Leviathan hath justly found fault with those who so understand that saying Nosce te ipsum As hereby either to countenance the barbarous State of Men in power towards their Inferiours or to encourage those of a low Degree to a sawcy Behaviour to their Betters But then whether he has been as happy in assigning the true meaning of it himself as he was in observing the salse Interpretation thereof in others may be justly doubted his Interpretation is this This says he teaches us that from the Similitudes of Thoughts and Passions of one Man to the Thoughts and Passions of another whosoever looks into himself and considers what he doth when he thinks reasons opines hopes fears c. and upon what Grounds he shall hereby read and know what are the Thoughts and Passions of all other Men upon the like Occasions Now this Explication of his seems liable to this Inconvenience that it makes each Man in particular the Rule and Measure of Humane Nature in general by attending to the Grounds and Reasons of his own Thoughts aed Passions to judge the very same of all others so that according to this Humane Nature must appear to the World according to the false Notions or vicious Affections of those who represent it according to the accidentally good or bad Dispositions of those who undertake to give an account of it Thus because the blood-shot Eye of one Man's mind represents all things in red Colours therefore must Cruelty be the immediate and universal Dictate of Nature 'T is true indeed in the very next Sentence he adds I say The Similitude of Passions which are the same in all Men Desire Fear Hope c. Not the Similitude of the Objects of the Passions which are the Things desiŕed fear'd hoped c. For these the Constitution individual and particular Education do so vary and they are so easie to be kept from our Knowledge that the Characters of Man's Heart are legible only to him who searcheth the Heart But how can we possibly gather the Similitude of other Men's Thoughts and Passions from our own without any relation they bear to their respective Objects for from the consideration of our Thoughts and Passions abstracted from their Objects we could only inser the Similitude of ours with other Men's meerly as bare Acts and Operations of the Soul that is that the Soul in its respective exercise of its Thoughts and Passions acts or suffers after the same manner in all Men but now this would be nothing to his purpose But surther when he says Whoever looks into himself and considers what he doth when he thinks opines hopes fears c. and upon what Grounds Now how can a Man consider upon what Grounds and Reasons he desires or fears without respect to the Objects of those several Passions for Men desire or fear either because the Things desir'd or fear'd are really good or bad for 'em or at least apprehended as such Nor can any just or full Account be given of our Passions abstracted from their Objects So that Mr. Hobbs by his seemingly distinct stating of the Question takes only the greater pains to blunder the whole Matter But to return This Knowledge of our selves includes in it these following Particulars 1. It includes the Knowledge of our selves as consisting of two distinct Principles of Soul and Body together with a right understanding of the Nature and Properties of both 2. A right understanding of the mutual Relations and respective Influences that each hath upon the other by vertue of their Union Hence are we taught not to mistake the brisker Motions of the Blood or a more slorid temper of Body for the Influences of the holy Spirit nor the more black melancholy temper of Mind sor a severe and religious Reservedness with some or for the Frowns of the Almighty or the Testimonies of the Divine Displeasure against us with others 3. It includes in it the true Knowledge of our Original Perfections and how far they are impair'd by the Fall both what God made us at first in the state of Innocence and what we have now made our selves by our Sins 4. The Knowledge of the right use of our Faculties as also a due consideration of the Ends for which God gave us such Souls and a due care of acting in Conformity thereunto 5. It consists in a just and due regard and reverend esteem of our Selves not such as is the result of Pride or the affectation of Popularity but in a true vertuous Care of doing nothing unworthy the Dignity of our Natures 6. It implies a due consideration of those Relations we stand in to God our Selves and Others so as that we may lead a fober righteous and holy life in this present World Now that which further speaks the Excellency of this Knowledge is That it transcends not the ordinary Capacities of a finite Understanding nor discourages us with the Difficulty much less with the Impossibility of the Thing the Knowledge of God so far as he has any ways made known himself to us and the Knowledge of our Selves in the utmost extent of it This God hath made our Duty and therefore hath not plac'd it out of the compass of those Powers and Faculties which he hath given us Not but that there are some Things in this lesser as well as in that greater World which are above our Knowledge viz. The Mode of the Union of our Soul and Body whether our Souls praeexist or no c. But these few Things which are unknowable ought not to discourage us in the search of those Things we may know especially in Things of a more practical Concernment only here we may consider That those Natural Mysteries of Humane Nature if I may so call 'em may be made use of to teach us Modesty and Submission of our Understandings in Things of a more Divine Concern Thus even Philosophers tell us That God on purpose constituted some unsolvable Difficulties in Nature to teach men not over-highly to value their own Understandings 2. This Knowledge of our Selves is founded upon surer Principles than any other Study Men commonly give themselves unto particularly than those two famous Mistresses of most Men's Courtship Philosophy and Philology as for Philosophy though I believe that it has arriv'd at as high a degree of Perfection in this Age as in any known Age of the World and it is to no purpose to talk of what might possibly be in those other of which we have no History no Records remaining yet it may be justly question'd Whether Truth it self was ever yet pull'd out of that Pit in which the Ancients plac'd it considering the several Hypotheses now extant in Philosophy each embrac'd with equal eagerness and as their respective Followers think with equal appearance of Reason And Philology that labours under these two Disadvantages that it is commonly founded upon no better Grounds than meer Conjecture and Probability so that it must be great
asks Pardon for what he design'd to do for the time to come whereas the words may be as well render'd so as to signify his asking Pardon for the time past but supposing that he here refers to the time to come yet this is not so much a denying of the true God as if he had deny'd him with his Lips as Mr. Hobbs would have it for here he did not deny the true God at all because he declar'd before that by this incurvation he did not design any adoration of the Idol and this Declaration was as publick as his action viz. that henceforth he would worship no other but the God of Israel Now Mr. Hobbs could not well imagine a Man to deny the true God with his Lips before a persecuting Magistrate and withal suppose him at the same time to declare as it was in Naamans Case that he intended no such thing as he spoke by his words for this in all probability would rather incense the Prince than any ways tend to his own preservation 2. Though the love of God and the love of our selves rightly understood are no ways opposite to one another in as much as God requires nothing of us that is inconsistent with our real interest yet we may truly and properly assert that God is to be lov'd for himself for the Excellency and Amiableness of his own Nature not but that we may and generally do love God too with respect to his relative goodness towards us thus Religion is suited both to the most generous tempers of some and provides objects for the most heroick acts of vertue and takes away all occasion from those who would upon this occasion fix upon it the name of mercenary and also on the other hand it condescends to the more common and ordinary inclinations of Mankind in suffering and encouraging them to act with respect to the recompense of reward But though the constitution of humane nature be such that the considerations of Gods relative goodness to us do generally mingle themselves with all our thoughts of God and exercises of our love towards him I doubt not but we may without any fantastical abstraction so far distinguish betwixt the mercies received and the excellency of the Divine Nature that we may even therein found a reason of our love of him So that the loving of God for his own sake though I believe it seldom occurs in practise yet it ought not to be spoke against in Discourse provided first that it be not made use of to lead men into unwarrantable extravagancies either in opinion or practise Secondly Provided as Bishop Tayler says that what is a great perfection in some be not impos'd as a Law upon all 3. In extreme necessity it is lawful for a Man to do what otherwise he ought not to do here I suppose a Man brought to that exigency that without timely and suitable supplies he certainly perisheth by what means he is here brought into these circumstances I do not here consider only I except this That he be not a Malefactor condemn'd and now about to undergo the just and due Punishment of his Offence but then this necessity must be for the necessary sustentation of Life not for the gratisication of Humour or sensual Appetite we must not think with Mr. Hobbs That we may not only for Preservation but Delectation also endeavour to destroy others He also tells us That in the State of Nature there is nothing further required to make a thing lawful but its being necessary to our Preservation and nothing required to make it necessary but a strong opinion that it is so so that according to him confidence of Belief and strength of Fancy may alter the nature of things and make 'em lawful or unlawful accordingly so that according to him we then principally if not only offend against the Laws of Nature when we pretend something necessarily to tend to our Preservation which indeed either doth not or what we do not confidently enough believe to do so Further This necessity must be real not imaginary urgent and inevitable not such as may be supply'd or prevented by our own Endeavours We must not pretend Necessity when indeed we only indulge our own Laziness and neglect the use of those means whereby we might possibly remove what we now suppose in these circumstances a Man may lawfully make use of those means which necessarily tend to his Preservation and no further Thus in case of extreme Hunger he may take so much of other Mens Goods as are necessary to preserve his Life without incurring the Guilt of Theft and the Reason hereof is not merely because the Owner in such a case is bound to give as much as is sufficient for that purpose for in many cases others may be bound to do what we have no power to force in case of denyal Nor secondly because at the first Division of things the Dividers excepted this case of extreme Necessity wherein they did not design the Right of Dominion and Property to be so strict and severe but that in this case the Ius primaevum should return But first it seems not so reasonable to believe that there ever was that Usus communis of all things as Grotius asserts and consequently no such Division wherein he supposes all Property to be founded Secondly Suppose the Dividers either thrô carelessness or inadvertency had left this as a Casus omissus without making any Provision about it and it doth not any ways evidently appear that they ever made any such or if thro' perverseness and ill nature they had determin'd it otherwise yet the thing would still have been as now we apprehend it so that it is more than probable that both Property and that lawful Power that a Man hath to relieve himself in extreme necessity doth depend upon some antecedent Reason and some higher Principle than that barely suppos'd Agreement of the first Dividers 3. The Reasonableness of laying down our Lives for the sake of Religion will appear from the unreasonableness of the contrary Assertion which must suppose one of these three things either that God has not Authority to command his Creatures such instances of Obedience or not Goodness enough to reward 'em for what he thus enjoyns or that we have not sufficient evidence that his Will and Pleasure is that in some cases he requires it to deny the two former is to deny the Dictates of natural Reason to assert the third is to deny the plain Words and Commands of God in Scripture And further if we consider what it is that we are commanded to part with only the short and transitory satisfactions of a frail Life which at best we cannot enjoy long and which may be otherwise so loaded with Miseries that the very continuance of it may be the greatest Punishment Besides 't is probable the Martyrs notwithstanding the greatness of their Torments being as great as either the Wit or Malice of their
informs his Understanding then assists and inclines his will by his Grace and so applys himself to his inferiour Appetites in a way suitable to their Natures in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reason and Religion I shall here rather enquire how far God made use of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himself to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy and this I shall rather do because of the dangerous Opinions that some Men have of late vented on this Subject thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation truly so call'd For they think if they can but once sufficiently disparage the manner of God's revealing himself to the Prophets under the Old Testament they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New I shall here therefore make some short reflections upon the Author of Tractatus-Theol Polit in his two first Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy In Order thereunto I shall premise 1st God in the Communications of himself to Mankind is not ty'd to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Persons he pleases to make use of For what ever is wanting either as to the vigorousness of the Fancy or strength of understanding God can supply the defects hereof some other way or act more immediately by himself in absence of them all 2dly Yet notwithstanding God commonly makes use of Second Causes and of Instruments duly qualified in order to the effecting his Designs in the World particularly in Prophecy According to the constant Opinion of the Iewish Doctors there were certain previous preparatory dispositions in order to it and these were of three Sorts Natural Acquir'd and Moral 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body a due mixture of the Humours without any predominancy of Melancholy a Mind naturally Calm and Chearful a Fancy Active and Vigorous an Understanding Clear and Strong without any Crazedness or Inconsistency 2. All these improv'd to the highest Degrees of perfection by Study and Industry 3. To these must also be added a vertuous and well-disposed Temper of Soul free from all vicious habits and inclinations Thus the Iews had their Schools of the Prophets for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars which they call'd the Sons of the Prophets for that imployment Now this sufficiently shews that something more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy Yet this is not so to be understood as if Prophecy was the Natural result of any of these singly or of all joyntly unless God was pleas'd to Communicate himself to some as he saw fit For all these who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets did not presently prophesie Thus neither the absence of the usual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet Prophecy in the formal Notion and Nature of it being no ways in the power of Man but wholly depends upon the will of God Hence we see what little reason the soresaid Author had to say that tho' God did make use of the Fancy sometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets yet that Prophecy Non nisi ope imaginationis persicitur à solâ imaginatione pendet and this he proves no other ways than because they prophesied But this is not to prove but to beg the Question He first makes an injust Comparison betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation 1. In respect of the Name and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other because they are both deriv'd from the same Fountain viz. God But thus by the same way of arguing he must and indeed doth assert That either there are no Miracles at all or else that all the effects of Nature are such because the power of Nature is the Divine Power as well as that of Miracles But in order to either of these he should first make good one or both of these Positions either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himself distinct from the ordinary course of Nature or else that since the constitution of the Natural Frame of the Universe he hath not reserv'd to himself a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power neither of which will he be ever able to prove 2. Suppose Natural Knowledge may also be call'd Prophecy or Divine Revelation in respect of it's Original yet how can it be call'd aequali jure as he says Divine because in other respects both as to the manner of their conveyance and largeness of extent there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em however why should Natural Knowledge be call'd Divine Revelation since Custom and good Reason have justly affix'd them to several things for he that goes about to unhinge the signification of Words which Use and Custom has truly appropriated to 'em in Divinity has probably no better design than he that removes the ancient Land-Marks in a common Field viz. Injury Disorder and Confusion Tho' this must be also granted that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to those respective Duties which it dictates even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation For we are first Men and then Christians and by both these ways God hath made known his Will and claims our Obedience He grants indeed that Humanae Naturae Leges in se consideratae non possunt ejus i. e. Divinae Revelationis esse causa Why he should thus mince the matter as to insert these Words in se consideratae I know not whereas 't is certain That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cause of Divine Revelation I know his meaning here is suspected by some to be this that the Laws of Nature consider'd in themselves that is without the supposal of a God which is one integral part of the Universe so indeed they cannot be the cause of Divine Revelation but then supposing a God so interwoven with the Laws of Nature as that he shall be either really the same with or very little different from the Universe and the Laws thereof under this consideration how far the Laws of Nature may be the cause of Divine Revelation that is of that which he calls such is the grand mysterious Question The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy is in respect of certainty wherein Natural Knowledge he says comes no ways short of Prophetical If we consider the certainty the Prophet himself had of those things which were reveal'd to him we are now at a loss how certainly to determine this Question for he only could fully assure us of the truth of these things they relating to himself Yet it seems very reasonable to believe that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall short of but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge seeing we may casily suppose that God may by the secret influences of his Spirit by the
