second is that the persons imployed in the Service of God should have respect answerable to their imployment which appears from their Relation to God as his Servants from the persons imployed in this work before positive Laws Masters of Families the first Priests The Priesthood of the first-born before the Law discussed The Arguments for it answered The Conjunction of Civil and Sacred Authothority largely shewed among Egyptians Grecians Romans and others The ground of Separation of them afterwards from Plutarch and others p. 85 CHAP. V. THE third thing dictated by the Law of Nature is the solemnity of all things to be performed in this Society which lyes in the gravity of all Rites and Ceremonies in the composed temper of mind Gods Worship rational His Spirit destroyes not the use of Reason The Enthusiastick spirit discovered The circumstantiating of fit times and place for Worship The seventh day on what account so much spoken of by Heathens The Romans Holy dayes Cessation of labour upon them The solemnity of Ceremonies used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 silence in devotions Exclusion of unfit persons Solemnity of Discipline Excommunication among the Iewes by the sound of a Trumpet among Christians by a Bell. p. 93 CHAP. VI. THE fourth thing dictated by the Law of Nature that there must be a way to end controversies arising which tend to break the peace of the Society The nature of Schisme considered The Churches Power as to Opinions explained When separation from a Church may be lawful Not till communion becomes sin Which is when corruptions are required as conditions of Communion Not lawful to erect new Churches upon supposition of corruption in a Church The ratio of a fundamental article explained it implyes both necessity and sufficiency in order to salvation Liberty of judgement and authority distinguished The latter must be parted with in religious Societies as to private persons What way the Light of nature directs to for ending Controversies First in an equality of power that the less number yield to the greater on what Law of Nature that is founded Secondly In a subordination of power that there must be a liberty of Appeals Appeals defined Independency of particular Congregations considered Elective Synods The Case paralleld between Civill and Church-Government Where Appeals finally lodge The power of calling Synods and confirming their Acts in the Magistrate p. 104. CHAP. VII THE fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature That all that are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Lawes and Rules of it Civil Societies founded upon mutual Consent express in their first entrance implicite in others born under Societies actually formed Consent as to a Church necessary the manner of Consent determined by Christ by Baptism and Profession Implicite consent supposed in all Baptized explicite declared by challenging the Priviledges and observing the Duties of the Covenant Explicite by express owning the Gospel when adult very useful for recovering the credit of Christia nity The Discipline of the primitive Church cleared from Origen Iustin Martyr Pliny Tertullian The necessary reâ—â—â—â—â—â—es of Church membership whether Positive signs of Grace nothing required by the Gospel beyand reality of profession Exâ—â—â—â—â—tâ— Coâ—â—â—â—â—â— how far necessary not the formal Constitution of a Church proved by severâ—â— arguments p. 132. CHAP. VIII THE last thing dictated by the Law of Nature is that every offender against the Lawes of this Society is bound to give an account of his actions to the Governours of it and submit to the censures inflicted upon him by them The original of penalties in Societies The nature of them according to the nature and ends of Societies The penalty of the Church no civil mulct because its Lawes and ends are different from civil Societies The practice of the Dâ—uâ—ds and Câ—rceâ—ae in e 〈…〉 n. Among the Iewes whether a meer civil or sacr 〈…〉 y. The latter proved by six Arguments Cherem Col Bo what Objections answered The original of the mistake shewed The first part concluded p. 141 PART II. CHAP. I. THE other ground of divine Right considered viz. Gods positive Lawes which imply a certain knowledge of Gods intention to bind men perpetuaâ—ly As to which the arguments drawn from Tradition and the practice of the Church in after ages proved invalid by several arguments In order to a right stating the Question some Concessions laid down First That there must be some form of Government in the Church is of divine right The notion of a Church explained whether it belongs only to particular Congregations which are manifested not to be of Gods primary intention but for our necessity Evidence for National Churches under the Gospel A National Church-Government necessary p. 150 CHAP. II. THE second Concession is That Church Government must be administred by officers of Divine appointment To that end the continuance of a Gospel Ministry fully cleared from all those arguments by which positive Laws are proved immutable The reason of its appointment continues the dream of a â—aeculum Spiritus sancti discussed first broached by the Mendicant Friers upon the rising of the Waldenses now embraced by Enthusiasts It s occasion and unreasonableness shewed Gods declaring the perpetuity of a Gospel Ministry Matth. 28. 20. explained A Novel interpretation largely refuted The world to come What A Ministry necessary for the Churches continuance Ephes. 4 12. explained and vindicated p. 158 CHAP. III. THE Question fully stated Not what Form of Government comes the nearest to the Primitive practice but whether any be absolutely determined Several things propounded for resolving the Question What the Form of Church-Government was under the Law How far Christians are bound to observe that Neither the necessity of a superiour Order of Church-Officers nor the unlawfulness can be proved from thence p. 170 CHAP. IV. WHether Christ hath determined the Form of Government by any positive Laws Arguments of the necessity why Christ must determine it largely answered as First Christs faithfulness compared with Moses answered and retorted and thence proved that Christ did not institute any Form of Government in the Church because he gave no such Law for it as Moses did And we have nothing but general Rules which are appliable to several Forms of Government The Office of Timothy and Titus What it proves in order to this question the lawfulness of Episcopacy shewed thence but not the necessity A particular form how far necessary as Christ was Governour of his Church the Similitudes the Church is set out by prove not the thing in question Nor the difference between civil and Church-Government nor Christ setting Officers in his Church nor the inconvenience of the Churches power in appointing new Officers Every Minister hath a power respecting the Church in common which the Church may determine and fix the bounds of Episcopacy thence proved lawful The argument from the Scriptures perfection answered p. 175 CHAP. V. WHether any of Christs actions have determined the Form of
named a Controversie But that which I am now clearing is this that whatsoever binds Christians as an universal standing Law must be clearly revealed as such and laid down in Scripture in such evident terms as all who have their senses exercised therein may discern it to have been the will of Christ that it should perpetually oblige all believers to the Worlds end as is clear in the case of Baptism and the Lords Supper But here I shall add one thing by way of caution That there is not the same necessity for a particular and clear revelation in the alteration of a Law unrepealed in some circumstances of it as there is for the establishing of a New Law As to the former viz. the change of a standing Law as to some particular circumstance a different practice by persons guided by an infallible spirit is sufficient which is the case as to the observation of the Lords day under the Gospel For the fourth Command standing in force as to the Morality of it a different practice by the Apostles may be sufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occasional part of it which was the limitation of the observation of it to that certain day So likewise that other Law standing in force that persons taken into Covenant with God should be admitted by some visible sign Apostolical practice clearly manifested may be sufficient ground to conclude what the mind of Christ was as to the application of it to particular persons and what qualifications are requisite in such as are capable of admission as in the case of Infants Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Gospel because it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular persons which might be gathered sufficiently from the Apostles practice the Analogy of the dispensation the equal reason of exclusion under the Law and yet notwithstanding the continual admission of them then into the same Gospel-Govenant Circumcision being the Seal of the Righteousness of Faith But this by the way to prevent mistakes We must now by parity of reason say that either the former Law in those things wherein it was not typical must hold in reference to the form of Government in the Church of Christ or else that Christ by an universal Law hath setled all order in Church Government among the Pastors themselves or else that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church to determine its own form of Government which I conceive is the direct state of the Question about Divine Right viz. Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be setled by an universal binding Law or no But for a further clearing the state of the Question we must consider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right or a standing Law in the Church of God for those who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right do not plead a Law in express terms but such things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred Which I now come to examine and that which I lay down as a Postulatum or a certain conclusion according to which I shall examine others â—ssertions concerning Divine Right is That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right nor can bind Christians directly or consequentially as a positive Law but what may be certainly known to have come from God with an intention to oblige Believers to the worlds end For either we must say it binds Christians as a Law when God did not intend it should or else Gods intentions to bind all Believers by it must be clearly manifested Now then so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually a thing may be said to be of an unalterable Divine Right and those can be no more then these two Either by the Law of Nature or by some positive Law of God Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two or by virtue of them as shall be made appear I begin with the Law of Nature The Law of Nature binds indispensably as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions but is founded upon the intrinsecal nature of good and evil in the things themselves antecedently to any positive Declaration of Gods Will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed that Law is unalterable as to its obligation When I say the Law of Nature is indispensable my meaning is that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept as the three first Commands of the Moral Law no man can by any positive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them neither by any abrogation of the Laws themselves nor by derogation from them nor interpretation of them