what end then did he run on in a long ramble of Doubting when as the very first Act of Doubting would have done his whole business and have prov'd that he is If it be pretended that Ego cogito was more comprehensive than Ego dubito because Doubting is one Head or sort of Thinking then his Argument should have been put thus Dubito ergo cogito as we argue from Est Homo which is one kind of Animal to Ergo est Animal whereas he takes and pursues a quite different Method 2dly He infers his First Principle Ego sum and so makes it a kind of Conclusion which is clearly against the Nature of First Principles they being Self-evident and therefore Incapable of being Inferr'd or Prov'd because there is nothing more Evident than themselves to inferr or prove them by I know Spinoza and some others of his School deny he meant an Inference but intended by these Words one positive proposition viz. Ego sum cogitans or Pâ—es cogitans But what means then the Illative particle Ergo or what sense bears it Or why did himself in his Third Meditation say expresly Ex eo quod dubito SEQUITUR me esse Again his first Principle is deny'd by himself to be Ego sum res cogitans but meerly Ego sum at which he arrives by the means of Ego cogito For in the 2d Meditation he has these words Nunquam efficiet Deceptor ille summè potens c. ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo adeò ut denique statuendum sit hoc pronunciatum Ego sum Ego existo necessariò esse verum But not to hold him too severely to his own words tho' no Man uses to express himself more clearly let his First Principle be Ego sum cogitans I object then farther against it 3dly That notwîthstanding all that can be alledg'd it must be granted he has inferr'd and prov'd that whole First Principle For was not all that anteceded to the finding it so many Discourses or Reasonings And did he not evidently inferr this to be True because all else might be doubted of If not to what purpose did he pretend he might doubt of all else For if this was Evident of it self and not needed to be Prov'd he might have propos'd it at first without making all that a-do 4thly Since he must necessarily grant that something or other is inferr'd or Prov'd by him that is follows from his Antecedent Discourses and it is evident that in his opinion something did follow thence because he discours'd or Argu'd all the while and us'd more than once the word Sequitur and no such Discourse can be but something must still follow out of what went before he ought in the First place and ere he began his Discourse or went about to speak consequentially to have been perfectly satisfy'd himself and have shown his Readers so as to put it past all Doubt what the Force of a right Consequence is and in what it consists and that himself while he discours'd did make use of such right Consequences And he should the rather have done this because Men do more frequently err in drawing Consequences than in judging that they have a Body that they see feel hear or use their other Senses all which he represents as possible to be doubted of Whereas he never starts or makes the least Doubt of his Consequences which are to bind the parts of his Discourse together all along and so bring him orderly to his First Principle nor gives any Reason why they may not be Doubted of as well as the rest nor takes care to settle that Doubt Which shows that he is not true to his own extravagant Method of settling his First Principle by Doubting of every thing till he comes at it but leaves it and consequently his First Principle which depends on it Uncertain 5thly and Lastly No man can have a Clear and Distinct Idea in which according to him all Knowledge consists of any thing following out of a First Principle unless he have a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of that Principle it self But Cartesius when in the Progress of his Thoughts he came to the settling Ego cogito or Ego sum for his First Principle had no Clear and Distinct Idea of that Principle it self therefore he could have no Clear and Distinct Idea of any thing which follow'd out of that Principle and consequently all that Method to Science laid by him is Useless to that End and Fruitless The Minor which onely can need proof is thus manifested For he had not as soon as he had arriv'd at that Principle as yet any Clear and Distinct Knowledge of the Subject of that Principle or Proposition Ego and therefore he had no such Knowledge of the Proposition or Principle it self The Antecedent is confess'd by himself in the words immediately following the place lately cited viz. Nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim ego ille qui jam necessariò sum and thence he proceeds to find after he had found his First Principle what Ego means and at length conciudes that he was praecisè res Cogitans Mens Ratio c. which Clear and Distinct Conception of himself he had not before tho' he pretended he knew his First Principle Again when he was newly come to the Knowledge of that First Principle he is put to know nothing but barely that nor could he gather this Clear Knowledge of himself from that Principle alone while it was yet Unknown It were worth our Enquiry then how and whence he had this Clear and Distinct Knowledge of himself He concludes the Soul to be a Distinct Thing from the Body because the Idea he has of it and of its Properties and Affections are clearly different from the Idea he has of the Body and its Modifications By which 't is most Evident that for want of Logick he reflects not on the Difference between the Nature and the Suppositum which has the Nature in it that is between the Essence or Nature and the Ens or Thing For if he did he would have seen that from the having Different nay Contradictory Ideas of two distinct NATURES it does not necessarily follow that they must be two THINGS meaning by Thing the Suppositum Surely he has a vastly Different Idea of the Divine and Human Natures and yet will grant that they were both in One Suppositum or which is the same in an Intelligent Being in the same Person And I am sure if he holds the Incarnation he must renounce this Principle of his that whenever he has distinct Ideas of two Natures there must be Two Individual Things or Suppositums It being one of the most Chief and most Fundamental Articles of our Christian Faith that there is in Christ our Saviour but One Hypostasis or Suppositum tho' the Essences and Properties of the Divine and Humane Nature and the Ideas as he calls it of them do still keep their
have an Entitative Union but by being join'd together as Act and Power that is as Matter and Form which are the Potential Parts of an Ens and therefore are apt to compound One Ens in regard neither of them is a Thing Actually 32. And indeed if we look more narrowly into the Doctrin of the Deniers of Formal Mutation the Antiperipateticks we shall find that they have Perplex't and render'd Obscure the most Common Easie Obvious Useful and Necessary Notion which Mankind has or can have viz. the Notion of a Thing For I cannot discern that they make their First Mass of Matter to be One Natural Thing unless they fancy it to be a kind of Idea Platonica of Body existing Indeterminately or in Common For they put the Form of it to be Extension and they make this Extension to be Indeterminate that is not-Particular that is to be Extension in Common Nor can we learn of them what kind of Thing it is more than that it is barely thus Extended Which tells us indeed that it has Quantity but gives us no light of it's Intrinsecal Nature or Entity that is they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is Extended And what man living can conceive a Body which has neither Figure or Colour Density or Rarity Heat or Cold Hardness or Softness in it but meerly Extension Again I cannot see that they put those little Particles made by Motion out of that Matter to be Natural Things tho' they do Actually and Distinctly exist in Nature because they make them Principia or Elementa Rerum Naturalium and the Elements of which Things are made can no more with good Sense be called Things than Letters which are the Elements of Words can be said to be Words The Compound made up of those Particles they do indeed expresly own to be a Thing but by making it consist of Many Things I mean those Particles each of which has a peculiar Actual Existence of its own and which are not United or made One according to the Notion of Ens but only according to the Notion of some Accident which is Extrinsecal to the Notion of Ens and differs from it toto genere they cannot with any show of Reason call such a Compound A Thing or One Thing Whence according to their Hypothesis we can have no Clear Light what is to be called a Thing or what the word Thing means As for our Four Elements which perhaps they will object they either are found Pure and out of the Compound and then having an Actual Existence of their own they are truly Things Or they do not and then they are Potential parts of the Compound in which they are which and only which Exists by One Actual Existence which shows it to be One Thing and not by Many as their Compound does which makes it Many Things at least such Things as they will allow those Elements or Particles to be 33. But to give them what Satisfaction we may without Injury to Truth and withal to Clear the true Aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those School-men who make Accidents so many little Entities distinct from Substances we will confess that many of those Forms we call Qualities are Effluiums or Particles sent out from other Bodies which while they transiently affect that Body on which they light they retain their own Distinct Entities and are call'd the Particles or Vertue of the Emittent Body affecting another Body that is Passive from them But when they gain a Permanency there and by Continuity of Quantity or Similitude of Nature or any other Cause they come to be naturally Vnited to it and assist it in its Proper Operation they lose their Actual Entity and Unity which they had formerly and become a Potential Part of the Subject that was Passive from them and Exist and Subsist in it And because the Notion of Form is to be Receiv'd in the Subject or Matter and those Particles advene to it already Existing they are hence call'd Accidental Forms of it and either give it such an Alterableness as is agreeable to their nature as is seen in Passible Qualities or sometimes if they suit with the Primogenial Constitution of that Body they strengthen and belong to some Habit Disposition Power or Property of it and piece out as it were those Qualities and in some degree or other denominate the Subject thus or thus Qualify'd 34. But to make it yet more manifest how industriously the Cartesians do wave the giving any account of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they hold all their three Elements and consequently all Nature was made we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it by omitting that Consideration which even by their own Doctrin was the Chiefest and most Necessary They affirm that Matter of theirs to have been Divided first by God into greater parts which again being moved or jumbled one against another did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their First Element was made Division then was the first and Principal Physical Action and that which most conduced to frame all Nature Nay in case there be no Vacuum as they grant there is not it is manifest that the First Motion and which was exercis'd Immediately upon their Matter as also all the following Motions exercis'd upon the said Matter was Division Now Divisibility of the Matter being the Proper Power that answers to the Act of Division or which is the same to Motion and withal directly speaking the nature of their Matter as apt to be wrought upon by those Causes how was it possible they should slip over that and regard only the Extension of it Divisibility is a Natural Notion and imports an Order to Natural Action whereas Extension is a dull sluggish Notion and meerly Mathematical that is it does Abstract from Action and Motion both For an Extended thing is never the more or less Extended whether it Moves or stands still but its whole Nature and Notion is taken up in affecting its own Subject or Extending it equally and all one whether it Acts or not acts But the reason of this willful neglect is this that tho' they grant it to have been Divided yet should they tell us it was thus Divisible Common Reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were Easily or Hardly Divisible that is Rare or Dense of which Qualities in their Matter antecedently to Motion and the Contexture of the particles made by that Motion their Principles can give no kind of account nor possibly explicate them 35. I am apt to think that they foresaw this Rub in their way which hindred the Currency of all their Doctrin of Physicks and seeing they could not remove it they very fairly let it alone Yet for a show they take notice of the Word but they
