of any thing may be enhaunced ibid. The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the siege of Samaria 255 When the Arithmetical proportion must be applyed to the value of the thing ibid. V. Argument 2. against it answer'd 256 A Judge or Umpire limited by the rule of Justice ibid. VI. What may be due by both kinds of justice without covenant 257 VII The justice of an Arbitratour different according to the case 259 Mr. Hobbes too nice and singular in his language ibid. His mistake in the division of justice 260 In his measure of commutative ibid. His boldness in confronting all the learned men before him ibid. Bodin's cavil ibid. His aâ—ery conceit of an harmonical proportion 261 VIII Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy ibid. IX His censure of all Philosophers 262 He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good citizen ibid. The foundation of Ethicks Oeconomicks Politicks ibid. X. Personal and relative perfection how taught by Philosophers 263 Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus ibid. With that of Lucretius 265 Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death ibid. Frugality and Temperance 266 Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans 267 XI Wherein the Stoicks placed humane happiness ibid. Wherein Aristotle 268 XII Mr. Hobbes mistake's the Philosopher's discourse of moderating Passions ibid. St. Paul's Philosophy 269 XIII Of Fortitude and Liberality 270 CHAP. XXX I. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial 272 II. No less applicable to a feigned then a true person 273 III. Person not Latine ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum 274 Person differently used in several arts and faculties ibid. IV. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes 275 No man personate's himself ibid. Cicero mis-interpreted ibid. Person how taken by the Criticks 276 V. Boethius's definition of a person ibid. Rich. de sancto Victore object 's against it ibid. His other definition of it more difficult 277 Scotus's Objections against the former ibid. VI. The definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop 278 The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo ibid. Reasonable of what extent 279 The Philosophers and School-men could have rectified Mr. Hobbes's mistake of a person ibid. The Etymology and common acception of Persona 280 VII Not the actor but the acted is the person ibid. VIII No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature 281 With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept ibid. IX The first part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroy's the second 282 God to be obeyed before Man ibid. An instance in the Hebrew Midwives ibid. Whâ— probably had covenanted 283 X. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind 284 XI The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated ibid. Moses though instead of God did not personate him 285 Nor do Kings ibid. Nor Priests ibid. XII How Moses was instead of God to Aaron 186 Hohim used for God what name ibid. How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh ibid. How fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him 287 XIII The Israelites how the people of God how of Moses 288 XIV Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God 289 XV. God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and General ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and them 290 CHAP. XXXI I. Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God 291 Who was really God ibid. II. Proved to be so from Acts 20.17 28. 292 Against Bernardinus Ochinus 293 Refuted by Smiglecius ibid. To whom Smalcius reply's having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus 294 Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ibid. Smalcius attempt's in vain to evacuate the Divinity of Christ. 295 III. Châ—ist's bloud not to be called the bloud of the Father according to Smiglecius 297 Smalcius's answer that argue's how it may ibid. His argument uâ—ged to the farthest by the Bishop 298 Who find's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's ibid. The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word 299 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated ibid. The Text which want's it retorted upon the Socinians 300 IV. How Christ is the Son of God 301 What a Son is ibid. V. The particulars in the definition applyed to our Saviour 302 VI. The mystery of our Saviour's divine and humane generation signifyed Mic. 5.2 303 The Bishop's observation upon that Text ibid. Faustus Socinus answer'd 304 And Valkelius 305 With other of the Socinians 307 VII The Text taken in pieces and vindicated from their Objections 308 One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers 309 Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun 310 VIII How from the beginning may signifie from eternity 311 A two-fold consideration of the word Beginning 312 A or Ab often denote causations ibid. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of Dâ—vid's reign ibid. The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto 313 IX God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of his Attributes 314 Particularly that of his Eternity ibid. X. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop 315 Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arrian 316 CHAP. XXXII I. The next name of our Saviour the Word 318 Socinus answer'd in his exâ—lication of St. John Chap. 1. ibid. The opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed 319 The shifts of the Socinians 322 II. St. John's reason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgeth ibid. Beza's genuine lection 323 Socinus singular in his ibid. But for a little consonance with Tremelius ibid. III. How the Socinians interpret John 1.1 324 With reference to the Baptist's preaching ibid. IV. Their Metaphor And Metonymie 325 V. Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the Text is to be understood ibid. So that of a Vine A Sheepheard A Doore 326 His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection ibid. The Truth and Life may be taken without a figure 327 VI. Christ called the Word according to none of those figures 328 But according to the Catholick sense is the internall word of God 329 How Aaron was Moses's mouth ibid. John Baptist called a Voice ibid. The word taken for Christ in a far different sense 330 VIII Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity 331 Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically ibid. IX Socinus's shift 332 X. A brief Paraphrase on the first words in St. John ibid. A word internall and externall both of God and Man 333 XI The Philosophers of old call'd the Son of God his word 335 XII As well they who writ after as who before St. John 336 XIII Which is yielded by Socinus ibid XIV Their language used by the Primitive Fathers and Saint Paul 337 That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John 338 Plato's description of Heaven parallel'd to that
where delivered in the Schooles for with one consent unlesse some passages in Gregorius Ariminensis and Durand expounded otherwise The Schooles both old and later agree to deliver that Heaven or Glory which he calls Paradise is merited ex Condigno because that righteous men acting such things by the assistance of God's grace in the mystical union with Christ their head to which God hath promised heaven heaven is due to them as a reward of such actions not for their owne ' excellency in an Arithmeticall proportion as some but a Geometrieal or as others by their Arithmetical proportion taken vertually as a seed is vertually a Tree and hath abilities vertually as a tree hath actually so these gracious acts have glory vertually in them as being the seed of glory and then although God can be no debtor to any mans Merits yet he having put such a prise upon them in his Gospell these have such a blessing due to them not out of Congruity onely but Condignity at which rate God doth value them by his standard but then as they say Heaven is merited by the righteous ex Condigno so they say that these Graces which enable a man to merit heaven ex Condigno by Gods Covenant those graces are merited ex Congruo by that man before he is justified or righteous so that then to understand the distinction better lest a Reader should be misguided by him who is no way acquainted with School-Divinity know that Merit ex Condigno necessarily requires a Covenant but ex Congruo none The first can never faile because founded upon justice and title the other may because built onely upon Grace as thus a man promiseth that he who fights this day well shall be made a Captaine or a King promiseth that he who plead's such a cause ably shall be made a Judge these places are due to him who doth it there is another who by industry in the Law hath greater abilities then he and hath pleaded a hundred causes better another man who hath fought in twenty battailes better yet not being imployed in these services to which the promise was made they deserve those places ex Congruo but the other ex Condigno the one is truly and as truly merit as the other but he deserves it not legally out of a law or Covenant but his owne vertue and the gallantry of his Commander in chiefe who rewards vertue or thus he who meeting a poore man in necessity shall bargaine with him to pay him doubly for those Clothes he supplies him with when he comes to a better fortune which he then adventures upon when he doth come to such a Condition the other merits that ex Condigno he must ought to have it payd it is his due the who seeing that or such another in that sad case should without any compact supply him when he came to a happier estate ex Congruo merits a returne from him although he cannot claime any thing upon debt or due yet out of Congruity it is fit he should be satisfied I do not here justifie the distinction in its application by the Schoole-men but onely set downe my observation of his unjust dealing with them and how unlike their meaning is to his for the Prise he speaks of which is proposed to him who winneth it out of Covenant that man who gaineth it hath it out of right of Condignity not out of the equality his worke hath to the reward in its self intrinsecally but out of that extrinsecall value which is added to it by the owners Covenant and therefore what he adds may have some truth that Because writers are not agreed upon the signification of the termes of Art he will determine nothing in it I beleeve all circumstances will hardly be agreed upon yet thus much as I have delivered