that can be here pretended is this that indeed it would have reslected dishonourably upon God to have created us so at first as that errour should be the natural result of our faculties But then what if by some offence either of our own or of some other in our stead this be brought upon us as a just punishment the contrary sate to Cassandra that as she always spake true yet never was believed so on the contrary we should always believe our faculties though they never spoke true But those that make this objection do either believe the Scriptures or they do not If they do then it must be the Sin of Adam that had this malignant influence upon all Mankind But then by the same Scriptures we are as fully assur'd that the punishment hereof did not extend so far as we are that it did at all descend upon his Posterity That our faculties are weakned and we hereby become more liable to errour by Adam's Fall is certainly true but that our faculties are so corrupted that we are become uncapable of perceiving natural truth is that which the Scriptures deny and what the assertors of Original Sin in its greatest latitude do not affirm If they be such as do not believe the Scriptures yet the objection it self doth suppose a God that is a being infinitely Wise Iust and Good Now upon this supposal we may easily refute this unreasonable surmise For this would introduce such disorder and confusion into the World as would be inconsistent with the nature of God who is a God of Order to suffer it According to this supposal we could never come to the certain knowledge of our fault for which this punishment was inflicted for if our faculties should any ways acquaint us with such a thing what reason had we to think that they should rightly inform us in this particular and be false in all the rest Nor could we ever come to the certain knowledge of the means and methods of amendment for according to this we ought to act contrary to our reason in obedience to our Principles as supposing the dictates of our faculties to be false and several other such like absurdities would follow hence which would be unworthy of a wise and good Man to suffer in the World if it was in his power to help much more unworthy of an infinitely wise and good God 2. If we should once suppose our faculties to be false I am afraid we should be condemn'd to Eternal Scepticism however beyond the power of the most wary experience to relieve us Lastly he tells us That the only way to be satisfy'd of the truth of these notions is to examine them by a wary and discreet Experience and if so to what purpose do they serve for before I have made tryal I cannot use them because I have no reason to trust 'em and Experience makes 'em useless because Experimental Knowledge is of all others the most certain and most indubitable To this I Answer That suppose these natural Notions were not so certain in themselves but that they stood in need of some further confirmation by experience yet would they not be altogether useless both as they would encourage us in our Tryals with fair hopes of success and then afterwards when we found the experiment fully to answer to and agree with our former Conceptions the concurrent testimony of these two Witnesses would more fully assure us in the belief of those things thus variously attested tho' indeed it would be very hard to try the truth of some Propositions by Experiment such as this Nihili nullae sunt affectiones c. But here a little more positively to lay down my apprehensions herein I conceive that God from all Eternity did see and know the natures of things and the several Relations they either did or possibly could bear to one another and this is that which some call Ideas in the Divine Intellect or objects of the Divine Understanding Thus what God understands to be either true or good that is necessarily so as a Learned Man expresses it the Divine Will and Omnipotence it self has no Dominion over the Divine Understanding For if the nature of truth and goodness did wholly depend upon the meer positive Command of God and the arbitrary determination of his Will then could we not be so fully assur'd but that the whole Scheme both of Truth and Morality might be changed and that which is now Vertue might afterwards become Vice and so on the contrary the very possibility whereof is very unworthy of God and inconsistent with that notion which we have of him Thus I conceive things are in respect of God Now in respect of us he hath communicated something of a Divine Ray relating both to Intellectual and Moral Notices into the very constitution of our humane Nature something that is both a light and a law unto us and this the very Nature and end of such Creatures as God design'd to make us that is Rational and Religious did require I know I must expect to meet with great opposition in the management of this Argument I am very conscious to my self of my own inabilities but I thank God I am not conscious of having said any thing against but as far as in me lies to promote the designs of truth and holiness Veniam petimusque damusque vicissim D. Carles though he grant Eternal Truths yet these he only derives from the Divine Will God says he is not only the Author of the Existences but of the Essences of things and as it was in his power whether any thing had existed or no so also their Essences depended upon his free determination Ep. 37. Part I. He tells us that it was equally free sor God at first to have made this true that the Lines drawn from the Center of a Circle to the Circumference should not be equal But doth not this weaken the force of his own Argument drawn from clear and distinct perception for we do as clearly and distinctly perceive that the lines in that case should be equal as we do the truth of this Proposition Cogito ergo sum If it be here reply'd That supposing such a Constitution of our Natures as at present we have then things cannot be otherwise than now we apprehend them but if either the srame of our Natures had been otherwise at first or shall afterwards be changed then the things also had been or may be otherwise But now the only way to consute such an extravagant Supposal is to appeal to Men's more serious and impartial Thoughts would not the very possibility of such a thing be very dishonourable to God would it not introduce such a Fate into the World as would also introduce a necessity of asserting an immoral Deity Or should we be ever able to assert and desend the just Rights and Interests of Truth and Goodness upon this Supposal So that as before I observed of Experimental
so much as any Law of Nature but then he says that it is false that the Gentiles not believing in Christ either did or could perfectly observe the Law and who ever said they could The Text only says That the Gentiles not having the Law that is not any reveal'd Law did by nature the things of the Law Now he will needs make doing the things of the Law to be perfectly to observe the Law and further if by Gentiles be understood those that believed in Christ how can it be said that these are a Law unto themselves seeing they had both the Law of Moses and the Law of Christ to direct ' em But from hence it will be obvious to observe what hard shifts Men are commonly forc'd to make when once they engage in the defence of a false Opinion Some Reflections upon the Tenth Chapter of the Second Book of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi THE Position he there endeavours to defend is this That by the mere light of Nature without Divine Revelation it cannot be made appear that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Vertue although we were already assur'd that there was a God etiamsi nobis jam innotuisset esse Deum Vertue therefore and Vice in respect of God can be nothing else quà m religiosus numinis cultus Vertue indeed may but how Vice can be a religious worship of the Deity is hard to understand Some would think such a stumble as this in the very Threshold was very ominous Others perhaps more agreeably to his Principles tell us that Vice and Vertue in respect of God are the same as to this particular and that God if he had so pleas'd might as well have been worship'd by the one as by the other Now worship he says necessarily requires the certain knowledge of these three things 1. That he to whom we pay it requires any such thing at our hands 2. What it is that he does require 3. Upon what conditions viz. What Rewards he will give in case of observance and what punishments he will inflict in case of neglect Now he would seem to infer that we have no natural knowledge of any of these three I shall here once for all remind the Reader that in the stating of the question he supposes not only that there is a God but also that we certainly know it Now as to the first requisite he grants that there is a worship due to God when it doth appear that we are his Creatures p. 250. So that by his own confession it doth appear that God requires this worship at our hands unless we may know that there is a God and yet at the same time not know that we are his Creatures which would be a strange position for a Christian Philosopher to assert And secondly if we know that there is a God then we know in general how and with what actions he will be worship'd If God be a Spirit then he is to be worship'd with a pure mind was a natural and easy consequence made by an honest Heathen This I say will follow unless we suppose an Immoral God But this though it be both absurd and impious to do yet I am afraid it will not be counted either by him As to his third Requisite we grant that we owe it only to Divine Revelation that God will reward our imperfect obedience with such degrees of eternal happiness yet this even Nature teaches us that holiness doth either entitle us to happiness or at least to a freedom from misery And as for what he says That it cannot be known among Men whether or how they will be served unless they first openly declare it the Argument is no ways conclusive if it be apply'd to this case because Men have no other way to make known their Will but by outward Declarations butGod has viz. those natural Notions which he inwardly inserted into the Minds of Men. But to this he answers That since Men draw these things from natural reason they must also by the same reason prove the existence of a God but since that cannot be done neither can there be any natural knowledge of good and evil of Vice and Vertue But here though I do not grant That the Being of God cannot be prov'd by the light of Nature yet I must remind him that he flies here from the Question as it was by himself first stated where he supposes the Bing of God to be now known to us But then as if he was himself conscious of his Evasion herein he immediately adds Vel st aliqua inde petenda esset scilicet vitii vel virtutis cognitio c. if there was any knowledge of Vice and Vertue to be drawn from Nature then it could be no other than that that should be counted vicious from which any Man's Nature doth abhor and that honest to which Men are carryed by a natural Propension But this is a strange account of Morality to make every Man 's exorbitant Lusts and Passions the rule and measure of good and evil nay according to these Principles there can searce be any thing evil for p. 254. he tells us Nihil fere est nec ullum flagitium ad quod natura multorum c. that there is scarce any wickedness to which the Nature of many Men is not naturally inclin'd I shall not here particularly examine his Opinion concerning Original Sin only herein he shows himself neither a sound Divine nor good Philosopher seeing many of the Heathens themselves did acknowledge the Substance that is the general depravation of humane Nature tho' they were unacquainted with the Name and Nature of it But he again resumes his former Argument That if the way how God is to be Worshipped may be known by the light of Nature then the reward of eternal Life might be known also by the same light But this is no good consequence as I before show'd 'T is true neither the way and method of Divine Worship nor eternal Life are so clearly known by the Light of Nature as they are now made manifest to us by Divine Revelation yet it doth not thence follow but that Nature hath in some measure discover'd Both unto us 2 Tim. 1. 10. Christ hath indeed brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel that is made clearer manifestations of it but then this hinders not but that both Iews and Gentiles might have some more obscure and imperfect Notions of it before But he goes on and tells us p. 252. Virtutis vitii Christiani notitia c. That the knowledge of Vice and Vertue both among Iews and Christians is no otherwise convey'd to either of 'em but by Divine Revelation And here he urges Rom. 7. 7. I had not known Sin but by the Law and I had not known Lust if the Law had not said Thou shalt not covet But here first I would ask him Whether those People who have no outward Law given 'em either do or
can commit any sin provided they do but follow their own natural Inclinations According to him there is no sin but when a Man is guilty of such a strange piece of Self-denial as not to comply with his own natural Appetites when there is nothing as in this case that forbids him so to do Thus p. 260. he tells us That no actions with respect to the Worship of God by the mere Light of Nature can be counted sin Praeter illas à quibus vel omnium hominum natura abhorret vel in certis hominibus illas quae ipsorum naturae sunt contrariae Where by Nature he means nothing but natural Affections Appetites and Inclinations But certainly a Man must have a new Nature and a new Bible given him before this will pass either for Reason or Religion But then for the better understanding of that place before cited some say That St. Paul there doth not speak in his own Person but in the Person of a Iew brought up under such Masters who did not understand coveting as it includes the inward act only to be a sin Others say That sin was known to be so by the Law of Nature before the giving of Moses his Law thus Theophylact 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. How was the Deluge brought upon the World And why were the Sodomites destroy'd by fire if Lust was not known to be a sin before the Law So that the Law did not first make Lust to be a sin but did more expresly declare it to be so He quotes indeed several other places of Scripture but to as little purpose p. 254. Si pietatis officia specialia c. if the special Offices of Piety were known by the Light of Nature then there must be some certain foundation from whence they might be drawn Here he mentions three 1. Natural Instinct 2. The Sanctity of God 3. Divine Power or Dominion As for the first Natural Instinct this indeed he says is not the rule of humane Actions to them who live under the Gospel but according to his Principles it must be to them who only enjoy the Light of Nature Nor Secondly says he can the Sanctity of God be the rule of our Actions but the reason he there gives is a very strange one and very odly express'd viz. because God acts nothing but by instinct of his Nature nor is there any thing holy in God but what his Nature desires But to this I Answer First That God sometimes acts as an absolute Soveraign of the Universe and Governour of the World and in these cases his Actions are not in all particulars to be the rule of ours Secondly It seems an irreverend way of speaking to say That God acts out of Instinct of Nature which is commonly and properly attributed to meer Animals yet granting the Expression in sano sensu it cannot be suppos'd that God doth daily alter the Determination of his Will concerning the same Object Thirdly Yet this we may safely say That the holiness of God is the rule of our Actions so far as either by the Light of Nature or Divine Revelation it is made known to us to be so But in the Third placo He resolves all into the absolute Power and Dominion of God That nothing is just and good but that only which he commands and for no other reason but because he does so And yet in the very next Sentence p. 255. as if something from within had whisper'd better things to him he tells us That God indeed may command any thing Madò Dei naturae non sit contrarium ut talia siant c. provided it be not contrary to his Nature that it should be done This indeed is a very pious and prudent a true and rational Assertion but then it contradicts the design of the whole Chapter Some things indeed may be more evidently and directly contrary to the Nature of God as not to love or not to obey him but then to forbid all due resemblance of himself all Vertue and Goodness and to command all filthiness both of Flesh and Spirit in rational Creatures this certainly is also contrary to the Divine Nature He then proceeds as he says to examine the principal parts both of Natural and Christian Religion in order to see whether there lies any obligation upon us to 'em but meerly by the Divine Command And here I grant That those Truths and those Duties viz. the belief of a Trinity and Faith in Christ that depend meerly upon Divine Revelation cannot be known to be such by the Light of Nature But then the reason is not the same in those other Moral Duties which Christianity did not first reveal but only further illustrate and confirm to us Nor shall I here follow him through all the parts of Natural Religion which he there instances in I shall only pitch upon one which yet seems of the greatest weight and moment that of Iustice. This he says cannot be recommended to us from the Nature of God because it doth not appear by Nature Deum neminem injuriâ afficere That God does no Body any wrong For he says that if that be injury when we hurt those who have not deserved any such thing at our hands Quid infantes in Deum peccaverunt Wherein have Infants sin'd against God who yet many times are grievously afflicted by him To this I answer 1. That I before premised this That God sometimes acts as a Soveraign or Lord of the World and in this case some actions may be injurious or unjust in Men which are not so in God 2. The consideration of original sin might give easie Solutions to what he there urges But because he doth not acknowledge any such thing I shall not therefore here insist upon it 3. It is no ways contrary to Divine Iustice to inflict very high degrees of Asflictions on rational Creatures provided that the Mercies they injoy be more than the Miseries they undergo And he will never prove that God ever inflicted such Miseries upon Infants but that if they had the power of Election they would rather chuse to undergo 'em than their own Annihilation But he lays great stress upon that action of the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians which was done by God's Command or Allowance and therefore was no sin Therefore nothing is just or unjust in it self but only as God commands or forbids it In Answer to this some say That God herein acted as the universal Creator and original Proprietor of all things and here transfer'd the Property as he justly might from the Egyptians to the Israelites Others say That as Soveraign Legislator he dispens'd with the Law in this particular yet it will not follow hence that there is nothing good or evil but with respect to God's positive Command For I humbly conceive there are some other rationes boni mali more sacred and indispensable than those of Property If the Reader here Object That my Stile