the Mind which is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who onely can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance I am heartily glad to know that Euclid and Archimedes were converted to God and that they were so infinitely Happy as to see God's Substance which is his Essence so manifestly He proceeds Men must look within themselves and draw near unto the Light that shines there continually that their Reason may be the more Illuminated The Mind ought to examin all Human Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which guides it without hearkening to the False and confused Testimonies of the Senses Those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears unless he that discover'd them to us he means GOD the Giver of Ideas do reveal them at the same time to the Mind So that all Science it seems comes by Divine Revelation To what end then are Teachers Professours Schools and Universities if when we have done what we can by all our Teaching and Learning nothing but Divine Revelation must do the business or gain us any Science But now he advances to a higher point The Mind says he is immediately and after a very strict manner United to God nay after a stricter and more Essential manner than with the Body Now if this be true I dare affirm that the Mind is more United to God Naturally than our Saviour's Humanity was Supernaturally and Miraculously For This was but United Hypostatically or according to the Suppositum or Person of the Eternal Word whereas by this new Philosophy every Human Mind is United Essentially to God that is to the Godhead it self For to be united Essentially is for one Essence to be united to another Essence that is to be one or the same Essence with the Divine Essence Was ever such Quakerism heard of among Philosophers Or plain honest Human Reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into Mystick Theology by Spiritual Alchymy Yet to say True this is very Consonant to the Doctrine of Ideas They slight the Instruction of Nature they scorn to be beholding to their Senses and Outwards Objects which forces them upon Introversion and to observe as the same Authour says what Eternal Truth tells us in the Recesses of our Reason that is in their Darling Ideas Now common Reason ever taught me and every Man who did but reflect upon what passes within his Understanding that the Proper and Effectual way to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of our Simple Notions is to make DEFINITIONS of them and there are most Certain Rules of Art how those Definitions may be fram'd But this was too Ordinary a way to please Minds so Extraordinarily Elevated as these Gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with The highest Flights of Nature do flag it seems too low for their Supernatural pitch nor can reach the Degrees of their Elevation above our dull Horizon They are Inspir'd with Heaven implanted Ideas and so they have no more to do but retire their Thoughts into the Inward Recesses of their Mind embellish'd and guilded with these Shining Innate Ideas and their work is done without any need of Definitions made by sublunary Art Sometimes I am apt to think that they had recourse to those Spiritual Pourtraitures out of despair of explicating any other way the Essences of Things or in what they consisted and I fear two of our Learned men lately mention'd apprehend them to be Inscrutable and In-explicable Whereas speaking of Essences in Common I do assure them that nothing can be plainer and that every Clown were he interrogated orderly could give us the true Essences or which is the same the true Natures of the things he is conversant with For whatever makes Mankind call and esteem any Bodies such or such Things in Distinction from all others is truly their Essence or to speak in the Language of a Philosopher let but Matter be determin'd by such a Complexion of Accidents with that Harmony or Proportion of parts connected with that Constancy that it is fit to act a Distinct part upon Nature's stage or perform its Primary Operation that Complexion of Accidents I say is truly the Essence of that Body or the Form that constitutes it such an Ens or such a Part of or in Nature Perhaps the Cartesians will say they allow Definitions to make their Ideas Clear and Distinct. But how can this cohere Definitions are the Effects of Art whereas these Ideas are imprinted by God's Hand who gave them their Nature and Cartesius says expresly they are Ingenitae This being so and GOD's immediate Works being Perfect and those Ideas being intended to give them Knowledge they can need nothing to make them more Clear and Distinct nor consequently can the Users of them have any occasion for Definitions unless perhaps to explain their Ideas to us who think we have a firmer Basis to build them on than those Ideas of theirs Nature gives the Ground and Art the Rules to make them And they are such necessary Instruments to true and solid Science that I could wish for the Improvement of Knowledge that our Universities would appoint a Committee of Learned Men to compile a Dictionary of Definitions for the Notions we use in all parts of Philosophy whatever Monsieur de Furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever in Three Volumes Out of which may be Collected those that make for our purpose which being by the Ioynt-labour and Concurrence of the Persons deputed Examined if faulty Amended and propos'd to the World it could not fail of advancing Science highly In carrying forward such a Noble Work and so Beneficial to Mandkind I should willingly contribute my Quota of Endeavours nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing I know of For Definitions explicating or unfolding the Nature of the Thing and all Proper Causes and Effects being so nearly ally'd to the Nature of the Thing it follows that there lies involv'd in the Definitions all Essential and Proper Middle Terms to demonstrate whatever belongs to the Notion Defin'd if Right Logick and studious Industry be not wanting He blames St. Austin and wishes he had not attributed to External Bodies all the sensible Qualities we perceive by their means And why Because says he they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter What Idea St. Austin had of Matter is little to purpose but if he proceeded consequently to his Thoughts he could not conceive the First Matter to be such as they put theirs to be For what Man of Common Sense can frame any Idea of a Thing that has onely Extension in it but is not to any degree either Dense or Rare Easie or Hard to be Divided Fluid nor Solid Soft nor Hard c. And if their Quaint Ideas and Clear and Distinct Conceptions which seem to be the Ground of all their Witty Discourses or Divine Revelations as Malbranche calls them of Science be no Wiser or Solider
Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it and be measur'd by it being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust Proportion and Design all their Motions or Actions by and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd which we call Quando If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest then either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole that is to be Immediate to it or meerly to Contain it which grounds the Notion and answers to the Question Where or Ubi Or it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it and then either the whole or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing and 't is call'd its Site or Situation or else the Extrinsecal thing or its parts are conceiv'd to be Fitted Ply'd or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments that is Common Receptacles which Contain and whence we may draw all our Predicates for the Common Subject Thing which we may briefly exemplifie thus Peter 1 tho' but a yard2 and half high yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 in8 the Field standing9 upon his guard armed10 21. All these Notions under whatever Head if they be Corporeal ones are Natural and Common to all Mankind For since they are made by Impressions on the Senses which are Common to all Mankind it follows that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions must be such also since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects must work the same Effects 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together of Considering them diverse ways of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections and lastly of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion such as are the Notions of Indivisible Immaterial Incorruptible Unactive Insignificant c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things All which is manifest by plain Experience if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads For Corporeal Notions are imprinted directâ—y Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind and on its Operations or Affections or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions Wherefore since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal Spiritual or Mix'd or Compounded of Former Notions 't is manifest that all the Notions we have or can have do arise from one of those Heads 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless who affirm That by a Motion made on the Senses the Soul by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea which till then lay dormant in it because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites For first how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object or that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies which are as it were little Models of their Nature It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler but that the Particles emitted be more subtil which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible And of all Men in the World the Cartesians should not be startled at it whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves Now this being granted the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence For such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them are apt when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge to breed in the Mind or convey into it the Nature or an Intellectual Notion of the Thing it self To do which there can need no more than that every thing according to the Maxim be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver viz. that those Effluviums by affecting the Body Corporeally do affect the Soul Intellectually Secondly How is it conceivable or any way Explicable that a Motion which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea Indeed were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas as our Words do now or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory But here things are quite otherwise for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement nor by our voluntary Designation that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions nor as is confess'd are they Naturally alike wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's Add That this hidden Virtue in the Soul to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve is both said gratis and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality and so far from Explicable that even themselves as far as I can learn have not so much as attempted to explain it but it seems to be in part taken up gratis to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body Lastly Their Argument drawn from Experience that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty is shewn to be Inconclusive by alledging as was said lately that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually or as standing under Notion are the self-same and not so Vnlike as they imagin Add That their Argument faulters in this too that the makers of it did not duly reflect when they advanced it on that ' foresaid Axiom Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis For had they done this they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body which is imprinted directly and an