nor change in the object matter or circumstance whatsoever it be Now although the formal reason of mans obedience to the precepts of this Law be the conformity which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodness yet I conceive the efficient cause of mans obligation to these things is to be fetched from the Will Command and Pleasure of God Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will but as it is executive of Divine purposes and as it ingraves such a Law upon the hearts of men For notwithstanding mans Reason considered in it self be the chiefest instrument of discovery what are these necessary duties of humane nature in which sense Aristotle defines a Natural Law to be that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath every where the same force and strength i. e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among all that have the free use of their reason and faculties yet I say it is not bare Reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law but as it is expressive of an Eternal Law and deduceth its obligation from thence And so this Law if we respect the rise extent and immutability of it may be call'd deservedly the Law of Nature but if we look at the emanation efflux and original of it it is a Divine Law and so it is call'd by Molina Alphonsus à Castrâ—â— and others For the sanction of this Law of Nature as well as others depends upon the Will of God and therefore the obligation must come from him it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a Law but those who had the Legislative Power to cause the obligation to it It appears then from hence that whatever by just consequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature is of Divine Right because from the very nature of that Law it being indispensable it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it The second way whereby we may know what is of Divine Right is by Gods
power is alwayes to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it which is done either by the annexing an Oath on a Promise which the Apostle calls the two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie For though God be free to promise yet when he hath promised his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance in which sense I understand those who say God in making promises is bound only to himself and not to men that is that the ground of performance ariseth from Gods faithfulness For else if we respect the right coming by the promise that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance But the case is otherwise in penal Laws which thoughâ— never so strict do imply a power of relaxation in the Legislator because penall Laws do only constitute the debstum poenae and bind the sinner over to punishment but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of faln man because it was a penal Law and therefore relaxable But because the debt of punishment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law therefore satisfaction was necessary to God as Law-giver either by the person himself or another for him because it was not consistent with the holiness of Gods nature and his wisdom as Governor to relax an established Law without valuable consideration Now for the third kind of Gods Laws besides promissory and penall viz such as are meerly positive respecting duties which become such by vertue of an express command these though they be revocable in themselves yet being revocable only by God himself and his own power since he hath already in his Word fully revealed his Will unlesse therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease they continue irreversible This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament which being commands meerly positive yet Christ commanding Christians as Christians to observe them and not as Christians of the first and second Ages of the Church his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them then that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the observance of them For al though the Socinians say that Baptism was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who professe themselves the admirers of it For Christs Command nowhere implying such a limitation and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation as obligatory as ever we have no reason to think that Christs command doth not reach us now especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call and consequently the same duty required which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws is when the things commanded in particular are necessary to the being succession and continuance of such a Society of men professing the Gospel as is instituted and approved by Christ himself For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what Society he please and appoint what Orders he please to be observed by them what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members into his Church in their continuing in it in the way means manner of ejection out of it in the preserving the succession of his Church and the administration of Ordinances of his appointment These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this Society they are thereby of a nature as unalterable as the duty of observing what Christ hath commanded is How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed will appear afterwards Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded viz either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature concurring with the rules of the written word or upon express positive Laws of God whose reason is immutable or which God hath declared shall continue as necessary to the being of the Church The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are brought for a Divine Right which are either Scripture examples or Divine acts or Divine approbation For Scripture-examples First I take it for granted on all hands that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them such are the Mediatory acts of Christ the Heroical acts of extraordinary persons all accidentall and occasionall actions Example doth not bind us as an example for then all examples are to be followed and so we shall of necessity go quà itur non quà eundum walk by the most examples and not by rule There is then no obligatory force in example it self Secondly there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind and when not for otherwise there can be no discrimination put between examples which we are to follow and which to avoid This rule must be either immediately obligatory making it a duty to follow such examples or else directive declaring what examples are to be â—ollowed And yet even this latter doth imply as well as the former that the following these examples thus declared is become a duty There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty and consequently it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such example which gives a Divine Right to those examples and not barely the examples themselves We are bound to follow Christs example not barely because he did such and such things for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility patience self-denyal c. and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation When men speak then with so much confidence that Scripture-examples do bind us unalterably they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty which I have shewn already to be absurd or else that the morall nature of the action done in that example or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example though in its self it be of no morall nature If the former of these two then it is the morality of the action binds us without its being incarnate in the example For the example in actions not morall binds not at all and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it and consequently it is the morality of the action which binds and not the example If the latter the rule making it our duty then it it is more apparent that it is not the example which
binds necessarily but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty And so it evidently appears that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves and resolved into one of the two former the morall nature of the action or a positive Law And therefore those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-examples must either produce the morall nature of these examples or else a rule binding us to follow those examples Especially when these examples are brought to found a New positive Law obliging all Christians necessarily to the end of the world Concerning the binding nature of Apostolicall practice I shall discourse largely afterwards The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right is by Divine Acts. As to this â—t is again evident that all Divine Acts do not constitute such a Right therefore there must be something expressed in those Acts when such a Divine Right follows them whence we may infallibly gather it was Gods intention they should perpetually oblige as is plain in the cases instanced in the most for this purpose as Gods resting on the seventh day making the Sabbath perpetual For it was not Gods resting that made it the Sabbath for that is only expressed as the occasion of its institution but it was Gods sanctifying the day that is by a Law setting it apart for his own service which made it a duty And so Christs resurrection was not it which made the Lords day a Sabbath of Divine Right but Christs resurrection was the occasion of the Apostles altering only a circumstantiall part of a morall duty already which being done upon so great reasons and by persons indued with an insallible spirit thereby it becomes our duty to observe that morall command in this limitation of time But here it is further necessary to distinguish between acts meerly positive and acts donative or legall The former conâ—er no right at all but the latter do not barely as acts but as legall acts that is by some declaration that those acts do conserr right And so it is in all donations and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legall title to it without express transferring of dominion and propriety with it Thus in Christs delivering the Keys to Peter and therest of the Apostles by that act I grant the Apostles had the power of the Keyes by Divine Right but then it was not any bare act of Christ which did it but it was only the declaration of Christs will conferring that authority upon them Again we must distinguish between a right conferâ—'d by a donative act and the unalterable nature of that Right for it is plain there may be a Right personall as well as successive derivative and perpetuall And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Christ unless it be made appear it was Christs intention that Right should be perpetuall if it oblige still For otherwise the extent of the Apostolical Commission the power of working miracles as well as the power of the Keyes whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty or a power authoritative and penall must continue still if a difference be not made between these two and some rule sound out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is personall when successive Which rule thus found out must make the Right unalterable and so concerning us and not the bare donative act of Christ For it is evident they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apostles by an act of Christ and if some continue still and others do not then the bare act of Christ doth not make an unalterable Divine Right And so though it be proved that the Apostles had superiority of order