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A44701 A view of that part of the late considerations addrest to H.H. about the Trinity which concerns the sober enquiry, on that subject : in a letter to the former friend. Howe, John, 1630-1705. 1695 (1695) Wing H3047; ESTC R39277 33,067 106

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〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or singly considered but if by negative abstraction you sever any one from the other so as to say the one is God and not the other or any one is all that is signify'd by the Name of God I deny it as before I did for so you would exclude the other two the Godhead which is but what was expresly enough said Sob Enquiry pag. 47. The Father is God but not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghost the Son is God but not excluding c. And if as this Author quotes we are compelled by the Christian Verity so to speak I wonder it should not compel him as it is Christian Verity or at least as it is Verity as well as the rest of Christians or Mankind Why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth Athanasius his word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we are necessitated and if the Considerator's own Translation grieve him he might relieve himself by considering that all Necessity is not compulsive And because he hath brought me to Athanasius I shall take the occasion to say I cannot apprehend him to have any sentiment contrary to this Hypothesis His business was against the Arians or the Ariomanites as he often called them as symbolizing also with Manes And because with them the Controversy was whether the Son and Spirit were Creatures in opposition hereto he constantly asserts their consubstantiality with the Father never intending for ought that appears that their Being was numerically the same with his but of the same kind uncreated coessential coeternal with his own For so he expresly speaks in his other or additional Questions i. e. asking Quest. 6. How many Essences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. How many sorts of Essence as the Answer will direct us to understand it do you acknowledg in God The Answer is I say one Essence one Nature one Form 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and adds one Kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which sufficiently expounds all the rest He acknowledged no different kinds of Essence or Nature in the Godhead but that One only which was eternal and uncreated agreeably to what he elsewhere says against the Followers of Sabellius 'T is impossible things not eternal Beings not partaking Godhead should be ranked or put in the same order with the Godhead Afterwards speaking of the Father and the Son he says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the One is such not the same as the other the other such as he And that the Son was not to be conceived under another Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor under a strange and foreign Character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but was God as the Father And I appeal to any Man's Understanding and Conscience If that great Author believ'd a numerical sameness of Essence common to the three Persons what should make him blame the Sabellians for making the Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when by the latter in that case he must mean the same thing as by the former In the forecited Questions he expresly says we were to acknowledg in the Deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three Individuals Answer to Quest. 7. ubi priùs And elsewhere he as distinctly asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three things And what could he mean by three things not three Deities as he often inculcates but he must certainly mean three Entities three Essences for by three things he could not possibly mean three Non-Entities or three Nothings His great care plainly was to assert the true Deity of the Son and Spirit or their Preeternity or that it could never be said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there was a time when they were not which he inculcates in an hundred places still insisting that one Deity one Essence was common to them but still with distinction and as warmly inveighs against Sabellius and P. Samosatensis as against Arius every whit And that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt speaking how the Father Son and Spirit tho of one and the same sort of Essence are three Hypostases he plainly says the Nature wherein they partake is so One as the humane Nature is One in all Men. We Men saith he consisting of a Body and a Soul are all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of one Nature and Substance or Essence but we are many Hypostases And to the same purpose Dial. 2. de Trinitate his Anomoeos comparing the Father Son and Spirit to a Bishop Presbyter and Deacon he brings in the Orthodox saying they have all the same Nature being each of them Man as an Angel a Man and an Horse have different Natures In the mean time because Men are not inseparably and vitally united with one another as the Divine Persons are and cannot but be by reason of the necessary eternal perpetual emanation of the two latter from the first they cannot admit to be called one Man as the three Persons in the Godhead are and cannot but be one God Inasmuch as these three Divine Persons partake real Godhead as existing necessarily each of them they are each truly God but because they partake it in necessary eternal vital Union and so that the first is the radix the second perpetually springing from the first and the third from both the other they are therefore together one God As Branches tho really distinct from each other and the Root are altogether notwithstanding but one Tree and all omoousial or consubstantial to one another