A LETTER To a FRIEND Concerning a POSTSCRIPT To the Defence of Dr. SHERLOCK's Notion OF THE Trinity in Unity Relating to The Calm and Sober Enquiry upon the same Subject LONDON Printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and 3 Crowns at the lower End of Cheapside near Mercers-Chappel 1694. A LETTER To a FRIEND c. SIR I Find a Postscript to the newly published Defence of Dr. Sherlock 's Notion of the Trinity in Unity takes Notice of the Enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead He that writes it seems somewhat out of Humour or not in such as it is decent to hope is more usual with him And I can't guess for what unless that one whom he imagines a Dissenter hath adventured to cast his Eyes that way that he did his But for that Imagination he may have as little ground as I to think the Dean's Defender is the Dean And as little as he had to say the Enquirer took great Care that no Man should suspect that he favours the Dean in his Notions where he is quite out in his guess for the Enquirer took no such Care at all but nakedly to represent his own Sentiments as they were whether they agreed with the Dean's or wherein they differ'd And really cares not who knows that he hath not so little kindness either for the truth or for him as to abandon or decline what he thinks to be true for his sake or as he express'd himself p. 29. of that Discourse because he said it But the Defender represents the Dean as much of another temper and that he will thank him for not favouring him in his Notions But yet he says that tho' the Enquirer doth not in every particular say what the Dean says yet he says what will justifie him against the Charge of Tritheism And is there any hurt to him in that what a strange Man doth he make the Dean as if he could not be pleased unless he alone did engross Truth will he thank a Man for not favouring his Notions and yet would blame him for not saying in every particular what he says tho' he say what will justifie him against the heaviest Charge fram'd against him may one neither be allow'd to agree with him nor disagree But Sir the Defender's Discourse hath no design nor I believe he himself to disprove the Possibility of a Trinity in the ever blessed God-head Therefore the Enquirer is safe from him as to the principal Design he is concerned for it is all one to him if it still appear possible in what way it be so represented that is intelligible consistent with it self and with other truth so that it is hardly worth the while to him further to enquire whether the Dean's Hypothesis or his be better if either be found unexceptionably safe and good But because the Defender hath to give preference to the one misrepresented both with some appearing disadvantage to the Cause it self what he says ought to be considered And the whole Matter will be reduced to this twofold Enquiry 1. Whether the Enquirer hath said more than the Dean or more than is defensible of the distinction of the Sacred Three in the Godhead 2. Whether the Dean hath said so much as the Enquirer or so much as was requisite of their Union 1. For the former the Defender p. 103. mentions the Dean's Notion of three Infinite Minds or Spirits And makes the Enquirer to have been proving three Spirits three distinct Essences three individual Natures in the Godhead and then adds for my part I cannot take where the difference is unless it be in the term Infinite 'T is indeed strange the Enquirer shou'd have said more than the Dean if there were no difference unless in the term Infinite wherein he must have said Infinitely less But he at length apprehends another difference tho' he after labours to make it none viz. that the Enquirer disputes but asserts nothing and he fancies he doth so to shelter himself from the Animadverter of whom he says he seems to be terribly afraid Here he puts the Dean into a fit of kindness and good Nature allowing the Enquirer to partake with him in his fears tho' not in his Notions as more sacred But he herein understands not the Enquirer who if he had been so terribly afraid could very easily have said nothing And who was really afraid of a greater Animadverter thinking it too great boldness under his Eye to speak confidently of his own peculiarities and that ly folded up in so venerable darkness He thought it enough in opposition to the daring Person whosoever he was with whom he was concern'd that so peremptorily pronounc'd the Trinity an absurdity a contradiction nonsense and an impossibility to represent whar he proposed as possible for ought he knew And now the Defender will have the Dean to have done no more And with all my Heart let him have done no more if he and his Animadverter and the rest of the World will so agree it But he will have the Enquirer to have done more and to be much more exposed to the Charge of Tritheism by asserting three distinct Essences three individual Natures and three spiritual Beings in the Godhead This is indeed very marvellous that the Enquirer should expose himself to the Charge of Tritheism by asserting all this when but a few Lines before upon the same Page he is said to have asserted nothing But he may as well make the Enquirer in asserting nothing to have asserted all this as the Dean in asserting all this to have asserted nothing And where the Enquirer hath said in express words that the Sacred Three are three distinct substances I can't find And we must in great part alter the common Notion of Substance to make it affirmable of God at all viz. that it doth substare accidentibus which I believe the Dean will no more than the Enquirer suppose the Divine Being to admit But 't is true that there is somewhat more considerable in the Notion of Substance according whereto if the Dean can make a shift to avoid the having of any inconvenient thing proved upon him by consequence I hope the Enquirer may find a way to escape as well But whereas he says the Dean allows but one Divine Essence and one individual Nature in the Godhead repeated in three Persons but without multiplication as he says he had already explained it This hath occasion'd me to look back to that explanation and if he thinks the allowing but one Divine Essence and one individual Nature in the Godhead will agree with what the Dean hath said in his Vindication I shall not envy him nor now go about to disprove it But I confess I see not how it can agree with what the Defender says in this his explanation it self when p. 23. he tells us the Son is the living subsisting Image of the Father and the Image and the Prototype can not