and jurisdiction over the Pastors of the Church by an act of Christ yet it must further be proved that it was Christs intention that superiority should continue in their successors or it makes nothing to the purpose But this argument I confess I see not how those who make a necessary Divine Right to follow upon the acts of Christ can possibly avoid the force of The last thing pleaded for Divine Right is Divine approbation but this least of all constitutes a Divine Right For if the actions be extraordinary Gods approbation of them as such cannot make them an ordinary duty In all other actions which are good and therefore only commendable they must be so either because done in conformity to Gods revealed Will or to the nature of things good in themselves In the one it is the positive Law of God in the other the Law of Nature which made the action good and so approved by God and on that account we are bound to do it For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his Will revealed or natural which Will and Law of his is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right i. e. perpetually binding as to the observation of it But for acts of meerly positive nature which we read Gods approbation of in Scripture by vertue of which approbation those actions do oblige us in this case I say it is not Gods meer approbation that makes the obligation but as that approbation so recorded in Scripture is a sufficient testimony and declaration of Gods intention to oblige men And so it comes to be a positive Law which is nothing else but a sufficient declaration of the Legislators will and intention to bind in particular actions and cases Thus now we have cleared whereon a necessary and unalterable Divine Right must be founded either upon the Law of Nature or some positive Law of God sufficiently declared to be perpetually binding CHAP. II. Six Hypotheses laid down as the basis of the following Discourse 1. The irreversible obligation of the Law of Nature either by humane or Divine positive Laws in things immediately flowing from it 2. Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God where there is no prohibition by positive Laws inlarged into 5 subservient Propositions 3. Divine positive Laws concerning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of Nature must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law 4. Things undetermined both by the naturall and positive Laws of God may be lawfully determined by the supream authority in the Church of God 5. What is thâ—â— determined by lawfull authority doth bind the consciences of men subject to that authority to obedience to those determinations 6. Things thus determined by lawfull authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed by the same authority HAving shewed what a Divine Right is and whereon it is founded our next great inquiry will be How far Church-Government is founded upon Divine Right taken either of these two wayes
But for our more distinct clear and rationaâ—â— proceeding I shall lay down some things as so many Postulata or generall Principles and Hypotheses which will be as the basis and foundation of the following Discourse which all of them concern the obligation of Laws wherein I shall proceed gradually beginning with the Law of Nature and so to Divine positive Laws and lastly to speak to humane positive Laws The first Principle or Hypothesis which I lay down is That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty as flowing from the principles of it there no positive Law can be supposed to take off the obligation of it Which I prove both as to humane positive Laws and Divine First as to humane For first the things commanded in the Law of Nature being just and righteous in themselves there can be no obligatory Law made against such things Nemo tenetur ad impossibile is true in the sense of the Civil Law as well as in Philosophy as impossibile is taken for turpe and turpe for that which is contrary to the dictates of Nature A man may be as well bound not to be a man as not to act according to principles of reason For the Law of Nature is nothing else but the dictate of right reason discovering the good or evil of particular actions from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light Whatever positive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles is thereby of no force at all And that which hath no obligation in it self cannot dissolve a former obligation Secondly the indispensablenesse of the obligation of the Law of Nature appears from the end of all other Laws which are agreed upon by mutual compact which is the better to preserve men in their rights and priviledges Now the greatest rights of men are such as flow from Nature its self and therefore as no Law binds against the reason of it so neither can it against the common end of Laws Therefore if a humane positive Law should be made that God should not be worshipped it cannot bind being against the main end of Laws which is to make men live together as reasonable creatureâ— which they cannot do without doing what Nature requires which is to serve God who made it Again it overturns the very foundation of all Government and dissolves the tye to all humane Laws if the Law of Nature doth not bind indispensably for otherwise upon what ground must men yield obedience to any Laws that are made Is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature that men must stand to all compacts and agreements made If Laws take their force among men from hence they can bind no further then those compâ—cts did extend which cannot be supposed to be to violate and destroy their own natures Positive Laws may restrain much of what is only of the permissive Law of Nature for the intent of positive Laws was to make men abate so much of their naturall freedom as should be judged necessary for the preservation of humane Societies but against the obligatory Law of Nature as to its precepts no after-Law can derogate from the obligation of it And therefore it is otherwise between the Law of Nature and positive Laws then between Laws meerly civil for as to these the rule is that posterior derogat priori the latter Law cassats and nulls the obligation of the former but as to natural Laws and positive prior derogat posteriori the Law oâ— Nature which is firstâ— takes away the obligation of a positive Law if it be contrary to it As Iustellus observe it was in the primitive Church in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils that such as were inserted in the Codex Canonum being of the more ancient Councils did render the obligation of later Canons invalid which were contrary to them unlesse it were in mâ—tteâ—s of small moment We see then that supposing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory the obligation of all humane positive Laws will fall with it as the superstructure needs must when the foundation is removed for if any other Law of Nature may be dissolved why not that whereby men are bound to stand to Covenants and contracts made and if that be dissolved How can the obligation to humane Laws remain which is founded upon that basis And so all civil Societies are thereby overturned Thirdly it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this for humane Laws bind only outward humane actâ—ons directly and internall acts only by vertue of their necessary connexion with and influence upon outward actions and not otherwise but the Law of Nâ—ture immediately binds the soul and conscience of man And therefore obligatio naturalis and nexus conscientiae are made to be the same by Lessius Suarâ—z and others For Lessius dâ—sputing Whether a Will made without solemnity of Law doth bind in conscience or no He proves it doâ—h by â—his argument from the opinion of the Lawyers that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation and the hresae ab Intestato who is the next of Kin is bound to make it good therefore it doth bind in conscience So then there ariseth a necessary obllgation upon conscience from the dictâ—tes of the Law of Nature which cannot be removed by any positive Law For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law as in the former case of succession to a Will not legally made in covenants made without conditions expressed in recovery of debtâ— from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupillage without consent of his Tutor in these cases though no action lie against the persons yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man but only that he is not responsible for the breach of morall honesty in them before civil Courts In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal before which all such offences shall be punished Thus then we see no positive humane Law can dispence with or dissolve the obligation of thâ— Law of nature Much lesse Secondly can we suppose any positive Divine Law should For although Gods power be immense and infinite to do what pleaseth him yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodnesse else it is no divine power and therefore posse malum non est posse it is no power but weakness to do evil and without this posse malum there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil which must be supposed if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with Therefore it was well said by Origen when Câ—lsus objected it as the common speech of
before Covenants made and things thereby determined may be so far from being lawful after that the doing of them may contradict a Principle of the Obligatory Law of Nature Thus in a state of liberty every one had right to what he thought fit for his use but Propriety and Dominion being introduced which was a free voluntary act by mens determining Rights it now becomes an offence against the Law of Nature to take away that which is another mans In which sense alone it is that Theft is said to be forbidden by the Law of Nature And by the same reason he that resists and opposeth the lawful Authority under which he is born doth not only offend against the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives but against that Original and Fundamental Law of Societies viz standing to Covenants once made For it is a gross mistake as well as dangerous for men to imagine That every man is born in a state of Absolute Liberty to chuse what Laws and Governours he please but every one being now born a Subject to that Authority he lives under he is bound to preserve it as much as in him lies Thence Augustus had some reason to say He was the best Citizen qui praesentem reipublicae statum mutari â—â—â— vult That doth not disturb the present state of the Commonwealth and who as Alcibiades saith in Thucydides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endeavours to preserve that form of Government he was born under And the reason of it is that in Contracts and Covenants made for Government men look not only at themselves but at the benefit of Posterity if then one Party be bound to maintain the Rights of the others Posterity as well as of his person the other party must be supposed to oblige his Posterity in his Covenant to perform Obedience which every man hath power to do because Children are at their Parents disposal And Equity requires that the Covenant entred should be of equal extent to both parties And if a man doth expect Protection for his Posterity he must engage for the Obedience of his Posterity too to the Governorâ— who do legally protect them But the further prosecution of these things belongs to another place to consider of my purpose being to treat of Government in the Church and not in the State The sum of this is that the Obligation to the