obligativa 4. Not content to give the definition he explains what is right and that is that which is not contrary to the Law and wrong and its that which is contrary But what he means by rule is hard to know If he mean by rule Law it self then its absurd if he intends some antecedent rule of divine wisdom manifesting what is just or unjust before a civil power command it he is obscure Though he undervalue the Philosopher so much as far below him though he was far above him he might with Marsulis of Padua in his Defensor Pacis pars 1. cap. 10. have observed out of him a better definition of a Law given Ethn. ad Nicho. lib. 10. cap. 9. Lex est sententia doctrina seu judicium universale justorum conferentium civilium suorum oppositorum cum praecepto coactivo per poenam aut praemium de ejus observatione in hoc saeculo destribuenda More briefly it s a coactive precept of the Soveraign binding the subject to obedience and upon the same to be rewarded or upon disobedience to be punished in this life where many things are to be observed 1. The matter of this Law is something in it self just and conducing to the publik good yet so that it reacheth to the contrary 2. This must be known and judged to be so by the wisdom and understanding of the Soveraign for all Laws arr made by wisdom Political 3. This judgement of the Law-giver must be made known unto the subject therefore the Philosopher saith its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word And he means not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word not only inwardly conceived in the mind of the Law-giver 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle saith but it must be uttered and made known as the ten Commandements are called the ten words therefore it s said Exodus 20. God spake all these words 4. It must be praeceptum which includes the will of the Soveraign intending to bind the subject and so declaring himself 5. It must be an universal precept binding the whole community of the subject 6. It must be a coactive precept and backt with the sword for to make the Obligation effectual In this respect the Philosopher saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law must have a coactive force And the Apostle saith he beareth not the sword in vain which words imply the Law-giver must have a sword 7. This sword protects and rewards the obedient who observe this Law according to their obligation and it punisheth the disobedient and for these two ends the Law must be co-active and armed with a sword 8. These rewards and punishments are to be conferrd and inflicted in this life for it cannot reach the soul and the life to come and this doth difference the civil Laws of men from the Laws of God which bind men to obedience upon the promise of spiritual and eternal rewards and for defect of obedience unto eternal and spiritual penalties This hath far more of the definition of a Law then his and more fully declares the nature of a Law civil Yet if either he or any other will improve it I shall like it well for I know mine own imperfections From his definition he infers several conclusions the first whereof is T. H. The Legislator in all Common-wealths is the Soveraign Again the Common-wealth is the Legislator by the Representative G. L. That pars imperans is the Legislator in every State must needs be granted but that the Common-wealth should be the Legislator either by or without pars imperans the Soveraign I do not understand For it consists of two parts the Soveraign and the subject and if the whole Common-wealth make Laws then the subject as well as the Soveraign is Legislator In a Republick or free-State there is a difference between the Soveraign and the subject much more in other models and forms Therefore he must needs speak either improperly or untruly when he saith the State is Legislator T. H. Conclusion 2. The Soveraign is not subject to the civil Laws because he hath power to make and repeal them at pleasure G. L. That the Soveraign in divers respects and especially as a Soveraign is not subject unto but above the Laws is a certain truth For Laws do bind the subject not the Soveraign to obey or be punished but the Soveraign doth command as Superiour not obey as inferiour doth punish is not punished The power to make a Law when there is none and to repeal after that it s made is sufficient evidence of his superiority as also dispensations in judgement and pardons be Yet this supreme will Legislative over men is subject to the superiour will of God and must neither make nor repeal Laws but according to wisdom and justice T. H. Conclusion 3. Custom is not Law by long continuance of time but by consent of the Soveraign G. L. This follows from the first Conclusion For if the Soveraign only be the Legislator then continuance of time and practise of the people though universal cannot make a Law The Soveraign must give either an express or tacit consent and this consent is then most evident when he makes the custom a rule in judgement and observes it And the Civilians well observe that besides continuance of time and the Soveraigns consent A third thing is required and that is that the beginning of it be reasonable as the Author here doth note T. H. Conclusion 4. The Law of Nature and the Civil Law contain each other and are of equal extent For the Laws of Nature which consist in equity justice gratitude and other moral vertues on these depending in the condition of meer nature are not properly laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience when a Common-wealth is once actually settled then are they Laws c. G. L. 1. This is no Conclusion from the definition except he mean that the rule of right and wrong be the Law of Nature 2. The Laws of Nature are the Laws of God and not of man and not only subjects but Soveraigns are bound by them 3. Therefore they bind not as commanded by the civil Soveraign but as written by the hand of heaven in the heart of man Neither is that which afterwards he makes the difference between the Law of Nature and the Law of civil Governors any difference at all that the one is written the other not For both are written one by the hand of man though every Civil Law be not written and the other by the hand of God the one in the heart the other upon some other material substance and that which is written in the heart may be written out of it 4. Equity justice gratitude and other moral vertues are not Laws of nature but either habitual or actual conformities unto the Laws of Nature 5. How the Laws of Nature and Laws Civil should be of equal extent and yet contain one
