And these are called different Modes of Subsistence on which the distinct Personalities are founded which can be no other than relative But a Person is that which results from the divine Nature and Subsistence together and although a Person cannot be said to be a relative consider'd as such yet being joyned with the manner of Subsistence it doth imply a Relation and so a Person may be said to be a relative Being But say they If the three Persons have all the same individual Substance then they are truly and properly only three Modes and therefore aâ—though among Men Personalities are distinct from the Persons because the Persons are distinct intelligent Substances yet this cannot hold where there is but one individual Substance The question is Whether those they call Nominal Trinitarians are liable to the charge of Sabellianism the answer is That they cannot because they assert far more than three Names viz. That each Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him But say they These Persons are but mere Modes No say the other We do not say that the Person is only a Modus but that it is the divine Nature or Godhead subsisting under such a Modus so that the Godhead is still included in it joyned to it and distinguished by it Grant all this the Vnitarians reply yet where there is the same individual Substance the Person can be only a Modus To which it is answer'd That this individual Substance hath three distinct ways of subsisting according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the three divine Persons So that here lies the main point whether it be Sabellianiâ—m to assert the same individual Substance under three such different Modes of Subsistence If it be the most learned and judicious of the Fathers did not know what Sabellianism meant as I have shewd at large in the following Discourse for they utterly disowned Sabellianism and yet asserted That the several Hypostases consisted of peculiar Properties in one and the same divine Substance But it is not the authority of Fathers which they regard for they serve them only as Stones in the Boys way when they quarrel viz. to throw them at our Heads Let us then examine this matter by reason without them Persons among Men say they are distinguished from Personalities because they have distinct Substances therefore where there is but one Substance the Person can be only a Mode and therefore the same with the Personality I answer that the true original Notion of Personality is no more than a different Mode of subsistence in the same common Nature For every such Nature is in it self one and indivisible and the more perfect it is the greater must its Vnity be For the first Being is the most One and all Division comes from Distance and Imperfection The first foundation of Distinction is Diversity for if there were no Diversity there would be nothing but entire and perfect Vnity All Diversity comes from two things Dissimilitudâ— and Dependence Those Philosophers called Megarici did not think much amiss who said That if all things were alike there would be but one Substance or Being in the World and what we now call different Substances would be only different Modes of Subsistence in the same individual Nature The difference of Substances in created Beings arises from those two things 1. A Dissimilitude of Accidents both internal and external 2. The Will and Power of God whereby he gives them distinct and separate Beings in the same common Nature As for instance the Nature or Essence of a Man consider'd in it self is but one and indivisible but God gives a separate Existence to every Individual whereby that common Nature subsists in so many distinct Substances as there are Individuals of that kind and every one of these Substances is distinguished from all others not only by a separate internal vital Principle and peculiar Properties but by such external Accidents as do very easily discriminate them from each other And the subject of all these Accidents is that peculiar Substance which God hath given to every Individual which in rational Beings is called a Person and so we grant that in all such created Beings the Personality doth suppose a distinct Substance not from the Nature of Personality but from the condition of the subject wherein it is The Personality in it self is but a different Mode of Subsistence in the same common Nature which is but One but this Personality being in such a subject as Man is it from thence follows that each Person hath a peculiar Substance of his own and not from the Nature of Personality But when we come to consider a divine Essence which is most perfectly one and is wholly uncapable of any separate Existence or Accidents there can be no other way of distinction conceived in it but by different Modes of Subsistence or relative Properties in the same divine Essence And herein we proceed as we do in our other Conceptions of the divine Nature i. e. we take away all Imperfection from God and attribute only that to him which is agreeable to his divine Perfections although the manner of it may be above our comprehension And if this be owning the Trinity of the Mob I am not ashamed to own my self to be one of them but it is not out of Lazyness or affected Ignorance but upon the greatest and most serious consideration They may call this a Trinity of Cyphers if they please but I think more modest and decent Language about these matters would become them as well as the things themselves much better And they must prove a little better than they have done that different Modes of Subsistence in the divine Nature or the relations of Father and Son are mere Cyphers which is so often mentioned in Scripture as a matter of very great consequence and that when we are baptized in the Name of the Father Son and Holy Ghost we are baptized into a Trinity of Cyphers But our Unitarians proceed and say that the same Author affirms not only the Personalities but the Persons to be merely Relative For he saith That every Person as well as every Personality in the Trinity is wholly Relative But it is plain he speaks there not of the Person in himself but with respect to the manner of Subsistence or the relative Properties belonging to them But if the Notion of a Person doth besides the relative Property necessarily suppose the divine Nature together with it how can a Person then be imagined to be wholly Relative But they urge That which makes the first Person in the Trinity to be a Person makes him to be a Father and what makes him to be a Father makes him to be a Person And what follows from hence but that the relative Property is the Foundation of the Personality But by no means that the Person of the Father is nothing but the relative Property
as well as for his Skill in Philosophy and Christianity and he wrote a short but learned Discourse to clear this Matter The Catholick Doctrine of the Trinity saith he is this the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost but they are not three Gods but one God And yet which our Vnitarians may wonder at this very man hath written a learned Book of Arithmetick But how doth he make this out How is it possible for Three to be but One First he shews That there can be but one Divine Essence for to make more than One must suppose a Diversity Principium enim Pluralitatis Alteritas est If you make a real difference in Nature as the Arians did then there must be as many Gods as there are different Natures Among men there are different individuals of the same kind but saith he it is the Diversity of Accidents which makes it and if you can abstract from all other Accidents yet they must have a different Place for two Bodies cannot be in the same place The Divine Essence is simple and immaterial and is what it is of it self but other things are what they are made and consist of Parts and therefore may be divided Now that which is of it self can be but One and therefore cannot be numbred And one God cannot differ from another either by Accidents or substantial Differences But saith he there is a twofold Number one by which we reckon and another in the things reckoned And the repeating of Units in the former makes a Plurality but not in the latter It may be said that this holds where there are only different Names for the same thing but here is a real Distinction of Father Son and Holy Ghost But then he shews That the difference of Relation can make no Alteration in the Essence and where there is no Diversity there can be but one Essence although the different Relation may make three Persons This is the substance of what he saith concerning this Difficulty which as he suggests arises from our Imaginations which are so filled with the Division and Multiplicity of compound and material things that it is a hard matter for them so to recollect themselves as to consider the first Principles and Grounds of Vnity and Diversity But if our Vnitarians have not throughly consider'd those foundations they must as they say to one of their Adversaries argue like novices in these questions For these are some of the most necessary Speculations for understanding these matters as what that Vnity is which belongs to a perfect Being what Diversity is required to multiply an infinite Essence which hath Vnity in its own Nature whether it be therefore possible that there should be more divine Essences than one since the same essential Attributes must be where ever there is the divine Essence Whether there can be more Individuals where there is no Dissimilitude and can be no Division or Separation Whether a specifick divine Nature be not inconsistent with the absolute Perfection and necessary Existence which belongs to it Whether the divine Nature can be individually the same and yet there be several individual Essences These and a great many other Questions it will be necessary for them to resolve before they can so peremptorily pronounce that the Doctrine of the Trinity doth imply a Contradiction on the account of the Numbers of Three and One. And so I come to the second Particular CHAP. VI. No Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common Nature II. THat it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in one common Nature I shall endeavour to make these matters as clear as I can for the greatest difficulties in most mens minds have risen from the want of clear and distinct apprehensiâ—ns of those fundamental Notions which are necessary in order to the right understanding of them 1. We are to distinguish between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being or between Essence and Existence 2. Between the Vnity of Nature or Essence and of Existence or Individuals of the same Nature 3. Between the Notion of Persons in a finite and limited Nature and in a Being uncapable of Division and Separation 1. Between the Being of a thing and a thing in Being By the former we mean the Nature and Essential Properties of a thing whereby it is distinguished from all other kinds of Beings So God and his Creatures are essentially distinguished from each other by such Attributes which are incommunicable and the Creatures of several kinds are distinguished by their Natures or Essences for the Essence of a Man and of a Brute are not barely distinguished by Individuals but by their kinds And that which doth constitute a distinct kind is One and Indivisible in it self for the Essence of Man is but one and can be no more for if there were more the kind would be alter'd so that there can be but one common Nature or Essence to all the Individuals of that kind But because these Individuals may be or may not be therefore we must distinguish them as they are in actual Being from what they are in their common Nature for that continues the same under all the Variety and Succession of Individuals 2. We must now distinguish the Vnity which belongs to the common Nature from that which belongs to the Individuals in actual Being And the Vnity of Essence is twofold 1. Where the Essence and Existence are the same i. e. where necessary Existence doth belong to the Essence as it is in God and in him alone it being an essential and incommunicable Perfection 2. Where the Existence is contingent and belongs to the Will of another and so it is in all Creatures Intellectual and Material whose actual being is dependent on the Will of God The Vnity of Existence may be consider'd two ways 1. As to it self and so it is called Identity or a thing continuing the same with it self the Foundation whereof in Man is that vital Principle which results from the Union of Soul and Body For as long as that continues notwithstanding the great variety of changes in the material Parts the Man continues entirely the same 2. The Vnity of Existence as to Individuals may be consider'd as to others i. e. as every one stands divided from every other Individual of the same kind although they do all partake of the same common Essence And the clearing of this is the main point on which the right Notion of these matters depends In order to that we must consider two things 1. What that is whereby we perceive the difference of Individuals 2. What that is which really makes two Beings of the same kind to be different from each other 1. As to the reason of our Perception of the difference between Individuals of the same kind it depends on these things 1. Difference of outward Accidents as Features Age Bulk Meen Speech Habit and Place 2. Difference of inward
Qualities and Dispositions which we perceive by observation and arise either from Constitution or Education or Company or acquired Habits 2. As to the true ground of the real Difference between the Existence of one Individual from the rest it depends upon the separate Existence which it hath from all others For that which gives it a Being distinct from all others and divided by Individual Properties is the true ground of the difference between them and that can be no other but the Will of God And no consequent Faculties or Acts of the Mind by Self-Reflection c. can be the reason of this difference because the difference must be supposed antecedent to them And nothing can be said to make that which must be supposed to be before it self for there must be a distinct Mind in Being from all other Minds before it can reflect upon it self But we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter For as to Individual Persons there are these things still to be consider'd 1. Actual Existence in it self which hath a Mode belonging to it or else the humane Nature of Christ could not have been united with the divine but it must have had the personal Subsistence and consequently there must have been two Persons in Christ. 2. A separate and divided Existence from all others which arises from the actual Existence but may be distinguished from it and so the humane Nature of Christ although it had the Subsistence proper to Being yet had not a separate Existence after the Hypostatical Vnion 3. The peculiar manner of Subsistence which lies in such properties as are incommunicable to any other and herein lies the proper reason of Personality Which doth not consist in a meer Intelligent Being but in that peculiar manner of Subsistence in that Being which can be in no other For when the common Nature doth subsist in Individuals there is not only a separate Existence but something so peculiar to it self that it can be communicated to no other And this is that which makes the distinction of Persons 4. There is a common Nature which must be joyned with this manner of Subsistence to make a Person otherwise it would be a meer Mode but we never conceive a Person without the Essence in Conjunction with it But here appears no manner of contradiction in asserting several Persons in one and the same common Nature 5. The Individuals of the same kind are said to differ in number from each other because of their different Accidents and separate Existence For so they are capable of being numbred Whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts and may be said to be one by the Union of them whatever is separated from another is capable of number by distinction But where there can be no Accidents nor Division there must be perfect Unity 6. There must be a Separation in Nature where-ever there is a difference of Individuals under the same kind I do not say there must be an actual Separation and Division as to place but that there is and must be so in Nature where one common Nature subsists in several Individuals For all Individuals must divide the Species and the common Nature uâ—ites them And this Philoponus understood very well and therefore he never denied such a Division and Separation in the divine Persons as is implied in distinct Individuals which is the last thing to be consider'd here 3. We are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the Persons in the Trinity and whether it be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the Godhead and but one God We are very far from disputing the Vnity of the divine Essence which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible as not to be capable of such a difference of Persons as is among Men. Because there can be no difference of Accidents or Place or Qualities in the divine Nature and there can be no separate Existence because the Essence and Existence are the same in God and if necessary Existence be an inseparable Attribute of the divine Essence it is impossible there should be any separate Existence for what always was and must be can have no other Existence than what is implied in the very Essence But will not this overthrow the distinction of Persons and run us into Sabellianism By no means For our Vnitarians grant That the Noetians and Sabellians held that there is but one divine Substance Essence or Nature and but one Person And how can those who hold three Persons be Sabellians Yes say they the Sabellians held three relative Persons But did they mean three distinct Subsistences or only one Subsistence sustaining the Names or Appearances or Manifestations of three Persons The latter they cannot deny to have been the true sense of the Sabellians But say they these are three Persons in a classical critical Sense We meddle not at present with the Dispute which Valla hath against Boethius about the proper Latin Sense of a Person and Petavius saith Valla's Objections are mere Iests and Trifles but our Sense of a Person is plain that it signifies the Essence with a particular manner of Subsistence which the Greek Fathers called an Hypostasis taking it for that incommunicable Property which makes a Person But say our Vnitarians a Person is an intelligent Being and therefore three Persons must be three intelligent Beings I answer that this may be taken two ways 1. That there is no Person where there is no intelligent Nature to make it a Person and so we grant it 2. That a Person implies an intelligent Being separate and divided from other Individuals of the same kind as it is among men and so we deny it as to the Persons of the Trinity because the Divine Essence is not capable of such Division and Separation as the humane Nature is But say they again The Fathers did hold a specifical Divine Nature and the Persons to be as so many individuals This they repeat very often in their late Books and after all refer us to Curcellaeus for undeniable Proofs of it Let us for the present suppose it then I hope the Fathers are freed from holding Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity for what Contradiction can it be to hold three individual Persons in the Godhead and One common Nature more than it is to hold that there are three humane Persons in One and the same common Nature of Man Will they make this a Contradiction too But some have so used themselves to the Language of Iargon Nonsense Contradiction Impossibility that it comes from them as some men swear when they do not know it But I am not willing to go off with this Answer for I do take the Fathers to have been men of too great Sense and Capacity to have maintained such an absurd Opinion as that of a Specifick Nature in God For either it is a mere Logical Notion and Act
