sown in Corruption and Weakness and Dishonour Either therefore he must speak of the same Body or his meaning cannot be comprehended For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption and is to be restored with more noble Qualities For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption and this Mortal must put on Immortality I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection and that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith this is an Article of it and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body The Dispute is not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a Renovation i. e. it may be a New Life but not a raising the Body from the Dead 2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with are no less than those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Saviour The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature the latter is said Art 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person which you have endeavour'd with all your Art to perplex and confound and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment Of which afterwards The Original Question was whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas and my business was to prove that we could not because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways These are your own Words And then I undertook to shew that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties or for that Substance wherein that Property lies whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas you could come to no Certainty about them And as to Person I shew'd that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses but upon a different manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another And as to this I said that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception but whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other way for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures but there must be two Persons Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it As to Nature you say That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea which when they are found united in any Individual existing though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man or the Nature of a Man to be in him forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him which answer the â—omplex abstract Idea to which the specifick Name is given by any one which abstract specifick Idea he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals And as to Person in the way of Ideas you say that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing and so no Idea belonging to it nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstracted and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more To this you answer in your second Letter That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition But the Question is whether these be meer Words and Names or not Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person Of which I gave this evident Proof that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals every Individual must make a different Kind And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason Nothing particular that I can find But in the general you say that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing And is this all indeed Did not I tell you in these Words which I am forced to repeat on this occasion although I am very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions The Question now between us comes to this whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea or a general Name and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted The Question is not whether in forming
the Notion of common Nature the Mind doth not abstract from the Circumstances of particular Beings but it is whether there be not an Antecedent Foundation in the Nature of things upon which we form this abstract Idea For if there be then it cannot be called an Universal Name only or a meer sign of an Idea which we have formed from putting many simple Ideas together which Name belongs to all of such a sort as have those simple Ideas united together In these Words which you cannot deny to be in the place mention'd I thought I had stated the Case fairly between us And why do you not return an Answer to them But instead of that you only mention another Passage more liable to cavilling where I say That upon your Notions of Nature and Person I do not see how it is possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the sign of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstract and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more Upon this you charge me with affirming that of you which you never said viz. that these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas but your Words are Taking therefore Nature and Person for the sign of two Ideas they are put to stand for and by enumerating all the simple Ideas that are contained in the complex Idea that each of them is made to stand for we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them These are your own Words Now from thence it appears that Nature and Person are Terms which are the signs of two Ideas by your own Confession but you never made these or any other Terms to be Ideas and you should be ashamed of such Iargon But have not you said in your Essay that it is a very common Practice for Names to be made use of instead of the Ideas themselves especially if the Ideas be very complex Nature and Person you grant to be complex Ideas and these Terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas Therefore here is an Ambiguity in the Use of these Words for they are complex Ideas themselves and they are made the signs of them and so the Words of the Sentence are capable of both those Senses For it is true according to you that these Terms Nature and Person really signifie nothing in themselves but are only complex and abstract Ideas and those Terms are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas So that Nature and Person are both Ideas themselves and those Terms are the Signs of two Ideas and the Sense had not been liable to Exception if And had been inserted For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas And which the common Use had appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas c. But whether this be properly expressed or not according to your Sense of Ideas the Weight of the Controversie depends not at all upon it but whether Nature and Person can be any other but abstract Ideas according to your own plain Expressions and if they are so they are no more than Notions of the Mind and then the Consequence must hold that One Nature and three Persons can be no more Upon which I said I did not see how it was possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity and I now add of the Incarnation which was the thing I undertook to make out But you very freely say whether I rightly deduce from it this Consequence