Affection of the Soul which is spiritual and known only by Reflexion should have a Different Appearance The two Manners of Existing with which the same Nature is vested differing toto genere that is as far as Body and Spirit their subjects can distance them To explicate this more fully and to shew the difference between Corporeal and Spiritual Idea's I offer to their thoughts this Reflexion concerning the distinct nature of a Phantasm which is a Corporeal Resemblance and the nature of the thing in the Mind that is its Nâ—tion express'd by a Dâ—finition which is Intellectual and Spiritual The Phantasm or Corporeal Resemblance of a Man is a kind of Picture of a thing with two Legs two Arms such a Face with a Head placed uprightly that grows moves itself c. Let us regard next the Definition of a Man or rather which is abating the Expression the same the Notion of him which is that he is a Rational Creature and we shall easily discern of how different a shape it is from the other how it abstracts from many Corporeal Qualities Figures of the Parts and other Considerations which were Essential Ingredients to the Picture or Phantasm and not at all Essential to It nor found in the Definition and how some Considerations too are added in the Definition or imply'd in it as to Apprehend Iudge Discourse c. which no more belong to the Phantasm than it did to Zeuxis's Grapes to have the Definition of the Fruit of such a Vegetable predicated of them In a word one of them is a kind of Portraicture outwardly resembling the other speaks the most Intrinsecal Essence of the thing Defin'd The one signifies Bodily Parts belonging to such an Animal and therefore is Corporeal the other does not signifie but is the Nature signified and this too by Words which denote to us the Mind or Meaning that is the Notion of the speaker which is therefore Spiritual at least in part Whence the Compleat Essence of Man could not be understood nor a Definition of it fram'd without making use of some of these Notions or Idea's which are made by our Understanding reflecting upon its own Spiritual Operations LESSON III. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided 1. THE Differences that divide each Common Head must be Intrinsecal to it For since we cannot discourse of two Disparate Notions at once and since were those Heads divided by Differences that are Extrinsecal to the Common Genus or taken from another Head each Species of it would consist of two Disparate Notions hence it is absolutely necessary to Science that the Differences which divide these Common Heads be such as belong to no other Common Head but be within the Limits of that Head or Intrinsecal to it Again since the Difference is most Formal in constituting the Species and the Genus only Material were the Differences Extrinsecal or Borrow'd from another Head it would follow that all the Species of the Head divided by such Differences would belong to another Head viz. to that Head whence those Differences are taken Which would put all our Notions into Confusion and involve a direct Contradiction as making Substances to be Quantities Qualities c. 2. Intrinsecal Differences can be no other but more and less of the Common Notion For since being Intrinsecal they cannot be taken from any other Head it follows that they must partake of the Common Notion of their own respective Heads Again since if they did partake of the Common Notion Equally they would not differ in that Notion and so would not be Differences of it it follows that they must partake of it Vnequally that is they must be more and less of the Common Notion 3. Hence the Common Notion of Ens Thing or Substence being that which is capable of Existence is Immediately Intrinsecally or Essentially divided into what 's more and less capable of Existence Wherefore 4. Divisible and Indivisible which constitute Body and Spirit are the proper and intrinsecal Differences of the Common Head of Substance For since Actual Division of the Entity makes the thing to be no longer indivisum in se that is to be unum that is to be Ens that is to be capable of Existence it follows that that Ens which is Divisible or Body is less capable of Existence that is has less of the nature of Ens or Substance and the Ens that is Indivisible or Spirit has more Again since Things Divisible or Bodies can only have their own Being or Existence whereas Things indivisible or Spirits are capable of being Other things also or of having in them the Natures and Existences of all the things they know hence they have a greater Capacity of Existence than Bodies have since they have enough for themselves and can impart it to Millions of Other things besides and consequently Body and Spirit are constituted by Divisible and Indivisible as by the proper immediate and Intrinsecal Differences that divide Substance or Ens. 5. The Divisibility and Indivisibility that are the Intrinsecal Differences of Ens are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative For were it so it would follow that some Intrinsecal Differences of Ens in Common would be taken from some other Head viz. that of Quantity and so the Differences being what 's most Formal in the Species hence those Species of Ens would rather be under that Head than its own Again that Divisibility which is of Quantity may oftentimes be put into Act and yet the same Ens remain v. g. a Man may lose the Quantity of an Arm a Tree of a Branch c. and yet remain still the same Things whereas if Quantitative Divisibility were the Intrinsecal Difference which constituted it such an Ens Quantitative Division must by consequence make it cease to be that Ens. Moreover since Quantity as will be shortly seen is Divisibility and Divisibility in Vnity in case Quantity did Intrinsecally divide Ens and constitute Body where-ever there were Quantity there would be Vnity under that notion and so all Quantitative things would be but one Ens or one Body which is the highest absurdity Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which are the intrinsecal Differences of Ens are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative 6. Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of the Constituents of Ens as such that is the Divisibility of it into Matter and Form and Indivisibility of it into such Constituent parts Which differences do Essentially divide the Genus of Ens and constitute the species of Body and Spirit For since we see Bodies chang'd into one another and therefore the former Body had really somewhat in it determining it to be actually what it was which we call the Form and somewhat by which it could be Another which we call the Power to be another or Matter Again since we see that the
not the Individual 8. The Relations of the later sort became Mutual upon another score viz. because Action and its proper Passion corresponding to it do infer one another For nothing can Act but it must Act upon something that receives that Action or suffers by it nor suffer or be Acted upon but by something that Acts on it 9. There is a Third Mix'd sort of Relation call'd Of the thing Measured to the Measure that is when the Thing Related depends for its Essence or its Perfection on Another and that other does not at all depend for either on it For Example When a Picture is drawn from the Prototype it depends on the Prototype for its Perfection and is as it were Measur'd by it in regard 't is only so far Good or Bad as it resembles the Man it was drawn for but the Prototype or the Man gets Nothing nor is in the least Better or Worse by having a Picture drawn from him Again there is a common Notion of Lineaments and Colour found in both which makes it seem to partake of the first sort of Relation also the Prototype by imprinting an Idea of it self in the Painter enables him in some sort to draw him and so contributes something to that Action which gives it to partake of the Second Kind so that this Kind of Relation seems to be Mixt of the other two and yet as will be shown is perfectly of Neither 10. This kind of Relation is not Mutual but is found only on the side of the thing measured For since the Measure v. g. the Prototype has no natural Order of Agency or Patiency by which it respects the Picture because the Man is not a Thing naturally ordain'd to work upon the Fancy of the Painter so to render him a perfect Efficient cause of the Picture as Fire is Ordain'd to Heat a Master to Command c. Nor is there a true Vnity of Form to wit of Colour and Figure in both but only some Counterfeit Resemblance of them whence we cannot without speaking nonsense say The Man is like his Picture as we can that the Picture is like the Man or that two white Walls are like one another nor as was said does the Man receive any degree of Perfection or Imperfection by being pictur'd it follows that there is no Ground or Reason on the Man's side to make him Related to his Picture wherefore he has no Real Relation to it at all but only a Verbal one consisting in the Grammatical chiming of the word pictured to â—â—â—ure 11. Of this sort are the Relations between all our Powers whether Corporeal or Intellectual to their Objects for the very Essence and Nature of those Powers is to see hear or understand the Objects and the Perfections of the Powers in their several kinds are Measured and rated by their doing this Better or Worse whereas the Objects are never the Better by being seen heard or known Wherefore there wants on those Objects side a Real Ground and therefore a Real Relation to our Powers however the words Seer and Seen Knower and Known do answer one another as if they were proper Agents and Patients and Order'd mutually to each other 12. Of this sort too is the Relation between GOD as Creator and his Creatures For seeing the Creature has received all it has or can have from its Creator that is has to be an Ens and not a meer Nothing from the Essential Ideas it had from all Eternity in the Divine Understanding and was put afterwards into Actual Being or Existence and is conserv'd in the same by his continual Influence and has besides all its Accidental Perfections and Conveniences by the course of Causes laid by his Divine Providence all which is demonstrated in Metaphysicks Hence there is all the Ground imaginable of a Real Relation on the Creature 's part towards GOD. On the other side since GOD gains no kind of perfection by making Creatures nor is intrinsecally better in the least by his Creating them there can be no Ground at all of a Real Relation on GOD's side to the Creature but only a Verbal Sound of Creator answering Grammatically to Creature as Creature does to Creator So important a thing it is in Philosophy not to be deluded by Articulate Ayr or meer Characters but to look deeply and attentively into the Thing it self and to guide our Thoughts by what we find there lest we come to frame Mock-notions out of our Fancy which Nature never gave us Corol. I. Hence follows that all the Expressions of the Holy Scripture of a Pact or Covenant between God and Creatures That upon their behaving themselves thus and thus he enters an Obligation of doing thus or thus towards them the which do consequently put God and the Creature upon the same rank of Agency and Patiency It follows I say that such Expressions are purely Metaphorical and far from Proper or Literally True but are spoken humano more or in accommodation to our Human