Cum igitur virtus res divina sit c. upon which the Commentator's words are Omnis rei cujuscunque sit summa excellentia quae à Deo esse putatur divina appellatur quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi potest quod hoc loco dicitur virtutem quae hominis est perfectio rem quandam esse divinam Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God either immediately or mediately but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the Iews of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase was only to express the excellency of the thing and the great Opinion he had of it or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind or by affording more advantagious Circumstances of time and place yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Industry and Inclination nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault However if this be Plato's Opinion That Vertue is so from God that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence this Opinion is neither reasonable in it self nor is it sufficiently prov'd by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose If says he Vertue was possible to be taught then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons that so they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes but the contrary frequently appears To this I Answer First That nothing can be prov'd from particular Instances seeing as many may be brought to the contrary where Vertue has been as it were propagated with the Family and we may furnish our selves even from our own Observation with Examples of the happy success of a Vertuous Education Secondly Vertuous Parents tho they may desire their Children may be such too yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto which are commonly joyn'd with some degrees of Severity Thirdly Vertue though it may be taught and is capable of being learn'd yet is it a very conditional thing and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together for the producing the effect and that which often defeats all the rest is the liberty of the Will which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and design'd by others to moderate their Passions and reduce 'em to Vertue Nor 2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens and natural Causes and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will it will be impossible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology in other respects do much more evince the folly of their pretences who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence when indeed it is nearer us even in our Mouths imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose If says he the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars then their Faith is either true or false if it be true then it cannot proceed from thence because it condemns that Opinion and asserts the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology if it be false and proceed from the Stars then it follows that the Stars incline Men to falshood and the falshood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature c. And thus Vertue is distinguished from Grace thus the Heathen Moralists have discours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings and given great Instances thereof in their Practices who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge as its right it allows to men in the state of Nature some inclinations and abilities too to Vertue but yet that without supernatural assistance he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection it doth not so far depress humane nature Modices to make it perfectly stupid nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin it grants Heathens to be Men and reminds Christians of their Original Sin and the present depravation of their Natures And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguish'd from Grace as to the Principle from whence it flows the one proceeding from nature the other from a more divine original yet do they agree in their end and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts 1. Natural and original 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards 1. Natural and Original and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence that it is a spiritual being and ray of Divinity now considering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul when we make it only a Slave to the Body and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof 2. As to its intellectual Endowments Man only of all this lower Creation is endowed with a power of reasoning now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects and debase 'em by unworthy Employments Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true what soever things are just c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think on these things 3. As to its moral Endowments that is all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodness that inward sense of Honesty that tactus quidam divinitat is as Iamblicus calls it now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us 2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards and these I shall consider
as belonging to humane nature in general 1. The honour that Christ has put upon humane nature by taking it upon himself 2. As Man now is made the Temple of the Holy Ghost 1 Cor. 3. 16. 1 Cor. 6. 19. 3. As humane Nature by being join'd to the Divine is made capable of enjoying Eternal Happiness in the highest Heavens but these are things rather of a Divine than Moral Consideration Thus have I more fully explain'd the definition of Moral Vertue wherein whilst I endeavour'd to do right to Nature I hope I have not any ways injur'd Divine Grace for I count him not worthy to partake of the benefits thereof who speaks the least word to derogate from the excellency and necessity of Divine Assistance How far Vertue Reason or Philosophy for they meant much what the same thing by them all was or is available to the Heathens in order to their future Happiness I shall not here particularly enquire or positively determine this being a Question wherein Scripture is much what silent and Modesty here teaches us not to be wise above what is written nor curiously inquisitive in things wherein we have no certain Rule to guide us Only here give me leave barely to relate their Reasons who are willing to entertain as favourable thoughts as they can concerning the possibility of the Salvation of some Heathens and here first to prevent mistakes they lay down this as an undoubted Principle and a certain Truth that there is no name given under Heaven by which any can be saved but only the name of Iesus So that none was ever saved but with a respect to Christ's Death and by the benefits they receive thereby nor do they here hold an indifferency of Religions as if it was equally possible and easy to be saved in any for tho' some Heathens may be saved yet the advantage on the Christians part above them is much every way both in respect of the means in order thereunto and also in respect of the certainty that God will certainly accept of such conditions as he has requir'd in the Gospel So that a Christian if he be not wanting to himself is not only sase but certain sree not only from danger but from doubt which an Heathen cannot be nor do they frame such notions of God as if he was compos'd wholly of Mercy and that Iustice was only an empty Title for they assert that as mercy appears in the Salvation of a Christian so likewise the Salvation of Heathens if any such thing be will not be in a way or method inconsistent with the Divine Iustice they do not here go about to describe the particular way how it is to be done only they charitably conceive that it is not any thing contrary to the Divine Nature nor to any Declaration that he has made in Scripture CHAP. VIII Some short Observations upon Mr Hobs his first Chapter of his Kingdom of Darkness HE begins this Part of his Leviathan with a pleasant description of the Kingdom of Satan which he makes altogether as phantastick as that of Oberon or the Fairy Land making the notion of Spirits and Immaterial Substances to be as groundless as the Dreams of Madmen and indeed the mere results of the timorous apprehensions of Children or Fools There is mention made in Scripture of the Principality of Belzebub over Demons that is to say over Phantasms that appear in the air and since Belzebub is the King of these Phantasms the Sons of Darkness Phantasms and the Spirits of illusion signify the same thing the bare repeating hereof seems a sufficient Answer it being too sancisul to require a serious consutation And yet he makes this one great instance of the Churches being not yet fully emerg'd out of the Territories of Darkness or not yet inserted into the glorious light and liberty of the Sons of God because it believes Spirits to be Immaterial Beings subsisting by themselves and not mere Phantasms as if the Church could never arrive at a perfect purity of Doctrine till it became a Company of Men openly prosessing that which either immediately borders upon or naturally tends to Atheism But then in the beginning of his next Chapter he tells us the manner how Phantasms are produc'd which in short is this by the impression which visible objects make upon the Senses which motion being continued to the place of perception doth there beget in the Mind or Soul the Conception or Phantasm of the object thus communicated to the mind So that a Phantasm according to this way of explaining it is not and cannot be any where existent but in the mind of the Perceiver But then how will this agree with what he had said before concerning Belzebub's being the Prince of Phantasms that inhabit the air But perhaps it would sometimes be as hard a matter to reconcile Mr. Hobs to himself as it would be to reconcile his Opinions to Truth How is Satan Prince of those Phantasms which every Man frames to himself May not every one rather create his own Subjects and become himself Prince of his own Phantasms but when he calls Satan or Belzebub Prince of these Phantasms he seems to grant a greater reality of Existence to him than to them Now I do not see according to his Principles but that Belzebub himself is as great a Phantasm as any of the other Now the first way he assigns by which this Kingdom of Darkness is promoted among Men is by extinguishing the light of Scripture by false Interpretations and I could wish Mr. Hobs was not thus guilty himself of promoting this Spiritual Darkness The first instance he gives of this false interpretation of Scripture is of those who make the Church now in the World the Kingdom of God so often mention'd in Scripture whereas says he 't is manifest to the contrary that the Kingdom of God was instituted by God by the Ministry of Moses over the Iews only who for that reason are call'd The peculiar People of God which Kingdom ceas'd at the Election of Saul and that there never was any Kingdom of God properly so call'd since that on Earth Two things there are generally requir'd to the founding of an Hypothesis 1. To show the reasonableness of it in it self 2. The agreeableness of it to all other Observations relating to such a matter Accordingly Mr. Hobs in his former part of his Leviathan had been laying down the reasons and foundations of his Political Hypothesis and now because he doth not altogether deny the truth of Scripture but that some respect is owing to it therefore he thought himself concern'd to sute it as near as possible to the Scripture also hence he endeavours if he cannot bring his Principles to it he will by forc'd Interpretations bring the Scripture to them This premis'd in general it is easily discernable why Mr. Hobs would not grant now God any Kingdom upon Earth truly so call'd because if he had it would contradict
Opinion of a God there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition But this Argument as it is deficient in other respects so also is it in respect of time for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World notwithstanding the force of this Argument For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself And indeed Mr. Hobs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal Another Artifice by which Mr. Hobs would disparage a truth that he has a mind to oppose is with a Philosophical Gravity to feign an idle and ridiculous original to which judiciously to ascribe it thus he fancies that Aristotle from the consideration of this or such like Propositions Homo est animal from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences Celestial Intelligences and humane Souls Leviat Latin p. 320. Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture is the asserting the immortality of the Soul and its being really distinct from the Body but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture which are commonly alledg'd for it so weak and frivolous many times are they Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it which words says he may suffer this interpretation but then they must undergo a great deal of pain and have a great deal of Patience if they suffer it One great defect which seems to run through all Mr. Hobs his Interpretations of Scripture is this that he supposes himsels on the defensive part and that all that he had to do was only to invent some frivolous Evasion or put some forc'd Interpretation upon the place and then all was done whereas he ought positively to prove that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place both from the generally approv'd concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages from the just and proper acceptation of the words by the best and most approved Authors from the general scope and design of the Context and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has to promote those noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World which God and Christ design'd to carry on by the Scriptures None of which things Mr. Hobs hath as much as attempted to do The Spirit returns to God that gave it that is says he God only knows whence it comes and whither it goes And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present and at what Periods it must return again to Life c. Another place he says which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham Isaac and Iacob to be alive to which he answers That they were indeed alive but not actually but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life but he also tells us That the wicked are sure of eternal Death and thus why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead even whiles they are alive by vertue of the threatning as the Righteous can be said to be alive by vertue of the promise even then when they are suppos'd not to be at all The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein is this he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits and by consequence it dies with the Body not that it is annihilated for matter in this sense is immortal that is not naturally capable of annihilation but that upon such grand indispositions of Body which is called Death the Soul is render'd uncapable of such agitations and such reactions in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist So that according to this Opinion a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead than Quicksilver may for though it be not so Organized as Mans Body is though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other and though it has not the use of Speech yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome yet we may observe that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects yet her Authority is then valued by him when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions thus he cites her Authority to confirm his assertion That Spirits are mere Phantasms because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so I shall here only further observe how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way was those false Opinions concerning God those various modes of Theism which now prevail in the World which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transform'd into other I know not whether I may say into better shapes Now if what I here write may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles and I hope it will rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management If these Papers I say have this good effect I shall not then need to make any other Apology but think my Pains very well bestow'd FINIS AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism an Opinion which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature Pride Ignorance and Ingratitude of Pride as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature of Ignorance as not fully understanding the true state and condition of laps'd Mankind of Ingratitude as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace But Secondly besides these there are others who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man do yet so melt it down as it were below it self till it come to an equal temper with or very little exceed mere natural Religion 3. Others who in words acknowledge a God but denying the common Principles of all Religion the immortality of the Soul and a future State seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus As for the light of Nature which these Men so much Idolize I shall grant to it as much