which is contrary to what he writes is universally consented unto by them and there is none of them but sayes that what God hath Covenanted for is merited ex Condigno by them who act their part NOTES UPON THE Fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan CHAP. XXVII Of transfering right Sinnes independence on Covenants Which are not voyd by suspiiion Of propriety and Coercive Power An arbitration between the Fool and Mr. Hobbes concerning Justice the feare of God getting Heaven by violence c. Faith not to be violated Concerning the Law of nature in order to aeternal faelicity Breach of Covenant Rebellion Sect. 1. CAp. 15. Pag. 71. In the beginning of this Chap. will appeare the unhappinesse of his former discourse concerning mens natural right over one another here in his first words he supposeth That law of nature by which men are obliged to transferre their right one to another The vanity of which I have discussed before from this he drawes a third That men must keep their Covenants made one to another The conclusion is good and of the highest consequence in all commerce betwixt men that possibly can be but his Commendation of it is not so commendable as his conclusion but most dangerous his words are these And in this Law of nature consisteth the fountaine and original of justice This Law is of keeping of Covenants Let the Reader look back upon Cap. 14. Sect. 4. and he shall find the wicked Sins of the Sodomites of Cain in which no man can say that there was any Covenant betwixt those parties preceded concerning such actions and then upon that score they were just because not unjust now if the fountaine of Justice were Covenant then those actions being where was no Covenant preceding could not be unjust His reason by which he confirm's this is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man which is this for where no Covenant hath preceded there hath no right been transferred and every man hath right to every thing and consequently no action can be unjust See here Reader how necessary it is timely to stop an Errour it is a Sicknesse in a man's soul and ought to be nipt in its growth it is an ill Guest which is easier kep't out then thrust out especially when it come's with force of a Law or Axiome as this did Had he proved before that every man hath right to every thing even in the possession of another's person yea to another's person as he pretended to doe then this Conclusion would have justly been deduced thence but I think that being confuted this Conclusion must likewise fall with it Let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some before not inhabited place were it not unjust against the law of nature that one should murther or maime the other without any injury from him were it not just that they should help one another in distresse by the Law of humanity If he say not consider his owne saying for a man so learned as he is cannot but in many things acknowledge the universall rules which governe the world although
he may misapply them see therefore pag. 65. Cap. 14. This saith he is that law of the Gospell Whatsoever ye require that others should doe to you that doe you to them and that law of all men Quod tibi fieri non vis alteri ne fâ—ceris apply this law to these men without any Covenant expressed or imply'd but onely that would any of these think it just that the other should doe him violence or Injury It is unjust then by this law that he should doe it to the other He againe labour's to confirme his Conclusion from the definition of injustice which saith he is The not performance of Covenant this definition was never I think writ before although a thousand have treated of injustice yet never any defined it so It is true every breach of Covenant is Injustice but Injustice is what is not a breach of Covenant as I have shewed and therefore will insist no further upon it Sect. 2. He goe's on But because Covenants of mutual trust where there is a feare on either part as hath been saide in the former chap. are invalid The place he mentioned is pag. 68 where he deliver's that If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the pâ—â—â—les performe presently but trust one another in the condition of mere nature which is a condition of war of every man against every man upon any reasonable suspition it is voyd but if there be a common power set over them both with right and force sufficient to compell performance it is not voyd This proposition although it make a faire shew upon a superficial view yet we shall find it upon diligent examination to be full of unhappy errours Had he said such Covenants are dangerous to be kept and that men with wicked principles will not keep them he had said somewhat that might have borne him out in it but to say they are voyd is to affirme they have no obliging nature or Tye with them which is not to be indured by Iustice. I will first put him the Case betwixt two neighbouring nations they enter Leagues of Confederacy they covenant upon Articles these two are just like such particular men unbodied in a common-wealth can any man think that when any of these are afrayd of the other's breach of Articles it shall therefore be fit for him to breake can his feare dissolve his Covenant yes perhaps as in his 14. Chap. to which this related If this suspition be reasonable A suspicion though reasonable is but a suspicion and it is possible for any man to finde reasons for suspicions by this all bargains and Contracts of nations one with another will be made nothing for no doubt but all nations may and will suspect one another and yet dare not breake their promises and Covenants which they make If this doctrine of his were received it would make all Commerce betwixt nations voyd yea I will tell him betwixt men in private so that those sacred Sponsalia betwixt man and woman were voyd if no Witnesses to them all those promises yea Oathes for they are but a stronger bond of the same Covenant should be voyd if no Witnesses to testify the Covenant If mens Covenants cannot bind them before they make a Leviathan why should that Covenant binde them for the Covenant concerning their superiour must be before he is who is an effect of it Plato in his Protagoras tell 's a most ingenious fable the result of which is this that the world being uninhabited Iupiter appointed Epimetheus to make all sorts of beasts but Prometheus he appointed to make men and indued them with Wisdome these men built Cities fenced themselves from beasts but by their wisdome were more wicked then beasts and injured one another most impiously upon that he sent Mercury amongst them who brought the men two Sisters Iustice and Modesty which regulated them in all vertue and Civility one towards another These are universally given to men and are with them where evill principles and wicked customes hâ—ve not extirpated them So that that which the School from the Philosophers call's Synderâ—sis dictateâ—s to men those great Axiomes of practice doe to others as ye would be done unto and keep your faith and promise with the like and no man doth violate these but with an Injury to the rest and quiet of his mind I could tell stories of morall men innumerable who would keep Covenant even with their ruine and death but they are obvious It is apparent that although men may and doe break Covenants yet they are not voyd they have a Tye upon man in his Conscience which makes them affraid to offend in Scandalous and great Injuries Sect. 3. He proceed's Though the original of Iustice be the making of Covenants yet injustice there can be none till the cause of such feare be taken away which while men are in the condition of warre cannot be done Thus farre he This phrase such feare must be understood of that feare a man hath of another's violation of Covenant I think all this is satisfied that there may be injustice before Covenant injustice against the practicke law of nature injustice after Covenant in the violation of it and although he imagine's feare to secure a man from violating Covenant it must certainly be such as the Casuists speak of metus cadens such as would shake a valiant or constant man as some certaine argument of Death or ruine not suspicion's that another will not keep his Covenant which must excuse Againe I have already shewed that men are not naturally in a condition of warre so that he build's upon very false foundations I will not trouble the Reader with nine or tenne lines together which are nothing but repetitions of formerly refuted conclusions but in the next page 72. neare the beginning he bring 's somthing like a new Argument from the usuall definition of justice among the Schoolemen thus Sect. 4. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Iustice in the Schooles for they say that Justice is the constant rule of giving to every man his own And therefore where there is no owne that is no propriety there is no Injustice and where there is no coercive Power erected that is where there is no Commonwealth there is no propriety all men having Right to all things Therefore where there is no Commonwealth there nothing is unjust I am glad to find him speaking something in the Schooles although not fully approving it the definition shall passe without any further trouble although I thinke it not perfect yet it will prove much better then any thing he hath produced Let us examine his inference which is drawne into some Syllogistical form and therefore will abide a juster answer His Major is undeniable where is no propriety there is no injustice but his minor is mightily to blame unproved any where which is where is no coercive Power erected