be the same but must be two No man is his own Image nor is an Image the Image of it self And he adds this is so self evident c. But whereas the distinction all this while might be understood to be but modal and that appears to be the Defenders present what ever was the Deans former meaning that the three subsistences differ only in their different manner of subsisting yet with this meaning his other words do little agree for he plainly asserts a real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature And who did ever make a real distinction to be but modal More expresly he had said before p. 18. the Divine Nature is one individual nature but not one single nature for one single nature can be but one person whether in God or man I shall not here discuss with him the Criticism upon which he lays so mighty stress of one individual nature and one single nature but take the terms he chooses and if the Divine Nature be not one single nature it must be double it must be triple And what doth this come to less than three Natures unless all ordinary forms of speech must be quite abandon'd and forsaken And wherein doth it come short of what is said by the Enquirer p. 50. and 51. This term individual must in the case now supposed as possible not as certain admit of a twofold application either to the distinct essence of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Ghost or to the entire essence of the Godhead in which these three do concurr Each of these conceived by it self are according to this supposition individual essences but conceived together they are the entire individual essence of God for there is but one such essence and no more and it can never be multiplied nor divided into more of the same name and nature Duplicity triplicity are admitted simplicity rejected if simple and single be of the same signification Where is the difference but that the one thinks absolute omnimodous simplicity is not to be affirmed of the Divine Nature as he often speaks The other says downright it is not single or simple without limitation The one denies multiplication of it so doth the other The one indeed speaks positively the other doth but suppose what he says as possible not certain And there is indeed some difference between supposing a thing as possible for ought one knows and affirming it so positively as to impute Heresie and Nonsense to all Gainsayers But both bring for proof the same thing The incarnation as in the Postscript the Defender takes notice the Enquirer doth p. 102. And so doth he himself in his letter p. 102. The Divine Nature was incarnate in Christ he was perfect God and perfect man and if there was but one single Divine Nature in all three persons this one single Divine Nature was incarnate and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost who are this single Divine Nature as well as the Son must be as much incarnate as the Son was He makes the contrary absurd And brings in fitly enough Victorinus Afer teaching that we ought not to say nor is it lawful to say that there is but one substance i. e. as he paraphrases it one single subsisting nature therefore there must be three single subsisting natures and three persons For if this same substance did and suffer'd all Patri-passiani et nos we must be Patri-passians which God forbid And what the Defender alledges from the Ancients against the Sabellians allowing only a Trinity of Names and his taking the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the concrete not in the abstract fully enough speaks the Enquirers sense his accounting the contrary too Fine and Metaphysical for him was what was writ to Dr. Wallis Calm Discourse p. 107. too fine or too little solid c. In short till it can be effectually prov'd that Mind and Spirit do not signifie somewhat as absolute as Nature or Essence or rather more than the former which signifies the Principle of Operation as the other of Being And till it can be as well prov'd that asserting a thing as certain so as to pronounce it Heresie and Nonsense to think otherwise is less than only to propose it as possible or enquire whether it be so or no The Dean must be judg'd by every one that understands common sense to have heightened the Distinction of three Persons at least as much as the Enquirer And whether the Enquirer have supposed more than is defensible against the Defenders objections will be considered by and by in its proper place In the mean time let it 2. Be examin'd whether the Dean has said as much for salving the Unity of the Godhead as the Enquirer or as much as is requisite to that purpose And here our Business will be short for it all turns upon that one single point whether mutual Consciousness be that Union which must be acknowledged or suppose it only For which we need only appeal to common Reason whether Being do not in the natural Order precede even the Power of working