performance of what things are determined which are of the permissive Law of Nature by Positive Laws doth arise from the Obligatory Law of Nature As the Demonstration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks doth depend upon the Principles of the Theoremes themselves and so whoever denies the truth of the Probleme deduced by just Consequence from the Theoreme must consequentially deny the truth of the Theoreme its self So those who violate the particular Determinations of the Permissive Law of Nature do violate the Obligation of the Preceptive part of that Law Obedience to the other being grounded on the Principles of this 4. God hath Power by his Positive Laws to take in and determine as much of the Permissive Law of Nature as he please which being once so determined by an Universal Law is so far from being lawful to be done that the doing of them by those under an Obligation to his Positive Laws is an offence against the Immutable Law of Nature That God may restrain mans Natural Liberty I suppose none who own Gods Legislative Power over the world can deny especially considering that men have power to restrain themselves much more then hath God who is the Rector and Governor of the World That a breach of his positive Laws is an offence against the common Law of Nature appears hence because man being Gods creature is not only bound to do what is in general suitable to the principles of reason in flying evil and choosing good but to submit to the determinations of Gods will as to the distinction of good from evil For being bound universally to obey God it is implyed that man should obey him in all things which he discovers to be his will whose determination must make a thing not only good but necessary to be done by vertue of his supreme authority over men This then needs no further proof being so clear in its self 5. Lastly What things are left undetermined by divine positive Laws are in the Churches power to use and practise according as it judgeth them most agreeable to the rule of the Word That things undetermin'd by the Word are still lawfull evidently appears because what was once lawfull must have some positive Law to make it unlawfull which if there be none it remains lawfull still And that the Church of God should be debarr'd of any priviledge of any other Societies I understand not especially if it belong to it as a Society considered in its self and not as a particular Society constituted upon such accounts as the Church is For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as such in a restrained sense but in the general notion of it as a Society of men imbodyed together by some Laws proper to its self Although it subsist upon a higher foundation viz. of divine institution and upon higher grounds reasons principles ends and be directed by other Laws immediately then any other Societies in the World are The third Hypothesis is this Where the Law of Nature determines the thing and the Divine Law determines the manner and circumstances of the thing there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations by vertue of the Law of Nature in its general obligation As for instance the Law of Nature bindeth man to worship God but for the way manner and circumstances of Worship we are to follow the positive Laws of God because as we are bound by Nature to worship him so we are bound by vertue of the same Law to worship him in the manner best pleasing to himself For the light of Nature though it determine the duty of worship yet it doth not the way and manner and though acts of pure obedience be in themselves acceptable unto God yet as to the manner of those acts and the positives of worship they are no further acceptable unto God then commanded by him Because in things not necessarily determined by the Law of Nature the goodnesse or evill of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance it must depend upon his Command supposing positive Laws to be at all given by God to direct men in their worship of him For supposing God had not at all revealed himself in order to his worship doubtlesse it had been lawfull for men not only to pray to God express their sense of their dependance upon him but to appoint waies times and places for the doing it as they should judge most convenient agreeable to natural light Which is evident from the
sit conditio Iudaeorum qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverint legalibus tamen sarcinis non humanis praesumptionibus subjiciuntur For although we cannot positively say how such things as these do manifestly iâ—â—pugn our Faith yet in that they load our Religion with such servile burdens which the mercy of God hath left free for all other observations but the celebration of some few and most clear Sacraments that they make our condition worse then that of the Iews for they although strangers to Gospel Liberty had no burdens charged upon them by the Constitutions of men but only by the Law and Commands of God Which Sentence and Reason of his I leave to the most Impartial Judgement of every true sober minded Christian. And thus I am at last come through this Field of Thorns and Thistles I hope now to find my way more plain and easie So much for the fourth Hypothesis The two next will be discharged with lesser trouble Hypoth 5. What is left undetermined both by Divine Positive Laws and by Principles deduced from the Natural Law if it be determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God doth bind the Conscience of those who are subject to that Authority to Obedience to those Determinations I here suppose that the matter of the Law be something not predetermined either by the Law of Nature or Divine Positive Lawâ— for against either of these no Humane Law can bind the Conscience For if there be any moral evil in the thing Commanded we are bound to obey God rather than men in which case we do not formally and directly disobey the Magistrate but we chuse to obey God before him And as we have already observed a former Obligation from God or Nature destroys a latter because God hath a greater Power and Authority over mens Consciences then any Humane Authority can have And my Obedience to the Magistrate being founded upon a Divine Law it must be supposed my duty to obey him first by virtue of whose Authority I obey another then the other whom I obey because the former hath commanded me If I am bound to obey an Inferiour Magistrate because the Supreme requires it if the Inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the Supreme I am not bound to obey him in it because both the derives his Power of Commanding and I my Obligation to Obedience from the Authority of the Supreme which must be supposed to do nothing against it self So it is between God and the Supreme Magistrate By him Kings reign God when he gives them a Legislative Power doth it cumulativè non privativè not so as to deprive himself of it nor his own Laws of a binding force against his So that no Law of a Magistrate can in reason bind against a Positive Law of God But what is enacted by a Lawful Magistrate in things left undetermined by Gods Laws doth even by virtue of them bind men to Obedience which require Subjection to the Higher Powers for Conscience sake So that whatsoever is left indifferent Obedience to the Magistrate in things indifferent is not And if we are not bound to obey in things undetermin'd by the Word I would â—ain know wherein we are bound to obey them or what distinct Power of Obligation belongs to the Authority the Magistrate hath over men For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws therefore either there must be a distinct Authority without Power to oblige or else we are effectually bound to whatsoever the Magistrate doth determine in lawful things And if it be so in general it must be so as to all particulars contained in that general and so in reference to matters of the Church unless we suppose all things concerning it to be already determined in Scripture which is the thing in Question and shall be largely discussed in its due place Sixthly Hypoth 6. Things undetermined by the Divine Law Natural and Positive and actually determined by lawful Authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed according to the different ages tempers inclinations of men by the same Power which did determine them All Humane Constitutions are reversible by the same Power which made them For the Obligation of them not arising from the matter of them but from the Authority of the Person binding are consequently alterable as shall be judged by that Power most sutable to the ends of its first promulgation Things may so much alter and times change that what was a likely way to keep men in Unity and Obedience at one time may only inrage them at another The same Physick which may at one time cure may at another only inrage the distemper more As therefore the Skill of a Physitian lies most in the application of Physick to the several tempers of his Patients So a wise Magistrate who is as Nicias said in Thucydides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Physitian to cure the distempers of the body Politick and considers as Spartian tells us Adrian used to say in the Senate Ita se Rempub. gesturum ut sciret populirem esse non propriam that the Peoples Interest is the main care of the Prince will see a necessity of altering reforming varying many Humane Constitutions according as they shall tend most to the ends of Government either in Church or State Thence it is said of the several Laws of Nature Divine and Humane that Lex naturae potest poni sed non deponi Lex divina nec poni nec deponi Lex humana poni deponi The Law of Nature may be laid down as in case of Marriage with Sisters in the beginning of the world but not laid aside the Law of God can neither be laid down nor laid aside but Humane Laws both may be laid down and laid aside Indeed the Laws of the Medes and Persians are said to be unalterable but if it be meant in the sense it is commonly understood in yet that very Law which made them unalterable for they were not so of their own Nature was an alterable Law and so was whatever did depend upon it I conclude then whatever is the subject of Humane Determination may lawfully be alter'd and changed according to the wisdome and prudence of those in whose hands the care of the Publick is Thus then as those things which are either of Natural or Christian Liberty are subjected to Humane Laws and restraints so those Laws are not irreversible but if the Fences be thrown down by the same Authority which set them up whatever was thereby inclosed returns to the Community of Natural Right again So much for these Hypotheses which I have been the longer in explaining and establishing because of the great influence they may have upon our present Peace and the neer concernment they have to this whole Discourse the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon these Foundations CHAP. III. How
