of what is more obscure and less known Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the most Perfect Beings God and Angels Though as to Angels I make no great doubt but that in the Consideration of very compounded Questions and such as include a multiplicity of Relations they are fain to use Reasoning as well as we as in the more simple ones we use Intuition as well as they though perhaps after a much more perfect manner and by such compendious and facilitating Rules as we know nothing of And as they may be supposed when they do reason to reason better and more expeditely than we so with equal probability it may be presumed considering the great disproportion of Natures and States between us that they use Intuition in very many things wherein we are forc'd to have recourse to Reasoning 21. Hereafter indeed when as the Scripture tells us all that is imperfect about us shall be done away and we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only like but equal to the Angels we shall be able to see 't is to be hoped by Intuition too and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of but thought impossible things that were not only above our Reason but as we thought contrary to it We shall not only be able to reason better than we do now but shall in most things not stand in need of any Reasoning at all but shall with one simple View glance over and through the Relations of Ideas and so have an intire prospect of the fair Field of Truth But at present we must travel it over and that with many a weary step there being but very few things that we know by Intuition no more than just to give us a taste of the great Priviledge of Heaven and to incourage both our Desires and our Hopes of that perfect State when we shall be so far from needing any Logic to direct us in our reasoning that we shall have in comparison but little need or use even of Reason it self But in this present state of our Nonage and Infirmity our Necessity of it is very great For our Intuition is so short-sighted and reaches so very little a way that as if we knew no more than what we can by this Means attain to the Compass of our Knowledge would be so very Scanty that we should not have near light enough to direct us in our journey through the World So if we would Know more and see to a further distance from us we must assist our Feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glass Now Reason is this Glass Naturally indeed a very good Prospective but which Logic and especially Algebra has improved into a Telescope But yet still 't is but an Artificial way of seeing and all Art supposes and argues a Defect in Nature And though it be a great help yet we know 't is no very great Commendation to a man's eye-sight to see with Spectacles 22. And why then are we Proud And why proud of that which should rather deject us and make us Humble of our Imperfections and our Defects Our Natural Reason is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men and both together give us but little Light and help us to see but a very little way off and that after the most imperfect and defective Manner such as upbraids our Ignorance at the very same time that it increases our Knowledge our Reason not so much inlightning as betraying the Darkness of our Understandings Some few things indeed we know as Angels do by Intuition or else we could not so much as reason like Men but still the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Rational and Demonstrative kind and we are fain to use Clues and Chains to Conduct our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth to proceed in a Train from one thing to another to walk step by step and feel out our way with wariness and Caution like Men that go in the Dark And such indeed is our state in this Body and in this World 'T is now a kind of Night with us as having for the Most part only the Lesser Light Reason for our Difection As for the Greater Intâ—ition we have little more of that than of the refracted Beams of the Sun a little before its rising and after its setting enough to make a Twilight a Mixture of Light and Darkness but such a Mixture as is very unequal Darkness making the far greater part of the Composition And is not this Consideration sufficient if there were nothing else to take down our Pride and inspire us with a Sentiment of the profoundest Humility and Self-dejection If not let us Consider that even this Lesser Light that is to govern our present Night and Darkness does oftentimes fail us and suffer an Eclipse Let us Consider that we have a darker side yet and are subject to a Much lower Dispensation There being many things and those of the highest Nature and greatest importance wherein our Reason is utterly at a loss and cannot help us out and with respect to which being destitute of Sight we must be Content to walk altogether by Faith Concerning which in the following Chapter CHAP. II. Of Faith 1. FAith is a Term of great Ambiguity as well as Reason but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings I shall only define in what sense I here take it and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is requisite to the Present Design 2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith but for the Act or Habit of Faith and that not Ethically consider'd as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity Fidelity Honesty and the like but Logically as it signifies a certain Assent Judgement or
also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
much more Apposite and Exact Whereof he himself appears sensible at the end of it where offering to consider the Matter more distinctly he tells you that the things above Reason are not all of one sort but may be distinguish'd into two kinds sufficiently differing from each other which he makes to be these that there are some things that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover And others that when proposed it cannot Comprehend This indeed is true but then he should have said so sooner and have told us withal that by things above Reason as the Phrase is used in this Distinction he meant the Latter Sort only the Former not being to the Purpose 8. However he proceeds upon that part First that is to shew that there are divers Truths in the Christian Religion that Reason left to it self would never have been able to find out Of which he gives several Instances which as not being to the Point I pass over and come to his other Consideration of things above Reason meaning such as when proposed do surpass our Comprehension and that as he well observes upon one or other of these three Accounts either as not clearly Conceivable by our understanding such as the Infiniteness of the Divine Nature or as inexplicable by us such as the Manner how God can Create a Rational Soul or how this being an Immaterial Substance can act upon a Human Body or be acted upon by it c. Or else lastly as Asymmetrical or unsociable that is such as we see not how to reconcile with other things evidently and confessedly true whereof he gives an instance in the Case of Prescience and Contingency 9. He further observes and I think rightly that there may be difference of degree in things above Reason as to their Abstruseness That some things appear to surpass our understandings immediately even before attentively lookt into And other things only when a narrow inspection is made into them being intelligible enough in the 〈◊〉 and as imploy'd in common Discourse Whereof he gives instances in Place Time and Motion And he makes use of this Observation to solve a Difficulty wherein it is pretended that we cannot profess to believe things which we acknowledge to be above our Reason without discovering that we do not well consider what we say and