Selected quad for the lemma: nature_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
nature_n	distinct_a	person_n	unity_n	2,409	5	9.8000	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A51289	A brief reply to a late answer to Dr. Henry More his Antidote against idolatry Shewing that there is nothing in the said answer that does any ways weaken his proofs of idolatry against the Church of Rome, and therefore all are bound to take heed how they enter into, or continue in the communion of that church as they tender their own salvation.	More, Henry, 1614-1687.	1672 (1672)	Wing M2645; ESTC R217965	188,285	386

or miles distant from A quoad integram suam substantiam as to its intire substance as B is from C. But B is really distant or separate from C suppose twenty yards or miles as to their intire substances Ergo A is distant or separate from A twenty yards or miles as to its intire substance nothing of its substance being between So that it is both present with it self and absent from it self at the same time twenty miles and may be many thousands according to this impossible Hypothesis In so much that it is plain this part of his Answer is weak and insufficient To the other part I say That it manifestly follows from my former Reply that shows plainly that A is distant and separate from A which is a plain and palpable Division of A wholly and intirely from it self That A is not Ens unum but Entia multa or plura because the very definition of Ens unum is that it be indivisum à se. This is perfect demonstration to any one 's whose eyes are not obstructed with prejud●ce And now to his Second Answer I deny that I go upon any such supposition That Essential Unity is derived from the unity of local Presence But what I contend for is this T●at unity of local Presence is a necessary consequence of Essential Unity Nor can any finite Essential Unity be in any m●re than one place at once as Athanasius and Anastatius also have concluded And there may be as ne essary and indubitable reasonings ●rom the property of a thing as from its intrinsick Principles As a man may as certainly conclude such a Triangle to be a Rectangle Triangle from the equality of the Power of the Hypotenusa to the Powers of the sides including the Angle subtended by the Hypotenusa as from the very definition of a Rectangle Triangle it self And though the ubi of a Being be not essential to it yet we are sure what ever is is some where quod nusquam est nibil est From whence it is apparent how weak my Adversaries Inference is That unless essential Unity be derived from the Unity of local Presence it will not follow that the same Body being in divers places at once is divided from it self any more than it is divided from its intrinsick Principles which it can never be by Plurality of local Presence they being wholly extrinsick to the subject Which is the same as if he should contend that a Man may be and yet be no where because Vbi or Place is extrinsecal to him Or that his Soul may be neither wiser nor less wise nor equally wise with others or his Body neither taller nor less tall nor equally tall with others and yet be these being onely external respects and comparisons and not in the definition or ●ssential constitution of a Man To all which I add That the very intrinsick Principles of any one ●eing supposed to be in two Places are divided from themselves that is are distant or s●parate so many Yards or Miles as is plain from my former Arguing As suppose Plato were at the same time at Athens and Thebes the intrinsick ●rinciples of Plato to wit his Soul and Body would be both divided from themselves at this distance and constitute two Plato's These things are so plain that it is a wonder to me that they can be hid from any Mans eyes that does not wilfully wink against them or rather that any Man can wink against them though in humour or for ends best known to himself he may talk against them Now to his third and last I Answer Who does the greater disservice to the Catholick Church he or I I dealing bonâ fide and plainly demonstrating that to be an errour that cannot be hid from the unprejudiced it being in a subject so easily comprehensible to all mens perceptions I mean the nature of a Body and the impossibility of what they pronounce thereof And it being an Opinion unknown or disown'd by the Fathers of the Church I mean this Opinion of Transubstantiation not avowed by any Council till about four or five hundred Years ago when as the Doctrine of the Trinity was repeatedly ratified in the Primitive times by general Councils above 1200 Years ago with what reason is it that my Adversary will allow no greater certainty of the Mystery of the Trinity then of Transubstantiation which has such palpable and easily deprehensible and plainly demonstrable contradictions in it Is not this to put weapons into the hands of In●idels with a witness But I hope I shall easily wrest them out again by a sufficient Reply to this third Answer of my Adversary In the First part therefore I say his supposition is very gross and incompetible to the Divine Nature As if it were in the three Persons as one hand phancyed in three distinct distanced gloves at once or one finger in three distinct finger●stalls filling them out in several with its presence whenas the Divine Nature and the Persons are promiscuously said to be in one another Iohn 17. 21. I in thee and thou in me And Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity Peter Lumbard not unskilfully resembles the Trinity and Divine Nature to the Mind and the three Powers in the Mind Memory and Understanding and Love or Will These three saith he out of St. Austin are not three Lives but one Life not three Minds but one Mind one Essence He descants further on this Similitude but it is enough to hint thus much that from hence also it is manifest That the Divine Nature is not in the three Persons as one finger that fits three distinct distanced finger-stalls but as the Memory Understanding and Will are adequately every-where where the Mind is by a Metaphysical Coincidency and ●ongruity so also is the Presence of the three Persons and Divine Nature every where coincident and adequate Nor is the Divine Nature any more repeated according to the number of Persons then the Essence of the Soul is according to the number of those three Powers Memory Vnderstanding and Will So that nothing more can be concluded then thus That the number of the Persons are triple to the Divine Nature which is but One as the Powers of the Soul or Mind are triple to the Soul or Mind that is but One. And what inconvenience is there in this Do not all Men say that there are three Persons though but One Divine Nature But he would bring a thick Night upon Truth that gross Errour also might find harb●ur under that Covert In the second part of his Answer there seems also to be a supposition as Uncatholick and false as the former As if the Divine Nature in the three Divine Persons were as One common general Humane Nature in three Men suppose Pythagoras Plato and Socrates when as according to St. Austin and others The Divine Nature is to the three Divine Persons ra●her as the Rational Soul or Mind to the three Powers