other places in him it may appear that he intended no Specifick Nature in God But saith Curcellaeus If the Fathers intended any more than a Specifick Nature why did they not use Words which would express it more fully As 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For that very Reason which he mentions from Epiphanius because they would seem to approach too near to Sabellianism S. Basil was a great Man notwithstanding the flout of our Vnitarians and apply'd his thoughts to this matter to clear the Doctrine of the Church from the Charge of Sabellianism and Tritheism As to the former he saith in many places That the Heresie lay in making but one Person as well as one God or one Substance with three several Names As to the latter no man asserts the individual Unity of the Divine Essence in more significant Words than he doth For he uses the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as S. Cyril of Alexandria doth likewise and yet both these are produced by Curcellaeus for a Specifick Nature But saith Curcellaeus S. Basil in his Epistle to Gregory Nyssen doth assert the difrence between Substance and Hypostasis to consist in this That the one is taken for common Nature and the other for individual and so making three Hypostases he must make three Individuals and One common or Specifick Nature I answer That it is plain by the design of that Epistle that by three Hypostases he could not mean three individual Essences For he saith The design of his writing it was to clear the difference between Substance and Hypostasis For saith he From the want of this some assert but one Hypostasis as well as one Essence and others because there are three Hypostases suppose there are three distinct Essences For both went upon the same Ground that Hypostasis and Essence were the same Therefore saith he those who held three Hypostases did make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Division of Substances From whence it follows that S. Basil did look upon the Notion of three distinct Substances as a mistake I say distinct Substances as Individuals are distinct for so the first Principles of Philosophy do own that Individuals make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Division of the Species into several and distinct Individuals But doth not S. Basil go about to explain his Notion by the common Nature of man and the several Individuals under it and what can this signifie to his purpose unless he allows the same in the Godhead I grant he doth so but he saith the Substance is that which is common to the whole kind the Hypostasis is that which properly distinguisheth one Individual from another which he calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the peculiar incommunicable Property Which he describes by a Concourse of distinguishing Characters in every Individual But how doth he apply these things to the divine Nature For therein lies the whole difficulty Doth he own such a Community of Nature and Distinction of Individuals there He first confesses the divine Nature to be incomprehensible by us but yet we may have some distinct Notions about these things As for instance In the Father we conceive something common to him and to the Son and that is the divine Essence and the same as to the Holy Ghost But there must be some proper characters to distinguish these one from another or else there will be nothing but confusion which is Sabellianism Now the essential Attributes and divine Operations are common to them and therefore these cannot distinguish them from each other And those are the peculiar Properties of each Person as he shews at large But may not each Person have a distinct Essence belonging to him as we see it is among Men For this S. Basil answers 1. He utterly denies any possible Division in the divine Nature And he never question'd but the distinction of Individuals under the same Species was a sort of Division although there were no Separation And the followers of Ioh. Philoponus did hold an indissoluble Vnion between the three individual Essences in the divine Nature but they held a distinction of peculiar Essences besides the common Nature which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as appears by Photius who was very able to judge And it appears by one of themselves in Photius that the controversie was whether an Hyposiasis could be without an individual Essence belonging to it self or whether the peculiar Properties and Characters did make the Hypostasis But as to S. Basil's Notion we are to observe 2. That he makes the divine Essence to be uncapable of number by reason of its perfect Unity Here our Vnitarians tell us that when S. Basil saith That God is not one in number but in nature he means as the Nature of Man is one but there are many particular Men as Peter James and John c. so the Nature of God or the common Divinity is one but there are as truely more Gods in number or more particular Gods as there are more particular Men. but that this is a gross mistake or abuse of S. Basil's meaning I shall make it plain from hâ—mself For they say That he held that as to this question How many Gods it must be answered Three Gods in number or three Personal Gods and one in Nature or divine Properties whereas he is so far from giving such an answer that he absolutely denies that there can be more Gods than one in that very place He mentions it as an Objection that since he said That the Father is God the Son God the Holy Ghost God he must hold three Gods to which he answers We own but one God not in Number but in Nature Then say they He held but one God in Nature and more in Number That is so far from his meaning that I hardly think any that read the passage in S. Basil could so wilfully pervert his meaning For his intention was so far from asserting more Gods in Number that it was to prove so perfect a Unity in God that he was not capable of number or of being more than one For saith he That which is said to be one in Number is not really and simply one but is made up of many which by composition become one as we say the world is one which is made up of many things But God is a simple uncompounded Being and therefore cannot be said to be one in Number But the World is not one by Nature because it is made up of so many things but it is one by Number as those several parts make but one World Is not this fair dealing with such a Man as S. Basil to represent his Sense quite otherwise than it is As though he allow'd more Gods than one in Number Number saith he again belongs to Quantity and Quantity to Bodies but what relation
Substance must be divided if there be three Persons That every Person must have a Substance to support his Subsistence is not denied but the question is Whether that Substance must be divided or not We say where the Substance will bear it as in created Beings a Person hath a separate substance i. e. the same Nature diversified by Accidents Qualities and a separate Existence but where these things cannot be there the same Essence must remain undivided but with such relative Properties as cannot be confounded But may not the same undivided Substance be communicated to three divided Persons so as that each Person may have his own proper Substance and yet the divine Essence be in it self undivided This is not the case before us For the question upon the Creed is Whether the Substance can be divided And here it is allow'd to remain undivided Yes in it self but it may be divided in the Persons The Substance we say is uncapable of being divided any way and to say that a Substance wholly undivided in it self is yet divided into as many proper and peculiar Substances as there are Persons doth not at all help our understanding in this matter but if no more be meant as is expresly declared than That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Division or Separation it is the same which all Trinitarians assert And it is a great pity that any new Phrases or Ways of Expression should cause unreasonable Heats among those who are really of the same Mind For those who oppose the expressions of three distinct Substances as new and dangerous yet grant That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost but this is done without any Division or Multiplication Now if both Parties mean what they say where lies the difference It is sufficient for my purpose that they are agrred that there can be no Division as to the divine Essence by the distinction of Persons And so this passage of the Athanasian Creed holds good Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance The next Article as it is set down in the Notes on Athanasius his Creed is a contradiction to this For there it runs There is one Substance of the Father another of the Son another of the Holy Ghost They might well charge it with Contradictions at this rate But that is a plain mistake for Person for there is no other variety in the Copies but this that Baysius his Greek Copy hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that of Constantinople 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but all the Latin Copies Persona But what consequence do they draw from hence Then say they the Son is not the Father nor is the Father the Son nor the Holy Ghost either of them If they had put in Person as they ought to have done it is what we do own And what follows If the Father be not the Son and yet is the one true God then the Son is not the one true God because he is not the Father The one true God may be taken two ways 1. The one true God as having the true divine Nature in him and so the Father is the one true God but not exclusive of the Son if he have the same divine Nature 2. The one true God as having the divine Nature so wholly in himself as to make it incommunicable to the Son so we do not say that the Father is the one true God because this must exclude the Son from being God which the Scripture assures us that he is and therefore though the Son be not the Father nor the Father the Son yet the Son may be the one true God as well as the Father because they both partake of the same divine Nature so that there is no contradiction in this That there is but one true God and one of the Persons is not the other For that supposes it impossible that there should be three Persons in the same Nature but if the distinction of Nature and Persons be allow'd as it must be by all that understand any thing of these matters then it must be granted that although one Person cannot be another yet they may have the same common Essence As for instance let us take their own Peter Iames and Iohn What pleasant arguing would this be Peter is not Iames nor Iohn nor Iames nor Iohn are Peter but Peter hath the true Essence of a Man in him and the true Essence is but one and indivisible and therefore Iames and Iohn cannot be true Men because Peter hath the One and indivisible Essence of a Man in him But they will say We cannot say that Peter is the One true Man as we say That the Father is the One true God Yes we say the same in other Words for he can be said to be the One true God in no other Respect but as he hath the One true Divine Essence All the difference lies that a finite Nature is capapable of Division but an infinite is not It follows The Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is all one the Glory Equal the Majesty Co-eternal To this they say That this Article doth impugn and destroy it self How so For if the Glory and Majesty be the same in Number then it can be neither Equal nor Co-eternal Not Equal for it is the same which Equals never are nor Co-eternal for that intimates that they are distinct For nothing is Co eternal nor Co temporary with it self There is no appearance of Difficulty or Contradiction in this if the Distinction of Persons is allowed for the three Persons may be well said to be Co-equal and Co-eternal and if we Honour the Son as we Honour the Father we must give equal Glory to him But one great Point of Contradiction remains viz. So that the Father is God the Son is God and the Holy Ghost is God and yet there are not three Gods but one God First they say This is as if a Man should say the Father is a Person the Son a Person and the Holy Ghost a Person yet there are not three Persons but one Person How is this possible if a Person doth suppose some peculiar Property which must distinguish him from all others And how can three Persons be one Person unless three incommunicable Properties may become one communicated Property to three Persons But they are aware of a Distinction in this Case viz. that the term God is used Personally when it is said God the Father God the Son and God the Holy Ghost but when it is said There are not three Gods but one God the term God is used Essentially
and therefore comprehends the whole three Persons so that there is neither a Grammatical nor Arithmetical Contradiction And what say our Vnitarians to this Truly no less Than that the Remedy is worse if possible than the Disease Nay then we are in a very ill Case But how I pray doth this appear 1. Say they Three personal Gods and one Essential God make four Gods if the Essential God be not the same with the personal Gods and tho' he is the same yet since they are not the same with one another but distinct it follows that there are three Gods i. e. three personal Gods 2. It introduces two sorts of Gods three Personal and one Essential But the Christian Religion knows and owns but One true and most high God of any sort So far then we are agreed That there is but One true and most high God and that because of the perfect Vnity of the Divine Essence which can be no more than One and where there is but One Divine Essence there can be but One true God unless we can suppose a God without an Essence and that would be a strange sort of God He would be a personal God indeed in their critical Sense of a Person for a shape or appearance But may not the fame Essence be divided That I have already shew'd to be impossible Therefore we cannot make so many personal Gods because we assert one and the same Essence in the three Persons of Father Son and Holy Ghost But they are distinct and therefore must be distinct Gods since every one is distinct from the other They are distinct as to personal Properties but not as to Essential Attributes which are and must be the same in all So that here is but one Essential God and three Persons But after all why do we assert three Persons in the Godhead Not because we find them in the Athanasian Creed but because the Scripture hath revealed that there are Three Father Son and Holy Ghost to whom the Divine Nature and Attributes are given This we verily believe that the Scripture hath revealed and that there are a great many places of which we think no tolerable Sense can be given without it and therefore we assert this Doctrine on the same Grounds on which we believe the Scriptures And if there are three Persons which have the Divine Nature attributed to them what must we do in this Case Must we cast off the Vnity of the Divine Essence No that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into Question Must we reject those Scriptures which attribute Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost as well as to the Father That we cannot do unless we cast off those Books of Scripture wherein those things are contained But why do we call them Persons when that Term is not found in Scripture and is of a doubtful Sense The true Account whereof I take to be this It is observed by Facundus Hermianensis that the Christian Church received the Doctrine of the Trinity before the Terms of three Persons were used But Sabellianism was the occasion of making use of the name of Persons It 's true That the Sabellians did not dislike our Sense of the Word Person which they knew was not the Churches Sense as it was taken for an Appearance or an external Quality which was consistent enough with their Hypothesis who allow'd but One real Person with different Manifestations That this was their true Opinion appears from the best account we have of