at the same time have Leisure enough to run into other Matters about which there may be more Colour for Cavilling So that this cannot be the true Reason and I leave the Reader to judge what it is The last thing is the point of Reason and here he finds Leisure enough to expatiate But I shall keep to that point upon which he supposes the whole Controversie to turn which is whether the difference between Nature and Person which we observe in Mankind do so far hold with respect to the Divine Nature that it is a Contradiction to say there are three Persons and not three Gods And there are several things I proposed in order to the clearing of this Matter which I shall endeavour to lay down as distinctly as I can and I shall not be Hector'd or Banter'd out of that which I account the most proper Method although it happen to be too obscure for our Men of Wit to understand without Hazard of their Iaws The Principles or Suppositions I lay down are these I. Nature is One and Indivisible in it self whereever it is II. The more perfect any Nature is the more perfect must its Unity be III. Whatever is affirmed of a most perfect Being must be understood in a way agreeable to its Perfection IV. It is repugnant to the Perfection of the divine Nature to be multiplied into such Individuals as are among Men because it argues such a dependence and separation as is inconsistent with the most perfect Unity V. To suppose three distinct Persons in one and the same Indivisible Divine Nature is not repugnant to the Divine Perfections if they be founded on such relative Properties which cannot be confounded with each other and be in themselves agreeable to the Divine Nature VI. Whether there be three such distinct Persons or not is not to be drawn from our own Imaginations or Similitudes in created Beings but only from the Word of God from whom alone the Knowledge of it can be communicated to Mankind Let us now see how he proves that since there is no Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common human Nature it must be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the same divine Nature He offers at no less than demonstrative Reason p. 58. c. 2. but I have always had the most cause to fear the Men that pretend to Infallibility and Demonstration I pass over his Mysterious Boxes as Trifles fit only to entertain his Men of Wit and come immediately to his demonstrative Reason is it be to be met with It comes at last to no more than this that Human Nature and Angelical Nature and Camel Nature have no Existence but only in our Conception and are only Notions of our Minds but the Persons in the same rational Being are not mere Metaphysical Persons or Relative Properties but they are such as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties But in the Trinity the Nature is a really existing Nature 't is a Spiritual Substance and endued with a great number of Divine Attributes not an abstracted or mere notional imaginary Nature and the Divine Persons are not distinct Substances or real Beings but Properties only in a real Being and in an infinite Substance This is the force of the Demonstration But now if I can make it appear that every Nature is not only One and Indivisible in it self but endued with Essential Attributes and Properties belonging to it as such then it will be evident that Nature is not a mere Abstracted Notion of our Minds but something which really exists somewhere and then the Foundation of this demonstrative Reason is taken away And I appeal to any Persons that consider things whether the Human Angelical and Camel Nature as he calls it do not really differ from each other and have such Essential Properties belonging to them as cannot agree to any other Nature For else it must be a mere Notion and Fiction of the Mind to make any real difference between them But if Human Nature and Camel Nature do essentially differ from each other then every Nature hath its Essential Unity and Properties which cannot belong to any other and that without any act of our Minds And if every Nature is really and essentially different from another it must have an Existence somewhere independent on our Notions and Conceptions It may be said That no such Nature doth really exist by it self but only in the several Individuals But that is not the present Question where or how it exists but whether it depend only on our Imaginations or the acts of our Minds and if it doth so then there can be no real and essential Difference in the Natures of Men and Beast which I think none who have the Understanding of a Man can imagine But really existing Natures he saith are in such Persons as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties and if they existed only in a common Nature as the Humanity and had not also distinct Substances they would never make distinct Persons I do allow that in created and dependent Beings there must be distinct Substances to make distinct Persons but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes distinct Persons ' necessarily to suppose distinct Substances For the Nature is One and Indivisible in them all or else every Individual must make a new Species which is an Absurdity I suppose he will not be fond of If there be then one and the same Nature in the Individuals whence comes the difference of Substances to be so necessarily supposed If it be from Diversity Dissimilitude Dependence and separate Existence as I asserted then these Reasons can hold only in created Beings and where they cannot hold as in the Divine Nature why may there not be a distinction of Persons founded on relative Properties without any distinction of Substances which is repugnant to the perfect Unity of the Godhead What demonstrative Reason nay what probable Argument hath he offer'd against this He takes notice p. 60. of what I had said about the distinction of Personality and Person and that Personality is originally only a particular Mode of Subsistence and a Person besides the relative Property takes in the divine Nature together with it And what Demonstration have we against this So far from it that he falls to Tristing again to keep his Men of Wit in good Humour So much for Madam Personality now for Sir Person Is this a decent way of Writing about these Matters to begin with the Talk of demonstrative Reason and to end with Burlesquing and turning them into Ridicule If this be an agreeable Entertainment for his Men of Wit it shews that they deserve that Character as well as he doth that of a Demonstrator But this sportfull Gentleman hath found something else to play with viz. that my Notion of three Subsistences without three Substances is really nothing but Sabellianism But I had already said