' em But then he says That since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage and to blame and discountenance the contrary 't is no wonder that Esteem and Discredit Virtue and Vice should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong c. But then suppose Men should so far mistake themselves as to place their Commondation or Blame on that side that really deserves it not and such a thing may possibly sometimes happen would this alter the nature of things and make Vice Vertue and Virtue Vice Lastly Tho' thou dost not find in these Papers that profoundness of Thought that depth of Reasoning that may be elsewhere met withal yet I hope what is here offered is free and natural easie and obvious and therefore probably not less true but more useful for I never look'd upon Intricacy and Obscurity either as any certain sign of Truth or any ways to promote the Benefit and Advantage of the Reader Contents of the Chapters CHAP. I. THE Excellency of the Knowledge of a man's self briefly intimated Mr. Hobbs's Interpretation of Nosce Teipsum examin'd and confuted The Knowledge of our selves in six particulars the possibility of this Knowledge the certainty of it hereby we come to the knowledge 1. of the Being of God 2. of the Nature of God 3. of the Worship of God CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body A Physical Account of Man not here intended The Question stated betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans Pride and Ignorance of the true state of Human Nature justly chargeable upon the Stoicks the Epicureans ascribe too much to the Body Epicurean Tranquility of Mind not true Peace of Conscience how far Epicurus chargeable with Atheism Virtue according to him founded upon very uncertain grounds Happiness according to him impossible Enthusiasts among Christians resemble the Stoicks among the Heathens some short Reflections upon the first and second Chapt. of Tractatus Theol. Posit concerning Prophets and Prophecy CHAP. III. Of Natural Notions of Truth and Goodness Natural Inscription and Divine Revelation the two great means of preserving Truth among all the Disadvantages it labours under Dr. Parker the late Bishop of Oxford's Opinion concerning Experimental Observation examin'd and confuted Our Faculties not false Des Cartes's opinion concerning Eternal Truths examin'd Dr. Cumberland the present learned Bishop of Peterborough no direct Enemy to Natural Notions some Remarks upon his opinion herein Some short Reflections upon the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding Mr. Norris's opinion examin'd That opinion that distinguisheth betwixt the Idea's of the Understanding and the Phantasms of Sense and Imagination seems no ways to favour Enthusiasm Some Remarks upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes Rational de Dco and upon Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi the one asserting That there is nothing good or evil antecedent to the Divine Placitum the other that it doth not appear by the light of Nature that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Virtue CHAP. IV. Of the Being of GOD. How an Atheist ought in Prudence to demean himself seeing he cannot be positively certain that there is no God the belief of a God antecedent to all Atheism not first invented by Statesmen the two great Arguments to prove the Being of God the Constitution of the Universe and the general Consent of Nations The production of Mankind not the result of blind Chance No Reason why the Christian Philosopher should willingly give up that Argument drawn from the Consent of Nations Unseasonable Differences among our selves in the choice of our Arguments to prove the Divine Existence so preferring one as to invalidate the force of all the rest Cuperus's opinion herein examin'd CHAP. V. The state of Nature neither a state of Equality nor a state of War A fault in Mr. Hobbs in not first setling the significations of those words Nature Naturally and by Nature His Arguments to prove the equality of Men frivolous and insufficient those to prove the state of Nature a state of War the same Man a sociable Creature by Nature not only by Education Me. Hobbs's Principles of Politicks a meer Hypothesis and not a good one neither as wanting the necessary Qualifications of such a one Of Self-preservation CHAP. VI. Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government The nature of Religion in general in reference to Government Two Considerations to prove the consistency of the one with the other The divine original of Civil Power Grotius's Opinion examin'd Dr. Donn's Opinion of the original of Civil Power asserted Dominion not founded in Grace not the Honour or Interest of a Prince to be wicked against Machiavil some of his Arguments answer'd Christianity doth not depress or effeminate Mens Spirits CHAP. VII Of Moral Virtue Virtue in general natural and essential to Man in Innocence Moral Virtue distinguished from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness founded in Nature not by inspiration from God Plato's Opinion herein examin'd natural and original Excellencies of Human Nature in respect of the Soul the adventitious Dignities thereof such as are conferr'd upon it by Divine Benignity their Reasons briesly intimated who would willingly grant a possibility of some Heathens being saved CHAP. VIII Some short Observations upon Mr. Hobbs's First Chap. of his Kingdom of Darkness Mr. Hobbs inconsistent with himself in his Discourses concerning Phantasms the Church in a proper sense the Kingdom of Christ Mr. Hobbs's notion of a Covenant no ways applicable to God Almighty his Answers to those places of Scripture which are commonly brought to prove the Immortality of the Soul no ways sufficient Appendix to the 7th Chapter CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Excellency of the Knowledge of a Man's Self THE true Worth and Value of a Thing consists either in its Intrinsick Nature or in the Relation it bears to us either that it is in it self Excellent or to us Useful Now both these meet together in the Knowledge of a Man's Self this being that which so nearly concerns us that no one ought in Honour to be ignorant of it Thus those whose ancient Families or personal Merits have Entituled to a Coat of Arms do usually think themselves bound at least to attain to such a degree of Skill in Heraldry as to be able to Blazon them So would it be a Disparagement to a Man as such to be owner of so many and great Excellencies of Nature and not rightly to understand them not to be able to derive their Descent from their first and divine Original not fully to know and duly to consider that nobleness and generosity of Action which even his Order obliges him to Now since there is no more effectual Way or Method to recommend a Thing truly Excellent than only fully to explain it I shall therefore shew wherein the Nature of this Knowledge of a Man's Self consists Mr. Hobbs in his Introduction to his
good Fortune if its Archers chance to hit the Mark. 2. The Subject-matter of those Enquiries are many times of such small Concernment that it is no great matter whether they do or no only both these are then best employ'd when they are made use of to explain or consirm some moral or divine Truth 3. The Knowledge of our Selves doth naturally load us to the Knowledge 1. Of the Being of God 2. Of the Nature of God 3. Of the Worship of God 1. Thus we come to the Knowledge of the Being of God in as much as at first he stamp'd such lively Characters of Himself upon our Minds as speak their Author Thus both Reason and Religion tell us That God did not leave himself without a Witness either in the greater or lesser World I know there are some who deny any such Natural Notions or Idea's at all and particularly this of God but I hope the contrary hereof in the Sequel of the Discourse will appear both piously and rationally credible God at first Created us after His own Image or Similitude more especially in respect of the intellectual and moral Endowments of the Mind Now this seems most naturally to suppose something actually existent in the Soul wherein this Similitude or Resemblance should consist and not only in a bare capacity or possibility of the Thing afterwards And by reslecting upon these we come to the Knowledge of him whose Image and Superscription they bear Thus do we sometimes more perfectly behold the Sun by looking downwards into the Water than we can possibly do with a direct Eye I shall not here enter into a particular examination of that Argument How far the Idea or Notion of God in our Minds doth prove his real Existence This being already so excellently done by the Learned Bishop of Worcester in his Orig. Sacrae and by Dr. Cudworth in his Systeme c. Only we may observe That since Moral Arguments do not as Mathematical ones do force Assent but suppose certain Dispositions of the Subject upon which their Prevalency doth in a great measure depend therefore I conceive the perswasive force of this Argument is greater to a sober and considerate Person within himself than perhaps it will appear to others For that which is very apt to prevail with such an one is to consider how agreeable this Notion of a Deity is to all his Faculties how consistent with all those Principles of Truâ—h and Goodness which he any ways finds lodg'd in his Soul So that from the Consonancy of these how they mutually defend and support each other nay how there could scarce be any Notions at all either of Truth or Goodness without the supposition of a God Hence a considerate and ingenuous Person is much more consirm'd in the belief of the Thing Thus D. Cartes was more fully perswaded of the Truth of his Philosophical Principles because they were so consistent with the present Phaenomena of Nature and gave such easie Solutions of ' em 2. From the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Nature of God for we are conscious to our selves of some Actions viz Those of Cogitation beyond the power of Matter to perform and therefore to be ascrib'd to some Being of greater Excellencies and Perfections than meer Matter is capable of that is to a Spirit Hence we infer first the Immateriality of our own Souls and then the Spirituality of the Divine Nature because what ever real and absolute Perfection we find in our selves that in the highest degree must we attribute to God Here I shall first prove the Immateriality of our own Souls and then make good the Consequence when from thence we infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature 1. The Immateriality of our own Souls or what is the same that Matter cannot think and this one would almost think a needless undertaking to prove that which the common sense of Mankind doth generally agree in that being a thing in a great measure self-evident it will be the more difficult by any other Argument to prove it The most effectual if not the only way to do it is to shew the strange and absurd Consequences that would follow from the contrary Assertion There seems no greater Argument against the possibility of Matters thinking than the unsuccessfulness of their Attempts and the improbability of their Ways and Methods who have gone about to explain it First They grant that Matter it self unless so and so modify'd cannot think and it is altogether unconceivable how either the tenuity of the Parts or the most vigorous Motion should add to it any principle of perception which otherwise of its own nature it was destitute of nor is it render'd the more intelligible by placing as Mr. Hobbs doth the Nature of it in Re-action this being only such a particular kind of motion with respect to the terms à quo and ad quem as if Reflection in the Soul which is an inward consciousness to our selves of our Thoughts and Actions was the same with or could be any ways explain'd by Re-actoin or Reflection in Matter I might as well argue thus That because Angulus reflectionis est aequalis angulo incidentiae Therefore if Matter cannot think in its direct neither can it in its reflected motion Nor is it any ways conceivable how senseless Atoms should grow into greater Wits only by jumping and running their heads against one another nor will Organization any whit help the matter for suppose a Company of plenipotentiary particles sent from the material Universe to the no less material Soveraign the Soul to treat about some grand astairs of State these while they rid on briskly in a direct Road might perhaps have their heads full of Intrigues and Politicks but then when they came into those many cross Ways which they must necessarily meet withall in Organized Bodies they will then probably either lose themselves or forget their Errand and when they came to Court find their heads fraught with nothing but some certain cross questions which they pick'd up by the way Further It would be very hard for the Patrons of this Mechanick Hypothesis to assign the respective Modes of action and re-action to the several modes of Cogitation what kind of Motion it is that causes assent what dissent what kind of agitation of the particles is required to cause understanding and how distinguished from that of the Will and then supposing that after a great deal of ill plac'd pains they compass their designs and be able to solve all the modes of cogitation as Des Cartes has all the variety of Colours only by the various motions figures and disposition of the particles besides the improbability of the thing it can never arrive at greater certainty but that whatever way they pitch upon we may with as good reason assign the just contrary Now seeing according to this Hypothesis Assent and Dissent Affirmation and Negation c. must consist in such a respective
motion and agitation of the particles how can any one secure himself or others that a saction of the dissenting Particles for Example or such a motion as causes dissent may not rise up when the nature of the thing requires the contrary assent and by this means erect a Babel in Man and bring all into confusion Further If Cogitation consist only in the various motion and disposition of the Atoms then Phaeton might possibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot than that of his Father Phoebus If this Hypothesis be true then Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius and the Chair may be as infallible as he that sits in it and this perhaps might gratifie some Men in the World all other methods failing thus to solve Infallibility by mechanick Principles Pardon me if in a ferious argument I thus seem to trifle seeing those I have here to deal withal first taught me the way For herein they seem rather to give an Essay of their own extravagant Fancies than to perswade others that they themselves believe their own Assertions But to return These Men must either assert That there neither is nor can be any such thing as Spirit in the World or if there be that it is impossible for such a being to cogitate neither of which will they be ever able to prove As for the being of a Spirit they do indeed with as much strength of confidence as weakness of Reason tell us that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way than first by supposing a material Universe and that nothing but matter is contained in it But this is to beg not prove the Question But the Essences of things being unknown the Notion of a Spirit seems as obvious and intelligible as that of matter for we may as easily conceive of one thing to which we attribute cogitation as its immediate property as we do of another to which we ascribe extension and impenetrability And then supposing a Spirit Cogitation seems the natural result of such a being Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner how Spirits think for it is hard to conceive how their own Native penetrability or the reduplication of themselves upon themselves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation We must satisfy our selves with this which is as far as our most exact Searches will extend to That first and immediate properties are not demonstrable of their Subjects neither as to the things themselves nor as to the modes Indeed Sharron in his Book of Wisdom lib. 1. ch 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Divines are corporeal Here he cites Tertullian Origen St. Basil Gregory c. The Names he mentions but not their Assertions or the Places where they say so But this being a general accusation we may as easily deny it as he assert it But as for those places which perhaps may seem to favour his assertion I doubt not but they may and have already receiv'd easy Solutions from one of these general considerations 1. That either they asserted the opinion of the Platonists who yet were no favourers of an universal corporeity viz. That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body but had certain etherial Vehicles and so in that respect might partake in some Sense of a Corporeal Nature Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret those places of the Fathers where perhaps sometimes body or matter may be ascribed to the Soul or Angels but then by Body there is to be meant nothing but Substance or Essence So that their Sense was good and orthodox though their Expressions might be liable to exception and yet I think it is only Tertullian that expresses himself in that manner The said Sharron goes on and tells us That Whatever is Created being compared with God is gross corporeal material and only God incorporeal I would willingly here be so charitable as to think that such was his awful respect and veneration of the Divine Essence that he would not easily grant any thing else to partake of the same generical nature Far be it from me to speak any thing that may in the least derogate from the excellency of the Divine Essence only we may consider that it is no honour done to that to depress other things below that just Order wherein God has placed them This seems but a piece of Will-worship and something like the Opinion of those who think they cannot sufficiently magnifie God's love to some unless they absolutely damn all the rest thus also as if we could not sufficiently magnifie the Spirituality of the Divine Nature unless we dispose all other beings into the rank and Order of Corporeity 2. Though I do not assert this yet I would propound it to consideration whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence as to the very Essence and Substance thereof and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections yet so as that which we suppose of the lower order to be perfectly Spiritual and contain nothing of Corporeity in it and perhaps the Logicians meant this when they called God Super-Substantia But he says further if it appear That Spirits change their place the very change shows they are moveable divisible subject to time and the successions thereof c. Which are all qualities of a Body But here I would only ask Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible or whether God could have created such a being or no If he could then his argument proves nothing for supposing such a being it must move and be in a place just in such a manner as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move and the argument would have the same force if we either suppos'd or were on all sides assur'd of the actual being that it has now So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit or else nothing at all to the purpose this being only such an objection or such a difficulty as would lye against an acknowledged truth I should now Secondly show how from hence we justly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature But I shall not need to spend any time herein for though there have been some who granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature have yet asserted the Corporeity of the Soul yet there never was any who granting the Soul to be immaterial ever asserted God to be Corporeal As for those who assert a material Universe and a Corporeal Deity they may perhaps nomine ponere but indeed they do re tollere Deum For a Corporeal Deity is inconsistent with the Notion we have of God uncapable of the Perfections we ascribe to him and unable to perform such actions as do properly belong to such a being But however those