viz. And so one Nature and three Persons can be no more is what you neither know not are concerned to examin Which I think is an Expression could hardly drop from a Person who did know how to declare his Belief of three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature But you pretend these are none of your Notions of Nature and Person nor indeed any thing you can understand But it is plain that this Consequence follows from your own Notions of Nature and Person as they are set down expresly by your self in the former Letter You tell me I made this Inference a little in haste Whether a Man write in haste or not the World will judge by what appears and not by what he or any other saith And I think it will appear that I did not make this Inference in haste but from a deliberate Consideration of your Notion of the Ideas of Nature and Person But by those Terms signifying nothing in themselves you say that you meant that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition And was this truly all that you meant by it And do you think that Peter and Iames and Iohn signifie any thing by Nature Are not all Words made significative by Imposition But is there no difference in the signification of Words as they stand for signs of Things If they be Words for particular Substances then you grant that there is something really existing which is meant by those Words but if they relate only to the Conceptions of the Mind then they signifie them and no more And the Question is which of these two you meant by those Words Nature and Person And you plainly affirm both of them to be complex Ideas which are made only by an Act of the Mind and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood You presume that upon more leisurely thoughts both my self and the rest of Mankind will concur with you I never affected Singularity and am ready to comply with the rest of Mankind in any reasonable thing But you say that this Notion of Nature and Person That they are two Words that signifie only by Imposition is what will hold in the common Sense of Mankind No doubt of it But I must again and again tell you that is not the Point in Question but whether they are only abstract and complex Ideas which have no other Being but in the Mind And to this you answer not a Word I do not in the least think as you suggest that it is necessary to the Defense of the Trinity that these two Articulate sounds should have Natural significations and that unless they are used in those significations it were impossible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity But I do affirm that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas can neither defend nor reasonably believe it And this is making no extraordinary Supposition necessary to the Belief or Defence of it but only that which in the common Sense of Mankind is necessary to it For if you have expressed your
own Mind in your former Letter that must guide us in your Notion of Nature and Person where you undertook to explain them For if Nature and Person be abstract and complex Ideas as you say and such are only Acts of the Mind I do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation I do not go about to accuse you of denying these Doctrines I hope you do not But I impute all this Hesitancy and doubting only to your Notions of Ideas which you had been so long forming in your Mind that as it often happens in such Cases one darling favourite Notion proves too hard for some Points of far greater Consequence when they are found inconsistent with it And because you had first fixed your Notion of Ideas and taken much Pains about them you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them But you could not but find that the Articles of three Persons and one Nature and two Natures and one Person were not reconcileable with your Ideas of Nature and Person which is that they are complex Ideas which depend upon the Act of the Mind for this were to make the two Natures in Christ to be only two complex Ideas For if Nature as you say be a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea then two Natures can be nothing else but two such Collections or two abstracted and complex Ideas It may be said that when you make Nature an abstracted and complex Idea you speak of a specifick Idea but the Humane Nature in Christ was a particular Substance and this you assert to be a real thing and not to depend on the Act of the Mind But this doth not clear the Matter For in your former Letter you said that all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas which in Corporeal Substances are sensible Qualities in Incorporeal are Operations of the Mind The utmost then which the Idea of Humane Nature in Christ comes to is that there were in him the sensible Qualities and Intellectual Operations of a Man with an unknown Substance to support them which belongs not to the simple Ideas but is supposed by them This is all I can make of your way of Ideas and so the Incarnation of Christ is the assuming the sensible Qualities and intellectual Operations of a Man to which a Substratum doth belong but is no Part of the simple Ideas So that we can have no Idea at all of the Humane Nature of Christ but only an Inference that since those are but Accidents there must be a Substratum to support them and consequently there was a particular Substance in him made up of Mind and Body But if this had come in the Way of Ideas yet it cannot make out the Humane Nature of Christ. For if it were in him no otherwise than in other Men then the Mystery of the Incarnation is quite gone and Christ is to be consider'd but like other Men which doth not answer to what the Scripture saith of the Word 's being made Flesh and that God was manifest in the Flesh. There must be therefore something beyond the meer Humane Nature in him and either it must be only some Divine Operation upon and with it and that is no Substance or if it be a Substance it must either cohabit with it or else be united to it If it only co-habits then there are two Persons dwelling together in one Body and the Actions of one cannot be attributed to the other If there be a real Union between them so as the Acts belong to one Person then there must be such a Manner of Existence in the Humane Nature of Christ which is different from it in other Persons For in all others the Acts belong to the Humane Person but if it were so in Christ then the Divine Acts of Christ must flow from the Humane Nature as the Principle of them which is to confound the Divine and Humane Nature and Operations together If they come from the Divine Person then the Humane Nature must have another kind of Subsistence than it hath in others or else there must be two Persons and Person being as you say a Forensick Term there must be two different Capacities of Rewards and Punishments which is so absurd an Opinion as I think no one will assert If there be then but one Person and two Natures how can you possibly reconcile this to your Way of Ideas Person say you in it self signifies nothing but