particular Substance a Complication of many simple Ideas for if it be so how could a Complication of simple Ideas which cannot subsist by themselves make the Idea of a Substance which doth subsist by it self This looks a little untowardly in the way of Knowledge and Certainty But there is no help for it a Substratum must be supposed to support these unlucky Accidents Let it be so then How came we to know that these Accidents were such feeble things What simple Ideas inform'd you of it If none then it is to be hoped there is some other way to attain Knowledge and Certainty in this matter No you tell me there is no need of any other way but this of Ideas How so Your words are these The general indetermined Idea of Something is by the Abstraction of the mind derived also from the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection But alas We are not upon the general indetermined Idea of something but upon the particular Idea of distinct Substances which is granted not to be by Abstraction but by a Complication of simple Ideas So that this is quite off from the matter But as to your general abstracted Idea I have something farther to say 4. A general Abstracted Idea of Substance is no real Substance nor a true Idea of one if particular Substances be nothing but a Complication of simple Ideas For you say That the Mind by Abstraction from the positive simple Ideas got by Sensation or Reflection comes to the general Relative Idea of Substance If then the general Idea be raised from the simple Ideas and those simple Ideas make that of particular and distinct Substances only by Complication then the general Idea of Substance can be nothing but an Abstracted Complication of these simple Ideas or else it is not by Abstraction from the simple Ideas But I do not deny that there is a general Nature of Substance which is as real as a general Idea can be and it is that which makes any particular Substance be what it is in its own Nature without respect to Individual Modes and Properties And although this general Substance doth not exist of it self yet it doth really exist in the several Individuals that belong to its kind and the several kinds of particular Substances are really distinguished from each other not merely by simple Ideas of sensible Qualities but by their inward Frame and Constitution as the Substance of a Man is from that of a Horse or a Tree For it is ridiculous to imagine that these really differ from each other only as Individuals of the same sort under the general Abstracted Idea of Substance And if there be Substances of several kinds really different from each other an account must be given not only of the general Notion of a Substratum for Accidents but of the specifick Nature of different Substances and wherein the difference of the unknown Support lies as to the Modes and Accidents of their kinds which I despair of ever seeing done by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection And your self confess That we have no Idea of Abstract Substance and that by the Complex Idea of sensible Qualities we are as far from the Idea of the Substance of Body as if we knew nothing at all And now I freely leave the Reader to judge whether this be a tolerable Account of the Idea of Substance by Sensation or Reflection and whether I deserve so much to be complained of for exposing the unreasonableness of laying the Foundation of all our Certainty and Knowledge upon simple Ideas which we receive by Sensation or Reflection But before I proceed further it will be proper here to take notice how you justifie your Idea of Substance from the Etymology of the Word which say you is standing under or upholding I told you very little weight is to be laid on a bare Grammatical Etymology when the Word is otherwise used by the best Authors for the Essence of a thing and I named Cicero and Quinctilian and the Greek Word imports the same But still you say it is derived à substando and you tell us your opinion That if we knew the Original of Words we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for If you mean the true Ideas of them I must beg leave to differ in my opinion and my Reason is this because Words were used before men came to form Philosophical Notions or Ideas of Things and therefore they were forced to make use of Words applied in another Sense or else to coin Words on purpose to express their own as Cicero often doth as Qualities Evidence Comprehension c. So that if substare were used in another Sense before it doth not follow that it ought to be so when we enquire into the true Ideas of Things But one of the best Criticks of the Latin Tongue in our Age hath told us that substantia is so called quia per se substat And substare is used by Terence not for standing under but for being stedfast Metuo ut substet hospes But as to your general Observation I think there are very few Words used in the Philosophical Language of the Romans but what were taken off from the original Sense they were applied to as Persona was first taken for a Man in Masquerade Genus for a Pedegree Species for a Sight from Specio to see Virtus for manly Courage and distinguish'd from Probity Sit virtus etiam non Probitate minor Ovid. de Pont. l. 3. And so Anima was first taken for the Breath in the Body as well as Spiritus Thence Varro saith Their Ancestors although they eat Leeks and Onions yet were bene animati had no ill Breath and thence Animam agere and efflare saith Cicero and from Anima he saith came Animus by which they understood the Mind Hinc Animus ad intelligentiam tributus saith Varro and many others of a like Nature But I shall only add one more and that is the Name of Idea so very often used by your self and others of late I wish we had been told the original use of it and how it was first applied that we might better judge of the true meaning of it now when so much Weight is laid upon it I find in Thucydides who was an accurate Writer and understood the true Sense of Words that an Idea is used by him for an Appearance and Shew without Reality as when he saith That the Athenians in dealing with the Sicilians made use of the same Idea which they had done before Where it can signifie nothing but what he calls before a Pretence But when the Philosophers came to use this Word they applied it to another Sense Plato made use of it to signifie the true Exemplars or Models of Things according to which the several sorts of them were framed and distinguished This Notion he had as many others from the
each other and saying that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body Against this I urged that if it be possible for Matter to think which you assert then from the Idea of Thinking we cannot prove the Certainty of a Spiritual Substance within us where it is plain that a Spiritual Substance is opposed to the Power of Matter It is not whether Matter so modified can think but whether Matter can think and let it be modified how it will Matter is Matter still But the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit say you But doth it cease to be Matter or not If not then it is Matter still endued with a Power of Thinking and so our Idea can be no other than of a Material Thinking Substance But you say further That the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modifications it has whether it hath the Modification of Solidity or not That is Although it be really a Material Substance yet the Modification of Thinking makes it a Spiritual Substance for we are to go no farther than that Modification of Thinking and from thence we are to conclude it to be a Spiritual Substance But we are now enquiring not into the bare Modification of Thinking but whether from thence we can prove an