Objections of Scotus and his followers which I would answer immediately in their order but that I think the bare explication of Boethius his Definition will doe it without more business which thus I doe Sect. 6. First a person is a substance by that Term it is opposed to all accidents and things onely imaginary it is an individual substance by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances the general or spâ—cial natures of substances which are dividual into many of the same nature as a Man a Lyon there are many of the same kind under each of these notions but there are no more the same as one person yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business which is it is incommunicable he may use it and by that may be denyed that the Soul of man separated is a person because although it is incommunicable ut quod as the Scotists speak yet it is not absolutely for it is communicable ut quo which distinction may be thus explained that thing is communicable ut quod which communicate's its self wholly and in recto as they speak so that it communicate's in such a manner as a man can say another is this so doe general or special any universal natures as we can say Socrates is a man a sensitive thing and the like but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature yet not such as that we may say another thing is this but that it hath this or is made such or such by it so whiteness heat coldness or any form the Soul of man the form of any thing these communicate themselves ut quo by which that thing to which they are communicated may be say'd to be white or have whiteness to be hot or have heat not to be whiteness or heat to be animated or have a Soul but not to be that soul and the like thus they say that the Soul of man separated is communicable ut quo though incommunicable ut quod it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again though it be now separated but a person is absolutely incommunicable The last Term in this Definition is that it is rationalis of a reasonable nature this word reasonable must be understood of any intellectual nature whether by discourse or else and so it comprehend's all Divine Angelical or whatsoever and if I am not deceived this mere exposition will satisfie all the Objections which have been made that of Richardus who saith this agree's to the Divine Nature which is the Trinity No saith my Definition that Divine Nature is Dividual communicable to three persons Scotus his first Argument that it agree's with a Soul separated No say I that is communicable ut quo His second which saith that individuum must be of that is divisible I think I might deny that Proposition howsoever to that which followe's that God cannot be divided I say not into Beings or Natures but he is into Persons and that without all Composition His third that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God is true in a gross sense as no words we use can yet reason may be affirmed of God in a superexcellent manner which excell's our knowledge or Discourse and Angels although they discourse not as most think yet they have an Angelical reason which discern's in a finer manner those things without Discourse which we doe by Discourse nor is it necessary that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge beyond beasts Thus you may discern what a person is esteemed to be amongst such as know how to define and Mr. Hobbes if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books might easily have discovered this amongst them and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage onely for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players rather than Philosophers in words we are not alwayes to consider their Etymologie but how they are used yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word the most commonly received amongst the Schools is significant of the true use which is per se una a person because it is by its self one nor are we to consider onely how words have been used but how they are now in our English formerly a Knave signified a servant now a dishonest man Bawdery signified onely bravery now obscenity with hundreds of the same nature So that since the Exposition which I have given of this word Person is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers when he give 's another sense of it he ought to have shewed more reason for it then he hath But he hath a Design in it I will therefore consider that Sest 7. Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent and then the Person is the Actor and he that owneth his words or actions is the Author I am of another mind not the Actor but the acted is the person as will appear manifestly A Constable hath his actions and his words legally spoke in the King's name owned as the King 's yet he is not the person of the King but the King in his own person act 's by him he beare's the person represent's the person of the King but the King is the person he the Actor or Representer the Author according to his phrase is the person not the actor I commend his observations upon Authority and what followe's in that page onely I can by no meanes approve what he saith in the middle of that page Sect. 8. When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him not he but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature This is very erroneous or else it make's an impossible supposition for this supposition if he be obliged by a former Covenant must either be understood that some former Covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the Law of Nature and that is impossible for no Authority but that of the God of nature can have right to crosse the Law of Nature and then it is most consonant to the Law of Nature to obey him contrary to all Covenants made to any other by any authority yea even of God himself and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his onely Son which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be was most honourable or else must be understood that some Covenant of one man to
another of generall obedience in all things should have power to oblige him to breake the Law of Nature upon such a man's command and then it is most wicked First it is sinfull to make such a Covenant and it is doubly wicked to keep it for when a man make's such a bargaine it is supposed to be in licitis et honestis in lawfull and honest things not against the Law of Nature yea should a man in expresse termes Covenant or bargaine in particular to doe this individual thing which is unlawful he were bound to repent and not to doe it his reason he give 's for the Conclusion is not strong enough to enforce it which is Sect. 9. For though the Action be against the Law of Nature yet it is not his but contrarily to refuse to doe it is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant This answer consist's of two parts I shall examine them distinctly First he saith it is not his that is his that doth it he put 's these relative termes very doubtfully to this I reply if it be not his he is not responsible for not doing of it for no mâ—n can be responsible for that which belong's not to him for any act but what is his own that which he hath not power and Authority to doe his doing is not vertuous nor his not doing viticus so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second which make's the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature when he hath covenanted to doe it but certainly those actions are the actors owne acts and he shall answer for them be blessed or cursed for them and because a man owe's obedience to God onely and to men onely for God's sake therefore whatsoever any man shall command contrary to Gods Law written in the Bible or the nature of man is a sin against God and disobedience to men commanding against the Law of God is true obedience with God See one Instance in the first of Exodus begin the Story at the fifteenth verse you shall find Pharaoh commanding the Hebrew Midwives that they should destroy â—he Male Children of the Hebrews it is said in the 17 verse the Midwives feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded and in the 21. verse it is said because the Midwives feared God that God made them houses that is blessed them here it is evident that when a Command was given to act that horrid sin of murder which is against the Law of Nature God blessed those persons who feared God more then men and would not be actors in that which was against the Law of Nature to destroy innocent Children nor can Mr. Hobbes have any evasion to say they had not covenanted to doe this act for it is exceeding probable that when Pharaoh commanded them to doe it he would not have dismissed them without a promise as it is reasonable to think when he convented them and charged them with their fault they would have excused themselves with saying they did not promise but besides this Mr. Hobbes a little after this which I intend to treat teacheth that every Subject make's a Covenant with Leviathan to owne his actions and obey him now then although there were no other Covenant these Midwives living under that Government where Leviathan Pharaoh commanded it they had covenanted to obey him yet God blessed them because they did not So that it seeme's their actions were their own for which God blessed them though contrary to the command of Pharaoh Sect. 10. The second part of his answeare is this But contrarily to refuse to doe it that is what is commanded is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant It is true that the breach of Covenant considered in its self is against the Law of Nature for a man by Covenant give 's away his liberty of using or acting that thing for which he covenanted otherwise then by his Covenant but consider now if a man that hath alienated away formerly his right to an estate or had no right to it should make a deed of that estate to another man such an act could be of no benefit to that other This is that man's case who shall Covenant to act against the Law of God written in books or hearts he cannot covenant to doe it it is voyd ipso facto it is God's due and he cannot alien it and what he shall act according to such a Covenant is wicked the very pretence to have power to doe it is a Conspiracy against God and his right of Dominion over us so that there can be no breach of such a Covenant which had no right to tye or bind any man that Conclusion therefore was a great mistake of Mr. Hobbes and is justly censured here because conducing to other ill Consequences hereafter Sect. 11. In the 82. page having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated towards the midst of that page he saith that the true God may be personated This phrase gave me an amazement for I cannot call to mind any such expression made either in Scripture or Orthodox ecclesiasticall writers and understanding personating in that sense that Mr. Hobbes doth to say the Actor is the person it was too boldly affirmed by him I think without any ground had he spoke of the true God as he did before of Idols to say man might be trusted for those Gods in things which are dedicated to pious uses and so in the place of God receive and dispose such Legacies and in that sense say they personate God quoad haec thus farre there might have been some excuse but to say that the true God may be personated by any thing which is not God was too great an exaltation of the Creature and diminution of his excellency but yet thus he doth as appear's by his Instance as he was first by Moses who governed the Israelites that were not his but Gods people not in his own name with hoc dicit Moses but in Gods name with hoc dicit Dominus first by Moses I am perswaded he can never shew me that the true God was ever personated by Moses A man may be instead of God in divers Offices to the poor are in the room of God instead of his hands receive in God's stead those Almes which for Gods sake are given them Kings and those which are in Authority are in God's stead to govern and rule us and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them because for this purpose they are ordained of God Priests are loco Dei in the place of God in Sacris holy Duties so that they open or shut the gates of heaven absolve and bind mâ—n and he that despiseth them in those holy dispensations despiseth Christ himself but none of these can be say'd to personate God nor can any Creature doe it he who personate's God must