their Doctrine from the first Rise of Sabellianism The Foundations of it were laid in the earliest and most dangerous Heresies in the Christian Church viz. that which is commonly called by the name of the Gnosticks and that of the Cerinthians and Ebionites For how much soever they differ'd from each other in other things yet they both agreed in this that there was no such thing as a Trinity consisting of Father Son and Holy Ghost but that all was but different Appearances and Manifestations of God to Mankâ—nd In consequence whereof the Gnosticks denied the very Humanity of Christ and the Cerinthians and Ebionites his Divinity But both these sorts were utterly rejected the Communion of the Christian Church and no such thing as Sabellianism was found within it Afterwards there arose some Persons who started the same Opinion within the Church the first we meet with of this sort are those mention'd by Theodoret Epigonus Cleomenes and Noëtus from whom they were called Noeâ—ians not long after Sabellius broached the same Doctrine in Pentapolis and the Parts thereabouts which made Dionysius of Alexandria appear so early and so warmly against it But he happening to let fall some Expressions as though he asserted an Inequality of Hypostases in the Godhead Complaint was made of it to Dionysius then Bishop of Rome who thereupon explained that which he took to be the true Sense of the Christian Church in this matter Which is still preserved in Athanasius Therein he disowns the Sabellian Doctrine which confounded the Father Son and Holy Ghost and made them to be the same and withal he rejected those who held three distinct and separate Hypostases as the Platonists and after them the Marcionists did Dionysius of Alexandria when he came to explain himself agreed with the others and asserted the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father as Athanasius hath proved at large but yet he said That if a distinction of Hypostases were not kept up the Doctrine of the Trinity would be lost as appears by an Epistle of his in S. Basil. Athanasius saith That the Heresie of Sabellius lay in making the Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person so that in one Respect he is the Father and in another the Son Gregory Nazianzen in opposition to Sabellianism saith We must believe one God and three Hypostases and commends Athanasius for preserving the true Mean in asserting the Vnity of Nature and the Distinction of Properties S. Basil saith That the Sabellians made but one Person of the Father and Son that in Name they confessed the Son but in Reality they denied him In another place that the Sabellians asserted but one Hypostasis in the Divine Nature but that God took several Persons upon him as occasion required sometimes that of a Father at other times of a Son and so of the Holy Ghost And to the same purpose in other places he saith That there are distinct Hypostases with their peculiar Properties which being joyned with the Vnity of Nature make up the true Confession of Faith There were some who would have but One Hypostasis whom he opposes with great vehemency and the Reason he gives is That then they must make the Persons to be meer Names which is Sabellianisn And he saith That if our Notions of distinct Persons have no certain Foundation they are meer Names such as
Property of a thing as when we say that such a thing is of a different Nature from another we mean no more than that it is differenced by such Properties as come to our Knowledge Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance which had the Principles of Motion in it self but Nature and Substance are of an equal extent and so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances I grant that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves So that the Nature of things propery belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas But we must yet proceed farther For Nature may be consider'd two ways 1. As it is in distinct Individuals as the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter Iames and Iohn and this is the common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them For the Nature of man as in Peter is distinct from that same Nature as it is in Iames and Iohn otherwise they would be but one Person as well as have the same Nature And this Distinction of Persons in them is discerned both by our Senses as to their different Accidents and by our Reason because they have a separate Existence not coming into it at once and in the same manner 2. Nature may be consider'd Abstractly without respect to individual Persons and then it makes an entire Notion of it self For however the same Nature may be in different Individuals yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same which appears from this evident Reason that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind Let us now see how far these things can come from our simple Ideas by Reflection and Sensation And I shall lay down the Hypothesis of those who resolve our Certainty into Ideas as plainly and intelligibly as I can 1. We are told That all simple Ideas are true and adequate Not that they are the true Representation of things without us by that they are the true Effects of such Powers in them as produce such Sensations within us So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them but the Effects they have upon us 2. All our Ideas of Substances are imperfect and inadequate because they refer to the real Essences of things of which we are Ignorant and no man knows what Substance is in it self And they are all false when look'd on as the Representations of the unknown Essences of things 3. Abstract Ideas are only general Names made by separating Circumstances of time and place c. from them which are only the Inventions and Creatures of the Vnderstanding 4. Essence may be taken two ways 1. For the real internal unknown Constitutions of things and in this Sense it is understood as to particular things 2. For the abstract Idea and one is said to be the Nominal the other the Real Essence And the Nominal Essences only are immutable and are helps to enable Men to consider things and to discourse of them But two things are granted which tend to clear this Matter 1. That there is a Real Essence which is the Foundation of Powers and Properties 2. That we may know these Powers and Properties although we are ignorant of of the Real Essence From whence I inferr 1. That from those true and adequate Ideas which we have of the Modes and Properties of Things we have sufficient certainty of the Real Essence of them For these Ideas are allow'd to be true and either by them we may judge of the truth of things or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our selves If our Ideas be only the Effects we feel of the Powers of things without us yet our Reason must be satisfied that there could be no such Powers unless there were some real Beings which had them So that either we may be certain by those Effects of the real Being of Things or it is not possible as we are framed to have any certainty at all of any thing without our selves 2. That from the Powers and Properties of things which are knowable by us we may know as much of the internal Essence of Things as those Powers and Properties discover I do not say That we can know all Essences of things alike nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that belong to them but if we can know so much as that there are certain Beings in the World endued with such distinct Powers and Properties what is it we complain of the want of in order to our Certainty of Things But we do not see the bare Essence of things What is that bare Essence without the Powers and Properties belonging to it It is that internal Constitution of things from whence those Powers and Properties flow Suppose we be ignorant of this as we are like to be for any Discoveries that have been yet made that is a good Argument to prove the uncertainty of Philosophical Speculations about the Real Essences of things but it is no prejudice to us who enquire after the Certainty of such Essences For although we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Constitution of things nor in what manner they do flow from the Substance yet by them we certainly know that there are such Essences and that they are distinguished from each other by their Powers and Properties 3. The Essences of things as they are knowable by us have a Reality in them For they are founded on the natural Constitution of things And however the abstract Ideas are the work of the Mind yet they are not meer Creatures of the Mind as appears by an instance produced of the Essence of the Sun being in one single Individual in which Case it is granted That the Idea may be so abstracted that more Suns might agree in it and it is as much a Sort as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars So that here we have a Real Essence subsisting in one Individual but capable of being multiplied into more and the same Essence remaining But in this one Sun there is a Real Essence and not a meer Nominal or abstracted Essence but suppose there were more Suns would not each of them have the Real Essence of the Sun For what is it makes the second Sun to be a true Sun but having the same Real Essence with the first If it were but a Nominal Essence then the second would have nothing but the Name Therefore there must be a Real Essence in every individual of the same kind for that alone is it which makes it to be what it is Peter and Iames and Iohn are all true and real Men but what is it
which makes them so Is it the attributing a general Name to them No certainly but that the true and Real Essence of a Man is in every one of them And we must be as certain of this as we are that they are Men they take their Denomination of being Men from that common Nature or Essence which is in them 4. That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas by the meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances but from Reason and Consideration of the true Nature of Things For when we see so many Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties we thence infer that there must be something common to all which makes them of one kind and if the difference of Kinds be real that which makes them of one kind and not of another must not be a Nominal but Real Essence And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substance whereby Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds for let them mistake in the Complication of their Ideas either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them and let their Ideas be what they please the Real Essence of a Man and a Horse and a Tree are just what they were and let their Nominal Essences differ never so much the Real common Essence or Nature of the several Kinds are not at all alter'd by them And these Real Essences are unchangeable For however there may happen some variety in Individuals by particular Accidents yet the Essences of Men and Horses and Trees remain always the same because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator who hath made several sorts of Beings 2. Let us now come to the Idea of a Person For although the common Nature in mankind be the same yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from one another So that Peter and Iames and Iohn are all of the same kind yet Peter is not Iames and Iames is not Iohn But what is this Distinction founded upon They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses as to difference of Features distance of Place c. but that is not all for supposing there were no such external difference yet there is a difference between them as several Individuals in the same common Nature And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not Communicable to another An Individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence which agrees to one and to none else of the Kind and this is it which is called Personality But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Person We may understand the difference between abstracted Ideas and particular Beings by the Impressions of outward Objects and we may find an Intelligent Substance in our selves by inward Perception â—ut whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other Way for if the meer Intelligent Substance makes a Person then there cannot be the Union of two Natures but there must be two Persons Therefore a Person is a compleat Intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence so that if it be a part of another Substance it is no Person and on this account the Soul is no Person because it makes up an entire Being by its Union with the Body But when we speak of Finite Substances and Persons we are certain that distinct Persons do imply distinct Substances because they have a distinct and separate Existence but this will not hold in an infinite Substance where necessary Existence doth belong to the Idea of it And although the Argument from the Idea of God may not be sufficient of it self to prove his Being yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him which is inconsistent with necessary Existence therefore if we suppose a Distinction of Persons in the same Divine Nature it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite Perfections of it And no objection can be taken from the Idea of God to overthrow a Trinity of Co-existing Persons in the same Divine Essence For necessary Existence doth imply a Co-existence of the Divine Persons and the Unity of the Divine Essence that there cannot be such a difference of individual Substances as there is among mankind But these things are said to be above our Reason if not contrary to it and even such are said to be repugnant to our Religion 2. That therefore is the next thing to be carefully Examin'd whether Mysteries of Faith or Matters of Revelation above our Reason are to be rejected by us And a Thing is said to be above our Reason when we can have no clear and distinct Idea of it in our Minds And that if we have no Ideas of a thing it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it and that if such Doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand we must have new Powers and Organs for the Perception of them We are far from defending Contradictions to our natural Notions of which I have spoken already but that which we are now upon is whether any Doctrine may be rejected when it is offer'd as a Matter of Faith upon this account that it is above our Comprehension or that we can have no clear Idea of it in our Minds And this late Author hath undertaken to prove That there is nothing so Mysterious or above Reason in the Gospel To be above Reason he saith may be understood two ways 1. For a thing Intelligible in it self but cover'd with figurative and mystical Words 2. For a thing in its own Nature unconceivable and not to be judged of by our Faculties tho' it be never so clearly revealed This in either Sense is the same with Mystery And from thence he takes occasion to shew his Learning about the Gentile Mysteries and Ecclesiastical Mysteries which might have been spared in this Debate but only for the Parallel aimed at between them as to Priest-craft and Mysteries without which a Work of this nature would want its due relish with his good Christian Readers Others we see have their Mysteries too but the Comfort is that they are so easily understood and seen through as when the Heathen Mysteries are said to have been instituted at first in Commemoration of some remarkable Accidents or to the Honour of some great Persons that obliged the World by their Vertues and useful Inventions to pay them such Acknowledgments He must be very dull that doth not understand the meaning of this and yet this Man pretends to vindicate Christianity from being