Immaterial Substance within us or which is all one a Spiritual Substance as opposed to Corporeal which is your own Distinction And that I may not be thought to do you injury I shall produce your own Words By the simple Ideas we have taken from our own minds we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking Perceiving Liberty and Power of moving themselves we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as well as material So that here we have two things clear 1. That a Spirit and Immaterial Substance are the same 2. That from the Operations of our Minds we have a clear Idea of an Immaterial Substance within us Again you say That the primary Ideas we have of Body as contradistinguished to Spirit are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse These you think are the Original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body Here Body is contradistinguished to Spirit and as it is so the Cohesion of solid and separable Parts is made one of the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body as distinguished from a Spiritual Substance How then I pray can a Spiritual Substance consist of solid and separable Parts For whatever is solid you grant to be consequently separable This seems to me to confound the Ideas of Body and Spirit which you had taken so much care to distinguish and so must destroy all Certainty of a Spiritual Substance from your Ideas For although the bare simple Idea of Thinking may be said to be distinct from that of a solid Body yet it is impossible from that Idea so explained to prove a Spiritual Substance as distinct from Body Which was the thing I intended to prove But you go on to compare the Complex Idea of Spirit and Body in these Words Let us compare then our Complex Idea of Spirit without our Complex Idea of Body Our Idea of Bodâ— is an extended solid Substance capable of communicating Motion by Impulse and our Idea of our Souls is of a Substance that thinks and has a Power of exciting Motion in Body by Will and Thought These you think are our Complex Ideas of Soul and Body as contradistinguished Here you do not speak of the bare Ideas of Thinking and Solidity but of the different Substances and one is said to be a solid Substance and the other a Substance that thinks I shall add one passage more to the same purpose The Idea we have of Spirit compared with that we have of Body stands thus The Substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the Substance of Body equally unknown to us Here we have again the Substance of Spirit and the Substance of Body distinguished from each other and not the bare Modifications So that I need no body to answer you but your self But least such expressions should be thought a mere slip of the Pen you are pleased again to assert the Notion of an Immaterial knowing Substance to imply no more of a Contradiction than an extended divisible Body And yet after all this you confess That you have not proved an Immaterial Substance and that it cannot be proved upon your Principles What is the meaning of this I cannot think you intended to lessen the Authority of your Book in so considerable a part of it And I should much rather have thought the latter Passage a slip of your Pen but that in your Letter you go about to defend it Therefore I must attend your Motions in it You say That all the great ends of Religion and Morality are secured barely by the Immortality of the Soul without a necessary supposition that the Soul is Immaterial I am of opinion that the great ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties and which I think prove it Immaterial I do not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance but I say it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality if it depend wholly upon God's giving that which of its own Nature it is not capable of For if the Soul be a material Substance it is really nothing but Life or Matter put into Motion with such Organs and Parts as are necessary to hold them together and when Death comes then this Material Substance so modified is lost God may by his Power grant a new Life but will any man say God can preserve the Life of a Man when he is dead This is a plain Absurdity and I think no such thing tends to preserve Religion or Morality Mr. Hobbes speaks very consonantly to his own Principles although not to those of Religion and Morality For he saith That the universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies there is no real part of it that is not also a Body And so he saith That Substance and Body signifie the same thing and therefore Substance Incorporeal are Words which destroy one another But what then is a Spirit That he saith in the proper signification of it in common Speech is either a subtle fluid invisible Body or a Ghost or other Idol or Phantasm of the Imagination But is there not an Immortal Soul in Man The Promise of Immortality saith he is made to the Man and not to the Soul and Immortal Life doth not begin in Man till the Resurrection From whence it is plain he look'd on the Soul as nothing but the Life and so he saith That Soul and Life in Scripture do usually signifie the same thing And in
the Vindication of his Leviathan he saith That his Doctrine is that the Soul is not a separated Substance but that the Man at his Resurrection shall be revived And he answers that place Fear not them which kill the Body but cannot kill the Soul thus Man cannot kill a Soul for the Man killed shall revive again I think he might as well have said That Man cannot kill the Body for that shall be revived at the Resurrection But what is all this to you I hope nothing at all But it shews that those who have gone about to overthrow the Immortality of the Soul by Nature have not been thought to secure the great ends of Religion and Morality And although we think the separate State of the Soul after Death is sufficiently revealed in Scripture yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it if the Soul be nothing but Life or a Material Substance which must be dissolved when Life is ended For if the Soul be a Material Substance it must be made up as others are of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts how minute and invisible soever they be And what is it which should keep them together when Life is gone So that it is no easie matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality unless it be an Immaterial Substance and then we know the Solution of the Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul being of a different Nature And this is no more than what the wisest and most intelligent Philosophers have asserted merely from the consideration of the Nature and Properties of the Soul as you very well know and I need not for your sake run into such a Digression or as you call it step out of my way any farther then you give occasion for it in what follows For you tell me You have great Authorities to justifie your using a Spiritual Substance without excluding Materiality from it And for this you refer me to two great men indeed among the Romans Cicero and Virgil. I was surprized at what you say out of Cicero having been no stranger to his Writings about these matters and I have consulted