he would vouchsafe to teach us how to reconcile them also For I for my own part think it every whit as hard a task to reconcile Contradictions as to reconcile Protestants and I hope much harder And yet this latter he has endeavoured to prove in a certain Book wrote by him in the Year 1685 a thing not to be done But whether it can or no I am sure he has hardly published any Book since but what manifestly proves That there is great need of some Reconciler to do the other But why do I speak of reconciling Contradictions It would be a very troublesome work if it could be done and a very uncomfortable one when it could not And therefore our Author to give him his due has attempted a much surer and more compendious way of clearing himself of this imputation than such a long and tedious way of reconciling inconsistent Propositions could possibly have been For having Asserted That we cannot justly charge a Contradiction where we cannot comprehend the Nature of the thing said to be contradicted and that in the next place there is nothing in the World which he knoweth of the Nature of which we can throughly understand or comprehend I hope it follows That where nothing can or ought to be contradicted as nothing ought to be which cannot be comprehended none can be guilty of a Contradiction And this I suppose none will deny to be an Expedient every way answerable and equal to our Author's Occasions For otherwise I cannot see what can stand between him and the charge of many Scurvy Contradictory Assertions but that which shall effectually prove and make out to us That indeed there neither is nor can be any such thing as a Contradiction CHAP. II. Containing an Account of several Terms commonly made use of in Discoursing of the Divine Nature and Persons and particularly shewing the Propriety of applying the Words Essence Substance Nature Infinity and the like to this great Subject and lastly proving this Author's Exceptions against the use of them about the same false groundless and impertinent With some further Remarks upon his forementioned Apology OUR Author seems so desirous to advance nothing upon this sublime Subject but what shall be perfectly new that in order to the making way for his particular Novelties he Quarrels with almost all the old words which Divines in their Discourses about the Divine Nature and Persons were heretofore accustomed to make use of He can by no means approve of the words Essence Substance Nature Subsistence and such like as reckoning them the Causes of all the Difficulties and seeming Absurdities that are apt to perplex Mens minds in their Speculations of the Deity and the Trinity 4 Sect. p. 68 69 70. and therefore they must be laid aside and made to give way to other Terms which he judges properer and more accommodate to those Theories To which purpose though our Author has fixed upon two purely of his own Invention which are to do such wonderful feats upon this Subject as in all past Ages were never yet seen nor heard of before and which I therefore reserve in due place to be considered of particularly by themselves yet at present the Author seems most concerned to remove and cashier the fore-mentioned useless cumbersome words and to substitute some better and more useful in their room Such as Eternal Truth and Wisdom Goodness and Power Mind and Spirit c. which being once admitted and applyed to all Disputes about the Divine Nature and an Act of Exclusion past upon the other the way will become presently smooth and open before us and all things relating to the Mystery of the Trinity according to our Author 's own excellent words be made very plain easie and intelligible Nevertheless as I may so speak to borrow another of our Author's Elegancies let not him that putteth on his Armour boast as he that putteth it off A great Promissor with a great Hiatus being much better at raising an Expectation than at answering it And hitherto I can see nothing but words and vapour Though after all it is Performance and the issue of things alone that must shew the strength and reason of the biggest Pretences Now for the clearer and more distinct discussion of the matter in hand I shall endeavour to do these Four things I. I shall shew That the ground upon which this Author excepts against the use of the Terms Nature Essence Substance Subsistence c. in this Subject is false and mistaken II. I shall shew That the same Difficulties arise from the Terms Truth Wisdom Goodness Power c. used for the Explication of the Divine Being that are objected against Essence Substance Nature and the like III. I shall shew That these Terms do better and more naturally explain the Deity or Divine Being than those other of Truth Wisdom Goodness c. And IV. And Lastly I shall shew That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity and the Divine Persons does really proceed from other Causes These four things I say I will give some brief Account of But because the Subject I am about to engage in is of that Nature that most of the Metaphysical and School-Terms hitherto made use of by Divines upon this occasion will naturally and necessarily fall in with it I think it will contribute not a little to our more perspicuous proceeding in this Dispute to state the Import and Signification of these Terms Essence Substance Existence Subsistence Nature and Personality with such others as will of course come in our way while we are treating of and explaining these And here first of all according to the old Peripatetick Philosophy which for ought I see as to the main Body of it at least has stood it's ground hitherto against all Assaults I look upon the Division of Ens or Being a summary word for all things into Substance and Accident as the Primary and most Comprehensive as we hinted before in our first Chapter But that I may fix the sense and signification of these Terms all along as I go by giving them their respective Definitions or at least Descriptions where the former cannot be had I look upon Ens or Being to be truly and well defined That which is though I must confess it is not so much a perfect Definition as a Notation of the word from the original Verb est For to define it by the Term Essence by saying That Ens or Being is that which has an Essence though it be a true Proposition yet I believe it not so exactly proper a Definition since the Terms of a Definition ought to be rather more known than the thing defined Which in the fore-mentioned Case is otherwise As for Substance I define that to be a Being not inhering in another that is to say so existing by it self as not to be subjected in it or supported this way by it Accident I define a Being inherent in another as in a
Created and Finite Persons I shall now proceed to the Consideration of what he says of it with reference to the three Persons in the Glorious God-head And this I shall do under these following Heads which shall be the Subjects of five distinct Chapters As First I shall treat of his two new Notions viz. of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness and shew That Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in the three Divine Persons nor Mutual-Consciousness the Reason of their Unity in one and the same Nature And this we have here allotted for the business and Subject of this 4th Chapter Secondly I shall prove That the Three Divine Persons of the Godhead are not Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits in the 5th Chapter Thirdly I shall Consider what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and School-men in behalf of his New invented Hypothesis and shew That they speak nothing at all for it or towards it And this shall make the 6th and 7th Chapters Fourthly I shall set down the Ancient and generally received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning the Article of the Trinity and Vindicate it from this Author's Exceptions in the 8th Chapter And when I shall have discussed and gone over these Particulars I cannot imagine what can be found Considerable in this his Book so far as I have undertook it but what will have received hereby a full and sufficient Answer Though when all is done I confess I have some further Complements to make to this Author upon some other Accounts though still occasioned by this Work of his which I should be extremely wanting both to him and the Cause now before me should I not with all due Address pass upon him And this will add three or four Chapters more to the former and so conclude this Work And First To begin with the first of these I shall endeavour to prove That Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons In order to which I shall premise and lay down these following Considerations Consideration 1. That although the Divine Nature be one Pure Simple Indivisible Act yet in our Conceptions of it which are always inadequate to it there is a Natural Order of Prius and Posterius founded in the Universal Reason of Things according to which the Conception of one Thing presupposes and depends upon the Conception of another which though it can make no Prius or Posterius in the Divine Nature yet is by no means to be contradicted or confounded in our discoursing of God forasmuch as without our admitting this Rule it is impossible for any Humane Understanding either to Conceive or Discourse consistently or intelligibly of Him at all Consideration 2. Which I think affords us a Rule safely and universally to be relied upon is this That in Things having a dependence between them where we may form to our selves a clear and distinct Conception of one Thing without implying or involving in it the Conception of any other Thing there that Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to all those Things which are not essentially included in the Conception of it Thus for instance we may have a clear and distinct Conception of Entity and Being and of Unity too without entertaining in our Mind at the same time any Notion or Conception of knowledge at all and therefore the Ratio Entitativa of any Thing must needs in Nature precede the Ratio Cognitiva as well as Cognoscibilis of the same Consideration 3. We must distinguish between the Affections or Modes of Being as they are strictly so called and between the Attributes of it The first sort are reckoned of the same Order with Being it self and so precede whatsoever is consequent upon it as the Attributes of it are accounted to be which relate to the Being or Subject they belong to as things in Order of Nature Posterior to it Accordingly in the first rank are Existence Subsistence Personality c. and in the second are all Acts issuing from a Nature or Subject so Subsisting whether they be of Knowledge Volition Power Duration or the like The Denominations derived from which are properly called Attributes Consideration 4. Though there can be no Accidents inhering in God yet there may be Accidental Predications belonging to him And I call those Accidental which are not Necessary or Essential Such as are all Extrinsecal Denominations of him founded on such Acts of God as were perfectly free for him to do or not to do nothing in the Divine Nature obliging him thereto Of which number are the Denominations or Predicates of Creatour Redeemer and the like Since there was nothing in God that made it necessary for him to be so Consideration 5. When the Terms Cause Formal Reason Constituent or productive Principle and the like are used about the Divine Nature and Persons they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms but only by way of Analogy as really meaning no more than a Causal or Necessary Dependence of one Notion or Conceptus objectivus upon another so that it is impossible for the Mind to Conceive distinctly of the one but as depending upon or proceeding from the other Consideration 6. That the Divine Nature may with all fair Accord to the Rules of Divinity and Philosophy be Considered as Prescinding or Abstracting though not as divided from the Divine Persons Consideration 7. That whatsoever is Essentially included in the Divine Nature thus Considered is equally Common and Communicable to all the Divine Persons Consideration 8. That whatsoever is the proper Formal Reason of Personality is utterly Incommunicable to any Thing or Person beyond or beside the Person to whom it belongs Consideration 9. That for any Absolute Perfection essentially included or implyed in the Divine Nature to be multiplyed in the Three Persons belonging to it is a manifest Multiplication of the Divine Nature it self in the said Persons By which we are given to understand the difference between the Multiplication and the Communication of the Divine Nature to those Persons These Rules I thought fit to draw up and lay down before-hand in order to the use which we shall have of them in the ensuing Disputation And so I proceed to my Arguments against this Author's New Notion of Self-Consciousness with reference to the Persons of the Blessed Trinity And the First is This Argument I. No Personal Act can be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is But Self-Consciousness is a Personal Act and therefore Self-Consciousness cannot be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is and to whom personally it belongs The Minor I suppose neither our Author Himself nor any one else can deny For if Self-Consciousness be not a Personal Act let any one assign what else it is or what it ought to pass for It is certainly an Act of
the God-head it self but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in it as well as Three But how then comes there to be only Three Why upon these grounds no other Reason can be assigned for it but only that it was God's free Determination that there should be Three and no more And then the Trinity of Persons must be an Effect of God's Will and not a Necessary Condition of the Divine Nature and the further Consequence of this must be that the three Persons are Three Created Beings as proceeding from the free Results of God's Will by vertue whereof they equally might or might not have been But on the contrary our Author himself holds Page 129. line 13. That the Three Persons are Essential to the Divine Nature and so Essential to it that they necessarily belong to it in this number and can be neither more nor fewer than Three And if this be so I am sure it is a Contradiction that it should be otherwise for it is a Contradiction that it should not be which necessarily is and cannot but be But now I have proved that there is no Repugnancy or Contradiction to the Nature of Things considered barely according to their Nature that three thousand Self-Conscious Minds or Spirits should subsist in the Godhead any more than that three such Spirits should so subsist And therefore if it be Absurd and Impossible as undoubtedly it is that so many Persons should belong to the Divine Nature then must the Reason of this Absurdity be fetched from some other Thing than either from Self-Consciousness with reference to the Divine Nature or from the Divine Nature considered in it self abstractedly from all Actual Personality for these as we have shewn afford no sufficient Proof of this Absurdity And therefore I say some other Reason must be found out and assigned against it And accordingly let this Author produce such an one whatsoever it be as shall solidly and conclusively prove That there cannot be Three Thousand Self-Conscious Persons belonging to the Godhead and that from the Nature of the Thing it self as several such Reasons may be brought and I will undertake to him to prove by the very same Reason and Argument as Conclusively That Self-Consciousness is not cannot be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons of the Trinity In the mean time by that kind of Arguing which is called Deductio ad Absurdum I have sufficiently disproved it by shewing what an Intolerable Absurdity must follow the Asserting it Argument IV. The Fourth and Last Argument shall proceed thus If Three distinct Self-Conciousnesses Formally Constitute Three distinct Personalities then Three distinct Self-Complacencies will Constitute Three distinct Personalities too But our Author Isuppose will not allow of the latter and therefore neither ought he to assert the former The Consequence is plain Because there is no Reason alleagable according to our Author's Hypothesis why Self-Complacency may not found a Personality as well as Sels-Consciousness For they are both of them equally distinct Internal Acts in the Person whom they belong to and as to the Formal Effect of each an Act of Self-Complacency seems to have the Preheminence since it is a greater Perfection to be United to an Infinite Good that is to the Deity by way of Love and Adhesion than barely by way of knowledge and Intellection And Self-Complacency is the former whereas Self-Consciousness rises no higher than the latter And consequently since Self-Complacency is the more Perfective Act of the two knowledge of good being still in order to the Love of it and since withall Personality is the most perfect way of Subsisting which any Nature is capable of it seems most rational to derive the perfectest way of Subsistence belonging to an Intelligent Being from the most Perfective Act of that Being if from any Act at all And now if this Author should Object That Self-Complacency is in Order of Nature Subsequent to Self-Consciousness and so that there cannot be the same ground to make it the Formal Reason of Personality that there is to make Self-Consciousness so I Answer That according to my Principle whereby I deny Self-Consciousness to be the Reason of Personality because it is postnate to Self-Subsistence it is indeed a good Reason but according to our Author's Hypothesis it is none at all For if the Priority of Self-Subsistence to Self-Consciousness according to him hinders not but that Self-Consciousness may nevertheless be the Principle or Reason of Personality why should the precedency of Self-Consciousness to Self-Complacency hinder Self-Complacency from being as proper a Reason or Principle to found Personality upon as the other All this I alledge only as an Argument ad Hominem and desire this Author to consider if any one should borrow some of that Boldness of him by which he dissents from all Antiquity and confidently averr That Self-Complacency is the Proper formal Reason of Personality in each and every one of the Divine Persons I would have him I say consider by what Reason or Argument consistent with his New Opinion he could Confute this other New Assertion For my own part since I think as much may be said for the one as for the other I am ready to set up for Self-Complacency against his Self-Consciousness when he pleases and will undertake to give as good Reasons for my Notion as he can sor his and perhaps better let him begin and enter into the Dispute as soon as he will And as I shall oppose my Self-Complacency to his Self-Consciousness so I shall find out a Mutual-Complacency to Vye against his Mutual-Consciousness too And if any one should here object That this and the like Disputes are of that Nature that the World is not like to be much Edified by them I perhaps think so as much as he But that is no great matter since our Author is of so very Benign a Temper That he does not always Write only for the Reader 's Edification but sometimes for his Diversion too Having thus given my Reasons against this Author's New Notion of Self-Consciousness both with reference to Persons Create and Uncreate and proved That it neither is nor can be the Formal Reason of Personality in either of them I shall now pass to his other New Notion of Mutual-Consciousness whereby those Persons who were distinguished from one another by their respective Self-Consciousnesses are United and made one in Nature by vertue of this Mutual-Consciousness Concerning which Notion also I must profess my self in the number of those who are by no means satisfied with it as of any such peculiar Efficacy to the use and purpose it is here brought for And there are sufficient Reasons against it In giving of which as I must acknowledge That that one Consideration of the Priority of Being whether Essentially or Personally considered together with the first Modes and Affections of it to any Act of Knowledge Attributable to the said Being is the Fundamental
Animadversions UPON Dr. SHERLOCK's Book ENTITULED A Vindication of the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity c. TOGETHER With a more Necessary Vindication of that Sacred and Prime Article of the Christian Faith from his New Notions and False Explications of it Humbly offered to His Admirers and to Himself the Chief of them By a Divine of the Church of England The Second Edition with some Additions LONDON Printed for Randal Taylor near Stationers-Hall MDCXCIII A PREFACE OR INTRODUCTION To the following Animadversions TO be Impugned from without and Betrayed from within is certainly the worst Condition that either Church or State can fall into and the best of Churches the Church of England has had experience of Both. It had been to be wished and one would think might very reasonably have been expected That when Providence had took the Work of destroying the Church of England out of the Papists Hands some would have been contented with her Preserments without either attempting to give up her Rites and Liturgy or deserting her Doctrine But it has proved much otherwise And amongst those who are justly chargeable with the latter I know none who has faced the World and defied the Church with so bold a Front as the Author of Two very Heterodox Books the first Entituled A Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ c. Published in the Year 1674. And the other A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever-Blessed Trinity c. Published in the Year 1690. And as one would think Wrote purposely to let the World see that the Truth cannot be so much shaken by a direct Opposition as by a Treacherous and False Defence I shall in this Preliminary Address to the Reader pass some brief Remarks upon both these Books But first upon this which I have here undertook to Animadvert upon It is now of about Three Years standing in the World and I have wondered even to Astonishment that a Book so full of Paradoxes and those so positively as well as absurdly delivered could pass Unanswered for so long a time For the Author having therein advanced a Notion immediately and unavoidably inferring Three Gods has yet had the Confidence not only to Assert it but to Declare it Heresie and Nonsence to think or hold otherwise that is in other Words to call the whole Christian Church in all Ages and Places Fools and Hereticks For I do here averr and will undertake to prove it as far as a Negative may be proved That no Church known to us by History or otherwise ever held this Notion of the Trinity before And must we then be all Fools and Hereticks who will not acknowledge the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits that is in other Terms to be Three Gods And can so Learned and every way Excellent a Clergy bear this For if they could not whence is it that some Writers amongst them while they are declaring their dislike of his Opinions yet do it with so soft an Air and so gentle a Touch as if they were afraid either to Condemn the Opinion or to Attack the Author Nay and some I find creeping under his Feet with the Title of Very Reverend while they are charging him with such Qualities and Humours as none can be justly chargeable with and deserve Reverence too For my own part I franckly own That I neither Reverence nor Fear him that is I Reverence none who gives whole Communities and Churches such Words nor Fear any One who Writes such Things and in such a manner For even those Mean Spirits who can both Court and Censure him in the same Breath complain That he gives no Quarter where he supposes he has his Adversary upon the least Advantage And if this be his Way and Temper never to give Quarter I am sure he has no cause to expect any whatsoever he may find But still methinks I can hardly believe my Eyes while I read such a Pettit Novellist Charging the Whole Church as Fools and Hereticks for not Subscribing to a Silly Heretical Notion solely of his own Invention For does he or can he think to Live and Converse in the World upon these Terms And to throw his Scurrility at High and Low at all About him Above him and Below him if there be any such at this insufferable rate Does he I would fain know in this speak his Judgment or his Breeding Was it the School the University or Gravel-Lane that taught him this Language Or does he never reflect upon himself nor consider That though he does not others assuredly will One would think by his Words and Carriage that he had ingrossed all Reason and Learning to Himself But on the contrary that this his scornful looking down upon all the World besides is not from his standing upon any higher ground of Learning and Sufficiency than the rest of the World and that he Huffs and Dictates at a much more commanding rate than he Reasons the perusal of my Ninth Tenth and Eleventh Chapters will or I am sure may sufficiently inform the Impartial Reader and shew him how many things there are in this Author's Vindication which too much need Another but admit none In the mean time I do and must declare both to himself and to all others That the forementioned Charge of Heresie and Nonsence as he has laid it is so very Rude Scandalous and Provoking that it is impossible for the Tongue or Pen of Man to reply any Thing so severely upon him which the foulness of the said Expression will not abundantly warrant both the Speaking and the Writing of The Church of England is certainly very Merciful Merciful as a Great Judge once said of K. Charles II. even to a Fault For who by her silence upon what this Bold Man has Wrote and the Encouragement he has since received would not be shrewdly induced after some consider able number of Years if his stuff should live so long to believe that his Notions were the Current Doctrine of our Church or at least of our Church-men at that time None then opposing them most over-looking them and some countenancing and advancing the Author of them and perhaps for them too This is truly the Case and I hope to do the Church of England so much Service at least as to break the Universality both of the Silence and the presumed Acceptance by one plain resolute and full Negative put in against it For upon a due Consideration of the Things vented by this Author and comparing them with the Proceedings and Zeal of the Primitive Church in its Councils I do from my Heart believe That had he lived and published this Book in those Days and Asserted That the Three Divine Persons in the Trinity were Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits And that Their Personal distinction consisted only in Self-Consciousness and their Unity only in Mutual-Consciousness And withal That the Terms Essence Nature Substance
what concerns the Licensing this Book so severely and so justly reflected upon by Dr. Owen it did it must be confessed meet with a Person as it were framed for the very purpose For none certainly could be so fit to stamp an Imprimatur upon a Book Wrote against Christ 's Satisfaction as One who while he was Eating the Bread and Wearing the Honours of the Church could stab the Doctrine of it to the Heart by Writing for Transubstantiation And then in the next place for it s passing Uncontrolled it had really been to be wished That the Clergy in Convocation in the last especially in which so many of them acquitted themselves so exceeding worthily upon other Accounts would have vouchsafed to wipe off this foul Blot from the Church by a due Censure passed upon the forementioned Positions so reproachful to that and so Contumelious to our Common Christianity For what vast advantage the Dissenters have taken from hence to Scandalize and Bespatter the Government and Governours of our Church is but too well known and cannot be too much Lamented and I heartily wish That it had been a Scandal only Taken and not Given And the rather do I represent this as a Work fit for the Convocation since this Author has given the World such a Notable Proof That nothing but a Convocation can Convince or work upon him And thus I have given the Reader a Specimen of the Doctrines of this Author in these Two Books of his In the former of which he affects to be the Socinian 's humble Servant by Ridiculing and Exploding Christ 's Satisfaction of God 's Iustice and so in effect the whole Mystery of the Gospel And in the latter he pretends to oppose them by such a Vindication of the Trinity and of Christ's Incarnation as one would think were Wrote by Themselves But whatsoever it is that he either pretends or intends as it is hard to know the latter by the former this Character I shall give of him as a Writer That there is hardly any one Subject which he has Wrote upon that of Popery only excepted but he has Wrote both for it and against it too Not that I say that he has Printed all which he has so Wrote but Printing is not the only way of Publication and this I will say besides That where he has not Printed he has Acted it with a Witness And yet even for Printing could any thing be Wrote and Printed more sharp and bitter against the Dissenters than what this Man Wrote in his Answer to the Protestant Reconciler And yet how frankly or rather fulsomely does he open both his Arms to embrace them in his Sermon Preached before the Lord Mayor on Novemb. 4. 1688 Though I dare say That the Dissenters themselves are of that Constancy as to own That they were of the same Principles in 88 that they were of in 85. But the Truth is Old Friendships cannot be so easily forgot And it has been an Observation made by some that hardly can any one be found who was first tainted with a Conventicle whom a Cathedral could ever after cure but that still upon every cross Turn of Affairs against the Church the irresistible Magnetism of the Good Old Cause as some still think it would quickly draw him out of the Good Old Way The Fable tells us of a Cat once turned into a Woman but the next sight of a Mouse quickly dissolved the Metamorphosis cashiered the Woman and restored the Brute And some Virtuosi skilled in the Useful Philosophy of Alterations have thought her much a gainer by the latter change there being so many unlucky turns in the World in which it is not half so safe and advantagious to Walk Upright as to be able to fall always upon one's Legs But not to hold the Reader too long in the Entrance of the Work which I am about to present him with I do here assure him That in the following Animadversions I have strictly pursued this Author in every part of his new Hypothesis I have answered all his Arguments not omitting so much as one or any Thing that looks like one And if I have thought fit sometimes in a short Remark or two here and there to refresh the Reader and my self by exposing his Bold and Blind side together yet this has still been my method throughly to dispatch the Argument before I offer to divert upon the Author As for that part of his Book which peculiarly concerns the Socinians I leave him and them to fight it out My business is to shew That the Doctrine of our Church is absolutely a stranger to his Novel and Beloved Notions It knows them not It owns them not nor ought we to look upon him so far as he Asserts and Maintains them to be any True and Genuine Son of it And consequently whether he worries the Socinians or which is much the more likely the Socinians worry him the Church of England is not at all concerned The Contents of the Chapters CHAPTER I. REpresenting the Sence and Signification of the Word Mystery as also a Vindication of the Use and Application of it to some of the most Difficult and Sublime Truths of the Gospel and lastly a full Proof That the Account given by this Author of his Explication of the Article of the Trinity is wholly inconsistent with the Mysteriousness of it together with some Remarks upon his needless Apology for Writing against the Socinians CHAP. II. Containing an Account of several Terms commonly made use of in discoursing of the Divine Nature and Persons and particularly shewing the Propriety of Applying the Words Essence Substance Nature Infinity and the like to this great Subject and lastly proving this Author's Exceptions against the use of them about the same False Groundless and Impertinent With some further Remarks upon his forementioned Apology CHAP. III. In which this Author 's New Notion of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness is briefly declared Self-Consciousness made by him the Formal Constituent Reason of Personality in all Persons both Create and Increate and on the contrary proved against him in the first place That it is not so in Persons Create CHAP. IV. In which is proved against this Author That neither is Self-Consciousness the Formal Constituent Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity nor Mutual-Consciousness the Reason of their Unity in one and the same Nature CHAP. V. In which is proved against this Author That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits CHAP. VI. In which is considered what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and the Schoolmen in behalf of his New Hypothesis and in the first place shewn That neither do the Fathers own the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds nor Self-Consciousness to be the Formal Reason of their Distinction CHAP. VII In which is shewn That the Passages alledged by this Author
Subject supporting it and without which it cannot exist or support it self Which Division being made by Terms contradictory viz. Inhering in another and not inhering in another must needs be adequate and perfect and fully comprehensive of the whole that is divided thereby But now besides these two Terms of Substance and Accident there is another assigned by Logicians Metaphysicians and School-men called a Mode of Being viz. such a thing as being added to another does not make any addition of another Being or degree of Being to it but only restrains and determines it and may be defined an Affection of a thing or Being by which the Nature of it otherwise indeterminate and indifferent is determined to some certain respect state or condition Thus whereas the Nature of a thing may be considered either as yet in its Causes or as actually produced and existing out of them either of these is a Mode of that Nature the first rendring it only Potential the other Actual Nor is this a meer Ens Rationis forasmuch as it affects the Being of a thing antecedently to any Operation of the mind passing upon it And the Reason assigned by some Logicians for the allowing and asserting these Modes is this That some things must necessarily be admitted to belong to Being which are not Beings themselves to prevent an Infinite progress in Beings For since every thing is capable of being defined or described and yet nothing can be defined merely by it self an Identical Proposition being no Definition it must needs be defined by somewhat or other distinct from it self but now if that be also a Being then that likewise must be defined by another Being and that by another and so on in insinitum which would be most absurd Whereas if this definition or description of a thing be made by some Modus of it which is not strictly and properly a Being it self the thing presently stops here without any necessity of proceeding to any more Beings But perhaps it will be here said if these Modes are not so many meer Nothings or Entia Rationis what order or rank shall they be placed in Since those ten heads of Being which we call Predicaments cannot seem the proper Receptacles of things which we own not to be properly or formally Beings I Answer That though they are not Beings properly so called and so not directly and upon their own Account placeable under any of the Ten fore-mentioned Heads of Being yet since they are Appendages of Being as cleaving to it and depending upon it they are accounted under and reduced to those respective Heads or genera of Being to which the Beings modified by them do directly belong Now the Nature of these Modi being thus accounted for we are in the next place to take notice of the difference resulting from them which we call Modal and that is either between two or more such Modes differing from one another as the Personalities belonging to several Persons differ amongst themselves or when a thing or Being differs from the Mode affecting it or Lastly When several things thus modified or affected do by vertue of those Modes differ from one another and thus the Persons in the Blessed Trinity may be said to differ amongst themselves I proceed now to those other Terms of Essence Existence Nature Subsistence and Personality And first for Essence As I shewed that Ens or Being might be truly defined That which is so Essence may be as truly and properly defined That by which a thing is what it is that is to say by which it is Constituted in such a kind or order of Being And this difference I take to be founded in the different ground upon which we conceive of the same thing Accordingly the Essence of a thing no less than the thing it self may be considered either as yet in the Power of its Causes and only producible by them or as actually existing and produced by them By which we see that an Essence as such may be indifferent to exist or not exist and that from hence springs the difference between Essence and Existence There is indeed a Reality ascribed to it even without Existence But that is not properly a reality in the thing it self but partly in respect of the power of its Causes enabling them to produce it and partly because it is properly the Subject of Science and capable of having true Propositions formed of it and Demonstrations built upon it As we may form as true Propositions of a Rose in Winter and demonstrate all the Properties of it as of their proper Subject by their proper respective Principles as well as while it is actually flourishing upon the Tree And this is all the reality which I think can be ascribed to Essence in its separation from Existence As for Existence it self it may be defined that Mode or Affection of Being by which a thing stands actually produced out of the power of its Causes or at least not actually included in any Cause in which sense God himself does exist From whence it appears That in Created Beings Essence bears no such necessary Connexion with Existence since it is not necessarily included in the Nature of any finite Being that it must needs be produced or actually Exist But it must be confessed That Existence being a perfection and in God especially a very great one must of necessity be included in his very Essence as containing in it formally or eminently all sorts or degrees of perfection The next Term is Subsistence which is a Mode of Being by which a thing exists by it self without existing in another either as a part in the whole or an Adjunct in the Subject I say an Adjunct not an Accident for a Substance may be an Adjunct And I think if we would assign a way by which the humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we shall hardly find out a fitter than to say That it exists in it as an Adjunct in the Subject For it is certain That it does not exist in it as a part in the whole since by this means the second Person in the Trinity must till his Incarnation have wanted one part of his Person But I shall not be positive in the Application of this Term here In the mean time it must be observed That Essence and Subsistence really differ so far as a Modal difference is reduced to a Real not only in Created Beings but also in Uncreate In Created it is evident forasmuch as a part divided from the whole loses the Subsistence which it had from thence but still continues its Existence as being still a Substance actually subsisting by it self and not inhering in any Subject as Accidents do Nor is it less evident in the Deity it self and the Divine Persons belonging to it For one and the same undivided Existence as well as one and the same Essence or Nature belongs to all the three Persons equally whereas
yet every Person has his own proper distinct Subsistence by himself which must make as great a difference between Existence and Subsistence as that which unites several Persons into one Nature and that which personally distinguishes them from one another And then also for Christ's Person with reference to his humanity though this subsists by the Subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet it does not properly subsist by the Existence of it since every distinct Nature must have its own distinct Existence which shews That even in the Oeconomy of this Divine Person Existence and Subsistence must be considered as formally different since something we see may relate to and be affirmed of one which cannot be affirmed of or bear the same relation to the other Now whatsoever Being or Nature this Mode of Subsistence does belong to that is properly called a Suppositum as being a thing which by no means exists in any other but as a Basis or foundation supports such things or Beings as exist in it from which also it receives its Name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Consequence of this is That as Subsistence makes a thing or Being a Suppositum so suppositality makes it incommunicable since that which makes it uncapable of existing in another must also hinder it from being Communicated to another And another Consequence of the same is That every Suppositum or Being thus Subsisting by it self is a compleat Being that is such an one as is not made for the Completion of any other For whatsoever is so must naturally exist in it as a part does in the whole or at least be originally designed so to do This Account being given of Subsistence and of a Suppositum which is Constituted such by it it will be easie to give an Account also what a Person is which is properly defined Suppositum Rationale or Intelligens So that as a Suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens so the Ratio Intellectiva being added to this makes it a Person which is a farther perfection of Suppositality and the utmost perfection of Subsistence as Subsistence and Suppositality is the utmost Bound and Perfection of Existence in all Beings not Intelligent If it be here now asked Whether Subsistence or Suppositality added to bare Nature does not make a Composition I Answer That in Created finite Persons it does but not in Uncreated and Infinite And the reason is Because though all Composition implys Union yet all Union is not therefore a Composition but something higher and transcendental so that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity The Divine Nature and the Personal Subsistence coalesce into one by an Incomprehensible Ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction And if this does not satisfie as I think it rationally may I must needs profess That my Thoughts and Words can neither rise higher nor reach further Having thus stated and fixed the signification of the fore-mentioned Terms I cannot but remark these two things of the Term or Word Essence As 1. That it is sometimes taken not only for the Ratio formalis entis but simply and absolutely for an entire Entity or Being it self And 2. That those two other Terms Nature and Form are for the most part used as Terms equipollent and of the same signification with it Nature being the Essence of a thing considered as an Active Productive Principle and Form being the Essence or Nature of a thing as it is the chief Principle giving Being and Perfection to it in the way of Composition Nevertheless it is sometimes also applyed to simple uncompounded Natures promiscuously with the other So that we see here That Essence Form and Nature generally taken are only three formally distinct Considerations of one and the same thing which I thought fit to take notice of to prevent all cavil or mistake about the use of these Terms I have now gone over and severally given an Account of the Notions of Being Substance Accident Modes of Being Essence Form Nature Subsistence and Personality and hereby I hope laid some foundation for our clearer and more intelligible discoursing of the great Article we have undertook to rescue from a false Vindication There being hardly any one of all the foregoing Terms of which a clear and distinct Notion is not highly requisite to a clear explicite and distinct consideration of the Subject now before us Concerning which I think fit to note this That so far as I can judge the thing now in dispute is not what fully and exactly expresses or represents the Nature of God for nothing can do that But what is our best and most rational way of conceiving and speaking of him and subject to fewest Inconveniences and for this we shall debate it whether this Author or we take the best course These things being thus premised and laid down we shall now resume the four Heads first proposed to be spoken of by us and Discourse of them severally And 1. I shall shew That the Ground upon which this Author excepts against the use of the Terms Substance Essence Subsistence c. in treating of this Subject is false and mistaken His Exceptions against them we find in Page 68 69 and 70. of his Book The great difficulty says he of conceiving a Trinity of Persons in one Infinite and undivided Essence or Substance arises from those gross and material Ideas we have of Essence and Substance when we speak of the Essence or Substance of God or Created Spirits We can form no Idea of Substance but what we have from matter that is something extended in a triple dimension of length breadth and depth which is the Subject of those Qualities which inhere and subsist in it And therefore as matter is the Subject of all sensible Qualities so we conceive some such Substance of a Mind or Spirit which is the Subject of Will and Understanding Thoughts and Passions and then we find it impossible to conceive how there should be three Divine Persons which are all Infinite without three distinct Infinite Substances each distinct Infinite Person having a distinct Infinite Substance of his own And if we grant this it seems a plain Contradiction to say That these three distinct Infinite Substances are but one Numerical Infinite Substance c. Thus far our Author And I freely grant That this does not only seem as he says but really is a Contradiction And before I have done with him I will prove to him also That to say That three distinct Infinite Minds are but one Numerical Infinite Mind which shall be effectually laid at his Door or That three distinct Infinite Minds are not three distinct Infinite Substances or Essences are as gross and palpable Contradictions as the other But he goes on in the same Page a little lower We know nothing says he of the Divine Essence but that God is an Infinite Mind and if we seek for any other Essence or Substance in God but an
much at present That the Greek Writers in expressing the Godhead or Divine Nature whensoever they do not use the Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constantly express it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and sometimes by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 while 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were commonly used in the same sense And likewise the Latins where they express not the same by Deitas or Divinitas do as constantly express it by Natura and Substantia which words stand now particularly condemned by this Presuming Man and that not only in Defiance of all the Ancients but also of the Church of England Her Self which has set her Authorizing Stamp upon those Two Words Substance and Person by applying them to this Subject both in her Articles and Liturgy In the first of them teaching us That in the Unity of the Godhead there are three Persons of one Substance Power and Eternity Artic. 1. And in her Liturgy rendring the Athanasian Creed by the same words Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance As likewise that Passage in the Nicene Creed by the Son 's being of one Substance with the Father And again in the Doxology at the Communion on Trinity Sunday it gives us these full and notable words One God one Lord not one onely Person but three Persons in one Substance After all which with what face can this strange Anomalar Son of the Church while he is sucking her Breasts and at the same time poysoning the Milk with which she should feed her Children I say with what Face can he aver to the World That this word Substance thus embraced owned and used by her ought to be thrown away as the Direct Cause of all the Errours Men are apt to fall into about this great Mystery And that we can have no Notion of Substance but what implies in it something gross and material Which were it so can any one imagine that the Church of England would ever have made use of such a word as could serve for nothing but a Snare and a Trap to betray the Understandings and Consciences of Men into such Errours as may cost them their Souls This is so fouly Reflexive upon her that I would have any Man living give me a good Reason Why this Author should not be call'd upon by Publick Authority to give the Church satisfaction for the Scandal given to all the Orthodox Members of it by the Contumely and Reproach which he has passed upon those Terms and Words which She has thought fit so solemnly to express her Faith and her Devotions by But some Men such is the Regard had to her Laws and Discipline will venture to utter and write any Thing that the Bookseller will pay them for though they throw their Conscience and Religion into the Bargain But God himself who resisteth the Proud seems to have took the Matter into his own Hands and to shew his Controlling Providence over the Minds and Hearts of Men has at length brought this Scornful Man to eat his own words the hardest Diet certainly that a proud Person can be put to and after all the black Dirt thrown by him upon the School-men and their Terms to lick it off again with his own Tongue So that after he had passed such a Terrible Killing Doom upon these words Essence Substance Subsistence Suppositum Person and the like here in his Vindication all on a suddain in a relenting Fit he graciously reaches out his Golden Scepter of Self-Contradiction and Restores them to Life again in his Apology And that the Reader may behold both sides of the Contradiction the more clearly I think it the best and fairest way to give him the Sense of this Author if it may be so call'd in his own Words Vindication I Have not troubled my Reader with the different signification of Essence Hypostasis Subsistence Persons Existence Nature c. which are Terms very differently used by the Greek and Latin Fathers and have very much obscured this Doctrine instead of explaining it P. 101. l. 12. The School-men have no Authority where they leave the Fathers whose sense they sometimes seem to mistake or to clog it with some peculiar Niceties and Distinctions of their own P. 138. l. 28. The Truth is that which has confounded this Mystery viz. of the Trinity has been the vain endeavour to reduce it to Terms of Art such as Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Hypostasis and the like Pag. 138. l. the last P. 139. l. 1. And speaking of the Ancient Fathers in the same Page he tells us They nicely distinguished between Person and Hypostasis and Nature and Essence and Substance that they were three Persons but one Nature Essence and Substance But that when Men curiously examined the signification of these words they found that upon some account or other They were very unapplicable to this Mystery Hereupon he asks the following Questions in an upbraiding manner viz. What is the Substance and Nature of God How can three distinct Persons have but one Numerical Substance And What is the distinction between Essence and Personality and Subsistence And Lastly At the end of the same Page He confesses that some tolerable Account of the School-Terms and Distinctions might be given but that it would be a work of more difficulty than use Apology HE viz. the melancholy Stander-by is very angry with the School-Doctors as worse Enemies to Christianity than either Heathen Philosophers or Persecuting Emperours Pray what hurt have they done I suppose he means the corruption of Christianity with those barbarous terms of Person Nature Essence Subsistence Consubstantiality c. which will not suffer Hereticks to lie concealed under Scripture-Phrases But why must the School-men bear all the blame of this Why does he not accuse the Ancient Fathers and Councils from whom the School-men learn'd these Terms Why does he let St. Austin escape from whom the Master of the Sentences borrowed most of his Distinctions and Subtleties But suppose these unlucky Wits had used some new Terms have they taught any new Faith about the Trinity in Unity which the Church did not teach And if they have only guarded the Christian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns which disguised Hereticks cannot break through is this to wound Christianity in its very Vitals No no They will only prick the Fingers of Hereticks and secure Christianity from being wounded and this is one great Cause why some Men are so angry with the School-Doctors tho' the more General Cause is because they have notIndustry enough to Read or understand them Apology P. 4 5. I have to prevent all exceptions given the Reader the whole Paragraph in which the last Clause strikes Home indeed tho' in such Cases some think this Author would do well to take heed of striking too Home and Hard for fear the Blow should rebound back again and do execution where