which is an illustration familiar with the the Antients And if there be any now a days that will call this Heresy tho as I said I will be no Heretick however yet if I must make a choice I had rather be an Heretick with the Ante-Nicene and Nicene Fathers and Post-Nicene for ought appears to the contrary through some following Centuries than be reputed Orthodox with P. Lumbard c. whom a German Divine not of meanest account calls one of the four Evangelists of Antichrist But having now done with what he said he would omit but did not tho he might to every whit as good purpose we come to what he overlooks not because he intimates he cannot And let us see whether he looks into it to any better purpose than if he had quite overlook'd it He is indeed the more excusable that he overlooks it not because he says he could not In that case there is no remedy Nor do I see how he well could when the Sober Enquirer had once and again so directly put it in his view and as was said objected it to himself But he thinks however to make an irrefragable Battering Ram of it wherewith to shiver this Doctrine of the Trinity all to pieces and he brings it into play with the two Horns before mentioned The Father he says for instance is either infinite in his Substance his Wisdom his Power his Goodness or he is not With the like pompous apparatus and even in
deliciis Therefore I believe the Considerator will be so ingenuous as to perceive he hath in this part of his Discourse grosly overshot or undershot or shot wide of his own Mark if indeed he had any or did not letting his Bolt fly too soon shoot at Rovers before he had taken steady aim at any thing In short all this Dust could be rais'd but with design only because he could not enlighten his Readers to blind them But now when he should come by solid Argument to disprove the Hypothesis by shewing that three individual Divine Natures or Essences can possibly have no Nexus so as to become one entire Divine Nature and at the same time which this Hypothesis supposes remain still three individual Divine Natures and Essences he thinks fit to leave it to another to do it for him who he says if he cannot prove this can prove nothing And when we see that Proof it will be time enough to consider it In the mean time I cannot here but note what I will neither in Charity call Forgery in the Considerator nor in Civility Ignorance but it cannot be less than great Oversight his talk of these Three so united as to become One the Enquirer never spake nor dreamt of their becoming One but of their being naturally necessarily and eternally so Then he comes to put the Question as he says it is between the Enquirer and the Socinians And he puts it thus How three distinct several individual Divine Beings Essences or Substances should remain three several individual Substances and yet at the same time be united into One Divine Substance called God One would have thought when he had so newly wav'd the former Question as wherein he meant not to be concern'd he should presently have put a new One upon which he intended to engage himself But we have the same over again even with the same ill look of an equivalent Phrase unto becoming united into One to insinuate to his Reader as if his Antagonist thought these Three were de novo united not in but into One. Which he knew must have a harsh sound and as well knew it to be most repugnant to the Enquirer's most declared Sentiment Nor will it be any presumption if I take the liberty to set down the Question according to the Enquirer's Mind who have as much reason to know it as he and I am sure it will be more agreeable to the tenour of his Discourse now referr'd to Whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Divine Being may not possibly for ought we know contain three Natures or Essences under the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost so far distinct as is necessary to found the distinct Predications or Attributions severally given them in the Holy Scriptures and yet be eternally necessarily naturally vitally so united as notwithstanding that remaining distinction to be One God And let us now see what he hath to say First To the Enquirer's Illustrations of it as possible Secondly What he brings to prove it impossible As to the former part He first falls upon what the Enquirer had said concerning the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures in our selves And upon this he insists so operously as if the whole weight of the Cause had been laid upon it and seems to think the Enquirer had forgot the Question when he mentioned it because he says those are only distinct Faculties not Persons or Substances tho Persons were not in his Question without ever taking any notice of the Enquirers waving it with these words That he would content himself with what was more obvious But this is is all Art To raise a mighty posse and labour to seem to those that he believed would read what he writ only not what the other did most effectually to expugne what he saw was neglected tho not altogether useless as we shall see anon In the mean time it is observable how needlesly he slurs himself in this his first brisk Onset He says No Man ever pretended That the vegetative sensitive and intellective Faculties or Powers are so many distinct individual Persons Substances or Essences we grant c. What did no Man ever pretend that these three distinct Natures the vegetative sensitive intellective were in Man three distinct Substances or Souls concurring by a certain subordination in him What necessity was there that to heighten his Triumph in the Opinion of his credulous Followers he should with so glorious a Confidence put on the vain and false shew of having all the World on his side and herein either dissemble his Knowledge or grosly bewray his Ignorance in the meer History of Philosophy And most imprudently suppose