were not such particular Organized Churches but they were as the first matter of many congregations to be propagated out of them which after made one Society consisting of those several congregations imbodyed together and ruled by one common Government As in a Colledge every Tutor hath his own Pupils wich he rules and if we suppose but one Tutor at first in the Colledge with his Pupils all the power both common to the Society and peculiar to his Flock is joyned together but when there are many more Tutors having Pupils under their charge all these for their better ordering as a Society must be governed by the common Government of the Colledge to which the particular Government of every Tutor is and must be subordinate But this will be more fully made appear in the Original of Civil Government It is far more evident that all Civil power lay at first in Adam and his Family and afterwards in particular Families than that all Church-power lay in particular congregations at first We may then with as good Reason say that there is no lawfull civil Government now but that of particular Families and that no Nationall Government hath any right or power over particular Families because Families had once all civil Power within themselves as because it â—â— supposed that all Church-power lay first in particular congregations therefore there must be no Church-power above them nor that particular congregations are subject to such Government as is requisite for the Regulating of the Society in common as comprehending in it many particular congregations Let them shew then how any Government in the State is lawfull when Families had the first power and by what right now those Families are subordinate to the civill Magistrate and what necessity there is for it and by the very same Reasons will we shew the lawfulness of Government in the Church over many Congregations and that those are by the same right and upon the same necessity to subordinate themselves to the Government of the Church considereâ—â—â— a Society taking in many particular Congregations The Parallel runs on further and clearer still For as the heads of the severall Families after the Flood had the command over all dwelling under their Roofs while they remained in one Family and when that increased into more there power was extended over them too which was the first Original of Monarchy in the World So the Planters of the first Churches that while the Church was but one Congregation had power over it when this Congregation was multiplyed into more their Power equally extended over them all And as afterwards several heads of Families upon their increase did constitute distinct Civil Governments wherein were subordinate Officers but those Governments themselves were co-ordinate one with another So in the Church so many Congregations as make up one Provincial or National Society as succession and prudence doth order the bounds of them do make up several particular Churches enjoying their Officers ruling them but subordinare to the Governours of the Church in common Which Society National or Provincial is subordinate to none beyond its self but enjoyes a free Power within its self of ordering things for its own Government as it judgeth most convenient and agreeable to the Rules of Scripture The summe then of what I say concerning subordination of Officers and Powers in the Society of the Church is this That by the light and Law of Nature it appears that no individuall company or Congregation hath an absolute independent power within its self but that for the redressing grievances happening in them appeals are 〈…〉 to the parties aggrieved and a subordination of that particu 〈…〉 Congregation to the Government of the Society in common 〈…〉 at the right of Appealing and Originall of Subordination is from Nature the particular manner and form of subordinate and superiour Courts is to be fetched from positive Lawes the limitation of Appeals extent of jurisdiction the binding power of Sentence so far as concerns external Unity in the Church is to be fetched from the power of the Magistrate and civil Sanctions and Constitutions The Churches power as to Divine Law being onely directive and declarative but being confirmed by a civil Sanction is juridicall and obligatory Concerning the Magistrates power to call confirm alter repeal the Decrees of Synods see Grotius Chamier Whitaker Casaubon Mornay and others who fully and largely handle it To whom having nothing to add I will take nothing at all from them As for that time when the Church was without Magistrates ruling in it in those things left undetermined by the Rule of the Word they acted out of Principles of Christian Prudence agreeable to the Rules of Scripture and from the Principles of the Law of nature One of which we come in the next place to speak to So much for the Churches Power considered as a Society for ending controversies arising within its self tending to break the Peace and Unity of it CHAP. VII The fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature That all that are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Lawes and Rules of it Civil Societies founded upon mutual consent express in the first entrance implicite in others born under societies actually formed Consent as to a Church necessary the manner of Consent determined by Christ by Baptism and Profession Implicite Consent supposed in all baptized explicite declared by challenging the priviledges and observing the duties of the Covenant Explicite by express owning the Gospel when adult very usefull for recovering the credit of Christianity The Discipline of the Primitive Church cleared from Origen Iustin Martyr Pliny Tertullian The necessary requisites of Church Membership whether positive signs of Grace Explicite Covenant how far necessary not the formal Constitution of a Church * proved by several Arguments THe Law of Nature dictates That all who are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of that Society according to its Constitution For none can be looked upon as a Member of a Society but such a one as submits to the Rules and Laws of the Society as constituted at the time of his entrance into it That all civil Societies are founded upon voluntary consent and agreement of parties and do depend upon Contracts and Covenants made between them is evident to any that consider that men are not bound by the Law of Nature to associate themselves with any but whom they shall judge fit that Dominion and Propriety was introduced by free consent of men and so there must be Laws and Bonds fit agreement made and submission acknowledged to those Lawes else Men might plead their Naturall Right and Freedom still which would be destructive to the very Nature of these Societies When men then did first part with their natural Liberties two things were necessary in the most express terms to be declared First a free and voluntary consent to part with
But those judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity to bind still not by virtue of that Sanction but by virtue of common principles of equity which certainly in the present shortness of humane reason cannot be fetched from a clearer Fountain then those Laws which once came from the Fountain of Goodness none of whose constitutions can any ways be supposed to deviate from the exactest rules of Justice and Equity And upon this very ground too some part of the fourth Commandment is abrogated and the other continues to bind still For the reason of the Ceremonial and occasional part is ceased and the reason of what was Moral continues Therefore the School-men say right of the Sabbath day Cultus est à naturâ modus à lege virtuâ— Ã Gratiâ Nature dictates that God should be worshipped the Law informs what day and time to spend in his worship Grace must enable us to perform that worship on that day in a right manner And because the same reason for Gods Worship continueâ— still therefore it is a Precept of the Natural Law that God should be worshipped What time precisely must be spent in Gods Worship as one day in seven though the reason be evident to nature of it when it is made known yet it is hard to conceive that Nature could have found out the precise determination of the time Although I must confess the general consent of Nations as to the seventh part if it were fully cleared would speak fair to be the voice of Nature or at least a tradition received from the Sons of Noah which if so will be an evidence of the observation of the Sabbath before the Children of Israels being in the Wilderness But granting that the seventh part of time was a positive Law of God yet I say it binds immutably because there is as strong a reason for it now as ever and Ratio immutabilis praecepti facit praeceptum immutabile This I take to be the sense of those who distinguish between morale positivum and morale naturale i. e. that some things are so moral that even Nature its self can discover them as that God should be worshipped Other things are so moral that though the reason of them be founded in Nature yet there wants Divine Revelation to discover them to us but when once discovered are discerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reason And these when thus discovered are as immutably obligatory as the other because the reason of them is immutable And of this nature is the determination of the particular time for Gods worship and limitation of it to one day in seven But what was in that Precept meerly occasional as the first and original ground of its limitation to the seventh in order Gods resting on that day from the work of Creation and the further ground of its inforcement to the Jews viz. their deliverance out of Egypt these being not immutâ—ble but temporary and occasional may upon as great ground given and approved of God for that end as is evident by the Apostles practice be sufficient reason of the alteration of the seventh day to the first day of the week By this may briefly be seen how irrationally those speak who say we have no further ground for our observation of the Lords day now then for other arbitrary Festivals in the Church viz. The Tradition of the Church of God I grant the Tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apostolical practice but the ground of our observation of the Lords day is not the Churches Tradition but that Apostolical practice conveyed by Universal Tradition which setting aside the Festivals observed upon the Lords days can very hardly be â—ound for any other But supposing Universal Tradition for other Festivals I say here Tradition is not only used as a testimony and instrument of conveyance as in the other case of the Lords day but is it self the only argument and the very ground of the original observation Between which two what a wide difference there is let any rational man judge But for a further clearing this observation we must consider that the reason of the Command which we say is the measure of its obligation must not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures among whom dreams often pass for reasons but it must be either expressed in the Law its self or deducible by apparent and easie collection from it as is plain in the Decrees of the Apostles about things strangled and offered to Idols where the reason of the Command is plainly implied to wit for present compliance with the Jews and therefore no sooner did the reason of the Command cease but the obligation of it ceased too but of this more afterwards This is one way then to discern the difference between positive Laws as to the obligation of them by the ground and reason of the Command And therefore it is well observed by Divines which further confirms what I now prove that no Command doth bind against the reason of the Command because it is not the words but the sense and reason of a Command which hath the greatest obligatory force Therefore Tully tells us that the ratio juris legislatoris consilium is the best Interpreter of any Law who excellently and largely proves that the reason of the Law is the Law and not the words So much for the first Rule Secondly Another way to know when Positive Laws are immutable is when Gods Will is expresly declared that such Laws shall bind immutably For it being granted on all hands that God may bind us to those things which are left indifferent by the Law of Nature and likewise for what term he please the only inquiry left is to see in his Word whether he hath so bound us or no and if he hath whether he hath left it in mans power to revoke his Laws For as to Positive Laws expresly laid down in Scripture the ground of which is only as the Jews speak 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the will of the King i. e. Gods own pleasure without any reason or occasion of it else expressed or necessarily implied these do bind immutably unless the same Power which commanded them doth again revoke them For we cannot in any wise conceive that the wise God should after the declaring his own will leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible Being to determine or dispence with the obligation of his own Laws Which to do and instead of them to enforce others immediately upon the Consciences of men as standing Laws is an attempt beyond that of the Gyants against heaven or the men at Babel that being only an affectation of reaching heaven but this an actual usurpation of Gods supreme and legislative power and authority But though man hath nor God alwayes reserves to himself a power to relax interpret and dispence with his own positive Laws which imply no repugnancy to his own nature And this