the place you refer to where you say that he opposes Corpus to Ignis and Anima i. e. Breath and that the Foundation of his distinction of the Soul from the Body is because it is so subtle as to be out of Sight It is a very easie matter to multiply Citations out of Cicero where Spiritus and Anima are both taken for Breath but any one who will but read the very beginning of his Tusculan Questions may understand his meaning For in the Entrance of that Dispute he takes Animus for the Soul and neither Anima nor Spiritus and he tells us there were two opinions about it at Death Some held a Discessus Animi à Corpore a departure of the Soul from the Body others said that the Soul never departed but was extinguished with Life and the several opinions he sets down at large Ch. 9 10. and then Ch. 11. he summs up the different opinions and saith he If it be the Heart or Blood or Brain because it is a Body it will be extinguished with it If it be Anima the Vital Breath it will be dissipated if it be Fire it will be extinguished It is true he distinguishes here the Vital Breath from the Body and no one questions such a distinction of the Animal and Vital Spirits from the grosser parts of the Body but all this proceeds upon the Supposition of those who held nothing to survive after Death but then he goes on to those who held the Souls when they are gone out of their Bodies to go to Heaven as their proper Habitation And here he plainly supposes the Soul not to be a finer sort of Body but of a different Nature from the Body which it leaves Nam Corpus quidem saith he quasi vas est receptaculum Animi C. 22. and elsewhere he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul C. 30. and saith That every wise Man is glad to be dismissed out of the Bonds and Darkness of it and his business in the Body is secernere Animum à Corpore to draw off the Soul from the Body which the Philosophers called Commentatio mortis i. e. a Continual Exercise of Dying therefore saith he Disjungamus nos à Corporibus id est consuescamus mori Is it possible now to think so great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a Modification of the Body which must be at an end with Life Instead of it there are several things very remarkable in this very Book concerning the Immortality of Souls by Nature 1. He extremely despises those who made the Soul a mere Mode of Matter which was extinguished with Life and he saith they were Plebeii Philosophi Ch. 23. a mean sort of Philosophers and in another place minuti Philosophi De Senect c. 23. who held there was no Sense after Death But he represents Cato there as weary of the Noise and Filth of this World and longing to go to far better Company O praeclarum diem cum ad illud Divinum Animorum Concilium Coetumque proficiscar atque ex hâc turbâ colluvione discedam Did these men look on the Souls of Men as mere Modifications of Matter 2. He urges the general Consent of Nations for the Permanency of Souls after Death c. 16. and he affirms Nature it self de Immortalitate Animorum tacitè judicare c. 14. And I do not think the general Consent of Mankind in this Matter so uncertain or so slight an argument as some have made it even since the late Discoveries as I think it were no hard Matter to prove but I shall not here go out of my way to do it 3. The most ancient Philosophers of Greece held the same opinion as he shews from Pherecydes Pythagoras Socrates Plato c. c. 16 17 c. and they went upon far better Reasons than the other as he proves at large c. 21 22 23. 4. That the Bodies and Souls of Men have a different Frame and Original Our Bodies he saith c. 19. are made of Terrestrial Principles but the Souls he saith are of a divine Original and if we could give an account how they were made we should likewise how they were dissolved c. 14. as we may of the Parts and Contexture of Bodies but saith he Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest nihil est enim in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur c. 27. So that here he plainly makes a Difference between our Bodily Substance and that of our Souls which have no bodily Texture and Composition because there is no material Substance which can reach to the wonderfull Faculties and Operations of the Soul and therefore he concludes in these words Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis
animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis What can express the Soul to be of a different Substance from the Body if these words do it not And presently adds That the Mind is of a divine and Spiritual Nature and above Material Composition as God himself is I hope this may give you satisfaction as to Cicero how far he was from making the Soul a Material Substance And the only place you produce out of him c. 22. proves nothing but that the Soul is Invisible as you may see by looking upon it again As to Virgil you quote that Expression Dum Spiritus hos regit artus where it is taken for the Vital Spirit which sense I know no body questions and so Tully expresses life quae Corpore Spiritu continetur and opposes it to a Life of Immortal Fame which he there speaks of Pro Marcello c. 9. but the only matter in debate is Whether they excluded any other Notion of Spirit which was not done as I have made it appear concerning Cicero and so I shall of Virgil too For soon after Aeneid 4.385 he hath these Words Et cum frigida mors Animae seduxerit Artus Omnibus Vmbra locis adero dabis improbe poenas Which shews that Virgil did believe the Soul to be more than a mere Vital Spirit and that it subsisted and acted in a separate State And it is observed by Servius that Virgil uses Spiritus Mens and Animus for the same In Aeneid 6.726 Spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem And he proves that Virgil asserted the Immortality of Souls and answers the arguments against it and as far as he could understand he saith that our Bodies are from the Elements and our Souls from God and the Poets intention was Vt Animos immortales diceret So that neither Cicero nor Virgil do you any kindness in this matter being both Assertors of the Souls Immortality by Nature If these will not do you bring me to Scripture and say that Solomon himself speaks after the same manner about Man and Beast as the one dieth so dieth the other yea they have all one Spirit Eccles. 