Laws of Nature These Laws are the moral precepts of eternal justice and equity from which all civil Laws have their rise and are either conclusions drawn from them or certain rules tending to the better observation of them Which things well considered do make it very evident how little the power of civil Lords and Princes must needs be In some few indifferent things they may be absolute have arbitrary power and be in some respect above those constitutive Laws which they themselves enact His instance in Jephtah gives them power above and contrary to the Laws of God and Nature Yet who will grant him that Jephtah sacrificed his daughter The text will not evince it for it only saith that whatsoever cometh forth of my doors to meet me c. shall be the Lords or I will offer it up for a burnt-offering Judges 11.31 For the particle 〈◊〉 Vau turned by some copulatively for and is here as in many other places dis-junctive and signifies or Again if Jephtah did sacrifice her he sinned not only against the Law of Nature but also the written Law of Moses For God gave no command permission or toleration to any that we read of but only to Abraham to sacrifice with humane blood and that Commandment was but to try him for he would not suffer him to put him to death Besides God threatens ruine and destruction to such as did offer their children to Moloch and shed their blood And their sin was not only because they offered them to Idols and Devils but also because they shed innocent blood without any warrant or Commission from God the only supreme and absolute Lord of life Further how could the vow of man which was but a voluntary Obligation be above the Law of God and make that lawful which by a Superiour Law was unlawful I verily believe she was devoted only not sacrificed But suppose he did sacrifice her to God to whom he had vowed her yet he did not this as a Soveraign of her life but as a subject to God The example of David murthering Vriah can much less prove the absolute power of Soveraigns to take away the lives of their innocent subjects For David had no such power for 1. He was no absolute Prince but limited both by the written Laws of God and also the Natural 2. Neither he nor any other can have any such power because man cannot God doth not give any such power 3. David did not only iniquity but injustice to Vriah 1. As his fellow-subject in respect of God 2. As his own subject whom he was bound as innocent to protect not to destroy 4. His proof out of Psal 51.4 Against thee only is invalid For 1. Though it be so translated by some and so understood by Ambrose and others who follow him yet neither that translation nor the interpretation thereon can be evinced either out of the Original or the Septuagint or the vulgar or Junius or Vatablus 2. Genebrard Vatablus Junius Ainsworth and others understand it that God only was privy to and knew of this sin and the words following And done this evil in thy sight seem to confirm this sense 5. Yet suppose it should be turned against thee only yet others interpret onely to be principally as supreme Law-giver and Judge not only to me but all others who only hast the Original power of punishing and pardoning not only me but others and that not only temporally but spiritually and eternally Yet the exposition of Ambrose is taken up because Princes desire it to be so absolute and both Divines and other men are very ready to slatter such as are in present possession of power But to make the point more evident let me digress a little and search out the reason and cause of the power of life and death as in the hands of civil Soveraigns To this end observe That no man hath absolute power of his own life as he hath of his goods Man may have the use and possession but not the propriety and dominion of it Therefore it s granted on all hands that though a mans life be said to be his own yet he may not be felo de se and kill himself he is not Master of his life so far as to have any power or liberty to do any such thing It s true that God who is Lord of life and death gives liberty to man in some cases to hazard in some he commands to lay down his life He may hazard it in a just war and defence of his own Countrey and also of himself against an unjust invader He must lay down his life and God commands it for the testimony of Christ in which case he that loseth it shall find it From all this it follows that no people can by making a Soveraign give any absolute power of life and death unto him For nothing can give that which it hath not neither can they make themselves Authors of the unjust acts of their Soveraign much less of his murthers and taking away the lives of their innocent subjects Id enim quisque potest quod jure potest If thus it be then they must have power to take away life from God who alone hath power of life and this power he only gives in case the subject be guilty of such crimes as by his Laws