Knowledge by which each Person knows and comprehends himself and whatsoever belongs to him The Major Proposition therefore is to be proved viz. That no Personal Act can be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is And I prove it thus The formal Reason of every Thing is in order of Nature before the Thing of which it is the formal Reason but no Personal Act is in order of Nature before the Personality of the Person whose Act it is and therefore it cannot be the formal Reason of his Personality The Major is Self-evident And as for the Minor That no Personal Act is before the Personality of the Person whose Act it is This also is manifest Because such an Act cannot be before the Person himself and therefore not before his Personality For as much as his Personality is that by which he is formally a Person so that it is impossible to be before the one without being before the other too And now that it cannot be before the Person himself is manifest from hence that as every Personal Act in general bears a Relation of Posteriority to the Person to whom it belongs as to the Cause or Productive Principle of all the Acts proceeding from Him so this particular Act of Self-Consciousness bears a Treble Relation of Posteriority to the Person whose Act it is viz. as to the Agent or Principle producing it 2. As to the Subject Recipient of it and sustaining it And Thirdly and Lastly As to the Object which it is terminated to All which Respects it sustains not barely as it is an Act but partly as it is an Immanent Act and partly also a Reflex Act. In the first place therefore every Person being the Agent or Productive Cause of all the personal Acts issuing from Him he must upon that Account in Order of Nature precede the said Acts and consequently every Divine Person must in Nature be before that Act of Self-Consciousness which personally belongs to him And moreover since it is likewise an Immanent Act it relates to him as the Subject in which it is as well as the Cause from which it is and upon that Account also must bear a Natural Posteriority to Him And then lastly as it is also a Reflex Act by which the Person knows himself to be a Person and is Conscious to Himself what he is and what he does it terminates upon him as its Object also So that the Cause the Subject and the Object of this Act being the same Person in this last respect no less than in the two former it bears another and third Relation of Posteriority to Him since every Act not productive of something besides and without the Agent is in Order of Nature Posterior to the Object it terminates upon From all which I conclude That that Act of Self-Consciousness by which each Divine Person knows or is Conscious to Himself of his own Personality cannot be the Formal Reason of the said Personality without being in Order of Nature both before it and after it too viz. Before it as it is the Formal Reason of it and yet Posterior to it as it is an Act proceeding from lodged and received in and lastly Terminated upon the same Person All which is so very plain that hardly can any Thing be plainer And indeed the very word Self-Consciousness contradicts and overthrows its being the ground or Formal Reason of Personality For still Self must be before Consciousness and Self imports Personality as being that by which a Person is said to be what he is and they both stand united in this one Word as the Act and the Object and therefore Consciousness cannot be the Reason of it Or to express the same Thing by other Terms Self-Subsistence must precede Self-Consciousness and Self-Subsistence here implys Personality and therefore Personality upon the same Account must in Nature precede Self-Consciousness and consequently cannot be the formal Effect or Result of it For surely according to the most Essential Order of Things a Person must be what he is before he can know what he is And this Argument I confess being founded upon the Priority of Subsistence to all Acts and particularly to those of knowledge in every Person Self-Conscious does and must Universally run through all Instances in which Personality and Self-Consciousness with reference to one another come to be treated of And as it affects Self-Consciousness so it will equally take place in Mutual-Consciousness too What Allowances are to be here made for the absolute Simplicity Eternity and Pure Actuality of the Divine Nature and Persons when these Notions are applyed to them we have already observed in the first of those Preliminary Considerations mentioned in this Chapter The proper use and design of all which Notions is to lead guide and direct our Apprehensions about that Great Object so much too big for our Narrow Faculties so that whatsoever contradicts the Natural Order of these Apprehensions ought upon no ground of Reason to be admitted in our Discourses of the Divine Nature how much soever it may and does transcend the said Apprehensions And this must be allowed us or we must sink under the vast Disproportion of the thing before us and not discourse of it at all For I cannot think that the Word Self-Consciousness has brought the Deity one jot lower to us or raised our Understandings one degree higher and nearer to that Argument II. My Second Argument against Self-Consciousness being the Formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons is this Nothing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity but Self-Consciousness is in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative and therefore it cannot be the Reason of personality in any of the said Persons Now the Major Proposition is proved thus Nothing in the Nature of it Absolute can be the Formal Reason of any Thing in the Nature of it purely and perfectly Relative But the Personality of every one of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative and therefore Nothing Absolute can be the Formal Constituent Reason of their Personality The Major of which Syllogism is also manifest For Things Essentially different and thereby uncapable of being affirmed of one another cannot possibly be the Formal Reason of one another And that the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative to one another and consequently that their Personalities are so many Relations is no less evident from this That Two of them relate to one another as Father and Son and the Third to Both as proceeding from Both and it is impossible for one Thing to proceed from another especially by a Continual Act of Procession without Importing a Relation to that from which it so proceeds so that the very personal Subsistence of these Persons implys and carries in it a Formal Relation For the Father Subsists personally as a Father by that Eternal
for representing the vanity of his Hypothesis by the forementioned Example and Comparison But I hope the World will give me leave to distinguish between Things Sacred and his Absurd Phantastick way of treating of them which I can by no means look upon as Sacred nor indeed any Thing else in his whole Book but the bare Subject it treats of and the Scriptures there quoted by him For to speak my thoughts plainly I believe this Sacred Mystery of the Trinity was never so ridiculed and exposed to the Contempt of the Profane Scoffers at it as it has been by this New-fashioned Defence of it And so I dismiss his two so much Admired Terms by himself I mean as in no degree answering the Expectation he raised of them For I cannot find That they have either heightned or strength'ned Men's Intellectual Faculties or cast a greater light and clearness upon that Object which has so long exercised them but that a Trinity in Unity is as Mysterious as ever and the Mind of Man as unable to grasp and comprehend it as it has been from the beginning of Christianity to this day In a word Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness have rendred nothing about the Divine Nature and Persons plainer easier and more Intelligible nor indeed after such a mighty stress so irrationally laid upon two slight empty words have they made any thing but the Author himself better understood than it was before CHAP. V. In which is proved against this Author That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits IT being certain both from Philosophy and Religion that there is but one only God or God-head in which Christian Religion has taught us That there are Three Persons Many Eminent Professors of it have attempted to shew how one and the same Nature might Subsist in Three Persons and how the said Three Persons might meet in one and make no more than one simple undivided Nature It had been to be wished I confess that Divines had rested in the bare Expressions delivered in Scripture concerning this Mystery and ventured no further by any particular and bold Explications of it But since the Nature or rather Humour of Man has been still too strong for his Duty and his Curiosity especially in things Sacred been apt to carry him too far those however have been all along the most pardonable who have ventured least and proceeded upon the surest grounds both of Scripture it self and of Reason discoursing upon it And such I affirm the Ancient Writers and Fathers of the Church and after them the School-men to have been who with all their Faults or rather Infelicities caused by the Times and Circumstances they lived in are better Divines and Soberer Reasoners than any of those Pert Confident Raw Men who are much better at Despising and Carping at them than at Reading and Understanding them Though Wise Men Despise nothing but they will know it first and for that Cause very rationally despise them But among those who leaving the Common Road of the Church have took a By-way to themselves none of late Years especially have ventured so boldly and so far as this Author who pretending to be more happy forsooth in his Explication of this Mystery than all before him as who would not believe a Man in his own Commendation and to give a more satisfactory Account of this long received and Revered Article by Terms perfectly New and peculiarly his own has advanced quite different Notions about this Mystery from any that our Church was ever yet acquainted with Affirming as he does That the Three Persons in the God-head are Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits as will appear from the several places of his Book where he declares his Thoughts upon this great Subject As First in Page 50. he says The Three Divine Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost are Three Infinite Minds really distinct from each other Again in Page 66. The Persons says he are perfectly distinct for they are Three distinct and Infinite Minds and therefore Three distinct Persons For a Person is an Intelligent Being and to say they are Three Divine Persons and not Three distinct Infinite Minds is both Heresie and Nonsense For which extraordinary Complement passed upon the whole Body of the Church of England and perhaps all the Churches of Christendom besides as I have paid him part of my thanks already so I will not fail yet further to account with him before I put an end to this Chapter In the mean time he goes on in Page 102. I plainly assert says he That as the Father is an Eternal and Infinite Mind so the Son is an Eternal and Infinite Mind distinct from the Father and the Holy Ghost is an Eternal and Infinite Mind distinct both from Father and Son Adding withall these words Which says he every Body can understand without any skill in Logick or Metaphysicks And this I confess is most truly and seasonably remarked by him For the want of this Qualification is so far from being any hindrance in the Case mentioned that I dare undertake that nothing but want of skill in Logick and Metaphysicks can bring any Man living who acknowledges the Trinity to own this Assertion I need repeat no more of his Expressions to this purpose these being sufficient to declare his Opinion save only that in Page 119. where he says That Three Minds or Spirits which have no other difference are yet distinguish'd by Self-Consciousness and are Three distinct Spirits And that other in Page 258. where speaking of the Three Persons I grant says he that they are Three Holy Spirits By the same Token that he there very Learnedly distinguishes between Ghost and Spirit allowing the said Three Persons as we have shewn to be Three Holy Spirits but at the same time denying them to be Three Holy Ghosts and this with great scorn of those who should hold or speak otherwise To which at present I shall say no more but this That he would do well to turn these two Propositions into Greek or Latin and that will presently shew him what difference and distinction there is between a Ghost and a Spirit and why the very same things which are affirmed of the one notwithstanding the difference of those words in English may not with the same Truth be affirmed of the other also But the Examination of this odd Assertion will fall in more naturally towards the latter end of this Chapter where it shall be particularly considered I have now shewn this Author's Judgment in the Point and in opposition to what he has so boldly Asserted and laid down I do here deny That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Three distinct Infinite Spirits And to overthrow his Assertion and evince the Truth of mine I shall trouble neither my Reader nor my self with many Arguments But of those which I shall make use of the first is this
Argument I. Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Gods But the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Gods And therefore the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits The Minor I suppose this Author will readily concur with me in howbeit his Hypothesis as shall be shewn in the certain Consequences of it Contradicts it and if it should stand would effectually overturn it For by that he asserts a perfect Tritheisme though I have so much Charity for him as to believe that he does not know it The Major Proposition therefore is that which must be debated between us This Author holds it in the Negative and I in the Affirmative and my Reason for what I affirm viz. That Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Gods is this That God and Infinite Mind or Spirit are Terms Equipollent and Convertible God being truly and properly an Infinite Mind or Spirit and an Infinite Mind or Spirit being as truly and properly God And to shew this Convertibility and Commensuration between them yet further Whatsoever may be affirmed or denied of the one may with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed or denied of the other And to give an Instance of this with reference to the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity As it is true that one and the same God or God-head is Common to and Subsists in all and every one of the Three Persons so is it true That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is Common to and Subsists in the said Three Persons And consequently as it is false That one and the same God or God-head by being Common to and Subsisting in the Three Persons becomes Three Gods or Three God-heads so is it equally false That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit by being Common to and Subsisting in the said Three Persons becomes Three Infinite Minds or Spirits This is clear Argumentation and craves no Mercy at our Author's Hands If it be here objected That we allow of Three distinct Persons in the God-head of which every one is Infinite without admitting them to be Three distinct Gods and therefore why may we not as well allow of Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits in the same God-head without any necessity of inferring from thence That they are Three distinct Gods I Answer That the Case is very different and the Reason of the difference is this Because Three Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three Absolute Simple Beings or Essences and so stand distinguished from one another by their whole Beings or Natures But the Divine Persons are Three Relatives or one simple Being or Essence under three distinct Relations and consequently differ from one another not wholly and by all that is in them but only by some certain Mode or respect peculiar to each and upon that Account causing their Distinction And therefore to Argue from a Person to a Spirit here is manifestly Sophistical and that which is called Fallacia Accidentis or since several Fallacies may concur in the same Proposition it may be also à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter For so it is to conclude That Three Persons are Three distinct Gods since the difference of Persons is only from a diverse respect between them but Three Gods import Three absolutely distinct Natures or Substances And whereas we say That the Three Persons are all and every one of them Infinite yet it is but from one and the same Numerical Nature Common to them all that they are so the Ternary Number all the while not belonging to their Infinity but only to their Personalities The Case therefore between a Mind or Spirit and a Person is by no means the same Forasmuch as Person here imports only a Relation or Mode of Subsistence in Conjunction with the Nature it belongs to And therefore a Multiplication of Persons of it self imports only a Multiplication of such Modes or Relations without any necessary Multiplication of the Nature it self to which they adhere Forasmuch as one and the same Nature may sustain several distinct Relations or Modes of Subsistence But now on the other side a Mind or Spirit is not a Relation or Mode of Subsistence but it is an Absolute Being Nature or Substance and consequently cannot be multiplyed without a Multiplication of it into so many Numerical Absolute Beings Natures or Substances there being nothing in it to be multiplyed but it self So that Three Minds or Spirits are Three Absolute Beings Natures or Substances and Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are accordingly Three distinct Infinite Absolute Beings Natures or Substances That is in other words They are Three Gods which was the Thing to be proved and let this Author ward off the Proof of it as he is able Argument II. My Second Argument against the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity being Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is this Three distinct Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Substances But the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances And therefore they are not Three distinct Minds or Spirits The Major Proposition is proved from the Definition of a Mind or Spirit That it is Substantia Incorporea Intelligens an Intelligent Incorporeal or Immaterial Substance and therefore Three distinct Minds or Spirits must be Three such distinct Substances And besides if a Mind or Spirit were not a Substance what could it be else If it be any Thing it must be either an Accident or Mode of Being But not an Accident since no Accident can be in God nor yet a Mode of Being since a Spirit not designed to concur as a part towards any Compound is an Absolute Entire Complete Being of itself and has its proper Mode of Subsistence belonging to it and therefore cannot be a Mode it self From whence it follows That a Spirit is and must be a Substance and can be nothing else As for the Minor viz. That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances this is evident both from Authority and from Reason And first for Authority Tertullian against Praxeas affirms Semper in Deo una Substantia And St. Ierom in his Epistle to Damasus Quis ore sacrilego Tres substantias praedicabit And St. Austin in his 5th Book de Trinitate Chap. 9. and in Book 7. Chap. 4. And Ruffinus in the 1st Book of his History Chap. 29. All affirm One Substance in God and deny Three and yet the same Writers unanimously hold Three Persons which shews That they did not account these Three Persons Three Substances And Anselmus in his Book de Incarnatione Chap. 3. says That the Father and the Son may be said to be Two Beings provided that by Beings we understand Relations not Substances And Bellarmine a Writer Orthodox enough in these points and of unquestionable Learning otherwise in his 2d Tome page 348. about the end says
69. positively says That we know nothing of the Divine Essence but that God is an Infinite Mind Very well and if he grant him to be an Infinite Mind let him prove this Infinite Mind to be three distinct Infinite Minds if he can The Truth is Infinite Mind or Spirit is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature and Convertible with it and whatsoever is so belongs equally to all the Three Persons and consequently cannot be ascribed to them plurally any more than the Deity it self it being as uncapable as that of being multiplied Upon which Account if the Three Persons are with equal Truth said to be one Infinite Mind or Spirit and to be one God they can no more be said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds than they can be said to be Three distinct Gods So that which way soever the Argument be proposed either That one Infinite Mind is Father Son and Holy Ghost or That Father Son and Holy Ghost are one Infinite Mind it still overthrows this Author's Hypothesis That the said Three Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Argument IV. My Fourth and Last Argument against the same shall be this Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the Athanasian Form so belongs to them all in Common that it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest But the Attribute Infinite Mind or Spirit may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in and according to the Athanasian Form And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest The Major is as evident as that no Attribute can be Common to several Subjects and yet peculiar and appropriate to each of them And the Minor is proved by Instance thus The Father is an Infinite Mind the Son is an Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is an Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds but one Infinite Mind And this I affirm to be as good Divinity as any part in the Athanasian Creed and such as I shall abide by both against this Author and any other whatsoever But now let us see how his Assertion cast into the Athanasian Model shews it self as thus The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three distinct Infinite Minds but one distinct Infinite Mind And this is so far from being true that it is indeed neither Truth nor Sence For what Truth can there be in denying That Three Persons of which every one is said to be a distinct Infinite Mind are Three distinct Infinite Minds And what sence can there be in affirming or saying That they are but one distinct Infinite Mind Whereas the Term distinct is never properly used or applyed but with respect had to several Particulars each discriminated from the other but by no means where there is mention made only of one Thing and no more as it is here in this Proposition But to make what allowances the Case will bear and for that purpose to remit something of the strictness of the Athanasian Form by leaving out the word distinct in the last and illative Clause we shall then see that our Author's Hypothesis will proceed thus The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds but one Infinite Mind Thus I say it must proceed in the Athanasian way with the word distinct left out of the Conclusion Nevertheless even so the Inference is still manifestly and grosly false in both the branches of it For it is absolutely false That Three distinct Infinite Minds are not Three Infinite Minds and altogether as false That Three Infinite Minds are but One Infinite Mind The Author's Hypothesis put into the Athanasian Model must needs fall in with that Fallacy sometimes urged against us by the Socinians viz. The Father is a Person the Son a Person and the Holy Ghost a Person and yet they are not Three Persons but one Person which is manifestly Sophistical by arguing ab imparibus tanquam paribus viz. Concluding that of an Attribute Relative and Multiplicable which can be concluded only of such as are not So. For the Athanasian Inference holds only in Attributes Essential and Common to all the Three Persons joyntly or severally taken and not in such as are Proper Personal and Peculiar to each As also in such as are Absolute as the Attribute of Mind or Spirit without the word distinct is and not in such as are Relative For those Attributes which agree to the Divine Persons Personally Peculiarly and Relatively can never Unite or Coincide into one in the Inference or Conclusion In a word Infinite Mind or Spirit is a Predicate perfectly Essential and so in its Numerical Unity Common to all the Three Divine Persons and for that cause not to be affirmed of or ascribed to either all or any of them with the Term distinct added to it or joyned with it For that would multiply an Attribute that cannot be multiplyed And now what I have here discoursed upon and drawn from the Athanasian Creed with respect to this particular Subject I leave to our Author's strictest Examination For my own part I rely upon this Creed as a sure Test or Rule to discover the falshood of his Hypothesis by So that as long as it is true that God is one numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit and as long as the Athanasian Form duely applied is a firm and good way of Reasoning this Author's Assertion That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is thereby irrefragably overthrown And therefore I shall not concern my self to produce any more Arguments against it Only by way of Overplus to and Illustration of those which have already been alledged I cannot but observe the Concurrent Opinion of the Philosophers and most Learned Men amongst the Heathens about God's being one Infinite Mind or Spirit as a necessary deduction no doubt made by Natural Reason from the Principles thereof concerning the Divine Nature For most of the Philosophers looked upon God as the Soul of the World as One Infinite Mind or Spirit that animated and presided over the Universe For so held Pythagoras as Cicero in his first Book de Naturâ Deorum and Lactantius in his Book de irâ Dei tells us Pythagoras quoque unum Deum confitetur dicens Incorpoream esse mentem quae per omnem Naturam diffusa intenta vitalem sensum tribuit In like manner the Great Hermes being asked What God was answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Maker of all Things a most Wise and Eternal Mind Thales called him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God the Mind of the World Diogenes Cleanthes and Oenipides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
would have kindled such a Fire for them as would have torrified them with a vengeance But as he has stocked the Church with such plenty of New Hereticks and all of his own making so could he by a sway of Power as Arbitrary as his Divinity provide for them also such a Furnace as that of Nebuchadnezzar whom in his Imperious Meen and Humour he so much resembles yet he must not think That the Sound and Iingle of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness how melodiously soever they may tinkle in his own Ears will ever be able to Charm Me◠over to the Worship of his Idol or make them Sacrifice their Reason and Religion either to Him or to the New Notions which he has set up And indeed I cannot but here further declare that to me it seems one of the most preposterous and unreasonable things in Nature for any one first to assert Three Gods and when he has so wel furnished the World with Deities to expect that all Mankind should fall down and Worship Him CHAP. VI. In which is Considered What this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and School men in behalf of his Hypothesis and shewn in the first place That neither do the Fathers own the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Minds nor Self-Consciousness to be the Formal Reason of their Distinction I Have in the foregoing Chapters debated the Point with this Author upon the Reason and Nature of the Thing it self But that is not all which he pretends to defend his Cause by endeavouring to countenance it also with great Authorities and that in these positive and remarkable words This is no New Notion says he but the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools Page 101. These are his very words and I desire the Reader carefully to consider and carry them along with him in his Memory For as they are as positive as Confidence can make them so if they are not made good to the utmost they ought severely to recoil upon any one who shall presume to express himself at such a Rate And now that we may do him all the right that may be The way to know whether this Author's Hypothesis be the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools is in the first place truly and fairly to set down what this Author's Doctrine is and wherein it does consist as we shall declare what the received Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools is in our Eighth Chapter Now we shall find That the whole Doctrine delivered by him concerning the Blessed Trinity is comprehended under and reducible to these four Heads First That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Secondly That Self-Consciousness is the Formal Reason of Personality and consequently that each of the Divine Persons is such by a distinct Self-Consciousness properly and peculiarly belonging to him Thirdly That the Three Divine Persons being thus distinguished from one another by a distinct Self-Consciousness proper to each of them are all United in one and the same Nature by one Mutual Consciousness Common to them all And Fourthly and Lastly That a Trinity in Unity and an Unity in Trinity by this Explication and Account given of it is a very Plain Easie and Intelligible Notion These four Heads or Particulars I say contain in them a full and fair representation of this Author 's whole Hypothesis concerning the Oeconomy of the Blessed Trinity And I am well assured That the knowing and Impartial Reader neither will nor can deny that they do so In the next place therefore that we may see how far our Author makes good all the said Particulars by the Authority of the Fathers as he has peremptorily promised and undertook to do I think it requisite to consider how the Fathers expressed themselves upon this Subject and how this Author brings the said Expressions to his purpose For surely the natural way of knowing any Writer's Mind is by the Words and Expressions which he pretends to deliver his Mind by But concerning these we have our Author declaring First That he has not troubled his Reader with the signification of Essence Hypostasis Substance Subsistence Person Existence Nature c. Pag. 101. and some of his Readers could give him a very good Reason why though I fear too true for him to be pleased with But the Reasons which he himself alledges for his not troubling his Readers either with these Terms or the Explication of them are First That they were very differently used by the Fathers themselves Page 101. And be it so yet still for all that used by them they were and that not so very differently neither the chief difference having been about the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which yet was fairly accorded and well high setled between the Greeks and the Latines before the end of the 6th Century as shall be further made to appear in our Eighth Chapter And his next Reason for his not troubling his Reader forsooth with these Terms is Because they have as he tells us very much obscured the Doctrine of the Trinity instead of explaining it Page 101. which being one of the chief Things which he might conclude would assuredly be disputed with Him for Him thus to presume it before he had proved it is manifestly to beg the Question In the mean time certain it is That these and these only were the Terms which the Father 's used in their Disputes about the Trinity and by which they managed them and consequently were they never so Ambiguous Faulty or Improper as they are much the contrary yet whosoever will pretend to give the Sence of the Fathers must have recourse to them and do it by them and to do otherwise would be to dispute at Rovers or as the word is to speak without Book which may much better become our Author in the Pulpit than in the management of such a Controversie And now let the Reader whom he is so fearful of troubling with any Thing that is to the Purpose judge Whether this Man has not took a most extraordinary way of proving his Doctrine the very same with the Fathers For neither in the first place does he set down what the Doctrine of the Fathers concerning the Trinity was which yet one would have thought was absolutely necessary for the shewing how his own Doctrine agreed with it which he professed to be his design Nor in the next place does he either use or regard or offer to explain those Terms which the Fathers all along delivered that their Doctrine in but is so far from it That he reproaches explodes and utterly rejects them as serving only to obscure this Doctrine instead of explaining it Which in my poor Judgment is such a way of proving the Fathers on his side as perhaps the World never heard of before and will be amazed at now But it is his way and it will
Author to tell us which of these two Assertions is false for both of them I am sure cannot be true But he who makes nothing to contradict himself within the compass of two or three Pages and sometimes as many Lines may do it cum Privilegio at the distance of near Thirty And whereas it is urged again from the same place in St. Austin That if we say the Father begets his own Wisdom we may as well say That he Begets his own Goodness Greatness Eternity c. I Answer No doubt but we may say one as well as the other but that in Truth and Propriety of Speech we can say neither For God cannot properly be said to beget Wisdom and much less his own Wisdom nor indeed any of his other Attributes or Perfections Essentially taken and considered he may indeed be said to Communicate them and by such Commmnication to Beget a Son But still though these are thus said to be Communicated it is the Person only who is or can be properly said to be Begotten But our Author tells us Page 103. out of the next Chapter of St. Austin the words of which he should have done well to have quoted that he there calls God the Father Sapientia Ingenita and the Son Sapientia Genita and are not these Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms I Answer No For that the Wisdom here spoken of is not taken Absolutely and Essentially but only Personally That is for Wisdom under two several Modifications which Modifications though they diversifie and distinguish the Thing they belong to yet do not multiply it For still it is one and the same Wisdom which is both Genita and Ingenita though as it is one it is not the other Sapientia or Wisdom considered Absolutely and Essentially in it self belongs in Common to all the Three Persons but with the Term Genita or Ingenita joyned with it it imports a peculiar Mode of Subsistence which determines it to a particular Personality So that Sapientia quatenus Genita properly and only denotes the Person of the Son In like manner when the Third Person of the Trinity is called the Spirit the Term Spirit is not there taken Essentially for that Infinite Immaterial Incorporeal Nature Absolutely considered for so it is common to all the Three Persons but for that Infinite Incorporeal Nature Quatenus procedens aut spirata and under that peculiar Mode of Subsistence it belongs not to the other Two Persons but stands appropriate only to the Third Nevertheless this makes them not Three distinct Infinite Spirits as we have already shewn but only one Infinite Spirit under Three distinct Modalities Accordingly when the Son is here called the Wisdom of the Father that very Term of the Father imports a Modification of it peculiar to the Son but yet this Modification does not make it another Wisdom from that which is in the Father since one and the same Wisdom may sustain several determining Modes Our Author's next Quotation is out of Peter Lombard Page 103. whom for the Credit of what he Quotes from him he styles the Oracle of the Schools though he who shall read Lambertus Denoeus upon the first Book of his Sentences will quickly find what a Doughty Oracle he is The Passage quoted proceeds upon the same Notion which we find in the foregoing Citation out of St. Austin whom he also alledges for it Nevertheless I shall Transcribe this also as I did the other both for the Choice Stuff contained in it as also that the Reader may have it before him and thereby see what use our Author is able to make of it for his purpose First of all then he tells us That in God to be and to be Wise is the same thing And I grant it with respect to the Absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature but for all that I must tell him That to Be and to be Wise fall under two formally distinct Conceptions of which the former does not include the latter and that for this Reason such as treat Scholastically of these Matters do always allow a formal difference between them and never treat of them but as so considered And let me tell him also that this consideration looks yet something further as inferring That Things formally distinct must have formally distinct Effects so that the formal Effect of one cannot be ascribed to the other And moreover that it is a very gross Absurdity to confound the Formal Cause with the Efficient and so to argue from one as you would do from the other Which Observations being thus laid down let us see how this Man and his Oracle argue in the Case And it is thus If the Wisdom which He viz. God the Father Begets be the cause of his being wise then it is the cause also of his very Being In Answer to which I deny the Consequence For that Wisdom is the cause of one's being Wise only by a formal Causality viz. by existing in Him and affecting him in such a particular way and this it does without being the Cause also of his Existence that being a Thing formally distinct from his Being Wise And therefore though Wisdom I grant must presuppose the Existence of the Subject where it has this Effect Yet it does not formally cause it or rather indeed for this very reason cannot possibly do so But he proceeds and argues further viz. That supposing the Wisdom Begotten by the Father were the Cause both of his Being and of his being Wise then it must be so either by Begetting or Creating him for so I Interpret Conditricem but for one to say That Wisdom is any way the Begetter or Maker of the Father would be the height of Madness It would be so indeed And so on the other side to attempt to prove the Father and the Son to be Two distinct Infinite Minds by such strange odd uncouth Notions as these which St. Austin himself particularly treating of them in his 7 and 15 Books de Trinitate confesses to be Quoestiones inextricabiles this I say whatsoever may be the height of Madness is certainly not the height of Discretion Nevertheless as to the Argument it self I deny the Consequence And that because the Begetting or any otherwise Producing a Thing imports a Cause operating by a proper Efficiency or Causality whereas Wisdom being only the formal Cause of one's being Wise as it would be no other could it be the Cause of one's very Being also operates only by an Internal Improper Causality viz. in a word Wisdom makes one Wise as Whiteness makes a Thing White not by producing any Thing in him but by Existing in him and affecting him by it self after such a certain manner and thereby giving him such a certain Denomination Now from hence let any one judge how foreibly and Philosophically this Man Disputes the Truth is were the whole Argument Conclusive it were nothing to his purpose But I was willing to shew That his way of arguing is
For though the Three Divine Persons differ as really yet it is certain that they do not differ as much But what the Fathers alledged only as an Illustration of the Case this Man is pleased to make a direct proof of his Point which by his Favour is to stretch it a little too far For if he would make the foregoing Example a Parallel Instance to the Thing which he applies it to it would prove a great deal too much as has been shewn and therefore as to the Thing which it is brought for does indeed prove nothing at all Now the Thing it is brought to prove is That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits but since we have shewn That a Real Difference or Distinction may be much short of such an one as is between two or more Minds or Spirits which we own to be as great as between two or more Men it follows That the Real Difference which is between the Three Divine Persons cannot prove them to be so many distinct Minds or Spirits In short our Author 's whole Argument amounts to no more but this which though it may sound something jocularly is really and strictly true viz. That because Peter Iames and Iohn are so many Men therefore Father Son and Holy Ghost are so many Minds A pleasant way of Arguing certainly I have now examined all that this Author has alledged about the distinction of the Three Divine Persons and I have done it particularly and exactly not omitting any one of his Quotations But how comes it to pass all this while that we have not so much as one Syllable out of the Fathers or School-men in behalf of Self-Consciousness Which being according to this Author the Constituent Reason of the Personality and Personal Distinction of the Three Divine Persons will he pretend to prove the Distinction it self from the Fathers and at the same time not speak one Tittle of the Principle or Reason of this Distinction Or will he profess to prove his whole Hypothesis by the Authority of the Fathers and yet be silent of Self-Consciousness which he himself makes one grand and principal part of the said Hypothesis Certainly one would think that the very shame of the World and that Common Awe and regard of Truth which Nature has imprinted upon the Minds of Men should keep any one from offering to impose upon Men in so gross and shameless a manner as to venture to call a Notion or Opinion the Constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools nay and to profess to make it out and shew it to be so and while he is so doing not to to produce one Father or Schoolman I say again not so much as one of either in behalf of that which he so confidently and expresly avows to be the joynt Sentiment of Both. This surely is a way of proving or rather of imposing peculiar to Himself But we have seen how extremely fond he is of this new Invented Term and Notion And therefore since he will needs have the Reputation of being the sole Father and Begetter of the Hopefull Issue there is no Reason in the World that Antiquity should find other Fathers to maintain it CHAP. VII In which is shewn That the Passages alledged by this Author out of the Fathers do not prove Mutual-Consciousness to be that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does Consist But that the Fathers place it in something else OUR Author having undertook to make good his Doctrine about the Blessed Trinity from the Fathers and that both as to the Distinction of the Divine Persons and also as to their Unity in the same Nature And having said what he could from those Ancient Writers for that new sort of Distinction which he ascribes to the said Persons in the former part of his 4th Section which I have confuted in the preceding Chapter he proceeds now in the following and much longer part of the same Section to prove the Unity of the Three Persons in one and the same Nature according to his own Hypothesis And the Proofs of this we shall reduce under these Two following Heads as containing all that is alledged by him upon this point of his Discourse viz. First That it is one and the same Numerical Divine Nature which belongs to all the Three Divine Persons And Secondly That the Thing wherein this Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature does consist is that Mutual-Consciousness by which all the Three Persons are intimately Conscious to one another of all that is known by or belongs to each of them in particular And here the Authority of the Fathers is pleaded by him for both of these and I readily grant it for the first but however shall examine what this Author produces for the one as well as for the other But before I do this I must observe to him That if that Distinction Asserted by him between the Divine Persons whereby they stand distinguished as Three Infinite Minds or Spirits holds good all his proofs of the Unity of their Nature will come much too late For he has thereby already destroyed the very Subject of his Discourse and it is in vain to seek wherein the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature as it belongs to the Three Persons does Consist after he has affirmed that which makes such an Unity utterly impossible And it has been sufficiently proved against him in our 5th Chapter That Three Infinite Minds or Spirits can never be one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit nor consequently one God Three distinct Spirits can never be otherwise One than by being United into one Compound or Collective Being which could such a Thing be admitted here might be called indeed an Union but an Unity properly it could not And hereupon I cannot but observe also That this Author very often uses these Terms promiscuously as if Union and Unity being United into One and being One signified the very same Thing whereas in strictness and propriety of Speech whatsoever Things are United into One cannot be Originally One and è Converso whatsoever is Originally One cannot be so by being United into One for as Suidas explains the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Union is so called from the pressing or thrusting together several Things into one But our Author who with great profoundness tells us of the same Nature in Three distinct Persons being United into One Numerical Essence or God-head Page 118. Lines 9 10. has certainly a different Notion of Union from all the World besides For how one and the same Nature though in never so many distinct Persons since it is still supposed the same in all can be said to be United into any one Thing I believe surpasses all Humane Apprehension to conceive Union in the very Nature of it being of several Things not of one and the same I desire the Reader to consult the place and
if not absolutely Notional and depends upon the Operation of the Intellect drawing one common Notion from the agreement which it observes in several Individuals is by no means necessary to make the Three Divine Persons One God nor can any way properly belong to them But a Specifick Unity is such an one And therefore it neither is nor can be necessary to the making the Three Divine Persons One God as this Author most absurdly Asserts p. 107. Line 23 24. The Major is evident For that if such an Unity could be necessary upon that Account then there would be some sort or degree of Unity in the Divine Nature so depending upon the Operation of some Intellect or other forming one common Notion out of several Particulars that had not such an Operation passed upon the said Particulars such an Unity could not have been nor consequently could the Three Divine Persons have been one God without it which to affirm would certainly be both a Monstrous and Blasphemous Assertion Fifthly and lastly If a Specifick Unity of Nature consists with and indeed implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in every one of the Particulars to which it belongs then such a Specifick Unity can by no means be admitted in the Divine Nature But a Specifick Unity of Nature imports a Multiplication of the said Nature in every one of the Particulars to which it belongs And therefore such an Unity cannot be admitted in the Divine Nature The Reason of the Consequence is evident because the Divine Nature is uncapable of any Multiplication And herein consists the difference of the Divine Nature's belonging to the Divine Persons and of any other Nature's belonging to its proper Individuals That this latter is by a Multiplication of it self in them and the other by a bare Communication of it self to them so as that the same Numerical Nature exists in and becomes thereby common to all the Three Persons As for the Minor Proposition That a Specifick Unity of Nature consists with and implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals which it belongs to I referr him to all the Logicians and Metaphysicians who have wrote of Species and Specifick Unity of Idem Diversum whether they do not give this Account of it But I fancy this Author has a reach of Cunning tho' but a short one in the case For that having made the Three Divine Persons Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which can never be One by a Numerical Unity he is willing to provide them a Specifical Unity and to see whether that will serve the turn but as the Nature of the Thing unhappily falls out to be that will not do it neither These are the Considerations which I thought fit to advance against the Admission of a Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature with reference to the Divine Persons And the Conclusion which I draw from them all is this That since the Fathers and that even by this Authors own Confession held a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons we can by no means grant that the said Fathers admitted also a Specifick Unity in the same without making them guilty of a gross Absurdity and Contradiction Forasmuch as these Two sorts or degrees of Unity are utterly incompatible in the Divine Nature I hope by this time the Judicious Reader sees how fit this Man is to be trusted with the Fathers whose Judgment about so weighty an Article he dares misrepresent in such a manner For to sum up briefly what he has said upon this Point First he tells us That the Fathers agree very well in the Account they give of a Trinity in Unity Page 106. and the four first Lines Next he tells us That the Nicene Fathers asserted a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity and understood the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only of such an Unity and not of a Numerical Page 106. and the five last Lines And Thirdly That this Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature was absolutely Necessary to make the Three Divine Persons One God and that it was impossible they should be so without it Page 107. Lines 23 24. And Fourthly That the other Fathers of which he there names four never so much as Dream'd of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature Page 109. lines 22 23. And Lastly That the Fathers do not stop in this Specifick Unity and Identity of Nature but proceed to shew how the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proves a true Numerical and Essential Unity of the Godhead in the Three Divine Persons Page 114. Lines 30 31 32 33. From all which Assertions which lie plain and open in the forecited Pages I desire this Author to resolve me these following Queries 1. Whether those Fathers who Assert a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature and those who never Dreamt of such an Unity And those again who by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood only a Specifick and not a Numerical Unity of Nature and those who by the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed to prove a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons can be said to agree so very well in the Account they give of a Trinity in Unity 2. Whether those could give a true and right Account of a Trinity in Unity who never so much as Dreamt of that which was so absolutely necessary to make the Three Divine Persons One God that they could not possibly be so without it 3. Whether a Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature in several Persons is or can be a direct and proper proof of a Numerical Unity and Identity of Nature in the said Persons These Questions I say being the Natural and Immediate Results of this Author 's Positions I hope he will graciously vouchsafe sometime or other to give the World a satisfactory Resolution of In the mean time I will tell him what it was that imposed upon him so as to make him talk thus Absurdly and Unphilosophically of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature and traduce the Fathers also as if they held the same And that in one word is That in the Subject before us he takes Specifick Nature and Common Nature to signifie one and the same Thing whereas though every Specifick Nature be a Common Nature yet every Common Nature is not a Specifick Nature no nor a Generical neither And that this was his mistake appears from those words of his in Page 106. where he says That Petavius and Dr. Cudworth have abundantly proved That the Nicene Fathers did not understand the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Numerical but of a Specifical Sameness of Nature or the agreement of Things Numerically differing from one another in the same Common Nature In which words it is evident That he makes Specifick Sameness of Nature and the Agreement of Things numerically different in one and the same Common Nature to signifie Convertibly the same Thing and