that we then talk like Parrots To which the substance of his Answer is that we may talk of those things according to that Notion of them which is more Obvious and Superficial though not according to that which is Philosophical and Accurate 10. After this Explanation of what is meant by Above Reason and contrary to Reason he comes in the Second place to justify the Distinction by shewing that it is grounded upon the Nature of things And that he does by shewing that there is no Necessity that things above Reason should be also Contrary to Reason This he shews first of things above Reason in the first Sense viz. those that are undiscoverable by Reason alone but this being not the sense of Above Reason as it is used in this Distinction and since things according to this sense above Reason are not affirm'd by our Adversaries to be contrary to it I pass over all that he says upon this part and strike in with him again where he shews the same of things above Reason in the Second sense I cannot meet with any thing directly under that Head but only a few Passages here and there scatter'd up and down As when he says of Galileo that when he first made his Discoveries with the Telescope and said that there were Planets that mov'd about Iupiter He said something that other Astronomers could not discern to be true but nothing that they could prove to be false And again when he says that for a thing to be above Reason is Extrinsecal and Accidental to its being true or false Because to be above our Reason is not an Absolute thing but a Respective One importing a Relation to the Measure of Knowledge that belongs to Human understanding And therefore it may not be above Reason in reference to a more inlightned Intellect c. which indeed is rightly and very judiciously remarqu'd in it self and no less pertinently to the present business And again when he says that there are some things true which yet are liable to Objections not directly answerable and so above Reason He instances in the Controversie of the Divisibility of Quantity where each side of the Contradiction is press'd with unanswerable Objections and yet as parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true And yet take which you will you run into invincible Difficulties Which indeed well concludes that a thing that is above Reason may yet be true and if true then not contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is so should be true Which one Consideration is indeed enough to justifie the Distinction beyond all exception 11. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Observation concerning this Distinction too Considerable to be pass'd over and that is that he looks upon it to be of Importance not only to the defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion but even of some important Articles of Natural Theology in which as he shews by several Instances there are many Doctrins which must be acknowledgâ—d to be true and yet whose Modus is not explainable 12. After this he Considers an Objection wherein it is pretended that the granting this Distinction would be of bad Consequence as affording shelter to any unintelligible stuff that a bold Enthusiast may obtrude under the venerable Title of a Mystery that is above Reason To which he answers very judiciously that he does not deny but that the Distinction is liable to be ill imploy'd but that this is no other than what is common to it with divers other Distinctions which are without Scruple Admitted because useful and not rejected because they have not the Priviledge that they can never be Misapplied And that therefore both in reference to those other Distinctions and that he had been treating of it becomes Men to stand upon their Guard and strictly examine how far the Doctrine proposed as a Mystery is intitled to the benefit of this Distinction Which if it should be employ'd to justifie any thing that though styl'd a Mystery is but a pretended one the Errour as he well observes in the Close of all will lye Not in the Groundlesness of the Distinction but in the Erroneousness of the Application 13. In this you have the Sum and Substance as briefly and as clearly as I could represent it of Mr. Boyle's Thoughts concerning things above Reason and contrary to Reason which like all his are great and strong and allowing only for those inaccuracies taken Notice of just and true And now though what this Excellent Person has offer'd may serve to let in a great deal of Light into the Distinction yet since a thing of such Consequence if true
so from the second and middle Relations result those Truths which are Necessary Eternal and Immutable and which I understand to be nothing else but the Relations of Agreement or Disagreement that are between Ideas 8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths and upon the as much allow'd Supposition that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eternal which therefore I take for granted as a Principle not to decline the trouble of proving it but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent that they are the Relations that are between Ideas I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them because they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Natures and Essences of things as they are in Idea and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ since then they would not be necessary but Contingent Truths which would be contrary to the Supposition And Because these Necessary Truths are the most considerable and principal sort of Truths as being the Ground and Foundation of all Science and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessary and immutable Truth hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas 9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas 'T is true indeed that exactly speaking all Ideas are Divine Ideas even those which we use to call our own it being most Certain as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn that the immediate Objects of our Understandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect in which we see and contemplate all things But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Divine Ideas it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are that is Necessary and Eternal For Necessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations and it being impossible that Relations should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Necessary and Eternal how can their Relations be so 'T is plain therefore that these Ideas must be Necessary and Eternal But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Divine What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections As therefore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves or between them and their Ideas because then they would be of the Order of Contingent not of Necessary Truths For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas those only being sufficiently steddy and Permanent Subjects to sustain such Stable and Immutable Relations And indeed were it not for those Representative Perfections of the Divine Nature which we call Ideas there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations and then there could be no such Relations and if no such Relations then there could be no Necessary Truths and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Capable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty of a God as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World 10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Perfections of God and really identify'd with his Divine Nature and Substance so it must necessarily follow that the Relations that result from them and subsist between them must also be Infinite And then since these