all his Readers as ignorant as he would seem What did he never hear of an Averroist in the World Doth he not know that Physician and Philosopher and his Followers earnestly contended for what he says no Man ever pretended to Or that divers other Commentators upon Aristotle have some abetted others as vehemently oppos'd them in it Not to insist also that some thought the Intellectus Agens and Patiens to be distinct Substances belonging to the Nature of Man as others had also other Conceits about the former And if he look some hundreds of Years back as far as the time and extant Work of Nemesius Bishop and Philosopher as he writes himself of the Nature of Man who liv'd in the Time of Gregory Nazianzen as appears by an Epistle of his writ to him and prefixt to that little Book of his he will find that Author takes notice there were divers that took Man to consist of Mind Soul and Body and that some did doubt whether the Mind super vening to the Soul as one to the other did not make the latter intelligent And in several other parts of that Work easy if it were necessary to be recited he speaks it as the Judgment of some That the unreasonable Nature in Man did exist by it self as being of it self an unreasonable Soul not a part of the reasonable accounting it one of the greatest Absurdities that the unreasonable Soul should be a part of that which is reasonable And he carries us yet much farther back referring us to Plotinus in whom any that will may read much more to that purpose in many places It matters not whether this Opinion be true or false but a great mistake or misrepresentation it was to say no Man ever pretended to it And be that as it will if all the Readers will suspend their Judgments That a Trinity in the Godhead is impossible till the Considerator shall have prov'd by plain demonstration the concurrence of three such Spirits a vegetative sensitive and intellective vitally united in the Constitution of Man is a thing simply impossible I believe he will not in haste have many Proselytes I for my part as his own Eyes might have told him laid no stress upon it but only mentioned it in transitu as
I was going on to what is obvious and in view to every Man the union between our Soul and Body Nor was I sollicitous to find this an exact Parallel as he fancies I was obliged to do What if there be no exact Parallel Will any Man of a sober Mind or that is Master of his own Thoughts conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being whereof there is not an exact parallel in the Creation If any Man will stand upon this come make an Argument of it let us see it in form and try its strength Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the Creation is impossible in God c. He will sooner prove himself ridiculous than prove his Point by such a Medium 'T is enough for a sober Man's purpose in such a case as we are now considering if we find such things actually are or might as easily be as what we see actually is among the Creatures that are of as difficult conception and explication as what appears represented in the Enquirers Hypothesis concerning a Trinity 'T is trifling to attempt to give or to ask a parallel exact per omnia It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose if there be a parallel quoad hoc viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of Conception And tho the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures be not so many distinct Substances a Trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being than three such Natures or natural Powers in the One humane Nature And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing as the Excellent Author of the 28 Propositions speaks must also acknowledg the most real Perfections in the Divine Being tho not univocal but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us And are they no way distinct Let any sober Understanding judg will the same Notion agree to them all Is his Knowledg throughout the same with his effective Power Then he must make himself For who can doubt he knows himself And is his Will the self-same undistinguishable Perfection in him with his Knowledg Then the Purposes of his Will must be to effect all that he can For doth he not know all that he can do And the Complacencies of his Will must be as much in what is evil as good even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest and most immoral Evils For he knows both alike I know what is commonly said of extrinsecal Denominations But are such Denominations true or false Have they any thing in re correspondent to them or have they not Then some distinction there must be of these Perfections themselves If so how are they distinguisht And there appears great reason from God's own Word to conceive greater distinction of the three Hypostases in his Being than of the Attributes which are common to them as is said Sob Enq. pag. 140. In reference whereto it is not improper or impertinent to mention such Differences as we find in our own Being tho they be not distinct Substances Less distinction in our selves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but Substance What he adds concerning the Union of Soul and Body in our selves which he cannot deny to be distinct Substances is from a Man of so good sense so surprisingly strange and remote from the Purpose that one would scarce think it from the same Man but that he left this part to some other of the Club and afterwards writ on himself without reading it over or this was with him what we are all liable to some drowsy Interval For when he had himself recited as the Enquirer's words or sense If there is this Union between two so contrary Natures and Substances as the Soul and Body why may there not be a like Union between two or three created Spirits He without shadow of a pretence feigns the Enquirer again to have forgot the Question