Author to the same Sarcastical Irony which he passed upon his Socinian Adversary Page 92. line 17 c. Right very Right Sir a plain Demonstration But still there is one half of his Promise to be yet accounted for viz. The proving his Opinion to have been the constant Doctrine of the Schools And how does he acquit himself as to this Why in a very extraordinary manner too For first instead of alledging the Authority of the School-men he tells us Page 138. That they are of no Authority at all but as they fall in with the Fathers And withall That instead of doing so They use to mistake and clog the sence of the Fathers with some peculiar Niceties and Distinctions of their own And that the Truth is the vain Endeavours of reducing this Mystery to Terms of Art such as Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Hypostasis Person and the like which he says some of the Fathers used in a very different sence from each other have wholly confounded this Mystery And here I cannot but desire the Reader to judge whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procuring Credit to an Hypothesis upon the score of its being the constant Doctrine of the Schools by telling the World as this Man here does that the School-men are a Company of Impertinent Fellows of little or no Authority in themselves and who have by their useless absurd Niceties consounded this whole Mystery For if they are of no Authority but what they derive from the Fathers as he avers why does he quote them upon the same level with the Fathers and plead them both as two distinct Authorities And if they do nothing but pervert and confound this Mystery why instead of alledging them does he not earnestly caution his Reader against them and disswade him from having any thing to do with their dangerous and absurd Writings This certainly is a way of proving a Point by Testimony and Authority so beyond all Example ridiculous that unless the Reader will vouchsafe to read these Passages in the Author himself and so take his Conviction from his own Eyes I can hardly blame him if he refuses to believe my bare Affirmation in a thing so Incredible As for the Terms Essence Substance Subsistence Person and the like which he so explodes I hope I have given my Reader a satisfactory Account both of their usefulness and of the uselesness of such as this Author would substitute in their room in Chap. 2. at large to which I referr him And whereas he says Page 139. line 25. c. That the Deity is above Nature and above Terms of Art and that there is nothing like this Mysterious Distinction and Unity and therefore no wonder if we want proper words to express it by at least that such Names as signifie the Distinction and Unity of Creatures should not reach it It by all this he means that there are no Terms of Art Comprehensive and fully expressive of the Divine Nature and the Mysterious Distinction and Unity of the Persons belonging to it none that I know of thinks otherwise But if he means that no Terms of Art can be of any use to aid us in our inadequate imperfect Conceptions of those great things so as thereby we may conceive of them in some better degree and clearer manner than we could without such Terms pray then of what use are his Self-Consciousness and Mutual Consciousness in this Matter For I suppose he will allow these to be Terms of Art too and such I am sure as he has promised the World no small wonders from But if he will allow any usefulness in those two Terms of Art of his own Inventing towards our better Apprehension of the Divine Nature and Persons the same and greater has the constant use of all Church-Writers proved to be in the Terms Essence Substance Hypostasis Person c. as the properest and most significant the fittest and most accommodate to help and methodize Men's thoughts in discoursing of God and Immaterial Beings of all or any other Terms of Art which the Wit of Man ever yet invented or pitched upon for that purpose And I hope the known avowed use and experience of such great Men and those in so great a number is an abundant overpoise to the contrary Affirmation of this or any other Novel Author whatsoever But all this it seems he endeavours to overthrow and dash with Three Terrible confounding Questions Page 139. Lines 22 23 c. Which yet I can by no means think so very formidable but that they may be very safely Encountered and fairly Answered too As Qu. 1. What says our Author is the Substance or Nature of God I Answer It is a Being existing of and by it self Incorporeal Infinite Eternal Omniscient Omnipotent c. Qu. 2. How can Three distinct Persons have but One Numerical Substance I Answer Every whit as well as they can be said to have but one Numerical God-head or Divine Nature or as they can have one Numerical Mutual Consciousness common to them all Qu. 3. What is the Distinction between Essence and Personality and Subsistence I Answer The same that is between a Thing or Being and the Modes of it And he who neither knows nor admits of a difference between these is much fitter to go to School himself than to sit and pass judgment upon the Schoolmen And as for the Terms Subsistence and Personality they import the last and utmost Completion of the Existence of Things by vertue whereof they exist by themselves so as neither to be Supported by nor Communicable to any Subject Of which two Modes Personality belongs only to Intelligent Beings but Subsistence to all others to whom the aforesaid Definition does agree And this is the True Proper Difference and Distinction between these Two And this Author may take Notice of it if he pleases However having thus answered his Questions tho' to what purpose he proposed them I cannot imagine yet that he may see how ambitious I am to follow his great Example I shall in requital of his three Questions propose these four to him As First Since in Page 139. he affirms the Deity to be above Nature and all Terms of Art so that we want proper Words and Names to express the Distinction and Unity of the Divine Persons by and that such as signifie the Distinction and Unity of Creatures cannot reach it I desire to know of him upon what ground of Reason it is That speaking of this same Mysterious Unity and Distinction in Page 106. lines 11 12 c. He says That the Fathers used several Examples and alluded to several kinds of Union thereby to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head For if the Deity be so far above Nature and all Terms of Art that there is an utter want of words or Names to express the Unity of it by How could any Examples or Allusions drawn from Nature though never so many form
the Things themselves yet derive only an External Habitude and denomination consequent from it upon the Deity it self The 2d Sort of Relation is Intrinsecal and founded upon those Internal Acts by which one Person produces another or proceeds from another For to produce and to proceed whether by Generation or Spiration is that which makes or Constitutes a Plurality of Persons in the Godhead From all which it follows That the Relation by which God as a Creator or Preserver respects his Creatures is extremely different from that by which God as a Father respects his Son The former adding only to the Deity an Extrinsecal denomination but the latter leaving upon it an Internal Incommunicable Character Essentially Inseparable from the Deity So that although it may well enough be said That God might never have been a Creator yet it cannot be said of Him That he might never have been a Father the former being only an effect of his Will but this latter the Necessary Result of his Nature Now these Internal Acts upon which the Divine Relations are founded and from which they flow are First That Eternal Act by which the Father Communicates his Divine Nature to the Son which accordingly is called Generation And that by which the Son receives his Divine Nature from the Father which is called Filiation And. Thirdly The Act of Spiration by which the Father and the Son together eternally breath forth the Holy Spirit And Lastly The Act of Procession by which the Holy Ghost proceeds and receives his Divine Nature joyntly from them both These I say are those Internal Incommunicable and distinguishing Acts from which the Personal Relations belonging to the Three Divine Persons are derived But you will say Does not this infer Four Persons in the Godhead viz. That as Generation and Filiation make two so Spiration and Procession should make two more I Answer No Because the same Person may sustain several Personal Relations and Exert and receive several Personal Acts where those Acts or Relations are not opposite to or inconsistent with one another in the same Subject As for instance The Person of the Father may Exert both an Act of Generation and of Spiration and so sustain the Relations resulting from both without any Multiplication of his Person and the Son likewise may receive and sustain the Act of Filiation and withal Exert an Act of Spiration without any Multiplication of Personality And this because neither are the Acts of Generation and Spiration inconsistent in the Father nor the Acts of Filiation and Spiration incompatible in the Son Though indeed the Acts of Generation and Filiation and the Relations springing therefrom would be utterly inconsistent because opposite in any one Person as likewise upon the same Account would the Acts of Spiration and Procession From whence by plain and undeniable Consequence it follows That Generation and Filiation Spiration and Procession Constitute only Three Persons in the Eternal Godhead and no more For Relations merely disparate do not Constitute several distinct Persons unless they be opposite too That Maxime of the Schools being most true That Sola Oppositio multiplicat in Divinis So that albeit Filiation and Spiration are Terms opposite to their respective Correlates yet being only disparate with reference to one another and as both of them meet and are lodged in one and the same Subject viz. the Person of the Son they neither cause nor infer in him any more than one Single Personality But now if any one should ask me What this Generation and Filiation this Spiration and Procession are I answer That herein consists the Mystery and since such Mysteries exceed the Comprehension of Humane Reason I am not in the least ashamed most readily to own my ignorance thereof in that known Anthem used in the Church Quid sit Gigni quid Processus Me nescire sum processus For tho the Author whom I have been Disputing with by the help and vertue of Two Wonder working words able to make one who is no Conjurer do strange things undertakes to make this greatest of Mysteries Plain Easie and Intelligible and when he has done this as he says he has owns it nevertheless for a Mystery still yet in the Judgment of other Mortals to acknowledge a Thing Inexplicable and in the same Breath to offer an Explication of it too will be thought a little too much for one of an ordinary pitch of Sence and Reason to pretend to and therefore for my own part I dare not look so high Upon the whole matter in discoursing of the Trinity Two Things are absolutely necessary to be held and insisted upon One That each and every Person of the Blessed Trinity entirely contains and includes in himself the whole Divine Nature The other That each Person is Incommunicably different and distinct from the other And here if it should be asked How they differ and whether it be by any real distinction between the Persons I Answer Yes But for the better explaining of my Answer we must distinguish of Two sorts of Real Distinctions 1. The first greater viz. When Two Things or real Beings differ from one another 2. The other lesser as when the difference is between a Thing or real Being on the one side and the Mode of it on the other Or between Two or more Modes of the same Being And this Distinction or Difference is called Real in opposition to that which is wholly founded upon the Apprehension or Operation of the Intellect and has of it self no Existence without it But a Being and the Mode adhering to it differ whether the Mind ever apprehends and thinks of them or no. And thus we affirm That the Divine Persons really differ and are distinguished from one another viz. by a Modal or lesser sort of Real difference according to which the Divine Nature Subsisting under and being determined by such a certain Mode personally differs from it self as subsisting under and determined by another Forasmuch as the Divine Nature or Godhead so subsisting and determined is properly a Person Nor ought this smallness of difference between the Divine Persons to be any presumption against the Truth of what we have delivered concerning the Oeconomy of the Blessed Trinity as shall be more particularly shewn in Answer to one of this Author's Objections against it before we come to a conclusion of this Chapter In the mean time to sum up the foregoing Particulars the Reader may please to take what I aver to be the Doctrine of the Catholick Church about this great Article in this following Account of it viz. That there is one and but one Self-Existing Infinite Eternal c. Being Nature or Substance which we call God And that this Infinite Eternal Self-Existing Being or Nature Exists in and is common to Three distinct Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost Of which the Son eternally issues from the Father by way of Generation and the Holy Ghost joyntly from both by way of
Spiration which Three Divine Persons superadd to this Divine Nature or Deity Three different Modes of Subsistence founding so many different Relations each of them belonging to each Person in a peculiar Uncommunicable manner so that by vertue thereof each person respectively differs and stands distinguished from the other Two And yet by reason of one and the same Numerical Divine Nature or Godhead equally existing in and common to all the Three Persons they are all but One and the same God who is blessed for Ever This I reckon to be a True and Just Representation of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church so far as it has thought fit to declare it self upon this Great and Sacred Mystery Not that I think this sets the Point clear from all Difficulties and Objections For the Nature and Condition of the Thing will not have it so nor have the Ablest Divines ever thought it so for where then were the Mystery But that it gives us the fairest and most consistent Account of this Article both with reference to Scripture and Reason and liable to the fewest Exceptions against it of any other Hypothesis or Explication of it whatsoever And the same will appear yet further from those Terms which the Writers of the Church have all along used in expressing themselves upon this Subject And that both with respect First To the Unity and Agreement of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Nature And Secondly To their Personal Distinction from one another And first For their Unity and Agreement in one and the same Nature The Greeks expressed this by the Terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Latines by Consubstantialitas and Coessentialitas By all which I affirm That they understood an Agreement in one and the same Numerical Nature or Essence For tho this Author has affirmed That the Nicene Fathers understood no more by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than a Specifick Unity of Nature this Matter has been sufficiently accounted for and his Assertion effectually confuted in the foregoing Chapter In the next place As for the Terms expressing the Distinction and Difference of the Divine Persons from one another the Greeks make use of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Subsistences or Persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Modes of Subsistence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Properties 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Marks of Distinction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinguishing Properties 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Notes of Signification And agreeably to them the Latines also make use of the following Terms Trinitas Personae Subsistentiae Modi Subsistendi Proprietates Relationes and Notiones seu Notionalia By which last the Schoolmen mean such Terms and Expressions as serve to notifie and declare to us the proper and peculiar distinction of the Divine Persons And they reckon four of them viz. the above mentioned Paternitas Filiatio Spiratio Processio all of them importing Relation To which some add a fifth which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latines Innascibilitas a Term not importing in it any positive Relation but only a meer Negation of all producibility by any Superiour principle and upon that account peculiar to the Father who alone of all the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is without Production Touching all which Terms I cannot think it necessary to enlarge any further in a particular and more distinct Explication of them since how differing soever they may be in their respective significations they all concur in the same use and design which is to express something proper and peculiar to the Divine Persons whereby they are rendred distinct from and Incommunicable to one another But these few general Remarks I think fit to lay down concerning them As 1. That albeit most of these Terms as to the Form of the Word run abstractively yet they are for the most part to be understood Concretively and not as simple Forms but as Forms in Conjunction with the Subject which they belong to In the former abstracted sence they are properly Personalities or Personal Properties viz. Those Modes or Forms by which the Persons whom they appertain to are formally constituted and denominated what they are but in the Latter and Concrete Sence they signifie the Persons themselves 2. The Second Thing which I would observe is That there has been in the first Ages of the Church some Ambiguity in the use of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Persona For neither would the Latines at first admit of Three Hypostases in God as taking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same Thing for that they had no other Latin Word to Translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by but Substantia by which also they Translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word Subsistentia being then looked upon by them as Barbarous and not in use so that they refused the Term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for fear of admitting of Three distinct Substances or Essences in the Trinity which they knew would lead them into the Errour of Arius Nor on the other side would the Greeks acquiesce in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor admit of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for fear of falling thereby into the contrary Errour of Sabellius for that they thought the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imported no real Internal difference but only a difference of Name or Attribute or at most of Office and for them to allow no more than such an one amongst the Divine Persons they knew was Sabellianisme And this Controversie of Words exercised the Church for a considerable time to appease and compose which amongst other Matters a Council was called and held at Alexandria about the Year of Christ 362. in which amongst many other Bishops Convened from Italy Arabia Aegypt and Lybia was present also Athanasius himself And in this Council both sides having been fully heard and found to agree in sence though they differ'd in words it was ordained That they should thenceforth Mutually acknowledg one another for Orthodox and for the future cease contending about these words to the disturbance of the Church By which means and especially by the Explication given of these words by Athanasius whereby as Gregory Nazianzen tells us in his Panegyrick upon him he satisfied and reconciled both Greeks and Latines to the indifferent use of them and indeed that Oration made by Nazianzen himself in the Council of Constantinople viz. The second General before 150 Bishops not a little contributing to the same the sence of these Terms from that time forward came generally to be fixed and the Ambiguity of them removed and so the Controversie by degrees ceased between the Greeks and Latines and the Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Personae and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Subsistentiae grew
but Three Hypostases or Subsistences This keep this hold c. Theodoret also speaks very fully upon the same Subject in his first Dialogue contr Anomaeos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is to say Such Things as belong properly to the Divine Essence or Substance are in like manner common to Father Son and Holy Ghost But the Term Father is not common to them and therefore Father is no Property of the Essence but of the Subsistence or Person But now if one Thing be proper to the Hypostasis or Subsistence and there be other Properties of the Essence it follows That Essence and Hypostasis do not signifie one and the same thing And again a little after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is The Essence or Substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost is common being equally and alike Immortal Incorruptible Holy and Good And for this Reason we affirm One Essence and Three Hypostases Auctarium sive Tom. 5. Theodoret. p. 286. Edit Paris 1684. Certainly nothing could with greater Evidence state the Personalities of Father Son and Holy Ghost upon Three several Subsistences than the Words here quoted out of this Father And I quote them out of him though I know the same Dialogues are inserted into Athanasius's Works but I am convinced by the reasons given by Garnerius the Learned Editor of this Auctarium that the said Dialogues cannot belong to Athanasius Next to him let us hear Basilius Seleuciensis speaking the same Thing in his first Oration upon the first Verse of the first Chapter of Genesis where upon these words Let us make Man after our own Image and Likeness he discourses thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is to say The Image here formed is but One but the mention here made is not of One Hypostasis or Person only but of Three For the Thing formed being the common Work of the whole Deity shews the Trinity to have been the Former thereof and so gives us one Image or Resemblance of the Trinity But if the Image of the Trinity be but One the Nature of the Hypostases or Persons must be One too For the Unity of the Image proclaims the Unity of the Substance or Essence Basil. Seleuciens Orat. 1. p. 5. Printed at Paris with Gregorius Thaumaturgus c. Anno Dom. 1622. Zacharias Sirnamed Scholasticus and sometime Metropolitan of Mitylene of the Sixth Century in his Disputation against the Philosophers who held the Eternity of the World to a certain Philosopher asking him How the Christians could acknowledg the same both a Trinity and an Unity too Makes this Answer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is We affirm a Trinity in Unity and an Unity in Trinity hereby affirming the Subsistences or Persons to be Three and the Essence or Substance to be only One Johannes Damascenus a Writer of the Eighth Century in his Third Book de Orthodoxâ fide Chap. 11. about the end of it speaks thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is The Godhead declares the Nature but the Term Father the Subsistence as Humanity does the Humane Nature but Peter the Subsistence or Person For the Term God denotes the Divine Nature in Common and equally denominates or is ascribed to each of the Hypostases or Subsistences Damascen Page 207. Edit Basil. 1575. I shall close up these particular Testimonies with some Passages in the Creed commonly called the Athanasian which I place so low because it is manifest that Athanasius was not the Author of it it being not so much as mentioned in any Antient Writer as the very Learned Dr. Cave affirms till it occurs in Theodulphus Aurelianensis who lived about the latter end of the Eighth Century Now the Passages are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in some Copies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That is Neither confounding the Hypostases or Persons nor dividing the Substance For there is one Hypostasis of the Father another of the Son and another of the Holy Ghost but the Godhead of the Father Son and Holy Ghost is One c. And again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is The whole Three Hypostases or Persons are Coeternal together and Coequal These Passages are full and plain and the Creed it self may well claim the Antiquity at least of the Eighth Century My next Authorities shall be those of the Councils But before I pass to them I cannot but observe and own to the Reader concerning some of the first of my Quotations viz. those out of Justin Martyr and that out of St. Athanasius that it has been very much questioned by some Learned Men Whether those Books from whence they are taken do really belong to the Authors to whom they are ascribed and among whose Works they are inserted or no. This I say I was not ignorant of nevertheless I thought fit to quote them by the Names under which I found them placed since many very Learned Persons and much more acquainted with the Writings of the Ancients than I pretend to be have upon several Occasions done so before me And the said Tracts are certainly of a very early date and though the Authors of them should fall a Century or two lower yet they still retain Antiquity enough to make good the Point for which I alledged them Nevertheless I must and do confess it very probable That the more distinct and exact use of the Terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applyed to the Divine Persons did not generally and commonly take place but as by degrees the Discussion of the Arian and other the like Controversies through frequent Disputes grew to still a greater and greater Maturity And that the use of these Terms did obtain then and upon that Account I think a very considerable Argument to authorize and recommend them to all Sober and Judicious Minds And so I pass to the Testimonies of Councils concerning the same Amongst which we have here in the first place the Council of Chalcedon making a Confession or Declaration of their Faith concerning the Person of our Saviour and that both as to the Absolute undivided Unity of his Person and as to the Difference and Distinction of his Two Natures part of which Confession runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is We confess One and the same Lord Jesus Christ the only begotten Son of God in Two Natures without Confusion c. the difference of the said Natures being by no means destroyed by their Union but rather the property of each Nature being thereby preserved and both concurring to or meeting in One Person or Hypostasis This Account of the Chalcedon Confession we have in the Second Book of Evagrius towards the latter end of the 4th Chapter and a lively Instance it is of the Council's expressing the Personality of Christ by and stating It upon Subsistence In the next place upon Justinian's calling the second Council of
Constantinople being the Fifth General one in the Year 553 for Condemning of the Tria Capitula we have a large and Noble Confession of Faith made by that Emperour and owned and applauded by all the Council and inserted amongst the Acts of it And in this we have the Three Divine Persons several times expressed by so many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as a Term equivalent to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and indeed importing withall the Personality or Formal Reason of the same and that so fully and plainly that nothing could or can be more so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That is We profess to Believe One Father Son and Holy Ghost Glorifying thereby a Consubstantial Trinity One Deity or Nature or Essence and Power and Authority in Three Subsistences or Persons And again to the same purpose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We worship says he an Unity in Trinity and a Trinity in Unity having both a strange and wonderful Distinction and Union that is to say an Union or Singularity in respect of the Substance or God-head and a Trinity in respect of Properties Subsistences or Persons with several more such Passages to the same Purpose and Signification And then as for the Council it self the first Canon of it speaks thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is If any one Confess not One Nature or Substance One Power and Authority of Father Son and Holy Ghost a Coessential Trinity and One Deity to be Worshipped in Three Subsistences or persons Let such an one be Accursed In the next place we have the Sixth General Council and the Third of Constantinople called by Constantinus Pogonatus against the Monothelites in the Year 681. In the Acts of which Council Article 6. we have the Council owning the same Thing and in the same words which a little before we quoted out of the Council of Chalcedon And moreover in the Tenth Article the Council declares it self thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That is We believing our Lord Iesus Christ to be the True God do affirm in him Two Distinct Natures shining forth in One Subsistence or Person Agreeably to this the Council immediately following called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by the â—atines Concilium Quini Sextum Consisting chiefly of the same Persons with the former and called by the same Constantine about Ten Years after for the making of Canons about Discipline by way of Supplement to the Fifth and Sixth Councils which had made none This Council I say in the first of its Canons which is as a kind of Preface owns and applauds the Nicene Fathers for that with an Unanimous Agreement and consent of Faith they had declared and cleared up one Consubst antiality in the Three Hypostases or Subsistences of the Divine Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And Lastly in the Florentine Council held in the Fif teenth Century in which the Greeks with their Emperor Iohannes Palaeologus met the Latines in order to an Accord between them touching that so much controverted Article about the Procession of the Holy Ghost In this Council Isay we have the Greeks also expressing the Personality of the Holy Ghost by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For whereas the Latines affirmed that the Holy Ghost the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is to say stream or flow from the Son the Greeks desired them to explain what they meant by that Expression 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whether they understood that he derived both his Essence and Personality from him and that in these words very significant to our purpose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which we see that even with these Modern Greeks also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is all one with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie Essence and Person as applyed to the Persons of the Blessed Trinity Hist. Concil Florent in the last Chapter and Question 7. of Section 8. Pag. 246. set forth by Dr. Creyghton 1660. I cannot think it requisite to quote any Thing more from the Greeks upon this Subject it being as clear as the Day that both Fathers and Councils stated the Personalities of Father Son and Holy Ghost upon Three distinct Hypostases or Subsistences of one and the same God-head Essence or Substance distinguished thereby into Three Persons And so I pass from the Greeks to the Latines whom we shall find giving an Account of the same partly by subsistences and Modes of subsistence and partly by Relations But not equally by both in all Ages of the Church For we have before shewn That there was a long and sharp Contest between the Greeks and the Latines about the Word Hypostasis and that the Latines dreaded the use of it as knowing no other Latin Word to render it by but Substantia which they could by no means ascribe plurally to God and as for the Word Subsistentia that was not then accounted properly Latin and it was but upon this occasion and to fence against the Ambiguity of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it came at length into use amongst the Latines And even after all it must be yet further confessed That notwithstanding that fair foundation of Accord between the Greeks and Latines laid by the forementioned Council of Alexandria and the hearty Endeavours both of Athanasius and of Gregory Nazianzen after him to accommodate the business between them the Latines were not so ready to come over to the Greeks in the free use of the Word Hypostasis as the Greeks were to comply withthe Latines in the use of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 answering to their Persona And therefore in vain would any one seek for an Explication of the Divine Persons in the Trinity by the Terms Subsistentiae or Modi Subsistendi in the earlier Latin Writers such as Tertullian about the latter end of the second Century and St. Cyprian about themiddle of the Third and Lactantius about the latter end of the same and the beginning of the Fourth Nevertheless find it we do in the Writers of the following Ages And how and in what sence it was used by them shall be now considered And here we will begin with St. Ambrose who is full and clear in the case in his Book in Symbolum Apostolicum Cap. 2. Tom. 2. in these Words Ità ergò rectum Catholicum est ut unum Deum secundùm Unitatem Substantiae fateamur Patrem Filium Spiritum Sanctum in suâ quemque Subsistentiâ sentiamus A Passage so very plain that nothing certainly could more effectually declare That this Father reckoned the Personalities of the Three Divine Persons to consist in their several and respective Subsistences The next whom we shall alledge is St. Hilary who flourished in the Fourth Century and wrote Twelve Books
Estius let us cast our Eye upon Suarez speaking much the same Thing with those before mentioned Advertendum est says he hoc nomen Subsistentia apud Antiquos Patres frequentiùs accipi in Vi concreti ad significandam Hypostasim seu Personam In quo sensu nulla est Quoestio inter Catholicos nam de fide est dari in Trinitate Tres Subsistentias realiter distinctas id est Tres Hypostases Suarez in 1 m Thomae de Trinitatis Mysterio lib. 3. cap. 4. And then again for the Relative Nature of the said Subsistences he gives this Account of the Divine Persons and their Personalities Ex his quoe hactenus diximus c. concluditur Relationem Personalem esse etiam proprietatem constituentem Personam seu quâ constituitur Persona De Trinit lib. 7. cap. 7. in the beginning To all which I shall add Martinez Ripalda a short but Judicious Writer upon the Sentences speaking of the Term Hypostasis in these Words Hoeretici says he referente Hieronymo eâ voce abutebantur ad decipiendum fideles jam eâ significantes Essentiam jam Personalitatem incommunicabilem Subsistentiam By which last Expression this Author manifestly shews That he takes Personality and Incommunicable Subsistence for Words Synonymous and consequently that such a Subsistence is and must be that by which a Divine Person is constituted formally what he is I cannot think it necessary to quote any more of this sort of Writers nor am I sollicitous to alledge many of them because I am well assured according to the forecited Saying of Cajetan that these are the Terms and this the Language of them all upon this Subject Only I think fit to remark this That whereas I have alledged some of the School-men and particularly Durandus Thomas and Suarez expressing the Divine Personalities by Relations as well as by Hypostases or Subsistences as they do in both these mean but one and the same Thing viz. a Relative Subsistence or a Subsisting Relation so by both of them they equally overthrow this Author's Hypothesis deriving the Divine Personalities from Self-Consciousness Forasmuch as Subsistence is in Nature before it and Relation is opposite to it it having been demonstrated by me in Chap. 4. That Self-Consciousness is a Thing wholly Absolute and Irrelative and therefore cannot possibly be the Formal Reason of that which is Essentially Relative In a word Self Consciousness is neither an Hypostasis nor a Relation and therefore can have nothing to do here whatsoever other Employment this Author may have for it And now I shall at last descend to the Testimony of several Modern Divines and all of them Men of Note in the Times in which they lived And amongst these let us first hear Philip Melancthon in his common places speaking thus upon this Head Satis constat says he veteres Scriptores Ecclesiae solitos haec duo vocabula discernere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicere unam esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id est Essentiam aeternam Patris Filii Spiritùs Sancti sed tres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 From him we will pass to Chemnitius who Wrote upon Melancthon's Common Places He in the first Chapter of his Book de duabus in Christo Naturis gives his Opinion thus Hypostases seu Personae Trinitatis omnes unum sunt propter Identitatem Essentiae suae atque adeò non differunt Essentialiter nec separatim una extra aliam sinè aliâ subsistit And presently after this Relatione autem seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 modo scilicet Subsistendi realiter differunt After Chemnitius let us consider what Calvin says in Book 1. of his Institutions Chap. 13. Sect. 2. Filium Dei Apostolus characterem Hypostaseos Patris nominans haud dubiè aliquam Patri Subsistentiam assignat in quâ differat à Filio Nam pro Essentià accipere sicuti fecerunt quidam Interpretes c. non durum modò sed absurdum quoquè esset And again in Sect. 6. of the same Chapter Personam voco Subsistentiam in Dei essentiâ quae ad alios relata proprietate incommunicabili distinguitur Subsistentiae nomine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quà m Essentiam In the next place Peter Martyr gives us the same Account of the same Subject Multò rectiùs says he veriùs intelligemus ex isto loco nempe 2 Samuelis Cap. 7. Commate 23. Tres Personas in Unâ Naturâ Divinâ Patrem inquam Filium Spiritum Sanctum quae cùm sint Tres Hypostases tamen concluduntur in Unam Essentiam Petrus Martyr Loc. Com. p. 50. col 2. Loco de Dei Attributis Sacro-Sanctâ Trinitate Likewise Wolfgangus Musculus in his Common Places under the particular Head or common Place de Deo declares the Matter thus Est itaque Deus Essentiâ Unus quemadmodum Naturâ Divinitate Hypostasi verò Trinus And a little after Haec sunt manifestâ fide tenenda Deum viz. Esse Unum Essentiâ Naturâ Divinitate sententiâ Motione Operatione Trinum verò Tribus Personis quarum singulis sua est Hypostasis Proprietas Musc. Loc. Comm. Cap. 6. p. 7. And a little before speaking of the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in what sence the Ancients understood these Words Voce Essentiae says he id expresserunt nempe Veteres quod commune est in Sacrâ Triade per Hypostasim verò quod Unicuique Personae proprium in illâ est significârunt p. 6. ibid. Piscator also in his Theological Theses speaks after the same manner Quum igitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 semper fuerit Filius Dei quis non videt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de quo loquitur Iohannes semper fuisse Personam seu Hypostasim rem scilicet per se Subsistentem Loc. 2. de Deo p. 57 58. Agreeably to this Tilenus an Eminent Divine expresses himself in his Body of Divinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 says he sive Personae sunt illa ipsa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quae in singulis Personis est Tota ipsae verò Relationibus sive Proprietatibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt distinctae And again Simpliciter dicimus Proprietates istas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse diversos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc est modos Subsistendi Tilen Syntag. par 1. cap. 20. p. 129. The Learned Ursinus in his Theological Treatises under the Head De tribus Personis in Unâ Deitate declares the same Tenendum est nequaquam eandem esse Patris Filii Spiritûs Sancti Personam sed Tres esse Personas seu Hypostases Divinitatis reipsâ distinctas nec plures nec pauciores Ursini Oper. Theol. Quaest. 4. Thesi 2. By which we see that this great Divine reckons Subsistence to be so much the Ground and Reason of Personality that he uses Persona and Hypostasis as Terms
Father Page 102. That is to say than Three vagrant Words applyed by him to he knows not what and to be found for ought appears he knows not where All which being manifestly so I desire any Sober Person to shew me something but like a Reason to prove That the Fathers and other Church-Writers from whom all these Quotations were drawn placed the Personal Distinction of the Divine Persons in Self Consciousness and their Unity only in Mutual-Consciousness On the contrary as these Words were never so much as mentioned by them so I affirm That whensoever in speaking of the Trinity they proceed beyond the bare Word and Name of Person so as to give any Account of the Thing signified thereby and the Reason thereof they do it constantly by Subsistences Modes of Subsistence and Relations This I am positive in and withal that as they never mentioned the Terms Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness upon this Subject so I avert moreover That when they use the Words Subsistences Modes of Subsistence and Relations on the one side and of Unity or Identity of Nature Essence or Substance on the other which they always do they neither do nor can mean Self Consciousness by the former nor Mutual-Consciousness by the latter nor yet the Things signified by either of these Terms And that for these Reasons First Because all Modes of Being importing Existence are in Order of Nature antecedent to the other Attributes of Being such as are Knowledg Wisdom Power and the like And Self-Consciousness is no more as being but a branch or sort of Knowledg and nothing else And Secondly Because nothing Absolute can give Distinction and Incommunicability to the Divine Persons the Rule of the Schools being undeniably true Non dari in Divinis Absolutum Incommunicabile Gr. Valent. Tom. 1. Pag. 874. But such a Thing I affirm Self-Consciousness to be and in Chap. 4. have abundantly proved it so So that it is evident That all the Fathers and Ancient Writers in all the Terms which they used to express the Trinity and Divine Persons by had no regard to Self-Consciousness either Name or Thing and consequently that it is a Term wholly foreign and unapplicable to this purpose And what is said of their silence about Self-Consciousness extends to Mutual-Consciousness too And the Truth is the other forementioned Terms asserted by us against this Innovator are to be looked on by all Sober Intelligent Men as a set of stated Words or Forms of Expression first pitched upon by the Ablest Divines and Writers of the Church then countenanced and owned by Councils and lastly established by a kind of Prescription founded upon a long continued use of the same throughout the several Ages of the Church as the best and fittest helps to guide Men in their Conceptions of and Discourses about this great Mystery and such as the Church in treating of so arduous a Point never yet would nor durst go beyond So that the Question now is Whether they ought to be abandoned and made to give place to a New Mushrom unheard of Notion set up by one Confident Man preferring himself before all Antiquity A Notion no doubt long before he was Born throughly considered canvased and laid aside as not only insufficient but Impertinent to give any tolerable Account of the Trinity by Well but having declared this for the Catholick Orthodox and Received Doctrine about the Blessed Trinity viz. That it is one and the same Divine Nature Essence or Substance diversified into Three distinct Persons by Three distinct Modes of Subsistence or Relations so that by vertue thereof God is truly and properly said to be Three Persons and Three Persons to be One God Having I say vouched this for the Doctrine of the Church let us in the last place see what this Author has to object against it And here his First Reason to put it into Form for him for once may run thus Whatsoever constitutes and distinguishes the Divine Persons is really and truly in God bu Modes of Subsistence are not really and truly in God and therefore Modes of Subsistence do not constitute or distinguish the Divine Persons The Major is evident and shall be readily granted him And the Minor he positively asserts by denying any Modes to be in God as particularly in Page 47. in these Words All Men grant says he that there are no Accidents Qualities or Modes in God And again Pag. 84. There are no Modes no more than there are Qualities and Accidents in the Deity So that we see here what this Author holds concerning all Modes with reference to God In Answer to which Argument as I have formed it and I challenge him to shew that I have at all wronged him in it if he can I deny the Minor viz. That Modes of Subsistence are not in God And as for his Two forecited general Assertions That Modes are no more to be allowed in God than Qualities and Accidents which by the way are so put together as if Qualities were not Accidents I have these Two Things to remark upon those Two Assertions so positively laid down by him First That it is a gross Absurdity and no small proof of Ignorance to reckon things so vastly different as Modes and Accidents are upon the same Range or Level and then to argue and affirm the same thing of both And therefore I do here with the same Positiveness tell him That Modes and Accidents do extremely differ and that none of any skill either in Logick or Metaphysicks ever accounted them the same For an Accident affects the Subject it belongs to so that it is also a distinct Being it self But a Mode affects it so that it is not a distinct Being it self I will not deny but Accidents may sometimes in a large and loose sence be called Modes But I deny That Modes are either Accidents or everso called where they are particularly and distinctly treated of by themselves School-men and Metaphysicians may speak very differently of Modes when they mention them occasionally and when they discourse of them professedly and under a certain and peculiar Head And whensoever they do so if this Author can bring me any one Logician Metaphisician or School-man who takes Accidents and Modes promiscuously for the same Things I dare undertake to forfeit to him a greater Sum than ever yet he received for Copy-money in his Life Secondly My next Remark upon his foregoing Assertion is this That as it is grosly absurd to confound Modes of Being with Accidents so it is equally absurd to deny Modes of Being to belong to God And this I shall prove both from the manifest Reason of the Thing and from Unquestionable Authority And First For the Reason of the Thing If Modes of Being should not be allowed in God then I affirm it to be impossible for any Distinction and consequently for any Persons to be in God Which I prove thus If there be any distinction in God or the Deity
it must be either from some distinct Substance or some Accident or some Mode of Being for I defie him or any Mortal breathing to assign a fourth Thing besides these But it cannot be from any distinct Substance for that would make a manifest Composition in the Divine Nature nor yet from any Accident for that would make a worse Composition And therefore it follows That this Distinction must unavoidably proceed from one or more distinct Modes of Being This I affirm and according to my promise made to this Author in the foregoing Chapter I shall be ready to defend the Truth of this Assertion against him whensoever he shall think fit to engage in the Dispute Secondly In the next place for the proof of this from Authority I affirm that all Metaphysicians School-men and Divines at least all that I have yet met with do unanimously concurr in these Two Things 1. That they utterly deny any Accidents in God And 2. That they do as universally affirm Modes of Being to be in God and to belong to him Nay and which is more That they do in these very Modes state the Ground and Reason of the Personalities and the distinction thereof respectively belonging to the Three Persons of the Godhead And for a further proof of what I have here affirmed and withal to shew how unable this Man's Memory is to keep pace with his Confidence whereas in the forementioned page 47. He affirms That all Men mark this Word deny Accidents Qualities and Mâ—des to be in God He himself afterwards in page 48. Owns That the School-men hold these different Modos Subsistendi in the Godhead and accordingly there sets himself as well as he is able to confute them for it Now how shall we reconcile these blind Assertions that so cruelly buâ—t and run their Heads against one another For will he say That the School-men do not grant such Modes to be in God after he himself has done his poor utmost to confute them for holding it Or having said That all Men deny these Modes to be in God and yet that the School men grant and hold it will he say That the School-men are not Men and so come not under that Universal Appellative What the School-men hold and assert in this Matter has been sufficiently shewn already But I must needs tell this Author upon this occasion That he seems to have something a bad Memory and withal to have more than ordinary need of a very good one There is one Thing more which I think fit to observe and it is something pleasant viz. That our Author having exploded all Modos Subsistendi in God and Chastised the School-men for holding them even to a forfeiture of their very Humanity he yet vouchsafes afterwards by a kind of Correctory Explication to allow them in this sence viz. That the same Numerical Essence is whole and entire in each Divine Person but in a different Manner P. 84. Lines 12 13 14. By which Words it appearing that he grants that of the Manner which he had before denied of the Modus it is a shrewd Temptation to me to think That certainly this Acute Author takes Modus for one Thing and Manner for another In fine I appeal to the Judicious and Impartial Reader Whether a Man could well give a more convincing Argument of his utter Unacquaintance with the True Principles of Philosophy and Theology than by a Confident Assertion of these Two Positions 1. That Accidents and Modes of Being are the same Things And 2. That such Modes are not at all to be allowed of or admitted in God Secondly His Second Objection against our stating the distinction of the Divine Persons upon Three different Modes of Subsistence is That these Modes are little better than Three Names of One God Which was the Heresie of Sabellius P. 83. To which I Answer Two Things First In direct and absolute Contradiction to what he asserts I affirm That the difference between Three Modes of Subsistence in the Godhead and only Three distinct Names applyed to it is very great For Names and Words depend only upon the Will and Pleasure of the Imposer and not upon the Nature of the Thing it self upon which they are imposed and for that cause neither do nor can Internally affect it But on the contrary all Modes of Subsistence spring from the Nature of the Thing or Being which they affect both antecedently to and by consequence independently upon the Apprehension or Will of any one So that altho neither Man nor Angel had ever considered or thought of or so much as known that there were such or such things yet the Modes of Subsistence proper to them would have belonged to them as really and as much as they do now And if this Author cannot by this see a vast difference between these and so many bare Names thanks be to God others can both see and defend it too But Secondly Whereas he says That these Three Modes are but little better than Three Names I answer That his very saying so is Concession that they are something at least more and better To which I add further That this something as small a Difference as it makes is yet sufficient to discriminate things which are only Distinguishable and no more For separable or divisible from one another I am sure they are not Nay this is so far from being a just and rational Exception against placing the difference of the Divine Persons in so many different Modes of Subsistence that in the Judgment of very Great and Learned Men it is no small Argument for it For St. Cyril says That the difference between the Divine Persons by reason of the perfect Unity of their Nature as it were blotting out or taking away all Diversity between them is so very small as but just to distinguish them and no more and to cause that One of them cannot be called the other the Father not the Son nor the Son upon any Account the Father c. I thought fit to Transcribe the whole Passage tho' the latter part viz. from the Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. is most immediately and directly to the Purpose which I here alledge the whole for And Thomas Aquinas tells us That the Divine Persons ought to be distinguished by that which makes the least distinction In like manner Durandus affirms That the first Instance of Plurality or remove from Unity ought to be the least And therefore that the distinction of the Divine Persons since it is the first ought to be by distinct Relations compatible in the same Essence Which for that cause is a less distinction than any that can be made by Things Absolute And Lastly Bellarmine averrs pofitively That the distinction of the Divine Persons ought to be the least that is Possible Supposing all along that it must still be Real and not barely Nominal or Imaginary This was the Judgment of these Learned Men who as they
were far from being Sabellians so they very well knew both what to assert and how to express themselves without giving any ground for their being thought so From all which it follows That for this very cause that Modes of Subsistence import the least Real difference that can be they are therefore the fittest to state the Distinction of the Divine Persons upon So that our Author here relapses into a fault which he has been guilty of more than once viz. In alledging that as an Argument against a Thing which is indeed a most Effectual Reason for it And so I come to his Third and Last Objection against our making these Modes of Subsistence the ground or Formal Reason of the Distinction between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity which is That it makes the Three Divine Persons only Three Modes of the Deity or only Modally distinguished whereas according to his Doctrine there are no Modes in the Deity and much less can a Mode be God And that As all must grant that the Father is not a Mode of the Deity but Essentially God so no Man can think that the Father begot only a Modus and called it his Son whereas a Son signifies a Real Person of the same Nature but distinct from the Father Thus he discourses pag. 83. 84. And is not this close and profound reasoning But as profound as it is if it be at all to his Purpose his Argument must lie in this That all the forementioned Absurdities unavoidably follow from deriving the Distinction of the Three Divine Persons from Three distinct Modes of Subsistence belonging to one and the same Divine Nature But this consequence I utterly deny and to make out the Reason of this denial I shall consider what he has said particularly And here first of all I would fain know Whether this Man will never leave confounding things perfectly different and taking them for the very same For to affirm the Three Divine Persons to be only Three Modes of the Deity is one Thing and to affirm them to be only Modally distinguished is quite another The former we absolutely deny and as positively hold the latter And yet this wretched Fallacy would he impose upon his Reader all along viz. That the Assertors of these Modes of Subsistence in the Trinity make a Person to be only a Modus Subsistendi But that is his own Blunder For we do not say That a Person is only a Modus but that it is the Divine Nature or Godhead Subsisting under such a Modus so that the Godhead is still included in it joyned to it and distinguished by it This is what we affirm and abide by and what sufficiently overthrows his pitiful Objection And as for his Absurd Denial of all Modes in God that has been throughly confuted already so that we have nothing more to do but to admire that Invincible and Glorious Ratiocination of his in these Words p. 84. No Man says he can think that the Father begot only a Modus and called it his Son No good Sir No none that I know of is in any danger of thinking or saying so no more than that Socrates begot only the Shape and Figure of a Man and then called it his Son or to turn your own blunt Weapon upon your self no more than God the Father begot another Self-Consciousness besides his own and called that his Son Nevertheless I hope it will be granted me That Socrates might beget one of such a Shape and Figure and by Xantippe's and this Author 's good leave call that his Son and that God the Father might beget a Person endued with such a Self-Consciousness amongst other Attributes and call that his Son too But I perceive this Author and the Fallacy of the Accident are such fast Friends that it is in vain to think of parting them In the mean time as I told him what we do not hold concerning the Father's Generation of the Son so for his better Information I shall tell him what the Assertors of these Modes of Subsistence do hold concerning it viz. We do hold and affirm That the Father Communicates his Nature under a different Mode of Subsisting from what it has in himself to another and that such a Communication of it in such a peculiar way is properly called his begetting of a Son In which we do not say That the Father begets a Modus no nor yet an Essence or Nature but that he Communicates his own Essence or Nature under such a distinct Modus to another and by so doing begets a Person which Person is properly his Son This Sir is the true Account of what the Assertors of the Personal Modes of Subsistence hold concerning the Eternal generation And if you have any thing to except against it produce your Exceptions and they shall not fail of an Answer I am now come to a close of this Chapter and indeed of the whole Argument undertook by me against this Author In which I have Asserted the commonly received Doctrine about this great Article of the Trinity both from the Ancient Writers of the Church and against this Author's particular Objections and in both fully shewn That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are one and the same undivided Essence Nature or Godhead diversified only by Three distinct Modes of Subsistence which are sometimes called Properties and sometimes Relations So that a Divine Person is formally and properly the Divine Nature Essence or Godhead with and under such a distinct Mode Property or Relation And this I averr to be the common current generally received Doctrine of the Church concerning the Trinity For Councils and Fathers hold it the School-men teach it the Confessions of Churches where they are any thing particular upon this Subject declare it and all Divines both Papist and Protestant in the several Bodies of Divinity wrote by them do Assert it only this Author who yet forsooth owns himself a Protestant of the Church of England denies and explodes it To whom therefore if he were not too great in his own Eyes to be Counselled and Advised I would give this Charitable piece of Counsel for once viz. That for the future he would not presume at such a rate to contradict the whole World till he has learn'd not to contradict himself CHAP. IX In which this Author's Paradoxes hoth Philosophical and Theological as they occurr in this his Discourse are drawn together Examined and Confuted I Am sensible that I am now engaged in a Subject that would threaten the Reader with a very long Chapter should I follow it as far as it would carry me For I am entered into a large Field Viz. this Author 's Paradoxical Assertions In the traversing of which I shall observe no other Method but just to take them in that order in which they offer themselves throughout his Book save only that I shall give my Reader this premonition That such of them as I have particularly