this is no other then the former for it is not Lawfull for me to kill another man if I can avoid his assault but when there is an extreme necessity and his assault is otherwise unavoidable so that it is still in an extreme necessity and that may be relieved with a few things much lesse then the whole world Sect. 12. Here he make's an objection thus How doth all this prove that one single man hath right to the whole world and that nothing out of the part of my neighbour doth hinder it this is page 107. he answer's it doth very much conduce for it For defence of my life my liberty my priviledges it is Lawfull to kill another to break out into war against another much rather will it be lawful for any man to vindicate these goods to himself which now submit themselves to the first possessor and to spoile my neighbour of all those things by which he contend's to out me of my possession For answer surely there is much difference in these cases In the first I defend my life and estate from an unjust invader In the second I invade another's right and interest and when he saith that the other keep 's him out of his possession quibus possessione mea me contendâ—t exuere is his Phrase I would fain know what possession he can say he hatâ— when the other according to his own language is the occupant but if he take possession here for the right of possession what right can he pretend to more then the occupant or by what Law doth that title accrue to him That which he adde's is of no Great force or saith he when there shall be a just fear that he will do the like by me if he gain opportunities this fear he speak's of entitle's a man to nothing but a care of himself untill hostility or injury be offer'd and then one may be provoked to a just war since saith he these things which I take from my neighbour before Covenant are no more his then mine I doubt not but I have and shall shew that those things which are in the possession of another are his own if in his lawful possession without any other Covenant but the Law of nature in the mean time it must needs be granted that the title is equall and melior est conditio possidentis and since he offer 's no force to the other there can be no justice for the other to offer violence to him What he add's further is a Comparison between this case and war that what is gotten in war is the Conquerours because then all Covenants cease and the ancient rights return Certainly both the antecedent is weak and the consequent the antecedent because the goods gotten by conquest are acquired by conquest not by an ancient right many a man get's goods by conquest in a lawfull war who had no title before to them I say else all such gain is but Robbery nor doth this simile agree the Difference is great betwixt the taking of a man's estate from him who offer'd me no injury and him who is my enemy and labour's my destruction At the bottom of the 108. page he begin's with a third Argument which he thus fâ—ameâ—s because the right to the use and possession of things is to be taken from the profit which I conceive will redound to me by them therefore what I shall trust will be profitable for me I have a title to This Argument he is tedious in I have reduced the whole force of it to this narrow compass and do return answer that mine or any man's judgment of the profitableness give 's me no title to it but the just and right judgment I may be deceived in my judgment and judge that profitable which is unprofitable nay although I judge truly that it is profitable yet so may any man's estate be thought that it would be profitable for me if I could get it nevertheless I have no right to it Sect. 13. At the bottom of the 110. page he enter's into another discourse against a Conclusion which I have been engaged in and must therefore undertake his Argument is thus Prima occupatio The first occupancy before Covenant shew's no right of my neighbour in any creature his main reason is this because then in no right in any case of necessity they can return to me again because that right is onely in such things which are yieldâ—d or forsaken which is a language I remember I have used and therefore do think this reflect's upon me First to observe the weakness of this Argument consider that this Argument fight 's equally against himself as against me for he hold's a right is obtained by covenant and yet that right yield's to extreme necessity therefore a man may say that it follow 's with no more force against Occupancy then against Covenant Secondly I deny that the right return's in this condition but a supposed right of humanity invade's all mankind in such states so that although a particular man have occupancy yet that Law which dictate's Do as you would be done unto appoint's the owner to relieve the necessitous person yet I have delivered and that truly that men in general have right to all things as citizens of the world but when any thing is appropriated by occupancy or civil Laws it belong's onely to that person Certainly saith he ye shall find nothing here but gentium institutio the institution of nations which give 's the occupant right but not to him in whose view it come's first My answer will be short and clear there is not the same reason for detection to give right as there is for the other of occupancy first an hundred may see the Countreâ— yea ten thousand yet cannot all these have any title to it which must be in one If a man had right to what he see 's any man's estate might be his but whosoever hath a possession hath an interest Many men see the same bird fly the same fish in the Sea yet it is onely his who catcheth and get's possession of it not sight but occupancy yield's title and right He give 's a third reason towards the 111. page Finge feign saith he two men the one swift of foot the other slow it appear's how unequal this pair of men are in acquiring dominion I believe they are and it is so in all conditions one is strong another weak one cunning another foolish and these may by those abilities according to his method get right from another why then not the swift from the slow as well as in the other disparities His Conclusion therefore from these premisses is exceeding weak when he bring 's it in with a Therefore Therefore saith he to the first occupation out of nature no right is due the vanity of which conclusion is evident out of what hath been said What he add's
p. 8. Colour in the object when Image is not sect 2. ib. Colour varyed according to the medium sect 3. p. 9. Colour in the object sect 4. p. 10. Colour no apparition of motion in the brain chap. 3. sect 3. p. 12. chap. 4. sect 1. p. 25. Colour a reall thing in the object chap. 4. sect 2. p. 26. Different colours dissipating and congregating the Sun-beams ibid. Colour and Light not the same thing sect 4. p. 30. Some colours opposite to Light ib. Light not therefore the form of colours because it produceth them into act chap. 5. sect 1. p. 32. sect 3. p. 34. The difference between reall and intentionall colours sect 3. p. 33. Intentionall colours not the same with Light chap. 5. sect 3. p. 35. Whence the fancy of colours in the dark chap. 9. sect 4. p. 66. The foundations whereon Mr. Hobbes build's a Commonwealth and theâ— justice of it ch 27. sect 4. p. 214 The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo chap. 29. sect 6. p. 278. The Concord of little families not dependent upon lust ch 21. sect 4. p. 156. How vulgar speech hath appropriated Confession chap. 16. sect 2. p. 126. Carthagena confine's God's infinite power unto his fancy chap. 35. sect 1. p. 393. The right to goods by Conquest what chap. 36. sect 12. p. 436. Conscience dictate's submission to a common power and Laws chap. 21 sect 7. p. 158. The restraint of Conscience from scandalous and great injuries chap. 27. sect 2. page 212. When Man resolve's things into their constitutive causes he need not lose himself in the inquest chap. 14. sect 6. p. 100. Benignity to a Musician varyeth not the nature of this or that Donor's contract cha 26. sect 2. p. 203. The original of Justice consisteth not in the Law of Nature for keeping Covenants ch 27. sect 1. p. 208. Propriety good without Covenant p. 209. chap. 36. sect 12. p. 436. Suspicion make's not Covenants void ch 27. sect 2. p. 210. The evil consequences of Mr. Hobbes's opinion in it p. 211. The Fool 's doctrine about Covenants more honest then Mr. Hobbes's sect 5. p. 215. The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken sect 11. p. 224. As that enter'd into by Thieves ib. The other by an Adulteresse ibid. Several qualifications good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants chap. 29. sect 1. p. 249. No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature chap. 30. s. 8. p. 281. With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept ib. The Hebrew Midwives had probably Covenanted sect 9. p. 283. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind sect 10. p. 284 The Creation of the World asserted by the same authority Mr. Hobbes pretend's he will submit to p. 119. The world's Creation not the Gospel's renovation the subject matter of St John 1.3 ch 33. sect 5. p. 357. Christ's interest in the Creation re-inforced against the Socinians glosse upon that Text sect 6. p. 359. Wherein he was a principal no baâ—e instrumental cause ibid. The Creation by Him not to be taken for recreation or regeneration sect 10. p. 365. much lesse for an endevour to regenerate p. 367 Creatures acting by naturall inclinations and appetites compared unto a Clock How God can enlarge the capacity of his creature and how make the object of knowledge approach the limits of its nature ch 35. sect 1. p. 393. D. No dammage without injury chap. 29. sect 2. p. 250. Death desired by such as foresee the happinesse they are to enjoy chapter 22. section 4. page 167. No losse but rather increase of power by death ib. section 5. Our Druâ—ds opinion of it p. 168. Death not so terrible and painful as pretended ib. section 6. Ancient instances to confirm it That of Otho and his souldiers most â—â—gnal page 169. Arria's encouragement of self-dispatcâ— to her husband Paetus page 171. A modern instance in the Bishop's child against the supposed pains of death ibid. Death as sleep to many and a-like desirable section 7. page 172. Diogenes took them for Brother and Sister ibid. Another young child of the Bishop's mistook Death for sleep p. 173 Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended ibid. The three periods of Death ibid. section 8. In which of them and when otherwise pain affect's the sick page 174. Epicurus's excellent discourse against the fear of death chapter 29. section 10. page 265. He that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent chapter 27. section 9. page 221. Devotion what and whence chaptâ—r 13. section 4. page 89. How Dogs and other sensitive creatures come acquainted with words and signs chapter 11. section 1. page 75. Man in his most peculiar Dominion subject and tributary to God chapter 44. section 1. page 181. Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over other creatures but not over other men section 2. page 182. Why men are exempt section 3. page 183. The contradiction of mutual dominion every man over every man page 185. How Christ call's himself a Door chapter 32. section 5. page 326. Dreams improperly assimilated to moved water in its return to rest chapter 9. section 2. page 64. Prophetike Dreams such as are recorded in holy Scripture arise not from an agitation of the inward paâ—ts chapter 10. s. 1. p. 71. f. 2. p. 72. Dreams according to Solomon come from the multitude of businesse ibid. Oâ—d men not alwayes subject to more dreams then young section 3. page 73. The Bishop's opinion of Naturall Constitutionall and Phantastike dreams ib. of coherent and incoherent dreams page 74. E The Philosophers first opinion cerning Echoes chapter 6. sect 2. p. 40. Their second opinion page 41. Their third opinion ib. What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was chapter 33. section 8. page 362. Why the Evangelist chose it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 page 363. what hard luck that word has among the Socicians section 10. page 365. Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun chapter 31. section 7. page 310. ELOHIM the name of God often given to Kings and Princes chapter 30. section 12. page 286. Equality of hopes oâ— desires render's not men alwayes enemies chapter 19. section 1. page 142. An instance in the contract between Abraham and Lot section 2. page 143. Nor self-conservation nor delectation ib. section 3. Not Equality of desires chapter 19. section 4. page 145. Ahab's and Naboth's case ib. Upon what hard conditions an Estate is not to be preserved chapter 23. section 3. page 178. No Eternity à parte ante which is not likewise à parte pâ—st chapter 14. section 2. page 93. An Eternity to be found in all the different principles of Philosophers section 6. page 99. How before and after may be applyed to God's Eternall being section 11. page 106. The double conceipt we may have of
The severall parts acted by the Understanding and the Will both which faculties are imperfect in this world The certainty of felicity after death resum'd and proved Object 1. Ans. The Objection answer'd toâ—ching man's felicâ—ty in the knowledge c. he hath though â—mperfect Objection 2. Answer A second Objâ—ction answer'd about Eternal felicity being the last Article of our Faith The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason An Argument to confirme this drawn from the H. Martyrs constancy in their sufferings Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design to disparage the foresaid Article of our â—aith Several qualificâ—tions good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants No dammage without injuâ—y The explication of Commutative and Distâ—ibutive justice To which is premised that of common or legal justice Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two Argument 1. against an Arithmeticall proportion in Commutative Justâ—ce examined By what the price of any thing may â—e enhaunsed The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the Siege of Samaria When the Arithmeticall proportion must be applied to the value of the thing 2. Argument agaiâ—st it answered A Judge or Umpire 〈◊〉 by the rule of â—ustice What may be due by both kindes of Justice without Covenant The justice of an Arbitrator different according to the Case Mr. Hobbes 〈◊〉 nice and singular in his language His mistake in the division of justice In his measure of commutative His boldnesse in confronting all the learned men before him Bodâ—n's cavill His aieâ—y conceit of an harmonical proportion Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy His censure of all Philosophers He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good Citizen The foundation of Ethikes Oeconomikes Politikes Personall and relative perfectâ—on how taught by Philosophers Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus With that of Lucretius Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death Frugality and Temporance Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans Wherein the Stoicks placed humâ—ne happinesse Wherein Aristotle Mr Hobbes mâ—stake's the Philosophers discouâ—se of moderating assions St. Pauls Philosophy Of Fortitude and liberality Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial No less applicable to a feigned than a true person Person not Latine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Suppositum Person differently used in severall arts and faculties Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes No man personate's himself Cicero mis-interpreted Person how taken by the Criticks Boethius's definition of a person Rich. de Sancto Vâ—ctore object 's against it His other Definition of it More dâ—fficult Scotus's Objections against the former The Definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop The Distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quâ— Reasonable of what extent The Philosophers â—nd School-men could have râ—ctified Mr Hâ—bbes's mistake of a person The Etymologie and common aâ—ception of Persona Not the Actor but the acted is the person No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept The fiâ—st part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroye's the second God to be obeyâ—d before man An instance in the Hebrew Midwives Who probably had covenanted No breach of Covenant which had not a right to biâ—d The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated Moses though instead of God did not personate him Nor doe Kings Nor Priests How Moses was instead of God to Aaron ELOHIM How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh Hoâ— fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him The Israelites how the pâ—ople of Gâ—d and how of Mâ—ses Moses's phrase shewe's he personated not God God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and Generall A messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God Who was really God Pâ—â—ved to be 〈◊〉 from Acts 20.17 28. Against Bernard Ochinus Refuted by Smiglâ—cius To whom Smâ—lcius replies having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus Oâ—hinus deserâ—â—d by the Socinians Smalcius attempt's in vaine to evacuate the divinity of Christ. Christâ—s blood not to be called the blood of the Father according to Smiglecius Smalcius that argue's how it may His argument urged to the farthest by the Bishop Who finde's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's The shifting Genius of the Socinians de luded by a single word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated The text whâ—ch want's it retorted upon the Socinians How Christ is the son of God What a son is The particulars in the definition applyâ—ed to our Saviour The mysterie of our Saviour's divine humane generation signified Mic. 5.2 The Bishop's observation on that Text. Faustus Socinus answâ—â—'d And Valkelius With other Socinians The text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers Christs eternal egression compared to the shining of the Sun How from the beginning may signifie from eternity A twofold consideration of the word Beginning A or Ab often denote causationâ— c. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of David's reigne The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto God's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes Particularly that of his eternity The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arian The next name of our Saviour the Word Socinus answerd in his Explication of St. John Ch. 1. The opinâ—on of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed Epiphanius contra haeret tom 2. cap. 28 The shifts of the Socinians St. Iohn's â—eason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgâ—th Beza's genuine lection Socinus rigulaâ— in his But for a little consonance with Tremelius How the Socinians interpret Joh. 1.1 With reâ—erence to the Baptist's preaching Their Metaphor And Metonymie Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the text is to be understood So that of a vine A Shepheard A Doore His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection c. The Truth and life may be taken without a figure Christ called the Word according to none of those figures But according to the Catholick sense is the internal Word of God How Aaron was Moses's mouth John Baptist call'd a voice The Woâ—d taken for Christ in a farre different sense Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically Socinus's shift A brief Paraphraâ—â— Wâ—â—es the first 〈◊〉 in St John A Word internal and external both of God and Man The Philosophers of old callâ—d the Son of God his Word As well they who writ after as who before St. John Which is yielded by Socinus Their language used by the primitive Fathers and St. Paul That of Plato conâ—onant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John Plato's deâ—â—â—lption of heaven parallel'd to