as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person i. e. Men may call a Person what they please for there is nothing but common use required to it They may call a Horse or a Tree or a Stone a Person if they think fit but since the common use of Language hath appropriated it to an Intelligent Being that is a Person And so you tell us That Person stands for a Thinking Intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking Being in different times and place How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else From whence comes Self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this Idea of a Person Whether it be true or false I am not now to enquire but how it comes into this Idea of a Person Hath the common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense If not this seems to be a meer Arbitrary Idea and may as well be denied as affirmed And what a fine pass are we come to in the Way of Ideas if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty But of that afterwards We now proceed in the Way of Ideas as you give it us But if this be the true Idea of a Person then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person For if an Intelligent Conscious Being be the Idea of a Person and the Divine and Human Nature be Intelligent Conscious Beings then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk for here must be two Persons in this Way of Ideas Again if this be the Idea of a Person then where there are three Persons there must be three distinct Intelligent Beings and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gone if this Way of Ideas hold So great a difference there is between forming Ideas first and then judging of Revelation by them and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds and interpreting the Sense of it by the due Measures of Reason You may pretend what you please that you hold the Assurance of Faith and the Certainty by
THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Second Letter Wherein his NOTION of IDEAS Is prov'd to be Inconsistent with it self And with the ARTICLES OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH LONDON Printed by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard MDCXCVIII THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Second Letter c. SIR I Was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your Second Letter considering the shortness of the Answer contained in it But it put me in mind of the Springs of Modená mention'd by Ramazzini which rise up with such a plenty of Water upon opening a Passage that the Undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it I see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a Person of such a fruitfull Invention to write for Letters become Books and small Books will soon rise to great Volumes if no way be found to give a Check to such an Ebullition of Thoughts as some Men find within themselves I was apt to think the best way were to let Nature spend it self and although those who write out of their own Thoughts do it with as much Ease and Pleasure as a Spider spins his Web yet the World soon grows weary of Controversies especially when they are about Personal Matters Which made me wonder that one who understands the World so well should spend above fifty Pages of a Letter in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concerning himself Suppose I had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your Words and anothers Intentions together had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self to have declared to the World that you owned the Doctrine of the Trinity as it hath been Received in the Christian Church and is by ours in the Creeds and Articles of Religion This had stopt the Mouths of the Clamorous and had removed the Suspicions of the Doubtfull and would have given full Satisfaction to all reasonable Men. But when you so carefully avoid doing this all other Arts and Evasions do but leave the Matter more suspicious among the most Intelligent and Impartial Readers This I mention not that you need be afraid of the Inquisition or that I intend to charge you with Heresie in denying the Trinity but my present Design is to shew That your Mind is so intangled and set fast by your Notion of Ideas that you know not what to make of the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation because you can have no Idea of One Nature and three Persons nor of two Natures and one Person as will fully appear afterwards And therefore out of regard to Publick Service in order to the preventing a growing Mischief I shall endeavour to lay open the ill Consequences of your Way of Ideas with respect to the Articles of the Christian Faith But I shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions and come immediately to the Matter of your Complaint as it is renewed in this Second Letter which I shall briefly answer before I proceed to that which I chiefly design Your Complaint you say was That you were brought into a Controversie wherein you had never meddled nor knew how you came to be concerned in I told you It was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon your Grounds and made use of your Words although I declared withall that they were used to other purposes than you intended them and I confess'd that the reason why I quoted your Words so much was because I found your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went and that he had nothing that look'd like Reason if that Principle were removed which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold and so I supposed the reason why I so often mention'd your Words was no longer a Riddle to you These Passages you set down in your Second Letter but you say all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter Whether it doth or not I am content to leave it to any indifferent Reader and there it must rest at last although you should write Volumes about it But for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied You tell us It is that the Author mentioned went upon this Ground That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty but that is not your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas which is That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas such as we have whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no And you say that you have no Notions of Certainty more than this one This is no more than what you had said before in your former Letter and I took particular notice of it and gave three several Answers to it which I shall here lay together and defend because you seem to think I had not answered it 1. That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than you do according to this Answer and speak more agreeably to your Original Grounds of Certainty For it is a very wonderfull thing in point of Reason for you to pretend to Certainty by Ideas and not allow those Ideas to be clear and distinct You say the Certainty lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas How can I