are capital T. H. pag. 110. in the margent The liberty which writers praise is the liberty of Soveraigns not of private men G. L. By writers he means the Roman and Greek Historians and Philosophers who wrote so much of liberty amongst the rest especially Aristotle and Cicero By this it seems he never understood these Authors though he accuse others of ignorance The liberty which the English have challenged and obtained with so much expence of blood is not the power of Kings much less of absolute Soveraigns as he would make the world believe but that which is due unto us by the constitution of the State Magna Charta the Laws and the Petition of Right It s but the liberty of subjects not Soveraigns when he hath said all he can we are not willing to be slaves or subject our selves to Kings as absolute Lords Neither are we willing that either flattering Divines Court-Parasites or Unjust Ministers of State should wind up the pretended prerogative so high as to subject our lives and estates and also our Religion to the arbitrary absolute and unreasonable will of one man whom they did desire to advance so much for their own interest There is a difference between the subjects liberty whereby in many things he may command himself and supreme power which commands others under their Supremacy By liberty Aristotle Cicero meant such a priviledge as every subject might have in a free-State not that Soveraignty which belonged to the whole and universal body over several persons where it is to be noted that one and the same person who is a subject and at the best but a Magistrate
God had conveyed it in common 4. It was for peace and order as also for to preserve the distinction of Tribes divided yet so as the Soveraign dividing it was God who ordered the lot Eleazer and Joshua were but Superintendents of the lot and no Soveraigns neither had they any the least propriety more then others of the people The Text expresly saith That when they had made an end of dividing the Land they gave Joshua Timnath Serah in Mount Ephra in for his inheritance Joshua 19.49 50. where it is to be observed That the people gave it him T. H. The propriety of the subject excludes all other subjects from the use of them and not the Soveraign G. L. It doth not only exclude other subjects but the Soveraign too For 1. The Soveraign is bound to observe the Laws of nature which are the moral Laws of God and propriety as by the Law of nature 2. Imperium nihil aliud esse sapientes definiunt nisi curam salutis alienae saith one very well For civil supreme power was never given by any people to destroy their propriety but to defend it Otherwise no intelligent people in the world would advance one person or more to take away their goods and so put themselves in a worse condition then they were by the Laws of nature 3. It may be granted that the Soveraign hath dominium eminens so far as to command not only the estates but the lives of the subjects for the publike safety but what is this to propriety properly taken 4. If his assertion were true then that distinction of Civilians and the Authors of Politicks whereby they put a difference inter res possessiones publicas and privatas were in vain and false but so it is not 5. By the Soveraigns in England he means the Kings who were no Soveraigns at all nor could at any time raise any moneys or impose any subsidy upon the people without their consent in Parliament as not only English men but forrein Ministers of State who have either read our Histories or our Laws or our practice do well know and have made it known to others 6. There may be a device in Law to pass all the land in England upon the Crown for to derive all tenures from thence or to confirm propriety to the subjects for that every one might not only know but keep and recover his own the better Yet this gives the King no more propriety then a Peoffee in trust may have and that is none T. H. The publick is not to be dieted in the Margint G. L. His meaning is that the Soveraign cannot be confined to a certain revenue as sufficient to defray the publick charge Yet the wisest States in the world have certainly defined a constant standing revenue for the publick use For we read of the Dominion of France which though the Kings could neither alienate nor justly impare yet Henry the fourth hath wofully mangled and given occasion of those heavy oppressions of the people of that State and also we are not ignorant of the Crown lands and revenue of England And this is but agreeable to Scripture where we read that God commanded in the division of the holy Land that the Prince should have his portion that he may no more oppress Ezek. 45.7 8. For the Land must be divided into three parts The first must be for God to maintain the Priests and Levites The second for the Prince the third for the people and thus some say the Land in England was divided in the time of the pious Saxon Kings Yet it must be confessed that sometimes the publick charge may be so great as that a standing revenue cannot defray it and then the subjects for the general good and safety are bound and may be commanded to contribute But if this in a time of peace and safety be embezelled and mispent by a prodigal Prince and his favourites and followers this will no waies warrant him to fly upon the spoyl and plunder his subjects What William the Conqueror here in England did it matters not much For if he did derive his title from Edward the Confessor as some Histories say he did pretend then he was no Soveraign If he did act as Conquerer then all compact and right upon Covenant is void as his successors who insist upon that title of conquest give full liberty to the English to fight against them and depose them if they can and deal with them as