because Soul and Body are not both intelligent Substances And why Sir doth this argue him to have forgot the Question 'T is as if he expected a Man to be at the top of the Stairs assoon as he toucht the first Step. In a Series of Discourse must the beginning touch the end leaving out what is to come between and connect both parts What then serve Mediums for And so farewel to all reasoning since nothing can be proved by it self He expected it seems I should have proved three intelligent Natures might be united because three intelligent Natures might be united But say I and so he repeats if there be so near Union between things of so contrary Natures as Soul and Body why not between two or three created Spirits The Question is as he now states it himself why may not three intelligent Substances be united And hither he with palpable violence immediately refers the mention of the Union of Soul and Body and says he Why Sir are Body and Soul intelligent Substances And say I but why Sir are not the three supposed created Spirits intelligent Substances And now thinks he will my easy admiring Readers that read me only and not him say What a Baffle hath he given the Enquirer What an ignorant Man is this Mr. to talk of Soul and Body as both intelligent Substances But if any of them happen upon the Enquirer's Book too then must they say how scurvily doth this Matter turn upon himself How inconsiderate a Prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a Considerer so to represent him And I my self would say had I the opportunity of free Discourse with him in a Corner which because I have not I say it here Sir is this sincere Writing Is this the way to sift out Truth And I must further say this looks like a Man stung by the pungency of the present Question If Soul and Body things of so contrary Natures that is of an intelligent and unintelligent Nature can be united into one humane Nature why may not three created Spirits all intelligent Natures be as well united into some one thing It appears you knew not what to say to it and would fain seem to say something when you really had nothing to say and therefore so egregiously tergiversate and feign your self not to understand it or that your Antagonist did not understand himself The Enquirer's Scope was manifest Nothing was to be got by so grosly perverting it Is there no Argument but à pari Might you not plainly see he here argued à fortiori If contrary Natures might be so united why not much rather like Natures When you ask me this Question Do not Body and Soul remain two Substances a bodily and a spiritual notwithstanding their concurrence to the Constitution of a Man I answer Yes And I thank you Sir for this kind Look towards my Hypothesis If they were not so the mention of this Union had no way serv'd it You know 't is only Union with continuing distinction
now speaking to i. e. the Delicious Society the Divine Hypostases are supposed to have with each other give me leave freely to discourse this matter I would fain know what it is wherein he supposes the Enquirer to have overshot his Mark Or of what makes he here so mighty a Wonderment It can be but one of these two things Either that there are three Divine Persons in the Godhead really distinct Or That they have if there be a Delicious Society or Conversation with each other Will he say the former is a singular Opinion Or that 't is Novel Was there never a real Trinitarian in the World before Doth he not in his own express words sort the Enquirer with one whom he will not deny to be a learned Divine p. 43. of these his present Considerations col 1. The Author of the 28 Propositions and Mr. H w as he calls the Enquirer are honest Men and real Trinitarians By which former Character he hath I dare say ten thousand times more gratify'd his Ambition than by calling him learned too And I believe he will as little think this a novel Opinion as a singular one Nor shall I thank him for acknowledging it to have been the Opinion of the Fathers generally not only Ante-Nicene and Nicene but Post-Nicene too for some following Ages unto that of P. Lombard so obvious it is to every one that will but more slightly search For my part I will not except Justin Martyr himself whom I the rather mention both as he was one of the more antient of the Fathers and as I may also call him the Father of the Modalists nor his Notion even about the Homoousian-Trinity as he expresly stiles it For tho it will require more time than I now intend to bestow to give a distinct account of every Passage throughout that Discourse of his yet his Expression of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must not be so taken as if it were to be torn away from its coherence and from it self When therefore he says the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the being unbegotten begotten and having proceeded are not Names of the Essence but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Modes of Subsistence he must mean they are not immediately Names of the Essence but mediately they cannot but be so For what do they modify Not nothing When they are said to be Modes of Subsistence what is it that subsists We cannot pluck away these Modes of Subsistence from that which subsists and whereof they are the Modes And what is that You 'll say the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one Essence which he had mentioned before and that one Essence is 't is true as perfectly one as 't is possible for what is of it self and what are from that to be with each other i. e. that they are congenerous as the Sun and its Rays according to that Heb. 1. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the effulgency of Glory or as Mind and where there is nothing else but Substance consubstantial Thought or Word Therefore this Oneness of Essence must be taken in so large and extensive a sense as that it may admit of these Differences For so he afterwards plainly speaks if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If the one the Father hath his Existence without being begotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another the Son by being begotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that the Holy Ghost by having proceeded here it befals us to behold differences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the things that import difference There must be a sense therefore wherein he understood this Essence to be most truly One and a sense wherein he also understood it to have its differences and those too not unimportant ones as being unbegotten and being begotten signify no light differences And in what latitude of sense he understood the Oneness of Essence whereof he had before spoken may be seen in his following Explication when what he said he would have be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more manifest he makes Adam's peculiar Mode of Subsistence to be that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not begotten but made by God's own Hand but for them that were from him he intimates theirs to be that they were begotten not made If then you enquire concerning the same Essence that was common to him and them you still find that Man is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Subject whether of formation as to him or of generation as to them And who apprehends not in what latitude of sense the humane Nature is One which is common to Adam and his Posterity Tho the Divine Nature is incomparably more One which is common to the Father Son and Spirit as we have formerly insisted and shall further shew it cannot but be in all necessary and continually-depending Emanations Yet I might if there were need again as to this part quote the Considerator to himself For I suppose he will not disown the Considerations in 1693. in which pag. 15. col 1. are these words Dr. Cudworth by a great number of very pertinent and Home-quotations hath proved that his Explication I mean that part of it which makes the three Persons to be so many distinct Essences or Substances is the Doctrine of the Principal if not of all the Fathers as well as of the Platonists And 't is added and I for my own part do grant it Upon the whole then I reckon that as to this first part we stand clear not only to the rest of the World but with this Author himself that to be a real Trinitarian is not so unheard-of a thing or what no learned Divine of any Perswasion ever dreamt of before the Enquirer But now for the Second Part. The Delicious Society supposed to be between or rather among the three Persons Is this a Dream And so strange a One Why good Sir Can you suppose three Persons i. e. three intellectual Subsistences perfectly Wise Holy and Good co-existing with inexisting in one another to have no Society Or that Society not to be delicious He says How can it be I say how can it but be Herein I am sure the Enquirer hath far more Company than in the former For whether the three Persons have all the same numerical Essence or three distinct all agree they most delightfully converse Will he pretend never to have read any that make Love as it were intercurrent between the two first the Character of the third In short Is it the Thing he quarrels with as singular or the Word At the Thing supposing three Persons he can have no Quarrel without quarreling with the common Sense of Mankind For the Word he hath more wit and knowledg of Language than to pretend to find fault with that For let him but consult Expositors even the known Criticks upon the mentioned place Prov. 8. whom in so plain a case I will not be at the pains to quote and transcribe and take notice whether none read those words fui in
that is for my purpose I doubt you nodded a little when you ask'd me that Question and I do annuere But when the Discourse was only of a natural Union what in the Name of Wonder made you dream of a Christmass-Pye Had you writ it at the same time of Year I am now writing I should have wondered less But either you had some particular preternatural Appetite to that sort of Delicate or you gave your Fancy a random liberty to make your Pen write whatever came to your fingers end and that whirl'd you unaware into a Pastry and so by meer chance you came to have your finger in the Pye Or you thought to try whether this wild Ramble might not issue as luckily for you as Dr. Echard's Jargon of Words fortuitously put together to ridicule Hobbes's fatal Chain of Thoughts at length ending in a Napkin which was mightily for your turn in your present Case But upon the whole Matter when you let your Mind so unwarily be in pati●nis your Cookery quite spoil'd your Philosophy Otherwise when you had newly read those words in the Sob Enquiry as I find you had pag. 17. Waving the many artificial Unions of distinct things that united and continuing distinct make one thing under one Name I shall only consider what is Natural you would never have let it your Mind I mean so fine a thing be huddled up and sopt with Meat Plums Sugar Wine in a Christmass-Pye or have thought that the Union of an humane Soul with an humane Body was like such a jumble as this I believe when some among the Antients made use of this Union of Soul and Body as I find they have to represent a very sacred viz. the Hypostatical One they little thought it would be so debased or that any thing would be said of it so extravagant as this And if we design doing any Body good by writing let us give over this way of Talk lest People think what I remember Cicero once said of the Epicureans arguing that they do not so much consider as sortiri cast Lots what to say But now 't is like we may come to some closer Discourse We see what is said to the Enquirer's Elucidation of his Hypothesis to represent it possible which by