Truths do essentially Consist in and in their Reason and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations it no less evidently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too 11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account For I confider again that since Relations do not in reality differ as distinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related these Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves and consequently with the Divine Nature with which these Ideas are identified And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Nature 12. And that indeed it is so may be further and somewhat more directly demonstrated thus That God is the Cause of whatever is besides himself or that whatever is is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Principle Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God But it is not the Effect of God and therefore it can be no other than God himself Now that it is not the Effect of God the many gross Absurdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknowledge For First if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary which is against the Supposition or if it be then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act and so God would be a necessary Agent even ad extra He would also be an unintelligent Agent The Consequence is not to be avoided For if Truth be the effect of God then antecedently to the effecting of it there was no Truth and consequently no Knowledge because there could be nothing known and so God in the production of Truth if indeed he did produce it must be supposed to act altogether in the dark and without any Intelligence Again if Truth be the Effect of God then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God nay upon something created
that is not God But now it being most Evident that there is nothing Necessary that is not God if Truth be not God then 't is plain that it cannot be Necessary which presently runs us into the Cartesian Absurdity of the Arbitrary Position of Truth or if it be Necessary then 't is as plain that it must be God The short is Truth is either God or the Effect of God If it be not God then 't is the Effect of God as Des Cartes says But if not the Effect of God as the Consequent Absurdities from that Principle demonstrate and as is generally granted then 't is God himself as we say It must be one or the other there is no Medium To say that Truth is God or to say that 't is the Effect of God are each of them Consistent Propositions though from the gross Absurdities of the Latter the Former only appears to be the right but to deny that 't is the effect of God and yet not to say that it is God that is to affirm that 't is neither the Effect of God nor yet God is all over unmaintainable and inconsistent If it be not the Effect of God as is both generally and justly acknowledg'd then it must of Necessity be God since whatever is is either God or the Effect of God 15. And indeed if Truth be not God how comes it to be Cloath'd with the Glorious Ensigns of his Majesty to wear the Characters of his Divinity and to have so many of his peculiar and incommunicable Attributes How comes it to be Necessary Immutable Eternal Self-existent Increated Immense Omni-present and Independent and that not only upon the Conceptions of any Minds whether Human or Angelical but even all things whatsoever which might never have been made or might now be annihilated without any Prejudice to the being of Truth which does not respect the natural and actual Existencies but only the Abstract Essences of things For were there no such thing as any real Circle or Triangle in Nature it would still be never the less true that their Abstract Essences would be determinate and invariable and that such and such distinct Properties would belong to them Which by the way plainly Convinces that Truth is none of the Effects Works or Creatures of God since it did exist before them does not now depend on them and would remain the self-same Immutable thing without them But then I demand whence has it this Self-subsistence and Independency of Being Whence again has it its fix'd and unalterable Nature such as we can neither add any thing to nor diminish ought from How is it that it is Present in all Places and to all Minds so as to be Contemplated by them all at the same time and after the same Manner How comes it to pass that we cannot so much as dis-imagine it or by way of Fiction and Supposition remove it out of Being but it still returns upon us with a strong and invincible Spring since even the very Supposition that there is no Truth carries a Formal Proposition in it whose Ideas have a certain Habitude to each other and so Contradicts it self Besides how comes it to be a Perfection of the Divine Understanding Is any thing a Perfection to God but himself How comes it also to be the Rule and Measure of his Will which can be determin'd by nothing but what is just Reasonable and True Can any thing be a Rule to God that is not himself Does he Consult or Follow any thing but what is One with his own Divine Nature and Essence And yet God consults and follows Truth and cannot act but according to its Immutable Laws and Measures It is not therefore really distinguish'd from him but Coeternal and Consubstantial with him and so in Consulting Truth he Consults his own Essence even the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Eternal and Increated Wisdom the true intelligible Light in whom are all the Ideas and Essences of things the Fulness of Being and Truth who in the Beginning was with God and was God who is Eternally Contemplated by him with Infinite Joy and Complacency and who said of himself Incarnate I am the Way the Truth and the Life I would fain know how all these incommunicable Attributes of God should agree to Truth if it be any thing less than a Divine Nature Particularly I demand whence has it that unshakeable Firmness and Stability that invincible Permanency and Stedâ—astness that Necessity of Existence that utter repugnance to Not Being but only because it is really Coessential and Consubstantial with him whose Name is Iehovah and who is Being it self to whom it is Essential to Exist or rather whose very Essence is Existence 16. But now from this Coessentiality and Consubstantiality of Truth with the Divine Nature a Noble and Sublime Theory but which I do but lightly touch over having not room here to pursue it at large it evidently and necessarily follows again that Truth is Infinite There cannot be a more immediate nor a more necessary nor a more inseparable Connexion between any two things than between this Consequence and that Principle And indeed if Truth were not Infinite how can the Knowledge of God be so Not sure as Concretely and Objectively Consider'd for that manifestly implies the Infinity of its Object And what is the Object of the Divine or of any other Understanding but Truth And should Knowledge here be taken for the Power or Faculty of Knowing to what purpose is an Infinite Power of Knowing unless there be an Infinite to be Known And would not such a Power be uneasie and afflictive as well as useless to him that had it unless the Object be supposed to carry due Proportion to it For if it be so uneasie a Reflexion to some of us to have such short and narrow Faculties when the Compass of Truth has so large and spatious an extent to be able to know so little when there is so much to be known how much more troublesom and painful would it be to the Supreme Intelligence to have an Infinite Understanding when all that is intelligible is but Finite Would not that Infinity of his Capacity serve to vex and disquiet him more than the Narrowness of ours does us the difference being as much as between having a great Stomach and but little Meat and a little Stomach when there is a great deal of Meat whereof which is the greatest Punishment is Obvious to imagine And we may judge of this in some measure by our selves We have in us a Capacity boundless and unlimited For tho' our Understandings be Finite our Wills know no Measure and are in a manner Infinite As God has made us capable of enjoying an Infinite Good so Nothing less than that can satisfie our Desires For we desire Good as Good and consequently all possible Good Now we find this to be a great Pain to us at present to desire an Infinite Good