and consequently whether being united vitally precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state whereupon the Enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only but as he speaks Consciousness Is it possible any three Persons or Intelligent Subsistences should naturally have vital Perception of each others internal Motions and Sensations without being vitally preunited I say naturally for that God might give to three created Spirits a temporary Perception of each other without bringing them into a stated Union each with other is little to be doubted as a Spirit may assume a Body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it And if that Body were also a Spirit they might pro tempore for ought we know by extraordinary Divine Disposition for within the ordinary course of Nature we know of no such intimacy of created Spirits to another be quasi animae to one another But if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse Sensations mutually into each other they must be naturally first in vital union with one another Nor therefore did the Enquirer mistake the Dean's Notion as the Defender fancies in the passage he quotes p. 104. as if he took mutual Consciousness for meer mutual Perspection For tho' scire abstractly taken doth not signifie more than perspicere yet the Enquirer in that passage speaking of a never so perfect mutual perspection properly enough express'd thereby as great a feeling such Spirits were supposed to have of each other in themselves as mutual consciousness is apt to signifie or as the Dean can yet be supposed to have meant that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the Object than that which stays in meer speculation only And upon the whole it seems very strange the Defender should say if such an internal vital sensation be not an essential union he
other Eyes than his own For then tho' in so gross praevarication he had not preserved his Innocency he might have sav'd in some degree his Reputation Yet also he should have taken some heed that Anger might not so have discoloured his Eye as to make so injudicious a Choice what to confess and what to conceal For had he not himself blab'd that it was said we are not under the precise notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost He might more plausibly have formed his odd Births and father'd them where he doth But wrath indulg'd will show its governing power And all this fury and vengeance upon the Enquirer and the Dean too he reckon'd was due only because it was so presumptuously thought that somewhat in his Hypothesis or which he defends might have been better and that he probably sees it might so much a greater thing in some ill fits is the gratifying a humour than the Christian Cause 2. But let us now see how all this turns upon himself And how directly his ill-polisht not to say envenom'd darts missing their designed Mark strike into that very Breast which he undertakes to defend Whereas there are two things principally to be designed in a Discourse of this subject viz. 1. The explaining the Unity of the Father Son and Holy Ghost so as that tho' they are some way three they may yet be concluded to be in Godhead but one 2. The evincing notwithstanding that unity the possibility of their sufficient distinction to admit the distinct predicates that are severally spoken of them in the Holy Scriptures The Enquirer's discourse chiefly insists upon these two things 1. That necessity of Existence is the most fundamental Attribute of Deity And that therefore the Father as the Fountain being necessarily of himself The Son necessarily of the Father The Holy Ghost necessarily from them both each cannot but be God and the same one God In reference to the former purpose 2. That absolute omnimodous simplicity being never asserted in Scripture of the divine Being nor capable of being otherwise demonstrated of it and it being impossible either from Scripture or rational evidence accurately to assign the limits thereof and determine what simplicity belongs to that ever-blessed Being and what not If it be necessary to our apprehending how such distinct predicates and attributions may severally belong to the Father Son and Holy Ghost that we conceive three distinct essences necessarily coexisting in an eternal vital inseperable union in the Divine Being The thing may be in it self possible for ought we know And this is propounded to serve the latter purpose The Defender of the Dean seems to think otherwise of these two things viz. Of necessity of Existence common to the sacred three which will prove each of them to be God and belonging to them in the mentioned order as Father Son and Spirit will prove them necessarily to be one God And of what is said of simplicity which might admit their sufficient distinction of both these I say he seems to think otherwise by neglecting both lest that Discourse should be thought any way pertinent or useful to its end And disputes vehemently against the latter How strongly and successfully he does it in respect of the Truth of the Thing we have seen But whether weakly or strongly that his disputation tends to wound the Dean's cause all that it can shall now be made appear It is notorious the Dean hath asserted so positively three infinite Minds or Spirits that the benign interpretation wherewith this Defender would salve the matter A new Vocabulary being to be made for him on purpose and the Reason of things quite alter'd will to any man of sense seem rather ludicrous than sufficient without express retractation For which the Enquirer thinks he is upon somewhat better Terms than he if there were occasion for it both by the Tenour of his whole Discourse and by what he hath particularly