though it were lawful not to do them before that Command The truth of the Proposition appears because Lawful Authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done Because nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things for nothing can hinder him from Commanding but what may hinder the Subject from Obedience I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey when it is very inconvenient for the Magistrate to command but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things nay and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded but then the matter of the Command it self is unlawful As in executing an unjust Sentence granting that a Princes Servants may lawfully do it especially when they know it not yet in that case the ground of their lawful obedience is the ground of the Magistrates lawful Command which is the supposed Justice of the Execution But that which makes the Magistrates Command unlawful is the intrinsecal evil of the thing its self So for unlawful Wars though the Subjects may lawfully obey yet the Prince sins in commanding not but that he hath right to command so far as they are bound to obey which is only in things lawful but that which in this case alters the matter is the Princes knowing his cause to be unjust So that however the Proposition holds in things not manifestly unjust But however this be it is hereby granted that the things may be lawfully done when they are restrained by the Magistrates Command and by that it appears that liberty may be restrained else it could not be lawful to act under that restraint not as it respects the things themselves but under that formality as they are the restraint of that which ought to be left free The Restraint however then is lawful as to the persons acting under Authority who are the Subjects of this liberty though it were granted unlawfull as to the authority doing it Which former is sufficient for my purpose viz. that Christian liberty as to the subjects of it may be lawfully restrained Secondly A lesser duty ceaseth to be a duty when it hinders from the performance of greater but the preserving Christian liberty is a lesser duty which may hinder the peace of the Church which is a greater therefore in that case it may be restrained The Major is granted by Divines and Casuists when duties stand in competition the lesser ceaseth to bind as is evident in that God will have mercy rather then sacrifice Positives yield to morals and naturals Thence the obligation of an Oath ceaseth when it hinders from a natural duty as the Corban among the Jews from relief of Parents And therefore Grotius saith that an Oath taken concerning a thing lawfull if it doth hinder majus bonum morale the obligation of that Oath ceaseth Now that preserving-liberty is a lesser duty then the looking after the peace of the Church is evident because the one is only a matter of liberty and left undetermin'd by the Word and the other a matter of necessity and absolutely and expresly required of all as a duty as much as possibly lyes in them to endeavour after Thirdly If an occasional offence of weaker Brethren may be a ground for restraining Christian liberty then much more may commands from lawfull authority do it but the offence of weaker Brethren may restrain Christian liberty as to the exercise of it as appears by the Apostles discourse Rom. 14. 21. The reason of the consequence lies here that a case of meer offence which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren cannot have that obligation upon Conscience which a known duty of obeying lawfull Authority in things in themselves lawfull hath Nay further insisting only on the Law of scandall I would fain know whether it be a greater offence and scandall to Christians consciences to infringe the lawfull authority of the Magistrate and to deny obedience to his commands in things undetermin'd by the Law of God or else to offend the Consciences that is go against the judgements of some well-meaning but less-knowing Christians Or thus whether in the matter of scandall it be a greater offence to go against the judgements of the weaker and more ignorant or the more knowing and able when the one have only their own weak apprehension to byasse them the other are backed by and grounded upon an established Law And whether it be not a greater scandall to Religion to disobey a Christian Magistrate then it is to offend some private Christians Let these things be examined and then let us see whether the argument will not hold à majori if the Law of scandall as to private Christians may restrain liberty then may a command from the Magistrate do it Fourthly I argue thus If the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of the exercise of it then it is not against the nature of Christian-liberty to have the exercise restrained but the former is true and therefore the latter Now that the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of its exercise I prove by these arguments First Because the nature of Christian-liberty is founded upon the freedom of judgement and not the freedom of practice The case is the same in moral and natural liberty as in Christian. Now we say truly that the radical liberty of the soul is preserved though it be determined to a particular action For the liberty of the Will lying in the power of determining its self either way as it is generally thought the actuall determination of the Will doth not take away the internal power in the soul and in that respect there may be a potentia faciendi where there is not possibilit as effectûs a power of doing when there is no possibility the thing should be done when the event is otherwise determined by a divine decree as in breaking the bones of Christ upon the Crosse. So it is in reference to Christian liberty though the exercise of it be restrained yet the liberty remains because Christian-liberty lyes in the freedom of judgement that is in judging those things to be free which are so so that if any thing that is in its self free be done by a man with an opinion of the necessity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it or without any Law prescribing it thereby his Christian liberty is destroyed but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it self but only with a consequential necessity of doing it supposing the Magistrates command he retains the power of his Christian-liberty still though under the restraint of the exercise of it And therefore it would be well observed that the opinion of the necessity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture destroys Christian-liberty more then a Magistrates command doth And by this
so much of their Natural Rights as was not consistent with the well being of the Society Secondly a free submission to all Laws which should be agreed upon at their entrance into Society or afterwards as they see cause But when Societies were already entred and Children born under them no such express consent was required in them being bound by vertue of the Protection they find from Authority to submit to it and an implicite consent is supposed in all such as are born under that Authority But for their more full understanding of this Obligation of theirs and to lay the greater tye of Obedience upon them when they come to understanding it hath been conceived very requisite by most States to have an explicite Declaration of their consent either by some formal Oath of Allegiance or some other way sufficiently expressing their fidelity in standing to the Covenants long since supposed to be made To apply this now to the Church We have all along hitherto considered the Church in general as a Society or Corporation which was necessary in order to our discovering what is in it from the light of nature without Positive Laws But here we must take notice of what was observed by Father Laynez the Jesuit at the Council of Trent That it is not with the Church as with other Societies which are first themselves and then constitute the Governours But the Governour of this Society was first himself and he appointed what Orders Rules and Lawes should govern this Society and wherein he hath determined any thing we are bound to look upon that as necessary to the maintaining of that Society which is built upon his Constitution of it And in many of those Orders which Christ hath settled in his Church the Foundation of them is in the Law of nature but the particular determination of the manner of them is from himself Thus it is in the case we now are upon Nature requires that every one entring into a Society should consent to the Rules of it Our Saviour hath determined how this Consent should be expressed viz. by receiving Baptism from those who have the power to dispense it which is the federal Rite whereby our consent is expressed to own all the Laws and submit to them whereby this Society is governed Which at the first entring of men into this Society of the Church was requisite to be done by the express and explicite consent of the parties themselves being of sufficient capacity to declare it but the Covenant being once entred into by themselves not onely in their own name but in the name of their Posterity a thing implyed in all Covenants wherein benefits do redound to Posterity that the Obligation should reach them to but more particular in this it having been alwayes the Tâ—nour of Gods Covenants with men to enter the seed as well as the persons themselves as to outward Priviledges an implicite consent as to the children in Covenant is sufficient to enter them upon the priviledges of it by Baptism although withal it be highly rational for their better understanding the Engagement they entred into that when they come to age they should explicitely declare their own voluntary consent to submit to the Lawes of Christ and to conform their lives to the Profession of Christianity which might be a more then probable way and certainly most agreeable both to Reason and Scripture to advance the credit of Christianity once more in the World which at this day so much suffers by so many professing it without understanding the terms of it who swallow down a profession of Christianity as boyes do pills without knowing what it is compounded of which is the great Reason it works so little alteration upon their spirits The one great cause of the great flourishing of Religion in the Primitive times was certainly the strictness