Creed is not liable to their charges of Contradiction Impossibilities and pure Nonsense 2. That we own no other Doctrine than what hath been received by the Christian Church in the several Ages from the Apostles Times 3. And that there are no Objections in point of reason which ought to hinder our Assent to this great point of the Christian Faith But the chief Design of this Preface is to remove this Prejudice which lies in our way from the different manners of Explication and the warm Disputes which have been occasion'd by them It cannot be denied that our Adversaries have taken all possible advantage against us from these unhappy differences and in one of their latest Discourses they glory in it and think they have therein out-done the foreign Unitarians For say they We have shewed that their Faiths concerning this pretended Mystery are so many and so contrary that they are less one Party among themselves than the far more learned and greater number of them are one Party with us this is spoken of those they call Nominal Trinitarians and for the other whom they call Real they prove them guilty of manifest Heresie the one they call Sabellians which they say is the same with Unitarians and the other Polytheists or disguised Pagans and they borrow arguments from one side to prove the charge upon the other and they confidently affirm that all that speak out in this matter must be driven either to Sabellianism or Tritheism If they are Nominal Trinitarians they fall into the former if Real into the latter This is the whole Design of this late Discourse which I shall here examine that I may remove this stumbling Block before I enter upon the main business 1. As to those who are called Nominal Trinitarians Who are they And from whence comes such a Denomination They tell us That they are such who believe three Persons who are Persons in Name only indeed and in truth they are but one subsisting Person But where are these to be found Among all such say they as agree that there is but one only and self-same divine Essence and Substance But do these assert that there is but one subsisting Person and three only in Name Let any one be produced who hath written in defence of the Trinity for those who have been most charged have utterly deny'd it That learned Person who is more particularly reflected upon in this Charge is by them said to affirm That God is one divine intellectual Substance or really subsisting Person and distinguished and diversified by three relative Modes or relative Subsistences And Mr. Hooker is produc'd to the same purpose That there is but one Substance in God and three distinct relaâ—ive Properties which Substance being taken with its peculiar Property makes the distinction of Persons in the Godhead But say they These Modes and Properties do not make any real subsisting Persons but only in a Grammatical and Critical Sense and at most this is no more than one Man may be said to be three Persons on the account of different Relations as Solomon was Son of David Father of Rehoboam and proceeding from David and Bathsheba and yet was but one subsisting Pâ—rson This is the force of what they say But then in a triumphing manner they add That the Realists have so manifest an advantage against them that they have no way to deâ—end themselves but by Recrimination i. e. by shewing the like Absurdity in their Doctrine And thus they hope either side will baffle the other and in the mean time the Cause be lost between them But in so nice a matter as this we must not rely too much on an Adversaries Representation for the leaving out some expressions may make an opinion look with another Appearance than if all were taken together it would have We must therefore take notice of other passages which may help to give the true Sense of the learned Author who is chiefly aimed at 1. In the very same Page he asserts That each of the divine Persons has an absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him though not a distinct absolute Nature and to the same purpose in another place 2. That the eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son and communicating his Essence to another And elsewhere that the Relation between Father and Son is founded on that eternal Act by which the Father communicates his divine Nature to the Son 3. That the foundation of the Doctrine of the Trinity is this 1. That there can be but one God 2. That there is nothing in God but what is God 3. That there can be no Composition in the Deity with any such positive real Being distinct from the Deity it self But the Church finding in Scripture mention of three to whom distinctly the Godhead does belong expressed these three by the Name of Persons and stated their Personalities upon three distinct Modes of Subsistence allotted to one and the same Godhead and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct Relations What do these men mean to charge one who goes upon these grounds with Sabellianism Doth he make the three Persons to be mere Names as S. Basil in few words expresses the true nature of Sabellianism that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One thing with different Denominations Can the communicating the divine Essence by the Father to the Son be called a Name or a Mode or a Respect only And these Men of wonderfull Subtilty have not learnt to distinguish between Persons and Personalities Where is the least Intimation given that he look'd on the divine Persons as Modes and Respects only That is impossible since he owns a Communication of the divine Essence and that each of the divine Persons hath the divine Nature belonging to him could it ever enter into any Man's head to think that he that owns this should own the other also But the Personality is a thing of another consideration For it is the reason of the distinction of Persons in the same undivided Nature That there is a distinction the Scripture assures us and withall that there is but one divine Essence How can this distinction be Not by essential Attributes for those must be in the divine Essence and in every Person alike otherwise he hath not the entire divine Nature not by accidents as Men are distinguished from each other for the divine Nature is not capable of these not by separate or divided Substances for that would be inconsistent with the perfect Vnity of the Godhead since therefore there can be no other way of distinction we must consider how the Scripture directs us iâ— this case and that acquaints us with the Father Son and Holy Ghost as having mutual Relation to each other and there is no Repugnancy therein to the divine Nature and therefore the distinction of the Persons hath been fixed on that as the most proper foundation for it
The instance of Solomon is not at all to the purpose unless we asserted three Persons founded upon those different Relations in his individual Nature Who denies that one Person may have different Respects and yet be but one Person subsisting Where doth the Scripture say That the Son of David the Father of Rehoboam and he that proceeded from David and Bathsheba were three Persons distinguished by those relative Properties But here lies the foundation of what we believe as to the Trinity we are assured from Scripture that there are three to whom the divine Nature and Attributes are given and we are assured both from Scripture and Reason that there can be but one divine Essence and therefore every one of these must have the divine Nature and yet that can be but One But it is a most unreasonable thing to charge those with Sabellianism who assert That every Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him and that the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son Did ever Nâ—etus or Sabellius or any of their Followers speak after this manner Is the divine Essence but a mere Name or a different respect only to Mankind For the asserting such relative Persons as have no Essence at all was the true Sabellian Doctrine as will be made appear in the following Discourse And so much is confess'd by our Unitarians themselves for they say That the Sabellians held that Father Son and Spirit are but only three Names oâ— God given to him in Scripture by occasion of so many several Dispensations towards the Creature and so he is but one subsisting Person and three relative Persons as he sustains the three Names of Father Son and Spirit which being the Relations of God towards things without him he is so many relative Persons or Persons in a Classical Critical Sense i. e. Persons without any Essence belonging to them as such But those who assert a Communication of the divine Essence to each Person can never be guilty of Sabellianism if this be it which themselves affirm And so those called Nominal Trinitarians are very unjustly so called because they do really hold a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead 2. Let us now see what charge they lay upon those whom they call Real Trinitarians and they tell us That the Nominals will seem to be profound Philosophers deep Sages in comparison with them These are very obliging expressions to them in the beginning But how do they make out this gross Stupidity of theirs In short it is That they stand condemned and anathematized as Hereticks by a general Council and by all the Moderns and are every day challenged and impeached of Tritheism and cannot agree among themselves but charge one another with great Absurdities and in plain terms they charge them with Nonsense in the thing whereas the other lay only in words Because these assert three divine subsisting Persons three infinite Spirits Minds or Substances as distinct as so many Angels or Men each of them perfectly God and yet all of them are but one God To understand this matter rightly we must consider that when the Socinian Pamphlets first came abroad some years since a learned and worthy Person of our Church who had appear'd with great vigour and reason against our Adversaries of the Church of Rome in the late Reign which ought not to be forgotten undertook to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity against the History of the Unitarians and the Notes on the Athanasian Creed but in the warmth of disputing and out of a desire to make this matter more intelligible he suffer'd himself to be carried beyond the ancient Methods which the Church hath used to express her Sense by still retaining the same fundamental Article of three Persons in one undivided Essence but explaining it in such a manner as to make each Person to have a peculiar and proper Substance of his own This gave so great an advantage to the Author of those Treatises that in a little time he set forth his Notes with an Appendix in answer to this new Explication Wherein he charges him with Heresie Tritheism and Contradiction The very same charges which have been since improved and carried on by others I wish I could say without any unbecoming Heat or Reflections But I shall now examine how far these charges have any ground so as to affect the Doctrine of the Trinity which is the chief end our Adversaries aimed at in heaping these Reproaches upon one who appear'd so early and with so much zeal to defend it We are therefore to consider these things 1. That a Man may be very right in the Belief of the Article it self and yet may be mistaken in his Explication of it And this one of his keenest Adversaries freely acknowledges For he plainly distinguishes between the fundamental Article and the manner of explaining it and affirms That a Man may quit his Explication without parting with the Article it self And so he may retain the Article with his Explication But suppose a Man to assent to the fundamental Article it self and be mistaken in his Explication of it can he be charged with Heresie about this Article For Heresie must relate to the fundamental Article to which he declares his hearty and unfeigned Assent but here we suppose the mistake to lie only in the Explication As for instance Sabellianism is a condemned and exploded Heresie for it is contrary to the very Doctrine of the Trinity but suppose one who asserts the Doctrine of three Persons should make them to be three Modes must such a one presently be charged with Heresie before we see whether his Explication be consistent with the fundamental Article or not For this is liable to very obvious Objections that the Father begets a Mode instead of a Son that we pray to three Modes instead of three real Persons that Modes are mutable things in their own Nature c. but must we from hence conclude such a one guilty of Heresie when he declares that he withall supposed them not to be mere Modes but that the divine Essence is to be taken together with the Mode to make a Person Yea suppose some spitefull Adversary should say That it is a Contradiction to say That the same common Nature can make a Person with a Mode superadded to it unless that be individuated for a â—erson doth imply an individual Nature and not a mere relative Mode Is this sufficient to charge such a Person with the Sabellian Heresy which he utterly disowns Is not the like Equity to be shewâ—d in another though different Explication Suppose then a Person solemnly professes to own the fundamental Doctrine of the Trinity as much as any others but he thinks that three Persons must have distinct Substances to make them Persons but so as to make no Division or Separation in the Godhead and that he cannot conceive a Communication of the divine Essence
without this must this presently be run down as Heresie when he asserts at the same time three Persons in the same undivided Essence But this is said to be a Contradiction so it was in the other case and not allow'd then and why should it be otherwise in this I speak not this to justifie such Explications but to shew that there is a difference between the Heresie of denying an Article and a mistake in the Explication of it Even the greatest Heresie-makers in the world distinguish between Heresies and erroneous Explications of Articles of Faith as any one may find that looks into them And even the Inquisitors of Heresie themselves allow the distinction between Heresie and an erroneous Proposition in Faith which amounts to the same with a mistaken Explication of it and they all grant that there may be Propositions that tend to Heresie or savour of it which cannot be condemned for Heretical And even Pegna condemns Melchior Canus for being too cruel in asserting it to be Heresie to contradict the general Sense of Divines because the Schools cannot make Heresies 2. It is frequently and solemnly affirmed by him That the Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible inseparable Unity that there is but one divine Nature which is originally in the Father and is substantially communicated by the Father to the Son as a distinct subsisting Person by an eternal ineffable Generation and to the Holy Ghost by an eternal and substantial Procession from Father and Son Do the others who maintain a Trinity deny this By no means For we have already seen that they assert the same thing So that they are fully agreed as to the main fundamental Article And even the Unitarians yield that from the beginning he asserted That the three divine Persons are in one undivided Substance Wherein then lies the foundation of this mighty Quarrel and those unreasonable Heats that Men have fallen into about it to the great scandal of our Church and Religion In short it is this that the same Author asserts 1. That it is gross Sabellianism to say That there are not three personal Minds or Spirits or Substances 2. That a distinct substantial Person must have a distinct Substance of his own proper and peculiar to his own Person But he owns that although there are three distinct Persons or Minds each of whom is distinctly and by himself God yet there are not three Gods but one God or one Divinity which he saith is intirely and indivisibly and inseparably in three distinct Persons or Minds That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by the Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Division or Separation and so it remains one still This is the substance of this new Explication which hath raised such Flames that Injunctions from authority were thought necessary to suppress them But those can reach no farther than the restraint of Mens Tongues and Pens about these matters and unless something be found out to satisfie their Minds and to remove Misapprehensions the present Heat may be only cover'd over and kept in which when there is a vent given may break out into a more dangerous Flame Therefore I shall endeavour to state and clear this matter so as to prevent any future Eruption thereof which will be done by considering how far they are agreed and how far the remaining difference ought to be pursued 1. They are agreed That there are three distinct Persons and but one Godhead 2. That there are no separate and divided Substances in the Trinity but the divine Nature is wholly and entirely one and undivided 3. That the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son and from both to the holy Spirit So that the charge of Sabellianism on those who reject this new Explication is without ground For no Sabellian did or could assert a Communication of the divine Essence Which being agreed on both sides the Dispute turns upon this single point whether a communicated Essence doth imply a distinct Substance or not On the one side it is said That there being but one God there can be but one divine Essence and if more Essences more Gods On the other side that since they own a communicated Essence necessary to make a distinction of Persons in the Son and Holy Ghost if the Essence be not distinct the foundation of distinct Personalities is taken away But how is this clear'd by the other Party They say That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost So that the Communication of the divine Nature is owned to the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost But how then comes it not to make a distinct Essence as it makes distinct Persons by being communicated The answer we see is That it is a peculiar Prerogative founded on the infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection of the divine Nature But they further add That when the Son and Holy Ghost are said to have the same divine Nature from the Father as the Origin and Fountain of the Divinity not by the Production of a new divine Nature but by a Communication of his own which is one and the same in all three without Separation Difference or Distinction that this is indeed a great Mystery which hath been always look'd upon by the greatest and wisest Men in the Church to be above all Expressions and Description So that the greatest difficulty is at last resolved into the incomprehensible Perfection of the divine Nature and that neither Man nor Angels can give a satisfactory answer to Enquiries about the manner of them And the Author of the Animadversions saith That in the divine Persons of the Trinity the divine Nature and the personal Subsistence coalesce into one by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction But do those on the other side think that the asserting three distinct Substances in one and the same individual Substance tends to clear and explain the Notion of the Trinity and make it more easie and intelligible The Divinity they say is whole intire indivisible and inseparable in all three But can one whole entire indivisible Substance be actually divided into three Substances For if every Person must have a peculiar Substance of his own and there be three Persons there must be three peculiar Substances and how can there be three peculiar Substances and yet but one entire and indivisible Substance I do not say there must be three divided Substances in place or separate Substances but they must be divided as three Individuals of the same kind which must introduce a Specifick Divine Nature which I think very