3.19 I will not dispute about the proper Sense of the Hebrew Word but I must about Solomon's Sense For although he makes Life and Death common to Man and Beast yet he saith v. 21. The Spirit of a Man goeth upward and the Spirit of a Beast goeth down to the Earth But you say If the Notion of a Spirit excludes Materiality then the Spirit of a Beast must be Immaterial as well as that of a Man I answer that although the bare Word doth not prove it yet the design of Solomon's Discourse doth and so the going upward of the Spirit of a Man must be understood in a very different Sense from the going downward of the Spirit of a Beast For he saith concerning Man That the Spirit shall return to God that gave it c. 12.7 To what purpose To be dissipated in the common Air or to be lost in the vast Confusion of Matter no but he concludes his Book thus v. 14. For God shall bring every Work into Iudgment with every secret thing whether it be good or whether it be evil If these be Solomon's Words as no doubt they were and he were a Man of Sense and laid his sayings together as no doubt he did these last Words must interpret the foregoing and his other sayings be made Consonant to this Yes you may say This relates to the general Iudgment and not to the Soul's Subsistence after Death But Solomon speaks of the Spirit of a Man going upward at Death and returning to God that gave it What Sense is there in this if it be a Material Substance which vanishes and is dissolved then And if the Soul be not of it self a free thinking Substance I do not see what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment For where there is nothing but Matter there is no Freedom of acting where there is no Liberty there is no Choice where there is no Choice there is no room for Rewards and Punishments and consequently no Day of Iudgment But Solomon positively concludes there will be a Judgment to come as to good and evil Actions in another World and therefore he must be understood in those Expressions to mean a Free and Thinking and consequently an Immaterial Spirit in us But you urge farther That our Saviour himself opposes Spirit to Flesh and Bones Luk. 24.39 i. e. to such a gross Compages as could be seen and felt The question then was whether it were the real Body of Christ or only an Appearance of it and how could this be resolved better than our Saviour doth Handle me and see for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones as you see me have But he calls this a Spirit What follows Therefore a Spirit is only an Appearance I do not think that is your meaning And no body questions but the name of Spirits is sometimes given to Apparitions But this is far from our case which is whether that real Spiritual Substance we find in our selves be Material or not Doth a Spiritual Substance imply Matter in its Idea or not You cannot say it doth Then it may be Immaterial But how come we to know things but by their distinct Ideas Is the Idea of Matter and Spirit distinct or not If not to what purpose do we talk of Knowledge by Ideas when we cannot so much as know Body and Spirit from each other by them Is it then any Absurdity to call a Spiritual Substance Immaterial No you say You would not be thought to affirm that Spirit never does signifie a purely Immaterial Substance for in that Sense the Scripture attributes the Notion of Spirit to God and you have proved from your Principles that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance And this you think proves an Immaterial Substance in your way of Ideas But of that afterwards We are yet upon the proving an Immaterial Substance in our selves from the Ideas we have by Sensation and Reflection Now I say still this is impossible if the Spiritual Substance in us may be material And at last you grant That what I say is true that it cannot upon these Principles be demonstrated Then say I Your grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up But you say it may be proved probable to the highest Degree But that is not the point for it is not Probability but Certainty that we are promised in this way of Ideas and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them and is it dwindled into a Probability at last The only reason I had to engage in this matter was a bold Assertion that the Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement or
To be moved only by Impulse from another Body and from the free Determination of our own Thoughts are two Ideas as disagreeing with each other as we can well imagine But if Matter may Think it may have Liberty too because you join these together but if it be uncapable of Liberty which goes along with Thinking how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking I argue from your Notion of Personal Indentity which you place in self Consciousness For you tell us That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that Consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to you essential to it From whence it follows that if there can be no Self-consciousness in Matter then it cannot think because it wants that which you say is Essential to it It being impossible for any one to perceive but he must perceive that he doth perceive But what is there like Self-consciousness in Matter Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth perceive For Bodies you say operate only by Impulse and Motion i. e. one Body upon another But how can a Body operate upon it self without Motion Those you call the Secondary Qualities of Bodies are only you say the effect of the Powers in some Bodies upon others endued with Sense and Perception So that the effects of these Powers in Bodies or of the Primary Qualities of Bulk Site Figure Motion c. is not upon themselves but upon other Bodies either by changing those Primary Qualities in them by different Site Figure Motion c. or producing those Effects in us or which we call Sensible Qualities But either of these ways there is no possibility for Matter to operate upon it self in a way of Self-consciousness If then every intelligent thinking Being have this so inseparably belonging to it that you say It is impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he doth perceive and it be impossible from the Idea of Matter to make out that a meer Body can perceive that it doth perceive I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think 5. I argue from the power of Abstracting which you make proper to a thinking Substance This is done say you by considering Ideas in the Mind as separate from the Circumstances of Time and Place And this power of abstracting you add puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to You tell me That you did not say the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly or any ways in this that Brutes cannot abstract for Brutes not being able to do any thing cannot be any Excellency of Mankind But I hope it is the Excellency of Mankind that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot And you say This puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which put a perfect Distinction was the chief Excellency with respect to them But let that be as it will the thing I insist upon is the power of Abstracting following that of Thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to Brutes but if it may be in the power of Matter to think how comes it to be so impossible for such Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abstraction Pomponatius thinks to avoid the Argument from Abstraction to prove the Souls Imateriality by saying That in the most abstract Speculation the Mind rests upon Particulars Vniversale in singulari speculatur But this doth not reach the force of the Argument which is not whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars when it forms Universal Notions but whether the power of forming such Abstract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Matter can never attain to And all that Philosopher hath said doth not amount to the least Proof of it 6. Lastly I argue from the Reason you give why God must be an Immaterial Substance For these are the words in your Letter And the Idea of an Eternal actual knowing Being is perceived to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter and of its actual Division Divisibility and Want of Perception c. Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial and this is drawn from the Idea and Essential Properties of Matter and if it be so Essential to it that from thence you concluded God must be an Immaterial Substance I think the same Reason will hold as to any thinking Substance Because the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections but from the general Idea of Matter But after all you tell me That God being Omnipotent may give to a System of very subtil matter Sense and Motion Your words before were a Power to perceive or think and about that all our debate runs and here again you say That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter makes it a Spiritual Substance But as to your Argument from God s Omnipotency I answer That this comes to the same Debate we had with the Papists about the Possibility of Transubstantiation For they never imagin'd that a Body could be present after the manner of a Spirit in an ordinary way but that by God's Omnipotent Power it might be made so but our Answer to them was That God doth not change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own Nature And that it was as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit as for a Body and Spirit to be the same The same we say in this Case We do not set bounds to God's Omnipotency For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance but we say that while he continues the Essential Properties of Things it is as impossible for Matter to think as for a Body by Transubstantiation to be present after the manner of a Spirit and we are as certain of one as we are of the other These things I thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared because I look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality which you think may be secured although the Soul be allowed to be a Material Substance but I am of a very different Opinion For if God doth not change the Essential Properties of things their Nature remaining then either it is impossible for a Material Substance to think or it must be asserted that a Power of thinking is within the Essential Properties of Matter and so thinking will be such a Mode of Matter as Spinoza hath made
immaterial most perfect Being whose Essential Attributes do not depend upon our Arbitrary Ideas nor any Names or Signs of Honour we give him nor upon the meer Inlarging the Ideas of our own Perfections or such as we account to be so in our selves for we attribute those to God which we are not capable of as Eternity or Necessary Existence Immutability c. Herein we take up no Complex Ideas from several Individuals but we form a true Idea of a Divine Essence from such Attributes as are Essential to an infinitely perfect Being which being Infinite is thereby Incomprehensible by us And so you own that the great God of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehensibly Infinite And that God is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities II. In the next place we look on this Supream Being as the wise Creator of all things who hath ordered the several Sorts and Ranks of Beings in the World according to his own Eternal Wisdom and hath given them all such Properties as himself thought fit whereby they are really and essentially distinguished from one another as appears by Mankind and Brutes and Plants And no man that ever imploys his own Thoughts can think that these are distinguished from each other only by an Act of our Minds III. Among these it is evident that there are some things wherein they agree and some wherein they differ They all agree in being real created Beings and having a sort of Life belonging to them But they differ that some have Sense which others have not and some have Reason and Understanding which others want And all this is so plain and evident that one might question whether those had Understanding or not who could think the difference of these from each others was not in their Natures but only depended on the several Names that we call them by IV. Among the Individuals of the same kind there is an Agreement in the same Essential Properties as all Men in being Rational Creatures and there is a Real Difference from each other in the several Accidents that belong to them as to Time Place Qualities Relations c. And no Man in his Senses can call this in question For his most plain and simple Ideas will inform him of it V. The Question now is Whether that wherein they do all agree be a meer Vniversal Name and Abstract Idea or not It is certain that what God created is no meer Name or Idea It is certain that God created not only Individuals but the several Kinds with the Differences which they have from each other it is certain that these Differences do not lie in meer Names or Ideas How comes it then not to be certain that there is a Real Common Essence or Nature in the Individuals of the same kind But it comes not to us in the way of Ideas If it be so the way of Ideas and Reason are two different ways and I shall never forsake one for the other unless I could see better Reason for it and even then I should not but adhere to Reason still But how doth it appear by Reason that Nature is any thing else but a Collection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea That will be done by considering 1. What these Ideas are which are so collected into a Complex Idea which is called Nature 2. What that Essence is which is implied in this Idea whether it be a Real or only a Nominal Essence 1. What these Ideas are of which this Complex Idea of Nature consists and they are said to be the simple Ideas of particular Substances united together without the Circumstances of Time and Place But those simple Ideas may be considered two ways 1. With respect to the Qualities of things and these Ideas are said to be true and adequate but they go no farther than the Qualities which reaches only to that Sense of Nature as it is taken for Properties 2. With respect to the Subject of them which is the Nature or Substance that supports them and of this you confess we have only imperfect and inadequate Ideas As they are true and adequate and so they are not the true Representations of Things without us but of the Effects of such Powers in them as produce Impressions in us which are those you call Secondary Qualities And in that Sense I take your words And of these I said that we can understand nothing really by them but the Effects they have upon us i. e. the Powers and not the Ideas The Ideas are the Impressions on our Minds and by these we can understand nothing but the Effects which the Powers in outward Objects have upon us and consequently not the Nature of them This I take to be plain Sense To this you Answer Two things 1. That we certainly know to distinguish things by Ideas supposing them nothing but Effects produced in us by these Powers as if they were Representations 2. That we have certainly as much pleasure and delight by those Ideas one way as the other Granting all this to be true what is it