who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles and that it really and actually was so may appear from hence that those to whom God convey'd these Revelations have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of such things which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason in all probability could not have perswaded 'em to Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo quod Dei naturam objectivè in se continet de eadem participat potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones c. Merito mentis naturam quatenus talis concipitur primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus This seems very strange mystical Divinity if by Divine Revelation he mean Revelation truly so call'd then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet de eâdem participat How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge besides the impropriety of the Expression I do not see how the Soul can so truly be call'd the first cause even of that neither but rather the first and immediate subject of it Upon the whole matter one might almost be perswaded from hence to think That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively and partaking of the very same that hereby he design'd as it were to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution and both into parts of a material Universe Then he tells us that Quicquid dici potest ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone This in general is a very good Rule yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph unless we had rather say that the latter part thereof contradicts the former for he tells us That the Iews never took any notice of Second Causes but did generally recur to God as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation which Scripture expressly says is such or what may be gathered to be so from the circumstances of the Relation First I grant that God may declare that again which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before Secondly When God makes any Revelation to a Man it is necessary that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this That this which I now speak is Pure Simple unmixt Divine Revelation such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known if so then it may be questioned Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no because we no where meet with any such Declaration And as to the circumstances of the Narration we can never according to his Principles from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine because as I intimated before he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same or however asserts that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend However we may make use of this assertion against himself that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation then it is not necessary that whatever is said concerning these things should be fetch'd from Scripture only 'T is easily observable how this Author by unsetling the significations of Words and confounding the Notions of things designs to bring all into confusion he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs that is weakly and probably with the same design that is Wickedly But Providence hath so ordered affairs that a bad Cause should always be a weak one He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination hence he says it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically and express'd spiritual things after a Corporeal manner because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination Hence it was that those that were with Christ saw the Spirit descending like a Dove and the Apostles as it were Tongues of Fire and S. Paul when he was Converted saw a great light because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief but only the imagination of Men or as if these appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy without any Divine Influence making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concern'd herein Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis vel figuris vel utroque modo That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations or both I shall here show First That this assertion is false Secondly If it was true yet it would not prove what he thereby designs 1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of these two ways There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two and to say that one of these was made use of tho' not express'd this is gratis dictum and contrary to his own Rule That whatever is said of these things must be drawn from Scripture The instances I mean are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth c. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ mente aliqua perciperet quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur nec ab iis deduci possant ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet But I know no reason why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination For this is certain and both Reason and Religion obliges us to believe That God doth convey his gracious Assistances by which he both enlightens the Understanding and reforms the Will without the mediation of the Phancy and it is also very reasonable to believe That God did many times under the Old Testament convey the Intimations of his Will to Men without either Voice or Vision however this is certainly done by the
and fundamental Principles But Knowledge is of a larger extent than that which relates strictly to natural Philosophy or what is the object of sensible Experiment There is also a Metaphysical Knowledge a truth of Propositions which no ways depends upon Observation so that I suppose when the Platonists spoke of resolving Science into its first Principles they only meant such Knowledge as was capable of such Resolutions They did not suppose us born with innate notions of such things the Knowledge whereof depends upon Experience and therefore we ought not to measure the Truth or Falshood of many late Inventions by searching for the respective Ideas of 'em in our Minds Indeed as to matters of natural Philosophy it is a much more certain way of resolving such Knowledge so far as can be done into the testimony of Sense and Experience than into any imaginary Principles of Speculation But he tells us That the Mind from particular Observations doth make general Rules which after an exact Scrutiny and comparing of every Individual are justly admitted for proleptick and fundamental Verities and that general Axioms are only the results and abridgments of a multitude of single Experiments and that from the plain experience of several Instances that we cannot look abroad but we see the parts always less than the whole Hence we gather this Maxime totum est majus suâ parte this indeed is plausible popular Discourse but not severely Philosophical For what if one should come and tell us that in a certain place in the East-Indies he found the contrary to his observation to be true viz. That the parts there were bigger than the whole I know not what we could Answer in this Case upon the former Principles for according to them this Proposition totum est c. is true only with this his Proviso so far as hath been yet observ'd But now we find in things of meer Observation some particulars to contradict what has been before generally receiv'd for true Besides I never heard of any general Council or Company of Men appointed to declare when particular observations had undergone a sufficient tryal and probation so that they then might be admitted into proleptick and fundamental verities and I conceive no Man's private authority is enough to do it It is very difficult if it all possible to convince a Sceptick yet are there more strong and probable ways of arguing with him than this which founds all truth upon experimental observation for thus the truth and certainty of any proposition can arrive no higher than this That so far as is yet observ'd 't is true Now this seems only a more ingenuous and well-natur'd piece of Scepticism for the more moderate of 'em will grant truth of appearance and tell you That Snow seems white but whether it be so or no they know not But to what purpose says he should God imprint such obvious and evident Notions upon Mens minds To this I answer 1. That it must be granted that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths upon the minds of Men and if so then it cannot be done any other way than by making 'em thus plain and self evident for we cannot suppose any other way than by making 'em such as do suâ luce patere So that supposing this possible and supposing God to reduce this possibility into act and really and actually imprint 'em yet the objection would lye still as strong against 'em as formerly So that this is only such an objection as would ly against an acknowledged truth which we commonly say upon that account is none at all 2. He must give us leave to suppose these natural Notions till such time as he has evinc'd the contrary Now in strictness of Argument we ought not to urge the needlessness of imprinting such obvious and evident Notions against those who say that these truths do in a great measure owe their clearness and evidence to their being thus imprinted they are indeed evident from the Nature of the Thing and to us evident from the Nature and Constitution of our Faculties that we cannot apprehend 'em otherwise And as for Observation that only claims in the Third place sic à Iove tertius haeres So that the needlessness of imprinting such evident Notions cannot be argued from their present clearness because it is their being thus imprinted or thus connatural to our minds that makes 'em so If it be here reply'd That however they would be sufficiently evident meerly by observation It is not certain that they would be thus sufficiently so as was before intimated However we have no reason to find fault if God has given us more and clearer evidences than perhaps were absolutely necessary But suppose says he that we were born with these innate Notions how shall we be assur'd but that errour may be the natural Result of our Faculties Here indeed is such a doubt raised as I see not how he either gives or can give a satisfactory Answer to according to his Principles For supposing that the seeds of errour may be the natural results of our Faculties that is Supposing our Faculties may be false I do not see how their truth can be evinc'd by the most wary and discreet experience and this he says is the only way by which to do it For if errour may be the natural result of my Faculties that is If my superiour Faculties be false I may then justly suspect my lower If I may be deceiv'd in what by the most clear and distinct methods of reasoning I conceive to be true I have then little reason to trust my Senses Here I shall further do these two things 1. Show that the Seeds of Errour are not the natural results of our Faculties 2. If they were the most wary and discreet experience would not at all help us in our searches after truth and certainty 1. It is not possible that the seeds of errour should c. in those things that we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true and this will appear First From the nature of Man as he is a rational Creature now rationality includes in it one or both of these two things 1. Some certain and undoubted Principles which are to be the Foundations of Truth and Goodness 2. However a natural power or faculty of making right consequences and drawing necessary Conclusions from true premises which way soever we come by ' em Now the possibility of our Faculties being false is not consistent with either of these Secondly This further appears from the nature of the divine Attributes for considering the excellency and goodness of the Divine Nature he could not give us such faculties as should deceive us in clarè distinctè perceptis as D. Cartes has well observ'd for this would argue either weakness or malice in God either that he stood in need of such fallacious methods to bring about his designs or that he did purposely impose upon his Creatures All
Observation That the highest degree of Certainty we can arrive at by that Principle is only this That such or such a Thing so far as has been yet observed is true So here though such or such a Thing I speak now of such as we call universal Truths be at present clearly and distinctly perceiv'd to be true yet at first it might have been otherwise and may for ought we know be so hereafter And what he asserts of speculative Truths the same also he says of moral Notions of Good and Evil. Resp. 6. There 's nothing neither matter of actual Existence nor reason of Truth and Goodness but what depends upon God If by depending upon God he means dependance upon his Will so that it was free for God to have made these Reasons just contrary to what they now are which seems to be what he there means then in this sense they do not depend upon the Divine Will If by dependance upon God he means this That there is nothing either of actual existence or reasons of Truth and Goodness but what owes its being to some relation it bears to God This I grant for even these Rationes veri boni do owe their Essences to the relation they bear to the Rectitude and Sanctity of the Divine Nature these were the proper and necessary Objects of Infinite Wisdom from all Eternity and do there only originally exist So that perhaps that which seem'd harsh to Des Cartes was this That there should be any Thing that was absolutely independent of God which no one here asserts only we say those Rationes veri boni depend upon or consist in that relation they bear to the Divine Understanding as the existence of other things of more indifferency do upon his Will Not but that these notions of Good and Evil have yet receiv'd a further impression of their respective obligations to perform the one and avoid the other from the Divine Will that though they were not only therefore good because God will'd them yet he hath made them now more absolutely and indispensibly so by adding the ratification of the Divine Will to their antecedent Natures Nor can that place of Genesis That God saw that all things were good that is says he according to the determination of his Will yet granting this this place cannot with any just reason be extended further than the material Creation so that though that was therefore good because God will'd so to make it yet it doth not therefore follow that those Rationes veri boni were only so upon the same account or if it be extended further than the material Creation then why may not things be good because God knew them to be so before the determination of his will I do indeed here suppose some kind of distinction betwixt the Divine Understanding and the Divine Will and if it be here objected that there is no such distinction of these in God yet I humbly conceive that we may in obedience to our own imperfect modes of conception conceive of God according to our best and utmost Capacity provided that we do not wilfully and maliciously derogate from the excellency of his Nature Now it seems more honourable to God and more agreeable to those Revelations he hath made of himself in Scripture to assert that Good and Evil do not so depend upon his will as that he can altar the fundamental Grounds and Reasons of them though our highest conceptions cannot answer the excellency of the Divine Nature yet certainly we may mediate upon God without any danger of committing Idolatry or dishonouring him in our Thoughts provided that we act according to the best of our possibilities Dr. Camberland also the present learned Bishop of Peterborough seems to be no great Favourer of these common or natural Notions though I humbly conceive that the design of that great Man in his Book De legibus Naturae is not directly to oppose ' erm as may appear 1. if we consider the Persons against whom he writ that is the Epicureans as he himself asserts in his 5th Paragraph of his Prolegomena against whom he thought that way and method would not be so Argumentative seeing it was wholly rejected and dehy'd by ' em Or 2dly The times in which he writ thus in the 4th Paragraph of his Prolegomena he chose rather that method there made use of Hisce saltem temporibus that is in an Age more Philosophically curious and inquisitive in an Age that will-not believe any thing but what comes fairly attested and sufficiently prov'd And lastly If we consider his own declaration of his Opinion which he lays down with the greatest Candour thus Non impossibile est ut nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae ab extra denuò imprimantur So that we see he doth not absolutely oppose these natural Notions only he thought it more convenient in respect of the Persons against whom and the times and places in which he writ rather to pitch upon another method Thus his design in that Book was to shew That the universal practice of Vertue and Piety was not only our Duty but our Interest and so founded the Obligation of the Laws of Nature in that more universally acknowledg'd and more generally prevailing principle of real advantage to our selves Now this was a design suitable to the profoundness of his Meditations very agreeable to the Genius of the present Age and indeed every way so noble and generous that none that are Friends to Vertue can with any reason oppose his undertaking especially considering with what respect he treats that Opinion which though he doth not contradict yet there seems less to favour Thus doth he streugthen Vertue there where it seems the weakest and not in the mean time to deprive it of any of its former assistances he fortifies it against the new Assaults of its modern Enemies and resuses not to joyn issue with them in a way wherein they think they have the most advantage But yet that first part of his own Assertion Non impossibile est ut nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae This I look upon as so great a Truth that I shall beg leave a little further to illustrate it As for his Opinion that these Notices are again imprinted srom without I shall not oppose it only I humbly conceive there are such good Reasons for the former part that of their being born with us that it ought not to be excluded As 1. This seems more agreeable to the plain simplicity of former times and to the less Philosopical Genius of many of those places wherein notwithstanding these Laws of Nature were generally receiv'd and acknowledg'd and seeing they were so and that by those who had neither opportunity nor capacity to enquire more profoundly into the formal Reasons and Causes of them any further than as they were conscious to themselves both of their truth and obligation hence it seems very probable that there was some