meer Oversight and Incogitance as I hope now appears was too hastily pronounced an Oversight or Incogitancy 2. We are next to consider what he says to prove it impossible And so far as I can apprehend the drift of the Discourse what he alledges will be reduced to these two Heads of Argument Viz. That three such Hypostases or Subsistents as I have chosen to call them can have no possible Nexus by which to be one God 1. Because they are all supposed intelligent 2. Because they can neither be said to be finite nor infinite He should not therefore have said the Hypothesis was meer incogitance and oversight for he knows I saw and considered them both In the Sob Enquiry it self the former pag. 20 21. the latter pag. 70 71. with pag. 122 123. And thought them unconcluding then as I still think Nor do I find the Considerer hath now added any strength to either of them But I shall since he is importune go to the reconsideration of them with him And 1. As to the former I cannot so much as imagine what should make him confessing which he could not help the actual Union of an intelligent and unintelligent Being deny the possible Union of intelligent Beings He seems to apprehend many dangerous things in it that if he cannot reason he may fright a Man out of it and out of his Wits too It will infer associating discoursing solacing But where lies the danger of all this Or to whom is it dangerous He says it introduces three Omniscient Almighty Beings as I expresly call them associating c. But he cites no place where and I challenge him to name any Persons among whom I so expresly called them He may indeed tell where I blam'd him for representing some of his Adversaries as affirming three Almighties and denying more than One but that is not expresly calling them so my self And he may know in time 't is one thing expresly to call them so and another to put him as he is concerned to disprove it Ay but it will further infer Tritheism It will make three Gods And if this be not to make three Gods it can never be made appear that the Pagans held more Gods Yes if there be no natural vital Nexus if they be not united in One of which the Pagans never talkt Or if they be co-ordinate not subordinate as Dr. Cudworth speaks And I add if that subordination be not arbitrary but by necessary natural continual emanation of the second from the first and of the third from both the other so as that their goings forth may be truly from everlasting as is said of the One and may as well be conceived of another of them I would have the Trinitarians be content with the Reproach of falling in quoad hoc with Plato and not envy their Antagonists the honour of more closely following Mahomet And Sir there is more Paganism in denying this and the Divine Revelation upon which it is grounded than in supposing it No. But there can be no such Nexus Conversation Consociation mutual Harmony Agreement and Delectation cannot be conceived but between Beings so distinct and diverse that they can be One in no Natural respect but only in a Civil or Oeconomical This is loud and earnest But why can there not Setting aside Noise and Clamour I want to know a Reason why intelligent Beings may not be as intimately and naturally united with one another as unintelligent and intelligent And if so why such Union should spoil mutual Conversation and Delight Perhaps his Mind and mine might not do well together for he cannot conceive and I for my part cannot but conceive that most perfect intelligent Natures vitally united must have the most delightful Conversation Harmony and Agreement together and so much the more by how much the more perfect they are and by how much more perfect their Union is Whereas then I expect a Reason why intelligent Beings cannot be capable of natural Union and no other is given me but because they are intelligent And again why such Beings naturally united cannot converse and no other is given me but because they are naturally united i. e. Such things cannot be because they cannot be By how much the less such Reasons have to convince they have the more to confirm me that the Hypothesis I have propos'd is not capable of being disproved And for my increased Confidence I must profess my self so far beholden to the Considerator This in the mean time I do here declare that I see not so much as the shadow of a Reason from him why three spiritual or intelligent Beings cannot be naturally and vitally united with each other with continuing
can be added thereto or be without its compass much less can there be another Infinite added to the former I only now say you talk confidently in the dark you know not what And so as to involve your self in Contradictions do what you can 1. In saying nothing can be added to what is infinite 2. In pretending to know if any thing can be added how much or how little can 1. In saying nothing can be added to or be without the compass of what is infinite For then there could be no Creation which I cannot doubt him to grant Before there was any was there not an infinitude of Being in the eternal Godhead And hath the Creation nothing in it of real Being Or will you say the Being of the Creature is the Being of God I know what may be said and is elsewhere said to this and 't will better serve my purpose than his 2. In pretending to know what can or cannot be added Or that in the way of necessary eternal Emanation there cannot be an infinite addition tho not in the way of voluntary or arbitrary and temporary production The reason of the difference is too obvious to need elucidation to them that can consider But for your part I must tell my Antagonist you have concluded your self even as to that which carries the greatest appearance of impossibility come off as you can You say a Body of an Inch square is not only not infinite in extension but is a very small Body yet it hath this infinite power to be