enemies As for making Laws for the regulation of Traffick Trade Exchange the value stamp and coining of moneys the sending out of Colonies for new Plantations as also to make them as Provinces or exempt them from subjection because they will not allow protection I grant all these are prerogatives of the Soveraign CAP. IX Of the Second Part. The 25. of the Book Of Counsel THE heads of this Chapter are 1. The difference between command counsel exhortation dehortation 2. The difference between counsel and command made evident out of Scripture 3. The qualifications of good Counsellors 4. To advise with Counsellors apart is better then to advise with them openly and in assemblies 1. The difference between counsel command exhortation dehortation is easily known For Counsel given is a declaration of the means which tend unto some certain end and also of the order and manner how they should be used to attain that end Command is the will of a Superiour made known whereby the inferiour is bound to obey or otherwise to suffer Exhortation presseth the practise of some good to be done as dehortation is the contrary Counsel directs command binds exhortation endeavours to stir up or incite the will dehortation keeps it back Command is of a Superiour Counsel exhortation dehortation are of a superiour inferiour equal For any of these may counsel exhort dehort as any of them may be counselled exhorted dehorted It s true that these words are not alwaies taken strictly That command should be for the benefit of the party commanding and counsel for the good of the party counselled is meerly accidental in waies essential to them And though sometimes both the intention and the event of both may be such as he determines yet we know it is many times otherwise For command may sometimes nay often be beneficial to the party commanded and intended to be so as counsel may be intended not only for the good of the party counselled but also counselling and also prove so to be The nature of exhortation and dehortation is as falsly loosely and impertinently defined as the former 2. Upon the former supposed difference between counsel and command he determines Thou shalt have none other Gods Thou shalt not make any graven image c. to be commands Yet these are not for the benefit of God but man keeping them For in keeping them there is great reward But Go and sell all thou hast c. is only a counsel with him because the party
alwaies did and ever will manifest the testimony and doctrine of the Gospel to be divine and that is the Holy-Ghost who by his powerful working upon the hearts of men seriously attending to this truth whereby a great change both inwardly in their hearts and outwardly in their lives is wrought doth mightily confirm it And those who find and feel in themselves the effects of sanctification and heavenly comfort can no waies doubt but are assured that God was in the Prophets and Apostles and did speak by them Besides when we consider 1. That the more we understand them the more excellency of wisdom we find in them 2. That these positives are agreeable and no waies contrary to pure morals 3. That they conduce effectually to holiness and eternal life 4. That they were approved received by the best men in the world and sealed with the blood of many Martyrs we must needs be fully satisfied that they are not false feigned fantastick conceits of deluded men and not only so but all these things may perswade any rational man to try upon practise whether they be divine or no. And this never any did but found the Apostles Doctrine to be of God If we had nothing but the universal and perpetual agreement and tradition of the Church of all places and times affirming the Scripture to be the Word of God it were sufficient to produce in a rational man a greater measure of belief then any Book or History in the world can possibly require or deserve For this universal testimony of the best in several parts of the world at such a distance as that they in their time neither heard of nor knew one another makes it more credible then any humane History can be But to return unto Mr. Hobbs I say its possible and not impossible to know the divinity of the testimony or declaration immediately but not of the revelation or matter revealed Yet that such a revelation and such a thing revealed there was is known in some measure by consequence And the divine Authority of this testimony may be infallibly known and that by natural reason yet by it as elevated and more perfected by outward representation and inward sanctification And the matter of the revelation to another together with the manner may be believed though not known For when we once know that God hath revealed it we believe the thing revealed to be true though by artificial and intrinsecal arguments we cannot prove it to be so For the testimony of God may be evident though the thing testified be hidden and above our reason The Conclusion is That we may have an infallible knowledge of the positive Laws of God so far as to know that they are from him and are his Laws and that without particular revelation that they were revealed to another T. H. If the divine positive Law be not against the Law of nature and he undertake to obey it he is bound by his own act to obey it but not bound to believe it For mans belief and interiour cogitations are not subject to the commands but only to the operations of God ordinary or extraordinary Faith of supernatural Law is not a fulfilling but only an assenting to the same it s not a duty but a gift c. G. L. His second question was how a man can be bound to obey supernatural positive Laws whereof he hath no particular revelation that they were revealed to others declaring them To this he answers 1. It must not be against