said in the 28 Sect. But after the Interpretation offer'd See whether such things are not said over and over in the Defence as make the Defender and the Dean if he speak his sense most obnoxious to the whole argumentation in the Postscript So as if a part was acted it was carried so untowardly that it seem'd to be quite forgotten what part it was and all the Blows for it was come now to offending instead of Defending fall directly upon him whom the Actor had undertaken to defend It hath been noted already that the Defender says expresly the Divide Nature is one individual nature and so says the Enquirer but not one single nature then it must be double and triple not absolutely simple as also the Enquirer says to which he viz. the Defender adds one single nature can be but one person whether in God or Man Now let any man judge whether all his Reasonings are not most directly applicable against him if they signify any thing which are contained in his Postscript p. 106 107 108. c. How furiously doth he exagitate that saying When you praedicate Godhead or the Name of God of any one of them viz. Father Son or Holy Ghost you herein express a true but inadequate conception of God c. insisting that the whole undivided Divine Nature no doubt it is everlastingly undivided wherever it is subsists entirely in three distinct Persons This the Enquirer never deny'd tho' he charges it upon him that he makes no one of the Persons to be true and perfect God But how well doth that agree with what he had himself said Defence p. 26. Tho' God be the most absolute compleat independent Being yet neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost can be said to be an absolute compleat independent God He falsly charges it upon the Enquirer that he makes the Persons severally not perfect God and he denies two of them to be compleat God To say not perfect is criminal as indeed it is to say not compleat is innocent But his saying the Son and Holy Ghost are not compleat God How doth it consist with what is said Postscr p. 109. The same whole entire Divinity distinctly and inseparably subsists in the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost What is wanting to make him compleat God in whom the whole entire Divinity subsists No wonder if he quarrel with all the World who so little agrees with him whose Defence he undertakes or with himself In the mean time the Enquirer hath the less reason to complain when he manifestly treats himself as ill as him I only add that for his Discourse concerning the one Divinity or one Divine Nature subsisting wholly and entirely three times whereas I had thought the three Persons had subsisted at all times and all at once Defence p. 26 c. And the Persons of the Son and Holy Spirit not being emanations p. 28. Not the Son because he is the Father's Image And an
Image is not an emanation but a reflection But how should there be a reflected Image without an emanation Nor the Holy Ghost being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not in the sense of emanation but of the mysterious Procession I shall make no guesses about it for it concerns not the Enquirer only I think it very secure against the formidable Objection which he mentions p. 35. of it's being too intelligible Upon the whole matter I see not what service it can do him to put intelligent person instead of mind For I thought every Person had been intelligent Boethius his definition which he alledges plainly implies so much and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of Person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents Therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish Persons as he doth by this addition of intelligent into such as are Persons and such as are no Persons But since he expresly saies and I think for the most part truly that the three Persons or subsistences in the ever blessed Trinity are three real substantial subsistances each of which hath entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature Divine Wisdom Power and Goodness and therefore each of them is eternal Infinite mind as distinct from each other as any other three Persons and this he believes the Dean will no more recant than he will renounce a Trinity for all the wit of man can not find a medium between a substantial Trinity and a Trinity of names or a Trinity of meer modes Respects and Relations in the same single essence which is no Trinity at all As also he had said much to the same purpose before that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract without three that subsist or of one single nature which hath three subsistences when it 's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person not the very same common nature for the Persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all Therefore the Divine Nature which is common to the three must according to him comprehend three single natures and not be absolutely simple Hither must be his resort at last after all his earnest disputation against it And these he will have to be parts which because they are undivided impartible inseparable everlastingly and necessarily united I do reckon the Enquirer did with very sufficient reason and with just decency and doth still continue very peremptorily to deny And whereas he contends that the whole Divine nature is entirely in each subsistence as he does again and again I think the term whole improper where there are no proper parts And I doubt not when he gives place to cooler thoughts he will see cause to qualify that assertion For if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the Godhead is in each Person I see not how he will fetch himself from the Socinian consequence that then each Person