Metaphor then it is meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. 2. Those who assert these Natural Notions do not suppose them super-induc'd or imprinted upon the Soul In esse completo but suppose them to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul as it is such as God first design'd to make it that is Rational and Religious Now it can be no meer Iargon to ascribe to a Subject its own natural and essential Properties such as are the very essential parts of its Constitution They do also suppose with Mr. Norris the ideal World or Idea's in the Divine Intellect which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth these they say are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion suitable to such a being that is they are made either the natural Properties of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its Faculties in the right use and free exercise of 'em But the Author in the forementioned place tells us That he accounts for the mode of Humane Understà nding after a very different way viz. by the presentialness of the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal World to our Souls wherein we see and perceive all things So that denying all mental Impressions not only innate Notions but also those which according to Dr. Lock derive their Original from Sensation or Reslection he asserts all sensible moral and intellectual Objects are only seen and understood in the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus in his Book of Reason and Religion p. 85. This ideal World this Essence of God consider'd as variously exhibitive and representative of things is no other than the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second Person in the ever blessed Trinity this I think says he is highly agreeable to Reason for I know no Hypothesis that would so intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God Against this Opinion I shall briefly suggest these few Prejudices which whether they be real or only imaginary I shall leave to the Reader to judge 1. I grant that every good Christian so far as in him lies ought to defend against the Socinians the Mysteries of the Trinity from all palpable and down-right Contradictions But then it is question'd by some whether it be either modest or indeed possible to invent Hypotheses which may as the Authour speaks Intelligibly make out these Mysteries or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain as indeed it is an Incomprehensible Mystery as thus explain'd by making the ideal World and the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing 2lv Though the natural parturiency of the Authors own Mind p. 185. of his Reason and Religion did early pitch upon this Notion of seeing and knowing all things in God as easy and obvious even before he had consulted any Authors herein yet other Mens Capacities may be so dull as not easily to apprehend the manner of it even now after such an exact Elaboration 3. According to his Hypothesis there seems not a sufficient difference and distinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation seeing God must immediately apply himself to the Souls of Men in both and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other 4. It seems not so becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majesty of God thus to make the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were the Glass of every trivial perception of sensible objects 5. May not his Hypothesis of seeing and perceiving all things in God seem to discourage or lessen the diligent use of our Faculties in the search of Truth or may it not encourage Enthusiasm by giving Men occasion to think that the only way to Knowledge is fantastically to give themselves up to the Impressions of the Ideal World These things I here propound to Consideration though withal I think that it is more easy to oppose the particular manner of any Mans explaining humane Understanding than it is to lay down a true one of his own But lastly That which seems of the greatest consequence is that the Author dangerously forces some places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion Thus Io. 1. 3. all things were made by him or according to him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 89. Reason and Religion and p. 90. Heb. 1. By him God is said to make the Worlds that is says he according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World Now if the Arrians were justly blam'd for putting that interpretation upon those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thereby to signify an Instrumental Cause as if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was only an Instrument in the hand of God in creating the World how much more then ought this interpretation to be rejected which makes the second Person in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform according to which God made the World but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a Genitive Case in Scripture generally signifies the efficient Cause And however I believe he will no where in Scripture find it in that sense which he there puts upon it So that this ingenious Author seems not so successful in assigning his own particular way of humane Understanding as he was in confuting that of Dr. Lock 's And here I would further appeal to the considerate Reader whether this way of seeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor whether it be not as meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant as the other Anima est abrasa tabula nihil est in intellectu quod non priùs erat in sensu These and such like Opinions seem to owe that general reception they meet withal rather to the Authority of their first Founder than to any strength of reason that would be found in 'em did they once undergo a severer Examination this Opinion seems to tye the Soul to its particular Seat or at most gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senses not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad but also for all the knowledge it enjoys at home That the Soul by the very Laws of Creation was at first dependant upon the Body and by the first transgression of the Divine Law is now more deeply immers'd in matter and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature is certainly true but then the Image of God wherein Man was at first Created did first more especially respect the Soul 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will viz. in Knowledge and Righteousness And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul by the assistance of the outward Senses but in something at first actually existent in it self And supposing this to be the true state
upon the 9th and 10th Chap. 2. lib. of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi concerning Eternal Truths Some Reflections upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes rationales de Deo lib. 3. Cap. 10. concerning Eternal Truths The Question he thus states p. 125. That God indeed doth necessarily conceive those Truths which immediately relate to him-self his Nature Essence and Attributes He was never indifferent as to these but as for all other Truths Quae ipse Deus non sunt which are not God himself these wholly depend upon the most free and arbitrary Determination of his own Will and are therefore only true because he appointed them to be so and that there might if God had so pleas'd either have been none of these at all or else quite different from what they now are and he extends his Assertion to all Propositions whether Mathematical or Moral relating either to Truth or Goodness and this he mannages with as much subtlety both of Argument and Answers as perhaps the thing is capable of But before I come more closely to examine his Opinion I shall premise in general 1. That it is very strange that God who created Man after his own Image in Knowledge and Righteousness should yet assign the Methods of Knowledge and Understanding in Men quite different from those of his own we know the respect and relation that the Actions of the Understanding bear to those of the Will in Men viz. That the one those of the Understanding always precede those of the Will But now according to his Way and Method it is quite contrary in God for according to him God doth not know or understand any thing but what he first determines to be so I know not whether I may urge this in strictness of Argumentation yet it seems at least a great presumption against the truth of his Opinion 2. It is a plausible pretence of Piety a seemingly profound Veneration and Respect for the absoluteness of the Divine Perfections which seems either the chiefest Argument for or the greatest Motive and Perswasive to his Opinion This tender care for the Honour of the Divine Nature is indeed a thing very commendable in it self and very worthy of a Philosopher and a Christian yet Men ought to be very careful and considerate herein lest they lessen and derogate as much from the excellency of the Divine Nature one way as they seem to advance it another Now in order to a more particular Answer to his Opinion I shall observe 1. How in the Progress of his Discourse he relinquishes his own Principle and limits the general extent of the question as it was at first stated so as that in effect he Answers himself for he either doth himself tacitly at least or from his own assertions will be forc'd to acknowledge That there is some truth antecedent to the Divine Placitum or appointment In his Answer to the first Objection that God knows what it is that he either will or will not appoint so that his knowledge must precede his determination to these Premises he returns no plain positive Answer but only holds to the Conclusion and says that they who assert this do pre-suppose that there is something different from God quod ante Dei arbitrium seu placitum habeat veritatem possibilitatem à parte sui which he says is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the grand original mistake here he asserts that God knows nothing to be true nothing to be possible before his own respective determination of both As to the first I shall only return what Dr. Cudworth says p. 646. of his Intellectual Systeme This is to destroy the Deity by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another insinite will and power insinite understanding and reason for to suppose God to understand and to be wise only by his will is all one as to suppose him really to have no understanding at all As to the other the possibility of things I would only ask him whether or no there was not a possibility in God of Creating or doing more things than ever he actually Created or did now this possibility must be something and something which God knew he had in his power antecedent to his determination But notwithstanding he confidently holds to the Conclusion non datur nec concipitur ullum quid ante Dei placitum and in the very next words he tells us and he doth not here suppose any Divine Placitum to intervene Absurdum est dicere c. it is not much material to repeat what he there asserts But how comes he to call any thing absurd in this Case the thing perhaps may be so in it self and may be counted so by others but according to his Principles how can any thing be absurd antecedent to the Divine Placitum or appointment For an absurdity doth suppose Truth and Falshood according to the agreeableness or disagreeableness to which rules a thing is said to be absurd or not absurd but it is very hard for a man who has undertaken such a Province not sometimes to contradict himself Res ipse nolunt malè determinari He further grants that there is a necessary truth in this Proposition that a thing cannot simul esse non esse that it is impossible that contradictories should be true at the same time as may be seen at large p. 133. for this would make God to be Statuens non statuens volens non volens ponens non ponens eandem operationem absurda haec sunt c. I am of his Opinion too herein But then doth not this one concession destroy his former assertion for why should this truth only be exempted from the common fate of all the rest I think Des Cartes acted at least more consistently with himself when he went thorough with what he had undertaken and tells us that if God had pleas'd contradictories might have been true at once nor is it sufficient for him to say that this would be absurd both for the reason before mention'd and also because several other of his assertions might be thus answer'd That they are absurd But he tells us p. 126. That the contrary to his opinion destroys both the unity and absolute perfection of God for there would not be one absolutely perfect God if he did conceive any thing necessarily true and immutable habens similem secum radicitùs essentialiter proprietatem besides himself But then what will he say to his former priviledg'd Proposition nihil potest esse non esse simul This will either be a sufficient Answer to his Arguments of this Nature or else he must make it an addition of another Person to the Trinity and make it God himself But why should he be so sollicitous lest granting these moral and intellectual truths to be necessary and immutable they should thus derogate from the divine perfection for it doth not thence follow that these truths have Similem cum Deo radicitùs
essentialiter proprietatem for these truths are only things of an intellectual nature such as terminate the act of Divine Wisdom and Understanding but no body says that they have any radical or essential propriety univocally equal or like to God But further What inconsistency or what unbecomingness would there be in the Notion if we thus conceiv'd of God that he is an insinitely wise and Omnipotent Being comprehending Himself and the extent of his own Power that is the Idea's of all the possibilities of things together with all their several either necessary or accidental relations one towards another So that according to this Scheme of things these truths are but the necessary objects of Omniscience or infinite Wisdom so that it is impossible that these necessary and immutable truths should any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections seeing we cannot suppose God to be Omniscient that is infinitely perfect without 'em neither would these truths be so absolutely Independent of themselves for we can scarce suppose any moral good or evil unless we first suppose a God in Conformity or Non-Conformity to whose pure and holy nature and to his Will acting always according thereunto consists the nature of both The second thing I shall observe from his management of this Question is this that as to things which relate to moral goodness such is the awful power of truth such is the natural modesty of Mankind that inward sense they have of and profound veneration for these things that many times they are asham'd openly to assert that which yet may be the natural consequence of some false Principles they have entertain'd And this seems the Case of this Author in this particular for it is observable through his whole Discourse he no where plainly and expresly asserts which yet according to his Principles will necessarily follow that God might if he had so pleas'd have appointed a quite contrary Scheme of Morality or a Set or Systeme of moral truths just contrary to what they now are Indeed he does say p. 126. that this Divine Placitum was of its own nature indifferent vel ad haec statuenda vel plane omittenda vel diversa decernenda and that God might have represented himself to the minds of Men per alia nescio quae quam per naturas rerum quales jam sunt p. 136. Yet these seem to come short of asserting the quite contrary way and method But some perhaps will say that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words but suppose it be yet I would rather err on this side than on the other yet if it be but thus far true it will be notwithstanding a sufficient confutation of his Opinion But give me leave only to suggest the reason of that my charitable interpretation viz. because he osten mentions a certain decency which he seems to make the Rule of Divine Actions even antecedent to the Divine Will Thus p. 131. he says that the justice of God did appoint things modo ipsum decenti in a way becoming him which would seem an impertinent expression if all the decency that things have arise only from God's appointing 'em to be so and immediately after speaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus he says that he was indifferent vel ad nulla statuenda vel ad alia stabilienda quae aequè Deum decuissent which words seem to imply that there was something truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of God antecedent to his positive appointment But then let us see how he answers that Objection that according to his Principles the hatred of God might have been good and the love of him evil if he had so appointed Now this might either have been so or not if it might then why did he not plainly say so if it could not then his Principles are false viz. that there is something good or evil antecedent to the divine positive appointment But when Men either cannot or will not return plain Answers to a plain Question it is a certain Argument that they ly under either some natural or some moral defect that their notions either do not ly smooth and clear in their Heads or else upon some worse design they thus purposely wrap themselves in Clouds But he tells us p. 136. amor praesupponit mentis naturam haec voluntatem sive placitum Dei sese hoc modo adumbrandi But we must abstract he says from all these but now to comply with him in his own way I am willing to abstract as far as is possible for us to abstract only he must not abstract us into nothing he must suffer us to remain subjects capable of abstracting and yet I believe after all these he is not that hardy Man as in plain words to say That God might have made the lovc of himself a Sin and the hatred of him a vertue However it doth not seem any good Argument of the truth or any great commendation of the goodness of an Opinion that we must abstract from every thing that is at least at present either rational or religious before we can possibly frame any conception of it And yet this is the opinion which he is so fond of and seems to value himself so much upon that in his Appendix p. 304. where he makes some reflections upon his former work he particularly commends this 10th Ch. de Dei dominio cujus excellentiam sine jactantiâ ob ipsam rei veritatem utilitatem non satis possum commendare And yet this seems a truer Character of it that it is in it self false unworthy of God and of dangerous consequence to Men. I shall only here clear one place of Scripture relating hereunto from a forc'd and false interpretation which Cuperus p. 246. Arcana Atheismi has put upon it Rom. 2. 14. the Gentiles having not the Law do by Nature the things contain'd in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves The Apostle here designs to assert that natural knowledge which the Gentiles had of good and evil But says he before this can be made appear we must prove these two things 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be understood the Pagan Gentiles those who had neither heard of the Law of Christ nor the Law of Moses 2. That the words by Nature are not to be join'd with those going before thus the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature do the things contain'd in the Law But first he has no warrant from any Copy or good Authority thus to place the Comma and so to read it now if Men may take that liberty to place Comma's where they please they may soon make the Scripture quite another thing But then further it would not be worthy of the Apostles way of discoursing to tell us that the Gentiles had not the Law of Moses by Nature for who ever imagin'd they had Now he does not grant here any other Law not