the Law of nature which is the Law of God And its true that the Law of nature is the Law of God and this is a good rule For the positive Laws of God are not contrary to his pure moral Laws which have an intrinsecal rectitude in them 2. He further adds that if he undertake to obey a supernatural positive Law of God he is bound to obey it but not believe it This is very obscure and very absurd For 1. To undertake to obey it seems to be a promise to obey it and this is a voluntary Obligation whereby a man may bind himself to obey it as a divine Law or as no Law or if as a Law yet not as a Law of God and then he doth not obey as he ought to do 3. It is absurd To obey it as a positive Law of God and not believe it to be a Law of God For if he neither know nor believe it to be a Law of God he cannot obey it as a Law of God His obedience is no obedience unto God 4. Whereas it s said That faith is not subject to Gods command it s not a duty it s a gift this must needs be a gross errour For though the active power whereby a man is enabled to believe a divine positive truth be the gift of God yet the exercise of this power and the acts thereof are subject to the Law of God Other wise positive unbelief of a supernatural divine positive Law sufficiently declared and proposed could be no sin It s true that some affirm that the first and natural acts of the soul are not subject to any Law yet these do grant that all practical operations and such assent unto divine truths is be subject unto Law That faith is a duty is apparent because God commands it approves it rewards it and reproves and punisheth unbelief That we may the better understand the drift of this Author in this discourse he produceth the examples of Abraham and Moses declaring positive Laws of God upon revelation made of them which the posterity of Abraham were to obey upon their declaration and thence concludes T. H. That it is manifest and sufficiently appeareth that in a Common-wealth a subject who hath no certain and assured revelation particularly unto himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the command of the Common-wealth G. L. But 1. It was formerly made manifest that neither Abraham nor Moses were Soveraigns much less Common-wealths 2. A Soveraign civil may declare something to be a Law of God and yet it may be no such thing and declare against a Law and yet it may be and many times it so falls out to be a Law of God and in neither of these cases is the subject bound to obey his Soveraign 3. If that which is declared for a positive Law divine be sufficiently attested especially by Miracles and Gifts of the Holy Ghost by undoubted history and universal tradition the matter be agreeable to the Law of nature tends to practise of piety being practised is conducing to an higher degree of holiness and justice and by experience constantly found to be accompanied with rare and excellent effects tending to mans inward and real happiness it is to be believed and obeyed as a divine Law though all the Soveraigns in the world declare against it If a subject do accept the Religion established by the civil Laws of his Countrey he is free from
good to deliver concerning the Nature of a Common-wealth civil The Distribution followeth Mr. Hobbs A Common-wealth is either by institution or acquisition G. L. This is not the distribution of a Common-wealth either into the integral parts which are two 1. The soveraign 2. The subject not into the kinds for those are usually taken from the several manners of disposing the supreme power in one or more to make it Monarchical or Polycratical but it s a distinction of the manner of acquiring supreme power And the ordinary way or rather means whereby it is acquired is either by force or consent Yet this distinction is imperfect for there be other means besides these neither when supreme Power is obtained either by force or consent is a Common-wealth framed The Power is alwayes derived from God as before and he takes it from one and gives to another either in an extraordinary or an ordinary way of Providence as by giving a finall victory or inclining mens hearts and that upon several reasons to submit and sometimes so that if they had liberty and power they would not consent at all And though men may be unjust in desiring and seeking yet he is just in giving it And by the way it s to be observed 1. That a Power acquired and held by force cannot govern without a tacit consent at least so that all Common-wealths are by consent 2. No man or men can govern any people long by force except it be the Will of God to punish and oppress them with an iron rod for their transgressions CAP. II. Of the Second Part and the Eighteenth of the Book Of the Rights of Soveraigns by Institution THis Chapter informs us what the rights of Soveraigns once constituted are In every Common-wealth there must be a supreme Power fixed in some certain Subject this is essential to it yet though this be a principal thing to be done yet it is not all neither being done doth it make a compleat Common-wealth His Covenant of every one with every one for to design a Soveraign is but an Utopian fancy For by the best Histories we may understand that many States have attained to a setled form of Regular Government by degrees in a long tract of time and that by several alterations intervening so that the Laws of their constitution are rather customs then any written Charter Some Communities come under a form of Government more suddenly and by a way fortuitous unto man though not so to God And in this point the practise of former times not the fancies and speculations of men must instruct us T. H. The first of the twelve Rights of the Soveraign is That Subjects cannot change the form of Government G. L. That