used by them in their admission of members into Church-Societies which is fully described by Origen against Celsus who tells us they did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 enquire into their lives and carriages to discern their seriousness in the profession of Christianity during their being Catechumeni Who after tells us they did require 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 true Repentance and Reformation of Life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then we admit them to the participation of our Mysteries I confess the Discipline of the Primitive Church hath been very much misrepresented to us by mens looking upon it through the glass of the modern practices and customs obtaining among us as though all this onely concerned the Admission to the Lords Supper though that was alwayes in chiefest veneration in the Church of God as being the chief of Gospel-Mysteries as they loved to speak yet I cannot find that any were admitted to all other Ordinances freely with them who were debarred from this but their admission to one did include an admission to all so on the contrary I finde none admitted to Baptism who were not to the Lords Supper and if Catechumeni presently after onely confirmation intervening which will hardly be ever found separate from Baptism till the distinction of the double Chrism in vertice pectore came up which was about Ieroms time The thing then which the Primitive Church required in admitting persons adult to Baptism and so to the Lords Supper was a serious visible profession of Christianity which was looked upon by them as the greatest Evidence of their real consent to the Rules of the Gospel For that purpose it will be worth our taking notice what is set down by Iustin Martyr Apolog. 2. speaking of the celebration of the Lords Supper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where we see what was required before Admission to the Lords Supper A Profession of Faith in the truths of the Gospel and answerable Life to the Gospel without which it was not lawful to participate of the Lords Supper And further we see by Pliny that the Christians of those times did make use of some solemn Engagements among themselves which he calls Sacramenta they did se Sacramento obstringere nè funta nè latrocinia nè adulteria committerent nè fidem fallerent c. and Tertullian reports it out of Pliny that he found nothing de Sacramentis eorum as Iunius first reads it out of M. S. for de Sacris after him Heraldus and as it is now read in Rigaltius Edition besides cautelam ad confoederandam disciplinam c. scelera prohibentes which Eusebius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pacta Covenants between them and so Master Selden interprets the place of Origen in the beginning of his Book against Celsus where Celsus begins his charge against the Christians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where he takes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as Gelenius renders it conventus but in its proper sense for contracts or covenants that were made by the Christians as by other Societies onely permitted and tolerated by the Common-wealth
Besides if either that place of Ioel or that of Ieremy cited Heb. 8. 11. or the Unction of the Spirit 1 John 2. 20 27. did take away the use of preaching how did the Apostles themselves understand their meaning when they were so diligent in preaching and instructing others Iohn writes to those to try the Spirits of whom he saith They have an Unction to know all things and those to whom the Apostle writes that they need not teach every one his Neighbour of them he saith that they had need to be taught the first principles of the Oracles of God And even in that very Chapter where he seems to say they that are under the New Covenant need not be taught he brings that very Speech in as an argument that the old dispensation of the Law was done away And so goes about to teach when he seems to take away the use of it These Speeches then must not be understood in their absolute and literal sense but with a reflection upon and comparison with the state of things in the times wherein those Prophecies were utter'd For God to heighten the Jews apprehensions of the great blessings of the Gospel doth set them forth under a kind of Hyperbolical expressions that the dull capacity of the Jews might at least apprehend the just weight and magnitude of them which they would not otherwise have done So in that place of Ieremy God to make them understand how much the knowledge of the Gospel exceeded that under the Law doth as it were set it down in this Hyperbolicall way that it will exceed it as much as one that needs no teaching at all doth one that is yet but in his rudiments of learning So that the place doth not deny the use of teaching under the Gospel but because Teaching doth commonly suppose ignorance to shew the great measure of knowledge he doth it in that way as though the knowledge should be so great that men should not need be taught in such a way of Rudiments as the Jews were viz by Types and Ceremonies and such things We see then no such dispensation was in the Apostles times for the same Apostle after this in Chapt. 10. 25. bids them not to forsake the Assembling themselves together as some did Wherefore were these Assemblies but for Instruction and in the last Chapter bids them obey their Rulers What need Rulers if no need of Teaching But so sensless a dream will be too much honour'd with any longer confutation In the Apostles times then there was no such dispensation of the Spirit which did take away the use of Ministry and Ordinances If it be expected since their times I would know whence it appears that any have a greater measure of the Spirit then was poured out in the Apostles times for then the Ministry was joyned with the Spirit and what Prophecies are fulfilled now which were not then Or if they pretend to a Doctrine distinct from and above what the Apostles taught let them produce their evidences and work those miracles which may induce men to believe them Or let them shew what obligation any have to believe pretended new Revelations without a power of miracles attesting that those Revelations come from God Or whereon men must build their faith if it be left to the dictates of a pretended Spirit of Revelation Or what way is left to discern the good Spirit from the bad in its actings upon mens minds if the Word of God be not our Rule still Or how God is said to have spoken in the last dayes by his Son if a further speaking be yet expected For the Gospel-dispensation is therefore called the Last dayes because no other is to be expected Times being differenced in Scripture according to Gods wayes of revealing himself to men But so much for this The second way whereby to know when Positive Lawes are unalterable is when God hath declared that such Lawes shall bind still Two wayes whereby God doth express his own Will concerning the perpetuity of an Office founded on his own Institution First if such things be the work belonging to it which are of necessary and perpetual use Secondly if God hath promised to assist them in it perpetually in the doing of their work First the Object of the Ministerial Office are such things which are of necessary and perpetual use I mean the Administration of Gospel-Ordinances viz. the Word and Sacraments which were appointed by Christ for a perpetual Use. The Word as a means of Conversion and Edification the Sacraments not onely as notes of distinction of Professors of the true faith from others but as Seals to confirm the Truth of the Covenant on Gods part towards us and as Instruments to convey the blessings sealed in the Covenant to the hearts of Believers Now the very Nature of these things doth imply their perpetuity and continuance in the world as long as there shall be any Church of God in it For these things are not typi rerum futurarum only Ceremonies to represent somthing to come but they are symbola rerum invisibilium signs to represent to our Senses things invisible in their own Nature and between these two there is a great difference as to the perpetuity of them For Types of things as to come must of necessity expire when the thing typified appears but representation of invisible things cannot expire on that account because the thing represented as invisible cannot be supposed to be made visible and so to evacuate the use of the Signes which represents them to us Types represent a thing which is at present invisible but under the Notion of it as future Symbols represent a thing at present invisible but as present and therefore Symbols are designed by Gods Institution for a perpetuall help to the weakness of our Faith And therefore the Lords Supper is appointed to set forth the Lords Death till he come whereby the continuance of it in the Church of God is necessarily implied Now then if these things which are the proper object of the Ministerial Function be of a perpetual Nature when these things are declared to be of an abiding Nature it necessarily follows that that Function to which it belongs to administer these things must be of a perpetual Nature Especially if we consider in the second place that Christ hath promised to be with them continually in the administration of these things For that notwithstanding the dust lately thrown upon it we have a clear place Matth. 28. 19. Go teach and baptize c. Loe I am with you alwayes to the end of the World If 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not signifie perpetuity yet certainly the latter words do for how could Christ be with the Apostles themselves personally to the end of the World It must be therefore with them and all that succeed them in the Office of Teaching and Baptizing to the Worlds end For that I
any such produced and therefore shall see what consequences can be made of a binding Nature To this I say that no consequences can be deduced to make an institution but onely to apply one to particular Cases because Positives are in themselves indifferent without Institution and Divine appointment and therefore that must be directly brought for the making a Positive universally binding which it doth not in its own Nature do Now here must be an Institution of something meerly Positive supposed which in its self is of an indifferent Nature and therefore no consequence drawn can suffice to make it unalterably binding without express Declaration that such a thing shall so bind for what is not in its own Nature moral binds only by vertue of a command which command must be made known by the Will of Christ so that we may understand its Obligatory nature So that both a consequence must be necessarily drawn and the Obligation of what shall be so drawn must be expressed in Scripture which I despair of ever finding in reference to any one Form of Government in the Church 2. If the standing Laws for Church-Government be equally applyable to several distinct Forms then no one Form is prescribed in Scripture but all the standing Lawes respecting Church-Government are equally applyable to several Forms All the Lawes occurring in Scripture respecting Church Government may be referred to these three heads Such as set down the Qualifications of the Persons for the Office of Government such as require a right management of their Office and such as lay down Rules for the management of their Office Now all these are equally applyable to either of these two forms we now discourse of We begin then with those which set down the qualifications of persons employed in Government those we have largely and fully set down by St. Paul in his Order to Timothy and Titus prescribing what manner of persons those should be who are to be employed in the Government of the Church A Bishop must be blamelesse as the Steward of God not self-willed not soon angry not given to wine no striker c. All these and the rest of the Qualifications mentioned are equally required as necessary in a Bishop whether taken for one of a Superiour Order above Presbyters or else only for a single Presbyter however that be if he hath a hand in Church-government he must be such a one as the Apostle prescribes And so these commands to Timothy and Titus given by Paul do equally respect and concern them whether we consider them as Evangelists acting by an extraordinary Commission or as fixed Pastors over all the Churches in their several precincts so that from the Commands themselves nothing can be inferred either way to determine the Question only one place is pleaded for the perpetuity of the Office Timothy was employed in which must now be examined The place is 1 Tim. 6. 