must have a Trinity subsisting in it and be Father Son and H. Ghost For I doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire Divinity includes in it the Father Son and Holy Ghost And therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case when all is done how much soever he hath contended against it I do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty than we unavoidably have in conceiving Infinites To say that all perfection is in each subsistent which I like better than subsistence as more expressive of the concrete as far as their natural necessary eternal order towards one another as the first is the fountain or radix the second from that and the third from both can possibly admit All must be originally in the Father with whom the other two have that intimate vital eternal union that what is in him the other communicate therein in as full perfection as is inconceivable and more than it is possible for us or for any finite mind to conceive Therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural eternal order is conjecturable only but is really unknown unrevealed and inscrutable it is better herein to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have than to boast that which we have not or aspire to that which we cannot have FINIS These Books written by the Reverend Mr. John Howe are sold by Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside 1. THE Blessedness of the Righteous The Vanity of this Mortal Life On Psal. 17. ver 15. and Psalm 89.47 2. Of Thoughtfulness for the Morrow With an Appendix concerning the immoderate Desire of fore-knowing things to come 3. The Redeemer's Tears wept over lost Souls in a Treatise on Luke 19.41 42. With an Appendix wherein somewhat is occasionally discoursed concerning the Sin against the Holy Ghost and how God is said to Will the Salvation of them that perish 4. Of Charity in reference to other Mens Sins 5. Self-dedication discoursed in the Anniversary Thansgiving of a Person of Honour for a great Deliverance 6. A Sermon directing what we are to do after a strict Enquiry whether or no we truly love God 7. A Funeral Sermon for that Faithful and Laborious Servant of Christ Mr. Richard Fairclough who deceased July 4. 1682. in the Sixty First year of his Age. 8. A Funeral Sermon for Mrs. Esther Sampson the late Wife of Henry Sampson Dr. of Physick who died Nov. 24. 1689. 9. The Carnality of Religious Contention In two Sermons Preach'd at the Merchant's Lecture in Broadstreet Books lately Printed for Thomas Parkhurst Spira's Despair revived Being a Narration of the Horror and Despair of some late Sinners under the Apprehensions of Death and Judgment Wherein are such Unquestionable Examples produc'd and such Matters laid down and proved as may stop the Mouths of the Atheistical Scoffers and Mockers By Thomas James Minister of the Gospel at Ashford in Kent The Confirming Work of Religion and its great things made plain by their primary Evidences and Demonstrations Whereby the meanest in the Church may soon be made able to render a rational account of their Faith The present Aspect of our Times and of the Extraordinary Conjunction of things therein in a rational View and Prospect of the same as it respects the publick hazard and safety of Brittain in this Day These two last by Rob. Fleming Author of the fulfilling of the Scriptures and Minister at Rotterdam England's Allarm Being an account of Gods most considerable dispensations of Judgment and Mercy towards these Kingdoms for fourteen years last past and also of the several sorts of Sins and Sinners therein Especially the Murmurers against this Present Government With an Earnest call to speedy Humiliation and Reformation and Supplication as the chief means of prospering their Majesties Councils and Preparations Dedicated to the King and Queen A Discourse concerning Old Age tending to the Instruction Caution and Comfort of Aged Persons By Richard Steel A. M. Letter p. 24 25. See his Letter p. 1. Calm Discourse p. 34. Calm Discourse p. 89 90. p. 139. Calm Disc. Calm Disc. p. 140. His Letter p. 105. See Calm Disc. p. 122.123 p. 108.109 110. His Letter p. 5. Calm Disc. 47. His Letter p. 110. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 140. Postscr to his Letter p. 111. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 73 74. Defence p. 16. p. 18. Calm Disc. p. 50.51 Postscrip p. 108 109. Postscrip p. 108. Defence p. 30.
believes no man can tell what it is For how can such actual sensation be imagin'd to be union As well might the use of sense its self speaking of any thing singly to which it belongs be said to be its constituent form or consequently the doing any thing that proceeds from Reason be the form of a Man So the writing a Book should be the Author And whereas he says it is certain the Dean took it to be so and therefore he did not leave out a natural external union it follows indeed that he did not leave it out in his Mind and Design but he nevertheless left it out of his Book and therefore said not enough there to salve the unity of the Godhead but ought to have insisted upon somewhat prior to mutual consciousness as constituent of that unity and which might make the three one and not meerly argue them to be so 2. But now p. 105. he comes to find as great fault with the Enquirers way of maintaining this unity and because he is resolv'd to dislike it if he can't find it faulty sets himself to make it so The Temper of Mind wherewith he writes to this purpose what follows p. 105. and onwards to the end so soon and so constantly shews it self that no man whose mind is not in the same disorder will upon Tryal apprehend any thing in it but such heat as dwells in darkness And he himself hath