the Being of God should either through the shortness of his Meditations or the sublimeness of the Theory make use of an Argument not perfectly conclusive yet seeing the success of the Cause depends not upon it and seeing the Man perhaps has effected as much as he intended by it that is added his Mite to the former Treasury upon the whole matter it seems hard if such an one must be prosecuted as an Atheist or a Betrayer of the Cause of Religion Cicer. de Univers Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ ortuque Mundi disserentes minùs id quod habemus Animo consequimur c. hand sanè erit mirum contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur aequum est enim meminisse me qui disseram hominem esse vos qui judicetis ut si probabilia dicentur nè quid ultra requiratis Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God these two seem the most considerable First That comprehensive one which is drawn from the Being of the World whereby I understand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing something out of nothing but that admirable Wisdom also that appears in making it such as it is and in the proper subserviencies of things therein to their respective Ends That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material but the Intellectual Universe not only from the structure of the Body but the Nature of the Soul Secondly That which is drawn from the Consent and universal Acknowledgment of all Nations As for that which seems Aristotle's Opinion That the World was from Eternity and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect in respect of God the Cause it will be impossible to free this Assertion either from a Contradiction or from an unworthy reflection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature For if God as a Cause was in time antecedent to the World then it is a contradiction to say it was from Eternity If it did flow from God as an Emanative Effect as the Beams from the Sun then this destroys the chiefest Perfection of the Divine Nature viz. its Liberty And this seems one of the best Arguments to prove That the World neither was nor could be from Eternity and it will be very hard if once we give our Adversaries leave to suppose it to be Eternal by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion For I do not see that it would be any absurdity to say That supposing the World to be Eternal there has been as many Years as Days that is an equal Infinite number of both all Infinites being Equal for Infinity can no more be exhausted by Years than Days if it could then it would not be what it is in its own nature inexhaustible But the truth is such is the nature of Infinite with respect to our Finite Capacity that the one is not a Competent Iudge of the other and when we enter into disputes of this nature we are often entangled with unanswerable difficulties on both sides But the Atheist tells us That all this visible Universe the Heavens the Earth and all Mankind at first were the lucky hits of blind Chance which after almost infinite successless Tryals going before did at last happen upon these admirable and excellent Structures particularly those of humane Bodies But here we must know that according to these Principles the same Chance which first made us must still continue us But then how comes it to pass that Chance is so regular and constant in its Productions since That whereas it is above ten thousand to one according to these Principles but that Mankind long ere this must have wholly ceased to have been or else nothing but Monsters have been produced instead hereof we see a very regular and orderly course of Nature generally observed This is as if a Man should be a thousand years in casting all sizes upon six Dice and then for a thousand years after to throw nothing else if we could suppose a Mans Life to last so long Whoever can believe such strange things as these ought never to blame any one for being over credulous As for that other Argument drawn from the consent of Mankind there are some who tell us That those natural Impressions of God upon the minds of Men upon which this universal consent is founded are mere imaginary things and that there is no need of 'em in our disputes against Atheism But these Men might do well to consider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheists and go too far towards the betraying the Cause of God and Religion in the World who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with such good success by the best and wisest of Men in all Ages willingly I say to give it up gratis for I verily believe it can never be forc'd and wrested out of the hand of a Christian Philosopher who rightly understands it And why should we grant any thing to an Atheist which may tend to the advantage of his or the prejudice of our own Cause unless he necessarily force it from us by dint of Argument always provided that we readily acknowledge evident Truth whereever we find it First I conceive there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper sense à priore to prove the Being of God that taken from the Idea is not such But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cause only the effect seems a more immediate one and such as bears a more particular resemblance to the Cause That somewhat was from Eternity is evidently demonstrable for if once there was nothing it was impossible for any thing ever to begin to be Now this something must be either Matter or Spirit a thinking or unthinking Being it cannot be an unthinking Being for then it would be impossible that there should be any such thing as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World which yet we are inwardly conscious to our selves of For as Dr. Lock Chap. 10. Book 4. hath well observ'd It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being as that nothing of it self should produce matter Now it must be either Man that was the first Eternal Being the Creator of all things or some other Being But though the Atheists are not the greatest Wits in the World yet we must not think 'em such very Atheists neither as to make mere Man to set up for a Sovereign Creator Thus we have an Idea or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than our selves and therefore we were not the Cause of our own Existence for if we had we should then have given our selves those Perfections which we find wanting in us and conceive in another Therefore we owe our Existence to and dependance upon that Being without us which enjoys all Perfections But now the Question is Whether the Idea be the Cause or occasion
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
with that state of absolute independency before describ'd where every one hath a right to every thing and every Man an Enemy each to other So that this exception of particular Families doth indeed destroy his general Rule but then he interposes these two things 1. That these Families are small 2. Their Concord depends upon natural Lust. But first he grants Lev. Pag. 105. that a great Family if it be not part of a Common-wealth as to rights of Soveraignty is a little Monarchy but he will not grant the same priviledge to a little Family viz. unless it be of that power as not to be subdued without the hazard of War but the rights of governing is that wherein the nature and essence of any Government doth consist and not in strength and greatness now these proportionally are as much in a little Family as in a great one and we may with the same reason say that the Essence of a natural as well as of a Political Body doth consist in such a proportion of strength and greatness below which a Man cannot truly be call'd a Man 2. He says that the Concord of these Families depends upon natural Lust Solâ cupiditatum similitudine Lat. Translation But let the Concord depend upon what it will 't is not material the Government and Constitution of Families is not consistent with such a state of nature as M r Hobbs describes and here he might as well say That Bastards are not Men because they are gotten for the gratification of unlawful Lust for the different grounds or reasons or ends Men may have in making a thing do not alter the nature and essence of it when once made The Question here is not whether the Families be small or great or upon what their Concord doth depend but whether the notion and being of a Family doth not destroy his suppos'd state of Nature But how doth he prove that the Concord of those Families depends only on natural Lust as his English for War seems the more genuine result of Lust than Concord or on similitude of desires as his Latin Translation renders it for this he makes the great Cause of competition and contest when several desire and are not able to enjoy the same thing Thus similitude of desires must be sometimes the cause of War sometimes of Peace thus doth he at once out of the same Mouth blow both hot and cold What the meaning of the Author of the device was when he made two Pitchers floating upon the Waters with this Inscription Si collidimur frangimur I know not but it seems very applicable to Mr. Hobbs his methods of reasoning if they be consider'd singly they may perhaps bear some plausible shew of Argument but if they be compar'd with each other they will often be found as inconsistent with themselves as they are singly inconsistent with the truth But he tells us that in all times Kings and Princes because of their Independency are in continual Iealousies in a State and posture of Gladiators Here 't is observable how cunningly he joins those two words State and Posture seeming thereby to insinuate that Men could not be in a posture of Defence unless they were in a state of War for Kings to put themselves into a condition to repel injuries when violently offer'd is no more than what reason and Prudence dictates but this doth not infer Mr. Hobb's his State of War but rather the contrary when we see some Kingdoms able and yet not willing to oppress their Neighbours That Men may awfully do something in the time of War which is not lawful to do in the time of Peace is certainly true but then we mast not think that the same blast of the Trumpet that Proclaim'd the War did at the same time blow away all those airy Notions of just and unjust which according to him have no other being in Nature but what they receiv'd from humane Compacts Iustice and Injustice are none of the faculties either of the Body or Soul they are qualities that relate to Man in Society not in Solitude Further in this slate of Nature nothing can be unjust here Force and Fraud are two Cardinal Pertues that the practice and external exercise of Iustice and many other moral Duties doth suppose a Society or at least a state of Friendship that so Men may have proper objects of those respective Vertues is certainly true yet the reasons of their obligation are founded in the nature of each single Man and so may belong to a Man in Solitude for the reasons of Iustice and other Moral Vertues are not ultimately to be resolv'd into that natural support and advantage they bring to a Society and Common-wealth and that they cannot without great disadvantage be banished out of it but into that Conformity they bear to the Divine Nature and to the participation thereof in our selves God indeed in the wise and benign disposals of his Providence has twisted our duty and our interest together Goodness and Vertue have a natural tendency to make us as perfectly happy as 't is possible even in our civil and political Capacities but then they are not therefore only Vertues because profitable to the publick but upon some other higher grounds and reasons being Vertues they thus also as parts of Godliness become prositable to all things having the promise of the Life that now is and of that which is to come But why are Iustice and Injustice qualities that relate to Men only in Society and not in Solitude seeing these may as well be in a Man alone in the World as some of his Passions which also necessarily relate to their proper objects Mr. Hobbs some where approves of that definition which the Schools give of Iustice constans perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi so that according to this a Man may be just if he have a real and sincere desire to give every one his own though he have not where withal to do it Thus also why may not a Man be just and charitable though he want fit objects to exercise these Vertues upon for why should the want of the object more destroy the nature of the Vertue than the want of the subject matter or material part as in the former Case of the necessitous just Man There were some fatal Philosophers of old and some such there are still who make good and evil just and unjust mere factitious things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such as depend only upon the free and arbitrary determination of the Divine Will but then to make 'em to depend merely upon the pleasure of the Civil Magistrate this seems to be a peculiar flight proper only to Mr. Hobbs thus to make a God of his Leviathan This Opinion of his doth either suppose no God at all or such an one as doth not much concern himself in the Government of the World but leaves all to his Vicegerent here below obey
Enemies could invent yet that they did not feel so much pain as mere sensual Men might imagine if we consider the intenseness of their Thoughts then set on the Ioys above and also the more plentiful effusions of the Divine Grace strengthening and assisting them so that they seemed rather pleasantly to enjoy than painfully to undergo the flames CHAP. VI. Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government With an Examination of some of Machiavel's Opinions relating hereunto IF we consider the Nature of Religion in general how that it is that Order and Constitution of things in the World whereby all rational Agents either do or at least are bound to act in observation of those mutual Respects they bear to God themselves and others how that it is that great instrument of Providence in the World for the management of the most considerable Affairs thereof And what some Philosophers have asserted of the Soul of the Universe may be very well applyed to Religion in respect of the rational World that it ties each part to it self and to one another and disposes of every thing for the Good and Advantage of the whole and of every part This consider'd it is impossible but that Religion should have a very good and benign influence upon all publick Societies these being the most considerable Bodies of the Universe And this the very Enemies of Religion acknowledge in their most malicious scandals and reproaches that are cast upon it viz. when they tell us That Religion is nothing but a meer politick Device and Contrivance of Princes by which they might better govern their Subjects and awe them into obedience but this as most Errours are is founded in a certain Truth and though it be a false scandal cast upon Religion yet it supposes this undeniable Verity That Religion is not only consistent with but also highly promotive of the Ends of Government Now the consistency of Religion with Government in general will appear from these following Considerations 1. Religion in the true and sincere Exercise of it is the only Means appointed by God for the attaining of eternal Happiness now one great end of God's instituting a Government in the World was to put Men into a better capacity of performing their Duty towards God themselves and others These things being first granted which I think also are sufficiently plain and evident in themselves it is impossible that Religion should be inconsistent with or destructive of Government seeing these two are made joint means in order to one common end of humane Happiness Thus God sent us into the World that by Holiness we should arrive at Happiness and he has appointed a Government over us that under it we should lead quiet and peaceable Lives in all Godliness and Honesty therefore these two Religion and Government are certainly consistent with each other otherwise it would charge God with Folly and Imprudence by designing to bring about an end by incosistent means 2. Though Government in general be subordinate to Religion in reference to the ultimate End eternal Happiness yet the Church and the Affairs of Religion in reference to its private Power and Authority is subordinate in a great measure to the State Thus we say that the Church is in the State and not the State in the Church But now this is not an essential but only an accidental Subordination that is such an one as depends upon Divine positive Institution for if God had so pleased he might have made the State inferiour to the Church in all things as he hath made the Church subject to the State in most Now if we may venture to give a Reason of the Divine Institution it may seem to be this That God seeing how much it was for the Interest of the State to provide for and secure the Affairs of Religion hath therefore subjected the Church in most things always excepting those spiritual Priviledges and Peculiarities belonging to the Church which I always suppose sacred and inviolable to the Power of the civil Government for it is not probable that God would thus have committed his Church to which he always bore such a tender regard to the care and charge of the State if it were as our Adversaries suppose so much for the Interest of the State to violate the Laws of the Church and of Religion But now particularly Religion lays the best foundation of Government these four ways 1. By asserting the Original of Civil Power to be truly Divine 2. By shewing the Religious Obligation of an Oath and founding Obedience neither in Fear nor Interest but in Conscience 3. By correcting and confuting all those false Opinions and Principles which are so destructive of all humane Societies and civil Obedience 4. By removing all those Lusts and Passions out of the Minds of Men which are the great Incendiaries of the World and Fomenters of War and Discord 1. Religion does the best secure Government by asserting the Original of civil Power to be truly Divine Here I shall not restrain my Assertion to Monarchy only but extend it also to all regular and well-settled Governments Though I think that Monarchy has a great advantage in its Plea for a more particular Divine Institution so far as Example and primitive Practice can give any right thereto nor do I here assert That all Monarchies in their original Constitution were absolute or however there was no necessity that they should be so Some indeed say That whatever Restrictions or Limitations have been since introduced into some Governments yet from the beginning it was not so these were the Encroachments of after Ages and the Peoples usurping upon the Prerogative or else the Grants and Concessions of good-natur'd Princes But this I think is rather barely asserted than positively proved yet will it not follow hence that the People are the original Proprietors of all civil Power What our Saviour said to Pilate Ioh. 19. 11. Thou could'st have no power over me except it were given thee from above the same we may say of the People that suppose but not granting that they had such a Power as some imagine yet they could not have it of themselves they must either mediately or immediately derive it from God so that they giving this Power to the King the Power will be still truly Divine though it be convey'd through the People as thro' a Conduit But then to what purpose should we suppose such a needless circuit in the proceedings of Divine Providence Why might not God give it more immediately himself seeing this is as easily conceivable attended with fewer Inconveniencies and more promotive of the Ends of Government than the other Thus Mr. Hobbs no less falsly than impiously tells us That God created Man in such an ill-condition'd State of Nature not that he design'd him to continue in it but that he might mend himself by his own Prudence by getting out of it as soon as he could And Grotius seems to be much what