to the Complex Idea of Nature which arises from these simple Ideas Nature is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea But the simple Ideas acquaint us not with the Nature of the Objects but only with the Powers which are in them by the help of Bulk Size Figure and Motion which you call the Primary Qualities Now these you say are really in the things themselves whether the Senses perceive them or not and the Ideas of these are the true Resemblances of what exists in the Objects i. e. that by the Impressions we find in our selves we are certain that there are Bodies of a determinate Bulk Size Figure and Motion And this is all we can by these simple Ideas come to as the Nature of Corporeal Substances But suppose one should ask how we can understand the Nature of these Operations of the Primary Qualities in producing the Secondary we are soon answered that there is no conceivable Connexion between them and that Reason cannot shew how Bodies by their Bulk Figure and Motion should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue Yellow c. And so we are extremely helped by these simple Ideas in understanding the Nature of any particular Substance For the sensible Qualities in us are only the Effects of certain Powers in the Objects caused by their Bulk Size Figure and Motion but if we ask how they are produced we are plainly told that our Reason by these simple Ideas can reach to no knowledge of it And so we are left in as much Ignorance as ever as to the Manner how Things without us produce Ideas in us But say you By these simple Ideas we can as certainly distinguish the Beings wherein those Powers are and receive as certain Advantages from them as if those simple Ideas were Resemblances As to Advantages from
them that is quite out of our Enquiry which is concerning the Idea of Nature as it is a Complexion of simple Ideas and all that it amounts to is that by these simple Ideas we understand the Distinct Powers in several Bodies to produce Impressions in our Minds and by the secondary Qualities we find in our selves we are certain of the primary Qualities in Bodies from their different Bulk Size Figure and Motion But still we have nothing but an Idea of Qualities which goes no farther than the Essential Properties but the Idea of Nature goes farther and implies that Being wherein those Qualities are and that I said which is the subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature or Substance of it which in this respect is the same Have we any Adequate Idea of this To this you say 2. That all Ideas of Substances which are referr'd to Real Essences are in that respect Inadequate This is what your self own to be your Sense and is as much as I desire For I pray consider what a fine Abstract Complex Idea you have given us of Nature Our Adequate Ideas go no farther than Qualities and if we enquire into the Real Essence or Substance that supports them we are told that they are Inadequate and consequently we can have no true Notion or Idea at all of it But you say farther that you do not affirm That Abstract Ideas are only general Names For you assert a Real Essence in things the internal unknown Constitution is the Real Essence and the Abstract Idea is the Nominal Essence The former you tell me you do readily own viz. That Essence which is in particular Substances but the Question before us is Whether that which is in more Individuals than one be a Real or only a Nominal Essence 2. And this is that which we are next to Examine To clear this I put the Instance of the Sun where an Essence was said by you to be in one Individual and yet more Suns might agree in it In this one Sun there is a Real Essence and not a meer Nominal and Abstracted Essence upon which I asked If there were more Suns would not each of them have the Real Essence of the Sun For what is it makes the second Sun to be a true Sun but having the same Real Essence with the first If it were but a Nominal Essence then the Second would have nothing but the Name Here I must examine your Answer as far as I can understand it For here indeed you may complain of the want of clear and distinct Ideas but I will do what I can to explain that which I conceive to be your Sense You say This doth not at all concern the Real but the Nominal Essence How is this possible Is there not the Real Essence of the Sun in that Individual we call the Sun But I put the Case that there were a Multiplication of Individuals and there were more Suns would not each of these have the Real Essence of the Sun If it were only a Nominal Essence the rest would have only the Name But you say you did not mean the real Essence of the Sun was in that Individual How could you mean otherwise when you acknowledge the Real Essence to be in particular Substances And is not the Sun a particular Substance But the Idea of it being a Complex and Abstracted Idea could not be the Real Essence I answer That the Essence of the Sun being communicated to another is a Real Essence or else the Second is but the Name and nothing else You tell me That you say expressly that our distinguishing Substances into Species by Names is not at all founded on their Real Essences And I think it is clear to any one that understands things and not meer Ideas that another true Sun must have the Real Essence of a Sun You ask What I mean by a true Sun I answer That which hath the Essence of a Sun and that the Name cannot be truly applied to that which hath it not Yes say you it may to any thing which hath united in it that Combination of sensible Qualities by which any thing else that is called Sun is distinguished from other Substances i. e. by the Nominal Essence So that now the Abstract Complex Idea is owned to be nothing but a Combination of Qualities in one Idea But I must still ask what becomes of this Combination of Qualities in the second Sun if there be not a Real Essence to support them You grant it when the second Sun comes to exist And if it does not exist how can it be the Second Sun Should it be true say you that the Real Essence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars yet it could not be called by us the Sun whilst it answers not our Complex Idea or Nominal Essence of a Sun If the Real Essence of a Sun be in a fixed Star it is really a Sun whether you call it so or not as a Laplander is as really a Man whatever you call him if he hath the Essence of a Man And it is strange to me to find any Man dispute such evident things And so I come to the Instance of the Individuals among Men. I said that there must be a Real Essence in every Individual of the same kind Peter Iames and Iohn are all true and real Men not by attributing a general Name to them but because the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them But you say I first suppose them to be Men no otherwise than as they are Individuals of the same kind Your Weweena Cuchepy and Cousheda I have nothing to say to they may be Drills for any thing I know but Peter Iames and Iohn are Men of our own Country and we know them to be several Individuals of the Race of Mankind And what is it makes them Men but that the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them Yes say you if making be taken for the Efficient Cause Whoever dreamt of a Specifick Essence being the Efficient Cause But I said that it was the true and real Essence of a Man which made every Individual a true and real Man of which I said we are as certain as that we are Men. That say you is only by our Senses finding those Properties which answer the Abstract Complex Idea which is in our Minds of the Specifick Idea to which we have annexed the Specifick Name Man I leave to you the Honour of this Scholastick Language which is always most proper when there is nothing under it I love to speak plain Sense if I can and so as to be understood by every one that is acquainted with these Matters but these Specifick Names and Abstract and Complex Ideas I think tend to confound Mens Apprehensions who can never think otherwise but that every Man is said to be a true real