Actions and Manners of Proceeding For on God's side there is nothing but his Infinit Wisdom and Goodness carrying on Supernatural Good Dispositions to conformable Effects as he does Natural Dispositions to Effects suitable to the Nature of such things Which Rectitude of his Will being Essential to him and consequently Independent on Creatures or their Actions had produc'd the same Effects whether he had made any such Covenant or no. And the same may be said proportionably of God's Promising Threatening Commanding Requiring Satisfaction Accepting the Payment of it and such-like which tho' Metaphorical are notwithstanding True amount to the same and induce the same Effects tho' in a more soveraign way and more becoming God's Infinit Majesty than the Gross Capacity of the Generality of Mankind for whose sake those low Conceptions and Expressions were us'd can apprehend 13. There is yet another sort of Mutual Relations which are partly Artificial partly Natural such as are those of Genus and Species Antecedent and Consequent Subject and Predicate Premisses and Conclusion c. These are partly Natural in regard our Vnderstanding has its distinct Nature or Notion as well as Whiteness Action or any other Ground of Relation hitherto spoken of and these are grounded on the Manner of the Objects existing in our Vnderstanding where they are as truly Vniversal and Particular Subject and Predicate c. as the Wall is White or the Quantity a Yard c. And they are also partly Artificial because Artists in Logick who reflect on the things as they are in our Minds do make use of such to clear their Notions predicate them of one another and discourse of them exactly 14. Wherefore those Logicians who call them Relationes Rationis meaning to oppose them by that Expression to Real Relations seem to forget that the Understanding and its manner of working are Real whereas they have more of Entity and consequently of Reality in them than Bodies and their Powers or
the same Ens where they are Entitatively Connected or the same Materially before they are Seen or Judg'd to be so by our understanding 11. It is sufficient that the two Terms be Materially the same or Identify'd with the same Ens when the Subject is a Concrete whether it be Substantially a Concrete that is consisting of the Nature and the Suppositum as when we say Petrus or Homo is Animal Or Accidentally as when we say Album est Dulce But in Abstract Notions they must besides this be moreover the same Essentially or Formally that is they must not onely be found in the same Material Ens or thing but those very Notions themselves must have the same Formality either in part or in whole in our Understanding In Whole as when we say Petreitas est Petreitas Quantitas est Divisibilitas In part as when we say Petreitas est Humanitas or Animalitas for then Humanitas and Animalitas are as Essential to Petreitas and Petreitas as much includes and is the Subject of their Notions and of its own Differnces besides as Petrus does or is of the Notions of Homo or Animal 12. An Abstract and a Concrete Term can never be Subject and Predicate in the same Proposition tho' never so Essential to one another For an Abstract Notion out of the very Nature of its Abstraction is formally a Part and a Concrete Notion in respect to it a Whole and a Part tho' taken materially it may belong to the same Ens which is a Whole and be the same Thing with it yet taken formally it cannot for then a Whole would be Formally a Part and a Part Formally a Whole Hence we cannot say Petreitas est Petrus or Petrus est Petreitas c. Hence also this Proposition Quantitas est Quanta and such like is False for Quanta being a Concrete signifies the Subject which has Quantity in it and it is False to say that Quantity alone is Quantity and its Subject too 13. From what 's said above we may gather that there may be diverse manners of Predicating or referring one Notion to another and they are reckon'd by Porphyrius to be Five called by the Schools Predicables that is several Manners how one Notion may be predicated of another Whose Pardon we must beg if following the Dictates of Reason which we Judge Evident and not the Track beaten by others we dissent from them and assign Six The first is when the whole Notion is Predicated of the whole as when we say Quantity is Divisibility A. Whole consists of all its parts or when we Predicate the Definition of â—he Notion Defiâ—'d as Man is a Rational Animal or all the Dividing Members of the Notion Divided And this Manner we call Entirely Identical that is the predicating of the same Whole Notion wholly of it self In the rest â— Part only is Predicated of the whole and then â—he Predicate is either Essential to the Subject or â—ot If Essential then it either predicates that part of his Nature which in the common acceâ—tation of Mankind not reaching to inferiour Differences is immediately Superiour to it and is thought to denote the whole Essence of the thing and then 't is call'd a Species as Petrus est Homo Or but some lesser part of its Essence as Petrus â—st Animal Vivens or Substantia which are call'd the Genus or Generical Notion And both these as also the first are said to be predicated in Quid because they are Essential Predicates and answer differently tho' imperfectly and but in part to the Question made by Quid. As ask Quid est Petrus we answer appositely Homo Animal Vivens c. Or else the Predicate is that Compart which distinguishes the Genus Essentially from others of the same Common kind and constitutes it in an inferiour Class under the Common Notion and is therefore Referr'd to what it thus constituted as its Essential Difference as Homo est Rationalis And this supposes the Question made by Quid or what Thing and answers to a further Question What kind of Thing And therefore 't is said to be predicated not meerly in quale for then it might have been a meer Quality and not Essential but in Quale quid as both giving account of the particular Nature of the Thing as also of its belonging to the Essence of it If the Predicate be not Essential then either one notion is Referr'd to another and Predicated of it not as any Part of its Essence but yet as more or less Connected with it as an Effect or Sign of it as Capable of Admiring or the being affected with Musick Proportion or Beauty are Connected with Rational Nature or Man and referr'd to him accordingly that is Predicated of him as a Property Thus Combustive or Rarefactive are Connected with Fire Opacous with Earth and referr'd to those Subjects or predicated of them as Properties Or lastly the Predicate is Comâ—par'd or Referr'd to the Subject as having no kind of at least known Connexion with the Essence but meerly casually belonging to it or as Indifferent to the Essence whether it belong to it or no. As Armed Placed Situated c. belongs to Maâ— or Body and then 't is said to be predicated as an Accident that is as affecting him only Casually and Accidentally Note 1. That in this last Predicable only the Manner how it is Predicated or Compar'd to the Subject is consider'd and not the Nature of that which is Predicated nor whether it be a substantial Notion or whether it does belong to some one of the other 〈◊〉 Accidents so it be but Casually or Accidentally belonging to the Subject or Referr'd to it for Wooden Golden and Earthen are all Predicated as Accidents or Accidentally of Cup for 't is still equally a Cup whether it be made of any of those or of any other matter tho' Wood Gold and Earth be substantial Notions Whence the word Accident does not here signifie what Inheres in the Substance as it does in those Predicamental Accidents which are Intrinsecal ones but that which belongs to a Subject by Chance or Casuality so that the Notion of the Subject is preserved entire whether it has it or has it not Note 2. That since it was clearly the Intention of him who invented these Predicables and of those who follow'd him and us'd them to comprehend all the Different Manners how Notions could be Predicated of their Subjects and the being Predicated as a whole of the whole is most evidently one Manner of Predicating and Distinct from the Five they assign'd it is manifest that their Account of the Predicables was Defective and our Supplying it Rational and Necessary Add that they omitted that Predicable or Manner of Predicating which if it were not the most Vseful at least it was the Chief and First in Dignity all the First Principles having as will be shewn hereafter this Manner of Predication and consequently having Title to belong to
we can have no occasion to Speak of False Judgments but in order to the avoiding them which is easily done if we settle the Knowledge of the True ones hence that which concerns us is to treat of True Judgments or Truths and in the first place of Those Propositions or Judgments that are the First Truths which we call First Principles Again since alâ— Propositions are either Evident or Inevident and Inevident or Obscure ones cannot avail us in our quest of Science it follows that only Evident Propositions are to be treated of or made use of by those who aim at Scientifical Knowledge Wherefore since all Propositions or Judgments that are Evident must either be Self-evident or made evident which is done by way of Proof and these Latter must depend on the Former for their Eviâ—dence we are therefore to begin with the Former which are Self-evident 2. All First Principles as being the First Truths must be Self-evident Propositions This is manifest from the very Terms For being the First they can have no other before them out of whicâ— they may be Deduc'd or made Evident or into which their Evidence if lesser may be Resolv'd Wherefore they must either not be Evident at all which would destroy all Possibility of any Evidence or they must be Self-evident 3. Our Knowledges may either be consider'd according to the Order by which they are Generated in us at first or according to the Dependance of one Truth on another and the Resolving them finally into First and Self-evident Principles The Former of these is the way that Nature takes to instill Useful Knowledges into us when as yet we know nothing the Later is the Method which Art makes use of to polish and promote those Rude and Short Knowledges had from Nature then to link many of those Knowledges together and lastly to render them Exact and Evident by Resolving them into First or Self-evident Principles to do which we call to beget Science or to frame a Science of them The Former comes by Experience Unreflectingly the Later is attain'd by Study and Reflexion And 't is of this Later sort of Knowledge and its First Principles we intend to treat in this and the next Lesson reserving the Former Consideration of how and in what manner Knowledge is first Generated till Lesson IV. 4. The Self-Evidence belonging to First Principles consists in this that the two Terms must be Formally Identical For since as was shewn above the Terms in every Ordinary and Inferior Proposition nay in every Conclusion that is True must be materially the same and so the Proposition it self materially Identical it follows that the Terms of the First Principles which ought to be more evident than They as being Self-evident must be Formally Identical 5. The Terms of the First Principles must noâ— only be Formally Identical in sense or be the same Formal Notion but it is moreover most convenient that they be such in the Expression also thâ—â— is 't is fit that the Subject and Predicate in those Propositions should be the same Word taken in the same sence For since First Principles must be the most Evident and the most Clearly Expressive oâ— Truth that can be imagin'd and not liable to the least Mistake and Words are subject to Equivocation which is apt to breed Mistake Obscurity and Error hence First Principles should not only be Formally Identical in sense as when we say Hoâ—â— est Animal Rationale but it is most Convenient they should be such in Expression too as Homâ— est Homo Idem est Idem sibi ipsi Quod est est c. For then whatever Distinction in case of Ambiguity affects the Predicate must also affect the Subject and so the Proposition will not only