when all that we can enjoy here is Finite The greatest part of the Uneasiness the Melancholy the Disconsolateness the Aridity that accompanies Human Life will be found if traced to the Original to proceed from hence viz. from the little proportion that is between our Capacities and our Gratifications between what is desired and what is enjoy'd And this Desire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punishment to us Hereafter when the Activity of our Faculties shall be more invigorated and inlarg'd if we have not then an Infinite Good to enjoy â—Twill be at least the worst ingredient of Hell and Damnation if not all that is to be understood by it And yet we are still to Consider that our Will is Inâ—â—nite only Ex parte Objecti because it desires an Infinite Good and not Ex parte Actûs because it desires it infinitely or with an unlimited Force and Activity For 't is impossible that a Finite Nature should have any Power or Force in it that is strictly infinite or that any such Act or Operation should proceed from it But then what would the Affliction be if the Act were Infinite as well as the Object and we were to aspire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Desire What Conception can Frame a just Idea of the Misery of such a State And can it be much less for an Infinite Intelligence to have only a Finite Intelligible for its Object But there is Nothing Painful or Afflictive in the Condition of the Supremely and Completely Blessed And therefore we must Conclude that as the Infinite Will of God has a Good fully Commensurate and Adequate to its unlimited Activity whereon it may Center and Repose its Weight so the Infinite Understanding of God has also an Infinite Intelligible for its Object And since the Formal Object of Understanding in General and Consequently of the Divine is Truth as that of the Will is Good hence it follows again that Truth must needs be of an Infinite Nature 17. And do we not find it so when we Convert our selves to it by Study and Meditation When we apply our Minds to the Contemplation of Truth and set our selves to muse and think do we not find that we launch forth into a vast intelligible Sea that has neither Bottom nor Shore And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not still more and more convinc'd of this and do we not discover the further we go in our Intellectual Progress that there still lies more and more beyond us so that the more we advance in the Knowledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it as the greatest Travellers think most Magnificently of the World Do we not find as in a Spatious Campaigne so in the immense Field of Truth that our Eye wearies and our Sight loses it self in the boundless Prospect and that besides the clear view which we have of a few things at a little distance from us there lie all round us vast Tracts unmeasurably diffused whereof we have only Confuse and indistinct Images like the Faint Blew of the far distant Hills Are not the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite and should but one link in this Endless Chain be alter'd would not innumerable Alterations ensue upon it Should but One Proposition that is False be supposed True or One that is True be supposed False what Understanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Consequences that would result from such a Supposition I say New Consequences For we are to consider that besides the Absolute Systeme of Truth which contains the Relations of Ideas with their settled Coherencies and Dependencies one upon another according as they really stand in their Natural Order there is a Secondary Systeme of Truth which I may call Hypothetical that results from any supposed Change made in the Absolute Systeme whence will still arise new and new Consequences even to Infinity But not to consider Hypothetical Truth can the Bounds of that which is Absolute be ever fix'd or its Stock ever Exhausted Does it not after all the Study that has been employ'd about it and the Numberless Number of Volumns that have been written upon it furnish perpetual matter for our Contemplation and is it not a Subject for everlasting Thoughts and Considerations Has it not been the great Research of the Thoughtful and Inquisitive for many Ages and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predecessour and produce New Discoveries Are not the Sciences continually improved and yet are there not still Depths in every Science which no Line of Thought can ever Fathom What a vast Fecundity is there in some plain simple Propositions nay who can number the Conclusions that may be drawn from any one Principle Take the most simple Figure in Geometry and where is the Mathematician who after a Thousand Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirm'd of it both as Absolutely Consider'd and as it stands in relation to other Figures And what then shall we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies Particularly of Algebra the Main Ocean of this Bottomless Sea And what shall we say of Metaphysick's another unmeasurable Abysse and what of the endless Circle of Truth if not the same which one of Iob's Friends says of God Canst thou by searching â—ind out Truth Canst thou find her out unto Perfection It is as high as Heaven what canst thou do deeper than Hell what canst thou know The Measure thereof is longer than the Earth and broader than the Sea And that because they after all are Finite whereas this is truly and strictly Infinite Which by the way sufficiently proves a God and that this God is Truth whose Eternal and Glorious Majesty be Blessed for Ever 18. But then let us Consider if Truth be indeed as you see of an Infinite Nature then to prove that Human Reason is not fully adequate to it does not intirely possess it nor all over and wholly comprehend it and consequently cannot be the Measure of it there will be no need of laying open the great Weakness and Deficiency of our Understanding I need not represent the Imperfection of its Light nor the Shortness of its Views nor the Slenderness of its Attainments nor the very Narrow Extent of its Knowledge nor the very little Progress it is able to make in the Contemplation and Comprehension of Truth That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas for which we need go no further for an Instance than our own Souls and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always discern the Relations and Connexions that are between them and that either for want of sufficient Clearness in the Ideas themselves to have their Relations perceived immediately without comparing them with other mediate Ideas or else for want of such due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them and