height of Impudence and Ignorance too to say That that Word confounds our Thoughts Notions and Conceptions of God which all Divines and Philosophers in all Places and Ages have constantly express'd the Nature of God by And which after the Notion of his bare Existence does next in order offer it self to the Mind of Man in its Speculations of this Great Object PARADOX We know not says he how far Infinite Wisdom and Goodness and Power reaches but then we certainly know that they have their Bounds and that the Divine Nature is the utmost Bounds of them p. 79. To which I Answer That for an Infinite Wisdom to have Bounds and the Bounds of it to be the Divine Nature which it self has no Bounds is in ipsis Terminis an express downright and shameless Contradiction See this further laid open in my Second Chapter PARADOX This Creed says he speaking of the Athanastan does not speak of the Three Divine Persons as distinguished from one another P. 88. Line 21. In reply to which I am amazed to read an Assertion so manifestly false and yet so positively uttered For will this Author put out the Eyes of his Reader He tells us here that Athanasius or whosoever else might be the Author of this Creed does not herein speak of the Three Divine Persons as distinguish'd from one another But I demand of him does Athanasius here speak of them as of Three Persons or no If the first then he does and must speak of them as distinguished from one another for that without such a Distinction they are not so much as Three But if he does not speak of them as of Three and as of Three thus distinguished What then mean those Words of the Creed There is one Person of the Father another of the Son and another of the Holy Ghost Do these Words speak of these Persons as distinguished or do they not If they do then what this Man has here said of the Creed is shamelesly false and if they do not express the said Persons as distinct I defie all the Wit of Man to find out any Words that can PARADOX He tells us That the Title of the one Only true God cannot be so properly attributed to any one Person but only to the Father p. 89. Answer This I have already shewn in Chap. 5. p. 137. to be both false and dangerous as by direct consequence either making several sorts of Gods or excluding both the Son and the Holy Ghost from the one true Godhead At present I shall only say thus much That the One only true God and the true God are Terms perfectly equivalent and not only Commensurate but Identical in their signification and withal That this very Author himself affirms Page 186. Line the last That the Son must be included in the Character of the only True God which how he can be without having this Character properly affirmed and predicated of him and his sustaining thereby the Denomination of the only True God let this Confident Self-contradicting Man declare if he can In the mean time let me tell him further That these Terms the True God and the only True God do both of them import an Attribute or Denomination purely Essential and by no means Personal or Oeconomical And moreover that every such Attribute does and must agree to all the Three Persons equally and whatsoever equally agrees to them all may with equal Propriety be affirmed of all and each of them and consequently that the Title of the One only True God may every whit as truly and properly be attributed to the Son and Holy Ghost as to the Father himself See more of this in my forementioned Chapter PARADOX I affirm says he that the Glory and Majesty and all the other perfections of the Three Divine Persons are as distinct as their Persons are And again These perfections are as distinct as the Persons and yet as Numerically one and the same as the Godhead is p. 91. Answer The first part of these Assertions is utterly inconsistent with and wholly overthrows the last And it is indeed very horrid as by inevitable consequence inferring a Tritheisme For if the essential Perfections of God which in truth are only the Divine Essence under several Conceptions and Denominations are as distinct as the Persons whom the Church acknowledges to be really distinct then it will and must follow That in the Trinity there are Three really distinct Essences or Godheads as well as Three really distinct Persons And if they are thus distinct it is impossible that the Three Persons should by virtue thereof either be or be truly said to be really one so that this Author we see has herein asserted a Trinity with a Witness but as for any Unity in it you may go look But I perceive he was driven to this false and absurd Assertion by that Argument of his Socinian Adversary urging him That if the Essential Glory and Majesty in Father Son and Holy Ghost be but One then it cannot be said that their Glory is equal their Majesty co-eternal forasmuch as Unity is not capable of Equality which must of necessity be between two or more This I say no doubt drove him to this Inconvenience In Answer to which Objection though I owe not this Author so much Service as I shall readily grant That where there is an Equality there must be also a Plurality of some sort or other whatsoever it be So I shall observe That the Divine Essence Glory or Majesty which I still affirm to be but different Names of the same thing falling under divers Conceptions and every other essential perfection of the Godhead may be considered two ways First Absolutely and Abstractedly in it self and as prescinding from all personal Determinations in which sense the Divine Nature Essence and every Essential Attribute included in it is and always must be taken whensoever in Discourse it is spoken of either as compared with or contra-distinguished to all or any of the Persons And accordingly in this sense being absolutely One it is incapable of any Relation of Equality Forasmuch as one Thing considered but as One cannot be said to be equal to it self Or Secondly This Glory Majesty or any other Essential perfection of the Godhead may be considered as sustaining Three several Modes of Subsistence in Three distinct Persons which said Modes as they found a plurality in this Essential Glory or Majesty though by no means of it so this Plurality founds a Capacity of Equality by virtue whereof the same Glory according to its peculiar way of Subsisting in the Father may be said to be equal to it self as Subsisting after another way in the Son and after a third in the Holy Ghost so that immediately and strictly this Equality is between the Three several Modes of Subsistence which this Essential Glory or Majesty sustains or if you will belongs to the said Glory for and by reason of them And this is the true Answer
is an act of Intellection and so must issue from an Intellective Faculty which the Body is not endued with and therefore cannot act by and withal every act of the Will is only an Intelligible and not a sensible Object and consequently cannot be otherwise apprehended and perceived than intellectually And as for the Commands of it a Command operates and moves only by way of moral Causation viz. by being first known by the Thing or Agent which it is directed to which thereupon by such a Knowledge of it is induced to move or Act accordingly But now the Will does not thus Act upon the Body the Body having no Principle whereby to know or understand what it Commands And therefore when we say That the Will Commands the Body in strictness of Truth it is only a Metaphorical Expression For the Will or Soul exerting an Act of Volition moves the Body not by Command but by Physical Impulse That is to say It does by its native Force Energy and Activity first move and impell the Spirits and by the instrumental Mediation of them so moved and impelled it moves and impells the Body and this by as real an Impulse as when I push or thrust a thing with my hand For though indeed a material Thing cannot actively or efficiently move or work upon an Immaterial yet Philosophers grant that an Immaterial as being of the nobler and more active Nature can move impell or work upon a Material and if we cannot form in our Minds an Idea of the Mechanism of this Motion it is because neither can we form in our Minds an Idea of a Spirit But nevertheless Reason and Discourse will Evince That the Thing must be so PARADOX He tells us That the Human Nature of Christ may be Ignorant of some things notwithstanding its personal Union to the Divine Word because it is an Inferiour and Subject Nature Page 270. Line 12 13 14. Answer These Words also are both absurd and false And First They are Absurd because no Rules of Speaking or Arguing permit us to say of any Thing or Person That it may be so or so when necessarily it is and must be so For the Term may imports an Indifference or at least a possibility to both sides of the Contradiction So that when a Man says That a Thing may be thus or thus he does by consequence say also That it may not be thus or thus And therefore to say That the Human Nature of Christ notwithstanding its personal Union to the Word may be ignorant of some Things when it cannot but be ignorant of some nay of very many Things is Absurd And in the next place also To make the Subjection of the Human Nature to the Divine the proper Cause of this Ignorance is false and the Assignation of a non causa pro causâ It being all one as if I should say That such an one cannot be a good Disputant because he has a blemish in his Eye For it is not this Subjection of it to the Divine Nature that makes it ignorant of many Things known by that Nature but the vast disparity that is between these Two Natures viz. That one of them is Infinite the other Finite which makes it impossible for the Infinite to communicate its whole Knowledge to the Finite Forasmuch as such a Knowledge exceeds its Capacity and cannot be received into it so as to exist or abide in it any more than Omnipotence or Omnipresence or any other Infinite Divine Perfection can be lodged in a Finite Being And besides this this very Author in the immediately foregoing Page had not only allowed but affirmed That the Body which certainly is both united to the Soul and of a Nature Subject and Inferiour to it was yet conscious to the Dictates and Commands of the Soul Wherefore where Two Natures are united the bare Subjection of one to the other is not the proper Cause that the Nature which is Subject is ignorant of what is known by the Nature which it is subject to For if Subjection were the sole and proper Cause of this Ignorance the Inferiour Nature would be equally ignorant of every Thing known by the Superiour which yet according to this Man 's own Doctrine of the Consciousness of the Body to the Soul is not so This Consideration I alledge only as an Argument ad hominem having already by the former Argument sufficiently proved the falseness of his Assertion But I shall detain my Reader no longer upon this Subject though I must assure him that I have given him but a Modicum and as it were an handful or two out of that full heap which I had before me and from which I had actually collected several more Particulars which I have not here presented him with being unwilling to swell my Work to too great a Bulk Nevertheless I look upon this Head of Discourse as so very useful to place this Author in a true Light that if I might be so bold with my Reader I could wish that he would vouchsafe this Chapter of all the rest a second Perusal upon which I dare undertake that it will leave in him such Impressions concerning this Man's fitness to Write about the Trinity as will not wear out of his Mind in haste And yet after all this I will not presume to derogate from this Author's Abilities how insolently soever he has trampled upon other Mens but content my self that I have fairly laid that before the Reader by which he may take a just and true measure of them And so I shall conclude this Chapter with an Observation which I have upon several occasions had cause to make viz. That Divinity and Philosophy are certainly the worst Things in the World for any One to be Magisterial in who does not understand them CHAP. X. In which the Author 's Grammatical and such like Mistakes as they are found here and there in his Writings are set down and remarked upon COuld this Author have carried himself with any or dinary degree of Candor and Civility towards those whom he wrote against he had never had the least Trouble given him by me upon this Head of Discourse But when I find him treating Learned Men with so much Disdain and Insolence and much liker a rough ill-bred School-Master domineering over his Boys than a fair Opponent entring the Lists with an Ingenuous Antagonist I must confess I cannot think my self obliged to treat him upon such Terms as I would an Adversary of a contrary Temper and Behaviour One Man and a very Learned one too he flirts at as if he could not distinguish between Conjunctive and Disjunctive Particles Vindication of his Case of Allegiance pag. 76. the Two last Lines Another he Scoffs or rather Spits at as neither understanding Greek nor Latine Vindic. Trin. Pag. 95. Line 25. and thereby I suppose would bear himself to the World as no small Critick in both As for the Socinians of which number this latter is
out of the Fathers do not prove Mutual-Consciousness to be that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does consist but that the Fathers place it in something else CHAP. VIII In which is set down the Ancient and Generally received Doctrine of the Church concerning the Article of the Blessed Trinity as it is delivered by Councils Fathers Schoolmen and other later Divines together with a Vindication of the said Doctrine so explained from this Author's Exceptions CHAP. IX In which this Author's Paradoxes both Philosophical and Theological as they occur in this Discourse are drawn together Examined and Confuted CHAP. X. In which this Author 's Grammatical and other such like Mistakes as they are found here and there in his Writings are set down and remarked upon CHAP. XI In which is given some Account of this Author's Temper and insolent way of Writing as well in Extolling himself as in Depressing and Scorning his Adversaries in both which he has not his Parallel CHAP. XII Containing a Brief Review and Conclusion of the whole Advertisement IT having been found requisite to make some Alterations and Additions in this Second Impression of these Animadversions c. yet that those who have bought up the former may suffer thereby as little as may be the Author has thought fit for their use and benefit to cause the said Additions and Alterations to be Printed in a Sheet or two by themselves Some of the most Considerable Errata of the Press are thus to be Corrected PReface Page 5. Line 2. of the Quotation for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 7. l. 5. of the Quotation for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 8. l. 23. for at read as Book p. 6. l. 20. for asserter r. Assertor p. 51. l. 10. for Analagous r. Analogous p. 71. for Chap. II. r. Chap. III. p. 72. l. 29. for destinct r. distinct p. 103. l. 17. for it r. that p. 116. l. 4. for Spirits r. Spirits p. 126. l. 7. for one and another dele and l. 17. for infiinite r. infinite p. 131. l. 23. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 25. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 132. l. 7 8 9. r. campósque lucentémque Titaniáque totámque p. 138. l. 28. for of Deity r. of the Deity p. 143. l. 8. instead of me read Men p. 155. l. 19. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 157. l. 10. of the Quot for utrûm r. utrùm p. 160. l. 31. for Denaeus r. Danaeus p. 161. l. 5. for our read our l. 8. in Quot for genetricem r. genitricem p. 164. l. 31. for gratis r. gratis p. 168. l. 14. dele one to p. 173. l. penult for imploying r. implying p. 196. l. 8. of the Greek Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 198. l. 21. for separately read separately p. 205. at the end of the second Greek Quot for quarta read quartâ p. 207. l. 18. for of Three read of the Three p. 215. l. 11. for specificully read specifically p. 220. l. 19. for quod sic read quòd sic l. 20. for quod non read quod non p. 224. l. 28. for in self r. in it self p. 229. l. 2. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 231. l. 2. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 6. of the Gr. Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 232. in the 3d Gr. Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 233. l. 1. of the 4th Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 234. l. 6. of the second Quot ex-eâ r. ex eâ p. 237. l. 14. for the Unity r. That Unity p. 253. l. 6. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 260. l. 3. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 9. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 263. l. 16. for ergò r. Ergo p. 266. l. 16. for audiérant r. audierant p. 268. l. 22. for Beotius r. Boetius and ibid. l. 25. for Difinition r. Definition p. 278. l. 17. for Nicaenae r. Nicenae p. 283. l. 6. for on r. upon p. 284. l. 1. for Bu r. But p. 285. l. 7. for Metaphisician r. Metaphysician alibi p. 288. l. 5. Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 17. for Concession r. a Concession p. 289. l. 6. Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 8. Quot for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 291. in the Latin Quot l. 2. for tantummodo r. tantúmmodo l. 8. for quarc r. quáre p. 310. l. 25. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 322. l. 25. for asserter r. Assertor p. 333. l. 13. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 335. l. 31. for Archbishop r. Bishop p. 343. l. 30. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 351. catch word for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. Greek Errata p. 352. Correction the 25th for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 362. l. 16. for wreaking r. reeking p. 364. l. 8. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 365. l. 24. for ita r. itá If the Reader chance to meet with any more Faults in Accents he is desired to Correct or Excuse them together with all Mispointings which in Books of any length are commonly too many to be particularly and exactly set down Besides that here through the faintness of the Character several Letters Points and Accents do scarce appear in some Copies though legible in others Animadversions c. CHAP. 1. Representing the Sence and Signification of the Word Mystery as also a Vindication of the Use and Application of it to some of the most Difficult and Sublime Truths of the Gospel and lastly a full Proof That the Account given by this Author of his Explication of the Article of the Trinity is wholly inconsistent with the Mysteriousness of it together with some Remarks upon his needless Apology for Writing against the Socinians IN Order to the better Examination of what this Author has wrote about the Holy Trinity I think it requisite to premise something concerning the Signification Sence and Nature of a Mystery For certainly the Unity of One and the same undivided God-head in a Trinity of distinct Persons is one of the greatest Mysteries if not absolutely the greatest in our Christian Religion Now a Mystery according to the common signification of the word is derived either from the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which
effect declares the Nature of the Cause And consequently that the Nature of the Cause may be known by it not by way of simple and immediate apprehension of the Cause it self I confess but by way of Inference and Discourse collecting one thing from another which is one sure way of knowing And therefore I do here affirm and own to this Confident Assuming Man That to assert absolutely as he does That the Essences of things cannot be known is by no means a justifiable Proposition or in the Latitude it is laid down in to be admitted But is really that fallacy that concludes à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter Well but since this Author has concluded the whole World in Ignorance himself I suppose still excepted from so general a Doom What must we do in so sad a Condition Must we all take up in Scepticism and acknowledge that nothing is to be known What then will that old Principle of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serve for but to tantalize and torment us For must we thus think and thirst and desire to know and after all find nothing to be known with any thing of plainness evidence and demonstration Why Yes to comfort us under this Cimmerian darkness and to shew that God has not given us our Intellectual Faculties wholly in vain There is one certain thing in the World viz. The Doctrine of the Trinity That is to say of three distinct Persons all united in one and the same numerical Divine Nature which is wonderfully plain easie and obvious to be known Though still thanks to our Author for it who by a New-found Exposition and Explication of it has bestowed this piece of Charity upon the World as to render it so For thus in Page 58. line 2. of his Book Explaining the Union of the three Persons in the God-head by Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness which words shall be throughly considered in their due place he says That this is very plain and intelligible and makes the three Persons to be as much one as every Man is one with himself And certainly it is hardly possible for any thing to be more plain and clear more evident and intelligible than that every Man is one with himself Except it be only when he contradicts himself Again in Page 65. line 31. he tells us That his Notion of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness seems to him to make a Trinity in Unity as intelligible as the Notion of one God is And in Page 66. line 2 3. That it gives a plain and intelligible Solution to all the Difficulties and seeming Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity And surely that thing about which all difficulties are solved and all seeming Contradictions are cleared cannot be imagined to have any difficulty remaining in it at all And again in Page 68. line 26. he roundly tells us That the Explication given by him of a Trinity in Unity is a very plain and intelligible Account of this great and venerable Mystery as plain and intelligible as the Notion of one God or of one Person in the Godhead And in good earnest the Notion of one first Cause of all things and of one Supreme Being and consequently of one God is so easily demonstrated or rather with such a broad light stares all Mankind in the Face even without any demonstration that if the Trinity in Unity be as plain as this is it is hardly possible for any thing to the Reason of Man to be plainer And the Arians and Socinians are ten times more inexcusable than ever I thought them before Again in Page 73. line 11. having affirmed The Trinity to be a most Sacred and Venerable Mystery within 6 or 7 Lines after he says If Men would but consider it according to his Hypothesis which he there sets down then a Trinity in Unity is a very plain intelligible Notion Again in Page 74. line 9. There will appear says he no difficulty or absurdity in the essential Union of Three Minds by a Mutual-Consciousness to each other But will this Man conclude That where there is no Absurdity there is therefore no Difficulty neither So that that which removes one must needs remove the other too It is strange to me That any one who pretends to argue closely should place two words so vastly different upon the same level But again in Page 82. line 30. he tells us That this gives an intelligible account of one of the most difficult Problems in all School-Divinity viz. That the whole Trinity is not greater than any one Person in the Trinity And again in Page 85. line 14. This Notion says he gives a plain account too of that Maxime of the Schools That all the Operations of the Trinity ad extra are common to all the Three Persons So that by this time we see here all things relating to the Trinity made plain easie and intelligible and that since this Man has shewed his skill upon it all knots and difficulties are wholly cleared off so that now none are to be found though a Man should beat his Brains as much to find them as Divines did heretofore to solve them And therefore well may he magnifie the Exploits of such a Triumphant Hypothesis as he does first in his Preface Page 1. line 13. which though it be always placed first in Books yet is generally written last Having told us That his Original Design was to vindicate the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation from those pretended Absurdities and Contradictions which were so confidently charged on them He adds these words This says he I am sure I have done for I have given a very easie and intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity If he has 't is well But how great soever the assurance is which he utters this with as he had always a very great stock of it I dare aver That he has here said more of himself than any Divine of Note since Christianity came into the World ever durst say He was sure of before But as high as this sounds in Page 85. line 27. he raises his Voice something higher or at least is more particular in the Encomiums he bestows upon this his Performance in these words Thus says he I have endeavoured to explain this great and venerable Mystery of a Trinity in Unity And this I may say That I have given not only a very possible and a very intelligible Notion of it but such also as is very agreeable to the Phrase and Expressions of Scripture such as preserves the Majesty of the Article and solves all the difficulties of it By which account as we see that our Author is not wanting to the Commendation of his own Hypothesis as it is pity but Self-Consciousness and Self-Commendation should go together so we see also that he does it upon three distinct Heads or Topicks which therefore by his good leave we will as distinctly consider And First for it 's being so agreeable
conclude That because a thing is actually thus or thus it cannot possibly be otherwise Do not some form to themselves gross and absurd Imaginations of God the Father from that Expression of the Ancient of Days Dan. 7. 9. representing Him to their thoughts as an Old Man sitting in Heaven But may not others therefore who are wiser conceive more worthily of him without laying aside that Scripture-expression If it be a good Argument as it is all our Author brings that Terms which may occasion gross and Material Imaginations in the Minds of Men ought not to be applyed to God then I hope it is as much an Argument in one thing as in another And accordingly I desire to know of him Whether the Terms Begetting and being begot Father and Son are not very fitly applyed to and used about the Divine Persons And if so Whether they are not altogether as hard to be abstracted from material Imaginations as the Notions of Essence or Substance are or rather indeed much harder I believe all thinking Men will conclude they are Nay and I shall venture to tell him further That these two words partly through their Corporeal signification and partly through the weakness of Men's Minds have occasioned more difficulties about the Notion of a Deity and a Trinity too than ever the words Essence or Substance did or perhaps could do And yet for all that the Spirit of God has thought sit to make use of them to express so sacred a Mystery by But this Man should have remembred That how gross and Material soever the Representations of things are which our senses first make to us there is a Iudicium Correctivum in Reason as the superiour faculty which is to consider and separate what is gross and Material in them from what is otherwise till at length by rejecting some Notions and retaining others it finds out something even in the most Material things which may truly properly and becomingly be applyed to the purest and most Immaterial But to give a fuller Account of this matter we must observe That the Idea of Substance may be said to be taken from Matter two ways 1. Remotely and Occasionally as the Observation of Material Things may first set Reason to work which in the strength of its own Discourse may draw from thence the knowledge of Immaterials as the Apostle tells us in Rom. 1. 20. That the Invisible things of God from the Creation were clearly seen and understood from the things that are made viz. Such visible sensible Objects as Men daily converse with And if so then surely these do not necessarily dispose the Mind of Man to gross and Material Imaginations of the things so apprehended by it But 2. The Idea of Substance may be said to be taken from Matter immediately and exemplarily as when the Imagination does as it were transcribe and copy one from the other and take one for the representation of the other and this I confess must needs imprint a very gross Idea of Substance upon the Imagination And to this way may be referred all those gross and Material Ideas of Substance which this Author so much exclaims against But then all this is from the neglect of the Person in not imploying his Reason to correct and refine the first reports of Sence as he might and ought to have done and if from hence we conclude an utter Incapacity in the thing it self to be improved and heightened into Immaterial Representations and thereupon to be conceived and spoken of agreeably to them we must even expect a Teacher to be sent down from Heaven to furnish us with a new Language or we must shut up our Mouths and put up our Pens and not speak or write of Divine Matters at all And therefore whereas this Author further adds in Page 70. That we cannot imagine how any substance should be without a Beginning and how it should be Present in all places I tell him This is not the Point in Controversie Whether we can imagine it or no But I tell him withal That it is as easie for the Mind of Man to conceive all this of Substance as of any thing else whatsoever For Why not a Substance without Beginning as well as Truth or Wisdom or Goodness without a Beginning I say Let him shew me some solid Reason why In the mean time I can tell him That of the two it should seem less difficult to imagine the Eternal Existence of Substance than of Truth since Substance is in order of Nature before it as the Subject must needs be before that which affects it Though in very deed the main difficulty here is not so much to find out which of those Perfections may be the most easily conceived to have been without a Beginning as it is to bring the mind to a full and clear Conception How any thing at all is so While it finds it self wholly at a loss in running up its thoughts still higher and higher without any bound or stint to determine them And this it is and not the particular Nature of Essence or Substance that nonplusses and confounds our Reason in these unlimited Speculations And whereas he goes on in the next words and tells us That we cannot imagine How Substance Existence and all the Divine Attributes and Powers should be all one and the same simple Act in God I Answer What if we cannot Must nothing be applyed to God but what shall let us into the full knowledge of all that is difficult and mysterious in the Divine Nature Or will this Man say That the Application of the Terms Essence and Substance to God is the true cause and reason why we cannot apprehend How Substance and Existence and all the Divine Attributes and Powers are one and the same simple Act in God For this is the thing that he has been professedly driving at and therefore ought to prove And besides as what he has here alledged is nothing to his purpose without the proof of that so it is all but a meer fallacy a fallacy of the Accident For albeit we cannot apprehend how all these Attributes are one and the same simple Act in God yet surely it will not follow hence that we cannot apprehend them singly and severally by themselves and as we so apprehend them apply them properly and fitly to God And here I cannot but take notice of a way of Arguing usual with this Author as I cannot conceive and I cannot understand and I cannot imagine c. After which as if he had laid down irrefragable Premises he concludes That the thing it self is not to be conceived understood or imagined But for my part I must be excused that I cannot allow this Man's single Judgment or prejudice rather for the universal Standard or measure of humane Reason or that such a way of discoursing proves any thing but the assuming humour of him who uses it and one strangely full of Himself instead of better things In
conclusion therefore I do here assert That the gross and Material Imaginations which Men form to themselves of Substance proceed not from the thing it self but from the grossness and fault of the Persons who take up these Imaginations And accordingly I affirm to this Author That that Assertion of his in Page 69. That we can form no Idea of Substance but what we have from Matter is false and manifestly proved to be so And moreover That it is not only as possible but as easie to form in the mind a conception of a Substance or Being Existing by it self which is all one as abstracted from and strip'd of all conception of Matter and Corporeity as it is to frame to our selves a conception of Truth or Wisdom or of a Being eternally True and Wise separate from all those gross Qualifications And consequently that the word Substance with others of the like import may be most fitly and significantly applyed to the Divine Nature and the Persons of the Holy Trinity which was the thing to be proved But because our Author avers in Page 70. That if we consider God as Truth and Wisdom which is his true Nature and Essence without confounding our mind with some material conceptions of his Substance as he had already affirmed all conceptions of Substance must needs be then these things viz. the Difficulties before-mentioned concerning our Apprehensions of God are all plain and easie Where by the way it is observable That he calls Truth and Wisdom the true Nature and Essence of God whereas in this very Page as well as in 68. he had excepted against the Term Essence no less than that of Substance as by reason of the gross Material Ideas raised by it in the Mind very unfit to be applyed to God So happy is this Author above other Men that he can rectifie the most improper words and expressions barely by his own using them But because he is so positive in making the Terms Truth and Wisdom an effectual Remedy against all the Inconveniences alledged from the Terms Essence and Substance as applyed to the Deity this brings us to our second Proposition viz. That the same Objection lies against the Terms Truth Wisdom Goodness c. as applicable to the Deity that are made against Essence Substance Existence and the like In order to the proving of which I shall observe That Truth may be taken in a three-fold sense First For the truth of Propositions which is called Logical Secondly For an Affection of Being which is Truth Metaphysical And Thirdly and Lastly As it is a Qualification of Men's Words and Actions and consists properly in an Agreement of the Mind with both Concerning all which I observe That the Truth of Propositions is no further eternal than as it exists in the Mind of God That the Metaphysical Truth of Things is eternal or not eternal as the Being or Thing it belongs to is or is not so And for the Moral Truth of Men's Words and Actions it is no more eternal than the said Words and Actions the proper Subject of them can be said to be This premised I would here ask our Author Whether the first Notions we actually entertain of Truth and Wisdom are not drawn from the Observations we make of these things in Men that is in Beings sensible and Material and consisting of Body as well as Soul and accordingly cloathed with sensible Accidents and Circumstances I cannot imagine that he will deny this since we do not speak immediately or converse visibly with God or Angels and I suppose also that he now speaks of Truth Wisdom Goodness c. not as they are exhibited to us in Books or Propositions but as they actually exist and occur in persons and consequently as they are first apprehended by us in Concretion or Conjunction with Men that is with Beings so Compounded Qualified and Circumstantiated as above expressed and as we find see and observe them in Men's Words and Actions in what they speak and what they do and these are certainly very sensible things and such as incurr into and affect the sence as much as Matter it self can do And if so I desire to hear some satisfactory Reason Why the Observation of Substance in Material Beings and our first Occasional collection of it from thence should so necessarily pervert and cause such a grossness in our Conceptions of it as to make it hardly if at all possible to conceive of Substance without the gross Conception of Matter and yet that the same consideration and cause should not equally take place in Truth and Wisdom and equally pervert and thicken our Apprehensions of them when they are equally drawn from sensible gross and Material Objects viz. the Words and Actions of Men which they both Exist in and Converse about For I can see no ground why the same Reason should not infer the very same thing and the same Antecedents draw after them the same Consequents whatsoever they are applyed to For the Argument à Quatenus ad omne c. is certain and infallible If it be here said That Truth and Wisdom in the proper Notion and Conception of them imply no Communication at all with Matter I Answer That as the Notion of them is Abstracted and gathered up by the Discourses of Reason it does not but so neither does that of Substance after such an Act of the Mind has passed upon it So that hitherto the Case is much the same in both But to carry the matter a little further Truth and Wisdom as observed in and amongst Men are certainly finite Things For whatsoever exists in a finite Subject whatsoever the Object be which it converses about or is terminated upon is certainly it self finite also And here I would have this Author tell me Why a Notion drawn off and borrowed from finite Things should not be as apt to perplex and confound our Minds when applyed to an Infinite Being as a Notion abstracted from a Material Being can be to distract and confound our Thoughts when applyed to an Immaterial I must confess I can see nothing alledgeable for one which may not be as strongly alledged for the other All that can be said is what has been mentioned already viz. That Reason may and does extract some Notions from a finite Being that may be properly applicable to an Infinite due allowance made for the disproportion between both and in like manner I affirm That it can and does draw Notions from a thing endued with Matter which may as well agree to Things Spiritual and Immaterial So that I cannot perceive that Truth Wisdom or Goodness have upon this Account any Preheminence or Advantage over Essence Substance Existence and the like Terms at all but the one may be applyed to the Divine Nature as well and properly as the other But this is not all for I affirm in the 3d Place That Essence Substance Nature Existence and other Terms equipollent to Being considered precisely
in and by themselves are naturally fitter to express the Deity by than those other Terms Truth Wisdom and Goodness contended for by our Author This is our Third Proposition and for the proof of it I first appeal to that high and glorious Account which God himself gave of his own Nature when Moses desired to be informed of it viz. I am that I am Exod. 3. 14. In which he describes himself only from his Being and Substance which indeed rendered him more eminently and even more substantially and truly a Being or Substance than all other Beings or Substances whatsoever which in comparison of him can hardly be so much as said to Exist or Be. And I am perswaded that God knew his own Name and Nature and withal how to give the best and most proper Declaration of Both as well as the Author of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness does or can pretend to do And indeed this seems to have been the very Character by which God would be then known to all the World viz. All the Rational part of the Creation for it was sent to his People then living under and with a Heathen Prince to answer them and him even in those Notions of a God which meer Nature suggested to all Mankind and consequently were so known and received by them that they could not easily question or deny them For otherwise we know God addressed himself to the same People afterwards in a Character extreamly different and more peculiar viz. A God Merciful and Gracious Long-suffering abundant in Goodness and Truth and pardoning Iniquity Transgression and Sin Exod. 34. 6 7. Which it seems was the Opening a Particular Attribute to them which the bare Account of his Being as known as it was could not sufficiently inform the World of before But to proceed to other Considerations vastly indeed inferiour to this but yet of singular use in their degree to direct our Speculations about these Matters I have some other Things to offer in behalf of the Proposition laid down by us As First That all Divines hitherto have looked upon and professedly treated of the Divine Nature and Attributes as different and distinct from one another still considering the first as the Subject and the other as the Adjuncts of it or at least as Analogous to these Terms as they stand properly applyed to other Things According to which Notion as the Subject or that which is Analagous to it naturally both precedes and supports the Adjuncts so all Notions importing the Divine Nature Being or Substance are to be accounted as the Subject in respect of all God's other Attributes or Perfections whether they be Truth Wisdom Goodness Power Eternity Omniscience or any other whatsoever Which being so I do here affirm That the Terms Essence Substance Existence and others Synonymous to them ought to have the Precedence of the other Divine Perfections commonly called Attributes in their Application to God and that upon a three-fold Account viz. 1. Of Priority 2. Of Simplicity 3. Of Comprehensiveness Of each of which severally 1. For that of Priority As we have already observed That the first thing in order of Nature Conceivable of God is That he is a Being and the next to it That he is a Being existing by it self or in another word a Substance so the same is yet further evidenced from this That the Notion of Being or Substance is that which fully answers and determines the last Question and Enquiry which can be made concerning God For if we describe his Nature by any particular Attribute or Perfection and be thereupon asked What that is And having given an Answer to that Question be afterwards urged with another and perhaps another and accordingly after an Answer given to those also the Enquiry be still continued till at length we Answer That God is a Being a Being existing by it self that is a Substance Then we must of necessity stop and can go no further which makes it evident even to a Demonstration That this is the first and Original Notion which we have or can have of God Forasmuch as that which answers the last Enquiry or Question naturally made concerning any thing is certainly the first Thing into which the Being or Reason of that Thing is resolved And thus much for Priority Pass we now to the Second Thing which is the Simplicity of these Terms For Primum in omni genere simplicissimum So that when we say God is a Being existing by it self viz. A Substance this includes in it no respect to and much less any Conjunction with any other Thing or Notion whatsoever But on the contrary Truth Goodness Power c. are all Affections of Being or Substance and so connote a Relation to and a Conjunction with it as their Subject So that to give you the same thing in words at length Truth and Goodness are nothing else but Being or Substance with these Qualifications or Being and Substance under such certain respects formally determining them to such a condition viz. either of Conformity to the Understanding as Truth determines them or of Conformity to the Will as Goodness does So that in these and all other the like Attributes Being or Substance do as it were pass from their absolute and Original Simplicity by the Accession of the fore-mentioned Perfections superadded to them And then in the Third and last place For the Comprehensiveness of Being or Substance above any one or more of the Divine Attributes This also is evident forasmuch as it runs through and contains them all which no other particular Attribute does or can be said to do And certainly that which signifies Being in the whole compass and perfection of it should be much more properly applicable to God than that which signifies Being only under some certain and particular determination of it as every one of his Attributes does and no more For we cannot say That God's Justice Mercy Wisdom Holiness and Power are properly contained under and formally attributable to his Truth but they are all contained under deducible from and referible to his Being or Substance So that it may properly be said That God is an Infinitely True Wise Good Holy Omnipotent Omnipresent Being or Substance But we cannot with any propriety of Speech pitch upon any one of the other Divine Attributes and in like manner affirm all the rest of that one As to say that God is an Infinitely Wise Good Eternal Omnipotent Omnipresent Truth This I say cannot be equally said For though the Thing be fundamentally true yet the Expression is neither Proper nor Natural Forasmuch as Goodness Justice Omnipotence Omnipresence and the like are not the proper Affections of Truth but they are properly so of Substance or Being And moreover Whereas this Author will needs have the Terms Substance Essence and Existence discarded and the Terms Truth Wisdom and Goodness put in their room when we speak of the Divine Nature I desire him to give me some good
Reason why he pitches upon Truth Wisdom and Goodness rather than upon Eternity Omnipotence and Omnipresence For these in their proportion express the Divine Nature as much as the other but neither the one nor the other can grasp in the whole Compass of the Divine Perfections so as to be properly denominable from all and every one of them as Substance and Essence and such other Terms as barely import Being are found to 〈◊〉 I conclude therefore that in our Discourses of God Essence Substance Nature and the like are so far from being necessary to be laid aside as disposing our Minds to gross and unfit Apprehensions of the Deity that they are much fitter to express and guide our thoughts about this great Subject than Truth Wisdom or Power or all of them together as importing in them both a Priority and a greater Simplicity and larger Comprehensiveness of Notion than belong to any of them and these surely are Considerations most peculiarly suted to and worthy of the Perfections of the Divine Nature I have now done with my Third Proposition and so proceed to the Fourth and last viz That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity and the Divine Persons does really proceed from other Causes than those alledged by this Author I shall assign Three As First The Spirituality of the Divine Nature For God is a Spirit Joh. 4. 14. And it is certain that we have no clear explicit and distinct Idea of a Spirit And if so must we not needs find a great difficulty in knowing it For we know Things directly by the Idea's the Species Intelligibiles or Resemblances of them imprinted upon the Intellect and these are refined and drawn off from the Species Sensibiles and sensible Resemblances of the same imprinted upon the Imagination And how can a Spirit incur directly into that Indeed not at all For we can have no knowledge of a Spirit by any direct Apprehension or Intuition of it but all that we know of such Beings is what we gather by Inference Discourse and Ratiocination And that is sufficient But 2. The Second Reason of our Short and Imperfect Notions of the Deity is The Infinity of it For this we must observe That we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing but as it is represented to us under some certain Bounds and Limitations And therefore one of the chief Instruments of our Knowledge of a Thing is the Definition of it And what does that signifie but the bringing or representing a Thing under certain Bounds and Limitations as the Geeek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manifestly imports Upon which Account what a loss must we needs be at in understanding or knowing the Divine Nature when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it something opposite to the thing known For the way of knowing is by Desining Limiting and Determining and the Thing known is that of which there neither are nor can be any Bounds Limits Definitions or Determinations And this I think is not only a sufficient but something more than a sufficient Reason why we stumble and fail when we would either have or give a distinct Account of the Deity 3. A Third Reason of the same especially with reference to the Trinity of Persons belonging to the Divine Nature is The utter want of all Instances and Examples of this kind For when a long and constant course of Observation has still took notice that every numerically distinct Person and every Suppositum has a numerically distinct Nature appropriate to it and Religion comes afterwards and calls upon us to apprehend the same Numerical Nature as subsisting in three Numerically distinct Persons we are extreamly at a loss how to conform our Notions to it and to conceive how that can be in three Persons which we never saw before or in any thing else to be but onely in One. For humane Nature which originally proceeds by the Observations of Sense does very hardly frame to it self any Notions or Conceptions of Things but what it has drawn from thence Nay I am of Opinion That the Mind is so far governed by what it sees and observes that I verily believe that had we never actually seen the beginning or end of any Thing the generality of Men would hardly so much as have imagined That the World had ever had any beginning at all Since with the greatest part of Mankind what appears and what does not appear determines what can and what cannot be in their Opinion And thus I have shewn Three Causes which I take to be the True Causes why we are so much to seek in our Apprehensions of and Discourses about the Divine Nature and the Three Glorious Persons belonging to it And the Reason of them all is founded upon the Essential Disparity which the Mind of Man bears to so disproportionate and so transcendent an Object So that it is a vain thing to quarrel at Words and Terms especially such as the best Reason of Mankind has pitched upon as the fittest and properest and most significant to express these great Things by And I question not but in the Issue of all wise Men will find That it is not the defect of the Terms we use but the vast Incomprehensibility of the Thing we apply them to which is the True Cause of all our Failures as to a clear and distinct Apprehension and Declaration of what relates to the Godhead From all which I conclude That the Terms Essence Substance Nature c. have had nothing yet objected against them but that they may still claim the place and continue in the use which the Learned'st Men the Christian Church hath hitherto had have allotted them in all their Discourses and Disputes about the Divine Nature and the Divine Persons which are confessedly the greatest and most Sacred Mysteries in the Christian Religion But as in my time I have observed it a practice at Court That when any one is turned out of a considerable Place there it is always first resolved and that out of merit foreseen no doubt who shall succeed him in it So all this ado in dismounting the Terms Essence Substance Nature c. from their ancient Post I perceive is only to make way for these two so highly useful and wonder-working Terms Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness And therefore let us with all due and awful Reverence as becomes us expect their August appearance and for a while suffer the Mountain to swell and heave up its Belly and look big upon us and all in good time no doubt we shall have the happiness to see and admire and take our measures of the Mouse But before I close this Chapter to shew how like a Judge upon life and Death this Man sits over all the formerly received Terms by which Men were wont to discourse of God Sentencing and Condemning them as he pleases not content to have cashiered the words Essence Substance and Nature from being used about this