remain still most Formally but also most Evidently iâ— every regard Identical Note That tho' this be most Convenient yet it may suffice that the Terms when explicated are reducible to the same Formal Expression by the same Word as when we say A Whole is Greater than a part For a Whole being that which consists of Parts and a thing being that of which it consists hence a Whole is All its Parts that is is one part and more than one part whence the Proportion is reducible to this what 's more than a part is more than a part which is not onely most Formally but besides most Evidently Identical 6. This Proposition Self-Existence is Self-existence is of it self most Supremely Self-Evident â—or if the meaning of the word self which is â—oyn'd with Existence be but understood and that the Addition of this word to Existence be not meant â—o signify any the least Composition in it but the most â—imple and most Uncompounded Actuality that can â—e imagin'd then the same Formality in every respect is predicated Intirely of the same and so 't is also most perfectly Self-evident And 't is most Suâ—remely such because it expresses the Existence of â—he Deity which is Infinitely more Simple and more necessarily it self than any Created Exiâ—tence can be Again since every thing the more Potential it is is more Confused that is less distinct and less Intelligible and the more Actual it is the more Intelligible and the Divine Nature which â—s meant by Self-Existence is a most infinitely Pure Actuality it follows that this proposition Self-Existence is Self-Existence is of its self the most supremely Self-evident Proposition that can be Imagin'd 7. This Proposition what is is or Existence is Existence is the most Self-evident Proposition that can be imagin'd to be taken from Created things For since Existence is the most Evident Notion that can be found amongst all our Notions that can be had from Creatures that Proposition must needs be the most Evident and consequently amongst Self-evident ones the most Self-evident in which not only the Notion of the Copula but of the Subject and Predicate too is Existence Again since the Clearness of all Truths whatever depends on the Connexion of the Terms by the word is it follows that unless the Nature or Notion of Existence be first immovably Fix'd or Establish'd to be Coherent with its self that is unless this Proposition What is is or Existence is Existence be Self-evident no Proposition whatever could be Absolutely Certain Clear or Coherent and so there would be no possibility of any Truth Certainty or Evidence in the World Lastly since both the Essences of things and the Existence they have are in the Divine Understanding and the Essences which are only Capacities of Being belong to things as they are Limited or apt to be Created that is belong to them according to the Notion of Creatures which being only Potential as to Being they can have no Claim thence to actual Being or Existence but meerly by the Free Gift of Him who is Essential Being hence the Nature of the Existence of Creatures and their being such is taken purely from God's side and holds entirely of him Whence it is most
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
or the Natures of things into us by Impressions from Objects and by such Impressions or by their affecting us thus or thus their Different Natures that is Knowledge how those things Differ from one another and Differences do constitute the Nature of the thing by Distinguishing it from all others 't is manifest that from the Judgment or Knowledge that we are struck thus and thus by these and these Objects we are furnish'd with means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us and of our own Bodies in the first place And our Soul having the power of Comparing them to themselves and to Other Natures that are also in her we hence become capable of framing Innumerable Judgments concerning them or Knowledges of them 6. These Knowledges of all things that affect our Senses being gain'd to a fair degree by the Different Impressions of Objects are made more Express and Improv'd very much by Study and Reflexion For since Study and Reflexion are not the Inventing New or Counterfeit Notions or Natures of our own coyning but the Receiving frequently and minding heedfully the true and solid Notions of the things which Nature had imprinted there before it follows that as in Corporeal Sight by our Regarding the Object frequently wistly and attentively we come to observe more and more in it so by often Reflecting on and Revolving Intellectual Objects or the Natures of things in us the Eye of our Mind must needs look deeper into them make new Discoveries of diverse Considerations in them which escap'd a single Cursory view and gain more exact and more penetrative Knowledge of them 7. By Methods of Discoursing or Ratiocination made evident by Maxims of Art this Improvement of Knowledge were not vita brevis might come to be in a manner Infinit For all this is perform'd by Evident Connexion of Terms both in some propositions which are Truths and the deducing others by necessary consequence from them and so forwards Since then there is no stint assignable of the Connexion of Truths and as will be shewn hereafter there are Rules or Maxims of Art to teach us how to connect Terms Aptly and Evidently it follows that there can be no Bounds of the Improvement of Knowledge 8. From what 's said above 't is manifest that this proposition Ego cogito cannot be the first-known Truth whence all our Science is Generated for since this proposition Ego cogito if put entirely or explicitly as it ought is Ego sum cogitans and in the order of Nature the proposition Ego sum is antecedent to Ego sum cogitans and more simple than it so that if it be not suppos'd to be known the other cannot possibly be known 't is most Evident that Cogito or Ego cogito or which is the same Ego sum cogitans cannot be the first-known Proposition or First Truth that can be laid in the Method of Generating Science 9. The proposition Ego sum cogitans is less clear and evident than many other propositions that have for their predicate Notions directly imprinted on our Senses such as are I am Heated Hurt Extended Moving c. For since all our first-known notions the Soul being Rasa Tabula come by Impressions of Objects on our Senses those propositions are most Clear whose predicates are the Immediate Effects of those Impressions and joyn'd with Ego sum which is the first Judgment do compound those propositions But such are the predicates abovesaid and not the predicate Cogitans Therefore the proposition Ego sum Cogitans is less clear than are the propositions which have those directly imprinted Notions for their Predicates That the other predicates are notions more known than is Cogitans I prove thus The notion of Cogitans is Spiritual and therefore could not be imprinted in the Soul by a Direct stroke of the Object on the Senses as are the Others but must be known by Reflexion but what is known by Reflexion is less easily and less early known that is less Evident to us taking us as not yet imbued with other Knowledges than that which is known by Experience or Directly therefore the notion of Cogitans is less known than are those other predicates and consequently this proposition Ego sum Cogitans is less Clear than the propositions Ego sum Extensus vulneratus movens c. Again were the predicate Cogitans known experimentally or by Impressions on the Sense which it is not at all but as it is joyn'd with the Imagination the most Fallacious Faculty we have co-operating with the Understanding nay were it an Affection of the Man and its Notion directly imprinted in him and so as easily and early known as any of the rest yet the proposition Ego sum Cogitans could not be the First or Second in the Order of Knowable for since as was shewn I am struck or Affected antecedes I am affected thus or have such an affection in me and Cogitans is not barely to be Affected by Objects but to have such a manner of Affection hence the proposition I am affected by Objects is more Simple and therefore in priority of Nature precedes I am affected thus or I am Thinking and is more Clear than it 11. Hence the proposition Ego cogito is also less Certain than multitudes of other propositions whose predicates are experimentally known by Direct Impressions on the Senses For Certainty follows Evidence as its Proper Cause as Judging does Knowing Wherefore if that proposition be less Evident it is also less Certain 12. If it be alledg'd that it is Certain by way of Evident Proof that this proposition Ego cogito is the most absolutely firm Ground we can relye on to generate and principiate all our other Knowledges because tho' we would voluntarily divest our selves of all other Knowledges and call them into doubt that is were all the rest Vncertain and my self Insecure whether I think True or False in holding them yet it is Unquestionably Certain and Impossible to be doubted of but that whether I think right or wrong still I think whence follows that the proposition Ego cogito seems to be a firm basis to ground all the rest upon I answer that the whole Discourse seems to me to be a Paralogism and a kind of Fallacy of non causa pro causa for the Question is not whether it be not more Certain that I think than that I think wrong or right for 't is granted that this proposition I think is more Simple and therefore antecedes and is presuppos'd to the propositions I think right or wrong or thus and thus and consequently it is more Evident and more Certain than These are But the true point is whether I am more Certain that I think at all than that I am Certain that I am since if it be not presuppos'd that I am 't is most Certain that it is Impossible that I should be Certain that I am thinking or any thing like
all the Materials as it were that are requisite to Science Nor while they attend to the Natures of the Things can they want First Principles by which to guide their thoughts so that they onely want Maxims of Art to put their Thoughts into the posture of Science to make them more firm distinct and express and to improve them by drawing new Consequences from them Wherefore such Acute Men some of which are found in every Country and every Age by having their Knowledge grounded on solid Nature may far exceed Hypothetical Philosophers or any of the others before-mentioned in True Knowledge and so come nearer the being true Philosophers than any of them nay than Great Artists and Reputed Scholars though they caper in the Ayr never so nimbly and quaintly with School-Terms Distinctions and Witty and Congruous Explications of their own Schemes if they do not begin with and build upon Good Honest Solid Nature BOOK III. Of the Third Operation of our Vnderstanding Discourse and of the Effects and Defects of it LESSON I. Of Artificial Discourse the Force of Consequence and of the only Right Figure of a Syllogism 1. DIscourse may either mean Common Reasoning us'd by all Mankind in their Ordinary Conversation or by some in Rhetorical Speeches which may fitly be call'd Loose Discourse Or it may mean that Artificial way of Reasoning which consists in such a Connexion of Terms in two Propositions call'd the Major and Minor or the Premisses as that a Third Proposition call'd the Conclusion must naturally and necessarily follow from them which may be properly nam'd Contracted or Strict Discourse and by Logicians is call'd a Syllogism 2. This following or Consequence of such a Proposition out of two others is call'd Inference Deduction Concluding Argumentation and Proving So that the Essence of a Syllogism consists as formally in the Consequence of that Proposition which is Concluded from the Premisses exprest by the Illative Particle ergo as the Essence of a Proposition does in the Copula that connects its Terms and Predicates or says something of another 3. Wherefore since if the Consequence in which consists the Essence and all the Force and Nerves of Discourse be not Clear and Evident there could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded and so our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have been