quickly see the Regularity of the most uneven and odd-figured Parts and how wonderfully they conspired like the Flats and Sharps of Musick to the Order and Harmony of that excellent and surprizing Beauty that results from them But being not able to reach this we are not competent Judges of the rest which by the way should repress our forwardness to fit in Judgment upon things so far above the Cognizance of our Court and though we know the Measures of God to be all Wise Good Just and Holy yet this is only an implicit Knowledge founded upon an External Evidence only much after the same manner as it is in Faith even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfection without any clear and immediate discernment of the Internal Connexion that is between the things themselves We believe 't is all well and right because the Infinitely Wise God sits at the Helm but then again because he is so Infinitely Wise we cannot found the Depths of his Wisdom as indeed it would be very strange if an Infinitely Wise Agent should not be able to do things Wisely and yet beyond our Understanding nor reconcile all his particular proceedings to the Laws of Reason and Equity but the more we study about these things the more we are at a loss the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it till at last we find our selves obliged to cry out with the most inspired Apostle O the Depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God how unsearchable are his Iudgments and his Ways past finding out And all for want of an Intire and Comprehensive View of them For if the Knowledge of some very Compounded Truths be impossible without the Clear Perception of the Simple Principles upon which they depend and a Man would to no purpose beat his Brains about the Consideration of Conical Sections till he has first well possessed himself of Ordinary Geometry how much less then may we conclude are the Intricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simultaneous Idea of the Universal Systeme whereof they are parts to which they relate and from their Concentricity with which they receive all their Order and Beauty but which is in a manner lost to us for want of Compass enough in our Prospect By which single Instance it appears among many others that might have been given how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may disable us from Comprehending many Particular Truths and consequently that the same Infinity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent must also hinder us as much from being able to comprehend every Particular Truth So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehensible by us and consequently Human Reason is not Commensurate to all Truth not only as Collectively but even as Distributively Consider'd And therefore not as Distributively because not as Collectively 22. But then to raise our Speculation a little higher I consider yet further that the Infinity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Extent but also an Infinity of Nature that is that the Compass of Truth is not only Boundless and illimited and that it has in it an inexhaustible Spring which like the Source of Light is never to be drawn dry by the most thirsty draught of the whole Intellectual World but also that there are Particular Truths of a Nature truely infinite and by consequence incomprehensible to any Understanding that is not so For we are here to recollect what has been already shewn that Truth is Consubstantial and Coessential with God and with the Divine Ideas Now though these Ideas are all equally of the Essence and Nature of God and so far equally Divine it being impossible that there should be any thing in God that is not God yet there is this general and very remarkable Difference between them that some of these Divine Ideas are Absolute and some Relative That is some are of the Essence of God Simply and Absolutely as He is in Himself without any Relation to any thing out of Himself And others again are of the Essence of God consider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in Act or in Possibility and only so far forth as the Divine Essence is representative of Creatures Or if you will thus We may consider a twofold Being in Ideas Esse Reale and Esse Ideale or Repraesentativum Some Ideas are Divine not only according to their Esse Reale for so they are all but also according to their Esse Repraesentativum as representing God to the Mind that Contemplates them Others again are Divine only according to their Esse Reale being indeed of the Substance of God but not representing him but his Creatures and so are Divine in the same sense as the Idea of a Body is Spiritual viz. Essentially only not Representatively Which Diversity indeed resolves into the former because they are of the Essence of God not as it is absolutely in itself but only as it is representative of Creatures according to such a certain Modality and Limitation of Perfection And accordingly though they are truly Divine Ideas as well as the other yet they are not said to be Ideas of God as not representing him but his Creatures The short is The Essence of God may be consider'd either as it is absolutely in it self according to its Infinite Simplicity or as it is in relation to and representative of things without either of an Actual or of a Possible Existence And so the Ideas or Essential Perfections of God are of two sorts Either such as are of the Essence of God consider'd in the first sense as it is in it self or else such as are of the same Divine Essence only in the second sense as far forth as that Essence is representative of things out of it self upon which by the way I suppose must be grounded if we will resolve things into their last Principle the common distinction of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunicable The Incommunicable Attributes of God being those Perfections that are of the Divine Essence Simply and Absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and the Communicable those that belong to the Divine Essence Relatively consider'd and as representative of Creatures to whom accordingly they are in their Measure truly applicable whereas the former are not but are peculiar to God alone which sufficiently shews the difference between this double order of Divine Ideas But to make it yet more intelligible by an Instance The Idea of the Divine Immensity or that Perfection in God which we call his Immensity is of the Essence of God according to the first sense as it is simply and absolutely in it self being no other than the Substance of God as it is universally diffused intirely present in and filling all places without being circumscribed by any yet without any Local Extension But now the
Idea of Extension or that Perfection in God which vertually eminently and modo intelligibili answers to Extension and is therefore frequently called by Mr. Malebranch L' ètendue intelligibl◠is of the Substance of God not as it is in it self simply and absolutely but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter or Body and imitable or participable by it according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being and which are represented by this its Idea I know not whether I express my self to the Conception of every Reader but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligible to my self and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics or in Attention cannot I think well miss my Meaning 23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present purpose is this Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it is representative of Creatures must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature Because however truly Divine and of the Essence of God yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self but only as it is in relation to Creatures that is as partially and inadequately consider'd according to certain Abstractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require And accordingly such Ideas are ordinarily said not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite for they do not represent him though Essential to him but to be the Ideas of Creatures