Subject he has as great or greater a Quarrel at the word Infinite as applyed to God and I shall here give his Exceptions against it in his own words being such as I believe few would dare to utter but himself and approaching so near or rather quite coming up to Blasphemy that it may be truly said That he has not spoke more blasphemously of God's Vindictive Iustice in his Book of the Knowledge of Christ than he has spoken of God's Infinity in this For in the 77 78 79 Pages he expresses his Thoughts of it thus The truth is says he this very word Infinite confounds our Notions of God and makes the most perfect and excellent Being the most perfectly unknown to us For Infinite is only a Negative Term and signifies that which has no end no bounds no measure and therefore no positive and determined Nature and therefore is Nothing mark that and withal That an Infinite Being had not Use and Custom reconciled us to that expression would be thought Nonsence and Contradiction Which I am so far from granting him that I affirm if there had never been any thing in the World besides God alone it had yet been most True and Rational But he goes on For says he every Real Being has a certain and determined Nature and therefore is not Infinite in this sense which is so far from being a Perfection that it signifies Nothing Real Thus he discourses And yet this word Infinite has been universally received and applyed to the Divine Nature by Learned Men in all Places and Ages and I desire this Man to tell me How if this word Infinite were so liable to be thought Nonsence and Contradiction this could possibly come to pass For what he speaks of Use and Custom reconciling us to this Expression is Impertinent and begs the Thing in dispute For still I would know of him how a word so utterly unfit to express the Thing it was applyed to could ever pass into Use and Custom so as to be took up approved and made use of by all Mankind Let him prevail with the whole World to speak Nonsence and to use words that signifie nothing if he can But this Man before he played the Aristarchus at this rate should have done well to have considered That every Term is not Negative which has a Negative Particle in the Composition of it Of which innumerable Instances may be given And if he does not know this for all his flirting at his Socinian Adversary as if he knew neither Greek nor Latin P. 95. it is a scurvy sign that he is not so over-stocked with either of them as to have any to spare And therefore whereas he goes on in Page 78. and pretends there to explain this word Infinite he might have kept his Explication to himself For no body ever used it otherwise but so as to signifie a Positive Perfection by it but yet withal connoting an Illimitation belonging to it It signifies I say a Thing Real Absolute and Positive but still with a Connotation of something which is to be removed from it and denied of it such as are all bounds and limits in respect of that Substantial All-comprehending Perfection of the Divine Nature In a word the Thing principally signified by this Term is Positive the Thing Consignified or Connoted which is but Secondary and Consequential is a Negation And this sufficiently overturns all his odd Descants upon it But if after all our Minds cannot fully master this Notion Persons as thinking as he can be know and acknowledge that it is not the word Infinite but the Thing Infinite that renders them so short and defective in this matter But it is pleasant to see him take his Turns backwards and forwards in speaking of this Thing There is says he Page 78. a measure of the most Absolute and in this sense Infinite Perfections and if such a measure there be then I hope there is as much Nonsence and Contradiction in the word Immense as in the word Infinite and withal if there is even in the most Absolute and Infinite Perfections a no plus ultrà and an ultimum quod sic as the School-men who were never bred at St. Mary Overies are apt to speak then I confess That an Infinite with all these Qualifications about it must needs according to his beloved Dialect be Nonsence and Contradiction and that of the highest Rank And again P. 79. We know not says he how far Infinite Wisdom and Power and Goodness reaches and thus much is very true but then says he again we certainly know that they have their Bounds and that the Divine Nature is the utmost Bounds of them By which words if he means That they have their fixed determinate Notions whereby they are formally distinguished among themselves as well as from other Things it is right For the Notion of Infinite Wisdom is so bounded that it cannot be said to be Infinite Power or Infinite Power to be Infinite Goodness or the like but still the Thing couched under all these is Infinite and neither has nor can have any Bounds set to its Being And if he should here reply That then the Notion of Infinite Wisdom Power and the like are false Notions as not answering the Things they are applyed to I answer That they are indeed imperfect and inadequate as not fully answering the Thing it self but they cannot be said to be false for all that But on the contrary if he will needs have the Thing hereby signified to have any Real Bounds or Limits of its Being then it will and must follow That in the forecited words he has with Accurate and Profound Speculation presented to us An Infinite with Bounds and the Divine Nature which has no Bounds made the Bounds of it These are the very words he uses and withal delivered by him with such a Magisterial Air and Contempt of the whole World besides who have hitherto approved and made use of these Expressions and that in a Sense and signification not to be born down by every self Opiniator after so long and universal a Prescription that so much Confidence cannot be sufficiently wondred at nor too severely rebuked And therefore to review a little the foregoing particulars and thereby to take some estimate of the Man Where shall we find such another Instance of a private Presbyter who in the Communion or rather in the very Bosom of so pure and Orthodox a Church as this our Church of England ever before durst in so great an Article of the Christian Faith draw his Pen against all the Writers of the Church Ancient and Modern Fathers and School-men and with one dash of it explode and strike off all those received Terms by which they constantly explained this Mystery as not only useless but mischievous in all Discourses about it Whereas not to anticipate what I intend more particularly and fully upon this Head in my Eighth Chapter I shall only affirm thus
he least intended it Now here the Reader is desired to observe the Soveraign usefulness ascribed by our Author to those School-Terms Person Nature Essence Subsistence Consubstantiality c. As That they will not suffer Hereticks to lie concealed under Scripture-Phrases That the Schools learned all these Terms of the Ancient Fathers That they have guarded the Christian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns which disguised Hereticks cannot break through That instead of wounding Christianity in its Vitals they only prick the Fingers of Hereticks and secure Christianity from being wounded All these great and good Things he tells us have been done in behalf of Christianity by the School-men and their fore-mentioned Terms here in this Apology and now if the Reader will but look back into the Vindication too our Author will there tell him also How and by what Way and Means the said School-men and their Terms have Atchieved all these worthy Feats viz. By their Obscuring instead of Explaining the Doctrine of the Trinity By their mistaking the Meaning of the Fathers or clogging it with peculiar Niceties of their own Also by confounding the Mystery of the Trinity through a vain endeavour to reduce it to such Terms of Art as Essence Substance Subsistence Nature Person and the like As likewise by the said terms being found very unapplicable to this Mystery And lastly Because though some tolerable Account might possibly be given of their meaning yet that it would be of little or no use to give any such Account or Explication of them So useful it seems does he account them to secure Christianity against Hereticks that it is of no use at all to explain them And now I hope when the Reader has considered what this Author has said on both sides he will acknowledge that Hand and Glove cannot more exactly agree than the Vindication and the Apology And as for that Melancholy Stander-by upon whose Account this Apology is pretended to have been written if he will but read and compare the Apology and Vindication together I dare undertake that he will not be half so Melancholy as he was before But does this Author in sober sadness think that this is the way to Confute Hereticks thus to play backwards and forwards to say and unsay and only to set two Books together by the Ears Let me tell him That God is not mocked nor the World neither and that he owes an Account of what he has wrote to both For my own part so far as my Converse reaches I meet with no serious and judicious Person who does not reckon that this Author by his Desultorious Inconsistent but withal Imposing way of writing will in all likelihood make Twenty Hereticks before he Confutes One. It is indeed an amazing Thing to consider That any one Man should presume to Brow-beat all the World at such a rate and we may well wonder at the force of Confidence and Self-Conceit that it should be able to raise any one to such a pitch But Naturalists have observed That Blindness in some Animals is a very great Help and Instigation to Boldness And amongst Men as Ignorance is commonly said to be the Mother of Devotion so in accounting for the Birth and Descent of Confidence too whatsoever other Cause some may derive it from yet certainly He who makes Ignorance the Mother of this also reckons its Pedigree by the surer side CHAP. III. In which the Author 's New Notion of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness is briefly declared Self-Consciousness made by him the formal Constituent Reason of Personality in all Persons both Create and Uncreate and on the contrary proved against him in the first place That it is not so in Persons Create OUR Author not being satisfied with the Account given of the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity by the Schools nor with those Notions about it which have hitherto obtained in the World till he came into it no doubt as a Person peculiarly sent and qualified to rectifie all those Imperfect and Improper Notions which had been formerly received by Divines He I say with a Lofty Undertaking Mind and a Reach beyond all before and indeed beside him and as the Issue is like to prove as much above him too undertakes to give the World a much better and more satisfactory Explication of this great Mystery and that by two new Terms or Notions purely and solely of his own Invention called Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness which though still joyned together by our Author in his Explication of the Blessed Trinity have yet very different Effects as we shall presently see For by Self-Consciousness he means a Mind 's or Spirit 's being Conscious to its own Thoughts Reasonings and Affections and I suppose all other Internal Motions too which no other finite Spirit is or can be naturally Conscious to but it self And this he says makes a finite Spirit Numerically one or one with it self for he uses both Expressions and withal separates and distinguishes it from all other Spirits so that hereby every Spirit feels only its own Thoughts Passions or Motions but is not Conscious to the Thoughts Passions or Motions of any other And this so far as his own Words import he means by Self-Consciousness As for Mutual-Consciousness That takes place when two or more Spirits or Minds know all that of one another which each Mind or Spirit knows of its self by a particular Self-Consciousness of its own And this I conceive to be a just Account of what this Man means by Mutual-Consciousness Now the Effects of these two as I noted before are very different For Self-Consciousness according to him is the Constituent Principle or formal Reason of Personality So that Self-Consciousnss properly Constitutes or makes a Person and so many Self-Consciousnesses make so many distinct Persons But Mutual-Consciousness so far as it extends makes an Unity not of Persons for Personality as such imports distinction and something personally Incommunicable but an Unity of Nature in Persons So that after Self-Consciousness has made several distinct Persons in comes Mutual-Consciousness and sets them all at one again and gives them all but one and the same Nature which they are to take amongst themselves as well as they can And this is a True and strict Account of this Author 's New Hypothesis and such as I suppose he will not except against because justly I am sure he cannot howsoever I may have expressed the Novel Whimsey something for the Reader 's Diversion Now by what has been said it is evident that the Author assigns Self-Consciousness as the formal Reason of Personality in all Persons Universally whether Finite or Infinite Create or Uncreate For having first stated it so in Finite and Created Spirits Pag. 48. lin 26 c. He afterwards applies it to Infinite and Uncreate viz. the Three Persons of the Godhead And therefore that we may proceed fairly and without any ground of Exception in the Case we will examine I. Whether or no
Self-Consciousness be the Reason of Personality in Finite Persons And II. Whether it be so in Infinite And First For Finite or Created Spirits I deny Self-Consciousness to be the formal Reason of Personality in these And before I give my Reasons against it I shall premise this one Consideration viz. That wheresoever the formal Reason of Personality is there is Personality And again That wheresoever Personality is there is the formal Reason of Personality viz. That they exist Convertibly and that one Mutually and Essentially infers the other Now this premised and laid down my Reasons why I deny Self-Consciousness to be the formal Reason of Personality in Finite or Created Beings are these 1. Argument According to the Natural Order of Things Self-Consciousness in Persons pre-supposes their Personality and therefore is not cannot be the Reason of it The Argument I conceive is very plain For whatsoever pre-supposes a Thing is in Order of Nature Posterior and Subsequent to the Thing so pre-supposed by it and again on the other hand the formal Reason of any Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to that Thing of which it is the Reason We will therefore prove the Major Proposition And we do it thus Personality is the Ground and Principle of all Action wheresoever it is For where there is a Suppositum whether it be Rational which is another word for Person or not still it is the whole Suppositum which Acts. So that there must be a Person before there can be an Act or Action proceeding from or attributable to a Person In a word there must be a Person in Being before any Action issues from him and therefore the Act must essentially and necessarily pre-suppose the Person for the Agent But now Self-Consciousness does not only do this but which is more it also pre-supposes another Act Antecedent to it self For it is properly and formally a Reflex Act upon the Acts Passions or Motions of the Person whom it belongs to So that according to the Nature of the Thing there is not only a Person but also an Action which is and must be Subsequent to a Person that is Antecedent to Self-Consciousness which being a Reflex Act must needs in Order of Nature be Posterior to the Act reflected upon by it And therefore Self-Consciousness which is by two degrees Posterior to Personality cannot possibly be the formal Reason of it This I look upon as a Demonstration of the Point And I leave it to our Author who is better a great deal at scorning the Schools than at confuting them to answer and overthrow it at his leisure 2. Our Second Argument is this The Humanity or Humane Nature of Christ is perfectly Conscious to it self of all the Internal Acts whether of Knowledge Volition Passion or Desire that pass in it or belong to it and yet the Humanity or Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person and consequently Self-Consciousness is not the proper formal Reason of Personality forasmuch as it may be in that which is no Person That the Humane Nature of Christ is thus Self-Conscious is evident since it has all the Principles and Powers of Self-reflection upon its own Acts whereby it intimately knows it self to do what it does and to be what it is which are in any particular Man whatsoever so that if any Man be Conscious to himself of these things the Humane Nature of Christ which has the same Operative Powers in perfection and those essentially proper to and inseparable from it self which the rest of Mankind are endued with must needs be so too And then as for the Assumption That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person is no less evident Since it is taken into and subsists in and by the Personality of the second Person of the Trinity and therefore can have no distinct Personality of its own unless we will with Nestorius assert two Persons in Christ an Humane and a Divine And the Truth is If Self-Consciousness were the formal Reason of Personality since there are two destinct Self-Consciousnesses in Christ no less than two distinct Wills an Humane and a Divine viz. One in each Nature I cannot see how upon this Author's Hypothesis to keep off the Assertion of Nestorius That there are Two distinct Persons in him also 3. My Third Argument against the same shall be taken from the Soul of Man in a state of separation from the Body And it is this The Soul in its separate Estate is Conscious to it self of all its own Internal Acts or Motions whether of Knowledge Passion or Desire and yet the Soul in such an Estate is not a Person And therefore Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality for if it were it would and must Constitute a Person wheresoever it was Now that the Soul in its separate Estate is thus Self-Conscious I suppose no body will pretend to deny but such as hold a Psychopannychisme viz. such a dormant Estate as renders it void of all Vital Motion or Action during its separation from the Body But this being an Errour which few now a-days think worth owning neither shall I think worth the disproving But for the Minor Proposition That the Soul in its separate Estate is not a Person In this I expect to find some Adversaries and particularly our Author himself who expresly affirms That the Soul in such a separate Estate is a Person Pag. 262. A Soul says he without a Vital Union to an Humane Body is a Person Nor does he bestow the Name and Nature of a Person upon the Soul only as separate from but also as shall be afterwards made appear as it is joyned with the Body which Assertion of his together with some others of near Affinity with it shall in due place be examined by themselves At present in Confirmation of my Argument I shall produce my Reasons against the Personality of the Soul held by this Author and in order to it shall lay down this Conclusion in direct Opposition to his viz. That the Soul of Man is not a Person And since as we have noted he holds that it is so both in its Conjunction with the Body and its separation from it I shall bring my Arguments against the Personality of it in both And First I shall prove That the Soul while joyned to and continuing in the Body is not a Person and as a Ground-work of the proof thereof I shall only premise this one Thing as a Truth acknowledged on all Hands viz. That the Soul and Body together constitute the Person of a Man The same being plainly Asserted in the Athanasian Creed where it tells us That the Reasonable Soul and Flesh is one Man or one Human Person for both signifie but the same Thing which being thus laid down as a Thing certain and confessed I Argue thus If the Soul and Body in Conjunction constitute the Person of a Man then the Soul in such a Conjunction is not a Person
But the former is true and therefore the latter must be so too The Proposition is proved thus Nothing which together with the Body Constitutes a Person is or can be it self a Person For if it be then the Body must be joyned to it either by being assumed into the Personal Subsistence of the Soul as the Human Nature of Christ is assumed into the Personal Subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the Composition and Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. Such an one as makes a Compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it Or Secondly The Body must be joyned with the Soul as one part joyntly concurring with another to the Composition of the whole Person And if so then the Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person Forasmuch as a Part is an Incomplete Being and therefore in the very Nature of it being designed for the Completion of something else must subsist in and by the Subsistence of the whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as Subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a Subject of Inherence or Dependence So that it is a direct Contradiction to the very Definition and Nature of the Thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul the former does irrefragably prove it not to be the other Besides if the Soul in the Composition of a Man's person were an entire person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the Constitution of the Man then a Man would be an Imperfect Accidental and not a Perfect Natural Compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Unum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into one For a Complete Being as every Person essentially is having received the utmost degree of Subsistence which its Nature can give it if it comes afterward to be compounded with another Being whether Complete or Incomplete it must necessarily make such a loose unnatural Union and Composition But to assert That the person of a Man is such a Compound would be exploded by all who understood any thing of Natural Philosophy So that it would be a very idle thing to attempt any further Confutation of it Let this Author overthrow these Reasonings and support his Assertion against them if he can But having thus disproved the Personality of the Soul while in Conjunction with the Body I go on to disprove it also while in a state of Separation from it Which I do thus If the Soul in such a state be a Person then it is either the same Person which the Man himself was while he was living and in the Body or it is another Person But to Assert either of them is extreamly Absurd and therefore equally Absurd That the Soul in such a state should be a Person And First It is Absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of Soul and Body as a Man is and a simple uncompounded Person as the Soul if a Person at all must needs be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several parts compounding it And a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Person and his Soul after his Death be a Person too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Person with the Man And then for the other part of the Disjunction To Assert That they are two distinct Persons is as Absurd as the other as drawing after it this Consequence viz. That it is one Person who lives well or ill in this World to wit the Man Himself while he was personally in the Body and another Person who passes out of the Body into Heaven or Hell there to be rewarded or punished at least till the Resurrection for what that other Person had done well or ill here upon Earth And does not this look mightily agreeable to all the Principles of Reason and Divinity Nevertheless so much is certain That wheresoever there are two distinct Persons we do and must by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick say That one of them is not the other and where one is not the other we cannot in Truth or Justice say That one ought to account for what was done or not done by the other But then if it be intolerably Absurd as no doubt it is That the Soul in the other World should not be responsible for what the Man himself in Person had done in this then it is altogether as Absurd and Intolerable for any one to represent and speak of these Things under such Terms and Notions as must necessarily throw all Discourse and Reasoning about them into Paradox and Confusion But 't is needless to insist any longer upon a thing so clear or to add any other Arguments in so plain a Case And indeed to me the Soul 's thus changing its state forwards and backwards from one manner of Subsistence to another looks very odd and unnatural As that from an Incomplete state in the Body it should pass to a Personal and Complete state out of the Body which state is yet preternatural to it and then fall back into an Incomplete state again by its re-union to the Body at the Resurrection which yet one would think should rather improve our principal parts in all respects not merely relating to the Animal Life as the bare Subsistence of them I am sure does not These things I say seem very uncouth and improbable and such as ought not without manifest Necessity to be allowed of which here does not appear since all this Inconvenience may be avoided by holding That the Soul continues but a Part of the whole Person and no more in all its Conditions And thus having proved our Assertion against the Personality of the Soul Whether in the Body or out of it let us now see what may be opposed to it And here I suppose some will object That the Soul in a state of Separation is not properly a Part forasmuch as it exists not in any Compound nor goes to the Composition of it To which I answer That an Actual Inexistence in a Compound is not the onely Condition which makes a Thing a Part but its Essential Relation to a Compound
Reason of it is with equal mistake and impertinence alledged by him in this case For he might and should have known That personal Acts are often ascribed to Faculties Vertues and Graces not in strict propriety of Philosophical speaking but Tropically and Figuratively by a Figure which he shall hear further of hereafter called Prosopopoeia which represents Things that are not Persons speaking and doing as if they were so But besides this there are here two Things which this Author takes for granted which yet such dull Mortals as my self will be apt a little to demurr to As First That he takes the Mind and the Soul of Man for one and the same thing whereas very Learned Men both Grammarians and Philosophers hold That in Men there is a great difference between Animus and Anima and that as Anima imports the Spiritual Substance which we call the Soul so Animus signifies only a Power or Faculty viz. The Supreme Intellectual Reasoning Governing Faculty of the Soul or at least the Soul it self considered as exerting the forementioned Acts. But whether it be one or the other we have sufficiently proved against this Author That neither of them can be a Person The other Thing here supposed by him is the Unity or Sameness of the Powers or Faculties of the Soul with the Soul it self which yet the Peripateticks generally and most of the School-men with Thomas Aquinas in the Head of them do positively deny and think they give very good Reason for such their Denial For if Substances and Accidents are Beings really distinct and if Qualities be Accidents and the Powers and Faculties of the Soul come under the second Species of Quality as Aristotle reckons them then it is manifest that they are really distinguished and that there is no Identity between them Nor does there want a further Reason for the same For since the bare Substance or Essence of the Soul considered nakedly in it self may rationally be supposed undetermined and therefore Indifferent to all those Acts or Actions that naturally proceed from it and since withal bare Objects can of themselves neither enable nor dispose the Agent to exert any Action there seems a Necessity of asserting the Intervention of some Third Thing distinct from both which may thus enable dispose and determine the Soul to exert it self in such a particular way of acting rather than another sutably to the several Objects which shall come before it which thing is properly that Quality residing in the Soul which we call a Faculty or Power And this to me seems the true Philosophy of the matter But I need not here press the Decision of the Case one way or other as not directly affecting the Point in debate between us Only I thought fit to suggest these Remarks to check this Author 's bold unwary way of dictating and affirming in things disputable and dubious and to remind him how much it becomes and concerns one that writes Controversies to be more liberal in his Proofs and less lavish in his Assertions But before I quit this Point about the Personality of the Soul since this Author has so absolutely and expresly affirmed That the Soul or Mind of Man is a Person and given this for the Reason of it That being the Superiour Governing Power in Man it does as such Constitute the Person over and above the Arguments which have been already brought for the Confutation of it I desire to leave with him two or three Questions which seem naturally to rise from this Wonderful Position As First Whether the Soul or Mind of Man be one Person and the Man himself Another Secondly Whether the asserting of the Soul to be a Person because it Constitutes the Person does not infer so much viz. That the Soul is the Person that Constitutes and the Man the Person that is Constituted unless we will say That the Soul Constitutes it self a Person And then Thirdly Whether to say or assert this does not infer Two distinct Personalities in the same Soul one in order of Nature before the other viz. That by which it is it self formally a Person and that other which by its Constituting it self a Person is Constituted and caused by it But since it is too hard a Task to drain any one Absurdity especially a very great one so as to draw forth and represent all its naturally descending Consequences I desire the Author with the utmost if Impartial strictness to compare the foregoing Questions with his own Assertion and to see First Whether they do not directly spring from it And next Whether the Matter couched under the said Questions if drawn out into so many Positive Propositions would not afford as many Intolerable Defiances to Common Sense Reason and Philosophy But thus it is when Men will be Writing at Thirty and scarce Thinking till Threescore But to proceed and shew That it is not only the Soul or Mind of Man which our Author dignifies with the Name and Nature of a Person but that he has almost as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a Person as K. Charles the Second had in making almost every Person he met with a Knight So that it was very dangerous for any one who had an Aversion to Knighthood to come in his way our Author out of the like Over-flowing Communicative Goodness and Liberality is graciously pleased to take even the Beasts themselves into the Rank and Order of Persons in some imitation I suppose of the Discreet and Humble Caligula so famous in History for making his Horse Consul And for this Let us cast our Eyes upon Page 262. where he has these words worthy in sempiternam rei memoriam to be wrote in Letters of Gold A Beast says he which has no Rational Soul but only an Animal Life as a Man has together with an Humane Soul is a Person or Suppositum or what you will please to call it But by your favour Good Sir the Matter is not so indifferent for Person and Suppositum are by no means the same Thing and I pity you with all my heart that you should think so For any single Complete Nature actually subsisting by it self is properly a Suppositum but not therefore a Person For as Subsistence superadded to Nature Constitutes a Suppositum so Rationality added to Suppositality Constitutes a Person which is therefore properly defined Suppositum Rationale or Intelligens as we have sufficiently shewn already in our Second Chapter So that to call a Beast a Person is all one as to call it a Rational Brute Which this Author who can so easily reconcile Contradictions or which may serve him as well swallow them may do if he pleases and so stand alone by himself in this as well as he says he had done in some other Things But others who think themselves obliged to use Philosophical Terms only as Philosophers intended them dare not venture to speak thus for fear Aristotle should bring an
Communication of his Nature to his Son which Act as proceeding from him is called Generation and renders him Formally a Father and as Terminated in the Son is called Filiation and Constitutes him Formally a Son and in like manner the Holy Ghost Subsists personally by that Act of Procession by which he proceeds from and relates to both the Father and the Son So that that proper Mode of Subsistence by which in Conjunction with the Divine Essence always included in it each of them is rendred a Person is wholly Relative and so belongs to one of them that it also bears a Necessary reference to another From all which it undeniably follows That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are in the Formal Constitution of them Relative to one another and consequently That the Three Personalities by which they become Formally Three Persons and are so denominated are Three Eternal Relations But now for the Minor Proposition in the first Syllogism viz. That Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative that I think can need but little Proof it being that Act by which each Person intimately knows and is Conscious to himself of his own Being Acts Motions and every Thing personally belonging to him so that as such it terminates within and looks no further than that one Person whom it is an Entire Survey and Comprehension of And as it is an Absolute and Irrelative Term so it may be Conceived distinctly and fully without Conceiving or implying the Conception of any Thing or Person besides And now what Relation does or can such an Act of Self-Consciousness imply in it It is indeed on the contrary a direct Contradiction to all that is Relative For it incloses the Person wholly within himself neither pointing nor looking further nor referring to any one else If it be here said That each Person by an Act of Self-Consciousness intimately knows the Relation which he stands in to the other Two Persons To this I Answer Two Things 1. That to know a Thing or Person to be Relative or to be Conscious of the Relation belonging to it or him does not make that Act of Knowledge to be either a Relation or of a Relative Nature 2. I Answer That this very Thing proves Self-Consciousness not to be the Constituent Reason of Personality For if the Father knows himself to be a Father by an Act of Self-Consciousness it is evident That Self-Consciousness did not make him so but that he was a Father and had the Relation of a Father and thereby a Personality belonging to him as such in Order of Nature Antecedent to this Act of Self-Consciousness and therefore that this Self-Consciousness cannot be the Reason of the Relation nor of the Personality implyed in it Forasmuch as it is in several respects Posterior to the Person whom it belongs to as in the foregoing Argument we have abundantly shewn But to take a particular and distinct Account of this Notion in the several Persons of the Trinity Does the Father become a Father by being Conscious to himself that he is so or rather by that Act by which he Communicates his Nature to and thereby generates a Son Or does the Son's Relation to the Father consist in his being Conscious to himself of this Relation Or Lastly does the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father and the Son and so personally relate to both by that Act of Self-Consciousness by which he is Conscious to himself of this Procession All this is Absurd Unnatural and Impossible For no Person is related to another by that Act of Self-Consciousness by which he knows and reflects Personally upon himself And yet it is certain That to be a Father is a Relative Subsistence and to be a Son depending upon the Father by an Eternal Act of Generation perpetually begetting him is also to have a Relative Subsistence and lastly to be Eternally proceeding from Both as the Holy Ghost is must likewise import a Way or Mode of Subsisting altogether as Relative as the Two former In which three ways of Subsistence consist the Personalities of the Three Persons respectively and upon these Self-Consciousness can have no Constituting Influence at all as being an Act quite of another Nature to wit Absolute and Irrelative and resting wholly within the Person whom it belongs to From all which I conclude That Self-Consciousness neither is nor can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity And this Argument I take to have the force and clearness of a Demonstration Argument III. The Third Argument is this If Self-Consciousness be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons then there is no Repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the Thing it self but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three But this is Absurd and therefore so must that be likewise from which it follows The Consequence appears from this That there is no Repugnancy but that there might be so many Self-Consciousnesses or Self-Conscious Minds or Spirits for the Deity to Communicate it self to And therefore if Self-Consciousness be the Formal Reason of Personality there is no Repugnancy but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the God-head as well as Three The Proposition is proved thus Because this Repugnancy if there be any must be either from the Nature of Self-Consciousness in the several Self-Conscious Minds or Spirits it belongs to or from the Nature of the God-head which is to be Communicated to them But it is from neither of them For First there is nothing in the Nature of Self-Consciousness to hinder its Multiplication into never so great a Number of Particulars but that there may be Three Thousand or Three Millions of Self-Conscious Minds or Spirits as well as Three Nor in the next place is there any Repugnancy on the Part of the God-head That Three Thousand Self-Conscious Spirits should subsist in it any more than that Three should For the Godhead considered precisely and abstractedly in it self and not as actually included in any Person is as able to Communicate it self to the greatest Number as to the smallest If it be here said That the Three Persons are not only Three Self-Conscious Spirits but also Three distinct Infinite Self-Conscious Spirits as our Author says they are and of which more in the next Chapter I Answer That there may be as well Three Thousand distinct infinite Spirits as Three For Infinity is as much inconsistent with the least Plurality of Infinites as with the greatest and therefore if it be no Repugnancy that there should be Three distinct Infinite Minds neither is there that there should be Three Thousand So that if Self-Consciousness be the Formal Reason of Personality there appears no Repugnancy either from the Nature of Self-Consciousness or the Number of the Spirits endued with it nor from the supposed Infinity of the said Spirits no nor yet from the Nature of
Principle upon which I impugn this Author's New Hypothesis so it does and must as I have noted run through all or most of the parts of this Disputation both about Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness too And accordingly in the first place I Argue against it thus Argument I. No Act of Knowledge can be the Formal Reason of an Unity of Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity But an Act of Mutual-Consciousness is an Act of Knowledge And therefore no Act of Mutual-Consciousness can be the Formal Reason of an Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons The Major I prove thus Every Act of Knowledge supposes the Unity of a Thing or Being from which that Act flows as Antecedent to it and therefore cannot be the Formal Reason of the said Being For still I affirm that Being and consequently Unity of Being which is the first Affection of it must in Order of Nature precede Knowledge and all other the like Attributes of Being And if so no Attribute Subsequent to a Thing can be the Formal Reason of that Thing which it is thus in Order of Nature Subsequent to For neither can Omniscience it self one of the greatest and most acknowledged Attributes of the Divine Nature be said to be the Reason either of the Being or of the Unity of the said Nature And therefore neither can any Act of Knowledge whatsoever be so This is my first Argument which I think sufficient fairly to propose without any farther Amplification Argument II. If Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-Consciousness in the said Persons then their Mutual-Consciousness is not the Cause or Reason of the Unity of their Nature But the former is true and therefore the latter is so too As for the Consequence of the Major Proposition it is as evident as that Nothing can be the Cause and Effect of the same Thing And for the Minor That Unity of Nature or Essence in the Divine Persons is the Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-Consciousness is proved from this That we can no otherwise conceive of Mutual-Consciousness than as of an Essential Property equally belonging to all the Three Persons And all Properties or Internal Attributes are accounted to issue and result from the Essence or Nature of the Things which they belong to and therefore can have no Antecedent Causal Influx upon the said Nature so as to Constitute either the Being or the Unity thereof But the Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons there is upon this Account one and the same Knowledge in them also And they are not one in Nature by vertue of their Mutual-Consciousness but they are therefore Mutually Conscious because the perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so And to Assert the contrary is of the like import still allowing for the Disproportion of an Infinite and Finite Nature as if we should make Risibility in a Man the Principle of his Individuation and affirm That Peter's having this Property is that which Constitutes him this particular Individual Man which is egregiously absurd in all the Philosophy I ever yet met with whatsoever it may be in this Author's Argument III. To affirm Mutual-Consciousness to be the Cause of the Union of the Three Divine Persons in the same Nature is to confound the Union and Communion of the said Persons together But such a confusion ought by no means to be allowed of and therefore neither ought that to be Asserted from whence it follows Now certain it is That all Acts of several Persons upon one another as all that are Mutual must needs be are properly Acts of Communion by which the said Persons have an Intercourse amongst themselves as acting interchangeably one upon the other But then no doubt both their Essence and Personality must still go before this Mutual-Consciousness since the Three Persons must needs be really one in Nature before they can know themselves to be so And therefore Union of Knowledge as I think Mutual-Consciousness may properly be called cannot give an Union of Nature It may indeed suppose it it may result from it and upon the same Account may infer and prove it but it can never give or cause it nor be that Thing or Act wherein an Unity of Nature does properly consist whatsoever this Author Asserts to the contrary But the Truth is all that he has said both of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness and he has no more than said it as never offering at the Proof of any Thing is founded in a manifest Perversion of that Natural Order in which Humane Reason Conceives and Discourses of Things Which Order to give an Instance of it in our discoursing of any particular Person or Complete Being proceeds by these steps First we conceive of this Person as possessed of a certain Essence or Nature Constituting or rendring him what he is Then we conceive of this Nature as one which is the first Affection resulting from Being After this we consider this Being as stepping forth or exerting it self in some Acts whether of Intellection Volition Power or the like In which whole process the Order of these Conceptions is such That it cannot with any Accord to Reason be transposed so as to have the second or third put into the place of the first But now let us see how contrary to this Order our Author's Hypothesis proceeds For whereas Nature or Being should be first Unity next and the Acts issuing from thence obtain the Third place and then those Acts stand in their due Order amongst themselves This Author on the contrary makes Mutual-Consciousness which is by two Degrees or Removes posterior to Unity of Nature in the Persons whom it belongs to to be the Cause or Formal Reason of the said Unity For first Self-Consciousness is posterior to this Unity and then Mutual-Consciousness is posterior to Self-Consciousness as being an Act supervening upon it For Mutual-Consciousness is that Act by which each Person comprehends or is Conscious of the Self-Consciousness of the other two and therefore must needs presuppose them as the Act must needs do its Object And therefore to make as this Author does Mutual-Consciousness the Constituent Reason of the Unity of the Three Persons when this Unity is by two degrees in Order of Nature before it runs so plainly counter to all the Methods of true Reasoning that it would be but time lost to pursue it with any further Confutation Argument IV. Our 4th and last Argument proceeds equally against Mutual-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness too and is taken from that known Maxime in Philosophy That Entities or Beings are not to be multiplied without manifest Necessity That is we are not to admit of New Things nor to coin new Notions where such as are known and long received are sufficient to give us a true and full Account of the Nature of the Things we discourse of and to answer all the Ends and
Purposes of Argumentation Accordingly I affirm That the Notions of Mutual-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness in the Subject now before us ought to be rejected not only as New and Suspicious but as wholly Needless For what can be signified by those which is not fully clearly and abundantly signified by that one plain Word and known Attribute the Divine Omniscience And what are Mutual-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness else if they are any thing but one and the same Omniscience exerting it self several ways and upon several Objects As to apply it to the Matter before us does not every one of the Divine Persons by vertue of the Divine Nature and of this Omniscience therewith belonging to him Perfectly Intimately and Intirely know himself as a Person and all the Actions Motions and every thing else belonging to him No doubt he does for that otherwise he could not be Omniscient And does not the same Person again by the very same Omniscience know all that is known by the other Two Persons and the other Two Persons by the same Mutually know all that is known by him No doubt they may and do Forasmuch as Omniscience knows all things that are knowable and consequently all that is or can be known of or in any one or all of the Divine Persons joyntly or severally considered But to argue the Matter yet more particularly Either Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness are one and the same with the Divine Omniscience or they are distinct sorts of knowledge from it If they are the same then they are useless and superfluous Notions as we affirm they are but if they import distinct sorts of knowledge then these two Things will follow 1. That in every one of the Divine Persons there are three distinct sorts of Knowledge viz. A Knowledge of Omniscience a Knowledge of Self-Consciousness and a Knowledge of Mutual-Consciousness too which I think is very absurd and ridiculous 2. And in the next place If we affirm them to be distinct sorts of Knowledge from that of Omniscience then they must also have Objects distinct from and not included in the Object of Omniscience since all such difference either of sorts or Acts of Knowledge is founded upon the difference of their Objects But this is impossible since the Object of Omniscience comprehends in it all that is knowable and consequently if Mutual-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness have Objects distinct from and not included in the Object of Omniscience those Objects must be something that is not knowable for that Omniscience as we have shewn claims all that is knowable or possible to be known for its own Object From all which it follows That Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness considered as distinct from Omniscience are two empty Chimerical Words without any distinct Sense or Signification In a word Every Person in the Trinity by one and the same Act of Omniscience knows all the Internal Acts Motions and Relations proper both to himself and to the other Two Persons besides And if so what imployment or use can there be for Self-Consciousness or Mutual-Consciousness which Omniscience that takes in the Objects of both has not fully answered and discharged already If it be here said That Omniscience cannot give Personality forasmuch as the Personality of each Person distinguishes him from the other two which Omniscience being common to them all cannot do This I grant and own it impossible for any Thing Essentially involved in the Divine Nature to give a Personal Distinction to any of the Three Persons but then I add also That we have equally proved that neither was Self-Consciousness the Formal Reason of this Personal Distinction by several Arguments and more especially because that Self-Consciousness being a Thing Absolute and Irrelative could not be the Formal Reason of any thing in the Nature of it perfectly Relative as the Divine Persons certainly are For this is a received Maxime in the Schools with reference to the Divine Nature and Persons Repugnat in Divinis dari Absolutum Incommunicabile Greg. de Valen. 1 Tom. p. 874. And it is a sure Rule whereby we may distinguish in every one of the Divine Persons what is Essential from what is Personal For every Attribute that is Absolute is Communicable and consequently Essential and every one that is purely Relative is Incommunicable and therefore purely Personal and so è converso Upon which Account Self-Consciousness which is a Thing Absolute and Irrelative cannot be Incommunicable nor consequently the Formal Reason of Personality in any of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity as we have already at large demonstrated So that still our Assertion stands good That all that can be truly ascribed to Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness with reference to the Divine Nature and Persons may be fully and fairly accounted for from that one known Attribute the Divine Omniscience And therefore that there Is no use at all either of the Term Self-Consciousness or Mutual-Consciousness to contribute to the plainer or fuller Explication of the Blessed Trinity as this Author with great fluster of Ostentation pretends but has not yet by so much as one solid Argument proved But when I consider how wonderfully pleased the Man is with these two new-started Terms so high in sound and so empty of sence instead of one substantial word which gives us all that can be pretended useful in them with vast overplus and advantage and even swallows them up as Moses's Rod did those pitiful Tools of the Magicians This I say brings to my Mind whether I will or no a certain Story of a Grave Person who Riding in the Road with his Servant and finding himself something uneasy in his Saddle bespoke his Servant thus John says he a-light and first take off the Saddle that is upon my Horse and then take off the Saddle that is upon your Horse and when you have done this put the Saddle that was upon my Horse upon your Horse and put the Saddle that was upon your Horse upon my Horse Whereupon the Man who had not studied the Philosophy of Saddles whether Ambling or Trotting so exactly as his Master replys something short upon him Lord Master What needs all these Words Could you not as well have said Let us change Saddles Now I must confess I think the Servant was much in the right though the Master having a Rational Head of his own and being withal willing to make the Notion of changing Saddles more plain easie and intelligible and to give a clearer Explication of that word which his Fore-Fathers how good Horse-men soever they might have been yet were not equally happy in the explaining of was pleased to set it forth by that more full and accurate Circumlocution And here it is not unlikely but that this Author who with a spight equally Malicious and Ridiculous has reflected upon one of his Antagonists and that for no Cause or Provocation that appears unless for having Baffled him may tax me also as one Drolling upon Things sacred