Community which hath Power and Liberty to alter the form of Government to the better do not their duty or are not wise if they do it not And it were wisdom in any people to reserve the Power to the whole body to be used as occasion opportunity and necessity shall require As they are bound to reform the State when it is corrupted so they are bound to alter the form when without an alteration reformation cannot be obtained That the Subjects have no power to alter the form of Government may be granted for Subjects as Subjects must submit unto the Power established not take upon them the highest and most transcendent Prerogative of all others yet this is no right of the Soveraign nor to be reckoned inter Jura Majestatis For the Soveraign himself hath no right of himself to change the fundamental constitution Before this can be done the People must return unto the original State of Liberty and to a Community which in England is not a Parliament but the fourty Counties Upon this ground some have said that a Parliament cannot alter the Government what men may do upon a Dissolution and in a case of real not pretended necessity is another matter But let us hear his reasons T. H. The first upon supposition of no former Obligation is That it is a breach of that Covenant whereby they made themselves authours of every act the soveraign doth or shall judge fit to be done 2. If they depose the Soveraign that which is his own and they had formerly given him they take away unjustly 3. If any attempting to depose his Soveraign be killed or punished he is Author of his own punishment 4. A new Covenant pretended to be made with God cannot free them from offence and injustice in their disobedience unto their Soveraign because they can make no Covenant with God without his Leiutenant which is the Prince G. L. 1. I grant as formerly that a Subject as such cannot act to change the Government or depose his lawful Soveraign 2. They who set up a Soveraign and by Covenant advance him to the Throne must and ought to be free from all former superiour obligations which cannot stand with this But what is this to purpose The question is whether Subjects cannot change the form of Government in any case and whether the Subjects may not be freed and that lawfully from their allegiance and cease to be in the State of Subjects That it many times fals out so to be is evident For by civil wars by forraign invasions transmigrations and other wayes it comes to pass that Subjects are free from their Soveraigns who cannot protect them and in such cases if God give them Power they may alter the form of Government if it may be for the best But to come more close unto his first reason let us suppose as he affirmeth That a people by Covenant have set up a particular person to be a Monarch and so made themselves authors of all his acts whether is it lawful for you by a new Covenant to obey another or cast off Monarchy or transfer his person upon another without injustice He saith ye cannot without breach of Covenant do it But 1. He here presupposeth his former Utopian fancy of a Covenant of every man with every man whereas its plain few States of the world now in power were thus constituted 2. Soveraigns are of two sorts 1. Such as in whom the supreme power doth constantly and immediately abide 2. Such as are such only for execution and administration To these latter the subjects bind themselves to be faithful so far as they shall be faithful to the Kingdom and the Crown which is theirs not jurc dominii by absolute right with a power to alienate them or destroy them For every subject is first bound to be faithful to their Countrey then unto their King who swears to maintain the Laws Liberty and Religion by Law established These cannot bind us to do any thing against the Laws of God of Nature nor against our Countrey But with this Author every Monarch is absolute and in particular the Kings of England amongst the rest 3. Suppose a Covenant with a Soveraign absolute or limited be against the Laws of God
another and be parts one of another I do not understand 6. A Law of Nature is only then a civil Law when it s declared to be so by the civil Soveraign yet it s a Law before 7. For the most part learned men do understand by the Laws of Nature certain divine principles imprinted upon the heart of man by the Laws of Nations more immediate by the Laws civil more remote Conclusions of constitutive Laws civil T. H. Seeing all Laws have their authority and force from the will of the Soveraign a man may wonder whence proceed such opinions as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in several Common-wealths directly or by consequence making the Legislative power depend on private men or subordinate Judges as for example That the Common-Law hath no Controuler but the Parliament Item That the Common-Law hath two arms Force and Justice the one whereof is in the King the other deposited in the hands of the Parliament G. L. The former Conclusion which is the fifth in order That the Laws of Princes and Countries subdued depend upon the Soveraign conquering is true And it is wisdom in the Conquerors to grant them the Laws and Customs of God and no waies prejudicial to their power For many are willing to change their Governors yet unwilling to change their Government But as concerning the two maximes of Law I might refer him to the Learned in that profession who no doubt can make them good against any thing he hath said They seem to him to be unreasonable partly because he is ignorant of the Constitution both of this and also of other States partly because they are inconsistent with his Utopian principles For he presupposeth 1. That the King of England is an absolute Monarch 2. That the Parliament as a