clearly perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas if I have not clear and distinct Ideas For how is it possible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or disagree if there be some parts of those Ideas we have only general and confused Ideas of And therefore I had great reason to say that if Certainty be placed in Ideas we must have clear and distinct Ideas You may as well say a Man may be certain of the Agreement and Disagreement of Colours in a confused or uncertain Light For so much as the Idea fails of Clearness and Distinctness so much it fails of that Evidence which it is necessary to judge by Where-ever there is Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection in the Ideas there must be so much Uncertainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of them And to pretend to Certainty by Ideas without pretending to clear and distinct Ideas is to judge without Evidence and to determine a thing to be certainly true when we cannot know whether it be so or not for how can you be sure that your Ideas agree with the Reality of things wherein you place the Certainty of Knowledge if there be no such Ideas of those things that you can perceive their true Nature and their difference from all others For therein you will not deny that the Notion of clear and distinct Ideas consists But you say more than once or twice or ten times That I blame those who place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas but you do it not and yet I bring
From whence we see that Aristotle's Notion of Nature was very consistent with an Efficient Cause of Nature But your Gentleman saith That to those who admit not Matter and Motion to be Eternal no Nature in that Sense will be left since Nature is said to be a Corporeal Substance which hath the Principles of Motion in it self and such a sort of Corporeal Substance those Men have no Notion of at all and consequently none of Nature which is such a Corporeal Substance But if Aristotle did not suppose Matter to move it self without an Efficient Cause as certainly he did not then all this falls to the Ground and his Notion of Nature for a Substantial Principle of Life and Action may remain good But it may be said That this was one of his singular Notions and that no other Philosophers took it so Which is so far from being true that a great Enemy of Aristotle's confesses That the Name of Nature among the Writers before him extended to all kinds of Beings and not only to Individual but to Specifick Natures Aristotle's fault lay in applying Nature only to Corporeal Substances and whatever was above them he look'd on as above Nature but the Pythagoreans and Platonists took Nature to extend to Spiritual as well as Bodily Substances Which appears by Timaeus Locrus his Book of Nature in the beginning whereof he divides Things into two kinds Intellectual and Corporeal and the former whose Nature was more excellent he derives immediately from the best Principle viz. God himself But to make this plainer we are to consider that there were four Opinions among the Old Philosophers about Nature Some held Nature to be the same with Matter and attributed the Beginning of all things to that alone such were the followers of Anaximander and Democritus Others rejected this Doctrine as absurd and impious and held a Divine Being above Matter which gave the beginning to Motion and framed the World and they asserted Spiritual as well as Corporeal Natures and these were the followers of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras Others asserted the Beginning of Motion and of the World from a first Cause but confined the Sense of Nature to the Course of things established in this Visible World by an Universal Providence at first And this was the Notion of Aristotle and his followers to the time of Strato who attributed all to meer Nature Lastly there were some who made Nature to be the first Principle which formed all things which sometimes they called God and sometimes Nature as is obvious in all the Writings of the Stoicks Vis illum Naturam vocare non peccabis saith Seneca and in another place Quid aliud est Natura quam Deus divina Ratio and again Nec Deus sine Naturâ est nec Natura sine Deo sed idem est utrumque which he elsewhere calls Incorporalis Ratio ingentium operum Artifex With which Balbus in Cicero agrees when he defines Nature from Zeno to be an Intelligent Fire that produces all things For what he calls Ignem artificiosum ad gignendum c. Laertius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it is called in Cicero Natura Artifex Consultrix Provida c. which can agree to nothing but a Spiritual Substance and when he explains what Nature is he saith That Epicurus called all by the Name of Nature and divided it into Matter and Vacuity and the Accidents of both but we saith he of the Stoicks by Nature understand no Inanimate Things which have no Principle within to unite them as Earth and Stones but a living Substance as an Animal in which is no Chance but Order and Contrivance And so Plato said That Nature ordered all things with Reason and Vnderstanding By which he understood the Divide Being If we come lower down among the Philosophers we shall find Nature taken for a Principle of Life So Sextus Empiricus distinguishes the Union of Matter in Stones and Wood from that which is in Plants and this he calls Nature which is the lowest degree of it for afterwards he speaks of Rational and Intellectual Natures and places God in the head of them Antoninus distinguishes Nature in Plants from a heap of the Particles of Matter in Wood and Stone But in another place he distinguishes that which is meer Nature in Man viz. what he hath in common with Plants from the Nature of an Animal in him and that again from the Nature of a Rational Creature in him Here indeed he speaks of the Properties of those Natures but he still supposes that where they are separate they are founded in distinct Substances So that I hope if the Philosophers of old of all kinds did understand the Sense of Nature and Substance the Gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory Humour of saying That for his Life he cannot understand Nature to be Substance nor Substance to be Nature For they all agreed in this however they differed in their Opinions of Nature But I have something farther to add concerning the Sense of the Christian Church in this Matter which I think is by no means to be despised It is observed by Damascen that some of the Philosophers made this difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the former was taken for simple Essence but the latter for Essence with a Specifical Difference but that the Christian Writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one as an Angel a Man a Horse c. So St. Chrysostom calls Angels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 St. Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but they all agree that Incorporeal and Invisible Substances are real Natures And the Reason Damascen gives is That they have both the same Original and you know that it is a good way to find out the true Idea for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both which are the same So that if Real Existence belong to Substance and Nature hath its Name from thence too then Substance and Nature must be of the same Importance And this Notion of Nature they do not take up meerly from the Etymology of the Word but from the Sense of it in Scripture as when St. Paul saith They worshipped those which by Nature are no Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Alexandrian Copy hath it more clearly i. e. which are not really and substantially Gods They had the Names of Gods and the Divine Properties were attributed to them but because they had not the Divine Essence they are said not to be Gods by Nature And what Sense would this Gentleman make of the Apostle's words who cannot for his Life understand that Nature is the same