or hate what we should love or to mistake the degrees over-love that which is lesse lovely or lesse love that which is more lovely and the like this is it make's a sin now the frame and constitution of the Objects of our passions is either such by Divine Institution or humane by divine that is the amiableness and fitness things have to man by that gift of God in nature or else in the positive law of God in the book of God That which is by Humane institution is that which humane lawes make desirable or hateful of the first sort are these combinations of Parents and Children of Brethren one amongst another yea of men in general as men for men are all made with natural abilities to doe one another good of the second sort are Sacraments and all such rites which having no force in their natural constitution receive a great loveliness and sweetness from the Covenants of God to us in them of the last sort are all our proprieties as goods and such things which by neither God in nature not his written book are appropriated to us but are only given us by the law of the Land wherein we live Sect. 3. What is said of Desire may be applyed to any other passion which affecting any thing contrary to these rules is a sin now what he adde's untill they know a Law is not universally material for Ignorantia juris non excusat such as he are so farre from knowing that they will have contradictoriam ignorantiam they will deny and oppose the very bond of Nature and teach what is crosse to it not knowledge in such cases is a sin and the mother of such a sin as leade's to Perdition when men hide their eyes and will not see the Sun but draw vailes betwixt them and it which saith he untill Lawes be made cannot be known but there is no man made without a law to guide him Nor saith he can any Law be made untill they have agreed upon the person that shall make it As men who are borne in a Commonwealth doe not choose their lawmaker but submit to him whose government they were under so every man is borne a Citizen of the world and he must submit to that great Governour and Law-maker of the world God and that law he hath made for him to doe so that whether a man agree upon a Law-maker or no there is a law-maker and a Law under which he is borne and to which he ought to submit Pag. 63. he undertake's to satisfie another question thus Sect. 4. It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time or condition of men as this is and I beleeve it was never generally so over all the world but there are many places where they live so now for the savage people in many places of America except the government of small families the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust have no government at all and live at this day in that brutish manner as I said before Thus farre he His instances in the Americans is false for they had divers Kings and Kingdomes and have Justice executed amongst them for misdemeanours as may appeare to any who reade's their stories but howsoever although they had but private families yet it doth not follow that they should be at war with all other we see Abraham's Lot's private families lived peaceably in that land where were two Nations the Canaanites and the Perizites cohabiting that Country with them Gen. 13. Nay not so onely but little families may live at peace with mighty Kings so you may see Iudges the 4. and 17. That there was peace betwixt Iabin a mighty King who brought a puissant Army into the field and the house of Heber the Kenite it was a most unworthy expression when he said that the concord of these families dependeth on natural lust no it depend's upon the natural authority of Parents the natural duty of Children the reciprocal returnes of obedience and protection betwixt Master and Servant I hasten to his and my maine designe Sect. 5. Howsoever saith he it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where there were no common Power to feare by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceable Government use to degenerate into a civill war This instance nothing illustrate's his conclusion to prove that men of themselves are at war by an instance drawn from a civill war or indeed from any other warre for the conditions of war must needs be with those that are at war but he should prove that they are such before any warlike act or menaces hath passed betwixt them and that he seeme's to doe in what follow 's Sect. 6. But saith he though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a conditirn of war one against another yet in all time Kings and persons of soveraign Authority because of their independency are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of Gladiators having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed one on another This was so handsomly expressed that I could willingly have let it alone but least it should by the ingenuity of it steale a credit of his opinion into a Reader I must censure it as nothing to the purpose for all this can prove no war but that these Soveraignes imagine each other may be wicked and Faith-breakers just as before because there may be Thieves in his family he lock's his Chest. This prove's only that they are in a posture of war but not in war it self or indeed this is not absolutely a posture of war for that require's men pressed drawne into the field And by this reckoning all Nations should be at war one with another and indeed there is the same condition betwixt them and particular persons who have no supreame coercive power amongst them to restraine them but to say that all Nations are at war one with another even those who are in peace were to say as he did before that all things are motion even rest its self But now I come to the upshot which he aimed at and I think most wicked for which cause it was necessary for me lightly to sâ—eep away the rubbige which being done I come to his following discourse Sect. 7. To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust He must understand this of such men who are not joyned in a politique society now I deny that there is nothing unjust to such men he affirme's it let us consider his proofes he prove's it thus the actions of right or wrong justice and injustice have there no place this is the same in other words but his proof lye's in what followe's where there is no common Power there is no Law where no law no injustice thus he To this I answer that there is no man born in this
that abominable Aphorisme before refuted that all men are naturally at war one with another untill I come to the last Clause where he fall's foule againe upon all manner of writers page 80. where he saith that the Science of Vertue and Vice is Moral Philosophy This so far is true that it is a good piece of moral Philosophy to treat of the Law of Nature and to shew how all vertuous actions are deduced out of it and agree with it but this is not all the Office of a moral Philosopher he is first to teach the end which is man's Summum bonum his chiefe good his felicity happinesse then to teach the meanes which are those vertues deduced out of the Law of nature and to shew how they conduce to the end so that he confined moral Philosophy in too narrow bounds when he restrayned it to Virtue and Vice which are only the meanes and are handled by a moral Philosopher onely in order to his end Now he come's to his high strain againe censuring the world Sect. 9. But saith he the writers of moral Philosophy though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices yet not seeing wherein consisteth their Goodnesse nor that they come to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living place them in a mediocrity of passions as if not the cause but the Degree of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality There are many things in this Period to be cenâ—ured First I blame him for accusing the whole Company of the Philosophers of ignorance in so weighty a businesse not so much as pardoning any one when for my part who have turned over hundreds of bookes in this businesse I know no one so blind as himselfe in this particular point I say no one either Christian or other for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction betwixt a good man and a good Citizen acknowledged by multitudes of Philosophers and must needs be by any man who consider's that a man may be discoursed of either concerning himselfe in his owne nature and the wayes of perfecting it or else in relation to others in the first consideration that Science which perfect's him is called Ethicke or Morall Philosophy for the second which referre's him to others it is either to a family then it is Oeconomick or else to a State or City and then it is Politick Now the writers of moral Philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himselfe so that they give Ruâ—es which way he should be happy in a desart in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world in the midst of worldly plenties miseries such surely are perfect in this world and such onely and this is the foundation of all Oeconomicks and Politicks no man can be either Oâ—conomically or Politickly vertuous who is not so in himselfe and being so in himself having neither family nor City to dispose himself to he may not be such to other men Mr. Hobbes dedicate's a mâ—n wholly to others in this place as in others he make's a man dispose all things to himself and consider's not the divers shâ—res which his Parents his friends I may adde his Children and above all his God is to have out of him as well as his Country Now Mr. Hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others when in this period he saith in effect That Sect. 10. The Philosophers did not know that humane vertues came to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living which are things onely in respect of others but I may tell Mr. Hobbes that in their politicks and Oâ—conomicks they teach this relative perfection as fully and much truer then hd as will appear but in Ethicks they teach how these vertues are excellent in themselves and doe perfect the owner this is done by all sorts of Philosophers to begin with the Epicureans whose Philosophy doth in many things agree with his although in some things he consent's with the Stoicks in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both first Epicurus agree's with him in this that he makes pleasure the happinesse the chiefe good of man as Mr. Hobbes doth in many places and I know Lactantius favour's Epicurus so much as to say he meant the pleasures of the soule yet surely it seemes to be the sensuall part of the Soule only for in that Epistle he writes to Menoeceus which is the chiefe we have of his moral Philosophy he seeme's to me to doe otherwise and places man's happinesse as Mr. Hobbes doth elsewhere in the enjoying sensuall Contentments now Mr. Hobbes in those other places did better then in this where he placed man's happinesse within himself and the use of his vertues conducing to himselfe but here in