That to assert that the Father and the Son differ in Substance is Arianism And yet if they were Two distinct Substances for them not to differ in Substance would be impossible And as for the Greek Writers they never admit of Three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Deity but where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to signifie the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as sometimes it was used And by reason of this Ambiguity it was that the Latin Church was so long fearful of using the word Hypostasis and used only that of Persona answering to the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lest they should hereby be thought to admit of Three Substances as well as Three Persons in the God-head Nor in the next place is the same less evident from Reason than we have shewn it to be from Authority For if the Three Persons be Three distinct Substances then Two distinct Substances will concur in and belong to each Person to wit That Substance which is the Divine Essence and so is Communicable or Common to all the Persons and that Substance which Constitutes each Person and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs Since for one and the same Substance to be Common to all Three Persons and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the Three and thereby to distinguish them from one another is Contradictious and Impossible And yet on the other side to assert Two distinct Substances in each Person is altogether as Absurd and that as upon many other Accounts so particularly upon this That it must infer such a Composition in the Divine Persons as is utterly Incompatible with the Absolute Simplicity and Infinite Perfection of the Divine Nature And therefore the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity can by no means be said to be Three distinct Substances but only one Infinite Substance equally Common to and Subsisting in them all and diversified by their respective Relations And moreover since Three distinct Minds or Spirits are Essentially Three distinct Substances neither can the Three Persons of the Trinity be said to be Three distinct Minds or Spirits which was the Point to be made out Argument III. My Third Argument against the same shall proceed thus If it be truly said That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is Father Son and Holy Ghost I mean all Three taken together and it cannot be truly said That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits then it follows That Father Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits But it may be truly said That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is Father Son and Holy Ghost and it cannot be truly said That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Therefore the Three Persons in the Trinity viz. Father Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits This is the Argument Now the Consequence of the Major appears from this That the same Thing or Things at the same time and in the same respect cannot be truly affirmed and denied of the same Subject And therefore since Father Son and Holy Ghost taken joyntly together are truly predicated of one and the same Infinite Mind and Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits cannot be truly affirmed or predicated and consequently may be truly denied of the same it follows That Father Son and Holy Ghost and Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits neither are nor can be accounted the same nor be truly affirmable of one another As for the Minor it consists of two parts and accordingly must be proved severally in each of them And First That it is and may be truly said That one and the same Infinite Mind is Father Son and Holy Ghost viz. joyntly taken as I noted before This I say may be proved from hence That God is truly said to be Father Son and Holy Ghost still so taken And it having been already evinced That one Infinite Mind or Spirit and one God are terms convertible and equipollent it follows That whatsoever is truly affirmed or denied of the one may be as truly affirmed or denied of the other And this is too evident to need any further proof And therefore in the next place for the proof of the other part of the Minor viz. That one and the same Infinite Mind or Spirit cannot be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits This is no less evident than the former because in such a Proposition both Subject and Predicate imply a Mutual Negation of and Contradiction to one and another and where it is so it is impossible for one to be truly affirmed or predicated of the other And now after this plain proof given both of the Major and the Minor Proposition and this also drawn into so little a compass I hope this Author will not bear himself so much above all the Rules which other Mortals proceed by as after the Premises proved to deny the Conclusion viz. That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity Father Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits The Affirmation of which is that which I undertook to confute But before I dismiss this Argument I cannot but take notice That the same Terms with a bare Transposition of them viz. by shifting place between the Predicate and the Subject which in Adequate and Commensurate Predications may very well be done will as effectually conclude to the same Purpose as they did in the way in which we have already proposed them And so the Argument will proceed thus If it be truly and properly said That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit then they cannot be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits But they are truly and properly said to be one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit And therefore they neither are nor can be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits The Consequence of the first Proposition is manifest because as we have shewn before one and the same Infinite Mind cannot be Three distinct Infinite Minds without a Contradiction in the Terms And for the Minor viz. That the Three Persons are truly said to be one Infinite Mind or Spirit That also is proved by this That all and every one of them are truly and properly said to be God and God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit And therefore if the Three Persons are said to be the First they must be said to be this Latter also and that as I shew before because of the Reciprocal Predication of those Terms But as to the Matter before us That God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit even this Author himself allows who in Page
expressing himself in this sacred and arduous Subject to give it no worse word whatsoever it may deserve affords the Arians and Socinians no small Advantages against this Doctrine should it stand upon the strength of His Defence as thanks be to God it does not But I must not here omit that Passage which in the former part of this Chapter I promised more particularly to consider a Passage which indeed looks something strangely It is that in P. 258. line 27. where he tells us that he allows That in the Blessed Trinity there are Three Holy Spirits but denys That there are Three Holy Ghosts so natural is it for false Opinions to force Men to absurd Expressions But my Answer to him is short and positive That neither are there Three Holy Spirits nor Three Holy Ghosts in the Blessed Trinity in any sense properly belonging to these words However the Thing meant by him so far as it is reducible to Truth and Reason is and must be this viz. That when the Third Person of the Trinity is called the Holy Ghost there the word Holy Ghost which otherwise signifies the same with Holy Spirit must be taken Personally and consequently Incommunicably but when the Father or Son is said to be a Spirit or Holy Spirit there Spirit must be understood Essentially for that Immaterial Spiritual and Divine Nature which is common to and Predicable of all the Divine Persons All which is most true But then for this very Reason I must tell our Author withal That as Holy Ghost taken Personally is but Numerically one so Spirit or Holy Spirit as it is understood Essentially is but Numerically one too And therefore though the Father may be called a Spirit or Holy Spirit and the two other Persons may each of them be called so likewise yet they are not therefore Three distinct Spirits or Holy Spirits nor can be truly so called as this Author pretends they ought to be and we have sufficiently disproved but they are all one and the same Holy Spirit Essentially taken and which so taken is as much as one and the same God And moreover though Spirit understood Personally distinguishes the Third Person from the other two yet taken Essentially it speaks him one and the same Spirit as well as one and the same God with them and can by no means distinguish him from them any more than the Divine Essence or Nature which Spirit in this sence is only another word for can discriminate the Three Persons from one another So that upon the whole Matter it is equally false and impossible That in the Blessed Trinity there should be Three Holy Spirits or Holy Ghosts Terms perfectly Synonymous either upon a Personal or an Essential account and consequently that there should be so at all For as the word Spirit imports a peculiar Mode of Subsistence by way of Spiration from the Father and the Son so it is Personal and Incommunicable but as it imports the Immaterial Substance of the Deity so indeed as being the same with the Deity it self it is equally Common to all the Three Persons but still for all that remains Numerically one and no more as all must acknowledge the Deity to be And this is the true state of the Case But to state the difference between the Holy Ghost and the other Two Persons upon something signified by Holy Ghost which is not signified by Holy Spirit as the words of this Author manifestly do while he affirms Three Holy Spirits but denies Three Holy Ghosts this is not only a playing with words which he pretends to scorn but a taking of words for things which I am sure is very ridiculous And now before I conclude this Chapter having a Debt upon me declared at the beginning of it I leave it to the Impartial and Discreet Reader to judge what is to be thought or said of that Man who in such an Insolent Decretorious manner shall in such a point as this before us charge Nonsense and Heresie two very vile words upon all that Subscribe not to this his New and before unheard of Opinion I must profess I never met with the like in any Sober Author and hardly in the most Licentious Libeller The Nature of the Subject I have according to my poor Abilities discussed and finding my self thereupon extremely to dissent from this Author am yet by no means willing to pass for a Nonsensical Heretick for my pains For must it be Nonsence not to own Contradictions viz. That One infinite Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Spirits Or must it be Heresie not to Subscribe to Tritheisme as the best and most Orthodox Explication of the Article of the Trinity As for Non-sence it must certainly imply the asserting of something for true concerning the Subject discoursed of which yet in truth is contradictory to it since there can be no Non-sence but what contradicts some Truth And whereas this Author has elsewhere viz. P. 4. declared it unreasonable to charge a contradiction in any Thing where the Nature of the Thing discoursed of is not throughly comprehended and understood I desire to know of him whether he throughly understands and comprehends the Article and Mystery of the Trinity If he says he does I need no other Demonstration of his unfitness to write about it But if he owns that he does not let him only stick to his own Rule and then he may keep the Charge of Non-sense to himself But what shall we say to the Charge of Heresie in which St. Austin would have no Person who is so charged to be silent Why in the first place we must search and enquire whether it be so or no And here if my Life lay upon it I cannot find either in Irenaeus adversùs Haereses or in Tertullian's Prescriptions contra Haereticos Cap. 49. Nor in Philastrius's Catalogue nor in Epiphanius nor in St. Austin nor in Theodoret nor in Iohannes Damascenus's Book de Haeresibus nor in the latter Haeresiologists such as Alphonsus à Castro Prateolus with several others I cannot I say find in all or in any one of these the Heresie of not asserting the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits no nor yet the Heresie of denying them to be so But where then may we find it Why in this Author's Book And therefore look no further it is enough that so great a Master has said it whose Authority in saying a Thing is as good as another Man 's in proving it at any time And he says it as we see positively and perhaps if need be will be ready to take his Corporal Oath upon it That such as deny his Hypothesis are Hereticks Now in this case our Condition is in good earnest very sad and I know nothing to comfort us but that the Statute de Haeretico comburendo is Repealed And well is it for the Poor Clergy and Church of England that it is so for otherwise this Man
not be long before we find him bestowing a like cast of his Kindness upon the School-men too But since notwithstanding all this He allows the Fathers good Men to have meant well and taught right albeit by reason of a certain Infelicity and Awkwardness they had in representing what they meant by what they wrote their meaning ought by no means to be gathered from their own words as possibly also for the introducing a new and laudable Custom amongst the Fathers and Sons of the Church that the Sons must teach the Fathers to speak our Author has for these and the like Reasons in great Charity and Compassion to their Infirmities provided two other and better words of his own Invention viz. Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness by which alone the True Sense and Doctrine of the Fathers in all their Writings about this Article of the Trinity may or can be understood Nevertheless how kind soever this design of his may be yet to me it seems very unreasonable For in the first place it is upon the most allowed grounds of Reason a just and a sufficient Presumption that the Fathers were wholly Strangers to what our Author intends by these two words for that they never so much as mention or make use of the words themselves Whereas to be Self-Conscious and Mutually-Conscious were things no doubt easie enough not only for the Fathers but for any Man else of Common Sense to find out and understand and they might also without much difficulty have been applyed to the Divine Nature as well as other Acts of Knowledge and therefore since the Fathers never used them in this case it is but too plain that they never thought them fit or proper for this purpose For the Arian Controversie was then viz. in the 4th and 5th Centuries in which also the most Eminent of the Fathers wrote against it at the Highest Among which Writers Gregory Nyssen whom this Author so often quotes has a Passage which in this case is to me very remarkable and a Rational ground to conclude that he knew nothing of Mutual-Consciousness as it is here applyed by this Author For that speaking of the Unity of the Divine Persons in respect of one Common though Single Nature he expresses it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of which certainly he could not have chosen a more apposite and proper place to have expressed the same by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had that Father had the same Notion of it which this Author so much contends for But it seems he was either less Happy or more judicious in this Particular And besides all this it is most worthy to be Noted That the very Terms in which the Orthodox Writers expressed themselves about the Trinity and whatsoever related to it were severely canvased and examined and some of them settled by Councils which is a fair proof that the said Terms were fixed and authentick and exclusive of all others and consequently of those of this Author as well as of the Notion signified by and couched under them which he would here with such Confidence obtrude upon the World by and from the Credit of the Fathers though their Writings demonstrate that they were wholly unconcerned both as to his Doctrines and his Expressions Nor can any Want or Penury of words be here pleaded for their silence in this Matter since the Greek being so happy above all other Languages in joyning and compounding words together in all probability had the Fortunes of Greece as the word is been concerned in the case we might have heard of some such words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or since most such words as in English terminate in ness usually in the Greek terminate in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 possibly we might have met with some such made-words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 since these do more properly import Consciousness than the former which rather signifie Self-Conscience and Mutual-Conscience and so in strictness of Speech differ something from the other But he who seeks in the Greek Fathers for these words or any thing like them as applyed to the Trinity may seek longer than his Eyes can see Nor will his Inquest succeed at all better amongst the Latines For although that Language be extremely less copious than the other and so affords no one Latine word either for Self-Consciousness or Mutual Consciousness but what we must first make and being made would sound very barbarously yet no doubt there were ways and words enough to have otherwise expressed the same thing had they found it the fittest and best Notion to have expressed this great Article by But no such thing or word occurs in any of their Writings But why do I speak of the Greek and Latine Fathers When the very Schoolmen the boldest Framers and Inventors of Words and Terms of all others where they think them necessary to express their Conceptions by notwithstanding all their Quiddities Hoecceities and Perseities and the like have yet no word for Self-Consciousness and Mutual Consciousness which is a sufficient Demonstration that either the thing it self never came into their Heads or which is most likely that they never thought it of any use for the explication of this Mystery which yet they venture further at than any other Writers whatsoever But after all though this Author is very much concerned to ward off the charge of Novelty and Singularity from his Notions for which I cannot blame him this being a charge sufficient to confound and crush any such Notion applyed to so Sacred and received an Article as the Trinity and for this cause is not a little desirous to shelter it with the Authority of the Fathers yet I assure the Reader That he is no less careful and concerned to keep the Glory of the Invention wholly to himself and would take it very ill either of Fathers School-men or any one else should they offer to claim the least share in it For he roundly tells us That the Fathers were not so happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this Mystery Page 126. Line 5. nay and that how right a Judgement soever they might have of it yet in down-right Terms That they knew not how to explain it Page 126. Line 18. which I confess is no small Complement passed upon himself a thing which he is seldom or never failing in but in good earnest a very course one upon the Fathers In short he would appropriate the Credit of the New Invention entirely to himself but with admirable and more than Metaphysical Abstraction at the same time clear himself of the Novelty of it and so in a word prove it of at least 12 or 13 hundred years standing in the World when yet the Author of it was Born since Conventicles began in England as is well known But I frankly yield him the Invention as perfectly his own and such an one too as he
nothing is so but a Mind or Spirit it may as I have said imply a Mind but it does not directly signifie it But admitting that it does both does this expression prove That the Son is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinct from the Father By no means For not only the Son but the Father may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Holy Ghost 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet they are not Three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Reason of this is because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an Essential Attribute following the Divine Nature and therefore common to all the Three Persons and not a Personal Attribute peculiar to any one of them So that granting the Son to be as truly and properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as this Author would have him yet we absolutely deny That he is a distinct 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Father And this Expression I am sure is far enough from proving him to be so From Nyssen he passes to St. Athanasius who he tells us observes out of these words of our Saviour John 10. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that our Saviour does not say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that by so speaking he gave us a perfect Duality of Persons in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and an Unity of Nature in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All which is very true and that this distinction of Persons overthrows the Heresie of Sabellius and the Unity of their Nature the Heresie of Arius But then this is also as true that all this is nothing at all to our Author's Purpose For how does this prove either that the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Or that Self-Consciousness is the proper ground or Reason of their distinction Why yes says He If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wisdom then the Son is also an Eternal but begotten Mind and Wisdom Very true but still I deny that it follows hence That the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begetting and the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begotten are Two distinct Minds or Wisdoms but only one and the same Mind or Wisdom under these Two distinct Modifications of Begetting and being Begot But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of a distinct Mind or Wisdom out of those words of the Nicene Creed in which the Son is said to be God of God Light of Light very God of very God By which words I cannot imagine how this Author thinks to serve his turn unless that by Light must be meant Infinite Wisdom or Infinitely Wise Mind and that this must also infer the Father and Son to be Two distinct Infinitely Wise Minds or Wisdoms one issuing from the other But if so then the same words will and must infer them also to be two distinct Gods and very Gods For all these words stand upon the same level in the same Sentence and then if we do but joyn the Term Distinct equally with every one of them we shall see what Monstrous Blasphemous Stuff will be drawn out of this Creed In the mean time let this Author know once for all That Light of Light imports not here Two distinct Lights but one Infinite Light under Two different ways of Subsisting viz. either by and from it self as it does in the Father or of and from another as it does in the Son All which is plainly and fully imported in and by the Particle of signifying properly as here applyed Derivation or Communication in the thing which it is applyed to And this is the clear undoubted sense of the Word as it is used here In the mean time I hope the Arians and Socinians will joyn in a Letter of Thanks to this Author for making such an Inference from the Nicene Creed In the next place he comes to St. Austin where though I am equally at a loss to find how he proves his Point by him any more than by those whom he has already produced yet I will transcribe the whole Quotation into the Margin that so both the Reader may have it under his Eye and the Author have no cause to complain that he is not fairly dealt with Now that which he would infer from thence seems to be this That God the Father is Infinitely Wise by a Wisdom of his own distinct from that Wisdom by which the Son is called The Wisdom of the Father and consequently that they are Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms or Infinitely Wise Minds This I say is that which he would inferr and argue from St. Austin or I know not what else it can be But this is by no means deducible from his words for the Father is wise by one and the same Infinite Wisdom equally belonging both to the Father and the Son but not by it under that peculiar Formality as it belongs to the Son For it belongs to the Son as Communicated to Him whereas it belongs to the Father as Originally in and from Himself And whereas it is objected That if the Father should be Wise by the Wisdom which he Begot then he could not be said to be Wise by a Wisdom of his own but only by a Begotten Wisdom proper to the Son I Answer That neither does this follow since it is but one and the same Essential Wisdom in both viz. in him who Begets and in him who is Begotten Though as it is in him who is Begotten it is not after the same way in Him who Begets So that it is this determining Particle as or Quatenus which by importing a distinction of the manner causes a quite different application of the Term while the Thing is still the same For the Father himself is not denominated Wise even by that very Wisdom that is Essential to Him considered as Personally determined to the Son for so it must be considered as Derived and Communicated and no Divine Perfection can agree to the Father under the Formal Consideration of Derived and Communicated albeit the Thing it self which is Derived and Communicated absolutely considered may and does In a word the Father is Wise by one and the same Wisdom which is both in himself and in his Son but not by it as it is in the Son But by the way it is worth observing That this Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies the Father to be Wise by this Begotten Wisdom which the Son is here called and which in the Sense we have now given of it is very true and alledges St. Austin and Lombard to abett him in it This very Man I say Page 131. Line 24. affirms That the Son is that Wisdom and Knowledge wherewith his Father knows himself Where If for the Father to be Wise and to know himself be formally the same Act and as much the same as his Wisdom and Knowledge can be as it is manifest they are then I leave it to this
to extract the best sense out of it that he can And thus having presented our Author with this Preliminary Observation I shall now proceed to consider how he acquits himself in the first Thing undertook by him viz. The proving a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons out of the Fathers which tho' I do as readily grant and as firmly believe as this Author does or can yet I think it worth while to shew with what Skill Decency and Respect he Treats the Fathers upon this Subject And here in the first place he tells his Reader That this being a Mystery so great and above all Example in Nature it is no wonder if the Fathers found it necessary to use several Examples and to allude to several kinds of Union to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head And withall That they take several steps towards the Explication of this great Mystery viz. of an Unity of Nature in a Trinity of Persons page 106. In our Examination of which Passages reserving his former words to be considered elsewhere we will first consider the steps which he says the Fathers made towards the Explication of this Mistery And these he tells us are Two First The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. the Coessentiality of the Divine Persons whereby all the Three Persons of the God-head have the same Nature Page 106. Secondly the other is a Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence or Nature Page 121. Line 6. which to answer one Greek word with another we may call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 St. Cyril authorizing the Expression whom we find speaking of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Ammonius Cites him in his Catena upon Iohn 17. 11 21. Now as this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature and this Numerical Unity of Nature lying fifteen whole Pages in this Author's Book distant from one another must be confessed to make a very large stride so for all that they will be found to make but an insignificant step as setting a Man not one jot further than he was before For as touching those Words and Terms which the Fathers used to express the Unity of the Divine Nature by I do here without any demurr affirm to this Author That Coessentiality Sameness of Nature and Sameness of Essence all signified by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as also Unity of Nature and Unity of Essence expressed by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do all of them in the sense of the Fathers denote but one and the same Thing viz. A Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature only I confess with some Circumstantial Difference as to the way or manner of their signification For 1. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Unity of Nature with a Connotation of some Things or Persons to whom it belongs Upon which Account it is that St. Ambrose whom this Author cites speaking of this word in his 3d Book Chap. 7. tells us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliud alii non ipsum est sibi Nor indeed is any Thing said to be the same but with respect to some Thing or Circumstance besides it self And therefore no wonder if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was anciently rejected since the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 relating to the Person whom the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belongs to must import a Singularity of Person as well as an Unity of Essence which would be contrary to the Catholick Faith But 2. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Unity of Nature or Essence without Connotation of any to whom it belongs Not but that it does really and indeed belong to the Three Divine Persons but that according to the strict and proper signification and force of the word it does not connote or imply them but abstracts or prescinds from them And this is a true Account of these words by which the Fathers without making more steps than one intended and meant the same Thing viz. a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature belonging to all the Three Persons only with this difference That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the Unity of the Divine Nature with a Connotation of the Persons in whom it is which also gives it the Denomination of Sameness and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the Unity of the same Nature absolutely and abstractedly without imploying or co-signifying any respect to those in whom it is and to whom it belongs So that these words as much Two as they are yet in the sense and meaning of the Fathers import but one and the same Unity But our Author tells us That though indeed the Fathers own an Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons yet since there is a Specifick as well as a Numerical Unity the Dispute is here which of these two Unities we shall assign to the Divine Nature with reference to the Divine Persons And for this He tells us That Petavius and Dr. Cudworth have abundantly proved That the Nicene Fathers did not understand the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Numerical but of a Specifical Sameness of Nature or the agreement of Things Numerically different from one another in the same Common Nature Page 106. about the end In Answer to which I must confess my self very unfit to take such Great and Truly Learned Persons to task and that upon comparing this Author and Petavius together if there can be any comparison between them I find much more Reason to believe that he mistook the meaning of Petavius than that Petavius could mistake the meaning of the Fathers But however I shall lay down this as a Conclusion which I take to be undoubtedly true viz. That the Ancient Fathers as well the Nicene as those after them held only a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity That is in other words They held and acknowledged one Numerical God and no more This Conclusion I hold and have good reason to believe That neither Petavius nor Dr. Cudworth shall be able to wrest it from me For the chief Reason of some Men's charging the Fathers with holding a Specifick Unity of Nature amongst the Divine Persons is drawn from this That some of them and particularly Maximus and Nyssen cited by this Author seem to argue from that Specifick Unity of Nature which is found in several Individual Men to an Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity To which I Answer That the Fathers never used the Example of Three or more Individual Men agreeing in the same Nature as a Parallel Instance of the same sort or degree of Unity with that which is in the Three Divine Persons but
always alledged it one or perhaps sometimes both of these two ways First By way of Allusion or Illustration as I have already noted in the foregoing Chapter and as it is the nearest Resemblance of and Approach to this Divine Unity of any that could be found in Created Beings For still their Argument proceeds only by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the one side and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the other as appears from that place quoted out of Maximus P. 107. which Terms surely do not of necessity import an Identity of the Case but only some Similitude in the parts of the Comparison Secondly The Fathers used the forementioned Example as an Argument à minore ad majus viz. That if several Individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature upon which Nyssen's who le Argument turns much less could this be said of the Three Divine Persons Forasmuch as it is not only certain but evident That Persons merely distinguished from one another and no more must have a greater Unity of Nature than such as are not only distinguished but also divided from one another by a separate Existence And let any one stretch this Argument of the Fathers further if he can I do not in the least deny but several Expressions may have dropped from the Fathers which if we look'd no further might be drawn to a very inconvenient sense But then also it is as little to be denied That the same Fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same Points have declared themselves in such Terms as are very hardly if at all reconcileable to those Occasional and Accidental Expressions And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both it ought much rather to be taken from what was Asserted by them designedly than what was Asserted only occasionally To which I shall add this further Remark That a due consideration of the Circumstances under which those Fathers wrote may very well Apologize for the Deseâ—â—s of some of their Arguments For the Grand Controversie which exercised the Orthodox Writers of the fourth and part of the fifth Century was that with the Arians So that we have the less cause to wonder if some of their Reasonings about the Trinity seem to look no further than the proof of a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons while they had to deal with Adversaries who would not allow so much as this between the Father and the Son but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Likeness of Nature between them which together with the foregoing Considerations may serve as a Key to let us into the true Explication of several Passages of the Fathers about the meaning of which we might otherwise possibly be something at a loss And the same likewise may serve to give a fair Account of what has been alledged by Petavius and mistook by this Author upon the present Subject For to traverse and examine all Petavius's Allegations particularly would require a full and distinct Work by it self But still our Author seems extremely set upon making good his first step of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature from the Fathers and to that purpose he tells us Page 107. Line 23. That one thing wherein the Fathers place the Unity of the Godhead is that all the Three Persons have the same Nature by which he means as shall be shewn presently Specifically the same Nature and a few Lines after he tells us again That some of the Fathers went further than this and plac'd the Essential Unity of the Divine Nature in the Sameness of Essence Lines 30 31 32 of the same Page Now here I would desire this Author to inform me of Two Things First By what Rule of speaking or upon what Principle of Divinity Logick or Philosophy Sameness of Nature ought to signifie one Thing and Sameness of Essence to signifie another and withal to be so contra-distinguished to each other that in the degrees of Unity this latter must be a step beyond the former For the Fathers I am sure make no such distinction but use the words Sameness of Nature and Sameness of Essence as well as the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themselves promiscuously so that neither by their Native signification nor yet by their use do they import any more than one sort of Unity Secondly Whereas in Page 106. Lines 23 24. he makes the first step towards this Unity to consist in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Coessentiality which also in the next Page Line 23. c. he explains by Sameness of Nature And whereas in Page 121. he makes a Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence the next step introducing it with the word Secondly and telling us That the Fathers added it to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he had before made the first step And whereas notwithstanding this having in Page 107. told us That Sameness of Nature was one Thing wherein the Fathers placed the Unity of the Divine Nature within seven Lines after he tells us That some of the Fathers went further and placed it in the Sameness of Essence which yet it is manifest all along that he reckons not the same Thing with Numerical Unity of Essence I desire to know of him whether there be Two second steps in this Unity or whether there be one between the first and the second For he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature one step Page 106 107. And Sameness of Essence a further step Page 107. Line 30. c. And then Numerical Unity of Nature another step calling it also the Second Page 121. Line 5. These Things I must confess I am utterly unable to give any Consistent Account of and I shrewdly suspect that our Author himself is not able to give a much better But it is still his way to forget in one place what he has said in another and how kind soever he may be to himself I should think it very hard for another Man to forget himself so often and to forgive himself too Nevertheless our Author without mincing the Matter roundly Asserts a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons telling us Line 23. c. of the fore-cited Page 107. That this is absolutely necessary to make the Three Persons one God and that it is impossible that they should be so without it where it is evident that he means a Specifick Unity both from this that it was the Subject which he had been there treating of as also from this that immediately after he mentions another sort or degree of Unity as a step further than this which since nothing can be but a Numerical Unity it follows That that which was one step short of a Numerical must needs be a Specifical And now is it not strange that in Page 109. which is but the next
save one after this this Man should positively say as he does That the Fathers never so much as Dream'd of a specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons having here in Page 107. affirmed it to be no less than absolutely necessary to make the Three Persons one God And that certainly is a necessity with a witness But he who exacts of this Author a consistency with himself for five Pages together deals very severely with him And accordingly the more I consider of this Matter I cannot but think that what he says of the Nicene Fathers holding a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons Page 106. and his affirming that Gregory Nyssen St. Cyril Maximus and Damascen never so much as Dream'd of any such Unity Page 109. Line 22. will by no means consist together For first If by the Nicene Fathers be meant not only those who were present at that Council but those Fathers also who about those Times held the same Faith which was Established in that Council then his two fore-cited Passages contain a gross manifest fulsome Contradiction even as gross as the positive asserting of a thing and the never so much as dreaming of it can import But if by the Nicene Fathers he means only those who sat and acted in that Council he will hardly however perswade any understanding Man That Gregory Nyssen who Wrote and flourished between Fifty and Sixty Years after the Council and Maximus about Sixty and St. Cyril about Ninety could be so grosly ignorant of and Strangers to the Sentiments of those Fathers as not so much as to Dream of that wherein they had placed the Unity of the God-head This to me seems Incredible and morally Impossible since it is not to be imagined that Nyssen Cyril and Maximus could so soon forget or knowingly dare to relinquish the Doctrine of the fore-mentioned Fathers whose Authority was so great and Sacred all the Christian World over And therefore since this Author allows these Fathers not to have Dreamt of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature I conclude That neither did the Nicene Fathers Dream of it any more than they howsoever they might express themselves upon some occasions And thus having as well as he could made his first step by Asserting a Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature in the Three Divine Persons from the Fathers that is to say partly from what Petavius and Dr. Cudworth had told him of the Nicene Fathers holding such a Specifick Unity between them and partly from the other Fathers never so much as dreaming of it he proceeds now to his other step or rather Counter-step which is to shew That the Unity between the Divine Persons held by the Fathers was no other than a Numerical Unity of Nature or Essence belonging to them For since to be one only Specifically and to be one only Numerically are by no means consistent with one another in respect of the same Persons what can this be so truly and properly called as a Counter-step to that which he had made before His Method being plainly this First he tells us that the Nicene Fathers by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood only a Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons Page 106. And then that the Fathers mentioning them indefinitely held this Sameness of Nature absolutely necessary to make the said Three Persons one God Page 107. And now at length he tells us Page 121. Lines 27 28 29. That though several of the Fathers attempted several ways of explaining that Unity of Nature that is in the Divine Persons yet they all agree in the Thing That Father Son and Holy Ghost Three distinct Divine Persons are united in one Numerical Nature and Essence So that the Sum of all must be this as appears also from his own words in the latter end of Page 120. and the four first Lines of the 121. that according to him the Fathers held a Specifick Unity of Nature necessary to make the Three Divine Persons one God but not sufficient without the Completion of it by a Numerical Unity superadded to it This I say is the Sum of what he delivers and in direct opposition to which I do here deny That there is any such Thing as a Specifick Unity of Nature belonging to the Divine Persons or that the Fathers ever held that there was And to prove this I shall premise this Assertion both as certain in itself and withall affirmed by this Author in those forecited words viz. That all the Fathers held That Father Son and Holy Ghost Three distinct Persons are United in or rather are One by One Numerical Nature and Essence Which being so premised I have these Considerations to oppose to the Admission of any Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature as it belongs to the Divine Persons As First If a Numerical Unity in the same Divine Nature be sufficient to make the Three Divine Persons to whom it belongs One God then a Specifick Unity of the same is not necessary but a Numerical Unity in the same Divine Nature is sufficient to make the said Three Persons One God and therefore a Specifick Unity is not necessary The Consequence is evident because nothing can be necessary to any Thing or Effect beyond or beside what is sufficient for the same since this would imply a manifest Contradiction by making the same Thing in the same respect both sufficient and not sufficient And as for the Minor That an Agreement in one and the same Numerical Divine Nature is sufficient to make the Persons so agreeing One God I suppose this carries with it so much Self-Evidence that no Man of Reason will pretend to doubt of and much less to deny it Secondly A greater degree of Unity and a less degree of Unity are not to be admitted in the Divine Nature But a Numerical Unity and a Specifical Unity are a greater and a less degree of Unity and therefore they are not both to be admitted in the Divine Nature The Major is proved thus because two such Unities would overthrow the simplicity of the Divine Nature forasmuch as they must be either two degrees of the same kind of Unity or they must be two different kinds of Unity Either of which would inferr a Composition by no means to be endured in the Divine Nature As for the Minor it is evident in it self and needs no Proof Thirdly Such a degree or sort of Unity of Nature as may agree to Ten Thousand Individuals neither can nor ought to be admitted in the Divine Nature with reference to the Divine Persons But a Specifick Unity of Nature may agree to Ten Thousand Individuals as well as to Two or Three since upon a Specifick Account it has no Stint or Limitation but may be every whit as well and properly in the former Number as in the latter and therefore it neither can nor ought to be admitted in the Divine Nature Fourthly Such an Unity as is principally
when he has done so he opposes them Both to a Numerical Sameness of Nature as appears from the Adversative Particle But placed between them In which let me tell him he is guilty of a very great mistake both by making those Things the same which are not the same and by making an Opposition where there is a real Coincidence For by his favour one and the same Numerical Divine Nature is a Common Nature too forasmuch as without any Division or Multiplication of it self it belongs in Common to the Three Divine Persons The Term Deus indeed is neither a Genus nor a Species Nevertheless all Divines and School-men allow it to be a Terminus Communis as properly predicable of and Common to Father Son and Holy Ghost and in this very Thing consists the Mystery of the Trinity That one and the same Numerical Nature should be Common to and Exist in Three Numerically distinct Persons And therefore for one who pretends to teach the whole World Divinity while he is Discoursing of the Divine Nature and Persons to oppose Common Nature to Nature Numerically One and from the Commonness of it to make the Fathers Argue against its Numericalness whereas the same Divine Nature may be and really is both it is a shrewd sign of the want of something or other in that Man that must needs render him extremely unfit to prescribe and dictate in these Matters In fine the sole Point driven at all along by the Fathers as to the Question about the Unity of the Divine Nature for their Arguments to prove the Coequality of the Three Divine Persons against the Arians are not now before us is an Assertion of a Real Numerical Existing Unity of the said Nature in the said Persons I say a Numerical Unity without making any more steps or degrees in it than One or owning any distinction between Sameness of Nature and Sameness of Essence And much less by making as this Author does a Specifick Sameness of Nature one thing wherein they place the Unity of the Divine Nature and then making Sameness of Essence another and further degree in the Unity of the said Nature and when they have done so by a return back explaining this Sameness of Essence by the Sameness of Nature newly mentioned as he says they do in these words immediately following by way of Exegesis of the former viz. That there is but one God because all the Three Divine Persons have the same Nature Page 107. and the two last Lines All which is a Ridiculous Circle and a Contradiction to boot making Sameness of Nature one step and Sameness of Essence another and then making this Sameness of Essence no more than a Sameness of Nature again so that according to him the Fathers must be said to go further by resting in the very same step which they first made Which way of Reasoning I confess may serve well enough for one who can forget in one Page what he had said in the other just before But by his favour the Fathers were a little more Consistent and understood themselves better than to run Divisions in such a senseless manner upon a Thing that admitted none And thus having shewn how he has dealt with the Fathers in the Account given by him of their Opinion about the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity which was the first Head under which I reduced his Allegations from them I come now in the 2d Place to the other and Principal Head under which he undertakes to prove the chief and more peculiar part of his Hypothesis from the said Fathérs viz. That the Unity and Identity of Nature belonging to the Three Divine Persons consists in the Mutual-Consciousness which is between them That is in Truth That they are therefore One God because they are Conscious to themselves that they are so And here I shall begin with shewing how this Author overthrows the Point undertook by him before he produces any Arguments from the Fathers for it And to this Purpose I shall resume those words of his before cited by me out of Page 106. In which he reminds his Reader That Trinity in Unity being so great a Mystery and of which we have no Example in Nature it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union and that therefore it was necessary to use several Examples and to allude to several kinds of Union to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head Now here since our Author's Notion and the Fathers too as he says of this Unity is nothing else but Mutual-Consciousness I desire to Learn of him what necessity there was or is of using several Examples and alluding to several kinds of Union to explain or form an adequate Notion of that And I wonder what kind of Thing he would make of his Mutual-Consciousness should he come to explain and describe it by several Examples and several Kinds of Union But this is not all for he tells us likewise as we also observed before that there are several steps to be taken towards the Explication of this Mystery Whereupon I would again learn of him how many steps are necessary to explain Mutual-Conciousness for one would imagine one single step sufficient to represent and declare a Thing which every Body understands This Author indeed confidently enough Asserts That the Fathers give no other Account of a Trinity in Unity than the same which he gives of it Pag. 101. Line 2. But certainly if the Fathers thought several Examples Steps and Kinds of Union absolutely necessary to explain the Notion they had of this Unity and if these cannot be necessary to explain the Notion of Mutual-Consciousness then it must follow That the Fathers neither did nor possibly could by that Unity mean Mutual-Consciousness And if this Author doubts of the force of this Reasoning let him try his skill and see what Learned stuff he is like to make of it when he comes to explain his Notion of Mutual-Consciousness by several Examples Steps and Sorts of Union and out of them all to form one adequate Notion of this so much admired Thing Wherefore I conclude and I think unanswerably That the Fathers by this Unity between the Divine Persons mean one Thing and this Man quite another and consequently that they have given a very different Account of it from what he gives contrary to his equally bold and false Asseveration affirming it to be the very same And now I am ready to see what he has to offer us from the Fathers in behalf of his Mutual-Consciousness but because I am extremely desirous that the Reader should keep him close to the Point and not suffer him to wander from it which in dispute he is as apt to do as any Man living I shall presume to hint this to him That the Point to be proved by this Author is not that the Three Divine Persons have one and the same