given us to no purpose hence 't is manifest that however one Proposition may be made known by others that are Connected and Consequential to one another yet the Consequence it self cannot be prov'd or made clear by another Consequence for the Question would still return how and in virtue of what that Consequence which made the other Evident is Evident it self and so in infinitum Whence it follows that the Evidence of all Consequences whatever must be built on something in a higher manner Evident than any Consequence or Proof can make it that is on a Self-evident or Identical Proposition as will be shown hereafter 4. Hence we may gather manifestly that a Syllogism can have but Three Terms in it Two of which are given us in the Proposition to be Concluded and the Third is that Middle Term by finding which to be Identify'd with the other Two in the Premisses we come to be assur'd by virtue of the self-evident Proposition hinted above that they are Identifyâ—d in the Conclusion or which is the same that the Conclusion is True 5. From what 's said it appears that a Syllogism is the Tâ—st of all other Discourses by reducing them to which their Truth is to be try'd For since whatever is most Perfect in its Kind ought to be the Standard or Test by which to Measure and try the Perfection of all others of the same Kind and a Syllogism is the best and most firmly grounded Act of our Natural Reason made exact by Art which is to perfect Nature and therefore absolutely the very Best that can be in its Kind or the best Discourse it follows that 't is to be the true Test and Standard of all other Discourses to which the Verity Sense or Coherence of all the rest are to be reduc'd and to be try'd by it Corol. I. Hence 't is of very Excellent Use for Young Wits to exercise themselves in Reducing loose Discourses to strict ones or Syllogisms For by endeavouring this they will to their Admiration find how Shallow and far from Evident the Grounds how precarious unprov'd and oft-times contradictious the particular Assertions and how Open and Incoherent the Contexture and Consequences are in many Rhetorical Discourses and Speeches which drest up in fine Language and embellâ—sht with little Tropes and Figures and other pretty Tricks of Wit and Fancy did before look very plausible and made a gay Appearance of most Excellent Sense Perhaps scarce any one Expedient can be invented that is more useful to advance Truth beat down Error and keep the Generality of Mankind from being deluded than thus to divest such empty Discourses of their Glossy Out-side and to let them see how deformed a Hag Errour will appear to the Eye of Reason when expos'd stark-naked Whereas on the other side 't is the Glory of Truth to be stript of these Ornamental Triâ—â—es for by this means her Native Beauty and the Symmetry of all her parts will appear more Amiable in the Eye of those who do sincerely affect her 6. From the third § it manifestly follows that the Consequence of a Syllogism having a self-evident Proposition for its Basis if upon severe examination we find that any Discourse does indeed bear that Test and can be Reduc'd to a rigorous Syllogism and the Premisses which the Consequence supposes to be True be really so or can be by this Method prov'd True it follows I say that we may be as perfectly assur'd as that we are that the Conclusion is Consequent and True and that sooner may all the Material World crumble into Incoherent Atoms or relapse into the Abyss of Nothingness than that any Conclusion thus deduced can be False since if it could then that Identical Proposition on which the Consequence is grounded would be False and so a Contradiction would be True which falsifies the Metaphysical Verity of Creatures and of the Ideas of them in the Divine Understanding which would consequently shock the Wisdom and even the Essence of the Godhead it self For self-existence might not be self-existence if a Contradiction might be True Corol. II. Were that which is said here and some other main Hinges of Science which occur in this Treatise duely consider'd and well penetrated it might be hoped that they would to a fair degree cure the Disease of Scepticism so Epidemical among our late Wits For even the worst of Scepticks will grant that an Identical Proposition must be True and he may see here that by this Doctrin both First Principles must be such and that all force of Consequence also which two are the main Pillars of
it absolutely Impossible the Conclusion should not be True nor more Evident than that which engages immediately the highest Evidence of an Identical Proposition and all this as has been prov'd is found in a Syllogism consisting of such a Matter and such a Form it follows that such a Syllogism is a Demonstrative one and that to Prove by such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate 5. All Middle Terms that are Proper for Demonstration must be taken Originally from the Nature of the Thlng or from it's Metaphysical Verity For since all Inferiour Truths are therefore such because they are finally resolvable into Identical Propositions which are the First Truths that is because those First Truths are virtually in them and Identical propositions are therefore true because the thing is what it is in which consists its Metaphysical verity it follows that the Verity of all Inferiour Truths such as are the Premisses on whose Truth all Demonstration and Truth of the Conclusion necessarily depends is taken originally from the Metaphysical verity of the Subject and Predicate Again since as has been shown the force of all Consequence is grounded on this that the Middle Term is the same with it's self or what it is It follows that the Force of all Middle Terms that any way conduce to Demonstration must be taken originally from the Nature of the Thing or from it's Metaphysical Verity 6. We can have no Demonstration of the Whole Thing taken in gross For the Whole Thing as was said may be consider'd diverse wayes and so ground many Notions and contains in it confusedly what corresponds to all those Notions we can frame of it since then we cannot have at once a Distinct and Clear knowledg of what corresponds formally to any two Notions it follows that we can have no Demonstration or Distinct and Clear Knowledg of the whole thing taken in Gross 7. Wherefore if we would demonstrate the Nature of the Thing according to what 's Essential to it we must take in pieces Unfold Explicate and as it were Detail the Thing into it's Essential Parts that so we may look more clearly thro' it's Nature or Essence which is done by Definitions of the Whole first and then of it's several Essential Parts till we come to those Parts of it which are most known or to the Common Head For we experience that we have but a Confused Notion of a Thing while it is exprest but in One Word but when Many Words are used to tell the Nature of it our knowledg of it grows Clearer and still more Clear and Distinct after each of those Words also has It's Meaning told or is Defind For Example ask what such a Thing is it is answer'd a Man which gives us indeed a True but a Confused Knowledg of it Whence we may have occasion to ask farther what is a Man and the Answer is a Rational Animal which clears the Notion of Man to a fair degree But the word Animal is also Confused tho' less than Homo was wherefore to gain a more Distinct Knowledg of it we set our selves to define It and we find it to be a Living or Self-moving Thing that is Sensitive or which is mov'd by Impression on the Senses And thus still to gain Clearer Light of more and more Essential Notions or Considerations of Man we may drive on farther the Definitions of the ascending Genus till we come to Ens or Substantia which is the Supreme in that Line and the Clearest of any except Existence which stints our quest By which way of defining still upwards we gain many Distinct Notions of Man's Essence which were before confusedly blended in the single word Man And were the Collateral Differences which constitute the Inferiour notions to Ens Defin'd too as well as each Genus descending in a right Line from it we should gain a most Distinct and clear Essential Notion of Man 8. It remains to define the Difference Rational which is the other Essential Notion that compounds the Entire Notion of Man If we ask then what Reason is it will be answer'd that it is a Faculty of Deducing some new knowledg out of foregoing ones or to express it in the Language of Art to draw a Proposition call'd the Conclusion from two other true ones call'd the Premisses To know more distinctly what this Definition means we may ask what a Proposition is and what True means and it will be answered that a Proposition is defin'd A Speech by which one Notion is Affirm'd or Deny'd of another Next ask what a Notion is and we are answer'd by the Definition of it that a Notion is the very Thing as conceiv'd by us or the Thing as existing in our Understanding Ask what True is it is answer'd it is the Conformity of what is in our Mind to the Thing without us Ask what Affirming is it is answered it is the Comparing one of the Terms of â—he Proposition to the other or seeing they both â—gree in the same Ens. Ask what Deducing is â—nd 't is answer'd 't is a Comparing two Terms â—o a Third and seeing them to be the same with it and thence the same with one another All which being known we shall have gain'd â—he Distinct and Clear Notion of Reasoning or Exact Discoursing and consequently of Rationaâ—ity the Power which produces that Act. 9. Hence Proper Middle Terms may be taken from the Line of Ens and the same may be said of any other Common Head for Demonstrations of any Truth that belongs Essenâ—ially to any Notion or Nature in those â—espective Lines For they are taken from the Definitions afforded us by the Genus and Difâ—erence in each Line both parts of which Deâ—initions are Essential 10. Tho' when it happens otherwise it wrongs not the Demonstration yet this is best done when the Superiour Notion is predicated of that which is the Immediate Inferiour and that Inferiour of the Notion immediately under it For then the Middle Term is not by our Choice or Ordering but ex naturâ rei placed in the middle between them as Every Animal is a Living thing Every Man is an Animal therefore Every Man is a Living thing Every Man is an Animal Peter is a Man therefore Peter is an Animal 10. The same may be said when any of the Intrinsecal Differences is used for the Middle Term even tho' it be Remote in the same Line from one of the Extremes as Every Sensitive thing is an Animal Every Worm is a Sensitive thing Therefore Every Worm is an Animal The same holds in all the rest whether they be Generical or Differential Notions whether Immediate or Mediate For the same Reason concludes for one as for the other viz. because all such are Essential Predicates and being found in the same Essence are not only Identify'd in the same Thing materially as is done when in a true Proposition the Subjects and Predicates are in Distinct Lines as Aethiops est niger but being either