who are Finite They are indeed Divine Ideas because Essential to God but they are not Ideas of God because they are of the Divine Essence only as it relates to Creatures and is representative of them Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas and God in seeing them is not properly said to see himself though they are of himself but to see Creatures because though they are of his Divine Essence yet 't is only according to such Precisions Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representative of their Finite Perfections As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Finite too it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite should be representative of what is Finite And as these Ideas are Finite so are they also by Consequence so Proportionate and of a Measure so adjusted to Finite Understandings as to be Intelligible by them and within the Possibility of their Comprehension which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to them And accordingly the Experiment answers the Theory We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things such as matters of Fact Human Events c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independently on their Actual Existence are Comprehensible by us as in Metaphysics and Geometry in the Contemplation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions 24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order nor with their Truths Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representative of Creatures be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Understandings which indeed otherwise would not be capable of any Science yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of are neither Finite nor Comprehensible For these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature and not as it is in relation to Creatures or as representative of any Reality out of it self And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God and that because they are of his Divine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and not as it is in reference to any thing besides or out of it self These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite because the Divine Essence as it is in it self simply and absolutely consider'd is so and consequently Incomprehensible by any Finite and consequently by Human Understanding God only can Comprehend these Ideas and that because he only can Comprehend himself Human Reason indeed has Light enough to discover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God and is withal able to discern enough of them to raise her greatest Wonder and Devotion and to make her despise all other Intelligible Objects in comparison of these Infinite Grandeurs and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty and stand in a better Light are able to see yet more of them but neither the one nor the other can Comprehend them fully any more than they can God himself and that because they are God So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Comprehensible these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the Instances above proposed of each The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are We have a very distinct View of it we Perceive it we Comprehend it Among all Intelligible Objects there is none that is more clear nor whereof we have a more adequate and exact Notion And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences which alone have the happiness to be free from Disputes and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject Extension But now as to the Divine Immensity so far are we from having a Clear Conception of that that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea but we enter into Clouds and Darkness or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes yea hurts and pains them till they can no longer indure to gaze but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids suspense of Thought or by turning their view upon less glorious Objects In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty only now and then meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our progress But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Immensity we are like men that commit themselves to the Main Sea at the very first Plunge out of our depth and ready to be overwhelm'd swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss
that knows no bottom 25. I use a little Figure and Imagery here the better to impress this upon the Imagination of those who are not so well habituated to the Conception of things by Pure Intellection but the thing it self needs none of the advantages of the Metaphorical way being strictly and severely true And by these two Instances it may appear what a vast difference there is between these two sorts of the Divine Ideas the Absolute and the Relative those that are of the Essence of God as in himself and those that are of the same Divine Essence as it is in relation to Creatures The First Infinite and Incomprehensible the Second Finite and Comprehensible For you see here the Idea of Extension is clear and distinct and such as we can fully and adequately Conceive but the Idea of the Divine Immensity has nothing clear and distinct in it but is all over Darkness and Obscurity and such as quite astonishes and confounds us with a Thousand difficulties upon the first application of our Thoughts to it as indeed do all the Absolute Attributes and Perfections of God which are all equally Infinite and equally incomprehensible to Finite Spirits however they may be able to Comprehend that which in the Essence of God is representative of and carries a Relation to those Realities which either actually do or possibly may exist out of it And in this I say no more setting aside only the Rationale of the thing than those who tell us that the Incommunicable Attributes of God are Infinite and Incomprehensible They are so But what is it that makes them Infinite and Incomprehensible Even the same that makes them Incommunicable viz. their being of the Essence of God as it is in it self according to its Absolute Simplicity and not as it is in Relation to Creatures For 't is most evident that the Essence of God as it is simply and Absolutely in it self is every way Infinite and Incomprehensible and therefore all those Ideas and Perfections of his which are in this Absolute Sense Essential to him must be also of an alike Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature Which by the way may serve to Silence the presumptuous Cavils of those who draw Objections against the Existence of God from the incomprehensibility of his Attributes since if there be a God he must have incomprehensible Attributes which unless we ascribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him 26. But to resume our Point we see then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Prospect of Infinite and Incomprehensible Truths even of a Compass as large as the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence For though all Created things are of a Finite Nature and though even the Divine Ideas that represent them as far as representative of them must fall under the same limited Consideration yet those Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God that have no such external Reference but are of the Divine Essence as it is in its pure simple abstracted Self must necessarily partake of the Divine Infinity and be as unbounded as God himself And since Truth as was before observ'd is Coessential and Consubstantial with the Divine Ideas I further Conclude that though those Truths which regard the Actualities and Existencies of things or if you please things that do actually exist be Finite because the things