in his Estate he must comply with the humours of such as may hurt him and even imitate their Vices and Corruptions In Answer hereto I shall not here mention some small Passages of those two Emperours which some Historians take notice of as possible occasions of those Disgusts that grew among their Men of War but shall suppose that these Soldiers did really hate the Vertues of these Emperours For it will not follow from hence that Vertue is equally liable to the hatred of Men. Thus Thieves hate the Magistrates because they execute Iustice upon 'em yet hereby do they get more Love from the publick than they contract hatred from the Offenders Thus though those two Emperours were hated by some few dissolute and disorderly Bands of Soldiers yet never did any Emperours fall more lamented by the generality of the Empire than they And though sometimes a private Person as I before intimated may be the cause of some inconveniences to himself by his Natural Ability or Moral Vertues yet this cannot take place in a Prince because he is already in that Supream Authority which others perhaps only aim at nay thus by being eminently Vertuous he will present all growing Popularity in the most Ambitious of his Subjects and eclipse their histre even in the Opinion of those why would otherwise be their great Admirers I shall here only add the Apology that the â—lorentines themselves make the their Country-man Machiavil viz. That he himself did not really believe his own Assertions in his wicked Maximes of Policy and Religion only designing hereby if possible to ruine the House of the Medices who had oppress'd the Common-wealth of Florence he broach'd these Pestilent Doctrines in hopes they would embrace 'em and so ruine themselves by the practice of them As for that Opinion of Machiavil That the Christian Religion has so effeminated the Spirits of its Professors that Christendom is now become an easie prey to all Invaders this is so false and soolish so contrary both to Reason and Experience that it scarce deserves a Confutation Christianity forbids indeed all private Revenge and teaches us Meekness and Humility towards all Men but this is no way destructive of true Valour and ' Generosity For a firm belief of God and the Immortality of the Soul and a due care of engaging in a just Cause are certainly the best foundations of true Courage There is nothing that a Christian fears more than to commit sin now if the fear of offending God and violating his Laws be counted Cowardise then who would be asham'd of such an Honorary Accusation but there is no necessity to purchase one Vertue at the expence of another or to forfeit our Magnanimity to maintain true Christian Meekness For the most Stout are always the most Generous Meek and Merciful and Cruelty is commonly a certain sign of a Pusillanimous Spirit and as for Experience both Ancient and Modern Histories testifie that neither Turks nor any other Infidels have any advantage over Christian Kingdoms upon this Account CHAP. VII Of Moral Vertue MOral Vertue is a thing so natural and only proper to Mankind that a Discourse of Humane Nature without this would seem defective in one of its most principal parts the retaining of this Vertuous Innocence was the Duty of Adam in Paradise and the regaining of it as far as this present state of Imperfection will admit is still ours now So that this universal rectitude of our Natures was the first and most absolute Duty incumbent on Man for Faith and Repentance those two great Evangelical Duties though they be absolutely necessary in this laps'd State of Mankind yet their necessity did only commence with Man's Fall for in Innocence there had been no need of either but Vertue and Holiness Piety towards God and Honesty and Charity to Men these were Duties at first and will be so to all Eternity hereafter when Faith shall be swallowed up in Vision and when all sin shall be done away and so no need of Repentance Thus Vertue was part of that Divine Image wherein we were first created and whoever in this sense speaks against it Blasphemes God Moral Vertue therefore as distinguish'd from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness may be thus describ'd It is an habit of the Mind founded indeed in Nature but perfected by frequent use and exercise whereby the Man is enabled by the mere strength of Natural Principles to do that which is most agreeable to the Duty and Dignity of his Nature in those three Relations he bears to him-self to others and to God I shall give a short Paraphrase upon the Desinition First It is an Habit and so distinguished from original Righteousness which was not an Adventitious Quality or super-induc'd upon Man in esse completo but it was as essential to Man in Innocence as roundness is to a Globe Here I call it an Habit rather than a Power or Energy because though External Causes and such is frequent Exercise by which Vertue is gotten be not of the Essence of a thing and so according to the exact Rules of Desining ought not to enter into the Definition yet it is very difficult to come to the knowledge of the Essences of things of this Nature and they are usually defin'd by their Causes and Effects by their Ends and Objects and the manner of their Operations Secondly Though a Man should be born with this Quality of Vertue yet notwithstanding he would be truly Vertuous yet here we speak of things as they are not as it is possible for us to suppose and imagine them because none naturally are born so Thirdly Habit is not a meer dull in-active thing but Action is included in the Notion of it especially in these Habits of Vertue wherein besides the general relation they bear to Action they also include a necessary obligation thereunto in the very Nature and Notion of ' em Indeed some tell us That original Righteousness or that first Grace by which Adam was enabled to rule his lower Faculties was only given as a Bridle into his Hand whereby he was to govern his Unruly Appetites which like a Wild Horse would otherwise easily have cast off their Rider and that this was only super-added to Man already perfect But this Opinion seems not so well to vindicate the Goodness of the Divine Providence herein for though Man had a super-added power of governing his Passions yet if they were naturally headstrong and exorbitant he was in much greater probability of falling than standing Founded in Nature and so neither by Inspiration from God nor by the Influence or Influx of the Stars 1. Not by Inspiration from God which either was or at least was more generally suppos'd to be the Opinion of Plato that Vertue could not be taught but was more immediately inspir'd by God But the later Platonists do either not make this his Opinion or if they do they do not then seem much to favour it Alcinous
as in reason it can desire and so satisfy its own just demands 1. The Law of Nature is a Divine Law and brings us under the obligation of its Commands so that whatever is directly contrary hereunto cannot be made part of any suture Revelation because one Divine Light is not contrary to another 2. The rational exercise of their Faculties might be and probably was made use of by the Prophets and Apostles in their revealing the Will of God to Man yet still under the Influence and Superintendence of the Holy Spirit guideing and directing them in such a measure as was necessary in order to such an end 3. This light of natural Reason together with the concurrence of those other means design'd by God in order thereunto may be made use of for the better understanding of God's reveal'd will in Scripture now after such fair Concessions made to it it ought not to exalt it self above or make it self equal to that of Divine Revelation Theism in a Christian state where Men have not only all the Opportunities of knowing and understanding the Christian Religion but also live in the outward profession of it this of all things is the most unreasonable for even the best and wisest Asserters of the Light of Nature and Human Reason do grant that in those places where Christianity is known Reason it self will find more and much stronger Arguments for the Christian than for any other Belief what soever These Theists must also prove one of these two things either 1st That there never were any such persons as the Prophets our Blessed Saviour and his Apostles in the World which is contrary to the universal Consent and Confession of all both Friends and Enemies Or else 2ly That they never made any new revelation of God's Will to Mankind which they can never be able to do As for the practical Duties of Religion we grant they are founded in Nature and agreeable to Reason but then withal we say That Revelation hath both added to the clearness of the Truth and to the necessity of the Obligation of those Duties But here they tell us That Natural Reason has discover'd enough and that there is no need of any farther Revelation to be made to Man but it is a very weak and illogical way of arguing against a Matter of Fact from a supposed needlesness that there should be any such thing we ought rather in this case to argue thus It doth sufficiently appear That God hath made such and such Declarations of his Will to Man therefore it was not needless because God doth nothing in vain Farther It is disingenuous and ungratesul for Natural Reason thus to boast it self upon its own sufficiency and not acknowledge its Benefactor seeing it now owes its present improvement in a great measure to the Benefits and Advantages it has received from Divine Revelation The Author of the Discourse of Human Reason with relation to matters of Religion printed 1690. tell us That the whole Substance of Christianity it self according to St. Iohn's account of it is most certainly founded upon that universal light which enlightens every man that cometh into the World Pa. 4. of his Presatory Letter But to this I answer 1. That St. Iohn there doth not speak of the Light of Nature but of Christ and tho' Christ be the Author of that Light yet his thus enlightning every one that comes into the World doth not supersede the necessity or lessen the excellency of Divine Revelation 2. The whole Substance of Christianity cannot be founded therein because Christianity contains in it Articles of Faith above the natural power of Reason to find out as well as matters of Practice 3. Tho' the practical part be founded in this universal Light of Nature yet Christianity may carry on the Superstructure higher than meer Nature was ever able to do 4. It is not most certain that that is the right Translation of that place of St. Iohn it may be also render'd thus He was that true Light which coming into the World enlightens every man that is every man that hath the Happiness to hear the glad tydings of the Gospel The said Author pag. 92. having before made an exact and full enumeration as he thinks it of the Principles of all or rather of meer Natural Religion In the Belief and Sense says he of these general Traths and in the practice of the Duties that result from 'em according to their full extent and tendency consists all true Religion and whatever else is introduc'd into any Religion either notional or practical I say what either doth not necessarily flow from some of these Branches or tend to enforce the observance of 'em is no essential part of true Religion but the meer Product of Superstition Folly or Design But according to his Scheme of Principles what shall we think of those Articles of the Christian Faith the Trinity the Incarnation and resurrection of the Body for these are neither included in that Enumeration nor do they necessarily flow from any Branch thereof If he say that these may tend to enforce the observance of those Duties before-mentioned this I grant but it seems a preposterous way of proving Articles of Faith to bring 'em in only by the by because the belief thereof may enforce the practice of Christian Duties though this also is true that they do so yet the true reason of our belief of 'em is because they are revealed in Scripture What Monsieur le Clerk's design or whoever else was the Author of those five Letters concerning the Divine Inspiration of holy Scriptures lately translated into English was I shall not here enquire Truth indeed forbids me to think him a Deist in the first sence before mention'd but Charity it self doth not forbid to think him one in the second that is one who would bring Divine Inspiration into as narrow a room as he could and believe as little of it in Scripture as possible Yet we ought not to be too severe in charging the consequences of an Opinion upon its Author especially when he disowns 'em to be his Opinions but on the other side we ought to be very watchful over our selves that we do not broach or defend any Opinion that may any ways tend to unhinge the Principles and undermine the Foundations of Christianity and we ought the more to suspect and carefully examine such from whence men generally draw dangerous consequences That a Papist should industriously set himself to lessen the Authority of holy Scripture and upon all occasions seek advantage against it is not so much to be wonder'd at because hereby he serves a turn and by this means endeavours to advance the Authority of his own Church that what is pretended to be wanting in Scripture may be supplied by Roman Tradition But then why they who call themselves Protestants should joyn in such a Design and pick up all the little Arguments of ill-designing Men against Scripture this is not
est utilis He tells us p. 48. That the Discourses which the Apostles made before their Iudges did not contain any thing which one might not as well say without inspiration But to prove the Apostles divinely inspir'd we do not only consider what they said but also what they did upon those occasions I do not here speak of the Miracles done by the Apostles but those practical Resolutions and pious Performances consequent upon theirinward Perswasions and Convictions 2. What the Apostles said and did in those Circumstances then were greater and stronger Arguments of their being inspir'd than any thing of the like nature would be to us now and the Reason is because the Gospel was a Religion then newly reveal'd and not grown as it were habitual to 'em by a long-continued Belief of it they acted not only against all the Power and Authority of the World which was then vigorously set against 'em but also against their own late Principles and Practices of a different Religion and they successfully attempted and perform'd such things which nothing but a Divine Impulse could prevail with a prudent man to undertake Upon the whole this Author seems very much to resemble Mr. Hobbs in his Arguings he would have the liberty of putting what Interpretations he pleases upon places of Scripture and then puts his Adversary to disprove 'em and this is that wherein the strength of his Plea doth generally consist But I humbly conceive that whereas he goes about to advance a novel opinion he ought first by positive Arguments to consute the sormer and prove that those Interpretations formerly put upon those places of Scripture are neither agreeable to the true sense of the Words nor to the analogy of Faith and not think it sufficient for him in this case to tell us That such or such a place may be interpreted so or so Thus p. 177. 't is remarkable how industriously he labours to put the Proof upon Mons. Simon it being Mr. N's as this Author is call'd usual way rather to suppose than prove any thing Thus in the very next Page 178. he vigorously supposes these two things 1. That St. Paul Acts 23. speaks not there as a Prophet but as a meer private Person 2. That he confesses himself to blame in giving such Language to the High-Priest but offers not the least thing in proof of either only makes the one Supposal to prove the other the latter to prove the former But if St. Paul spoke as a Prophet as the generality of Interpreters do assert and nothing here offer'd to prove the contrary then we cannot in reason suppose him to beg Pardon for what he spoke as such and therefore some other Interpretation ought to be put upon that place ERRATA PAge 3. line 6. for aed read and p. 6. l. 22. a comma only p. 11. l. 22. r. effectual p. 17. l. 28. for dispose r. depose p. 18. l. 26. for the r. their p. 19. l. 28. make a comma at Service l. 29. dele Semicolon p. 33. l. 1. for motions r. motives p. 42. l. 15. for they r. thus p. 44. l. 25. for it is r. is it p. 55. l. 26. dele his p. 86. l. 26. for and r. but p. 89. l. 14. dele Colon p. 107. l. 12. after God and says he p. 145. l. 19. for it r. this p. 160. l. 28. for awfully r. lawfully p. 184. l. 20. for now r. more p. 188. l. 6. add what to the beginning of the line p. 189. l. 14. r. Martyr p. 190. l. 26. r. contradistinctions p. 194. l. 15. for principal r. principle p. 196. l. 2. after Kingdom add or p. 103. l. 23. for viz. that r. and p. 196. l. 26. add to in the beginning of the line p. 57. l. 12. for we r. he in the running Title of Chap. 8. for of r. upon p. 141. l. 5. add For if Arguments drawn from Natural Reason have no force of themselves to prove a God antecedent to Divine Revelution I do not see how they can have any afterwards and if they be such as any ways depend upon Divine Revelation so far will they be of less force to convince an Atheist Thus Simplicius prays that be may be mindful of this Nobility of Nature