a place internal upon which our Argument goes but is equally true of locus externus Nor then will this high flight beyond 〈◊〉 supreme or extimate Heaven serve for any ev●● 〈◊〉 For as much as we speak of Bodies placed ●n this side of 〈◊〉 extimate Heaven and no Bo●y can b● found amongst Bodies but it will be 〈◊〉 cumscr●bed b● the ambient superficies of the next Bodies about it that superficies of the ambient Bodies that do immediately compass 〈…〉 Body being its place And every Body ●ill h●ve such a place that is found on this 〈…〉 extimate Heaven This is a Truth that 〈◊〉 be denied And our Question is 〈◊〉 onely of suc● Bodies as are on this side 〈◊〉 extimate Heaven From which the unseasonablen●ss of my Adversaries subter●uge is plainl● d●cerned which in no sense will serve his turn unle●s for the amuzing the minds of the People To 〈◊〉 Second Answer I return this To the first 〈◊〉 thereof That it is not onely enough to him but it is also en●ugh to me that in each of the two ●paces the Body be equal to that de●erminate place it t●ere occupies understanding either an internal or external place For suppose one and the ●ame Body at each place at ●nce 〈◊〉 either an internal or external place of such a quantity of six Cubits suppose which it cannot fill unless it be commensurate to them it is plain it fills as much space as comes to twelve Cubits if six and six make twelve which is as sure as two and two make four And therefore that it is equal to twelve Cubits because it plainly fills up the space of twice six Cubits Or how ever at the same time fills the ambient superficieses that would exactly fit twice six Cubits in several There is no greater demonstration of equality then this which the Geometricians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Co●gruentia So certain is it that a Body adequately filling two places of six Cubits big at once has it self the magnitude of twelve Cubits But the Body is supposed but one and the same Body in both places and therefore can be but six Cubits Wherefore it is both six Cubits and twelve Cubits at once that is to ●ay it is double to it self at the same time which is impossible Nor does the Second part of my Adversaries Answer evade this Impossibility That it will no more follow that a Body occupying at ●he same time two places and so being equal to those two places which are double to one single place that the Body is double to it self then that a Body of one Cubit ●a●ified into a double dimension and therefore occupying a double space is double to it self Or the rational ●oul informing a Bod● of a span length at first but 〈◊〉 the same Body grown another span is thereby double to it self For not at all to quarrel with the mistake of the nature of Rarefaction which I must confess I take to be the Cartesian way not the ●ristotelean and candidly interpreting his meaning in those words a body of a span length and then grown up to another span which grown up to another span naturally implies the Body not double but octuple to what it was before passing by these and medling onely with his own meaning as it may be hoped and Hypotheses the examples do not at all reach the present purpose For speaking in his sense a body of one Cubit rarified into a double dimension is double to it self unrarified that is It is as big again as it was when it was unrarified But it is not as big again or double to it self at the same time but double it is to what it was before And the same is to be said of the soul in such a sense as extension is applicable to her and increase or decrease of it namely by dilatation and contraction Spiritual that it is double when the Body is grown as big again as it was when it was but a span long to what it was when the Body was but a span long But here in the present Case a Body is demonstrated double to it self compared with it self and its present condition at the same time Which is impossible viz. That the same Body should be double now to what it is now That it now should be as big again as it self is now For neither can the Soul her self be said to be now as wise again as she is now but onely as wise again as she was some time ago And so my Adversaries Answer does not at all reach the point in hand And therefore my Demonstration stands firm and unshaken of the Impossibility of Transubstantiation from this Argument taken from Physicks as any unprejudiced eye may easily discern Nor had we any need here to consider the continuity or discontinuity of places But all is clear from what we have thus briefly represented His Answer to the Argument from Metaphysicks in this fifth Paragraph To my Metaphysical Argument that infers that the Body of Christ will be Divisum à se and both Unum and Multa First he Answers to the first part If divisum à se secundum substantiam I deny it If divisum à se quoad locum transeat To the Second That it will not be Unum Multa but onely Unum in Multis one and the same in many places His second Answer is that I go upon a false supposition That essential Vnity is derived from the Vnity of local Presence not from the Intrinsick Principles of the subject For unless this be granted Plurality of local Presence at once will not prove a thing divided from it self His last Answer is That by this and my former Argument I put armes into the hands of Infide●s against the Mystery of the Holy Trinity For it will follow saith he That one and the same Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons at once the same Nature will be treble to it self as much as the same Body being in two places at once will be double to it self And secondly that one Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons it will be as much Divisa à se besides that it will not be Divisa ab aliis viz. from the three distinct Persons with which it is really identified as a Body will by being in two distinct places at once Th●s is the bare edge and full strength of his Answers against my Metaphysical Argument As for his Rhetorical Flourishes and Boasts they are no part of any proof and I list not to meddle with such things The Reply To the First part of his first Answer I Reply That it is plain that it is divisum à se secundum substantiam both quoad totum and quoad partes because it is separate or distant so many yards or so many miles suppose from it self nothing of it self being between As distant and separate as two several Individual Bodies at the same distance that is to say A is as many yards