13 14. I give thee charge in the sight of God c. that thou keep this commandement without spot unrebukable untill the appearing of our Lord Iesus Christ. From hence it is argued thus The Commandment here was the Charge which Timothy had of governing the Church this Timothy could not keep personally till Christs second coming therefore there must be a Succession of Officers in the same kind till the second coming of Christ. But this is easily answered For first it is no wayes certain what this Command was which St. Paul speaks of Some understand it of fighting the good fight of Faith others of the precept of Love others most probably the sum of all contained in this Epistle which I confesse implies in it as being one great part of the Epistle Pauls direction of Timothy for the right discharging of his Office but granting that the command respects Timothy's Office yet I answer Secondly It manifestly appears to be something personal and not successive or at least nothing can be inferr'd for the necessity of such a Succession from this place which it was brought for Nothing being more evident then that this command related to Timothy's personal observance of it And therefore thirdly Christs appearing here is not meant of his second coming to judgement but it only imports the time of Timothy's decease So Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Estius understands it usque ad exitum vitae and for that end brings that Speech of Augustine Tun◠unicuique veniet dies adventûs Domini cum venerit ei dies ut talis hinc exeat qualis judicandus est illo die And the reason why the time of his death is set out by the coming of Christ is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Chrysostome and from him Theophylact observes to incite him the more both to diligence in his work and patience under sufferings from the consideration of Christs appearance The plain meaning of the words then is the same with that Revel 2. 10. Be thou faithful unto death and I will give thee a Crown of life Nothing then can be hence inferred as to the necessary succession of some in Timothy's Office whatever it is supposed to be Secondly The precepts of the Gospel requiring a right management of the work are equally applyable to either form Taking heed to the flock over which God hath made them overseers is equally a duty whether by flock we understand either the particular Church of Ephesus or the adjacent Churches of Asia Whether by Overseers we understand some acting over others or all joyning together in an equality So exhorting reproving preaching in season and out of season doing all things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without rash censures and partiality watching over the flock as they that must give an account Laying hands suddenly on no man rebuking not an Elder but under two or three witnesses And whatever precepts of this nature we read in the Epistles of Timothy and Titus may be equally applyable to men acting in either of these two forms of Government There being no precept occurring in all those Epistles prescribing to Timothy whether he must act only as a Consul in Senatu with the consent of the Presbytery or whether by his sole power he should determine what was the common interest and concern of those Churches he was the Superintendent over Neither doth the Apostle determine at all in those Epistles chiefly concerning Church-government whether upon the removal of Timothy or Titus thence as Evangelists as some pretend or upon their death as fixed Pastors and Bishops as others any should succeed them in the power they enjoyed or no nor in what manner the Pastors of the several Churches should order things of common concernment Which would seem to be a strange omission were either of these two forms so necessary taken exclusively of the other as both parties seem to affirm For we cannot conceive but if the being and right constitution of a Church did depend upon the manner
the Christians That with God all things are possible that he neither understood how it was spoken nor what these all-things are nor how God could do them and concludes with this excellent speech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We say saith he that God can do all things which are reconcilable with his Deity Goodnesse and Wisdom And after adds That as it is impossible for honey to make things bitter and light to make things obscure so it is for God to do any thing that is unjust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the Divine Nature and that Omnipotency which is consistent with it To the same purpose he speaks elswhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God wills nothing unbecoming himself And again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We affirm that God cannot do evil actions for if he could he might as well be no God For if God should do evil he would be no God So then though God be omnipotent yet it follows not that he can therefore dissolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature or change the natures of good and evil God may indeed alter the properties of those things from whence the respects of good and evil do result as in Abrahams offering Isaac the Israelites taking away the Aegyptians Jewels which God may justly do by vertue of his absolute dominion but the change here is not in the obligation of the Law but in the things themselves Murther would be an intrinsecal evil still but that which was done by immediate and explicit command from God would have been no murther Theft had been a sin still but taking things alienaâ—ed from their properties by God himself was not Theft We conclude then what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of command binds immutably and indispensably Which is the first Hypothesis or Principle laid down The second Hypothesis is That things which are either deducible from the Law of Nature or by the light of Nature discovered to be very agreeable to it may be lawfully practised in the Church of God if they be not otherwise determined by the positive Laws of God or of lawfull humane authority We shall first inquire into the nature of these things and then shew the lawfulnesse of doing them For the nature of these things we must consider what things may be said to be of the Law of nature They may be reduced to two heads which must be accurately distinguished They are either such thingâ— which Nature dictates to be done or not to be done necessarily and immutably or else such things as are judged to be very agreeable to natural light but are subject to positive determinations The former are called by some jus naturae obligativum by others jus naturae proprium whereby things are made necessarily duties or sins the latter jus naturae permissivum and reductivum for which it is sufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light From these two arise a different obligation upon men either strict and is called by Covarrâ—vias obligatio ex justitiâ an obligation of duty and justice the other larger obligatio ex communi aequitate or ex honestate morali an obligation from common equity that is according to the agreeablenesse of things to natural light The former I have shewn already to bind indispensably but these latter are subject to positive Laws For our better understanding the obligation of these which is more intricate then the former we shall consider men under a double notion either in a state of absolute liberty which some call a state of Nature or else in a state wherein they have restrained their own liberty by mutual compacts or are determined by a higher Law These things premised I lay down these Propositions 1. In a state of absolute liberty before any positive Laws were superadded to the naturall Whatsoever was not necessarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature was wholly left to mens power to do it or not and belongs to the permissive Law of Nature And thus all those things which are since determined by positive Laws were in such a supposed state left to the free choyce of a mans own will Thus it was in mens power to joyn in civil Society with whom they pleased to recover things or vindicate injuries in what way they judged best to submit to what constitutions alone they would themselves to choose what form of Government among them they pleased to determine how far they would be bound to any Authority chosen by themselves to lodge the legislative and coercive Power in what persons they thought fit to agree upon punishments answerable to the nature of offences And so in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reason and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Nature 2. A state of absolute liberty not agreeing to the nature of man considered in relation to others it was in mens power to restrain their own liberty upon compacts so far as should be judged necessary for the ends of their mutuall Society A state of Nature I look upon only as an imaginary state for better understanding the nature and obligation of Laws For it is confessed by the greatest Assertors of it that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a state of natural liberty because Children assoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their Parents But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand we shall proceed with it Supposing then all those former rights were in their own power it is most agreeable to natural reason that every man may part with his right so far as he please for his own advantage Here now men finding a necessity to part with some of their Rights to defend and secure their most considerable Ones they begin to think of Compacts one with another taking this as a Principle of the Natural Law and the Foundation of Society That all Covenants are to be performed When they are thus far agreed they then consider the terms upon which they should enter into Society one with another And here men devest themselves of their original liberty and agree upon an Inclosure of Properties and the Fences of those Properties I mean upon living together in a civil state and of the Laws they must be ruled by This is apparently agreeable to Natural Reason the things being in their own power which they agree to part with Men entring upon Societies by Mutual Compacts things thereby become good and evil which were not so before Thus he who was free before to do what and how he pleased is now bound to obey what Laws he hath consented to or else he breaks not only a Positive Law but that Law of Nature which commands Man to stand to Covenants once made though he be free to make them And therefore it is observable that the doing of things that were lawful