themselves are so and though even those that regard the Divine Ideas themselves are also Finite supposing the Ideas to be of the inferiour Order such as are of the Divine Essence only as it is representative of and in relation to Creatures yet those Truths which respect those Divine Ideas of the Superiour Order that are of the Absolute Essence of God as it is in it self purely and simply Consider'd and so are not only Essentially but even Representatively Divine as truly representing God and being in a strict and proper sense his Ideas I say the Truths of this Order and Character must necessarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Creatures yea above all other Ideal Truths even as far as what is of the Simple and Absolute Essence of God transcends that which in the same Essence is only Relative to things without and can therefore be no less than Infinite We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths even allthose which regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God These Divine Ideas and Perfections are all Infinite as that Glorious Essence whose Ideas they are and whom they represent and so also are the Sublime Truths which result from them They are of a Nature strictly Infinite and if Infinite then by Consequence Incomprehensible I mean to all understandings that are not so For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough to represent Infinite so neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Comprehend it For as the actual knowledge of any intelligent Being can never exceed its intellectual Power so neither can its Power exceed the measure of its Essence A Finite Being therefore must have a Finite Understanding and a Finite Understanding must have a Finite Perception Since then our Understandings are Finite 't is plain that our Perception of Infinite must also be Finite 'T is true indeed that Objective Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits and so we may be said in some respect to have an Infinite Thought as far as the Operation of the Mind may be denominated from the quality of the Object but yet still we think according to the Measure of our Nature and our Perception of Infinite can be no more at the most than Finite But now a Finite Perception bears no proportion to an Infinite Intelligible besides that to perceive such an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is but only Partially and inadequately But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be said to be a Comprehension of that thing even though the thing be Finite much less then when it is Infinite Whereby it plainly appears that if there be an Order of Infinite Truths the same will also be Incomprehensible Ones and since again as I have shewn there is an Order of such Truths even all those that regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence it clearly follows that there is an Order of Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth even Distributively consider'd since there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend which was the thing to be proved 27. And of all this we may have a plain and visible illustration in the foremention'd Instance of the Divine Immensity This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely Insinite as being of his Divine Essence as it is Absolutely in it self and not as in Order to or representative of Creatures And as Infinite 't is also Incomprehensible by any but God himself Accordingly the Complex Truth that
If not then you must suppose either that there is no Necessity that either of the two parts which yet are Contradictory should be true or that though one of them be true yet that God does not known which is so or that though he does know which is so yet he does not deal faithfully in revealing that which is the Right all which are extravagant Suppositions and such as Men of your Sense and Reason can never allow But then if you say as you must that you would believe it then I pray what becomes of your Maxim of believing nothing but what you can Comprehend and why do you so stiffly plead the incomprehensibility of an Article of Faith against the Belief of it and why must there be no Mysteries in Religion I say in Religion where if any where our Reason might expect to find things above its Measure unreachable Heights and unfathomable Depths and where God is not only the Revealer as in the Case now supposed but also the Object Reveal'd For is it not reasonable to suppose that there are things more incomprehensible in God than in Nature and if you would receive an Incomprehensible Revelation of his concerning his Works how much rather ought you to admit the same concerning Himself 9. And this gives me occasion to say something to you concerning the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity This great Article of the Christian Faith you have a particular Prejudice against and will not believe and that because it so utterly transcends the Force of Reason to Conceive how the same undivided and Numerically One Simple Essence of God should be Communicated to Three really distinct Persons so as that there should be both a Unity in Trinity and a Trinity in Unity This however as inconceivable as it seems some will not yield to be so far Above Reason but that a Rational and Intelligible Account may be given of it which accordingly they have essay'd to do by several Hypotheses But I decline at present all advantage that may be had from them or any other that may be invented to render this an intelligible Article You know I Reason all along upon the Contrary Supposition that those Articles of the Christian Faith which we call Mysteries are really incomprehensible and only go to invalidate the Consequence that is drawn from thence in prejudice of their Belief Well then for once we will give you what you stand for that the Doctrine of the Trinity is indeed utterly above Reason You have our leave to suppose it as incomprehensible as you please But then you are to Consider besides what has hitherto been discours'd concerning the Nullity of the Consequence from the incomprehensibility of a thing to its incredibility that this is a Revelation of God concerning Himself and do you pretend to Comprehend the Nature and Essence of God If you do then your Understanding is as infinite as the Divine But if you do not then the incomprehensibility of this Mysterious Article ought to be no Objection with you against the Belief of it since if it be you must be driven to say that you Comprehend the Nature of God which I hope you have too much Religion as well as Reason to affirm 10. And indeed if we meet with so many insuperable Difficulties in the Search of Nature much more may we in the Contemplation of its Author if the Works of God do so puzzle and baffle our Understandings much more may they Confess their Deficiency when God himself is their Object and if we are not able to explain Creation or give an Account how the Material World issued in time from the great Fountain of Being much less may we be supposed able to explain the Eternal and ineffable Generation of his Divine and Consubstantial World But what then shall we not Believe it Or rather shall we not say upon this Occasion with the Pious and Ingenious Mr. Wesley Ineffable the way for who Th' Almighty to perfection ever knew But He himself has said it and it must be true Nay to go lower yet if there be so many things relating to Extension Motion and Figure of all which we have Clear Ideas which we cannot Comprehend and there result from them Propositions which we know not what to make of with how much greater reason may we expect to find what we cannot Understand in the Nature of an Infinite Being whereof we have no adequate Idea And indeed we meet with so