expresly or by consequence Included in some part of the Definition the Formality of one is in some part the Formality of the others as the Notions of Ens Corpus Mixtum Vivens Sensituum are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and integrate the Definition Note that the Genus must be Immediate because otherwise it confounds the Intermemediate Notions with the Species and so gives a less-less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd Hence Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly or in part speak the Notion or Nature of Animal Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Difference of Ens and Vivens 12. Hence Dichotomy or a Division made by two Members is the best For in such a Division the Parts if rightly exprest may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible that is not-Divisible of Animal into Rational and Irrational that is not-Rational of Number into Odd and Even or not-Odd For since there can be no Middle between Contradictories it is Evident there can be no more Members than Two and consequently that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole 13. The Whole Definition and All the Members of a Division that is rightly made if taken together may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration For both of these taken together are Equivalent to the Whole Notion Defin'd and Divided and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word as by Man Animal c. v. g. Every Rational Animal is capable of Science Every Clown is a Rational Animal therefore Every Clown is Capable of Science What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion All Number is either Even or Odd therefore All Number is capable of Proportion 14. Out of what has been proved 't is seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science For since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing and therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg such as Science ought to be from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented and this as has been shown is done by Definitions it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science 15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this when two Notions by being Remote seem in a manner Disparate and so the Proposition is Obscure we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally Identical appears in both of them Which done all farther disquisition ceases and the Point is demonstrated For example If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable we shall find that the word Laudable signifies deserving to be spoke well of and Practical Self-Evidence as well as Reason telling us that our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Mankind to express their thoughts that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of and that what 's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks or to true Reason deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good that is thought well of To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Disposition to Act according to True Reason it comes to appear that Virtuo and Laudable have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical and that this Proposition Virtue is Laudable is full as Certain as that What 's according to right Reason is according to right Reason or what 's Laudable is Laudable which seen perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of Virtue is Laudable that is 't is the Proposition Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated Note hence that in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles Rigorous Definitions do not alwayes need but Explications of the two Notions or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms may serve so they be True and Solid since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the Inferiour Truths and the Notions that compound them into Superiour ones For which reason also Practical Self-evidence or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts through Converse with those Natural Objects is sufficient For this is a Solid Knowledg tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape Whence it may Suffice oftentimes without Framing the Demonstration coucht in these Discourses into a Syllogistick Method unless the Form of the Discourse be Deny'd 16. Hence follows that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them For since all Truths are therefore such because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing or to its being what it is which is express'd by an Identical Proposition it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them 17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction and is grounded on it For since all Truths as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing are grounded on the things being what it is and so have an Identical Proposition for their Bases therefore for the same reason every Error being a Dis-conformity to the Thing or a Deviation from its being what it is must be Grounded on this as its first Principle that the Thing is not what it is which is a perfect Contradiction 18. Hence follows necessarily that if Art and Industry be not wanting Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evidâ—nt or an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction For since these as has been prov'd are the Basâ—s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Falshoods and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods that is from Identical Propositions or Contradictions it follows that either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known or be Knowable or Provable to be such or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Propositions or to Contradictions as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity Corol. I. Hence follows that all Learning being Knowledge those Men only ought to be accounted Absolutely speaking True Schollars or perfectly Learned who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour that is thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute By which it will appear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned by the Generality meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors Since the Former know the Truth of the Things or of the Subjects discours'd of
These only know it to be True that such and such Authors say thus or thus Those are such Schollars as have God and Nature for their Masters These are only the Schollars of meer Men who if they take not this way speak out of Fancy which is Ungrounded and therefore Various and Inconstant Whence such Men of Reading use to fill their Heads with a gallimowfry of thrums ends of Sayings glean'd from diverse Logicians or Philosophers discoursing thus or thus but if you put them to Demonstrate any point or to Reduce it to its First Principles they are utterly at a Loss A certain Sign they do not in true speech know any thing Corol. II. Were the Method of Reducing Truths as is abovesaid well settled Probability in Speculatives which is the bane of Science would be quite dash'd out of countenance and sham'd out of the Schools To do which how highly it conduces to the Advancement of Science is â—â—sily discernible by the dimmest Eye LESSON IV. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition and consequently every Errour to a Contradiction What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another and of the Science of Pure Spirits 1. TO Reduce any Truth to an Identical Proposition is nothing but to show clearly that if you deny such a Truth you must by consequence deny the Identical one which is proper to that Subject and expresses its being what it is For since the Reducing Inferiour Truths in any Subject to those which are Supreme or Identical is perform'd by way of Discourse or drawing Consequences and it is Evident that those Propositions which are Inferiour Truths and the Supreme ones cannot be the same Formally and Expresly it follows that they can only be the same Virtually or as one Truth is Included in another Wherefore as Deducing is nothing but Deriving downwards the verity which was in some Higher Truths to the Inferiour ones so Reducing is the carrying upwards or Resolving those Inferiour Truths into those Higher ones on which they Depend and the showing them to be by consequence the Same or that the Inferiour Thesis must needs be True if the Identical or Supreme one be so and that the Supreme one cannot be True unless the Inferiour one be such also So that the verity of the Supreme Truth does by consequence stand engag'd in the Patronage of the Inferiour one Lâ—mma All Essences consist in an Indivisible For since Essence is the Form of the Ens and Ens that which is Capable of Existing and nothing can Exist but that which is Ultimately determin'd in the line of Ens and distinguisht from all others in that Line and any Essential Predicate taken away it wants Part of its Essence that is Part of that which was to Constitute it such an Ens and distinguish it from all others that is which Determin it to be This it follows that the Notion of Ens or Essence requires a Totality of all its Essential parts But a Totality since the least part defalkt from it makes it to be no Totum consists in an Indivisibility therefore All Essences consist in an Indivisible 2. Hence an easie way is chalkt out how to Reduce any Truth to an Identical Proposition or any Errour to a Contradiction For let but the Subject of the Discourse Homo for example be Defin'd and the two parts of its Definition be Defind likewise and so forwards we shall have gain'd a clear and distinct Notion of the Subject and of all its Essential parts If then the Discourse be about the Nature or Essence of Homo all the Divisions of the parts of that Essence which are Common Notions being as they ought made by Contradictory Differences and this from the Notion of Ens to the very Notion Discours'd of consequently that Discourse must either evidently clash with and Contradict some one of those Essential Parts or Agree to them All. If it contradicts any one of them then since Essences consist in an Indivisible it does by consequence destroy the whole Essence of the Subject and make homo not to be homo and if it Agrees with All its parts then since All the parts are evidently the whole 't is by consequence as Certain as it is that Homo is Homo since to say that Homo is an Ens and such an Ens as is Corpus and such a Corpus as is Compounded and such a Compound Body as is Vivens and such a Vivens as is Sensitive or an Animal and such an Animal as can have Notions in it and can Compare one Notion to another and two to a Third is evidently to say in Equivalent Terms Homo est Homo 3. Another Method of Resolving all Truths into Identical Propositions is to Define both the Subject and Predicate and to pursue their Definitions till some Notion that is perfectly Identical appears in both as is Instanced in this proposition Virtue is Laudable in the last Lesson § 15. 4. Moreover all Conclusions formally as such that is considering them as Inferr'd or Concluded are resolv'd finally into this Identical Proposition The same is the same with its self as has been demonstrated above B. 2. L. 3. § 10. 5. Wherefore the Method being settled of Reducing to Identical Propositions both Inferiour Truths which are the Premisses and also the Necessity of the Following of the Conclusions from their respective Premisses which is the Consequence it is hard to conceive what can be farther wanting to the Method to Science so these Rules be thorowly penetrated and industriously put in Practice 6. All Truths whatever that concern the Essences of things if we have but Notions of the Terms of the Propositions which express them do come within the Compass of this Method and are Demonstrable For since all Truths whose Terms we understand do consist of Notions and it s not hard to know to what Common Head those Notions do belong nor insuperably hard to Divide by Proper Differences that Common Head nor the less General Notions under that Head till we come to the very Notions whose Connexion is in question it follows that all Propositions belonging to any Head are for the same reason equally Reducible to their Proper Identicals since all the Predicates in the nine last Common Heads which are Analogically Entia have also their Analogical Essences of which we can have as clear and distinct Notions as we have of the First Common Head which is properly Ens and so we can as easily define their Abstract Notions as we can the other or rather much more easily and consequently Reduce them to their Identicals 7. Hence we can Discourse Scientifically or have true Science not only of Quantities which are the Subject of Mathematicks but with equal reason of Virtues and Vices which are the Subject of Ethicks For we can equally Abstract the Notions of the several Virtues have a Distinct Conception of them equally define them and by that means equally Reduce them to