inconsistent with the divine Perfections but of this at large in the following Discourse I do not lay any force upon this argument that there can be no ground of the Distinction between the three Substances if there be but one Substance in the Godhead as some have done because the same Substance cannot both unite and distinguish them for the ground of the distinction is not the Substance but the Communication of it and where that is so freely asserted there is a reason distinct from the Substance it self which makes the Distinction of Persons But the difficulty still remains how each Person should have a Substance of his own and yet there be but one entire and indivisible Substance for every Person must have a proper Substance of his own or else according to this Hypothesis he can be no Person and this peculiar Substance must be really distinct from that Substance which is in the other two so that here must be three distinct Substances in the three Persons But how then can there be but one individual Essence in all three We may conceive one common Essence to be individuated in three Persons as it is in Men but it is impossible to conceive the same individual Essence to be in three Persons which have peculiar Substances of their own For the Substances belonging to the Persons are the same Essence individuated in those Persons and so there is no avoiding making three individual Essences and one specifick or common divine Nature And Maimonides his argument is considerable against more Gods than one If saith he there be two Gods there muâ—t be something wherein they agree and something wherein they differ that wherein they agree must be that which makes each of them God and that wherein they differ must make them two Gods Now wherein doth this differ from the present Hypothesis There is something wherein they differ and that is their proper Substance but Maimonides thought that wherein they differ'd sufficient to make them two Gods So that I fear it will be impossible to clear this Hypothesis as to the reconciling three individual Essences with one individual divine Essence which looks too like asserting that there are three Gods and yet but one And the Author of this Explicaâ—ion doth at last confess that three distinct whole inseparable Same 's are hard to conceive as to the manner of it Now to what purpose are new Explications started and Disputes raised and carried on so warmly about them if after all the main difficulty be confess'd to be above our Comprehension We had much better satisfie our selves with that Language which the Church hath receivâ—d and is express'd in the Creeds than go about by new Terms to raise new Ferments especially at a time when our united Forces are most necessary against our common Adversaries No wise and good Men can be fond of any new Inventions when the Peace of the Church is hazarded by them And on the other side it is as dangerous to make new Heresies as new Explications If any one denies the Doctrine contained in the Nicene Creed that is no new Heresie but how can such deny the Son to be consubstantial to the Father who assert one and the same indivisible Substance in the Father and the Son But they may contradict themselves That is not impossible on either side But doth it follow that they are guilty of Heresie Are not three Substances and but one a Contradiction No more say they than that a communicated Substance is not distinct from that which did communicate But this whole dispute we find is at last resolved into the infinite and unconceivable Perfections of the Godhead where it is most safely lodged and that there is no real Contradiction in the Doctrine it self is part of the design of the Discourse afterwards But here it will be necessary to take notice of what the Unitarians have objected against this new Explication viz. That it was condemned by the ancients in the Person of Philoponus in the middle Ages in the Person and Writings of Abhor Ioachim but more severely since the Reformation in the Person of Valentinus Gentilis who was condemned at Geneva and beheaded at Bern for this very Doctrine To these I shall give a distinct answer 1. As to Joh Philoponus I do freely own that in the Greek Church when in the sixth Century he broached his opinion That every Hypostasis must have the common Nature individuated in it this was look'd upon as a Doctrine of dangerous consequence both with respect to the Trinity and Incarnation The latter was the first occasion of it for as Leontius observes the dispute did not begin about the Trinity but about the Incarnation and Philoponus took part with those who asserted but one Nature in Christ after the Vnion and he went upon this ground That if there were two Natures there must be two Hypostases because Nature and Hypostasis were the same Then those on the Churches side saith Leontius objected That if they were the same there must be three distinct Natures in the Trinity as there were three Hypostases which Philoponus yielded and grounded himself on Aristotle's Doctrine that there was but one common Substance and several individual Substances and so held it was in the Trinity whence he was called the leader of the Heresie of the Tritheius This is the account given by Leontius who lived very â—ear his time A. D. 620. The same is affirmed of him by Nicephorus and that he wrote a Book on purpose about the Vnion of two Natures in Christ out of which he produces his own words concerning a common and individual Nature which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which can agree to none else And the main argument he went upon was this that unless we assert a singular Nature in the Hypostases we must say that the whole Trinity was incarnate as unless there be a singular humane Nature distinct from the common Christ must assume the whole Nature of Mankind And this argument from the Incarnation was that which made Roscelin in the beginning of the disputing Age A. D. 1093 to assert That the three Persons were three things distinct from each other as three Angels or three Men because otherwise the Incarnation of the second Person could not be understood as appears by Anselm's Epistles and his Book of the Incarnation written upon that occasion But as Aâ—selm shews at large if this argument hold it must prove the three Persons not only to be distinct but separate and divided Subâ—â—ances which is directly contrary to this new Explication and then there is no avoiding Tritheism But to return to Joh. Philoponus who saith Nicephorus divided the indivisible Nature of God into three Individuals as among Men Which saith he is repugnant to the Sense of the Christian Church and he produces the Testimony of Gregory Nazianzen against it and adds that Leontius and Georgius Pisides confuted
Philoponus But in that divided time there were some called Theodosiani who made but one Nature and one Hypostasis and so fell in with the Sabellians but others held That there was one immutable divine Essence but each Person had a distinct individual Nature which the rest charged with Tritheism Which consequence they utterly rejected because although they held three distinct Natures yet they said They were but one God because there was but one invariable Divinity in them Nicephorus saith that Conon's Followers rejected Philoponus but Photius mentions a conference between Conon and others aâ—out Philoponus wherein he defends him against other Severians Photius grants that Conon and his Followers held a consubstantial Trinity and the Unity of the Godhead and so far they were Orthodox but saith They were far from it when they asserted proper and peculiar Substances to each Person The difference between Conon and Philoponus about this point for Conon wrote against Philoponus about the Resurrection seems to have been partly in the Doctrine but chiefly in the consequence of it for these rejected all kind of Tritheism which Philoponus saw well enough must follow from his Doctrine but he denied any real Division or Separation in those Substances as to the Deity Isidore saith That the Tritheists owned three Gods as well as three Persons and that if God be said to be Triple there must follow a Plurality of Gods But there were others called Triformiani of whom S. Augustin speaks Who held the three Persons to be three distinct parts which being united made one God which saith he is repugnant to the divine Perfection But among these Severians there were three several opinions 1. Of Philoponus who held one common Nature and three Individual 2. Of those who said there was but one Nature and one Hypostasis 3. Of those who affirm'd there were three distinct Natures but withal that there was but one indivisible Godhead and these differ'd from Philoponus in the main ground of Tritheism which was that he held the common Nature in the Trinity to be only a specifick Nature and such as it is among Men. For Philoponus himself in the words which Nicephorus produces doth assert plainly that the common Nature is separated from the Individuals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a mere act of the Mind so that he allow'd no individual Vnity in the divine Nature but what was in the several Persons as the common Nature of Man is a Notion of the Mind as it is abstracted from the several Individuals wherein alone it really subsists so that here is an apparent difference between the Doctrine of Joh. Philoponus and the new Explication for herein the most real essential and indivisible Unity of the divine Nature is asserted and it is said to be no Species because it is but one and so it could not be condemned in Joh. Philoponus 2. We now come to Abbat Joachim whose Doctrine seems to be as much mistaken as it is represented in the Decretal where the Condemnation of it by the Lateran Council is extant But here I cannot but observe what great Authority these Unitarians give to this Lateran Council as if they had a Mind to set up Transubstantiation by it which they so often parallel with the Trinity Thence in their late Discourse they speak of it as the most general Council that was ever called and that what was there defined it was made Heresie to oppose it But by their favour we neither own this to have been a general Council nor that it had Authority to make that Heresie which was not so before But that Council might assert the Doctrine of the Trinity truly as it had been receiv'd and condemn the opinion of Joachim justly But what it was they do not or would not seem to understand Joachim was a great Enthusiast but no deep Divine as Men of that Heat seldom are and he had many Disputes with Peter Lombard in his Life as the Vindicator of Joachim confesses After his Death a Book of his was found taxing Peter Lombard with some strange Doctrine about the Trinity wherein he called him Heretick and Madman this Book was complained of in the Lateran Council and upon Examination it was sound that instead of charging Peter Lombard justly he was fallen into Heresie himself which was denying the essential Vnity of the three Persons and making it to be Vnity of Consent He granted that they were one Essence one Nature one Substance but how Not by any true proper Unity but Similitudinary and Collective as they called it as many Men are one People and many Believers make one Church Whence Thomas Aquinas saith that Joachim fell into the Arian Heresie It is sufficient to my purpose that he denied the individual Vnity of the divine Essence which cannot be charged on the Author of the new Explication and so this comes not home to the purpose 3. But the last charge is the most terrible for it not only sets down the Heresie but the capital punishment which follow'd it Yet I shall make it appear notwithstanding the very warm Prosecution of it by another hand that there is a great difference between the Doctrine of Valentinus Gentilis and that which is asserted in this Explication 1. In the Sentence of his Condemnation it is expressed That he had been guilty of the vilest Scurrility and most horrid Blasphemies against the Son of God and the glorious Mystery of the Trinity But can any thing of this Nature be charged upon one who hath not only written in Defence of it but speaks of it with the highest Veneration 2. In the same Sentence it is said That he acknowledged the Father only to be that infinite God which we ought to worship which is plain Blasphemy against the Son But can any Men ever think to make this the same case with one who makes use of that as one of his chief arguments That the three Persons are to be worshipped with a distinct divine Worship 3. It is charged upon him That he called the Trinity a mere human Invention not so much as known to any Catholick Creed and directly contrary to the Word of God But the Author here charged hath made it his business to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity to be grounded on Scripture and to vindicate it from the Objections drawn from thence against it 4. One of the main Articles of his charge was That he made three Spirits of different Order and Degree that the Father is the one only God by which the Son and Holy Ghost are excluded manifestly from the Unity of the Godhead But the Person charged with his Heresie saith The Reason why we must not say three Gods is because there is but one and the same Divinity in them all and that entirely indivisibly inseparably But it is said that although there may be some differences yet they agree in asserting
God that he saith The Consequence must be that the three Persons must be three Gods as three humane Persons are three Men. And in another place That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are One in the same individual Nature And what saith Curcellaeus to these places for he was aware of them To the latter he saith That by individual he means Specifick This is an extraordinary Answer indeed But what Reason doth he give for it Because they are not divided in Place or Time but they may have their proper Essences however But where doth S. Augustin give any such Account of it He often speaks upon this Subject but always gives another Reason viz. because they are but One and the same Substance The Three Persons are but One God because they are of One Substance and they have a perfect Vnity because there is no Diversity of Nature or of Will But it may be said That here he speaks of a Diversity of Nature In the next Words he explains himself that the three Persons are One God propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis but the Union of three Persons in one Specifick Nature is no ineffable Conjunction it being one of the commonest things in the World and in the same Chapter propter Individuam Deitatem unus Deus est propter uniuscujusque Proprietatem tres Personae sunt Here we find one Individual Nature and no difference but in the peculiar Properties of the Persons In the other place he is so express against a Specifick Vnity that Curcellaeus his best Answer is That in that Chapter he is too intricate and obscure i. e. He doth not to speak his Mind Thus much I thought fit to say in Answer to those undeniable Proofs of Curcellaeus which our Vnitarians boast so much of and whether they be so or not let the Reader examine and judge CHAP. VII The Athanasian Creed clear'd from Contradictions III. I Now come to the last thing I proposed viz. to shew That it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in the Trinity and but one God and for that purpose I shall examine the charge of Contradictions on the Athanasian Creed The summ of the first Articles say they is this The one true God is three distinct Persons and three distinct Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost are the one true God Which is plainly as if a Man should say Peter James and John being three Persons are one Man and one Man is these three distinct Persons Peter James and John Is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous Indignity to go about thus to make Asses of all Mankind under pretence of teaching them a Creed This is very freely spoken with respect not merely to our Church but the Christian World which owns this Creed to be a just and true Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity But there are some Creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking as for their Stupidity And is not this great skill in these Matters to make such a Parallel between three Persons in the Godhead and Peter Iames and Iohn Do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect Being and such finite limited Creatures as Individuals among Men are Do they suppose the divine Nature capable of such Division and Separation by Individuals as human Nature is No they may say but ye who hold three Persons must think so For what reason We do assert three Persons but it is on the account of divine Revelation and in such a manner as the divine Nature is capable of it For it is a good rule of Boethius Talia sunt praedicata qualia subjecta permiserint We must not say that there are Persons in the Trinity but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine Nature and if that be not capable of Division and Separation then the Persons must be in the same undivided Essence The next Article is Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance But how can we say they not confound the Persons that have as ye say but one numerical Substance And how can we but divide the Substance which we find in three distinct divided Persons I think the terms numerical Substance not very proper in this case and I had rather use the Language of the Fathers than of the Schools and some of the most judicious and learned Fathers would not allow the terms of one numerical Substance to be applied to the divine Essence For their Notion was That Number was only proper for compound Bâ—ings but God being a pure and simple Being was one by Nature and not by Number as S. Basil speaks as is before observed because he is not compounded nor hath any besides himself to be reckon'd with him But because there are different Hypostases therefore they allow'd the use of Number about them and so we may say the Hypostases or Persons are numerically different but we cannot say that the Essence is one Numerically But why must they confound the Persons if there be but one Essence The relative Properties cannot be confounded for the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father and on these the difference of Persons is founded For there can be no difference as to essential Properties and therefore all the difference or rather distinction must be from those that are Relative A Person of it self imports no Relation but the Person of the Father or of the Son must and these Relations cannot be confounded with one another And if the Father cannot be the Son nor the Son the Father then they must be distinct from each other But how By dividing the Substance That is impossible in a Substance that is indivisible It may be said That the Essence of created Beings is indivisible and yet there are divided Persons I grant it but then a created Essence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one Person from another which cannot be supposed in the divine Nature and withall the same power which gives a Being to a created Essence gives it a separate and divided Existence from all others As when Peter Iames and Iohn received their several distinct Personalities from God at the same time he gave them their separate Beings from each other although the same Essence be in them all But how can we but divide the Substance which we see in three distinct divided Persons The question is whether the distinct Properties of the Persons do imply a Division of the Substance We deny that the Persons are divided as to the Substance because that is impossible to be divided but we say they are and must be distinguished as to those incommunicable Properties which make the Persons distinct The essential Properties are uncapable of being divided and the Relations cannot be confounded so that there must be one undivided Substance and yet three distinct Persons But every Person must have his own proper Substance and so the