divisible to infinity So I suppose you must say of half that Inch or a quarter or the thousandth part of it much more of two or twenty or a thousand Inches You say indeed this Body it self is not infinite Nor will I insist upon the trite and common Objection against you How can any thing be divisible into parts which it hath not in it Which yet Men have not talkt away by talking it often over Still haeret lateri Nor of an infinite Power 's being lodged in a finite and so minute a Subject But in the mean time here are Infinites upon Infinites an infinite Power upon an infinite Power multiplyed infinitely and still these infinite Powers greater and less than other as either the Inch is augmented or diminished And he saith the Mind of Man hath the Property of infinite or eternal duration Therefore so many Minds so many Infinites And he must suppose the infinite duration of some Minds to be greater than of others unless he think his own Mind to be as old as Adam's or do not only hold their preexistence but that they were all created in the same moment Which if he do I am sure he can never prove And so for ought he knows there may not only be many Infinites but one greater than another What therefore exceeds all limits that are assignable or any way conceivable by us as we are sure the Divine Being doth it is impossible for us to know what differences that vast Infinitude contains And we shall therefore but talk at random and with much more presumption than knowledg when we take upon us to pronounce it impossible there should be three infinite Hypostases in the Godhead Especially considering that most intimate vital Union that they are supposed to have each with other in respect whereof the Son is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexisting in the Father as Athanasius's Phrase is agreeably to the Language of Scripture Joh. 14. 11. and elsewhere And which by parity of Reason is to be conceiv'd of the Holy Ghost too who is also said to search all things even the deep things of God 1 Cor. 2. 10. In respect of which Union and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may thence be collected whatever of real Perfection Wisdom Power Goodness c. is in any one is each ones as truly as any ones all being originally in the Father as the first and everliving fountain of all As was said Sober Enquiry p. 31 32. But whereas the Considerator urges If the Father be infinite in his Substance in his Wisdom his Power his Goodness he is God in the most adequate and perfect sense of the Word I say well and what then If therefore he mean the Son and the Holy Ghost must be excluded the Godhead let him prove his consequence if he can And he may find the answer to it Sob Enquiry pag. 53. I shall not transcribe nor love when I have writ a Book to write it over again His Notion may fit Pagans well enough or those who are not otherwise taught Christians are directed to understand that the Deity includes Father Son and Holy Ghost Their equality I acknowledg with the mentioned Athanasian Exception notwithstanding which that they equally communicate in the most Characteristick difference of the Deity from all Creatures viz. Necessity of Existence is conceivable enough To sum up all the Considerator I understand even by the whole management of his Discourse and specially by the conclusion of that part wherein the Enquirer is concern'd to have most entirely given up this Cause as ever did any Man The Enquirer's only Undertaking was to maintain the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in opposition to his former daring Assertion of its being impossible and nonsense He now in conclusion says the Enquirer saw there must be a Nexus intimating if there can that he hath gain'd his point but 't is added he durst not venture to say what it was To which I must say That this is most uncautiously said I will not say deceitfully tho I know 't is said untruly and he might have known or remembred too that he the Enquirer often spoke of it as a necessary natural eternal vital and most intimate Union He further says he only explains it by the Union of Soul and Body Which again 1. Is so great a Misrepresentation that I wonder he would say it here when he himself but two or three Pages off recites as the Enquirer's words If God could unite into one two such contrary Natures let any Man give me a reason why he might not much more first make and then unite two and if two why not three Spirits c. Is this only to explain it by the Union of Soul and Body But by the way that first make and then unite was none of the Enquirer's but appears thrust in to make what was manifestly possible seem impossible Sic notus Let two Substances be created entire with no natural Propension to each other they are capable of no natural Union without change of their Natures Who sees not it were a Contradiction to suppose them the same still and not the same But suppose them created with mutual aptitudes to Union and united what should hinder but they may continue united without being confounded 2. And 't is said impertinently as well as untruly for what if he had not explain'd it at all