relation to others which is so extrinsecall a thing as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men to converse and be sociable and affable with and then he is not happy who can be miserable which Epicurus himself denied to be possible to a vertuous and prudent man so that in respect of the end although Epicurus make the same happinesse as Mr. Hobbes in other places yet Epicurus and Mr. Hobbes in other places speake righter then Mr. Hobbes in this Then consider the meanes of obtaining this end Epicurus first writes against the fear of the Gods as he call's them a thing which Mr. Hobbes countenanceth although he let 's fall in one place as Mr. Hobbes now and then will that God doth punish wicked men and blesse the honest and vertuous yet he after speake's against man's feare of any such thing because saith he nothing must be spoken of the Gods but eternal felicity which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affaires therefore denies prayers or any religious duty to have any power with the deities as I remember Mr. Hâ—bs out of his Stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belong's to all things and actions Cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both like as Herod and Pilate joyne together in nothing but crucifying Truth To the same purpose Lucretius a follower of Epicurus speak's in his first fifth and sixth books and diverse times make's it the greatest piece of happinesse to abhorre Religion and contemne it and make's man by that act to be the greatest Conquerour Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim Obteritur nos exaequat victoria Caelo And one of Mr Hobbes his Principles of religion is made by him to be the chiefe the ignorance of second causes Thus doe men who conspire against Religion meet likewise in the meanes But Epicurus and Lucretius spake out fully Mr. Hobbes darkely thus they joyne in one Principle by which happinesse may be acquired but in another Epicurus farre
represent an infinite Excellency infinite in Power infinite in Wisdome c. yea must represent an unspeakable an incommunicable unexpressible an unrepresentable excellency which is impossible If Mr. Hobbes had say'd that some men as Moses were Messengers of God as the Apostles Embassadors of God to deliver or act his will amongst us he had say'd aright but to make them personate him sound 's too high for a finite Creature in his sense Sect. 12. I know Exodus 4.36 it is said by God to Moses That Aaron should be his Spokes-man to the people he should be to him instead of a mouth and Moses should be to him instead of God And again Exodus 7.1 See I have made thee a God to Pharaoh and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet By the understanding these two places I think may be cleared whatsoever can be say'd for Moses his personating God for that which concern's hâ—s being a God to Aaron we may observe that he could be no otherwise a God to Aaron then Aaron was a Mouth to Moses the same words are used to both How was he a mouth but by speaking and delivering those things which Moses directed the same way was he a God to Aaron by directing Aaron such things as God directed so as the people need not doubt but what Aaron spoke was by the Direction of Moses so Aaron need not doubt but what Moses appointed him to doe or speak was the will of God and it is remarkable that in both these places the word used for God is ELOHIM which is a name given often to Kings and Princes to men in Authority so in particular not to multiply the places in the 22 of Exodus 28. Thou shalt not revile the Gods that is the Princes so thou shalt be to him as God or a Prince howsoever the place enforceth no more but that Moses should be so a God as Aaron was his mouth that was to deliver his will this is not to personate or represent him as a person The second place is as cleare where Moses is said in the 7 Chap. 1. to be made a God to Pharaoh The storie is thus Moses had something of man in him and was afraid to goe to Pharaoh be not afraid of him saith God to him as he is above thee without me so thou shall be above him with me I can rule him thou shalt be a God to him thou shalt terrify him with signes and wonders and Aaron thy brother shall be thy Prophet that is deliver thy words as it is expounded in the following verse or else we may take Elohim in the other sense for a Prince or King so I have made thee a King or Prince over Pharaoh thou shalt have power over him as he over his subjects but which way soever he is but enabled by God for certain workes and we may take another observation in neither of these places is he called God or a Representment of God but God to Aaron God to Pharaoh that is to those particular persons in those particular businesses but this come's not up close to Mr. Hobbes who say's the true God may be personated concerning which there is no such expression in these Texts but that Moses was made an Instrument of God's to act some things towards these two persons Pharaoh and Aaron Nay I will adde one note more that from these Texts had Moses represented God never so fully yet could he not be say'd to personate God according to Mr. Hobbes his understanding a person for a person by Mr. Hobbes is such a man as is a Liâ—utenant a representer an Atturney c. according to all these phrases he expresseth him in the preceding page but none of these could Moses be because all those must be notified that they are such to the parties with whom they negotiated but this certainly was onely expressed to Moses he was made acquainted with this power not Aaron not Pharaoh and therefore he was not made one of Mr. Hobbes his persons but if he were which no where appear's yet it is most evident not in that sense which he expressâ—th that is in respect of the people which is his expression who governed the people now he is never sayd to be a God to the people which yet he might have been by the same word which is used in those places signifiing a Râ—ler or Prince he adde's an unadvised Parenthesis that were not his but Gods People Sect. 13. They were God's by adopting them into a more peculiar favour then any other nation in the world guarding them with eminent Miracles of his providence they were Moses his people by being under God the Dispenser of those acts of providence and therefore Exodus 32.7 God called them his people Get thee down for thy people which thou broughtest out of the Land of Egypt have corrupted themselves and Moses repeating in a long Discourse the mercyes of Gods providence towards them rehearseth the same words Deut. 9.12 so that they were the people of God by his especial grace and they were Moses his people by his being under God their Governour the same act is attributed to the first and supreme Cause in a most high and eminent way to the second as an Instrument cooperating with it In the 20 of Genesis it is said that God brought them out of the Land of Egypt in this place it is say'd that Moses brought them both in their several wayes God as the first Moses as the second Cause but let us consider perhaps he gives a reason for what he sâ—ith he affirme's that Moses govern's the people not in his own name with hoc dicit Moyses but in God's with hoc dicit Dominus Sect. 14. If this would serve to make him personate another then he and I should personate God for when we urge Scripture we say God or the Spirit of God saith it nay I may say for Moses whose humility was far from usuâ—ping that excellency which Mr. Hobbes ascribe's unto him if he had personated God in Mr. Hobbeâ— his sense he would not have used that phrase hoc dicit Dominus but Ego hoc dico let a man consider a Player upon the Stage when he personates and act's a King he doth not say the King saith this or the Lord but I command as if he were a King and this is by Mr. Hobbes the original of this word person to which he applie's all Sect. 15. One word more I am of Opinion as Mr. Hobbes in another place speake's rightly and others before him say a much that in the time of Moses Josua and the Judges God was the sole King of the Israelites he gave them Lawes they by Covenant bound themselves to obey those Lawes he to protect them and Moses was so far from being their King that he gave them no Lawes so that he was but as it were a Judge and a Generall to lead them in their
battails as God directed and to judge their Causes according to God's Lawes which he had given them and we shall find that Moses used that Authority but sparingly for he had recourse to God still in any weighty matter of that nature and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the Law So you may find Leviticus 24.11 12 13 14. that the Lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name he was in the 12. verse put in ward that the mind of the Lord might be knowne in the 13. verse the Lord spake unâ—o Moses not his person but his Officer bring forth c. verse 14. See likewise Numbers 15.35 The Lord declared to Moses what should be done to the man who gathered stickes on the Sabbath day and the like you may find in the Case of Zelophehad Numbers 27. verse 1. and Moses brought their cause before the Lord verse 5. and verse 6. the Lord spake unto Moses saying c. so that Moses was so far from personating God that he did nothing but as a Messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them delivering God's will to them their requests and many times his owne for them to God and therefore though God in 32. of Exodus when he was angry with the abominations of the Israelites would disown them and his peculiar interest in them he as it were threw them off to Moses and called them his people yet Moses pleading for them verse 11. c. returne's them to God againe and calle's them his people which he brought forth of the Land of Egypt he owned none of those glorious workes to be his of which he was but an Instrument but attributed all to God Well then we see Moses was but an instrument a Judge a Generall and those Offices in a weake manner performed not without a perpetuall direction from God but in nothing did he personate him so that I think Mr. Hobbes was deceived in using this unheard of phrase concerning Moses but I would he had rested in this and had gone no further me thinke's I could have forgiven this although somewhat too bold a language taking personating in a very large sense that Moses and all Kings might be sayd in a little weake manner to personate God although I did distast it but what followe's is worse CHAP. XXXI Christ personated not God being really God himsâ—lfe His Divinity asserted against Smalcius and other Socinians Christ's bloud not the bloud of the