Sabellius called Persons But by this Foundation he doth not mean any distinct Essences but the incommunicable Properties belonging to them as Father Son and Holy Ghost It is plain from hence that the necessity of asserting three Hypostases came from thence that otherwise they could not so well distinguish themselves from the Sabellians whose Doctrine they utterly disowned as well as Arianism and Iudaism and it appears by the Testimonies of Athanasius Gregory Nazianzen and S. Basil that they look'd on one as bad as the other and they commonly joyn Iudaism and Sabellianism together But yet there arose Difficulties whether they were to hold one Hypostasis or three The former insisted on the generally received Sense of Hypostasis for Substance or Essence and therefore they could not hold three Hypostases without three distinct Essences as the Platonists and Marcionists held Upon this a Synod was called at Alexandria to adjust this matter where both Parties were desired to explain themselves Those who held three Hypostases were asked Whether they maintained three Hypostases as the Arians did of different Substances and separate Subsistences as Mankind and other Creatures are Or as other Hereticks three Principles or three Gods All which they stedfastly denied Then they were asked Why they used those terms They answered Because they believed the Holy Trinity to be more than mere Names and that the Father and Son and Holy Ghost had a real Subsistence belonging to them but still they held but one Godhead one Principle and the Son of the same Substance with the Father and the Holy Ghost not to be a Creature but to bear the same proper and inseparable Essence with the Father and the Son Then the other side were asked When they asserted but one Hypostasis whether they held with Sabellius or not and that the Son and Holy Ghost had no Essence or Subsistence which they utterly denied but said that their meaning was That Hypostasis was the same with Substance and by one Hypostasis they intended no more but that the Father Son and Holy Ghost were of the same individual Substance for the Words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so they held but one Godhead and one divine Nature and upon these terms they agreed From whence it follows that the Notion of three Hypostases as it was received in the Christian Church was to be underâ—â—ood so as to be consistent with the Individual Vnity of the divine Essence And the great rule of the Christian Church was to keep in the middle between the Doctrines of Sabellius and Arius and so by degrees the Notion of three Hypostases and one Essence was look'd on in the Eastern Church as the most proper Discrimination of the Orthodox from the Sabellians and Arians But the Latin Church was not so easily brought to the use of three Hypostases because they knew no other Sense of it but for Substance or Essence and they all denied that there was any more than one divine Substance and therefore they rather embraced the Word Persona and did agree in the Name of Persons as most proper to signifie their meaning which was That there were three which had distinct Subsistences and incommunicable Properties and one and the same divine Essence And since the Notion of it is so well understood to signifie such a peculiar Sense I see no reason why any should scruple the use of it As to it s not being used in Scripture Socinus himself despises it and allows it to be no good reason For when Franciscus Davides objected That the terms of Essence and Person were not in Scripture Socinus tells him That they exposed their cause who went upon such grounds and that if the sense of them were in Scripture it was no matter whether the terms were or not Hâ—ving thus clear'd the Notion of three Persons I return to the Sense of Scripture about these matters And our Vnitarians tell us that we ought to interpret Scripture otherwise How doth that appear They give us very little encouragement to follow their Interpretations which are so new so forced so different from the general Sense of the Christian World and which I may say reflect so highly on the Honour of Christ and his Apostles i. e. by making use of such Expressions which if they do not mean what to honest and sincere Minds they appear to do must be intended according to them to set up Christ a meer Man to be a God And if such a thought as this could enter into the Mind of a thinking Man it would tempt him to suspect much more as to those Writings than there is the least colour or reason for Therefore these bold inconsiderate Writers ought to reflect on the consequence of such sort of Arguments and if they have any regard to Christianity not to trifle with Scripture as they do But say they The question only is Whether we ought to interpret Scripture when it speaks of God according to reason or not that is like Fools or like wise Men Like wise Men no doubt if they can hit upon it but they go about it as untowardly as ever Men did For is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men to take up some novel Interpretations against the general Sense of the Christian Church from the Apostles times Is this to act like wise Men to raise Objections against the Authority of the Books they cannot answer and to cry out of false Copies and Translations without reason and to render all places suspicious which make against them Is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men to make our Saviour affect to be thought a God when he knew himself to be a mere Man and by their own Confession had not his divine Authority and Power conferr'd upon him And to make his Apostles set up the Worship of a Creature when their design was to take away the Worship of all such who by Nature are not Gods Is this like wise Men to tell the World that these were only such Gods whom they had set up and God had not appointed as though there were no Real Idolatry but in giving Divine Worship without God's Command CHAP. VIII The Socinian Sense of Scripture examined BUT they must not think to escape so easily for such a groundless and presumptuous saying that they interpret the Scripture not like Fools but like Wise Men because the true sense of Scripture is really the main point between us and therefore I shall more carefully examine the Wise Sense they give of the chief places which relate to the matter in hand 1. Is this to interpret Scripture like Wise Men to make the Author to the Hebrews in one Chapter and that but a short one to bring no less than four places out of the Old Testament and according to their Sense not one of them proves that which he aimed at viz. that Christ was superiour to Angels Heb. 1.5 as will appear by the Sense they give of
thought he could not honestly conceal so fundamental a Point of the Christian Faith and which related to their being entred into the Christian Church For if the Profession of this Faith had not been look'd on as a necessary condition of being a Member of the Church of Christ it is hard to imagine that Iustin Martyr should so much insist upon it not only here but in his other Treatises Of which an Account hath been given by others Athenagoras had been a Philosopher as well as Iustin Martyr before he professed himself a Christian and therefore must be supposed to understand his Religion before he embraced it And in his Defence he asserts That the Christians do believe in Father Son and Holy Ghost in God the Father God the Son and the Holy Ghost And he mentions both the Vnity and Order which is among them Which can signifie nothing unless they be owned to be distinct Persons in the same Divine Nature And in the next Page he looks on it as thing which all Christians aspire after in another Life That they shall then know the Vnion of the Father and the Communication of the Father to the Son what the Holy Ghost is and what the Vnion and Distinction there is between the Holy Ghost the Son and the Father No man who had ever had the name of a Philosopher would have said such things unless he had believed the Doctrine of the Trinity aâ— we do i. e. that there are three distinct Persons in the same Divine Nature but that the manner of the Union and Distinction between them is above our reach and comprehension But our Vnitarians have an Answer ready for these men viz. That they came out of Plato 's School with the Tincture of his three Principles and they sadly complain that Platonism had very early corrupted the Christian Faith as to these matters In answer to which Exception I have only one Postulatum to make which is that these were honest Men and knew their own Minds beâ—t and I shall make it appear that none can more positively declare than they do that they did not take up these Notions from Plato but from the Holy Scriptures Iustin Martyr saith he took the Foundation of his Faith from thence and that he could find no certainty as to God and Religion any where else that he thinks Plato took his three Principles from Moses and in his Dialogue with Trypho he at large proves the Eternity of the Son of God from the Scriptures and said He would use no other Arguments for he pretended to no Skill but in the Scriptures which God had enabled him to understand Athenagoras declares That where the Philosophers agreed with them their Faith did not depend on them but on the Testimony of the Prophets who were inspired by the Holy Ghost To the same purpose speaks Theophilus Bishop of Antioch who asserts the Coeternity of the Son with the Father from the beginning of S. John's Gospel and saith their Faith is built on the Scriptures Clemens Alexandrinus owns not only the Essential Attributes of God to belong to the Son but that there is one Father of all and one Word over all and one Holy Ghost who is every where And he thinks Plato borrowed his three Principles from Moses that his second was the Son and his third the Holy Spirit Even Origen himsâ—lâ— highly commends Moses above Plato in his most undoubted Writings and saith That Numenâ—us went beyond Plato and that he borrowed out of the Scriptures and so he saith Plato did in other places but he adds That the Doctrines were better deliver'd in Scripture than in his Artificial Dialogues Can any one that hath the least reverence for Writers of such Authority and Zâ—al for the Christian Doctrine imagine that they wilfully corrupted it in one of the chief Articles of it and brought in new Speculations against the Sense of those Books which at the same time they professed to be the only Rule of their Faith Even where they speak most favourably of the Platonick Trinity they suppose it to be borrowed from Moses And therefore Numenius said That Moses and Plato did not differ about the first Principles and Theodoret mentions Numenius as one of those who said Plato understood the Hebrew Doctrine in Egypt and during his Thirteen years â—ay there it is hardly possible to suppose he should be ignorant of the Hebrew Doctrine about the first Principles which he was so inquisitive after especially among Nations who pretended to Antiquity And the Platonick Notion of the Divine Essence inlarging it self to three Hypostases is considerable on these Accounts 1. That it is deliver'd with so much assurance by the Opposers of Christianity such as Plotinus Porphyrius Proclus and others were known to be and they speak with no manner of doubt concerning it as may be seen in the passage of Porphyrie preserved by S. Cyril and others 2. That they took it up from no Revelation but as a Notion in it self agreeable enough as appears by the passages in Plato and others concerning it They never suspected it to be liable to the Charge of Non-Sense and Contradictions as our modern Vnitarians charge the Trinity with although their Notion as represented by Porphyrie be as liable to it How came these Men of Wit and Sense to hit upon and be so fond of such absurd Principles which lead to the Belief of Mysterious Non-Sense and Impossibilities if these Men may be trusted 3. That the Nations most renowned for Antiquity and deep Speculations did light upon the same Doctrine about a Trinity of Hypostases in the Divine Essence To prove this I shall not refer to the Trismegistick Books or the Chaldee Oracles or any doubtful Authorities but Plutarch asserts the three Hypostases to have been receivâ—d among the Persians and Porphyry and Iamblicus say the same of the Egyptians 4. That this Hypostasis did maintain its Reputation so long in the World For we find it continued to the time of Macrobius who mentâ—ons it as a reasonable Notion viz. of one supreme Being Father of all and a Mind proceeding from it and soul from Mind Some have thought that the Platonists made two created Beings to be two of the Divine Hypostases but this is contrary to what Plotinus and Porphyry affirm concerning it and it is hard to give an Account how they should then be Essentially different from Creatures and be Hypostases in the Divine Essence But this is no part of my business being concerned no farther than to clear the Sense of the Christian Church as to the Form of Baptism in the Name of the Father Son and Holy Ghost which according to the Sense of the Ante-Nicene Fathers I have proved doth manifest the Doctrine of the Trinity to have been generally receiv'd in the Christian Church 2. Let us now see what our Vnitarians object againâ—t the Proof of the Trinity from these
with deducing our Certainty of Knowledge from clear and simple Ideas I do not go about to justifie those who lay the whole stress upon that Foundation which I grant to be too weak to support so important a Truth and that those are very much to blame who go about to invalidate other Arguments for the sake of that but I doubt all this Talk about clear and distinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty came Originally from those Discourses or Meditations which are aimed at The Author of them was an ingenious Thinking man and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of Certainty as well as he could The first thing he found any certainty in was his own Existence which he founded upon the Perception of the Acts of his Mind which some call an Internal infallible Perception that we are From hence he proceeded to enquire how he came by this Certainty and he resolved it into this that he had a clear and distinct Perception of it and from hence he formed his general Rule That what he had a clear and distinct Perception of was true Which in Reason ought to go no farther than where there is the like Degree of Evidence for the Certainty here was not grounded on the clearness of the Perception but on the Plainness of the Evidence Which is of that Nature that the very Doubting of it proves it since it is impossible that any thing should doubt or question its own Being that had it not So that here it is not the Clearness of the Idea but an immediate Act of Perception which is the true ground of Certainty And this cannot extend to things without our selves of which we can have no other Perception than what is caused by the Impressions of outward Objects But whether we are to judge according to those Impressions doth not depend on the Ideas themselves but upon the Exercise of our Judgment and Reason about them which put the Difference between true and false and adequate and inadequate Ideas So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves but from the Evidence of Reason that those Ideas are true and just and consequently that we may build our Certainty upon them But the Idea of an infinite Being hath this peculiar to it that necessary Existence is implied in it This is a clear and distinct Idea and yet it is denied that this doth prove the Existence of God How then can the Grounds of our Certainty arise from clear and distinct Ideas when in one of the clearest Ideas of our Minds we can come to no Certainty by it I do not say That it is denied to prove it but this is said That it is a doubtful thing from the different make of mens Tempers and Application of their thoughts What can this mean unless it be to let us know that even clear and distinct Ideas may lose their Effect by the difference of mens Tempers and Studies so that besides Ideas in order to a right Judgment a due Temper and Application of the mind is required And wherein is this different from what all men of Understanding have said Why then should these clear and simple Ideas be made the sole Foundation of Reason One would think by this that these