is it therefore impossible which it belonged to him to prove or he did nothing and he hath done nothing towards it I have askt him before and now I put it again seriously to him whether he do in his Conscience believe this a good Argument Such an Union i. e. natural necessary c. hath no pattern or parallel in the Creation therefore it is impossible in the Nature of God For what he adds That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Substance or Essence nor possibly can be The Cause indeed depends not on it but lies remote from it Methinks however it is very feat and shews him pinch't that he can be brought to this Hath a Man no Substance Is he a shadow Or hath he no Essence Is he a Non-entity Or is his Essence a Body Then a Body is a Man Or is his Essence a Spirit Then a Spirit is a Man If he say either of these I wish he would tell us the quantity of those Propositions that we may know whether he means that every Body is a Man or every Spirit is a Man I am sure where the Essence is there must be the Essentiatum Or whether Soul and Body united make nothing different from either or both disunited Or whether a Man be only such a thing as a Pye Or why might not a Pudding serve as well if made up of several Ingredients He hath greatly indeed oblig'd Mankind for such an Honour done them If indeed the Cause depended on it he would have good store of Philosophers to confute and all that have any concern for their own kind before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed Union in the Deity and you have nothing for it but his bare word Which at least without the addition of his Name will not do the business Nor if he could also bring us a demonstration against the Union of Soul and Body can he thereby prove such an Union as we suppose in the Godhead impossible The case is quite another The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called essential for I well know if they were essentially united in the strict sense they could never be disunited But 't is commonly call'd a substantial Union and I called it natural in respect of the Principle Nature in contradistinction to Art As for the supposed Union we speak of in the Deity that being necessary original eternal it must be essential or none but with such distinction as before was supposed For it was Union not Identity that was meant which Union with such distinction till they be proved impossible the Enquirer's Cause is untoucht And is certainly to any such purpose not in the least touch'd by the Considerator Whether there be any such Union that may admit to be called essential among the Creatures doth neither make nor marr We have never said there was nor doth the stress of the Cause lie upon it I find indeed an ingenious merry Gentleman animadverts upon a Postscript writ against the Sober Enquiry and upon a Letter in answer to it who at a venture calls all essential Union essential Contradiction and substantial Nonsense Who this is I will not pretend to guess only I guess him not to be the same with the Considerator for this besides other Reasons that he calls the Author of the Considerations a great Man and I scarce think he would call himself so His Wit and sportful Humour I should have liked better in a less serious Affair For this heboldly pronounces in immediate reference to the Trinity it self that the World might know he hath a Confidence at least equal to his Wit I can easily abstain from asserting that any created Unions are to be called strictly essential because then they must be simply indissoluble And I see not but whatsoever things the Creator hath united he may disunite if he be so pleased Yet one might have expected this Author to have been a little more civil to him whom he stiles the late famous Dr. More who hath publisht to the World his express Sentiments in this matter that created Spirits have real amplitude made up of indiscerpible parts essentially united so as not to be separable without annihilation of the whole One would think he should not have treated him so as to make his essential Union substantial Nonsense But there are those left in the World who have that Veneration for the Doctor as to think it no indecent rudeness to this Gentleman not to put his judgment in the ballance against the Doctor 's or to distinguish between his calling it Nonsense and proving it so But if any wonder that they who think there is no such thing as an essential Union among Creatures do yet think there may be in the uncreated Being they will shew themselves mighty wise in their wonder i. e. in wondering that the Creatures are not God And if they further hereupon enquire why we will then make use of Unions not essential among Creatures to illustrate that which is supposed essential in the uncreated Being and expect very particular distinct accounts of every thing so represented they will shew themselves as wise in their Expectations i. e. that they think nothing can serve to illustrate unless it be like in all respects That Question still returns Is every thing to be judg'd by any Man of sense impossible in God whereof he hath not given distinct and explicit accounts and illustrations from somewhat in the Creatures And another will be added Is there any thing originally in God not essential to him But when the World is so full of instances of substantial Unions without Confusion or Identification that he cannot so much as name me a created Substance that he can be sure exists absolutely simple I am sure it can be no contradiction to suppose that there may be uncreated necessary eternal Union without Confusion or Identification and that it would be as he phrases it essential Contradiction or substantial Nonsense to say that things united necessarily tho distinct can possibly ever admit of Separation And if our modern Anti-Trinitarians for I will not call them by the inept Name of Unitarians which as rightfully belongs to them whose Adversaries they are pleas'd to be as to themselves and therefore cannot distinguish the one from the other would allow it to be their Method to understand the Doctrine of the Orthodox Antients before they decry and hoot at it they would find that as they allow sufficient distinction of the sacred Hypostases so the Union they assert is not such as identifies them but only signifies them to be inseparable So speaks Athanasius himself We think not as the Sabellians that the Son is of one and the same Essence with the Father but consubstantial Nor do we assert three Hypostases separated as with Men bodily lest with the Gentiles we should admit Polytheism c. So do Liberius and he agree in Sentiment The