Numerical Nature or Essence nor that they are Mutually Conscious to one another of whatsoever each of them is or knows no nor yet that this Mutual-Consciousness inferrs an Unity of Nature in them as a Thing inseparable from it But he is to prove That this Unity of Nature and this Mutual-Consciousness are Convertibly one and the some Thing or that this latter is to the former what the Essence or Form of any Thing is to that Thing That is to say That the Unity of the Divine Nature formally Consists in and is what it is by that Mutual-Consciousness which belongs to the Three Divine Persons This I say is the Thing to be proved by Him And so I proceed to his Arguments which I assure the Reader he shall find very strange ones nevertheless to give him as easie and distinct a view of them as I can I will set down the several Heads of them before I particularly discuss them 1. The First of them is from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed by the Fathers to all the Three Divine Persons joyntly 2. The Second from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. The Third from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Circumincession attributed likewise by the Fathers to them 4. The Fourth from the Representation which St. Austin makes of the Trinity by the Mind and its Three distinct Faculties of Understanding Memory and Will And 5. The Fifth and Last from the Unity of the Original Principle or Fountain of the Deity or rather say I of the second and third Persons of the Trinity All which I shall examine distinctly and in their order But before I do so I think fit to give the Reader an Account in one word of this Author 's whole design in all the Particulars above specified And that is to prove that the Unity of the Divine Nature consists in Unity of Operation and then to suppose for he does not so much as to go about to prove it that this Unity of Operation is Mutual-Consciousness This is the Sum Total of the Business but I now come to Particulars And First for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quoted by him out of Greg. Nyssen Where before we see how far it may be formed into an Argument I think it requisite to give some Account how this Author Discourses of it I must confess I have sometimes wondred what design he could have in so zealously exploding those commonly received Terms of Substance Essence and Nature from any application of them to God which here he does again afresh telling us in Page 115. lines 24 25 26 27. That it confounds our minds when we talk of the Numerical Unity of the God-head to have the least Conception or Thought about the Distinction and Union of Natures and Essences And that therefore we are to speak of God only in words importing Energy or Operation And accordingly for this reason Gr. Nyssen expresses God by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 words not signifying Nature or Essence but only Sight and Inspection Nay and this Author has gone a step much beyond this plainly telling us That the Father and the Son are Energy or Operation Page 132. Line 13. And that Nature and Energy are the same in God P. 133. L. 20. and consequently That we are to entertain no other Conception of God but as of a pure simple Operation And thus when we have degraded the Divine Nature from Substance to Operation it is but one step more to degrade it to bare Notion This conceit of this Author I say at first I could not but wonder at but am since pretty well aware of what he drives at by it And that is in short That he thinks it a much easier Matter to make Action or Operation than Substance Essence or Nature pass for Mutual Consciousness And this upon good Reason I am satisfied is the Thing he designs But I believe he will fall short of fetching his Mutual-Consciousness out of either of them And therefore first to Correct that Crude Notion of his That we must not speak of God in Terms importing Nature but Operation I desire this Bold Man as I urged before in Chap. 2 to tell me whether the Names of Iah and Iehovah and I am that I am by which God revealed himself to his People were not Names of Nature and Essence and whether God revealed them for any other purpose than that he might be known and understood by them But for all this he will have us to know from Gr. Nyssen That the Divine Nature is quid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Thing above Name or Expression And it is so I confess as to an adequate complete Conception or Description of it But then I ask him are not the Divine Operations so too Are we able to comprehend them perfectly and to the utmost of what and how they are When the Psalmist tells us that God has put darkness under his feet Psal. 18. 9. and that his footsteps are not known Psal. 77. 19. And the Apostle in Rom. 11. 33. That his judgments are unsearchable and his ways past finding out And are not these passages an Account of his Dealings and Operations in the Government of the World And yet surely notwithstanding all this we may have some true though imperfect Conceptions both of his Nature and of his Operations also And I desire this Assuming Man to inform me What should hinder but that so much as we Conceive of God we may likewise express and what is more prove too For though Gregory Nyssen has told us That the Divine Nature is unexpressible yet I hope a Thing may be proved though the Nature of it cannot always be throughly expressed But the Truth is he makes this Father Argue at a very odd rate For he tells us Page 115. That one way by which Gregory Nyssen undertakes to prove That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Specifick Sameness of Nature as this Man understands it proves a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons is because the Name God does not so properly signifie the Divine Nature as something relating to it Which is a rare Proof indeed it being as much as to say that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature proves one God because God does not signifie Nature But St. Gregory is far from arguing so which besides the Absurdity of it is only denying instead of proving but he proves Sameness and Unity of Nature by Sameness or Unity of Operation and that surely he might very well do without making Unity of Nature only an Unity of Operation And no less absurd is it to represent St. Gregory making Unity of Operation one way whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Specifick Sameness of Nature proves a Numerical Unity of Nature For though Unity of Operation it self proves this yet surely it is not a Medium whereby a Specifick Unity of the said Nature does or can prove it But
to proceed That Assertion of this Author That God is properly Energy or Operation contains in it more Absurdities than one For first he takes Energy and Operation for the same Thing whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is properly vis activa and Operation is only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or actual Exercise of that vis or Power But whether it signifies one or both it is certain that God is properly neither of them For as I have shewn before we must speak of God as we are able to conceive of him and we conceive of God not as of an Action but as of an Agent that is as of a Substance acting or exerting it self and upon this Account I do here tell this Author that it is impossible for Humane Reason to conceive of Action or Operation but as founded in Substance and that nothing would more confound and overturn all the Methods Ways and Notions of Men's Minds than to endeavour to conceive of it otherwise And therefore if God is sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Action it is by a Metonymy of the Adjunct for the Subject or the Effect for the Cause for truly and properly he is not so And now if this Author shall think to take Sanctuary in that known Expression of God That he is a pure simple Act he may please to take notice that the Term Act is Ambiguous and sometimes signifies an Actus Entitativus which is no more than the Entity or Being of a Thing and sometimes an Actus Physicus which is the Operation or Exertion of some Active Power And it is in the former sense only in which God is said to be a pure simple Act and not in the latter And by this Author's Favour every Substance Essence or Nature is such an Act which quite spoils all his fine Notion about expressing God only by Terms of Energy and Operation in exclusion of those of Nature Essence and Substance This I thought fit to premise as throwing up the very foundation of all his Arguments and indeed of his whole Hypothesis And so I come to his Argument the Sum of which is this That the Divine Nature is Divine Energy or Operation and therefore That the Unity of Divine Operation is Unity of Divine Nature and Lastly That this Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Consciousness Now it is certain That there is not one of all these Three Propositions true but that is no fault of mine since if they were cast into a Syllogism that would not mend the Matter for the Syllogism must proceed thus Unity of Divine Energy or Operation is Mutual-Consciousness Unity of Divine Nature is Unity of Divine Energy or Operation And therefore Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Consciousness Every one of which Propositions is still salse And yet I shall referr it to this Author himself or to any one who has Read and Considered his Book to form a better Argument from what he has said of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with reference to the present Subject if he can Nevertheless whether it be an Argument or no Argument my Answer to his Allegation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with relation to the Unity of the Divine Nature and to Mutual-Consciousness is thus First That it is one Thing to be a Proof of a Thing and another to be that wherein the Nature of the Thing proved does consist Thus actual Ratiocination is a certain Proof of a Principle of Reason yet nevertheless it is not that wherein a Principle of Reason does consist since that may be and continue when actual Ratiocination ceases In like manner I will allow the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be a Proof of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But I absolutely deny That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Energy is that wherein the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Nature is or ought to be placed or that the Fathers ever accounted it so how truly and strongly soever it might in their Judgment inferrit What the Fathers designed to prove by Unity of Operation in the Three Divine Persons is evident from the following Passages to which Twenty times as many might be added Gregory Nyssen tells us that those whose Energy is the same have their Nature altogether the same And St. Basil That those who have the same Operations have also the same Essence or Substance But the Operation orEnergy of the Father and the Son is one as appears in that Expression Let us make Man And again Whatsoever the Fatherdoes that likewise does the Son and therefore there is but one Essence of the Father and the Son And again The Sameness of Operation in the Father Son and Holy Ghost evidently shews That there is no difference in their Essence or Substance And accordingly St. Austin The Operation cannot be diverse where the Nature is not only equal but also undivided From all which it is most clear That the Fathers alledge this Unity of Operation only as a Proof or Argument of this Unity of Nature or Essence And therefore since nothing can be a proof of it self That they did not take Unity of Operation and Unity of Nature for one and the same Thing But Secondly Supposing but not granting that it were so viz. That Unity of Operation did not only prove but really was it self this Unity of Nature or Essence yet how will this Author prove that Unity of Nature or Unity of Operation is properly Mutual-Consciousness Is there so much as one Tittle in the Fathers expressing or necessarily implying that it is so And as to the Reason of the Thing it self Will any one say That there is no other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belonging to the Divine Nature but Mutual-Consciousness Or that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the whole Latitude and Compass of it extends no further Nay on the contrary does it not Exert it self in Infinite other Acts And what is yet more does it not more properly belong to any other of the Divine Acts than to an Act of Knowledge bare Knowledge as such being of it self unoperative and Mutual-Consciousness is but an Act of Knowledge I protest I am ashamed to dispute seriously against such Stuff 2. His next Argument to prove That Mutual-Consciousness is formally that Unity of Nature which is in the Three Divine Persons is taken from another Expression of the said Gregory Nyssen viz. That there is amongst the Divine Persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concerning which this Author has the boldness to appeal to any one to judge whether this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this single Motion of the Will which at the same instant is in Father Son and Holy Ghost can signifie any thing but Mutual Consciousness which makes them Numerically One Page 117. Lines 8 9 10 c. And he adds That it is impossible they should have such a single Motion of Will passing through them all without this Mutual Consciousness Page 124. Lines 30 31. And this is the
Sum of his Argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Answer to which before I address my self to his Argument I will give some Account of the Quotation In which by his Favour we are to take the sense of the Father's words from the Father himself and not from the Inferences which he who Quotes them thinks fit to draw from them how good soever he may be at that Work Now what St. Gregory means by them appears plainly by his manner of Reasoning The Question before him was Whether the Three Divine Persons were Three Gods Which St. Gregory denies and amongst other Proofs says That God is the Name of Energy and from the Unity of Energy proves the Unity of the Deity and that three Persons are but one God because the Operation is the same in all To this he raises an Objection from the Sameness of Faculty Office or Operation amongst Men as Geometricians Husbandmen Orators whose Office Business and Operations in their respective way are the same which yet does not hinder but that they are still Three or more several Men. To which he Answers that these act seperately and by themselves but that it is not so in the Divine Nature no Person in the Holy Trinity doing any Thing by himself only or acting separately from the other Two but that there is one and the same Motion ond Disposition of Will passing from the Father through the Son to the Holy Ghost This is the force of St. Gregory's Reasoning and the plain meaning of it is no more but this That Three Men acting the same Thing are still Three Men because they act separately and by themselves but that the Three Persons in the Trinity are but One God because they do not act separately but that there is the same Motion and Disposition of Will in all the Three Persons as on the contrary Three Men's not having one and the same Motion of Will equally proves That they are not One but Three several Men and accordingly makes a manifest difference between Three Men acting the same Thing and the Operation of the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity which is the Sum of St. Gregory's Answer to the forementioned Objection And now what does all this prove Why truly neither of those Two Things which this Author must prove or he proves nothing viz. That this Unity of Motion and Disposition of Will is properly and formally Unity of Divine Nature And next That this Unity of Divine Nature is properly Mutual Consciousness These two Things I say it is incumbent upon him to prove But how it can be done from the fore-mentioned Words or Argument of Gregory Nyssen I believe will pose the Learned'st Man alive to shew The proper Answer therefore to this Argument will be much the same with that just before given to the Argument drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is but a Branch and it proceeds thus First I deny the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be any more than a proof of the Unity of the Divine Nature just as either the Effect or the Causality is a sure proof of the Cause but for all that is not the Cause or as a Consequent proves its Antecedent without being the Antecedent or that wherein the Nature of the Antecedent does consist Secondly In the next place I deny that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is formally and properly the same with Mutual-Consciousness any more than an Act or Motion of the Will is formally the same with an Act of the Understanding And before this Author takes it for granted which is his constant way of proving things I expect that he make it appear That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie formally one and the same Thing And it was boldly done of him to say the least to appeal to his Reader about a Thing in which if he understood the difference between an Act of Volition and an Act of Intellection he must certainly judge against him But it may be reply'd That this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does at least inserr a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I grant it may But affirm That this is nothing to his Purpose unless it could follow from hence that that which inferrs or proves a Thing is the very Thing which it inferrs and proves which it neither is nor for that Reason can be As for what he adds That this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be in the Three Divine Persons without such a Mutual-Consciousness I do readily grant this also But in the mean time is not this Dictator yet old enough to distinguish between the Causa sinè quâ non or rather the Condition of a Thing and the Ratio formalis or Nature of that Thing Between That without which a Thing cannot be and that which that Thing properly is There can be no such Thing as Sight without a due Circulation of the Blood and Spirits But is such a Circulation therefore properly an Act of Sight Or an Act of Sight such a Circulation To dispute this further would be but to abuse the Reader 's Patience And last of all if this Author should take advantage of those words from Gregory Nyssen That God is the Name of Energy Besides that it is not the bare Notation but use of the Word that must govern its signification I would have this Author know That God may have many Names by which his Nature is not signified as well as several others by which it is and may be But I must confess it is a very pleasant Thing as was in some measure hinted before to prove the Divine Nature to be Energy because the Name God does not signifie Nature but Energy or Operation whereas in Truth if it proves any thing it proves that Nature and Energy applyed to God do by no means signifie the same Thing And so I have done with his Argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and effectually demonstrated That there is not so much as the least shew or semblance of any proof from this That Mutual Consciousness is properly that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does consist 3. His Third Argument is from the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commonly Translated Circumincession and signifying a Mutual-Inexistence or In-dwelling of each Person in the other Two The Word was first used in this sence so far as I can find by Damascen a Father of the 8th Century But the Thing meant by it is contained in those words of our Saviour in Iohn 14. 11. 21. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me which I confess are a solid and sufficient proof of the Unity and Identity of the Divine Nature both in the Father and the Son and withal a very happy and significant Expression of the same
But what is this to our Author's Purpose And how does he prove this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be Mutual Consciousness Why truly by no Argument or Reason produced or so much as offered at by him but only by a confident Over-bearing Affirmation That there is no other Account to be given of that Mutual In-being of the Divine Persons in each other which the Fathers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but by Mutual Consciousness Page 125. Lines 6 7 8. But by his leave I must debate the case a little with him before he carries it off so And in order to this I must tell him in the first place That the Question is not whether Mutual Consciousness best explains this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but whether it be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons And in the next place I demand of him Whether our Saviour's Words do not plainly and expresly signifie the Mutual In-being or In existence of the Persons in one another without any signification of their Mutual Consciousness at all And if so let me hear a Reason Why we should not take our Saviour's meaning from the Native signification of his own Words rather than from those of this Author For will he venture to affirm That the Father cannot be in the Son and the Son in the Father by a Mutual In-existence in one another but only by a Mutual Knowledge of one another Let him take heed what he says and how he ventures beyond his Depth Or will he say That our Saviour meant the same Thing with himself but was not so happy in expressing it For no other Reason but one of these two can be assigned That when our Saviour expresses himself in Terms importing Mutual In-existence this Man shall dare to say That he means nothing by them but Mutual Consciousness I referr it to the Serious and Impartial Reader to Judge of the Horrible Boldness of this Man and withal to observe how extremely he varies from himself about this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Mutual Consciousness For First He sometimes says That Mutual Consciousness is the only thing wherein both the Unity of the Divine Nature and this Mutual In-dwelling of the three Divine Persons does Consist Page 124. lines 4 5. And Secondly He says That Mutual Consciousness is the only thing that can explain or give an account of this Mutual In-dwelling or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Page 125. lines 6 7. To which I Answer That when he speaks of giving an account of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if he means only an Account that there is such a Thing belonging to the Divine Persons our Saviour's Words have given a sufficient Account of that already But Secondly If he means such an Account of it as explains and makes clear to us the Nature of it by shewing what it is and how it is I deny that any such Account can be given or perhaps understood by Humane Reason and much less that his Mutual Consciousness does or can give it Concerning which I shall ask him this one Question viz. Whether the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Mutually Conscious to one another of their Mutual In-existence in one another I suppose he will not because he dares not deny it And if he grants it then it manifestly follows That their Mutual In-existence in one another is in Order of Nature before their Mutual Consciousness and consequently cannot be the same with it nor consist in it For certainly those Divine Persons must Exist Mutually in one another before they can know or be Conscious to themselves that they do so So that we see here that nothing is or can be concluded from this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for his Mutual Consciousness whether we consider the Use of the Word or the Nature of the Thing But let us see how he makes good his Point from the Authority of the Fathers which was the grand Thing undertook by him in this his 4th Section And here as for the Fathers he both Despises and Reproaches them and that very grosly too For first he tells us That such an Union amongst the Divine Persons as is expressed by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they all agree in but how to explain it they knew not Page 125. lines 17 18. And why then in the Name of God does he referr to the Fathers to justifie his Explanation of that which in the very same Breath he says They knew not how to Explain And the Truth is the Fathers never owned themselves able to explain it and that for a very good Reason viz. because they held it unexplicable and unconceivable and not for that scandalous Reason given by him viz. That they had gross Material Conceptions of the Deity by conceiving of it as of a Substance Page 125. lines 27 28. For says he within two lines after Had they Contemplated God as a pure Mind it had been easie to explain this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Indwelling of the Divine Persons in each other Good God! That any Professor of Divinity should call that easie to explain which the Reason of all Mankind has hitherto bent under as a thing too great and mysterious for it to comprehend or to grapple with So that if ever we have cause to cry out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is here Or that he should tax all those who own themselves at a loss about it for not Contemplating God as a pure Mind But to him I confess who can conceive of such a pure Mind as is no Substance that is to say in other words No being For I am sure he will not so much as pretend it to be an Accident to Him I say I cannot wonder if nothing seem difficult or mysterious In the mean time it is shameless and insufferable in this Man to say as he does Page 100 101. That his Explication of the Trinity is not new but the same with that of the Fathers and afterwards in pursuance of this Assertion to say That the Fathers knew not how to explain it and to give this as a Reason of their not knowing how to do so viz. That they had such gross Notions of God that they could not conceive rightly of this Mystery For this he has roundly affirmed and therefore ought in all Reason either to prove this Charge upon the Fathers or to give the World and the Church of England in particular satisfaction for speaking so falsely and scandalously of such glorious Lights and principal Pillars of the Christian Church and such as I dare say never Preached nor Prayed in any Conventicle But what the Doctrine of the Fathers is concerning this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and how they understood those words of our Saviour expressed by this Term is manifest from the Testimony of two or three of them which I shall set down as in so known a
case abundantly sufficient St. Cyril of Alexandria says expresly Christ's saying that he is in the Father and the Father in him shews the Indentity of the Deity and the Unity of the Substance or Essence And so likewise Athanasius Accordingly therefore says he Christ having said before I and my Father are one He adds I am in the Father and the Father in me that he might shew both the Identity of the Divinity and the Unity of Essence And so again St. Hilary The Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father by the Unity of an inseparable Undivided Nature By which Passages I suppose any Man of sense will perceive That the thing which the Fathers meant and gathered from those words of our Saviour since expressed by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was no Unity of Mutual Consciousness which they never mention but an Unity of Essence or Nature which they expresly and constantly do Nor does this very Author deny it as appears from his own words though he quite perverts the sence of the Fathers by a very senceless Remark upon them Page 125. lines 20 21. This Sameness or Unity of Nature says he might be the Cause of this Union in the Divine Persons viz by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not explain what this Intimate Union is Now this Author has been already told That the Question here is not what explains this Union but what this Union is But besides this his mistake of the Question I desire him to declare what he means by the Cause of this Union as he here expresses himself For will he make an Union as he calls an Unity in the Divine Persons by Sameness of Nature a Cause of their Intimate Union by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mutual In-being of them in each other and affirm also this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the same thing with Mutual Consciousness If he does so he makes the same thing the Cause of it self For the Sameness of Nature in the three Persons and their Mutual In-being or Indwelling are the very same thing and the same Unity though differently expressed But however if we take him at his own word it will effectually overthrow his Hypothesis For if the Sameness of the Divine Nature in the three Persons be as he says the cause of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the same with Mutual Consciousness it will and must follow That this Sameness or Unity of Nature can no more consist in Mutual Consciousness than the Cause can consist in its Effect or the Antecedent in its Consequent And this Inference stands firm and unanswerable against him But as to the Truth of the Thing it self though we allow and grant the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons and the Mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the said Persons in each other to be the same Thing yet we deny That this their Mutual In-being is the same with their Mutual Consciousness But that their Mutual Consciousness follows and results from it and for that cause cannot be formally the same with it And so I have done with his 3d. Argument which he has drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and is indeed nothing else but a bold down-right Perversion of Scripture and a gross Abuse of the Fathers 4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of St. Austin who though he does not as our Author confesses Name this Mutual Consciousness yet he explains a Trinity in Unity as he would perswade us by Examples of Mutual Consciousness particularly by the Unity of three Faculties of Understanding Memory and Will in the same Soul all of them Mutually Conscious to one another of the several Acts belonging to each of them And his 9th Book is spent upon this Argument In which he makes the mind considered with its knowledge of it self and its love of it self all three of them as he says but one and the same Thing a faint Resemblance of the Trinity in Unity And this is what he Argues from St. Austin To which I Answer First That Faint Resemblances are far from being solid Proofs of any Thing and that although similitudes may serve to illustrate a thing otherwise proved yet they prove and conclude nothing The Fathers indeed are full of them both upon this and several other Subjects but still they use them for Illustration only and nothing else And it is a scurvy sign that Proofs and Arguments run very low with this Author when he passes over those Principal Places in which the Fathers have plainly openly and professedly declared their Judgment upon this great Article and endeavours to gather their sence of it only from Similitudes and Allusions which looks like a design of putting his Reader off with something like an Argument and not an Argument and of which the Tail stands where the Head should For according to the true Method of proving things the Reason should always go first and the Similitude come after but by no means ought the Similitude ever to be put instead of the Reason But Secondly To make it yet clearer how unconclusive this Author's Allegation from St. Austin is I shall demonstrate That this Father does not here make use of an Example of Mutual Consciousness by shewing the great disparity between the thing alledged and the thing which it is applyed to and that as to the very Case which it is alledged for For we must observe That the Mutual Consciousness of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is such as is fully and entirely in each Person so that by virtue thereof every one of them is truly and properly Conscious of all that belongs to the other Two But it is by no means so in those three Faculties of the Soul Understanding Memory and Will For though the Understanding indeed be Conscious to all that passes in the Will yet I deny the Will to be Conscious to any Thing or Act that passes either in the Understanding or the Memory and it is impossible it should be so without exerting an Act of Knowledge or Intellection which to ascribe to the Faculty of the Will would be infinitely absurd It is true indeed That one and the same Soul is Conscious to it self of the Acts of all these three Faculties But still it is by virtue of its Intellectual Faculty alone that it is so And the like is to be said of its Knowledge and of its Love of it self For though it be the same Soul which both Knows and Loves it self yet it neither knows it self by an Act of Love nor loves it self by an Act of Knowledge any more than it can Will by an Act of the Memory or Remember by an Act of the Will which is impossible and amongst other proofs that it is so it seems to me a very considerable one That if a Man could remember by his Will this Author in all likelyhood would not forget
himself so often as he does It is clear therefore on the one side That the Acts of Understanding Memory and Will neither are nor can be Acts of Mutual Consciousness and on the other that Father Son and Holy Ghost do every one of them Exert Acts of Mutual Consciousness upon one another and consequently that as to this thing there is a total entire difference between both sides of the Comparison For which cause it is to be hoped that this Author himself will henceforth Consult the Credit of his own Reason so far as to give over proving That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Blessed Persons consists wholly and solely in the Mutual Consciousness of the said Persons by Examples taken from such Created Things as are by no means Mutually Conscious to one another But to manifest yet further the Vanity of this his Allegation out of St. Austin I shall plainly shew wherein this Father placed the Unity of the Three Divine Persons And that in short is in the Unity of their Nature Essence and Substance This is the Catholick Faith says he that we believe Father Son and Holy Ghost to be of one and the same Substance And again Let us believe in the Father Son and Holy Ghost These are Eternal and Unchangeable that is One God of one Substance the Eternal Trinity And moreover speaking of such as would have Three Gods to be Worshipped he adds That they know not what is the meaning of one and the same Substance and are deceived by their own Fancies and because they see Three Bodies separate in three Places they think the Substance of God is so to be understood I think it very needless to add the like Testimonies from other Fathers how numerous and full soever they may be for our Author having here quoted only St. Austin I shall confine my Answer to his Quotation and think it enough for me to over-rule an Inference from a Similitude taken out of St. Austin by a Plain Literal Unexceptionable Declaration of St. Austin's Opinion The Sum of the whole Matter is this That the thing to be proved by this Author is That the Three Divine Persons are One only by an Unity of Mutual Consciousness And to prove this he produces only a Similitude out of St. Austin and that also a Similitude taken from things in which no such thing as Mutual Consciousness is to be found By which it appears that his Argument is manifestly lame of both Legs and as such I leave it to shift for it self 5. In the fifth and last place He tells us That the Fathers also resolved the Unity of the God head in the three Divine Persons into the Unity of Principle meaning thereby that though there be three Divine Persons in the God-head Father Son and Holy Ghost yet the Father is the Original and Fountain of the Deity who begets the Son of his own Substance and from whom and the Son the Holy Ghost eternally proceeds of the same Substance with the Father and Son so that there is but one Principle and Fountain of the Deity and therefore but one God Page 128. line 6. Now all this is very true but how will our Author bring it to his purpose Why thus or not at all viz. That the Numerical Unity of Nature in the three Divine Persons by being founded in and resolved into this Unity of Principle does therefore properly consist in Mutual Consciousness This I say must be his Inference and it is a large step I confess and larger than any of the Fathers ever made Nevertheless without making it this Author must sit down short of his Point And yet if he really thinks that his Point may be concluded from hence why in the Name of Sence and Reason might he not as well have argued from Gen. 1. 1. That God created the Heavens and the Earth and that therefore the Three Divine Persons are and must be one only by an Unity of Mutual Consciousness For it would have followed every whit as well from this as from the other But since the Creation of both I believe never Man disputed as this Man does while he pretends to prove his Mutual Consciousness from the Unity of Principle in the Oeconomy of the Divine Persons And yet if he does not design to prove it from thence to what purpose is this Unity of Principle here alledged where the only Point to be proved is That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Persons is only an Unity of Mutual Consciousness But to come a little closer to him If this Author can make it out that the Father Communicates his Substance to the Son and the Father and the Son together Communicate the same to the Holy Ghost by one Eternal Act of Mutual Consciousness common to all three Persons then his Argument from Unity of Principle to an Unity of Nature consisting in Mutual Consciousness may signifie and conclude something but this he attempts not nor if he should would he or any Man living be ever able to prove it But he is for coming over this Argument again and tells us That as Petavius well observes it does not of it self prove the Unity that is to say the Numerical Unity of the God-head but only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature i. e. as he elsewhere explains himself the Specifick Sameness of Nature And that therefore the Fathers thought fit to add That God begets a Son not without but within Himself Page 128. line 17 c. In Answer to which Observation though it affects the Point of Mutual Consciousness the only thing now in hand no more than what he had alledged before yet in vindication both of the Fathers and of Petavius himself I must needs tell this Author That it is equally an Abuse to both For as to the Fathers it has been sufficiently proved to him That neither is there any such thing as a Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons nor that the Fathers ever owned any such but still by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 held only a Numerical Unity of Nature and no other so that their saying That God begot a Son within himself was rather a further Explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than any Addition at all to it And as for Petavius whereas this Man says That he has observed That this Argumentation of the Fathers does not of it self prove the Numerical Unity of the God-head in the three Persons I averr That Petavius observes no such thing He says indeed If this Reasoning viz. from Unity of Principle were considered Absolutely and Universally it would prove rather a Specifick than a Numerical Unity of Nature and gives a Reason for it from Humane Generation But then he does by no means say That the Fathers Arguments in this Case ought to be so considered but plainly limits them to the Divine Generation as of a peculiar kind
differing from all others And thereupon no less plainly Asserts That when the Father begets the Son he Communicates to him the same Numerical Substance and Nature and says expresly That the force and strength of the Fathers Argumentation is taken from the proper Condition and Nature of the Divinity and the Divine Generation from whence they collect not any kind of Unity of Essence but only a Singular and Numerical Unity in the three Divine Persons Which he makes good by Instances from St. Athanasius and St. Hilary And this is the true state of the Case and shews That Petavius understood the Fathers whether he who takes upon him to be his Corrector and Confuter does or no. In the mean time it is shameless to insinuate in this manner that Petavius represented these Arguments of the Fathers as proving only the Specifick Sameness of Nature and not the Numerical Unity of the God-head when he plainly shews That they designed thereby to prove a Numerical Unity of Essence in the Divine Persons and nothing else But this Author seems to assume to himself a peculiar Privilege of saying what he will and of whom he will In which nevertheless I cannot but commend his Conduct as little as I like his Arguing For that as he makes so bold with so Learned and Renowned a Person as Petavius So he wisely does it now that he is laid fast in his Grave For had Petavius been living and this Man wrote his Book in the same Language in which Petavius wrote his which for a certain Reason I am pretty well satisfied he never would there is no doubt but Petavius would have tossed him and his New Notion of three distinct infinite Spirits long since in a Blanket and effectually taught him the difference of insulting over a great Man when his Head is low and when he is able to defend himself We have seen how little our Author has been able to serve himself of the fore mentioned Resolution of the Unity of the Divine Nature into an Unity of Principle by way of Argument in behalf of his Mutual Consciousness Nevertheless though it fails him as an Argument yet that he may not wholly lose it he seems desirous to cultivate it as a Notion and upon that score tells us That it needs something further both to Complete and Explain it which with reference to his own Apprehensions of it I easily believe but however I shall take some Account of what he says both as to the Completion and Explication of it And First For the Completion He tells us That Father Son and Holy Ghost are Essential to one God and that upon this Account there must be necessarily three Persons in the Unity of the God-head and can be no more As to which last clause he must give me leave to tell him That it is not the bare Essentiality of the three Persons to the God-head which proves that there can be no more than three belonging to it but it is the Peculiar Condition of the Persons which proves this without which the Essentiality of the Three would no more hinder the Essentiality of a Fourth or Fifth than the Essentiality of Two could take away the Essentiality of a Third And therefore though the Proposition laid down by him be true yet his Reason for it will not hold But one choice Passage quoted by him out of a great Father I must by no means omit viz. That upon Account of this Unity of Principle St. Austin calls the Trinity Unam quandam summam Rem Page 123. line 8. Concerning which I desire any Man living except this Author to declare freely whether he thinks that St. Austin or any one else of Sence and Learning would call three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which are neither Numerically nor Specificully nor so much as Collectively one Unam quandam summam Rem But in the Second Place As for his Explication of the said Notion he tells us That he shall proceed by several steps and those as he would perswade us very plain and Universally acknowledged by all Page 126. lines 16 17 c. Nevertheless by his good leave I shall and must demur to two of them as by no means fit to be acknowledged by any and much less such as are acknowledged by all And they are the Third and Fourth In which he tells us That in the first place Original Mind and Wisdom and in the second That Knowledge of it self and lastly Love of it self are all of them distinct Acts and so distinct that they can never be one simple individual Act And withal that these Acts being thus distinct must be Three substantial Acts in God that is to say Three subsisting Persons By which three substantial Acts he must of necessity mean three such Acts as are three Substances Forasmuch as he adds in the very next words That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God Page 130. line 7 8 9. to the middle of the page Now against these strange Positions I Argue thus First If the three fore-mentioned Acts are so distinct in God that they can never be one Simple Individual Act then I inferr That the said three Acts cannot possibly be one God Forasmuch as to be one God is to be one pure simple indivisible Act. And thus we see how at one step or stroke he has Ungodded the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity For these three Acts he tells us are the three Persons in the God head Though I believe no Divine before him ever affirmed a Person to be an Act or an Act a Person with how great Confidence soever and something else this Man affirms it here Secondly If those three Acts in the God-head are three distinct infinite Substances as he plainly says they are by telling us Page 130. line 19. That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God then in the God-head there are and must be three distinct Gods or God-heads Forasmuch as an infinite Substance being properly God every distinct infinite Substance is and must be a distinct God These I affirm to be the direct unavoidable Consequences of those two short Paragraphs in Page 130. which he makes his Third and Fourth Explanatory Steps But because he may here probably bear himself upon that Maxim That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God which yet by the way might better become any one to plead than himself let me tell him That that Proposition is not absolutely and in all Sences true If indeed he means by it That there is no Being whether Substance or Accident in God besides his own most Pure Simple Indivisible Substance or Essence which is the commonly received sence of it it is most true But if he therefore affirms That neither are there any Modes or Relations in God this will not be granted him For in God besides Essence or Substance we assert That there is that which we call Mode Habitude and Relation And by one or
other of these in Conjunction with Essence or Substance we give account of all the Acts Attributes and Personalities belonging to the Divine Nature or God-head This is the constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysicians in their Discourses upon God and without which it is impossible to Discourse intelligibly of the Divine Acts Attributes or Persons And as it stands upon a firm bottom so it may well be defended And if this Author has ought to except against it I shall be ready to undertake the defence of it against him at any time But still that he may keep up that Glorious standing Character of Self-Contradiction which one would think to be the very Ratio formalis or at least the Personal Property of the Man Having here in Page 130. made a very bold step by Asserting the three Divine Persons to be three distinct Acts and so distinct that they can never be one Simple Individual Act. In the very next Page but one viz. 132. line 13. he roundly affirms That the Father and the Son are one single Energy and Operation Now how safe and happy is this Man that no Absurdities or Contradictions can ever hurt him Or at least that he never feels them let them pinch never so close and hard What remains is chiefly a Discourse about the different way of the Son 's issuing from the Father and the Holy Ghost's issuing from both As that the former is called Generation because the Son issues from the Father by a Reflex Act and the latter termed Procession because the Holy Ghost issues from both by a Direct Act. But why a Reflex Act must needs be termed properly a Generation and a Direct Act not be capable of being properly so accounted this our Acute Author very discreetly says nothing at all to though under favour all that he says besides leaves us as much in the Dark as we were before And for my own part I cannot think my self concerned to clear up a Point wholly foreign to that which alone I have undertook the Discussion of And thus I have finished my Dispute with Him concerning the Authorities of the Fathers alledged in behalf of his Notion of Mutual Consciousness as that wherein he places the Unity of the Divine Nature belonging to the three Blessed Persons The Sum of which whole Dispute is resolved into this single Question viz. In what the Father 's placed the Unity in Trinity And if they placed it in the Sameness or Unity of Nature Substance or Essence words applyed by them to this Subject at least a thousand Times and still used to signifie one and the same thing then it is plain that they did not place it in an Unity of Mutual Consciousness For I suppose no Man this Author himself not excepted will say That Essence or Substance and Mutual Consciousness are Terms Synonymous and of the same signification And as the whole Dispute turns upon this single Question so in the management of it on my part I have with great particularity gone over all the Proofs by which this Author pretends to have evinced his Doctrine from the Fathers The utmost of which Proofs amounts to this That the Fathers proved an Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common to them all And moreover sometimes illustrated the said Unity by the three Faculties of the Understanding Memory and Will being one with the Soul which they belonged to And lastly That they resolved the Unity of the Trinity into an Unity of Principle the Father being upon that account styled Principium fons Deitatis as communicating the Divine Substance to the Son and together with the Son to the Holy Ghost And what of all this I pray Do all or any of the fore-mentioned Terms signifie Mutual Consciousness Why No But this Author with a non obstante both to the proper signification and common use of them all by absolute Prerogative declares them to mean Mutual Consciousness And so his Point is proved viz That Mutual Consciousness is not only an Argument inferring the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Blessed Persons which yet was all that the Fathers used the fore-mentioned Terms for but which is more That it is that very thing wherein this Unity does Consist This I say is a true though a short Account of all his Arguments upon this Subject and according to my custom I refer it to the Judicious Reader to judge impartially whether it be not so and withall to improve and carry on the aforesaid Arguments in his behalf to all further advantage that they may be capable of But in the issue methinks the Author himself seems to review them with much less confidence of their Puissance than when at first he produced them For if we look back upon the Triumphant Flag hung out by him at his Entrance upon this part of his Work the only proper time for him to Triumph in and when he declared That his Explication of the Trinity was the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools Page 101. lines 24 25. who could have imagined but that he then foresaw that he should prove his Point with all the strength and evidence which his own Heart could desire And yet alas Such for the most part is the vast distance between Promises and Performances that we have him bringing up the Rear of all with this sneaking Conclusion Page 138. line 22 c. It must be confessed says he That the Ancient Fathers did not express their sence in the same Terms that I have done But I leave it to any Indifferent and Impartial Reader whether they do not seem to have intended the same Explication which I have given of this Venerable Mystery These are his words and I do very particularly recommend them to the Reader as deserving his peculiar Notice For is this now the Upshot and Result of so daring a Boast and so confident an Undertaking to prove his Opinion the constant Doctrine of the Fathers viz. That though the Fathers speak not one word of it nay though they knew not how to express themselves about it Page 125. line 18. yet that to an Indifferent Reader and a very indifferent one indeed he must needs be in the worst sence they may seem to intend the same Explication he had given of it So that the sum of his whole Proof and Argument amounts to this and no more viz. That to some Persons videtur quod sic and to others videtur quod non For see how low he sinks in the issue First of all from the Fathers positive saying or holding what he does it is brought down to their Intending it and from their Intending it it falls at last to their seeming to intend it and that is all And now is not this a worthy Proof of so high a Point And may it not justly subject this
in us an Adequate Notion thereof Hitherto both Divines and Philosophers have judged the Divine Nature absolutely Incomprehensible by any Adequate or Complete Conception of it And for my own part I account the Unity of it in Trinity much less capable of having an Adequate Notion formed of it than the Deity considered barely in self is and consequently that it is as much as Humane Reason can reach to to have a true and certain Notion of it though very Imperfect and Inadequate But as for an Adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head in three Divine Persons if this Author can form to himself such an one let him enjoy it as a Priviledge peculiar to himself and not obtainable by any other Mortal Man whatsoever And this is not the first Instance of his misrepresenting the Fathers Secondly Whereas this Author in the latter end of Page 138 and the beginning of Page 139. explodes the Terms Essence Substance Subsistence Hypostasis Person c. as useless Niceties and serving only to confound the Mystery of the Trinity and yet nevertheless in line 12 c. of Page 139. acknowledges That these very Terms were found out and made use of to encounter the Heresie of Sabellius who had turned this Sacred Mystery into a Trinity of Names or at most of Offices I desire to know of him what greater Proof he could have given of the exceeding usefulness and importance of these Terms than by thus deriving the invention and use of them from such an Occasion And especially when notwithstanding all the Curious Examination since passed upon them whereby he says they were found in some respect or other defective as what Terms are not when applyed to God experience yet shews that they have maintained their Use and Credit from that Age all along to this very Day Certainly it is a great Unhappiness when a Man can neither forbear Writing nor yet know when he Writes for a thing and when against it Thirdly I desire to know of this Author whether in the very same place viz. Page 130. in which he professes to explain an Unity in Trinity by an Unity of Principle he does well to tell us in line 19. of the said Page That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God having so often and so positively declared That these Terms serve only to obscure and confound Men's Notions of God And whether he accounts such Terms as serve only thus to confound Men's thoughts and notions about the God-head and the Unity thereof the fittest to explain the Unity of the said God-head with reference to the Divine Persons Which is the thing there promised and undertaken by Him Fourthly and Lastly Since this Author has condemned all the fore-mentioned Terms both as useless and sit only to obscure and confound instead of explaining the Doctrine of the Trinity I desire to know of him why he tells us at the close of Page 139. That he does not think it impossible which is only a Figure called a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying that it is very possible and easie to give a Tolerable Account of the said School-Terms and Distinctions For since by a Tolerable he must mean if he means any thing to the Purpose such an Account of them as shews them to have a Rational Sence and meaning under them I desire him to tell me whether every Rational Sence is not as such also a True one And if True whether one Truth can any more obscure perplex and confound than it can contradict another Truth Which being invincibly evident as to the Negative I desire this Author in the last place to tell me whether it does or can become a Man consistent with himself to pass so Reproachful a Character upon the Terms of the Schools in the beginning of Page 139 and afterwards to give so contrary and commendatory an Account of the said Terms in the latter end of the very same Page I hope the Reader will be pleased to take this Notable Instance also of this Author's Consistency with himself so far as Self Contradiction may be so called into his Consideration And so these are the Four Questions or Queries which I would have him resolve me or rather the World in for I am sure it concerns him and his Credit so to do Having thus followed this Author both in his Reasonings and Quotations and found him equally Impertinent in both I must again desire my Reader to joyn with me in admiring the strange Confidence of the Man I have already noted with what a daring Assurance he vouched his new Opinion for the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools Page 101. line 24. c. After which Peremptory Asseveration who could have expected but that he would have appeared in the Head of Thirty or Twenty Fathers at least Greek and Latin together to have rescued his beloved Hypothesis from the Imputation and Charge of Novelty which he seems so desirous to Ward off P. 100. l. 22. And that besides Gr. Nyssen Athanasius Maximus Nazianzen Damascen and these for the most part quoted upon an Account not at all relating to his Hypothesis and St. Cyril who is not so much as quoted but only Named we should have had Iustin Martyr Irenaeus Origen Clemens Alexandrinus St. Basil Theodoret Epiphanius with several more all alledged in his behalf And amongst the Latins that we should besides St. Austin whom alone he quotes and St. Ambrose whom he only mentions about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Page 107. line 10. have heard also of Tertullian Lactantius St. Cyprian St. Ierom and St. Hilary with a great many others And then lastly for the School-men who could have expected fewer of them also than Ten or Twenty And that we should have seen Alexander Alensis the first who Commented upon the Oracle with Durandus Aquinas Scotus Major Biel Soto Vasquez Cajetan Gr. de Valentiâ Estius and many more of the Scholastick Tribe all drawn forth in Rank and File to have fought his Battels But when after all none but poor Peter Lombard comes forth like a Doughty Captain with none to follow him this methinks looks more like the Despair of a Cause than the Defence of it For though our Author calls Peter Lombard the Oracle of the Schools and all know his Sentences to be the Text which the School-men undertake to Explain and Comment upon Yet Experience has told us That the Responses of this Oracle as well as of those heretofore are often found very Dubious and Ambiguous Witness Thomas and his Followers expounding them one way and Scotus and his Disciples understanding them another and several amongst whom Durandus and Greg. Ariminensis going a different way from both So that sometimes there is but too much need of a good Interpreter to fix the sence of this Oracle as great a Veneration as the Schools may have for him And therefore since his Text is not always so very plain and easie as to