Ideas would presently satisfie mens Minds if they attended to them But even this will not do as to the Idea of an infinite Being It is not enough to say They will not examine how far it will hold for they ought either to say that it doth hold or give up this Ground of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas But instead of the proper Argument from Ideas we are told That from the Consideration of our selves and what we find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being All which I readily yield but we see plainly the Certainty is not placed in the Idea but in good and sound Reason from the Consideration of our selves and our Constitutions What! in the Idea of our Selves No certainly for let our Idea be taken which way we please by Sensation or Reflection yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our Selves But we find in our selves Perception and Knowledge It 's very true but how doth this prove that there is a God It is from the clear and distinct Idea of it No but from this Argument That either there must have been a knowing Being from Eternity or an unknowing for something must have been from Eternity but if an unknowing then it was impossible there ever should have been any knowledge it being as impossible that a thing without knowledge should produce it as that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones Allowing the Argument to be good yet it is not taken from the Idea but from Principles of true Reason as That no man can doubt his own Perception that every thing must have a Cause that this Cause must either have Knowledge or not if it have the Point is gained if it hath not nothing can produce nothing and consequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing Again If we suppose nothing to be first Matter can never begin to be if bare Matter without Motion eternal Motion can never begin to be if Matter and Motion be supposed Eternal Thought can never begin to be For if Matter could produce thought then Thought must be in the power of Matter and if it be in Matter as such it must be the inseparable Property of all matter which is contrary to the Sense and Experience of mankind If only some parts of Matter have a power of Thinking how comes so great a difference in the Properties of the same Matter What disposition of Matter is required to thinking And from whence comes it Of which no account can be given in Reason This is the Substance of the Argument used to prove an infinite spiritual Being which I am far from weakning the force of but that which I design is to shew That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas but upon the force of Reason distinct from it which was the thing I intended to prove 2. The next thing necessary to be clear'd in this Dispute is the Distinction between Nature and Person and of this we can have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity depend upon the right understanding of it For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person and the grounds of Identity and Distinction But that these come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection I shall now make it appear 1. As to Nature That is sometimes taken for the Essential
it may be observed that the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so the Mysteries related to those who were initiated and not made Epoptoe i. e. to those who did not throughly understand them although they had more knowledge of them than such as were not initiated Olympiodorus in reckoning up the Degrees of Admissions mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that they were properly Mysteries to such who knew something though there were other things farther to be discover'd but they did not yet know what they were as the Epoptoe did From hence the ancient Christian Writers did not only call the Sacraments but more abstruse Points of Faith by the name of Mysteries so S. Chrysostom calls the Resurrection a great and ineffable Mystery And Isidore Pelusiota in his Epistle to Lampetius saith That S. Paul when he speaks of the great Mystery of Godliness doth not mean that it is wholly unknown to us but that it is impossible to Comprehend it Theophylact saith it is therefore called the great Mystery of Godliness because although it be now revealed to all yet the manner of it is hidden from us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for this Reason it is called a Mystery But this is in the way of Reading let us now come to deep Reasoning and see how strongly he argues against this Sense of the Word Mysteries his Words are these They trifle then exceedingly and discover a mighty Scarcity of better Arguments who defend their Mysteries by this pitiful shift of drawing Inferences from what is unknown to what is known or of insisting upon adequate Ideas except they will agree as some do to call every Spire of Grass sitting and standing fish and flesh to be Mysteries And if out of a pertinacious or worse humour they will be still fooling and call these things Mysteries I 'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others as these are to me It is easie to guess whom these kind Words were intended for And are not these very modest and civil Expressions Trifling Fooling out of a pertinacious or worse Humour but why Fooling about Mysteries to call such things by that Name which are in some measure known but in a greater measure unknown to us and if these are real Mysteries in Nature why may not the same term be used for Matters of Faith And I think in so plain a Case no great store of Arguments need to be used But in these natural things he saith we have distinct Ideas of the Properties which make the Nominal Essence but we are absolutely ignorant of the Real Essence or intrinsick Constitution of a thing which is the ground or support of all its Properties Are not then without Trifling and Fooling these Real Essences Mysteries to them They know there are such by the Ideas of their Properties but know nothing of their Real Essence and yet they will not allow them to be Mysteries If they do understand them why do they say They do not nor cannot And if this be true let them call them what they please they must be inexplicable Mysteries to them So that all this is mere quarrelling about a Word which they would fain be rid of if they knew how but they involve and perplex themselves more by their own deep Reasonings against the Trifling and Fooling of others But he saith That some would have the most palpable Absurdities and gross Contradictions to go down or words that signifie nothing because men cannot comprehend the Essence of their own Souls nor the Essence of God and other Spiritual Substances We utterly deny that any Article of our Faith contains in it any palpable Absurdities or gross Contradictions as I hope hath been proved already as to the Doctrine of the Trinity which is chiefly struck at but surely your deep Reasoners may find a difference between gross Contradictions to our Reason and barely being above it or not having any distinct Conception of the Nature of it And that is all that we assert and which they grant as to all Substances If this be their Way of arguing they may even return to Transubstantiation again without any great lessening of their Understandings But none are so bold in attacking the Mysteries of the Christian Faith as the Smatterers in Ideas and new Terms of Philosophy without any true Understanding of them For these Ideas are become but another sort of Canting with such men and they would reason as well upon Genus and Species or upon Occult Qualities and Substantial Forms but only that they are Terms out of Fashion But we find that the change of Terms doth neither improve nor alter mens Understandings but only their Ways of speaking and ill Gamesters will not manage their Game one jot the better for having new Cards in their hands However we must see what Work they make of it Although we do not know the Nature of the Soul yet we know as much of it as we do of any thing else if not more i. e. we really know nothing by any adequate Idea of it but we must believe nothing but what we have a clear distinct Idea of Is not this a rare way of fixing the Boundaries of Faith and Reason As to God and his Attributes it is said That they are not Mysteries to us for want of an adequate Idea no not Eternity And in another place As to God we comprehend nothing better than his Attributes Let us try this by the Attribute pitched on by himself viz. Eternity We see he pretends to comprehend nothing better than the Divine Attributes and Eternity as well as any which I am very apt to believe but how doth he Comprehend Eternity Even by finding That it cannot be Comprehended Is not this Subtle and deep Reasoning But Reason he saith performs its part in finding out the true Nature of Things and if such be the Nature of the thing that it cannot be Comprehended then Reason can do no more and so it is not above Reason Was there ever such Trifling that pretended to Reason and that about the highest Matters and twith Scorn and Contempt of others whom he calls Mysterious Wits The Question is whether any thing ought to be rejected as an Article of Faith because we cannot comprehend it or have a clear and distinct Perception of it He concludes it must be so or else we overthrow Religion and the Nature of Man and the Wisdom and Goodness of God Here is an Essential Attribute of God viz. his Eternity Am I bound to believe it or not Yes doubtless But how can I comprehend this Attribute of Eternity Very easily How so Do not you comprehend that it is incomprehensible What then Doth this reach the Nature of the thing or only the manner of our Conception If the Nature
That there are three distinct eternal Spirits or Minds in the Trinity and Genebrard is brought into the same Heresie with them But Genebrard with great indignation rejects the Doctrine of Valentinus Gentilis because he held an Inequality in the Persons and denied the individual Vnity of the Godhead in them but he saith he follow'd Damascen in asserting three real Hypostases and he utterly denies Tritheism and he brings a multitude of reasons why the charge of Tritheism doth not lie against his opinion although he owns the Hypostases to be three distinct individuals but then he adds That there is an indivisible and insepâ—rable Union of the divine Nature in all three Persons Now to deal as impartially in this matter as may be I do not think our understandings one jot helped in the Notion of the Trinity by this Hypothesis but that it is liable to as great difficulties as any other and therefore none ought to be fond of it or to set it against the general Sense of others and the current Expressions of Divines about these Mysteries nor to call the different opinions of others Heresie or Nonsense which are provoking Words and tend very much to inflame Mens Passions because their Faith and Vnderstanding are both call'd in question which are very tender things But on the other side a difference ought to be made between the Heresie and Blasphemy of Valentinus Gentilis and the opinion of such who maintain the individual and indivisible Unity of the Godhead but withal believe that every Person hath an individual Substance as a Person and that Sabellianism cannot be avoided otherwise Wherein I think they are mistaken and that the Fathers were of another opinion and that our Church owns but one Substance in the Godhead as the Western Church always did which made such difficulty about receiving three Hypostases because they took Hypostasis for a Substance but yet I see no reason why those who assert three Hypostases and mean three individual Substances should be charged with the Heresie of Valentinus Gentilis or so much as with that of Abbaâ— Joachim or Philoponus because they all rejected the individual Unity of the divine Nature which is constantly maintained by the Defenders of the other Hypothesis But it is said and urged with vehemency that these two things are inconsistent with each other that it is going forward and backward being Orthodox in one Breath and otherwise in the next that all this looks like shuffling and concealing the true meaning and acting the old Artifices under a different Form For the Samosatenians and Arians when they were pinched seem'd very Orthodox in their Expressions but retained their Heresies still in their Minds and there is reason to suspect the same Game is playing over again and we cannot be too cautious in a matter of such Consequence I grant very great caution is needfull but the mixture of some Charity with it will do no hurt Why should we suspect those to be inwardly false and to think otherwise than they speak who have shew'd no want of Courage and Zeal at a time when some thought it Prudence to say nothing and never call'd upon their Superiours then to own the cause of God and to do their Duties as they have now done and that in no very obliging manner And if the same Men can be cool and unconcerned at some times when there was so great reason to be otherwise and of a sudden grow very warm and even to boil over with Zeal the World is so ill natur'd as to be too apt to conclude there is some other cause of such an alteration than what openly appears But there is a kind of bitter Zeal which is so fierce and violent that it rather inflames than heals any Wounds that are made and is of so malignant a Nature that it spreads and eats like a Cancer and if a stop were not given to it it might endanger the whole Body I am very sensible how little a Man consults his own ease who offers to interpose in a dispute between Men of Heat and Animosity but this moves me very little when the interest of our Church and Religion is concerned which ought to prevail more than the fear of displeasing one or other Party or it may be both I do heartily wish that all who are equally concerned in the common Cause would lay aside Heats and Prejudices and hard Words and consider this matter impartially and I do not question but they will see cause to judge as I do that the difference is not so great as our Adversaries for their own advantage make it to be And since both sides yield that the matter they dispute about is above their reach the wisest course they can take is to assert and defend what is revealed and not to be too peremptory and quarrelsom about that which is acknowledged to be above our comprehension I mean as to the manner how the three Persons partake of the divine Nature It would be of the most fatal consequence to us if those Weapons which might be so usefully imploy'd against our common Adversaries should still be turned upon one another I know no manner of advantage they have against us but from thence and this is it which makes them write with such Insolence and Scorn towards those who are far their Superiours in Learning and Wit as well as in the Goodness of their cause And is it possible that some of our most skilfull Fencers should play Prizes before them who plainly animate them against each other for their own Diversion and Interest Sometimes one hath the better sometimes the other and one is cried up in Opposition to the other but taken alone is used with the greatest Contempt One Man's work is said to be learned and accurate and the more because it follows that he concerns not himself with the Socinians The wiser Man no doubt for that Reason At another time it is called the Birth of the Mountains and the Author parallel'd with no less a Man than Don Quixot and his elaborate Writings with his Adventures and they ridicule his Notion of Modes as if they were only so many Gambols and Postures And then for his Adversary they hearten and incourage him all they can they tell him He must not allow to the other the least Title of all he contends for least their sport should be spoiled and to comfort him they tell him that his Adversary is a Socinian at bottom and doth not know it that all his Thingums Modes Properties are only an Addition of Words and Names and not of Persons properly so called and that his whole Scheme is nothing but Socinianism drest up in the absurd Cant of the Schools That his Book hath much more Scurrility than Argument that his usage of him was barbarous and a greater Soloecism in manners than any he accuses him of in Grammar or Speech and in short That