Man not for any Specifick Name but because his Properties shew him to be endued with the true real Essence of a Man I said that the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas but by meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances but from Reason and Consideration of things You Reply That you thought Reason and Consideration had been meer Acts of the Mind when any thing was done by them I hope the Ideas you have of the Acts of your own Mind are clearer than those you have of other Mens For it is plain I opposed your General and Abstract Idea by a meer Act of the Mind to a Rational Inference from the Nature and Properties of things For I added for when I see so many Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties we thence inferr there must be something common to all which makes them of one kind and if the difference of Kinds be real that which makes them of one kind and not of another must not be a Nominal but a Real Essence Is there now no difference between these Two Acts of the Mind viz. Abstraction and Ratiocination And you grant that the Inference is true But you say it doth not follow that the general or specifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind Where do I deny that Abstraction is made by an Act of the Mind But that is not the Question but whether the Notion of Essence in Individuals of the same kind be a meer Act of the Mind by Abstraction or have a real Foundation in the Nature of Things i. e. whether it be a Real or a Nominal Essence But you say There may be Objections to the Name of Nominal Essence My Objection is not to the Name but to the Thing you understand by it viz. that there is nothing beyond Individuals but Names which utterly overthrows the Difference of Nature and Person For if there be nothing really but an individuated Essence then it must follow that there can be no difference of Hypostases in the same Nature For Nature individuated must take in the Hypostasis and Nature being taken as common is affirmed by you to be nothing but an Abstract and Complex Idea and a mere Nominal Essence You say That we cannot know the differences of things by their real Essences And what then Do I ever deny that the difference of kinds is to be understood from the different Properties But we are not upon our Knowledge of the difference of Species but upon the Real and Nominal Essence And I shew'd that the real Essence doth not depend upon Complex Ideas because if men mistake never so much in the Combination of Ideas yet the same Essence remains as I instanced in the Essence of a Man a Horse and a Tree True you say Our Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Constitutions of things that exist but the Change of Ideas can and does alter the signification of their Names and thereby alter the kinds which by these Names we rank and sort them into But this doth by no means reach the point which is not concerning our sorting of Things which is by Names but God's sorting them when he made them of different kinds For so I said that the Essences remain always the same because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator who hath made several sorts of Beings All the Answer you give is this That the real Constitution or Essence of particular things existing do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator but their being ranked into sorts under such and such Names does depend and wholly depend upon the Ideas of Men. But my Argument did not proceed upon particular things existing but upon the several kinds of God's making and is it possible for you to think that the kinds are not of his making but that Men only by their Ideas make the several sorts If so I have very little hopes to remove you from your Ideas but I am bound to do what in me lies to hinder such Notions from overthrowing the Mysteries of our Faith And it is a great satisfaction to me to find that these Notions of Ideas as far as they tend that way have so very little Foundation in Reason or rather are so manifestly repugnant to them Before I conclude my self I must take notice of your Conclusion viz. That you must content your self with this condemned way of Ideas and despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that or farther than that will lead me to it Which is in effect to say that you see no way to avoid Scepticism but this but my great Prejudice against it is that it leads to Scepticism or at least that I could find no way to attain to Certainty in it upon your own grounds For 1. you say That Knowledge to you seems to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas In this alone it consists Whence it unavoidably follows that where we can have no Ideas we can have no Knowledge But you go about to prove That there are many more Beings in the World of which we have no Ideas than those of which we have any and that one holds no Proportion to the other So that we are excluded from any Possibility of attaining to knowledge as to the far greatest part of the Universe for want of Ideas and yet you say That he that will consider the infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator of all things will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable mean and impotent a Creature as he will find man to be who in all Probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings And not long after you say That the Intellectual World is a greater Certainly and more beautifull World than the Material But whence comes this Certainty where there can be no Ideas Is a general Reason sufficient without particular Ideas Then why not in other cases as well 2. Suppose we have no Ideas of the Intellectual World yet surely we may have as to the visible World No you say That although we have Ideas of Bulk Figure and Motion in general yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Figure and Motion of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Vniverse we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and Ways of Operation whereby the Effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too remote in others by being two minute So that you confess We can attain to no Science either as to Bodies or Spirits And what a narrow compass must our Knowledge then be confined to You confess We have no Ideas of the Mechanical Assertions of the minute Particles of Bodies and this hinders our