make an Explication of it superfluous this Author having quoted Peter Lombard in such or such a sence ought in all Reason to have produced the Major and more eminent part of the School-men and Writers upon him and shewn their Unanimous Concurrence in the same Sence and Notion which he took him in and quoted him for And this indeed would have been to his Purpose and look'd like proving his Opinion to have been the Doctrine of the Schools Otherwise I cannot see how the Master of the Sentences can be called or pass for all the School men any more than the Master of the Temple can pass for all the Divines of the Church of England Unless we should imagine that this Peter Lombard had by a kind of Mutual Consciousness gathered all his Numerous Brood into Himself and so united them all into one Author So that the Sum of all is this That this Author having declared his Opinion the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools to make his words good has produced for it Three or Four Greek Fathers and Two Latin though even these no more to his purpose than if he had quoted Dod and Cleaver or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of Homer and lastly One Sentence out of one School-man Which if it be allowed to pass for a good just and sufficient Proof of any Controverted Conclusion let it for the future by all means for this our Author's sake be an Established Rule in Logick from a Particular to infer an Universal And now that I am bringing my Reader towards a close of this long Chapter I must desire him to look a little back towards the beginning of the foregoing Chapter wherein upon this Man 's Confident Affirmation That his Opinion was the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools I thought it necessary to state what his Opinion was and accordingly I shew'd that it consisted of Four Heads 1st That the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity were three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits which how far he was from being able to prove from the Authority of any of the Fathers cited by him was sufficiently shewn by us in the preceding Chapter The 2d Was That Self Consciousness was the formal Reason of Personality in the said three Persons and consequently That whereby they were distinguished from each other which in the same Chapter I shew'd he was so far from proving from the Authority of those Ancient Writers that he did not alledge one Tittle out of any of them for it nor indeed so much as mention it in any of the Quotations there made by him And as for the 3d. Member of his said Hypothesis viz. That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Blessed Persons Consisted in the Mutual Consciousness belonging to them This we have Examined at large and confuted in this Chapter But still there remains the 4th And last to be spoken to as completeing his whole Hypothesis and resulting by direct Consequence from the other Three viz. That a Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity explained by the three forementioned Terms or Principles is a very plain easie and intelligible Notion which having been in a most Confident Peremptory manner affirmed by him all along as I shew in Chap. 1. and upon that Score making so great a part of his Hypothesis ought in all reason to be proved to have been the Sence and Doctrine of the Fathers concerning this Article But not one word does he produce upon this Head neither Nor for my own part do I expect ever to find the least Sentence or Syllable in any Ancient Writer tending this way And I challenge this Author to produce so much as one to this purpose In the mean time how and with what kind of words I find these Ancient Writers expressing themselves about this venerable Mystery I shall here set down Only I shall premise a Sentence or two out of this Author himself and which I have had occasion to quote more than once before from Page 106. line 7. viz. That the Unity in Trinity being as he confesses so great a Mystery that we have no Example of it in Nature it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union and that therefore it was necessary to use several Examples and to allude to several kinds of Union to form an Adequate Notion of the God head and moreover Page 139. line 26. c. That there is nothing like this Mysterious Distinction and Unity and that we want proper words to express it by All which Passages lying clear open and express in the fore-cited places of this Author I must needs ask him Whether all these are used by him to prove the Unity in Trinity a plain easie and intelligible Notion as he has frequently elsewhere asserted it to be As to go over each of the Particulars First Whether we must account it plain because he says It is a great Mystery of which we have no Example in Nature And Secondly Whether we must reckon it easie because he says That it cannot be Explained by any one kind of Natural Union but that several Examples must be used and several sorts of Union alluded to for this purpose And Lastly Whether it must pass for Intelligible because he tells us That we want proper Words to express it by that is in other Terms to make it Intelligible since to express a Thing and to make it Intelligible I take to be Terms equivalent In fine I here appeal to the Reader Whether we ought from the forementioned Passages of this Author to take the Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity for a plain easie Intelligible Notion according to the same Author's affirmation so frequently inculcated in so many Parts of his Book But I shall now proceed to shew as I promised how the Fathers speak and declare themselves upon this great Point And here we will begin first with Iustin Martyr A Singularity or Unity says he is understood by us and a Trinity in Unity is acknowledged But how it is thus I am neither willing to ask others nor can I perswade my self with my Muddy Tongue and Polluted Flesh to attempt a Declaration of such Ineffable Matters And again speaking of the Oeconomy of the blessed Trinity the nature and manner says he of this Oeconomy is unutterable And yet again speaking of this Mysterious Oeconomy of the Deity and the Trinity as one of the greatest Mysteries of the Christian Faith I cry out says he O wonderful For that the Principles and Articles of our Religion surpass and transcend the Understanding Reason and Comprehension of a Created Nature In the next place Dionysius the Areopagite or some very Ancient Writer under that Name calls it the Transcendent Superessential and Superlatively Divine Trinity In like manner Gregory Nyssen we apprehend says he in these viz. the three Divine Persons a certain Inexpressible Inconceivable
Similitude besides it self to allude to and yet afterwards producing several Similitudes Allusions and Metaphors out of the Fathers to explain both this In-being and this Mutual-Consciousness by God give him a better Memory for as these things represent him no Man living would he but impart his skill could be so fit to teach the Art of Forgetfulness as himself But after all I must not omit to give the Reader notice of another of his Absurdities though of a lower rate viz. That all along Page 57. he takes a Pattern or Example and a Similitude or Metaphor for Terms equivalent whereas a Pattern or Example imports a perfect entire Resemblance between it self and the thing of which it is the Pattern and indeed approaches next to a Parallel Instance while on the other side an Agreement in any one respect or degree is sufficient to found a Metaphor or Similitude upon And therefore tho it may easily be granted this Author That there is no Pattern or Example of such an Union as is between the Father and the Son yet that does not infer that there is nothing in Nature that bears any similitude to it since this may very well be without the other as that place in Iohn 17. 11. and 21. has already proved And now I should here have finished my Remarks upon this particular Head but that there is a certain Passage in order to his proving that there is nothing in Nature like the Unity between the Father and the Son and it is this That in Substantial Unions that which comprehends is greater than that which is comprehended So that if Two Substances should be United by a Mutual-Comprehension of one another the same would be both greater and lesser than the other viz. greater as it comprehended it and less as it was comprehended by it P. 57. Now this Proposition I will neither note as Paradoxical nor absolutely affirm to be false But so much I will affirm viz. That it is nothing at all to his Purpose and that he can never prove it to be True For besides that he still confounds an Example or Parallel Case with a Similitude I would have him take notice First That this Maxim Omne continens est majus contento upon which he founds a Majority of the thing comprehending to the thing comprehended is wholly drawn from and founded upon the Observations made by the Mind of Man about Corporeal Substances endued with Quantity and Dimensions in which the Substance comprehending is and must be of a greater Dimension than the Substance comprehended But what is this to Spiritual Substances Concerning which I demand of this Author a solid Reason Why Two such Substances may not be intimately united by a Mutual-Permeation or Penetration of one another For all that can hinder such a Penetration or Permeation as far as we know is Quantity which in Spiritual Substances has no place and then if such a Mutual-Penetration be admitted these Substances will be mutually in one another and United to one another not indeed by a Comprehension of one another of which there is no need if such a thing could be but by a Mutual-Adequation or exact Coequation of one to the other so that nothing of one Substance shall exist or reach beyond or without the other but the whole of both by such a Permeation mutually exist in each other This I say I neither do nor will affirm to be actually so but I challenge this Author to prove that it cannot be so and till he can it may become him to be less confident In the next place I have one thing more to suggest to him about Substantial Unions which he talks so much of viz. That the Term is Ambiguous and may signifie either First The Union of two or more Substances together and so the Father and the Son who are not two Substances but only two Persons as has been shewn in the foregoing Chapter can never be substantially United Or Secondly It may signifie the Union of Two or more Persons in one and the same Substance which is truly and properly the Union of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity And thus though there is no Instance in Nature of Persons so united yet by way of Allusion and Similitude the Union of the three fore-mentioned Faculties of Understanding Memory and Will in one and the same Soul alledged by St. Austin may pass for a small or as this Author himself calls it Page 126. Line 28. A faint Resemblance of the Union of the said Three Divine Persons in the same Nature or Substance which according to his excellent Talent of Self-Contradiction he positively denies here in Page 57. and as positively affirms in that other now pointed at In fine this Assertion That the Father and the Son cannot possibly be One or in One another which is here the same but by Mutual-Consciousness Page 57. Line 23 24 25. unavoidably infers and implies That they are not One by Unity of Substance Unity of Essence or Unity of Nature For I am sure neither Substance Essence or Nature are Mutual-Consciousness And if the Church will endure a Man asserting this I can but deplore its Condition PARADOX If we seek for any other Essence or Substance in God says this Author but Infinite Wisdom Power and Goodness the Essence of God though considered but as one Numerical Person is as perfectly unintelligible to us as one Numerical Essence or Substance of Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity Page 69 70. Answer This Proposition is False and Absurd and to prove it so I shall lay down these following Assertions First That it is certainly much easier for Humane Reason to conceive one and the same Divine Nature or Deity as Subsisting in one single Person than in Three distinct Persons Secondly That Essence Substance Wisdom Power and Goodness are in the Divine Nature which is a pure simple Act all but one and the same Thing or Being Thirdly That notwithstanding this Essence or Substance and Wisdom Power and Goodness are formally distinct from one another That is to say The Conceptus Objectivus or proper Essential Conception of one does not imply or involve in it the proper Conception of the other Upon which Account one of them cannot properly be said to be the other Now these Three Things thus laid down it is readily granted to this Man That Essence or Substance Wisdom Power and Goodness are really one and the same Being and that therefore it is vain and foolish to seek for any Essence or Substance in God which is not also Wisdom Power and Goodness But this by his favour is not the point For if he will nevertheless say That the Divine Nature expressed by one Infinite Essence or Substance Subsisting in One Person is as unintelligible as the same Subsisting in Three distinct Persons Nay that One and the same Numerical Wisdom Power and Goodness consider'd as Subsisting only in one Person is not more Intelligible than the same
to this Socinian Objection which by a manifest Fallacy proceeds à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter viz. That because Equality cannot belong to the Essential Glory or Majesty of the Godhead considered abstractedly from the Divine Persons therefore neither can it agree to the same Glory or Majesty upon any other Account whatsoever which is utterly false forasmuch as considered according to the Three different ways of its Subsistence in the Three Persons it may as Subsisting under any one of them be said to be equal to it self as Subsisting under the other Two PARADOX This Author represents Gregory Nyssen as first asserting a Specifick Sameness or Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons which also he makes all along to be signified by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and then asserting that this Specifick Sameness or Unity of Nature makes the said Three Persons Numerically One Page 118. the latter end Answer This is too great an Absurdity for so Learned a Father to be guilty of and therefore ought to lie at this Author 's own Door for that a Specifick Sameness or Unity of Nature should make any Thing or Person Numerically One any more than a generical Unity can make Things specifically One is beyond measure senceless and illogical PARADOX Though the Fathers says he assert the singularity of the Godhead or the Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence yet they do not assert such a Numerical Unity as where there is but one Person as well as one Essence but such a Numerical Unity as there is between Three who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the very same Nature but are not merely united by a specifick Unity but by an Essential Union and therefore are Three and One Page 121 Line 15. Answer In these Words there are several Absurdities which he falsly charges upon the Fathers but ought in all Reason to take to himself As 1. He supposes a specifick Unity and an essential Unity to be distinct Unities whereas every specifick Unity or Union call it at present which you will is also an essential Unity or Union For a specifick Unity is one sort of an essential Unity which in its whole compass contains the Generical the Specifical and the Numerical and therefore thus to contra-distinguish a Species to its Genus is fit for none but such a Logician as this Author it being all one as if one should say of Peter That he is not only a Man but also a Living Creature 2. The second Absurdity is That he owns a specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons which sort of Unity I have abundantly proved in Chap. 7. the Divine Nature not to be capable of for he says here of the Divine Persons That they are not merely United by a specifick Unity which Words must imply that however so united they are 3. He makes Two sorts of Numerical Unity contrary to all Rules of Logick viz. One where there are several Persons of one Nature as here in the Trinity and the other where there is but One Person as well as One Nature But let me here tell him That the Divine Nature is every whit as numerically One in the Three Persons as if there were but one Person in the Godhead and no more And in this very Thing as has been shewn does the Mysteriousness of an Unity in Trinity consist I say The Divine Nature is as Numerically One in the Three Persons as the humane Nature was numerically One in Adam while there was no other Person in the World but himself nay much more so since it is not multiplicable as that was And to affirm That the Numerical Unity of the Godhead is not so perfect or is not the very same Subsisting in Three distinct Persons as if we could imagine it to subsist but in One Subverts and Overthrows such an Unity in Trinity as the Church in all Ages hitherto has maintained PARADOX Having told us That the Fathers universally acknowledged the Operation of the whole Trinity ad Extra to be but One and from thence concluded the Unity of the Divine Nature and Essence for that every Nature has a Virtue and Energy of its own Nature being a Principle of Action and if the Energy and Operation be but One there can be but One Nature He adds within four Lines after That this is certainly true but gives no Account how Three distinct Persons come to have but One Will One Energy Power and Operation nor that any Account that he knows of can be given of it but by Mutual-Consciousness Page 124. Line 7 c. Answ. Were I not acquainted with this Man's way of Writing I should be amazed to see him in so small a compass so flatly contradict himself For will he in the first place assert in the Three Divine Persons a Numerical Unity of Nature And in the next assert also that this Unity of Nature is proved by Unity of Energy and Operation And after this tell us That this gives no Account at all how Three distinct Persons come to have but one Will and Energy Power and Operation For does not Unity of Nature in these three distinct Persons prove this While the said Unity of Nature proves Unity of Operation as the Cause proves its Effect and Unity of Operation again proves Unity of Nature as the effect proves its cause This any one of sense would think is a fair full and sufficient Account how Three distinct Persons having all but One Nature come thereby all to have but one Will Energy and Operation And should any one else argue otherwise I should think him beside himself but this Author in this Discourses like himself PARADOX Knowledge Self-reflection and Love are distinct Powers and Faculties in Men and so distinct that they can never be the same Knowledge is not Self-reflection nor Love either Knowledge or Self-reflection though they are inseparably united they are distinct P. 130. L. 11 12 c. Answ. Here also is another knot of Absurdities For First Knowledge Self-reflection and Love are not in Men distinct Powers and Faculties as this unfledged Philosopher calls them but only distinct Acts. Secondly Admitting that Knowledge were a Faculty as it is not yet I deny that Knowledge and Self-reflection would make Two distinct Faculties forasmuch as it is one and the same Intellectual Faculty which both exerts an Act of Knowledge and an Act of Reflection upon that Act of Knowledge or upon it self as producing the said Act. For which Cause it is as has been observed before that Philosophers hold that the Understanding is Facultas supra se Reflexiva all of them allowing both the direct and the reflex Acts of Knowledge to issue from the same Faculty Thirdly He says That albeit the forementioned Acts are distinct yet they are inseparably united But this also is false for whether an Act of Knowledge may be without an Act of Self-reflection as some not without Reason think it may I am sure in
Men of whom alone we now speak both an Act of Knowledge and of Self-reflection too may be without an Act of Love consequent thereupon And if the former may be without the latter then they are not inseparably united as this Author here says they are PARADOX He says That Love is a distinct Act and therefore in God must be a Person P. 133. Answ. If this be a true and good Consequence then the Ground and Reason of it must be This That every distinct Act in God is and must be a distinct Person And if so then every Decree in God whether it be his Decree of Election or of Reprobation if there be such an one or of creating the World and sending Christ into it and at last of destroying it and the like are each of them so many Persons For every Divine Decree is an Act of God and an Immanent Act too as resting within him and as such not passing forth to any Thing without Him that Maxim of the Schools being most true that Decreta nihil ponunt in esse Nor is this all but most of the Divine Acts are free also so that there was nothing in the Nature of them to hinder but that they equally might or might not have been which applied to the Divine Persons would make strange work in Divinity In the mean time if this Author will maintain this Doctrin viz. That Acts and Persons are the same in God as I think he ought in all Reason to maintain the immediate consequences of his own Assertion I dare undertake that here he will stand alone again and that he is the only Divine who ever owned or defended such wretched Stuff PARADOX These three Powers of Understanding Self-reflection and Self-Love are one Mind viz. in Created Spirits of which alone he here speaks adding in the very next words What are mere Faculties and Powers in Created Spirits are Persons in the Godhead c. Pag. 135. at the latter end Answer This is a very gross Absurdity and to make it appear so I do here tell him That the Three foremention'd Powers are no more one Mind than three Qualities are one Substance and that very Term Powers might have taught him as much Potentia and Impotentia making one Species of Quality under which all Powers and Faculties are placed So that his three powers of Understanding Self-Reflection and Self-Love are one only Unitate Subjecti as being subjected in one and the same Mind but not unitate Essentiae as Essentially differing both from one another and from the Mind it self too in which they are Certainly if this Man did not look upon himself as above all Rules of Logick and Philosophy he would never venture upon such absurd Assertions PARADOX He tells us That the Son and Holy Ghost Will and Act with the Father not the Father with the Son and the Holy Ghost Pag. 169. Line 13 14 c. Answ. This is a direct Contradiction For if the Son and Holy Ghost Will and Act with the Father the Father must Will and Act with the Son and the Holy Ghost And he who can find a distinct sense in these two Propositions and much more affirm the first and deny the latter has a better Faculty at distinguishing than any Mortal Man using his Sense and Reason will pretend to It being all one as if I should say I saw Thomas William and John together of whom William and John were in the Company of Thomas but Thomas was not in the Company of William and John And I challenge any sensible thinking Man to make better sense of this Author 's fore-mention'd Assertion if he can But this must not go alone without a further cast of his Nature by heightning it with another Contradiction too which you shall find by comparing it with pag. 188. line 4. where he affirms That Father Son and Holy Ghost act together having before expresly told us here That the Father does not will and act with the Son and Holy Ghost which very Assertion also to shew him the further fatal Consequences of it absolutely blows up and destroys his whole Hypothesis of Mutual Consciousness by destroying that upon which he had built it For if the Father may and does Will and Act without the Son and Holy Ghost then farewel to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for they must never be alledged in this Cause more PARADOX Nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature Page 234. Line 22 23. Answer This is a most false Assertion and directly contrary to Scripture And to prove it so I shall lay down these Four Conclusions First That the Godhead or Divine Nature neither is nor can be visible to a Corporeal Eye by an immediate sight or Intuition of the Godhead it self Secondly That God is visible to such an Eye only by the special Signs or Symbols of his Presence Thirdly That God is visible by a Body personally united to him only as the said Body is such a Sign or Symbol of his peculiar Presence And Fourthly and Lastly That a Body actually assumed by God for a Time is during that Time as true and visible a Symbol of his Presence as a Body or Nature personally united to him can be And thus it was that God appeared visibly to the Patriarchs in Old Time and particularly to Abraham to Gideon and to the Father and Mother of Sampson who thereupon thought that they should Die for having seen God Face to Face For generally all Interpreters hold the Person who thus appeared to have been the Second Person of the blessed Trinity the Eternal Son of the Father though sometimes called simply the Angel and sometimes the Angel of the Covenant from the Office he was then actually imployed in by his Father as the extraordinary Messenger and Reporter of his Mind to holy Men upon some great Occasions This supposed I desire this bold Author to tell me Whether the second Person of the Trinity God equal with the Father was personally united to the Body which he then appeared in or not If not then the forementioned Assertion That nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature falls shamefully to the Ground as utterly false But if he was personally united to it then these Paradoxes must follow 1. That he either laid down that assumed Body afterwards or he did not if he did then an Hypostatical Union with God may be dissolv'd and not only so but there may be also a thousand personal Unions one after another if God shall think fit to assume a Body and appear in it so often which would be contrary to the sense of all Divines and to all Principles of sound Divinity which own but one hypostatical Union and no more Or 2. He still retains an Union to that assumed Body and then there is a double hypostatical Union viz. One to the visible Body assumed by him in
which he appeared of old and the other to that Body which he was Born with in the World All which Positions are horrid and monstrous but unavoidably consequent from the foregoing Assertion But for the further Illustration of the Case I do here affirm to this Author That God is as visible in an assumed Body whether of Air or Aether or whatsoever other Materials it might be formed of as in a Body of Flesh and Blood personally united to him I say as visible For notwithstanding the great difference of these Bodies and the difference of their Union and Relation to God One being by a temporary Assumption and the other by a personal Incarnation yet no Corporeal Eye could discern this Difference during the Appearance but that one was for the time as visible as the other and therefore since both of them were truly Symbols of God's peculiar Presence the only way by which the Divine Nature becomes visible to a Mortal Eye it demonstratively overthrows that positive false Assertion of this Author That nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature PARADOX All the Circumstances of our Saviour's Birth and Life and Death were so punctually foretold by the Prophets and so peremptorily decreed by God that after he was come into the World there was no place for his Choice and Election And he could not shew either his Love or his Humility by choosing Poverty Death c. Page 242. Line 5. Answer This is False Absurd and Dangerous and indeed next to Blasphemous as overthrowing the whole Oeconomy of Man's Redemption by the Merits of Christ. For that which leaves no place for Choice leaves no possibility for Merit For all Merit is founded in freedom of Action and that in Choice And if Christ after his Incarnation had not this he could not Merit And whereas the Author says That Christ chose all this as the second Person of the Trinity antecedently to his Incarnation I Answer That this is indeed true but reaches not the present Case For what he did before he was Incarnate was the Act of him purely as God but a meritorious Action must still be an humane Action which could not proceed from the second Person before his Assumption of an humane Nature I readily grant and hold That the Actions of Christ's humane Nature received a peculiar Worth and Value from its Union with his Divine Person yet still I affirm that this Worth and Value was subjected and inherent in his humane Actions as such and thereby qualified them with so high a degree of Merit So that whencesoever this Merit might flow they were only his humane Actions viz. such as proceeded from him as a Man that were properly and formally meritorious And whereas this Author states the Reason of this his horrid Assertion upon the Predictions of the Prophets and the peremptory Decrees of God concerning all that belonged to or befell Christ I do here tell him That neither Predictions nor Decrees though never so punctual and peremptory do or can infringe or take away the freedom of Man's Choice or Election about the things so decreed or foretold how difficult soever it may be for humane Reason to reconcile them and if this Man will affirm the contrary he must either banish all Choice and Freedom of Action or all certain Predictions and peremptory Decrees out of the World let him choose which of these two Rocks he will run himself against for he will be assuredly split upon either This vile Assertion really deserves the Censure of a Convocation and it is pity for the Church's sake but in due time it should find it PARADOX Concerning Person and Personality he has these following Assertions which I have here drawn together from several parts of his Book viz. The Mind is a Person Page 191. Line 21 22. A Soul without a Vital Union to a Body is a Person Page 262. Line 17. And the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour governing power and Constitutes the Person Page 268. Line 28. A Beast which has no Reasonable Soul but only an Animal Life is a Person c. Page 262. Line 18 19 20. And again We may find the Reasonable and Animal Life subsisting apart and when they do so they are Two Persons and but One Person when United Page the same at the end of it And lastly One Agent is One Person Page 268. Line 2. Answer In all these Propositions so confidently laid down by this Man there are almost as many Absurdities and Falsities as there are Words I have already shewn this of some of them in Chap. 3. and therefore I shall be the briefer in my Remarks upon them here And first for that Assertion That the Mind is a Person To this I Answer That the Mind may be taken Two ways First Either for that Intellectual Power or Faculty by which the Soul understands and Reasons Or Secondly For the Rational Soul it self In the former Sense it is but an Accident and particularly a Quality In the second it is an Essential part of the whole Man and therefore upon neither of these Accounts can be a Person For neither an Accident nor a Part can be a Person which as such must be both a Substance and a compleat Substance too And secondly Whereas he says That a Soul without a vital Union to the Body is a Person I tell him That the Soul without such an Union is still an incomplete Being as being originally and naturally designed for the Completion and Composition of the whole Man and therefore for that reason cannot be a Person And then Thirdly whereas he adds That the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour governing Power and Constitutes the Person I answer That it is the former and does the latter only as it is the prime essential part of the whole Man and for that very cause is an incomplete Being as every part is and must be and consequently cannot be a Person In the next place for an Answer to his saying That a Beast is a Person I refer him to his own positive Affirmation pag. 69. line 18. That a Person and an Intelligent Substance are reciprocal Terms And the same may serve for an Answer to his next Absurdity That when the Reasonable and the Animal Life subsist apart they are Two Persons For the Animal Life separate from the Rational is void of all Reason and the very Definition of a Person is That it is Suppositum Rationale aut Intelligens In the last place By his saying That One Agent is One Person which I am sure he affirms universally of every single Agent he makes every Living Creature under Heaven a Person For every such Creature is endued with a Principle of Life and Action and accordingly acts by it and by so acting is properly an Agent From all which it follows That this Author as great as his Retinue may be has many more Persons in his Family
no doubt have took him upon such an advantage and well-favouredly exposed him for so foul a Blunder But to go on In Page 209. Line 13. of the same Book I find mention of the Quadrigesimal Fast. And this put me as much to a stand as the other to imagine what kind of Fast this should be For the nearest and likest Word I could derive it from was Quadriga signifying a Coach Cart or Waggon And accordingly as the Jews had their Feast of Weeks and of Tabernacles so I did not know but the Papists or some Christians like them might have some Fast called The Fast of Coaches or Waggons and might possibly give it that Name from its being carried on with the Discipline of the Whip and the Lash as Coaches and Waggons used to be This Conjecture I say I made with my self For I concluded that this Author could not mean it of the Lenten-Fast for that is called Quadragesima or Jejunium Quadragesimale and issues from the Numeral Quadraginta and so is quite another Thing from this Quadrigesimal-Fast which I cannot find in all the Rubrick of our Church though perhaps when those Excellent Persons spoken of Apology P. 5. Line 20. have finished their Intended Alterations of our Rubrick we shall find it there too In the next place let us pass to such of his Words as stand conjoyned with others in Sentences or Forms of Speaking And here let us first of all consider his absurd use of that form of Expression as I may so speak which he has at least Twenty times in this one Book Now the proper use of these Words is to bespeak excuse for that which they are joyned to as for something that is legendum cum veniâ and containing in it a kind of Catachresis or at least some Inequality some Defect or other in the Expression with Reference to the Thing designed to be expressed by it And this I am sure is all the true and proper Reason assignable for the use of these Words as I may so speak But this Author applies and uses them even when he pretends to give the properest and most Literal Account and Explication of Things and such an one as is not only better than all others but even exclusive of them also as the only True Account that can be given of them As for instance where he affirms Self-Consciousness to be the True and only Formal Reason of Personality and Mutual-Consciousness to be the same of the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons he ushers it in with those Words as I may so speak Page 56. Line 6 7 8 c. Which according to what he holds about these Two Terms is all one as if I should say God is an Infinite Eternal Almighty Being as I may so speak and God is the Creator and Governour of the World as I may so speak and Man is a Rational Creature having Two Eyes Two Arms and Two Legs I may so speak all which is egregiously Absurd and Ridiculous And the more so for that this very Author reproaches one of his Adversaries whether Owen Baxter Lobb or the Reconciler I cannot at present remember but the Thing I perfectly do for using the like Expression as I may so say with great scoff and scorn telling him thereupon That certainly no Man had ever more need of so says than he had Now for my own part I think this Author's so speaks are every whit as bad and contemptible as his Adversary's so says unless he can perswade the World That a Man may speak an Absurd thing much more excusably than he can say it To this we may add some more such Absurd Expressions As for instance that in P. 55. Line 26. where he says That the Three Divine Persons are so United to each other as every Man is to himself In which Words besides the falseness of the Proposition it being impossible for the Three Divine Persons to be so United to each other as to be but One Person which yet every Man is we ought to note also the Absurdity of the Expression For all Union or Unition is Essentially between two things at least so that unless the Man be One thing and himself another He cannot be said to be United to Himself He may perhaps be properly enough said to be One with Himself but to say That he is United to himself is unpardonable Nonsence Again in Page 85. Line 8. He tells us That the Infinite Wisdom which is in the Father Son and Holy Ghost is Identically the same which is as much as to say That a Man is Wisely Wise Honestly Honest Learnedly Learned and the like For though I know what it is to be perfectly or absolutely the same yet to affirm any Thing or Person to be Identically the same is an Idle and a Nauseous Tautology Likewise in Page 182. Line 19. He tells us That God intercedes with no Body but himself Concerning which Form of Speaking I must observe That when the Term But is used as a Particle of Exception it implys the Thing or Person excepted from others to be of the same kind or at least condition with the rest from which it was excepted And therefore unless God were a Body it can with no Congruity of Speech be said That God intercedes with no Body but himself So that this also must pass for another Blunder With the like Absurdity he tells us in Page 124. Line 15. Where there are Two distinct and divided Operations if any of them can act alone without the other there must be Two divided Natures Now it is a Maxime in Philosophy and that such an one as I think ought to take place in Grammar too That Actionis non datur Actio And accordingly if the Reason of Things ought to be the Rule of Words then to say That an Operation Acts or Operates is extremely Senceless and Ridiculous But to proceed he has a way of promiscuously applying such Words to Things as are properly applicable to Persons only such as are who and whose As for instance he tells us of the Being of a Thing whose Nature we cannot conceive Page 6. Line 11. And in the same Page Line 23. We may know says he that there are a great many things whose Nature and Properties we cannot conceive And in Page 7. Line 18. It is so far from being a wonder to meet with any Thing whose Nature we do not understand c. But is this Sence or Grammar Or does any Man say Reach me that Book who lies there or that Chair who stands there No certainly none who understands what proper speaking is would express himself so And moreover to shew that he can speak of Persons in a Dialect belonging only to bare Things as well as he did of bare Things in words proper only to Persons he tells us of a Son produced out of the Substance of its Parent instead of his Parent Page 257. Line 19. which is a
best way of Illustrating Things is by example I shall also take this course here Thus for instance For any one to own a Thing for a great and sacred Mystery the very Notion and use of the word Mystery importing something Hidden and Abstruse and at the same time to affirm it to be very Plain Easie and Intelligible is Nonsense To say That in Men Knowledge and Power are Commensurate nay That Knowledge is Power so that whatsoever a Man knows how to do he is by vertue thereof also able to do it is contrary to the Common Sense of all Mankind and consequently Nonsense To say A Beast is a Person and yet to say withal That a Person and an Intelligent substance are Terms reciprocal is both Nonsense and Contradiction too with a Witness To affirm That a specifical Unity can make any Thing or Person Numerically One is Nonsense To affirm That there are two distinct Reasons and two distinct Wills in each Man and those as really distinct as if the same Man had Two distinct Souls is Nonsense And to affirm That the Body which is utterly void of any Intellectual Power or Faculty is conscious to all the Dictates and Commands of the Will is gross and inexcusable Nonsense So that whereas this Author according to his mannerly way charges his Adversary with unintelligible Nonsense p. 227. l. 6. it must needs be granted that he has much the advantage of him in this Particular since all must acknowledge that his own Nonsense is very Intelligible And here I could easily direct him where he may be supplyed with several more such Instances as those newly alledged but that I think these may suffice for the Purpose they are produced for In the mean time I would advise him for the future to use this rude Word more sparingly and cautiously and to apply it only where the generally received way of speaking applies it And now and then also to cast his Eye upon his own Writings These things I say I would advise him to and to consider withal how unreasonable and unjust it is for him to bestow about the Word so freely upon others while he keeps the Thing to himself CHAP. XII Containing a Brief Review and Conclusion of the whole Work I AM at length come to a close of that Work which I should much more gladly have been Prevented than engag'd in by being a Reader rather than the Author of a Reply to this Man 's strange unjustifiable Innovations upon this great Article of our Religion But it is now a considerable Time that the Book here Animadverted upon has walked about the World without any publick Control And though in private Discourse generally censur'd by all yet as to the Point undertook by me hitherto Answered by none which may well be Matter of Melancholy Consideration to all Hearty Lovers of our Church and Ancient Christianity Whereas I dare say had this Heterodox Piece been wrote and published in a Language understood by Foreigners we should long since have had several Confutations of it sent us from abroad and probably not without some severe Reflexions upon the English Church and Clergy for their silence in a Cause which so loudly called for their Defence To take off therefore this Reproach from our Church in some degree at least I have while others far more able to Defend it chuse rather to sit still and enjoy it ventur'd to set my weak Hand to the Vindication of a Principal Article of her Faith against the rude Attacks of this bold Undertaker In which though I freely own that all that has been done by me in it is extremely below the Dignity of the Subject which I have employed my self in yet I am well assured that I have fully and effectually answered this Man and if it should prove otherwise I must ascribe it to a peculiar Misfortune attending me since none besides has hitherto wrote against him but has confuted him In the Work I have here presented the Reader with I have examined and gone over all that I conceive requires either Answer or Remark and that according to the following Method and Order which I shall here briefly set down I have in the first place laid my Foundation in the Explication and State of the Sense of the Word Mystery which I shew in General signifies something Concealed Hidden or Abstruse in Religious Matters and amongst Christian Writers not only that but something also neither Discoverable nor Comprehensible by bare Reason According to which I shew that this Author 's frequent affirming that his Hypothesis and Explication of the Trinity rendred the Notion thereof very Plain Easie and Intelligible was utterly incompatible with the Mysteriousness of the same I shew also upon what absurd Grounds he stated the Nature of a Contradiction according to which joyned with another of his Assertions I shew That no Man could be justly charged with Contradiction though he discoursed never so incoherently and falsely upon any Subject whatsoever From hence I proceeded to consider the Ancient Terms constantly received and used by Councils Fathers and Schoolmen in speaking of the God-head and Trinity which this Author in his Book had confidently and avowedly condemned as obscuring and confounding Men's Notions about these great Matters and upon a distinct Explication of each of them I shew the Propriety and singular usefulness of them both against all his Exceptions and above those other Terms which he would needs substitute in their Room And under the same Head I laid open the Contradiction of his Vindication and his late Apology to one another as I had done before in my Discourse about the Nature of a Mystery From hence I passed to his New Notions of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness in the strength of which two Terms he pretended to make a Trinity in Unity a plain easie and intelligible Notion nay so very plain as to solve all Difficulties about it these being his very words And as he pretended Self-Consciousness to be the formal constituent Reason of Personality Universally both in Beings Create and Uncreate I first Demonstrated the contrary in Created Beings and that both from the general Reason of Things and from Two manifest Instances and withal examined and confuted several extremely absurd Propositions and Assertions advanced by him concerning Personality From this I passed on and proved that neither could this Self-Consciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons shewing the impossibility thereof by several clear and unquestionable Arguments And in the next place with the same Evidence of Reason I proved That Mutual-Consciousness could not be the Ground or Reason of the Unity or Coalescence of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Divine Nature and all this upon known allowed Principles of Philosophy as well as Divinity And so I Naturally went on to the examination of that monstrous Assertion of his by which he holds and affirms the Three Divine Persons to be
Person and Hypostasis or Subsistence c. applyed to the Godhead and the Divine Persons served only to perplex obscure and confound Men's Apprehensions of them and for that cause ought to be laid aside I say I do not in the least question but that all and every one of these Propositions would have been publickly and solemnly Condemned in Council and the Author of them as high as he now carries his Head like another Abbot Joachim severely dealt with for Asserting them and that upon great Reason Forasmuch as the Two chief of those Terms viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance and Subsistence were equally with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self opposed by those Two grand Arian Hereticks and Furious Disturbers of the Church Ursacius and Valens who with their Accomplices vehemently contended to have them all wholly suppressed and disused So that as for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Father and the Son they would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no mention at all to be made of any such Thing and as for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not so much as to be named concerning any of the Three Persons And as one Reason for this they alledged the satisfaction of Tender Consciences Which shews That there are some such tender Consciences in the World as when opportunity serves may put the Church not only to part with its Liturgy Rites and Ceremonies but its very Creed also for their sake But right or wrong those Two Arian Incendiaries pressed hard for the Abolition of these Two Words as this Author also does in this his Vindication treading hereby exactly in the steps of those Blessed Leaders who no doubt understood the Interest of their base Cause well enough and were both Self-Conscious and Mutually-Conscious how much they served the design they drove at by what they did And since Things were so in former Days what hinders but that in these latter Days likewise the same if not prevented may happen again And that One who tho' he carries himself as if he were able to teach the whole World yet for some certain Reasons professes himself a Learner still having already exploded the Terms Substance and Subsistence as not to be used about the Trinity may upon the winning prospect of some Approaching Advantage as where Advantage is the Teacher some care not how long they continue Learners be very easily prevailed upon to send the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 packing after its Fellows and to abandon and cast off that too For though such an One should give the Church his Oath to the contrary there is no security from thence but that a Perpetual Learner by a due waiting upon Providence may all in convenient time Learn to forget it too And a Self-Contradictor having freely allowed a Thing at one time as freely and fully disown it at another Wherefore it was no doubt upon a most serious consideration of the force of Words in Conjunction with the Tempers of Men That the Sixth General Council and Third of Constantinople was so jealously concerned and so remarkably strict to fence against all Heretical Mischief from that Quarter as appears from the Concluding Article of the Synodical Sentence pronounced by the said Council against the Monothelites as we find it thus set down in the Acts thereof These Things therefore being thus with the utmost care and exactness on all sides formed and drawn up by us We Decree and Enact That it shall not be lawful for any one to Produce Write Compose Conceive or Teach another Faith or this in any other way or manner But as for those who shall presume to Compose or Contrive another Faith or Publish Teach or deliver forth another Creed to such as shall be ready to come over to the Acknowledgment of the Truth from Heathenism or Judaisine or any other Sect whatsoever or shall introduce any unusual way of speaking or new Invented Terms as tending to Subvert all that has been defined by us if they be Bishops or in Clerical Orders we decree That they shall be deprived of their Bishopricks or said Orders or if they be Monks or Laymen that they shall be Anathematized So that we have here a clear and full Declaration of a General Council against all teaching not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is not only against delivering another Faith but against delivering the same in another way or manner than the Council had settled and against the use of all new-Invented Terms all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness themselves not excepted as in the Judgment of the Council destructive in their consequence to the Faith declared and all this upon pain of Deprivation or Anathematization as the Quality of the Persons concerned should happen to be According to the rigour of which Sentence and the Proceeding of the Church in those â—ges sutable to it Deprivation or Suspension would no doubt have attended this Author had he then lived and produced his new Terms in defiance and reproach of the former received ones And if such a punishment had actually befallen him he would have found that in those Days Men were not wont either to be Suspended or Deprived in order to their Promotion I know indeed that in the Apology lately put out by him for Writing against the Socinians he utters some Things contrary to what he had Asserted in this his Vindication of the Trinity But this the Reader ought not at all to be surprized at it being as Natural to some Men to Write as to Breath and to Contradict themselves at to Write And no Man of Sence who knows this Author will reckon that he knows his Iudgment or Opinion from any Book Wrote by Him any longer than till he Writes another nor from that neither till he has Wrote his last Having given the Reader this short Prelibation or Taste of the Book which I shall more particularly and fully examine presently I think fit to remark something also upon that other Piece mentioned by me and Entituled A Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ c. A Book fraught with such Vile and Scandalous Reflexions upon God's Justice with reference to Christ's Satisfaction that it may deservedly pass for a Blasphemous Libel upon both And I do seriously think that never was any Book Licensed Published and suffered to pass Uncontrolled more to the Disgrace of the Church of England than this which the Reader will quickly see upon his Reading some Passages of it which I am sure if he be but Christianly disposed be cannot do but with extreme Horrour But before I direct the Reader to his Blasphemies I shall lay before him one Grand leading Absurdity which utterly Evacuates and Overthrows the whole Doctrine of Free Grace and the Redemption of Mankind thereby and indeed by Consequence