with Substance He must understand this only of the Properties which belong to God But these Properties must be somewhere and so a Substance must be supposed as the Subject of them and what Reason can there be to exclude that which is the Subject of those Properties For there must be a Divine Being as well as Properties and that Being must have Essential Properties belonging to it and what imaginable Reason can there be why that should not be called the Divine Nature And if it be then Substance and Nature are the same I might easily pursue this farther but I design to bring things into as little a compass as I can But it may be there is something in our own Language which hinders Nature from being taken for a Substance and for this I appeal to a late Ingenious and Honourable Person and Philosopher of our own I mean Mr. Boyle who hath written a Philosophical Enquiry into the Notion of Nature and he tells us of the various Acceptations of it 1. For the Author of Nature 2. For the Essence of a Thing 3. For what comes to Men by Birth as a Man is Noble by Nature 4. For an Internal Principle of Motion as that a Stone is carried downwards by Nature 5. For the established course of things as that Nature makes the Night to succeed the Day 6. For an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Living Body as that Nature is strong or weak 7. For the System of the Universe as when we say of a Chimaera there is no such thing in Nature 8. For a Semi-Deity which is the Notion he opposes But we may observe that he allows God and all the real Beings of the Vniverse to have Nature belonging to them and he saith The Word Essence is of great Affinity to it if not of an adequate Import But the Real Essence of a thing is a Substance and therefore Nature and Substance are of the like Importance The next thing fit to be considered is How far your Certainty by Ideas and the Certainty by Reason differ from each other The occasion of this Debate stands thus I had said in my Book That I granted that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas In answer to this you said That you can find no Opposition between Ideas and Reason but Ideas are the Objects of the Vnderstanding and Vnderstanding is one of the Faculties imployed about them To which I replied No doubt of it But you might easily see that by Reason I understood Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind which I think are very different from Ideas But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of or one as obscure as that of Substance If there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the Manner of Expression I do not go about to defend it but the worst of it is That your Idea of Reason is as obscure as that of Substance And whether there were not a just Occasion for it the Reader must judge when the Faculty was put for the Principles of Reason Could any Man judge otherwise but that you had a very obscure Idea of Reason who could mistake the Vnderstanding for it But Reason you say taken for the Faculty is as different from Ideas in your Apprehension But what is that to the Point in Dispute whether the Notion of Nature be to be taken from Ideas or from Reason You say the Vnderstanding is imploy'd about them And what then I shewed that the Nature of things belongs to Reason and not to bare Ideas because Ideas come in by Sensation and Reflection by which we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but we cannot come to know the Notion of Nature as the Subject of them but by this Reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves And is this no more than to say the Vnderstanding is imployed about Ideas But now you answer farther That if Reason be taken for the Faculty or the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind Reason and Ideas may consist together This leads me to the Examination of that which may be of some use viz. To shew the Difference of your Method of Certainty by Ideas and the Method of Certainty by Reason And the Way of Certainty by Reason lies in two things 1. The Certainty of Principles 2. The Certainty of Deductions As to the former the Gentleman your Defender in your Book saith That in your Essay in more places than one you have spoken and that pretty largely of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims so that if I have ever read them I cannot doubt but you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason What Ideas you have of them must appear from your Book And I do there find a Chapter of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims which I cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it which is thus summed up in the Conclusion viz. That it was to shew That these Maxims as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are not clear and distinct And is not this a fair way to convince me that your Way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason when the Way of Reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon General Principles and you assert them to be Vseless and Dangerous Your first Design you say is to prove that the Consideration of these General Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge which overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonstration and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason To make this plain I shall put a Case grounded upon your Words which are that you have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. These Words I. S. understands as spoken of themselves and charges them with very ill Consequences but I think they are capable of another meaning However let us put the Case that Men did in earnest question whether they were Men or not and then I do not see if you set aside general Maxims how you can convince them that they are Men. For the way I look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason As in the first place that Nothing can have no Properties which I take to be the Fundamental Principle of Certainty as to real Beings For all our inward Perceptions are only of some Acts or Properties as of Thinking Doubting Reasoning c. and if a Man