be Immediate and nothing be assum'd which is not some way Evident This way also is Shorter and more fit to comprize much Truth or many Syllogisms in a little room The other way is Clearer at first sight This is more fit for Writers whose Productions may be scann'd leasurely by multitudes of Readers and Examiners That is proper for Disputants in the Schools who are to Argue or Answer upon the Spot and ought to be so well verst in the Rules of Art as to be ready to act the part of Opponent or Respondent ex tempore and without Studying Amongst the other differences between them this is one that if an obstinate Adversary denies any Link in the Demonstration of the Second kind to be connected to the Other part of the Chain recourse must be forcibly had to the Syllogistick Method to convince him by plain Self-evident Principles of our Understanding on which all Force of Consequence is built We shall give here some few Examples of either Method The first of which is purely Logical the Second Arithmetical The Third and Fourth Physical The Fifth Sixth and Seventh Metaphysical Thesis I. Infinit Number is Impossible Demonstration First Bar-Whatever involves a Contradiction is Impossible but ba-All Infinit Number involves a Contradiction therefore ra-All Infinit Number is Impossible The Minor is thus prov'd Bar-Whatever Notion compriz'd under any of the Common heads is neither the Genus of it's Particular Kind nor any Species under that Genus involves a Contradiction but ba-All Infinit Number it being Discrete Quantity is Compriz'd under one of the Common Heads and yet is neither the Generical Notion of Discrete Quantity nor any Species of it therefore ra-All Infinit Number involves a Contradiction 2. The Major is evident For all the Notions of any Common Head till we come to the bottom of that Scale are either Generical or Specifical Whence such a Notion as Infinit Number would be under that Common Head as 't is evident Discrete Quantity is under Quantity and yet it would not be under it because Infinit Number is neither the Genus of Discrete Quantity nor any Species of it The Minor likewise as to it 's First part is most Evident because Infinit Number is a Number nor is it less a Number for it's being Infinit but more The same Minor as to it's Second part viz. that Infinit Number cannot be the Genus or the whole Notion of Discrete Quantity is thus prov'd Ce-No Notion that is not Comprehended in each of it's Species can be a Generical Notion or a Genus but la-Every Infinit Number is a Notion that is not comprehended in each of the Species of Discrete Quantity therefore rent-No infinit Number can be the Generical Notion of Discrete Quantity 3. The Major is Evident For the Genus or Superiour Notion is but a Part of the Inferiour or the Species and a Part must necessarily be Comprehended in the Whole And accordingly we find the whole Notion and Definition of Animal to be in Homo of Corpus in Vivens and of Ens in all under it 4. This last Minor is likewise most evident For Ten and Twenty are Species of Discrete Quantity being both of them Numbers and yet 't is impossible that the Notion of Infinit Discrete Quantity or Infinit Number should be found in each of these which yet it must be if Infinite Quantity be their Genus 5. The Former Minor according to it's Third part viz. that Infinit Number can be no Species of Number or Discrete Quantity is thus prov'd Ce-No Species comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species but leaves it somewhat which it self has not but la-Every Infinit Number comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species and does not leave it somewhat which it self had not therefore rent No Infinit Number can be a Species of Discrete Quantity 6. The Minor is prov'd For Essential Differences that constitute the Species are more and less of the Genus and not All and None And as for the Formal part of the several Species of Number they are Constituted formally by some one Unity shutting up the rest otherwise those Species had had no Distinct Notion being Indeterminate v. g. Ten and Twenty are Formally such Species of Number because there is a Tenth Unity and a Twentieth in them shutting up or Determining that is Terminating those Unities which were presupposed Wherefore for the same reason if Infinit Number be a Distinct Species it must have besides It 's other Material Constituents something belonging to it's own Intrinsical and Particular nature constituting it formally of such a Species which can be nothing but an Infinitth one Determining or Terminating it in the Line of Number which is a clear contradiction and makes an Infinit to be Finite The same Thesis Infinit Number is impossible Demonstration Second Axiom Units are the Elements of which all Number consists v. g. The Number of Twenty is Twenty Ones The Number of a Hundred is a Hundred Ones and for the same reason an Infinit Number consists of Infinit Ones Da-Whatever Tenet puts some One to be Infinitely distant in the Line of Number from Another One assignable or puts an Infinitth One puts a Contradiction but ri-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts some One to be Infinitly distant in the Line of Number from Another One assignable or an Infinitth One therefore i-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts a Contradiction 7. The Major is self-evident for it clearly puts à n Infinit or Endless Number to have Two Ends viz. this One assignable and that other One Suppos'd Infinitely distant from it or the Infinitth One. 8. The Minor is also Evident For since by the Axiom all Number even tho' Infinit consists of One's as it 's constituent parts if no One be an Infinitth then every one is a Finitth and so all the parts being the whole that Whole or the Infinit Number it self must be Finite which is a Contradiction Thesis II. All Continu'd Quantity is one Whole consisting of Potential or still Divisible Parts Demonstration III. Axiom I. Quantity is Divisible without end This is suppos'd prov'd by Euclid Element Lib. 6. Prop. 10 th Axiom II. What is Actually distinct in any Line is determinate in that Line All Act coming from the Form which being Determinate it self makes those Subjects in which it is Determinate likewise Axiom III. A Quatenus ad omne valet consequentia Proposition I. Quantity cannot be compounded of a Finite Number of Indivisibles Co-Nothing that is Infinitly Divisible can consist of a Finite Number of Indivibles but la-All Quantity is Infinitly Divisible therefore rent-No Quantity can consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles 9. The Major is evident For putting it to consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles Ten for example when 't is Divided into those Ten it can be no longer Divisible and so no Quantity by the Ax. I. Proposition II. Quantity cannot be compounded of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles Ce-No One
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing and those must be also Conclusive ones For their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums or by Extrinsical ones that is by Another Authority and the same question recurrs How we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority and so in infinitum Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by Intrinsical Mediums or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority Moreover the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate which is done by Intrinsical Mediums and unless they be Conclusive they prove nothing and so are good for nothing 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd § § 15.16 Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us and the best proof omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact c. is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End which was to Deceive Which reason is grounded on this that no one man who is not perfectly Frantick acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed For example to fly to the Moon or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it which was their Immediate End whatever farther End they might propose to themselves So many Records Practices Laws and other Consequences Issuing thence giving them the Lie besides the Histories of our own and other Countries and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neighbouring Nations all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore the End being Evidently Impossible to be atchiev'd it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it and therefore they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it 22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated and Consequently the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no◠Opinion It cannot be Opinion because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes as is found here Nor can it be Science because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested causing such a Notion or Impression in us directly by it's self or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones on which kind of Impressions all Science is built but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg Nor is the Thing as an Object the Proper Cause of that Knowledg only which can beget Science For a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation to it 's Proper Effect whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power as was shown above where we treated of Relation By which we may farther more clearly discover the Essential Differences between Science Faith and Opinion It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens therefore every Ens is a Proper Cause of Knowledg 'T is answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively as it were in regard nothing can be understood but Ens Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us Or it may mean that 't is only a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsical thing not a true Property Perfecting it Intrinsically as Properties due to a thing by Nature and Springing from their Essences do It may be objected farther that all Natural Powers are true Properties tho' they respect Extrinsical things on which they are to work 'T is answer'd that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically or give them some perfection in their Intrinsical Nature which Intelligibility does not for nothing is Intrinsically better or otherwise than it would be for being Known or Vnderstood To explicate this better we may consider that every Entity being a Part of the World has some Office or Place there and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature And accordingly Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation which 't is fitted to produce as Fire to heat Water to Cool c. Whence what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it or a Property immediately Connected with it's Essence such as are those Natural Powers objected Now 't is Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for and so the whole course of Nature carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects would be quite out of frame and Order whereas 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self whether those Proper Causes or Effects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters or made known to us by their Knowing them is not a Proper Effect of those Causes nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature but Accidental to them as such but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them and so does Necessarily infer the Conclusion 23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies is adequately divided into Living and Dead that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce and those that speak by Writing Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others or testify to them their Knowledg of such things 24. Matters of fact done long a go if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Mankind may be made known to us who live now by a Delivery of them down from the foregoing Age to the succeeding One Which Continued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition For since the Generality of First Attesters who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd could not but know them and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents it follows that the Continuance of those Causes may still