Parliament is meerly a subject 3. That the King hath power at will and pleasure to call Parliaments and dissolve them yet these hath he not made good neither can he 1. That our Kings are not absolute Monarchs is well known the Laws and practice have made it manifest And whatsoever ignorant persons and parasites may say yet wise men both English and Forreign States-men who have dealt with England have been assured of the contrary especially when in certain leagues they have required the consent of the Parliament Again the Kings of England never made or repealed a Law nor levied a subsidie alone themselves without a Parliament And they are sworn corroborare leges quas vulgus elegerit For let Elegerit be what tense it will vulgus which is populus non rex eligit leges and the late King in his answer to the 19. Propositions did confess that the Lords and Commons had a share in the Legislative power And it were very much to be wondered at if that King who himself alone could never make or repeal a Law nor levy or impose a subsidie nor revoke the judgement of any Court nor alter a word or clause in any Law agreed upon in Parliament should be an absolute Monarch It s far more probable he was only trusted with the force for the execution of justice according to Law and Judgement according to the second maxime And if he was no absolute Soveraign then his second supposition that the Parliament as such is only an Assembly of private men and subjects and to be considered in no other capacity is false As likewise his third That the King can call and dissolve Parliaments at will and pleasure For by the Constitution the Laws and practise he was bound to call them once a year and oftner as the necessity and exigency of affairs either of peace or war should require And in such cases to dissolve them before the ardua Regni were dispatched was both dangerous and destructive and did argue either a bad constitution or a corruption of the same T. H. Law cannot be against reason neither is it the letter but the intention of the Law-giver that is the Law And this reason is not private of subordinate Judges but of the supreme Lawgiver G. L. All this is willingly granted if he understand by Reason not the meer conceit or will of the Soveraign but that reason which is a ray of divine wisdom shining in the mind of the Law-giver regulating his judgement and expressed in the words of the Law And the sense of a Law given by a learned Judge subordinate may be very true yet not authentick because he that makes the Law can interpret Law in that manner and none else I pass by his discourse concerning promulgation and interpretation of Law as also the qualification of Judges which belongs to that Chapter of Officers formerly mentioned He might have done well to have improved these excellent Treatises of other learned Authors who have informed us both more accurately and also more particularly of these things then he himself hath done But he conceits himself as far above them as they surpass ordinary men Neither is his distribution of Laws worth the examination as being very crude and indigested as also heterogeneous I proceed therefore to his two questions concerning what assurance may be had of and obedience ought to be given unto divine positive Laws The questions are T. H. 1. How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer of those Laws 2. How can he be bound to obey them The answer to the first By sanctity miracles wisdom success without particular revelation its impossible for a man to have assurance of a revelation made to another Therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another hath had a supernatural revelation of Gods will but only a belief G. L. This presupposeth 1. That there is a positive Law of God 2. This positive Law is declared and witnessed to be the Law of God 3. That this testimony concerning this Law is divine and infallible 4. That it is such because it s grounded on and agreeable to an immediate revelation from God of that Law to him that doth declare it as to Moses the Prophets or Apostles For God formerly spake unto the Fathers by the Prophets in the latter times to their children by his Son first and after by his Apostles The question here is not how we shall attain a demonstrative clear or intuitive knowledge of the matter of the Law nor of the manner of the revelation but how we may be assured that the declaration or testimony of him to whom the revelation was made is divine that we may believe it as divine and from God The means whereby the divinity of the testimony was made evident at the first were extraordinary as signs wonders and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost according to his own will Heb. 2.4 But after that upon these divine attestations the Gospel was generally received in all Nations and the prophesies of the Old Testament in this particular fulfilled these ceased yet one thing