given the Document which may be a measure to any apprehensive Reader True divine Wisdom rests not on an ill natur'd and perverse Spirit I understand it while the ill fit lasts But 't is strange he could write those words without any self-reflection The Thing to be reveng'd is that the Enquirer did freely speak his Thoughts wherein he judg'd the Dean's Hypothesis defective his not taking notice of what he reckon'd naturally antecedent and fundamental to mutual consciousness A most intimate natural necessary eternal union of the sacred Three If the Enquirer spake sincerely as he understood the matter and him and it evidently apppear the Defender did not so I only say the wrong'd person hath much the advantage and wishes him no other harm than such gentle Regrets as are necessary to set him right with himself and his higher Judge He says he the Enquirer represents this Unity by the union of soul and body and by the union of the divine and humane nature c. 'T is true he partly doth so but more fully by the supposed union of three created Spirits to which he that will may see he only makes that a lower step and he says with respect especially to the former of these That an union supposeable to be originally eternally and by natural necessity in the most perfect being is to be thought unexpressibly more perfect than any other But he adds these are personal unions and therefore cannot be the unity of the Godhead And he very well knew for he had but little before cited the passage that the Enquirer never intended them so but only to represent that the union of the three in the Godhead could not be reasonably thought less possible What he farther adds is much stranger and yet herein I am resolv'd to put Charity towards him to the utmost stretch as he professes to have done his understanding for he says as far as he can possibly understand and that he should be glad to be better informed tho' there is some reason to apprehend that former displeasure darkned his understanding and even dimn'd his Eye-sight which yet I hope hath it's more lucid Intervals and that his distemper is not a fixed habit with him And what is it now that he cannot possibly understand otherwise that no other union will satisfie him viz. the Enquirer but such an union of three spiritual Beings and individual natures as by their composition constitute the Godhead as the composition of soul and body do the Man i. e. He cannot understand but he means what he expresly denies Who can help so cross an understanding If he had not had his very finger upon the place where the Enquirer says in express words I peremptorily deny all composition in the Being of God this had been more excusable besides much said to the same purpose elsewhere It had been ingenuous in any man not to impute that to another as his meaning which in the plainest terms he disavows as none of his meaning And it had been prudent in the Dean or his Defender of all Mankind not to have done so in the present case as will further be seen in due time But he takes it for an Affront when he fancies a man to come too near him He adds for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the divine Nature and will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God and distinguished into different Conceptions by us only through the weakness of our understandings which cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts I know not what he means by earnestly the matter was weighty and it is true he was in writing about it in no disposition to jeast But it 's said he disputed against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature I hope the Defender in this means honestly but he speaks very improperly for it supposes him to think that the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity so earnestly disputed against did really belong to the Divine Nature but I can scarce believe him to think so and therefore he should have said his disputation tended to prove it not to belong If he viz. the Defender or the Dean did really think it did they or he must be very singular in that sentiment I would have them name me the man that ever laid down and asserted such a position Some I know have said of that Sacred Being that it is summè simplex or more simple than any thing else but that imports not universal absolute omnimodous simplicity which is impossible to be a perfection or therefore to belong to the Divine Nature No man that ever acknowledged a Trinity of persons even modally distinguished could ever pretend it for such simplicity excludes all modes Nay the Antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it as the Calm Discourse hath shewn And if the Dean be he is gone into the remotest extream from what he held and plainly enough seems still to hold that ever man of sense did But for what is added that he will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God This is not fairly said Civility allows me not to say untruly There is no word in the place he cites nor any where in that book that signifies not allowing 't is intimated we are not instructed by the Scripture to conceive of the Divine Nature as in every respect most absolutely