many Incomprehensibles in the School of Nature that one would think we should be too much familiarized to 'em to think them strange in that of Religion and God seems on purpose to exercise and discipline our Understandings with what is above them in Natural things that so we might be the less surprized to find what passes our Conception in his own Infinite Essence Here then at least you may Confess your Ignorance and that without any reproach to your Understandings which were indeed intended for the Contemplation but not for the Comprehension of an Infinite Object You need not therefore here be backward to own that you meet with what you cannot Comprehend it would indeed be a Mistery if you should not nor think it any disgrace to have your Eyes dazzl'd with that Light at the insupportable Glory of which even the Seraphin Veil and Cover theirs 11. You may perceive by this that your Denial of the Doctrine of the Trinity because of the Incomprehensibility of it proceeds upon no good Consequence but you are also further desired to Consider the very Bad one that it Naturally leads to You refuse to receive this Article because you cannot Comprehend it but besides that your Reason for this your refusal is not good unless you could be supposed to Comprehend every thing even the Deep things of God Pray Consider what the Consequence will be if you pursue your Principle to the utmost and Conduct your selves intirely by its Measures Will it not inevitably lead you to the denial of all Religion This perhaps may startle you but think again Will not this necessarily lead you to the denial of God the Foundation of all Religion For if you will not believe the Trinal Distinction of Persons in the Divine Essence because you cannot conceive how such a thing can be then may you not for the same reason refuse as well to believe the Divine Essence it self some of whose incommunicable Attributes such as his Self Existence Eternity Immensity c. are as Incomprehensible as any thing in the Notion of the Trinity can be So that if you will but follow your Measure from the denial of Three you may be quickly brought to deny even One. So directly does your Principle of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend lead to Atheism and that with such swift and wide strides that were it not for the assistance of the same expedient your Friends the Deists would hardly be able to follow you 12. And now Sirs what
Perswasion of the Mind particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent wherein it agrees with some other Acts of the Mind and the more special and peculiar part that limits and Contracts the General and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd is the Motive and ground of this Assent 'T is it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evidence of the thing but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker 3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent Reason and Authority That is we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete that is if we perceive only in part then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary which is what we call Opinion But if the Evidence be full and perfect then we yield a firm and most assured Assent which is generally distinguish'd from the other by the Name of Knowledge which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not Formally Consist in the Assent but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else For to give yet a further Confirmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion let Assent be never so evident the evidence lies in the Perception not in the Assent which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind and can be said no otherwise to be Evident than as 't is an Assent to an Evident thing that is to what we perceive But now Perception and Assent are not only two things but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge which is an Act only of one And indeed to speak the truth Evident Assent as 't is here applied seems to me a mere jumble of Words confusely uniting together in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties one belonging to the Will and the other to the Understanding And how the result of this heterogeneous Composition should be Knowledge I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension And besides after all an Evident Assent when resolv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know and would it not be a Notable Definition of Knowledge to say that it is an Assent to what we know 4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it as consisting purely and wholely in Perception 't is plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge For 't is necessary that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in general which it cannot do if it be Knowledge for that were to pass over into another Kind Knowledge not being Assent but Perception 'T is therefore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also gone upon a wrong ground and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents which are usually reckon'd to be Faith Opinion and Science since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge is most apparently not so as differing from it no less than in the whole kind 5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Second Assent to a thing when the Evidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is supposed not to be so perfect I answer that indeed so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought there is no proper Name that I know of for it When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is complete this has been usually call'd Knowledge but certainly with the utmost impropriety knowledge as appears being quite another thing But by what name to call it or how to distinguish it I proâ—ess I know not Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing for my Thought of it is very distinct but merely because we want a word for it As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to distinguish it from Assent upon Authority in general For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd somewhat if one could tell what as every generical Idea ought to be distinguish'd by a generical Name But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the Deâ—initio instead of the Definitum and express the things at large by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incomplete though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the other which is fitly call'd Opinion whereby we denote the imperfection both of the Evidence and of the Assent 6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all but only upon Testimony or Authority then we call it Faith Which appears to be an Assent of a quite different Nature from the other two For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence and differ only as the Evidence differs and that is gradually as complete differs from incompletâ— But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind as having no Evidence at all but only Authority for its Ground And thus we have here a Threefold Assent though not such as is taught us in the Schools the Account of which in short proceeds thus All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority If the Reason be incomplete then 't is Opinion If complete then 't is another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General But if the Assent be upon Authority only then 't is Faith 7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man then the Assent that is so grounded is Human Faith If of God then 't is Divine Faith Between which two there is this in Common that they both proceed not
upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has