either moral or positive in force may not the subjects break this Covenant without injustice Nay is it not injustice for to keep it seeing Nullum juramentum ligat ad illicitum 4. If the Soveraigns Acts be directly contray to justice equity and the fear of God must the subjects who gave him no such power be Authors of these horrid acts as murther incest adultery blasphemy as also of his unjust commands and perverse judgements 5. To be obedient to another to transfer his power to depose him is not to change the form of government but to pull down one and set up another the form remaining the same 6. Subjects or rather they who are subjects as subjects cannot make any such Covenant as to make one who was no Soveraign to be their Soveraign If they can make a Soveraign they must be equal and equally free in making that Covenant whereby a supreme Governour is constituted 7. If they who were aequà liberi before and in the time of making this Covenant and after it is concluded become subjects afterwards rebel they cease to be subjects and become hostes enemies and are so to be dealt withall And what reason can be given why the Soveraign if he prove a Tyrant in the administration and challenge more power then was given him or could by the Laws of God or Nature be conferred upon him should not cease to be a Soveraign and the subjects free from their allegiance to him seeing he hath violated the essential part of the Covenant and perverted the main end of all Government Why should it be otherwise in this then in all other pacts and contracts This question is the more difficult to be answered by this Author because he allows the people a power to make a Soveraign and if he be such as is one onely for administration its unanswerable This point might have been more clearly determined if he had instanced in any particulars In all this I desire to be understood aright For 1. That power which the Bishop of Rome doth challenge and hath sometimes exercised in the excommunication and deposition of Princes and absolving their subjects from allegiance I detest 2. I desire all Covenants that are just and justly made whilest they are in force to be kept especially by all subjects to their lawful Soveraigns For no subjects are to be perswaded or encouraged to Treason or Rebellion 3. I would advise all people to beware how they rise against or resist the highest powers though the cause may be just and because the remedy may prove worse then the disease and often proves so and the confusions which follow such commotions are more mischievous then the former oppressions and a Tyrannie is better then an Anarchy His second reason is because they had given him the right of Soveraignty which the cannot take away Where 1. He grants That the people give the Soveraign his right and if so then they gave it him not as subjects and when they return to the same occasion again they may give the power to another 2. I deny that subjects do give any such right 3. Neither can he prove that there is any such Covenant of every man with every man in the constitution of civil States His third reason is not worth an answer But in the end of this paragraph he seems to take away the pretence and allegation of some new Covenanters with God What Covenant he means is not here expressed If he understand the National Covenant as it s very likely he doth then let those who pretend it answer for themselves For that Covenant could not give the least power either to England or Scotland or any in either Nation entering into it and in the same they only engaged to use lawful means to accomplish what they had promised Yet with him this and all other Covenants are void if made with God without his Vicegerent who is their Soveraign Yet if this were true then the Covenant made in Baptism by the converted Christians under the heathen Emperours cannot be valid This is evidently false because every man may voluntarily bind himself to God in those things wherein the Laws of God and man have left him free without the consent or express permission of his civil Soveraign T. H. The second right of a Soveraign is he cannot forfeit the reasons are 1. There is no Covenant made on his part either with them all joyntly or severally not with them joyntly because they cannot be one person before they subject unto him Not with them severally for they Covenant one with another not with him and if any one pretend freedom from subjection there can be no judge of the controversie 2. Words as all Covenants are be of no force without a sword publick G. L. This is the substance though not all the words to prove that Soveraigns cannot forfeit His 1. Reason takes that for granted which is false and cannot be proved For a community is one person moral by siction of Law as they use to speak or as the Civilians express themselves persona conjuncta opposed to singularis For a community is the immediate subject of a Common-wealth and must be associate before they can be capable of a form of Government and without union and communion too it cannot be civitas societas populus As thus united it may act and covenant by their Deputies who may be many or by a Deputy which may be one and here they may in the name of the whole Covenant with the person whom they like for Soveraign and upon conditions just and reasonable Thus Israel a meer community makes Moses their Deputy and Mediator to Covenant with God in their behalf Thus the ten Tribes by some of their principal men capitulate with Jeroboam Thus the Gileadites by their Messengers offer to contract with Jephtah and some of the Tribes make the same offer unto Gideon Thus a free people may invest one man or more either with original power or trust him and them only with the administration And they may put conditions upon them either to give them an unlimited or limited power as the wisest men amongst them shall think fit And there is great reason so to do For 1. They are free 2. He with whom they purpose to contract hath no right to command them no power over them before he be made Soveraign He is but a private person and they are mad men if they will subject themselves upon unreasonable conditions They are very unwise who will make a Butcher their Shepherd or set a Woolf over their Flocks And surely it s no point of wisdom in any free-people to trust any one man or assembly of men with an absolute unlimited power If an enemy come in by conquest they must be content with what conditions he pleaseth not with such as they desire For they are not free because their estates liberty lives are in his power As for the Covenant of every one with