no parts if partiri whence they are so called must not and herein he cannot so fool the whole Christian World as to make it concur with him lose its signification to serve a turn Tho' the things be real there partibility is not real If any indeed will call them parts beeause they may be conceived or contemplated apart as parts meerly conceptible are no prejudice to the perfection of the Divine Being so are such conceivable parts acknowledged by this Author himself in express words we cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one Thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts God can as little admit to be a part of any thing as to have any thing a part of him And yet 't is no prejudice to the Dignity and Perfection of his Being to conceive of him conjunctly with other things as when we make him a part subject or predicate of a Proposition All his disputation therefore against parts and composition in the Deity is against a figment or no present adversary For my part I am of his mind and I should be obliged to thank him that this once he vouchsafes to let me be on his side when he knows I am if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know it How hard a thing is it for an angry man especially when he knows not why to write with a sincere Mind But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the Honour of the Divine Being as God forbid I should think he never hath what is that he supposes injurious to it Is it the words parts and compounds or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being The words he knows to be his own and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how parts that were never put together never parted nor ever shall be the one or other i. e. that never were or will be parts And a compound of such parts But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words three Essences natures or if you please Infinite minds or spirits signified by the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost in eternal union but distinct in the Being of God Let us consider his disputation against them united or in union according to its double aspect First upon the Hypothesis or Supposition of them Secondly upon himself First Consider his Disputation as levell'd against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences natures minds spirits in necessary eternal Union in the Divine Being And one of his arguments against it is in those words of his One principal argument against it here put out parts and composition which are his own and we have no more to do with them is that God is eternal and unmade and whatsoever hath parts saies he hath such essences in it must have a maker And here let him prove his consequence and his business is done viz. both ways as will be seen by and by But let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it as the supposition to be argued against is and before ought to have been justly stated and it 's being eternal and unmade But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as guess confident affirmation against the most obvious Tenour of Gods own Word is of little account who shall ascend into the heavens or fathom the depths or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature as without and visibly against his own revelation to be able without great rashness to pronounce so concerning him But so toyish an Argument as here follows is worse than the Position i. e. when one shall say that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union united into one in the Being of God any man should say and be so vain as to expect to be regarded that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing by it self is to say nothing or is all one with proving a thing by it self He proceeds to what hath no thing in it like an Argument but against his own Conceit of parts and that very trifling too There can be but one eternal nature in God But if there be three there must be three This 't is now come to proving his Point by its self Here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd but then nothing is prov'd no advance is made if there be three there must be three But if there be three what eternal parts There must be three different Natures or else they would be the same What tho' distinct But this supposes some body said the first And who himself therefore he is disproving himself If I had said so I would have deny'd his consequence for there may be similar parts Whereas by different he seems to mean dissimilar He says not only distinct but different natures Now you have that wonderful thing talk'd of some times but never brought to view before a distinction without a difference 'T is strange how any things should be distinct and no way different What distinguishes them if they differ by nothing This different apply'd to this present Case is his own word coined to introduce a Notion that is not new to Christians only but to all Man-kind If by different Natures he means as he seems of a different kind who thought of such a difference But I trow things that differ in number do as truly differ however essentially cohaering tho' not so widely His next is that though we have a natural notion of an eternal Being we have no notion of three eternal Essences which again I put instead of his parts which necessarily coexist in an eternal union Doth he mean we are to disbelieve every thing of God whereof we have not a natural Notion Then to what purpose is a Divine Revelation Is this Notion of God pretended to be Natural 'T is enough if such a Notion be most favoured by his own Revelation who best understands his own Nature and there be no evident natural Notion against it He forgot that he had said Defence p. 5. If every thing which we have no positive Idea of must be allow'd to contradict Reason we shall find contradictions enow adding We must confess a great many things to be true which we have no Idea of c. He adds once more we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature but if there be I here again leave out his three parts because I design to consider if there be any thing of strength brought against what was supposed possible by the Enquirer not against his fiction which I trouble not my self any further with three spiritual Beings