Father the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appropriating it to him Acts 20.28 His Filiation and eternal Generation vindicated from the Subtile exceptions of Valkelius c. And our Saviour justified in his first name of being the Sonne of God Sect. 1. SEcondly by the Son of man his own Son our Saviour Jesus Christ I will stop here and leave the intent of our Saviour's coming to another place he make's here our Saviour to personate God he call's him truly the Sonne of man and the Son of God but in saying he personated God he used a phrase no whit comely to expresse such a sacred Mystery by no man can properly be said to personate another who is that other now this son of man is the son of God and he is God and thought it no robbery to be equall with God if he be God he cannot be said in any propriety of speech to personate God for he who personate's another is not really that other but counterfeitly onely Now our blessed Saviour is really God which he would have him personate and therefore cannot personate God This truth not long since had had no need to have been spoken of amongst Christians whosoever heretofore professed the name of Christ did readily assent to it but of late it hath been denied by many in Polonia and the infection hath come into our nation and that infection hath Antidotes prepared for it which are able to remove it from the heart of those who would cordially apply it to them so that there need no more to be said to it yet because they who read this little treatise may perhaps not have opportunity or leasure to look upon other writers I shall adde a word or two to satisfie the Reader concerning this businesse and shew that Mr. Hobbes hath very unhandsomely expressed himself in it and deâ—ogatorily from the eternall deity of our most blessed Saviour and first in saying he doth personate God for although he say he is the Sonne of God his own Son which in its self were enough to satisfy a Reader that he must be of the same nature with his father for every Son is such yet since the waywardnesse of men hath studied so many foolish distinctions to beguile the simple amongst which that is one of a naturall and adopted Son of an eternally and a temporary begotten Son to which sense are expounded that Christ is his Son but an adopted Christ is his own but a Temporary begotten Son either when the holy Ghost overshadowed the blessed Virgin as soon or before the world was made as others â—his phrase of his cannot shelter him from many peevish and perverse doctrines when he make's him not to be but to personate God I shall first shew that he is God and then how it is not incongruous to reason to say it labouring in all to make my Reason ascend up to my Faith not my Faith descend to my Reason crosse to which I have thought since first I was acquâ—inted with their writings that the Socinians first laid a plot for Religion by Reason then laboured to wrest Scriptures to that plot Sect. 2. In proving our blessed Saviour to be God I shall not use many places of Scripture one or two will be enough so they be cleare and evident the first shall be Acts 20. where you shall find that St. Paul verse 17. did at Miletum sâ—nd to Ephesus for the elders of the Church which were there and verse 28. he gave them a charge in these words Take heed therefore to your selves and to all the flock over which the holy Ghost hath made you overseeers to feed the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own bloud I observe that the Church is called the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood this Article he can relate to none but God he therefore who hath purchasâ—d this Church with his blood is God I will spare nothing that I find brought by any in the way of answeare but doe hope this place will vindicate its selfe and this cause very cleerely First then Bernardinus Ochinus in his second book of his Dialogues Dialogue 19. but the first of that book page 100. in mine edition bring 's this place and answeares it thus First that this is not spoke of the blood of God but of Christ of whom a little before Saint Paul spake but this is so faâ—re from all reason as nothing can be more for the Apostle
Wisdome but that this Wisdome should be a person that this person should be the Son of God without some other Light then he hâ—th naturally a man cannot perceive it for although it be a most received Axiome in the School that Omnia opera Dei ad extrà sunt indivisa that all the outward workes of God are wrought by the whole Trinity yet they are done by such an unity of the Trinity as is not observed out of those vestigia's as they speak those partiall representations which are in the Creature of it and therefore I am perswaded that Trismegistus Socrates Plato and such others who have such lively expressions of these mysteries either had some revelations made to them from above or else had met with some Prophet or prophetick writing upon which they confiding were bold out of tâ—em to make these expositions to this which I have said I cannot discerne any thing answered because I have not known it urged to that height by others nor do I know what they can object unlesse it be that St. John seeme's to upbraid the world with ingratitude that they should not take notice of so great a goodnesse of God's who made it but this cannot be justly urged against them who could not know him whom as it seem's by discourse the world could not to this I answer that for any thing I see such an intention of the Text is yielded to by writers on both sides but I discerne nothing in the Text that enforceth any more then an historiall narrative of the nature and condition of the World that he was undiscerned in the world untill some supernaturall blessing enlightned men I cannot discerne any such upbraiding as they speak of but if there be any morall intention besides the history there is nothing can be deduced more naturally then that men who have this light are bound to a gratefull acknowledgment of all they have to arise from God both naturall and spirituall things and to use them to his glory or if men will apprehend such a thing as upbraiding be it that they may think it consisted in this that the generality did not know him as they might men did not apprehend so much as was apprehendible of him but I choose rather the first exposition although the second be the common road and I proceed to the next Verse He came unto his own and his own received him not this and the two next Verses yield a great many heavenly meditations which I could delight to discourse as well as thinke of but they are not pertinent to this businesse I have in hand to shew that our Saviour was the word of God which was God Sect. 14. I therefore let them passe and come to the 14. Verse where we find opposition from them with much art which we render thus And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us there are two propositions in this particle And the Word was made flâ—sh that is the first Here by the Word the Socinian understand's the same Word as before Christ as by preaching and Miracles he manifested the will of God to men but that this could not be made flesh is evident because it was flesh alwayes and nothing can be made that which it is but this Word was alwayes such if it had been that flesh was made the Word there had been some sense in it because then we had understood that that man who at the first was not the Word by preaching c. was made the Word but this sentence the Word was made flesh abide's no such construction to avoid this therefore they fly to that other Term was made of which I have treated before when it came in my way at the sixth Verse this word say they with one consent signifye's to be and it should be read the word was flâ—sh this I have examined before and shewed that I can find no place in St. John where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so used that necessarily men must understand it in their sense so that that place in the sixth Verse was so read for the smoothnesse of the Latine or English Language which would not abide the verball translation of the Greek now I will adde thus much in these 14. Verses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used for was or being at the least nine or ten times and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 five or six times for made what reason can we imagine that the style or language should be altered here but then let us consider what the sense would be if the Text were read as they would make us believe the Word was flesh as much as if we should say the preacher was a man which were a most ridiculous speech and therefore to avoid this they fly to this Term flesh and say that that Term doth not signify flesh its self or a man cloathed with flesh pars pro toto which is often in Scripture but the humble estate of a man and here they bestow much Rhetorick to shew that the Evangelist having spoken so great things of the Word that it was with God was God that all things were made by him c. lest men should enter into this vain Conceipt that he was the great God he pluck's him down to consider that he is but a weak man flesh subject to many miseries and misfortunes death and injuries c. observe here that this word Flesh in its naturall and proper meaning signifye's a part of man in a figurative manner by a Synechdoche it signifye's the whole but for any thing I can discerne in Scripture it is not used for any base or miserable condition of man but onely in generall Terms to shew that man whilest he live's in flesh is subject to the infirmities of it the places produced by Socinus speak no more the first is Psal. 78.39 he remembred that they were but flesh here is a speech concerning the Israelites in their generall State as men and as frail and weak but no particular dejectednesse of their Condition but that they were no better then men His second place is Isaiah 40.6 All flesh is grasse and all the goodlinesse thereof as the flower of the field suppose I should yield that here by flesh is reprepresented a low and mean Condition yet here is such a Comment joyned to this word flâ—sh as enforceth that conceipt but in my Text there is no such thing so that still I may say that this Term flesh teacheth us no such thing without an addition of such other language as may render it of that sense but then again all the expression of any lownesse or dejectednesse of estate that is here made is nothing else but the generall condâ—tion of mankind no particular humiliation mean't by it and that is evident out of that phrase all flesh is grasse c. this sign all shew's it to be mean't universally So