have these to God but as he is the Maker of them Number belongs to material and circumscribed Beings but saith he the most perfect Vnity is to be conceived in the most simple and incomprehensible Essence Where it is observable that he uses those Words which are allow'd to express the most perfect and singular Unity Which Petavius himself confesseth that they can never be understood of a specifick Nature and Curcellaeus cannot deny That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being added to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth restrain the Sense more to a numerical Vnity as he calls it How then is it possible to understand S. Basil of more Gods than one in number And in the very same Page he mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sameness of the divine Nature by which the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is better understood But Curcellaeus will have no more than a specifick Vnity understood Before he said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would have signified more but now he finds it used the case is alter'd So that the Fathers could not mean any other than a specifick Vnity let them use what expressions they pleas'd But these I think are plain enough to any one that will not shut his Eyes In an other place S. Basil makes the same Objection and gives the same answer One God the Father and one God the Son how can this be and yet not two Gods Because saith he the Son hath the very same Essence with the Father Not two Essences divided out of one as two Brothers but as Father and Son the Son subsisting as from the Father but in the same individual Essence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But Curcellaeus hath one fetch yet viz. That S. Basil denied God to be one in Number and made him to be one in Nature because he look'd on a specifick Vnity or Vnity of Nature as more exact than numerical S. Basil look'd on the divine Nature as such to have the most perfect Vnity because of its Simplicity and not in the least speaking of it as a specifick Vnity but Curcellaeus himself calls this an Vnity by a mere Fiction of the Mind and can he imagine this to have been more accurate than a real Unity These are hard shifts in a desperate cause After all our Vnitarians tell us That S. Basil doth against Eunomius allow a distinction in Number with respect to the Deity But how As to the Essence By no means For he asserts the perfect Vnity thereof in the same place even the Vnity of the Substance But as to the characteristical Properties of the Persons he allows of Number and no farther But say they This is to make one God as to essential Properties and three as to Personal How can that be when he saith so often there can be but one God because there can be but one divine Essence and therefore those properties can only make distinct Hypostases but not distinct Essences And is this indeed the great Secret which this bold Man as they call him hath discover'd I think those are much more bold I will not say impudent who upon such slight grounds charge him with asserting more Gods than one in Number But Gregory Nyssen saith Curcellaeus speaks more plainly in his Epistle to Ablabius for saith he To avoid the difficulty of making three Gods as three Individuals among Men are three Men he answers that truly they are not three Men because they have but one common Essence which is exactly one and indivisible in it self however it be dispersed in Individuals the same he saith is to be understood of God And this Petavius had charged him with before as appears by Curcellaeus his Appendix This seems the hardest passage in Antiquity for this purpose to which I hope to give a satisfactory answer from Gregory Nyssen himself 1. It cannot be denied that he asserts the Vnity of Essence to be Indivisible in it self and to be the true ground of the Denomination of Individuals as Peter hath the name of a Man not from his individual Properties whereby he is distinguished from Iames and Iohn but from that one indivisible Essence which is common to them all but yet receives no Addition or Diminution in any of them 2. He grants a Division of Hypostases among Men notwithstanding this Indivisibility of one common Essence For saith he among Men although the Essence remain one and the same in all without any Division yet the several Hypostases are divided from each other according to the individual Properties belonging to them So that here is a double consideration of the Essence as in it self so it is one and indivisible as it subsists in Individuals and so it is actually divided according to the Subjects For although the Essence of a Man be the same in it self in Peter Iames and Iohn yet taking it as in the Individuals so the particular Essence in each of them is divided from the rest And so Philoponus took Hypostasis for an Essence individuated by peculiar Properties and therefore asserted that where-ever there was an Hypostasis there must be a distinct Essence and from hence he held the three Persons to have three distinct Essences 3. We are now to consider how far Gregory Nyssen carried this whether he thought it held equally as to the divine Hypostasis and that he did not appears to me from these arguments 1. He utterly denies any kind of Division in the divine Nature for in the conclusion of that Discourse he saith it is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Word often used by the Greek Fathers on this occasion from whence Athanasius against Macedonius inferr'd an Identity and Caesarius joyns 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so S. Basil uses it but he adds another Word which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Indivisible Yes as all Essences are indivisible in themselves but they may be divided in their Subjects as Gregory Nyssen allows it to be in Men. I grant it but then he owns a Division of some kind which he here absolutely denies as to the divine Nature for his words are that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any consideration whatsoever Then he must destroy the Hypostases Not so neither for he allows that there is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Hypostases however For he proposes the Objection himself That by allowing no difference in the divine Nature the Hypostases would be confounded To which he answers That he did not deny their difference which was founded in the relation they had to one another which he there explains and that therein only consists the difference of the Persons Which is a very considerable testimony to shew that both Petavius and Curcellaeus mistook Gregory Nyssen's meaning But there are other arguments to prove it 2. He asserts such a difference between the divine and human Persons as is unanswerable viz. the Vnity of Operation For saith he
of the thing be that it cannot be comprehended then you rightly understand the Nature of the thing and so it is not above your Reason Let the Case be now put as to the Trinity do you believe the Doctrine of it as of Divine Revelation No God hath given me the Nature and Faculties of a Man and I can believe nothing which I cannot have a distinct and clear Idea of otherwise I must have new Faculties Will you hold to this Principle Then you must believe nothing which you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of Very true But can you have a clear and distinct Idea of what you cannot comprehend A clear Idea is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident Perception A distinct Idea is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others Is this right Yes But can you have a full and evident Perception of a thing so as to difference it from all others when you grant it to be Incomprehensible If you have a full Perception of it you comprehend its Nature and especially if you can difference it from all other things but when you say its Nature is Incomprehensible and yet believe it you must deny it to be necessary to Faith to have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing proposed And if it be repugnant to your Faculties to reject the Trinity because you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of it for the same Reason you must unavoidably reject his Eternity and all other Attributes which have Infinity joyned with them But we must stop here because this admirable Undertaker hath said That he despairs not of rendring Eternity and Infinity as little Mysterious as that three and two make five And till then I take my leave of him And so I return to our professed Vnitarians who in answer to my Sermon fell upon the same Subject and it is necessary that I consider so much as tends to the clearing of it In my Sermon I had urged this Argument to prove that we may be bound to believe some things that are Incomprehensible to us because the Divine Nature and Attributes are acknowledged to be so and I had said 1. That there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the Trinity and Incarnation than there is of Eternity Not but that there is great Reason to believe it but from hence it appears that our Reason may oblige us to believe some things which it is not possible for us to comprehend And what say our Vnitarians to this They Charge my Notion of Eternity as they call it with a Contradiction The best way of proceeding will be to set down my own Words which are these We know that either God must have been for ever or it is impossible he ever should be for if he should come into being when he was not he must have some Cause of his Being and that which was the first Cause would be God But if he was for ever he must be from himself and what Notion or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it To this say they To say a Person or Thing is from it self is a Contradiction it implies this Contradiction it was before it was And they are sorry an Eternal God must be a Contradiction What a false and spiteful Inference is this But it had look'd like very deep Reasoning if I had said That God was the cause of himself For that would have implied the Contradiction he had charged it with but I had expressly excluded his being from any Cause and the thing I urged was only the Impossibility of our having a clear and distinct Conception of Eternity For if he could have no Cause what could we think of his being Eternal If to be from himself as a Cause be unconceivable as I grant it is then it proves what I designed that we cannot have any distinct Idea of Eternity But to be from himself in the Sense generally understood is a meer Negative Expression for no Men were such Fools to imagine any thing could be before it self and in this Sense only Learned Men have told us that it is to be understood by those ancient and modern Writers who have used that Expression As when S. Ierom saith That God is self Originated and S. Augustin that God is the Cause of his own Wisdom and Lactantius that God made himself all these and such like Expressions are only to be Negatively understood But I confess I aimed at shewing that it was impossible for us to have any clear and distinct Idea of Eternity and therefore I took in all possible ways of conceiing it either by Gods being from himself or his Co-existing with all differences of Time without any Succession in his own Being or his having a successive Duration From all which I argued the Impossibility of a clear Notion of Eternity And now what do these Men do They dispute against one of these Notions and very triumphantly expose as they think the Absurdities of it And what then Why then this Notion will not do But I say none will do I prove there can be no successive Duration in a Being of necessary Existence and that it is not to be conceived how without Succession God should be present with the Being and not Being the Promise and Performance of the same thing and yet one of these ways we must make use of From whence I concluded That all we can attain to is a full Satisfaction of our Reason concerning God's Eternity although we can form no distinct Conception of it in our Minds But when these Men instead of answering the Argument from all the Notions of Eternity only dispute against one Notion of it they apparently shew the weakness of their Cause if it will bear no other Defences but such as this For I take it that the main Debate in point of Reason depends upon this whether we can be certain of the Being of a Thing of which we can have no clear and distinct Idea If we may then it can be no Objection in point of Revelation that we can have no clear and distinct Idea of the Matter revealed since there can be no Reason to tie us up stricter in Point of Revelation than we are without it If we can be certain in Reason of many things we can have no such Ideas of what imaginable Reason can there be that a Point of Faith should be rejected on that account 2. I urged another Attribute of God viz. his Spirituality for the same Reason viz. that we are satisfied in point of Reason that God must be a Spirit and yet we cannot have a clear distinct positive Notion of a Spirit And what answer do they give to this As wise as the former Why truly I had no cause to object this against them because they own the Spirituality of God's Nature and none since Biddle have denied it Very well but doth my argument proceed
upon that or upon the not having a distinct and clear Idea of a Spirit It was hardly possible for men so to mistake my meaning unless they did it because they had no other answer to give 3. I argued from God's Prescience which I do expresly assert and prove that they cannot have a distinct Notion of it nay that Socinus denied it because he could not understand it 〈…〉 they tell me I cannot defend our 〈…〉 against theirs without finding Contraâ—â—â—tions in Godâ—s Eternity and Foreknowledge If this be the Ingenuity and Justice and Charity of the Vnitarians commend me to the honest-hearted Deists if there be any such as they assure us there are One had better be charged with Trifling and Fooling with Mysteries than with undermining the main foundations of Religion by charging them with Contradictions But nothing could be farther from my Thoughts than any thing tending that way And such a base Calumny is too much honoured with a Confutation But do they offer to clear the difficulty and give us a clear and distinct Idea of Godâ—s fore-knowing future Events without a certain Cause to make them future Nothing like it For the question is not Whether a thing be necessary because God foresees it as certain as they suppose But how of a thing merely possible it comes to be certain without a certain Cause and how a thing which hath no certain Cause can be certainly foreknown and what clear and distinct Notion we can have of this in our Minds If they had answer'd this they had said something to the purpose To resolve all into God's infinite Wisdom is a good answer from us but not from them For we think it our Duty to satisfie our selves with what God hath revealed without prying into the manner of things above our Comprehension but these Men who will receive nothing but what they have clear and distinct Ideas of ought to shew the manner of this or else we must be excused on the same reason if we allow the manner of the divine Subsistences in the same Essence to be above our Comprehension 4. I shew'd how unreasonable their demands were when the Nature of God is owned to be incomprehensible and his Perfections infinite And now of a sudden they are quite turned about for before they were only for fencing and warding off Blows but at last they come to the point and own the being of God to be comprehensible by them and that they have clear and distinct Ideas of God's infinite Attributes This is indeed to the purpose if they can make these things out But Fencers have many tricks and I wish we find none here I had said That in consequence to the Assertion that nothing is to be believ'd but what may be comprehended the very Being of God must be rejected too because his Being is incomprehensible and so they must reject one God as well three Persons To this they reply That to comprehend the Being or Existence of God is only this to comprehend that God is and if we cannot comprehend that all Religion ceases Is not this a fine turn What I said of God as to the Perfections of his Nature they will have it understood of his bare Existence which I do not mention When God is said to be an incomprehensible Being who before them did understand the meaning to be That we cannot comprehend that there is a God This is not mere trifling for it looks like something worse and yet they presently after say That to comprehend a thing is to have a clear adequate Conception of it And will they pretend to have such a one of the divine Essence when they confess but a little before That we converse every day with very many things none of which we comprehend and that I might have spared my pains in proving it But what can be the meaning of these sayings They cannot comprehend the common Natures of things nor have a clear and distinct Idea of them but they can comprehend an infinite Being whom all Mankind own to be incomprehensible But as to divine Attributes they say They have clear distinct and adequate Conceptions of them and instance in Eternity Power Wisdom and Iustice. We do not deny that in such Attributes which we apply to God because we find them to be Perfections in us we have a distinct and clear Perception of them as they are consider'd in themselves for that is the reason why we attribute them to God But for such as peculiarly belong to God as Eternity doth and for the degrees of other Attributes as they belong to him as they are infinite so they are above our Comprehension 1. As to Eternity say they it is a clear and distinct Notion of Eternity to say it is a duration without beginning and without end But we can have no clear and distinct Notion of Duration when applied to a Being that hath necessary Existence For Duration they say consists in a Succession And what Succession can there be in a Being which always is the same if there were no difference of times i. e. God was the same Being before time was and is the very same Being under all the differences of times he hath not any other Duration now than he had before and what Succession could there be where there was no time But we make use of Duration with respect to things done in time and for the help of our undâ—â—standings apply the measure of time to divine Acts. But in a necessary Existence there can be no past present or to come and in a successive Duration there must be conceived a longer continuance from time to time which is repugnant to the Notion of a Being which always is So that if we cannot conceive Eternity wiâ—hout Duration nor Duration without Succession nor can apply Succession to a Being which hath necessary Existence then we can have no clear and distinct Notion of God's Eternity 2. As to the Infiniteness of God's Perfections they say That although the Mind be in it self finite yet it hath an infinite Comprehension for what is finite with respect to its Extension of parts may be infinite in other respects and with respect to some of its Powers But how doth it appear that we have any Power to comprehend what is infinite All the Power we have extends only to adding and enlarging our Ideas without bounds i. e. we can put no stop to our apprehensions but still they may go farther than we can possibly think but is this an infinite Comprehension So far from it that this shews our Capacities to be finite because our Ideas cannot go so far as our Reason For our Reason tells us we can never go so far but we may still go farther but it is impossible for our understanding to have distinct Ideas of the infinite moments in an eternal Succession of the utmost Bounds of Immensity or of the extent of infinite Power and Knowledge since